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A45618 The Oceana of James Harrington and his other works, som [sic] wherof are now first publish'd from his own manuscripts : the whole collected, methodiz'd, and review'd, with an exact account of his life prefix'd / by John Toland. Harrington, James, 1611-1677.; Toland, John, 1670-1722. 1700 (1700) Wing H816; ESTC R9111 672,852 605

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of this Government Wherfore it being inavoidable in the Turkish Empire that either the Janizarys or the Timariots may do what they list in regard that whether of them be able to give Law to the other must at the same time be able to give Law to the Prince and to bring them to an equal Balance were to make a Civil War or at least to sow the Seed of it the native Wound of Monarchy by Arms remains incur'd and incurable What more may be don for Monarchy founded upon a Nobility coms next to be try'd In this the Considerer gives his word that there never rises any danger to the Crown but when either a great part of the Soverain Power is put into the hands of the Nobility as in Germany and Poland Consid p. 47. where it should seem by him that the Electors and the Gentry do not put Power into the hands of the Emperor or King but the Emperor or King puts Power into the hands of the Electors or Gentry or when som Person or Family is suffer'd to overtop the rest in Riches Commands and Dependence as the Princes of the Blood and Lorrain not long since in France and of old the MONTFORTS and NEVILS in England The first of these he declares to be a vicious Government and a Monarchy only in name The second he undertakes shall easily admit of this Remedy That the great ones be reduc'd decimo sexto to a lesser Volum and level'd into an Equality with the rest of their Order HIS Putpin is pretty The Emperor puts Power into the hands of the Electors and the King of Poland puts Power into the hands of the Gentlemen Which Governments therfore and all such like as when the King of England did put Power into the hands of the Barons at such a time as he was no longer able to keep it out of their fingers by which means the antient and late Government of King Lords and Commons was restor'd are vicious Constitutions and Monarchys only in name such as he will not meddle with and therfore let them go Well but where is the Patient then if these be not Monarchys by Nobility Book I what do we mean by that thing or what Government is it that we are to cure Why such a one where som Person or Family is suffer'd to overtop the rest in Riches Commands and Dependence as the Princes of the Blood and Lorrain not long since in France and of old the MONTFORTS and the NEVILS in England So then the same again for these are no other upon recollection are those that admit of this easy cure Let the great Ones be reduc'd to a lesser Volum and level'd with the rest of their Order But how if they be the weaker Party they are not the Great Ones and if they be the stronger Party how will he reduce them Put the case a man has the Gout his Physician dos not bid him reduce his overtopping Toes to the Volum of the other Foot nor to level them to equality with the rest of their Order but prescribes his Remedys and institutes the Method that should do this feat What is the Method of our AESCULAPIUS Point de Novelle or where are we to find it e'en where you please The Princes of the Blood and of Lorrain in France the MONTFORTS and the NEVILS in England overtop'd not their Order by their own Riches or Power but by that of the Party which for their Fidelity Courage or Conduct intrusted them with the managing of their Arms or Affairs So the Prince that would have level'd them must have level'd their Party which in case the Controversy be upon the Right or pretended Right of the Nobility in the Government which commonly makes them hang together may com to the Consid p. 49. whole Order what then Why then says he the Prince must preserve his Nobility weighty enough to keep the People under and yet not tall enough in any particular Person to measure with himself which abating the figure is the same again and so I have nothing to answer but the figure Now for this the Prince himself is no otherwise tall than by being set upon the shoulders of the Nobility and so if they set another upon the same shoulders as in HENRY the 4 th or the 7 th who had no Titles to the Crown nor could otherwise have measur'd with the Prince be he never so low he coms to be tall enough in his particular person to measure with the Prince and to be taller too not only by those old examples but others that are younger than our selves tho such the Nobility having not of late bin weighty enough to keep the People under as derive from another Principle that of popular Balance A Prince therfore preserving his Nobility weighty enough to keep the People under must preserve in them the balance of that kind of Empire and the balance containing the Riches which are the Power and so the Arms of the Nation this being in the Nobility the Nobility when willing must be able to dispose of the King or of the Government Nor under a less weight is a Nobility qualify'd to keep down the People as by an Argument from the contrary HENRY the 7 th having found the strength of his Nobility that set him in a Throne to which he had no right and fearing that the Tide of their Favor turning they might do as much for another abated the dependence of their Tenants and cut off their Train of Retainers which diminution of their weight releasing the People by degrees has caus'd that Plain or Level into which we live to see the Mountain of that Monarchy now sunk and swallow'd wherfore the Balance of the Nobility being such as failing that kind of Monarchy coms to ruin and not failing the Nobility if they join may give Law to the King the inherent disease of a Monarchy by a Nobility remains also uncur'd and incurable Chap. 9 THESE are points to which I had spoken before but somthing The Balance of France concerning France and foren Guards was mumbl'd by the Prevaricator in a wrong place while he was speaking of Turky where there is no such thing This lest I be thought to have courted opposition for nothing shall open a new Scene while I take the occasion in this place to speak first of the Balance of the French Monarchy and next of the Nature and Use of Foren Guards THE whole Territory of France except the Crown Lands which on this account are not considerable consists of three shares or parts wherof the Church holds one the Nobility another and the Presidents Advocats other Officers of the Parlaments Courts of Justice the Citizens Merchants Tradesmen the Treasures Receivers of the Customs Aids Taxes Impositions Gabels all which together make a vast body hold a third by how equal Portions I am sorry that I do not know nor where to learn but this is the Balance of the
an Army of Lions tho by som accidents as I confest before they be for a season confinable to their dens So the advantage or increase of Strength depends also upon the Balance There is nothing in the world to swear this Principle out of countetenance but the fame of PHALARIS GELON DIONYSIUS AGATHOCLES NABIS c. with which much good do them that like it It is proper to a Government upon the Balance to take root at home and spread outwards and to a Government against the Balance to seek a root abroad and to spread inwards The former is sure but the latter never successful AGATHOCLES for having conquer'd Africa took not the better root in Syracusa Parvi sunt arma foras nisi sit consilium domi To conclude this Chapter the Prevaricator gives me this thanks for finding out the Balance of Dominion being as antient in Nature as her self and yet as new in Art as my Writing that I have given the world cause to complain of a great disappointment who while at my hand that Satisfaction in the Principles of Government was expected which several great Wits had in vain study'd have in diversifying Riches in words only as Property Dominion Agrarian Balance made up no more than a new Lexicon expressing the same thing that was known before seeing the opinion that Riches are Power is as antient as the first Book of THUCYDIDES or the Politics of ARISTOTLE and not omitted by Mr. HOBBS or any other Politician Which is as if he had told Dr. HARVEY that wheras the Blood is the Life was an Opinion as antient as MOSES and no Girl ever prick'd her finger but knew it must have a course he had given the world cause to complain of great disappointment in not shewing a Man to be made of Gingerbread and his Veins to run Malmsy Book I CHAP. IV. Whether the Balance of Empire be well divided into National and Provincial And whether these two or any Nations that are of distinct Balance coming to depend upon one and the same Head such a mixture creates a new Balance THE Balance of Empire that is National as it is stated in the former Chapter stands in a regulated or mix'd Monarchy upon the Property or native Interest of the Nobility in a Commonwealth upon the Property or native Interest of the People so these are very natural But the Balance of absolute Monarchy partaking of Force as well as Nature is a mix'd thing and not much different from the Balance of Provincial Empire or the manner of holding a Province or conquer'd Country In a Province if the Native that is rich be admitted to Power the Power grows up native and overtops the foren therfore you must either not plant your Citizens in your Provinces where in time they will becom native or so planting them neither trust them with Power nor with Arms. Thus the provincial Balance coms to be contrary to the National And as where Empire is native or national the administration of it can be no otherwise than according to the national Balance so where Empire is foren or provincial the administration of it can be no otherwise than contrary to the national Balance That this may be admitted without opposition the Considerer is inclining to allow always provided he be Consid p. 16 17. satisfy'd in this demand Whether distinct Balances under the same Head or Governor as those of Castile and Arragon the Power of the King I presume he means by the Balance of a Nobility being greater in the one and that of the People in the other may not so poise one the other as to produce a new Balance To which I answer That no one Government whatsoever has any more than one of two Balances that except in the cases excepted of Land which is national or that of Arms which is provincial Wherfore if the King of Spain by his War against the Commons alter'd the Balance of Arragon it must have bin one of two ways either by strengthning the Balance of the Nobility and governing the Arragonian People by them in which case their Balance tho alter'd remain'd yet National or by holding both Nobility and People by a provincial Governor and an Army in which case his Empire in that Kingdom is provincial There is no third way nor putting the case that the Balance of Castile be national and that of Arragon provincial dos this any more create in the Monarchy of Spain a third Balance of Empire than did the multiplication of Associations and Provinces divers for their Balances in the Commonwealth of Rome England and Scotland being united in one Prince made if it had bin rightly us'd an increase of Strength but not a third Balance nor do the Kingdoms in Spain Whether a Soverainty has many Territorys and Provinces in subjection or in League it is all one as to this point the stronger Union or League will give the stronger Balance and the case of the present Soveraintys in Europe being no other the more nice than wise Speculation of the Considerer who has not bin able to discern the Balance of a League from that of Empire is a Mares nest CHAP. V. Chap. 5 Whether there be any common Right or Interest of Mankind distinct from the parts taken severally and how by the Orders of a Commonwealth it may best be distinguish'd from privat Interest IN the next place the Prevaricator dos not go about to play the man but the unlucky boy Where I say that the Soul of Man is Mistress of two potent Rivals Reason and Passion he dos not stand to weigh the truth of the thing or the fitness of the comparison either of which had bin fair but tumbles Dick upon Sis the Logic upon the Rhetoric the Sense upon the Figure and scuds away in this manner If I could be perswaded Mr. HARRINGTON was so far in earnest as Consid p. 19. 20. to expect any man should be convinc'd by the metaphorical use of two or three words som farther consideration might be propos'd This is to use his Readers as the Fox dos the Dogs when having pist upon his Tail and flapt it in their Eys he gets away Dos not his Book deserve to be gilded and carry'd in Statesmens Pockets Alas mine are nothing Quis leget haec vel duo vel nemo they break the Stationer And yet let me comfort my self Whose are better the Prevaricator seems to set every whit as light by those of HOOKER and GROTIUS at least where they favor me The Opinions of GROTIUS says he cannot oblige us beyond the Reasons wheron they are founded and what are those he will dispute against that which he dares not repeat that his Comment may take you by the Nose he has left out the Text. The words of GROTIUS are of this sense Tho it be truly said that the In Proleg de jure B. ac P. Creatures are naturally carry'd to their proper Vtility this ought not to