for to such the Defendant Preached and to them he declared the power given unto him by God to heal them by Prayer Then he tells them that their King is wicked and having insinuated this Doctrine into their Minds he then bids them stand to their Principles in opposing and subduing wicked Kings 'T is objected that there ought to have been a precedent Discourse of the King but the Presidents are otherwise In 33 H. 8. Rot. 17. There was an Indictment against the Lord Grey for words spoken against the King without setting forth any precedent Discourse of him So was my Lord Cobham 's Case in 12 Jac. for that he proditorie dixit pro palavit haec verba viz. It will never be well for England until the King and his Cubbs are killed without an Avernient that the words were spoken de Rege And in William 's Case 2 Roll Rep. 88. Reported by my Lord Rolls who was Indicted for High Treason for writing two Books in which were many Traiterous Assertions but no Averment of any previous Discourse concerning the King all these Indictments were thus viz. Dixit such words de Domino Rege Therefore the Indictment is good in form if the words therein contained amount to Treason now they do import Treason or not if they do import it then 't is unnecessary to aver that they were spoken de Rege because it cannot be intended to be Treason against any other King If a Man should say that he would go to Whitehal and kill the King 't is not necessary to averr any precedent Discourse de Rege In Actions on the Case for Words there must be an Averment of the person because many men are of the same Name but in Indictments the form will govern the Case Several Traitors have suffered Death in such Cases as this at Bar and many learned Men in all Ages have attended this Court and this Objection was never made till now and therefore the Presidents being without this Averment de Rege where the overt Act is by words Iudgment was prayed against the Prisoner Curia Words may be an overt Act but then they must be so certain and positive as plainly to denote the intention of the speaker If a Man should tell another that he would drive the King out of England there needs no averment that such words were spoken de Rege because they tend immediately to depose the King but if he had said that he would go to Whitehal and destroy his Enemies that is not Treason without an Averment c. Iudgment was arrested DE Term. Sancti Hill Anno 36 Car. II. in Banco Regis 1684. Pool versus Trumbal THE Defendant was sued in the Spiritual Court for Dilapidations 25 Car. 2. cap. 5. and pleaded the general Pardon by which all Offences Contempts Penalties c. were pardoned and for this reason he prayed a Prohibition but it was denied because the Statute never intended to pardon any satisfaction for Damages but only to take away Temporal Punishments Dorrington versus Edwin Mich. 36 Car. II. Rot. 277. SCire Facias against Pledges in a Replevin brought by Pleint Sci. Fac. will lye against pledges in Replevin by pleint setting forth that John Temple did levy a Pleint in the Sheriffs Court of London for the taking of three Baggs of Mony in which Suit he found Pledges de prosequendo de retorno habendo if it should be awarded That this Pleint was transmitted out of that Court into the Hustings and by * If it had not been a Court of Record it might have been remov'd by Re falo Dalt 425. 9 Hob. 6.58 13 Ed. 1. cap. 2. F. N. B. 74. F. Dalt 273. Certiorari removed into the Kings-Bench where the Plaintiff declared as aforesaid c. Dorrington avowed the taking c. and Temple was Non-suited and thereupon a Retorn ' Habend ' was awarded to the Sheriff who returned elongat ' c. Then a Sci. Fa. was brought against the Pledges upon the Statute of Westm 2. which provides that where Lords upon Replevins cannot obtain Justice in Inferiour Courts against their Tenants when such Lords are attached at their Tenants Suits they may have a Recordari to remove the Plea before the Justices c. and the Sheriff shall not only take Pledges of the Plaintiff to prosecute his Suit but also to return the Cattle if a Return be awarded c. The Defendants appeared and prayed Oyer of the Certiorari which was returned by the Mayor and Sheriffs only without the Aldermen And upon a Demurrer the Question was Whether a Scire Facias will lie against them by virtue of this Statute they being only Pledges in Replevin brought by Pleint without Writ This Case was argued by Mr. Pollexfen for the Defendants And for the Defendants it was said that they could not be charged by this Scire Facias because the Pleint was removed by Certiorari and thereby the Plaintiff Dorrington had lost the benefit he had against the Pledges in the Sheriffs Court This Case was compared to other Actions in inferior Courts which if removed by Habeas Corpus the Bail below are discharged of course By the Common Law there were no Pledges of Retorn ' habend Dyer 246. for before this Statute the Sheriff could not make a Replevin without the King 's Writ Now he hath power to take Pledges but if he will make deliverance of the Goods ad querelam alicujus sine brevi the fault is still in him for he may * Dalt 434. compel the Party to bring a Writ and then the Pledges will be liable because it will appear who they are And therefore it hath been adjudged Cro. Car. 446. that where a Replevin is brought by Writ the Sheriff cannot make deliverance without taking Pledges because if the Plaintiff should recover he hath a remedy against them by Scire Facias but if he recover upon a Replevin brought by Pleint Cro. Car. 594. the Iudgment shall not be avoided by assigning the want of Pledges for Error because in such Case the Sheriff is not by Law obliged to take Pledges 2. This Scire Facias is brought too soon for there ought to go an Alias Pluries Retorn ' habend before the Return of Elongata and then and not before the Scire Facias is properly brought The Pledges are answerable E contra and the Scire Facias is well brought and this grounded upon the Statute of W. 2. which directs Pledges to be taken before the delivery of the Goods It takes notice that Replevins were sued in inferior Courts by the Tenants against their Lords who had distrained for Rents due for Services or Customs and that such Lords could not have Iustice done in those Courts and therefore to remedy this mischief the Statute gives the Writ Recordare c. to remove the Pleint before the Iustices and because such Tenants after they had replevied their Cattle did usually
of Wills did not Originally belong to the Spiritual Courts de jure they had that Authority per consensum Regis Magnatum And as those Courts had not original Iurisdiction in such Cases so they had no power to grant Administration 'till enabled by the Statute of Edw. 31 Ed. 3. cap. 11. 3. For before that time the Kings of England by their proper Officers solebant capere bona intestatorum in manus suas 'T is plain that the Ordinary had no power by the Common Law over an Intestate's Estate for he could not maintain an Action to recover any part of it now if the Law had given him a power over the Goods it would likewise have given him an Authority or Remedy to recover them An Action would have lain against him at the Common Law 13 E. 1. cap. 19. and by the Statute of Edw. 1. which was made in affirmance thereof if he had possessed himself of such Goods and refused to pay the Debts Then since he hath no original Power in this Case and this being a special kind of Administration when he hath once executed that power he shall not repeal it and the Court enclined to that Opinion vid. 9 Rep. Henslow's Case DE Term. Sancti Mich. Anno 35 Car. II. in Banco Regis 1683. Roe versus Sir Thomas Clargis IN a Writ of Error Papist is actionable Raymond 482. upon a Iudgment in the Common-Pleas in an Action upon the Case wherein the Plaintiff declar'd That the King had made him one of his Privy Council in Ireland and that he was a Deputy Lieutenant of the County of Middlesex and had serv'd in several Parliaments for the Burrough of Christ-Church in Hampshire and that the King having summon'd a Parliament to meet at Westminster he did stand to be a Member of that Burrough and that the Defendant Roe did then speak these words of him Viz. He meaning the Plaintiff is a Papist Vpon a Tryal there was a Verdict and a Iudgment for the Plaintiff This Case was argued by Sir Francis Winnington for the Plaintiff in the Errors and by Mr. Roger North for the Defendant The Questions were these 1. Whether the words abstracted from the Offices set forth in this Declaration were actionable or not 2. Whether they are actionable as joined to those Capacities The Councel for the Plaintiff in the Errors held the Negative in both Points 1. The word Papist is not defin'd either by the Common Law or the Statutes of this Realm for from the first of the Queen to the 25 Car. 2. it is not to be found what a Papist is There are several Statutes between those times which provide against the Iurisdiction of the Pope and which inflict particular Punishments upon committing Offences therein prohibited but none of those Laws give any definition of a Papist If by a Papist is meant him who embraces the Doctrine of the Pope it was punishable before the Reformation to be of a contrary Opinion Now in the vulgar acceptation of the word a man may hold the same Opinion with the Church of Rome and yet not profess the Popish Religion so as to bring himself in danger of any of the Penalties in these Laws There was never yet an Indictment against a person for being a Papist but many have been indicted upon the breach of those Laws made against Recusants by which they incurred the Penalties thereby appointed In Michaelmas 27 H. 8. 27 H. 8. 14. B. an Action on the Case was brought in the Common-Pleas for calling of the Plaintiff Heretick and Willoughby the King's Serjeant argued That the Action would not lye because the word did import a Spiritual Matter of which the Temporal Courts had no knowledge and of that Opinion were the Chief Justice Fitzherbert and Justice Shelley The same may be said in this Case that the word Papist relates to something which is Spiritual of which this Court hath no cognizance Words which are actionable must immediately injure the person of whom they are spoken either in his Profession or bring him in danger of some Punishment Hob. 8. as to call an Attorney Bribing Knave which are adjectively spoken yet 't is an Injury done to him in his Profession It was said at the Trial in the Common-Pleas That 't is actionable to call a Man Papist at this time though it might not be so at another time This seems to be a very vain assertion for though the Times may alter the Law is still the same It would be a very great inconvenience if Men should be deterr'd by Actions to call another Man a Papist for this would be an encouragement to Popery and a check upon the Protestant Religion to punish the Professors thereof for saying a Man is a Papist who is really so both in his Iudgment and Profession But admitting the word to be actionable Not actionable to call a man Papist Cro. Eliz. 191. 't is not so before Conviction for 't is very improperly used and of no signification or discredit before that time 2. These words are not actionable as coupled with his Offices because he hath alledged no particular damage or Loss and his Offices are only Honorary and of no Profit and therefore he could receive no Damage by speaking these words if true when they in no sort relate to his Offices and are too remote to be applied to them 1. E contra The words are actionable in themselves for they scandalize the Plaintiff in his Reputation and may be a means to bring him to corporal Punishment for by several Acts of Parliament many Punishments are inflicted upon Popish Recusants which is the same thing with a Papist they are disabled from holding any Office or Imployment in the Kingdom they are not to come into the Kings presence or within five Miles of the City of London and the calling of him Papist subjects him to the danger of being Indicted for a Traytor for the words are Synonimous When H. 8. took upon him the Supremacy which the Pope had unlawfully Vsurped there were certain Papists in those days who called themselves Roman Catholicks that they might be distinguished from those who bore Allegiance to their lawful King which general appellation was afterwards changed into the word Papist so that both signifie the same thing The Objection that tho Times change the Law is still the same may receive this Answer That when the force of words is changed with the Times those words shall be actionable now which were not so at another time As for Example the proper and genuine signification of the word Knave is a Servant but now the Times have altered the sense of that word and made it to be a term of Reproach so that 't is actionable to call an Attorny Knave who is but a Servant to his Client 1. Then as to the Objection that the word Papist is not defin'd in our Law There is a Statute which disables a
and that Aliens might bring Wines into this Realm and that all Merchandizes might be carried into Ireland and exported from thence which shews that without such leave persons could not trade thither and Denizens could not import Wines from those parts The Case of sole Printing is a Manufacture and so not in the power of the King to restrain for 't is a piece of Art and Skill but when once it becomes of publick concernment then the Prerogative interposeth 'T is a vain Objection to say that every Subject hath a Right to trade which Right is grounded upon the Common Law for that Law can give no such Authority against any King's Prohibition For suppose a foreign Prince should forbid the Subjects of England to trade within his Dominions what Right can the Common Law give them so to do Or suppose any Foreign Prince should restrain Trade to a peculiar number of Men exclusive from the rest how would the Common Law help them So that if this Trade depend upon the Will of a Foreign Prince why may not the King of England prohibit his Subjects from using of it He who hath the sole power of making Leagues and Treaties is the foundation of Trade and can that Right which the Subject hath at the Common Law be independent on this The Question now is about the Regulation of a Trade by Letters Patents which the King hath power to do 1. By his Prerogative 27 E. 3. c. 1. 43 E. 3. c. 1. 47 E. 3. 1 H. 5. num 40. for the appointment of the Staple is not by vertue of any Act of Parliament but 't is the effect of Leagues and Treaties 2. By Acts of Parliament which have allowed such Grants and from other Acts which take notice of the Kings Prerogative In 12 H. 7. 12 H. 7. c. 6. a Fellowship of Merchant Adventurers in London made an Order to restrain all persons to sell at such a Mart without their consent The Statute of 3 Jacobi recites Letters Patents of the Incorporation to certain Merchants to trade into Spain and 4 Jac. 3 Jac. c. 6. Cap. 9. recites the like Letters Patents granted to the Merchants of Exeter by the Queen The next thing to be considered is what Acts of Parliament have either taken away or abridged the King's Prerogative The first is Magna Charta viz. That all Merchants shall stay here nisi publice antea prohibiti the meaning of which hath been already explained The second Statute is that which the Defendant hath pleaded In answer to which 't is to be observed that a Preamble of any Statute Law is the best Expositor of it because it usually mentions the occasion of its making and this Act amongst other Things and Petitions recites that the King had granted to the Men of Flanders that the Staple of Wool should be at Bruges which Town had ordered that no Wool should be sold to Strangers which was much to the damage of trading Merchants Now what is the Remedy in this Case Why the King grants that they may buy Wool at such prizes as they can agree and carry it where they please let the Seas be open c. So that this Act had only a prospect to remedy the abuse of the Staple which hath in no sort abridged the King's Prerogative If there should be no Regulation of Trade by the Power and Prerogative of the King what would become of the Turkey Company when it might be in the power of one Man to ruine all the Effects of our English Merchants there by a Misdemeanour Therefore it ought to be looked after very strictly All Arguments which may be deduced from Monopolies will have no influence upon this Case because this Grant doth not barr the Subject of any precedent Right 2. As to the second Point 't is not to be doubted but that since they are abridged in Interest an Action on the Case will lie Mr. E contra Pollexfen contra These Letters Patents extend to a great part of Europe and the consequence of this Iudgment if for the Plaintiffs must be that all Merchants trading thither must be of this Company or excluded from Trade in those Parts Now supposing that several Men may be of this Company 't is impossible that all Merchants who trade into those parts of Europe should be Members thereof for where should they meet to make By-Laws Neither is it probable that other Merchants who live remote from London will adventure their Stock and Estates with the Citizens What will become of the Clothiers must they sell their Cloth at the Rate imposed by this Company The Question is not whether the King may restrain his Subjects from trading to particular places or that the Trade of the People is not under the Government of the King nor whether he may make Leagues and Treaties for 't is certainly his Prerogative nor how the Staple was formerly which hath been long since discontinued and not easie to find out nothing will follow from either of these considerations which may be of any use in this Case But the Question is whether the King can make such a Grant excluding all others from trading for 't is expresly provided by the Statute of H. 7. 12 H. 7. c 6. that no Englishman shall take of another any Fine or Imposition for his Liberty to buy and sell The Case of the East-India Company is not like this for they who argued then did admit that if the Grant to that Company had restrained the Subjects from trading to Christian Countries it had been void but it only prohibiting a Trade with Infidels with whom we should have no Communication without the King's Licence lest we should forsake the Catholick Faith and turn Infidels for that reason it was held good And such a Licence was seen by my Lord Coke 2 Brownl 296. as he tells us in Michelburn's Case which was granted in the Reign of Ed. 3. But a Patent to exclude all others is void both by the Common Law and the Statute Law As to the Argument that the Common Law gives no Priviledge to Trade against the King's Prohibition because Foreign Princes may restrain the Trade to a particular number of Men can any Inference be made from thence that the Kings of England may therefore restrain Trade to a like number of Men All Patents prohibiting Trade are void 1 Rol. Rep. 4. 13 H. 4.14 If a Man would give give Lands in Mortmain or would have a new Way by taking in the Common High-way this may be done with the King's Licence and the Escheator or Sheriff is to examine the Fact and if it be ad dampnum alterius such a Licence is void as being prejudicial to the Subject F. N. B. 222. and if 't is void a fortiori a Grant to restrain Trade must be so All Engrossing and Monopolizing are void by the Common Law the one is a Species of the other 't is defined by
Commitment and that for two reasons 1. Because the persons committing had not any Authority so to do for upon the Return it appears that they were committed by several Lords of the Council whereas it should have been by so many Lords in Council or by Order of Council 2. They ought not to be committed for this Fact which is only a Misdemeanour The Bishops are Peers and therefore the Process ought to be a Summons by way of Subpoena out of the Crown Office and not to commit them the first time If a Man comes in voluntarily he cannot be charged with an Information neither can a person who is found in Court by any Process be so charged if it be illegal as if a Peer be committed by Capias Iustice Allybon replyed that when a Commitment was made by the Lord Chief Iustice of this Court his Name is to the Warrant but not his Office 't is not said Committitur per Capitalem Justiciarium Angliae c. for he is known to be so and why should not a Commitment by such persons Dominos Concilij be as good as a Commitment by Sir Rob. Wright Capitalem Justiciarium That it was enough for the Officer to return his Warrant and when that is done the Court will presume that the Commitment was by the Power which the Lords in Council had and not by that Power which they had not To which it was answered by Mr. Finch that the Lord Chief Iustice always carries an Authority with him to commit where-ever he goes in England but the Lords of the Privy Council have not so large a Power for though they be Lords of the Council always yet they do not always act in Council Then the Statute of 17 Car. 1. cap. 10. was read in which there is mention made of a Commitment by the Lords of the Privy Concil c. But it was answered that that Statute was to relieve against illegal Commitments and those enumerated in that Act were such only and none else And it was strongly insisted that Peers of the Realm cannot be committed at the first instance for a Misdemeanour before Iudgment and that no President can be shewed where a Peer hath been brought in by Capias which is the first Process for a bare Misdemeanour The constant Proceedings in the Starr-Chamber upon such Informations were Crompt Jurisdiction 33. Dyer 315. 4 Inst 25. Regist 287. viz. First the Lord Chancellor sent a Letter to the person then if he did not appear an Attachment went forth The Kings Council answered Sir Baptist Hick's Case Hob. that a Peer may be committed for the Breach of the Peace for which Sureties are to be given and can there be any greater Breach of the Peace than a Libel against the King and Government 'T is certainly such a Breach of the Peace for which Sureties ought to be demanded for where there is any seditious Act there must be a Breach of the Peace and if Sureties are not given then the person must be committed The Objections were over-ruled by three Iudges Then the Information was read which in Substance was viz. That the King by vertue of his Prerogative did on the 4th day of April in the third year of his Reign publish his gracious Declaration for Liberty of Conscience which was set forth in haec verba That afterwards viz. 27 Aprilis in the fourth year of his Reign the King did publish another Declaration reciting the former in which he expressed his care that the Indulgence by him granted might be preserved c. that he caused this last Declaration to be printed and to manifest his favour more signally towards his Subjects on the 4th day of May 1688. it was Ordered in Council that his Declaration dated the 27th day of April last be read on two several days in all Churches and Chappels in the Kingdom and that the Bishops cause the same to be distributed through their several Diocesses c. That after the making of the said Order c. the Bishops naming them did consult and conspire amongst themselves to lessen the Authority and Prerogative of the King and to elude the said Order and in further prosecution of their said Conspiracy they with Force and Arms did on the 18th day of May c. unlawfully maliciously c. frame compose and write a Libel of the King subscribed by them which they caused to be published under the pretence of a Petition Then the Petition was set forth in haec verba In contemptum dicti Domini Regis c. The King's Council moved that the Defendants might plead instanter for so they said is the course of the Court when a Man is brought thither in Custody or appears upon Recognizance But the Council on the other side prayed an Imparlance and a Copy of the Information and argued that the Defendants ought not to plead instanter because their Plea ought to be put in Writing and that they ought to have time to consider what to plead that it was impossible to make any Defence when they did not know the Accusation and that the Practice of the Court anciently was with them 'T is true when a Subpoena is taken out and the Party doth not appear but is brought in by Capias he shall plead instanter and the reason is because he hath given delay to the Cause So 't is likewise in Cases of Felony or Treason but not to an Information for a Misdemeanour Then the Clerk of the Crown informed the Court that it was the Course to plead instanter in these following Cases viz. when the person appears upon a Recognizance or in propria persona or is a Prisoner in Custody upon any Information for a Misdemeanour where no Process issued out to call him in As to the Objection that the Defendants cannot make any Defence without a Copy of the Information the Vsage is otherwise even in Cases where a Man's Life is concerned and what greater difficulty can there be to defend an Accusation for a Misdemeanour than a Charge for High-Treason certainiy the Defendants all know whether they are innocent or not These Points being over-ruled by the Court the Archbishop offered a Plea in writing the Substance of which was that they naming all the Defendants were Peers of Parliament and ought not to be compelled to answer this Misdemeanour immediately but they ought to appear upon due Process of Law and upon their Appearance to have a Copy of the Information and afterwards to imparle and because they were not brought in by Process they pray the Iudgment of the Court. This Plea was offered to the end that what was denied before upon a Motion might be settled by the Opinion of the Court but it was over ruled Then they pleaded severally Not-Guilty and were tried at the Barr a Fortnight afterwards by a Middlesex Iury and acquitted Anonymus In the Common-Pleas AN Action of Debt was brought upon a Bond against the Defendant
quarter for by such means Diseases may be brought into a Family and a Man hath no security either for his Goods or Mony This was the Opinion of Iustice Twisden in Coutrell's Case Sid. 29. and it seems to be very natural and therefore the chief reason why power was given by the Statute to the Overseers to raise mony was that they might place poor Children to such who were willing to take them for Mony for otherwise they might compel a Man to receive his Enemy into his Service He relied on the Case of the King and Price Hillary 29 and 30th of Car. II. which was an Order of the like nature moved to be quashed And Iustice Twisden said in that Case that all the Iudges of England were of Opinion that the Iustices had not such a Power and therefore that Order was quashed 'T is plain that by the Statute of the 43 Eliz. E contra the Iustices may place out poor Children where they see it convenient and so the constant practice hath been so is the Resolution of the Iudges in Dalton which was brought in by the Lord Chief Iustice Hyde but denied so to be by Iustice Twisden for no other reason but because Iustice Jones did not concur with them In Price 's Case this matter was stirred again but there hath been nothing done pursuant to that Opinion Since then the Iustices have a power to place out poor Children 'T is no Objection to say that there may be an inconvenience in the exercise of that power by placing out Children to improper persons for if such things are done the Party hath a proper remedy by way of Appeal to the Sessions Three Iustices were of Opinion that the Iustices of Peace had such a Power and therefore they were for confirming the Order and Iustice Dolbin said it was so resolved in the Case of the King and Gilliflower in the Reign of King James the first Foster being then Chief Iustice tho' the Iudges in Price 's Case were of another Opinion The Chief Iustice was now likewise of a different Opinion for the Statute means something when it says that a Stock shall be raised by the Taxation of every Inhabitant c. for putting out of Children Apprentice There are no compulsory words in the Statute for that purpose nor any which oblige a Master to take an Apprentice and if not the Iustices have not power to compel a Man to take a poor Boy for possibly such may be a Thief or Spy in the Family But this Order was quashed for an apparent fault which was that the Statute has entrusted the Churchwardens and Overseers of the Poor by and with the Approbation of two Iustices to bind Apprentices c. And the Churchwardens are not mentioned in this Order DE Term. Sancti Hill Anno 1 Gulielmi Mariae Regis Reginae in Banco Regis 1689. Thirsby versus Helbot DEBT upon a Bond for performance of an Award Award void where a person who is a Stranger to the Submission is ordered to be a Surety Vpon Nullum Arbitrium pleaded the Plaintiff replyed and shewed an Award made which amongst other things was that the Defendant should be bound with Sureties such as the Plaintiff should approve in the Sum of 150 l. to be paid to him at such a time and that they should seal mutual Releases and assigned a Breach in not giving of this Bond. There was a Verdict for the Plaintiff and now Serjeant Pemberton moved in arrest of Iudgment that this was a void Award because 't is that the Defendant shall be bound with Sureties c. and then Releases to be given now the Sureties are Strangers to the Submission and therefore the Defendant is not bound to procure them He relied upon the Case of Barns and Fairchild 1 Roll. Abr. 259. which was an Award that all Controversies c. should cease and that one of the Parties should pay to the other 8 l. and that thereupon he should procure his Wife and Son to make such an Assurance c. this was held to be void because it was to bind such persons who were not Parties to the Submission Tremain Serjeant contra E contra That Cause doth not come up to this at the Barr because by this Award the Party was to sign a general Release whether the Defendant paid the Mony or not But the Court was of Opinion that the Award was void because it appointed the Party to enter into a Bond with such Sureties as the Plaintiff shall like and Releases then to be mutually given Now if the Plaintiff doth not like the Security given then he is not to seal a Release and so 't is but an Award of one side Savier versus Lenthal ASsisa ven ' recogn ' si Willielmus Lenthal Armiger Henricus Glover Armiger Johannes Philpot Generosus Thomas Cook Generosus Samuel Ellis Generosus injuste c. Assize disseisiverunt Thomam Savier de libero tenemento suo in Westm infra triginta annos c. Et unde idem Thomas Savier per Jacobum Holton Attornatum suum queritur quod disseisiverunt eum de officio Marr ' Maresc ' Domini Regis Dominae Reginae coram ipso Rege Regina cum pertin ' c. The Cryer made Proclamation and then called the Recognitors between Thomas Savier Demandant and William Lenthal Tenant who were all at the Bar and severally answered as they were called Then Mr. Goodwin of Greys-Inn arraigned the Assize in French but the Count being not in Parchment upon Record the Recognitors were for this time discharged and ordered to appear again the next day But the Council for the Tenant relied on the authority in Calvert's Case that the Title ought to be set forth in the Count Plo. Com. 403. 4 E. 4.6 which was not done now and therefore the Demandant ought to be nonsuited But the Writ being returnable that day was ex gratia Curiae adjourned to the Morrow afterward and if the Demandant did not then make a Title he must be nonsuited The next day the Iury appeared Then the Cryer called Thomas Savier the Demandant and then the Tenants and afterwards the Recognitors and the Assize being arraigned again the Demandant set forth his Title Then Sir Francis Winnington of Council for Mr. Lenthal one of the Tenants appeared after this manner Vouz avez icy le dit Williem Lenthal jeo prye oyer del Brief del Count. Then the other Tenants were called again three times and they not appearing Process was prayed against them Doe versus Dawson BAil was put in to an Action brought by the Plaintiff Bail liable if the Principal had two Terms after an Injunction dissolved and before he declared the Defendant obtained an Injunction to stay Proceedings at Law which was not dissolved for several Terms afterwards Then the Injunction was dissolved and the Plaintiff delivered his Declaration and had Iudgment by default
quam ad illud facere debet solet And it was the Opinion of a * Justice Doderidge in Surry and Piggots Case Pop. 171.27 Assise placito 8. Br. Prescription 49. Rast Entr. 441 Tit. Nusance learned Iudge that the words currere consuevit solebat did supply a Prescription or Custom Thus it was in an Assise of Nusance wherein the Plaintiff set forth that he had a Fountain of Water currentem usque ad rotam molendini c. and that the Defendant divertit cursum aquae and this was held good The Cases of stopping up of Lights and diverting of Water-courses are not parallel the Prescription to Lights must be ratione loci and therefore if a Man will erect a new House and a Stranger will stop the Lights 't is an injury done and the Action may be maintained upon the Possession Lutterel 's Case was grounded upon the Possession for upon the Plaintiff Cottell 's own shewing the Prescription was gone because he set forth that he had pulled down the old Mills and that the Defendant Lutterel diverted the Water from running to those Mills which the Plaintiff newly built All which prove that a Prescription goes to the Right but a possession is sufficient to support an Action against a Tort-fesor Lastly Slackman vers West Palmer 387. 2 Cro. 673. in the Case of a Common or a Rent which cannot pass without Deed if the Plaintiff shews a Que Estate he must produce the Deed by which it was granted but where he prescribes for a Way he may set forth his Estate without shewing how he came by it because 't is but a Conveyance to the Action which is grounded upon the disturbance done to the Possession Cur. The word solet implies Antiquity and will amount to a Prescription and solitus cursus aquae running to a Mill makes the Mill to be antient for if it be newly erected there cannot be solitus cursus aquae towards that Mill For which Reasons the Iudgment in the Original Action was affirmed in Hillary Term Primo Willielmi But the Chief Iustice was of Opinion that if the Cause had been tried upon such a Oeclaration that the Plaintiff ought to prove his Prescription or else he must be Nonsuit Anonymus ONE was Indicted for drinking of an Health to the Pious Memory of Stephen Colledge who was Executed at Oxford for High Treason He was Fined 1000 l. and had Sentence to stand in the Pillory and was ordered to find Sureties for his good Behaviour Rex versus Rosewel THE Defendant was a Non-conformist Minister and Indicted for High-Treason in Preaching of these words viz. Why do the People innuendo the People of England make a flocking to the King innuendo Carolum Secundum under pretence of curing the Kings Evil which the King cannot do but we are the Priests and Prophets to whom they ought to flock who by our Prayers can heal them We have had two Wicked Kings now together innuendo Carolum Primum Carolum Secundum who have suffered Popery to be introduced under their Noses whom I can liken to none but wicked Jeroboam and if they innuendo the People c. would stand to their Principles I make no doubt but to COnquer our Enemies innuendo the King and all his Loyal Subjects with Rams Horns broken Pitchers and a Stone in a Sling as in the time of old Vpon this Indictment he was arraigned and pleaded Not Guilty and was Tried at Bar and found Guilty of High Treason upon the Evidence of two Women And the Court having assigned Mr. Wallop Mr. Pollexfen and Mr. Bampfield to be his Council they moved in Arrest of Iudgment First That the Words discharged of the Innuendo's if taken seperate or altogether have no tendency to Treason The first Paragraph doth not import any Crime and to say that we have had two wicked Kings may be a Misdemeanor but 't is not Treason either by intendment of the Death of the King or by levying War against him The Crime seems to consist in the next Words which are if they would stand to their Principles c. This seems to stir up the People to Rebellion but as they are placed in the Indictment they will not admit of such a Construction neither as they have reference to the words precedent or as they stand by themselves The words which go before are viz. We have had two wicked Kings together 'T is not expressed what Kings or when they Reigned which is very uncertain Et si ipsi ad fundamentalia sua starent which word ipsi is relative and must refer ad proximum antecedens and then it must be ipsi Reges which is the proper and natural sense of the words But now if the Innuendo's must be incerted 4 Co. 17. it must be under some Authority of Law either to design the person or the thing which was not certain before that the intention of the Party speaking may be more easily collected and this is the most proper Office of an Innuendo It will not change the meaning of the words Hob. 45. 2 Cro. 126. for that is to make them still more incertain Now most of the Innuendo's in this Indictment are naught because they do not ascertain the subject matter First by the word People innuendo the People of England may be as well intended any other People because there was no previous Discourse of the People of England Then follow these words We have had two wicked Kings now together innuendo King Charles the First and Second which may be as well intended of King Ethelred and Alfred because the words denote a time past and therefore cannot possibly intend the King of whom there was no precedent Discourse And the Rule is De dubiis generalibus benignior Sententia recipienda est Besides those words are insensible and indeed impossible for we cannot have two wicked Kings together it ought to be successively Then to say we shall Conquer our Enemies cannot be intended the Enemies of the King because the word Enemies is of a large sense for Man by reason of his Sins and Infirmities hath many Enemies and possibly such might be intended If therefore it be doubtful what Enemies were meant if it shall not be in the power of a Clerk by an innuendo to make Words of another sense than what they will naturally bear nor to help where they are insensible as in this Case If there was no precedent Discourse either of Kings People or Enemies which must be proved by the Evidence then is this Indictment naught and therefore Iudgment ought to be arrested Mr. Attorney and Solliciter contra 'T is laid in this Indictment that the words were spoken to stir up Rebellion and to depose the King and 't is so found by the Verdict of twelve Men. That which aggravates the offence is That it was spoken in a publick Assembly to the People which must be intended the People of England