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A60829 Some queries concerning the disbanding of the army humbly offered to publick consideration : which may serve for an answer to Mr. A, B, C, D, E, F, G's argument. 1698 (1698) Wing S4560; ESTC R33845 5,940 12

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the Regular Exercising of every private Company or Troop without which it cannot be imagined to make it Serviceable if with it than to have a sufficient Number of Regular Old Troops under such Regulations as may be established in Parliament 10. Whether Land-Forces raised and maintained by Parliamentary Funds and increased diminished or continu'd every Session according as a present Conjuncture of Affairs in Christendom shall then or from time to time may require can be called A Standing Army and inconsistent with the Nature and Laws of A Free Government 11. Whether the Horse as may be thought convenient for our Defence in the manner now specifi'd may not whilst our Neighbours are quiet be employ'd for the Guard and Security of Highways and consequently for the Ease and Encouragement of our Inland Trade 12. Whether the Foot may not then be imployed in the Fortifying of our Sea-Coasts in the repairing of Highways and other publick useful Works with a small addition then to their Pay which Works cannot be done otherwise without a vast Expence and not in the laudable Occupations our Author is pleas'd to compliment the Army with 13. Whether the Parliament may not find Methods for the keeping of Land Forces necessary for our Defence so as to be no Burthen to Inns or any other publick Houses unless upon Marches 14. Whether if we have a great Fleet at Sea as we must of necessity without Land Forces it can effectually shelter us from an Invasion by our Neighbours from any of their Sea-Ports whatsoever notwithstanding they should Arm at once at D k in the Channel and Western Ocean 15. Whether we can keep such a Fleet without Pressing Seamen and forcing them out of Merchant Ships to Man it 16. Whether this can be done without bringing a great prejudice to the Trade and Commerce of the Nation and consequently increasing the Trade and Wealth of our Neighbours 17. Whether this will not be a fair and just pretext for HIM to bring the main of his Forces upon his Frontier Sea-Coasts towards England and consequently of projecting and effecting our Invasion with more Ease and Secresie And whether we can have great Fleets at Sea without giving a Jealousie to those who will only seek for an opportunity to break with us 18. Whether the Admiralty may not prove as bad in time of Peace as our Author supposes it I hope injuriously to have been in time of War Whether there may not happen Treachery besides many Accidents of Sea Wind and Weather which 't is reasonable to expect and provide against which may spoil all the Precautions that can be taken in relation to our Sea Defence And whether His Majesty did not come clear from the Maese to Torbay notwithstanding that my Lord Dartmouth's Fleet was then in a Readiness which is much a greater distance than HE has to come upon us 19. Whether these Dangers to which we must expose our selves without an Army may not cause Fears and Jealousies among the trading part of the Nation and the People in general who thereupon may be apprehensive of an Invasion Which consequently may tend to the crying down the publick Credit of the Government and thus bring a general Loss and Detriment upon all Trade and Trading In Relation to the Army I ask Mr. A B C D E F G. 1. Whether as 't is necessary notwithstanding the Peace considering the present Conjuncture of Affairs to provide for our Defence we are not in a better posture of Defence with an Army than we can be without one and if so then consequently whether a competent Army for our Defence will not be a means to make the Peace more lasting and durable And whether from thence we may not expect a better support from Allies abroad against the exorbitant Power of HIM 2. Whether the having no Army for our Defence may not expose His Majesty's Person to the Attempts of Wicked Men who have already taken hold of such a Conjuncture to put such a horrible Design on Foot when we had but few Land Forces in England and this without any regard to the greatness of our Fleet then at home 3. Whether the Army has not been very Instrumental in procuring to us the present Peaceable Enjoyment of our Religion Laws and Liberties by the Glorious Reduction of Ireland and in the whole course of the War in Flanders where they have not only put a stop to the French King's Carier but taken one of the most impregnable Places of Europe and where in other Wars without us his Progresses went on like a Flood and an Inundation 4. Whether this be the only Service of this kind perform'd by our Land Forces for the security of the Protestant Religion and of the Rights and Priviledges of the People of England But may be our Author owes them no thanks for some of these Services and 't is hard to know whether for the Services of 1660. or those of 1688. 5. Whether the Army has not for the two years last past not to mention other times serv'd the King and Government notwithstanding the great Necessities to which all the Officers have been reduc'd among Strangers for want of Pay with an inviolable Fidelity and Constancy Of which Fidelity and Constancy His Majesty has given a Royal and most solemn Testimony and Acknowledgement in His most Gracious Speech at the opening of the last Sessions of Parliament 6. Whether our Author does believe in his Conscience or any Man in his Wits can believe that this Army if kept in Pay for our Defence will bring in the late King as he extravagantly advances it in his Argument 7. Whether His Majesty in the whole Course of His Life has acted like a Man of Arbitrary Principles Whether on the contrary He has not refus'd the Soveraignty of a Powerful Republick when may be he had a fair opportunity at home but certainly the offer of a Powerful Assistance from abroad and that even a whole Province had freely chose him for their Prince 8. Whether such a King can make any other use of such an Army as may be necessary for our Defence than for the Safety and Protection of His People Or if he would Whether 't would be safe or even possible for him to attempt it considering the present Conjuncture of Affairs both at home and abroad 9. Whether Considering the late King James and the pretended Prince of Wales after him 's Claim to the Crown of England and their Support from Abroad upon a favourable occasion it be even feasible for an Army rais'd for our Defence to offer any Violence to our Rights and Liberties under the present Government without bringing manifest Ruin upon it and themselves too From whence I offer by way of Conclusion to those who may be given to change amongst us That no Change can happen in England arguing from Human Probabilities according as Affairs are at present in Europe and likely to continue for many yeats from the present Government but for Tyranny and Popery 10. Whether the Land Forces we have had Quartered in England during this War have answered the Bug-bear Character given 〈◊〉 a Standing Army by our Author Whether on the contrary they have not behav'd themselves with all Submission and Obedience to the Laws and Honour and Respect and Zeal for the Constitution of Parliaments And whether we had not in the year 1696. above 17000 Men Quartered in England besides Officers and at other times more or less Whether the Troops Quartered in England during the late War have endeavour'd in the least to Byass or offer any manner of Violence to the Freedom of Elections And whether considering what has been said in the precedent Query it be not more difficult for the Army to offer such a Violence now than during the late War For France would always profit of those Distractions which such Attempts would certainly cause in England 11. Whether upon Cashiering of the Army which has gain'd so much Honour and Credit to the English Nation abroad where they have pass'd for the bravest and the finest Troops in the World we can propose to our selves to have such another at any time if threatned with an Invasion at a month or two's warning at the most or even one then fit for our Service 12. Whether this will not be a Temptation to good and serviceable Officers and Soldiers unless their Zeal and Fidelity to the King and Government carries it against their Interest to go where they may find Rewards and Advancements suitable to their Profession and whether 't will not make Officers in another War careless and backward in our Service to prolong a War For the Experience of near forty years last past tells us That Treaties have not been of a long continuance 13. Whether 't will not be the Interest of our Neighbours to Invite by good Rewards and Encouragements our best Cashier'd Officers and Soldiers and if it is their Interest Whether they will not do it 14. Whether considering this and the late King 's present Forces * They are his if his upon any Occasion and that our Neighbours Ships may assist him under our own Colours we do not run a Risque of being Invaded and Conquer'd and Popery and Tyranny introduc'd by our own selves if we have not a competent Army for our Defence Lastly I shall ask Mr. A B C D E F G in the gross of his Book Whether all the Jacobites of the Land or any others who may wish for or imagine the alteration of the present Government be not of his Opinion in this Point But God forbid I should say that all those who are of his Opinion are such Persons no doubt a great many good Men and well-meaning Persons are of his mind and who I hope when they are sensible of the fatal Consequences of it will be of another Sentiment and if our Author himself be amongst these well-meaning Men I doubt not but he will forgive me freely when nothing but my Zeal Sincerity and Affection for our Safety has put me upon this Work FINIS
SOME QUERIES Concerning the DISBANDING OF THE ARMY Humbly offered to Publick Consideration Which may serve for an Answer to Mr. A B C D E F G's Argument Printed in the Year 1698. IN putting any Nation in a Posture of Defence Men must consider the Power of its Neighbours especially those who are most to be feared and that instead of being Friends they may become Enemies notwithstanding Treaties to provide for a Perpetual Peace for so all Treaties of Peace are called though of late they have been found but of a very short Continuance and that they will be our Enemies when ever there is any Advantage to be got by it is certain according to the Maxims of the World This is the Foundation of the following Queries and is I think an undeniable Postulatum some of them have not been urged so expresly and so home to the Point as they might have been which would give them a much plainer Force and Evidence for fear of writing any thing which might give Offence either one way or t'other but there is enough said to lead the Understanding and Impartial Reader into what may be wanting QUERIES concerning the Disbanding of the Army c. 1. WHether 't is not as much the Interest of a Powerful Neighbour both for the Preservation of that Monarchy in the formidable Greatness 't is at present and for the Propagation of the pretended Catholick Faith to endeavour to subdue England by the Re-establishment of the late King James now in time of Peace as it was during the late War 2. Whether HE be not more able to do at present in Peace ●han he was during the War that he has no Diversion abroad for his Forces and that consequently he can bend them all upon us 3. How long the Treaties of the Pyrenees Aix la Chapelle and Nim guen and the 20 years Truce concluded at Ratisbone after the taking of Luxembourg have lasted And whether 't is not so much the Expresness of Articles and Conditions that makes a Peace lasting and durable as the putting our selves in such a Posture of Defence as to give no Advantage to those who would be willing to break it 4. Whether 't is not fit to consider in the present Juncture of our Affairs the Case between Spain and Portugal after the Pyrenean Treaty And whether if we do not look to our selves it may not become our own Case For what has been may be again 5. Whether HE being at Peace with the rest of Europe and in a Condition to bend all his Forces upon us both by Land and Sea and his Fleet being in the good Condition 't is at present we can put our selves effectually in a Posture of Defence without Land-Forces 6. Whether if HE Arms at once at Dunkirk Brest and the Hogue which Place as 't is reported Monsieur de Vauban has been to visit in order to fortifie it and make it a Royal Harbour our Fleet can hinder his Forces from coming upon us from every one or any one of these Places 7. Whether we have not found HIM very secret and expedite in his Designs And whether HE has not his Seamen more at command than we have ours And consequently whether HE may not put out all his Fleet or a competent Squadron in less time than we can 8. Whether we may not be invaded during the vacancy of a Parliament which of course must be dissolved every three years and this the last year of this present Parliament when His Majesty can have no Funds ready for the Raising Cloathing c. of an Army nor even for the putting out of our Fleet soon enough for our Defence And whether the Prince of Conti's present Pretensions upon Poland will not give our Neighbours a fair and plausible Pretext to embark Land-Forces the very next Summer From the Premisses I ask Mr. A B C D E F G 1. Whether the present Government our Religion Laws Liberties c. considering our present Circumstances be not in an evident Danger of being Invaded or of an Attempt towards it without Land-Forces for our Defence And whether if HE or the late King ever land in England with an Army we shall not be Conquer'd without one to oppose them And whether under such Circumstances we are not in a greater Danger of losing our Liberty of Parliaments and Rights Privileges c. than in having a sufficient Number of Land-Forces for our Defence 2. Whether of two Evils the least and the least likely to happen is not to be chosen when we must of necessity expose our selves to one or t'other And whether 't is not more certain considering all things that HE will Invade us or attempt to Invade us if we have no Land-Forces for our Defence than that the Land-Forces we may provide for that purpose will Invade our Privileges and Liberties 3. Whether Salus Populi or the publick Safety of a People be not the Fundamental Law of ours and of all Governments And if we are in danger of being invaded by our Neighbours and if invaded of being conquered by them unless we have an Army as well as a Fleet for our Defence whether 't is then reasonable just or prudent to object That 't is inconsistent with the Nature and Laws of a free Government to have an Army in time of Peace 4. Whether during this Peace we can compound with our Neighbours that whenever they attempt to invade us they shall only bring their Arrier-ban along with them If not 5. Whether the Militia which was at first a very useful Institution when there were hardly any Standing Regular Troops in the World and which may be still useful against a sudden rising of Irregular Forces can ever be made Defensible against Regular Veteran Well-disciplined Troops if they land upon us Or whether any Person that knows what Armies are or can do be of this Opinion 6. Whether if the Militia can be made Serviceable to this effect it will not be an incomparably greater Charge and Burden to the Nation than a sufficient Number of Land-Forces which may be maintained for our Defence 7. Whether the proposing to make the Militia Serviceable be not an acknowledging that 't is at present Unserviceable for our Defence And if so then whether 't is safe considering the present Juncture of Affairs to disarm at least till it be made Serviceable 8. Whether if the Militia can be made Serviceable for our effectual Defence if invaded and if Men will go to the Charges mentioned to make it so this can be done without subjecting the Militia to Military Discipline and Orders And whether this can be done without intrusting the King with more Military Power than our Author desires to see him have or than he could have with only a competent Number of Disciplined Regular Forces 9. Whether in all other respects 't will not be worse for the Country to have the Militia up in every County so often as must then be required besides