secure those who must supply your Camp must never omit their duties in punctually meeting rather before than after the hour and in carefully conveying what is brought to the Camp and must be strong in proportion to the need for should such Parties fail of meeting the Countrey at the set time and place it might discompose all your Affairs discourage the Bringers of Necessaries and give them but too much cause to fail by your example or should the Convoys by being weak or negligent be defeated by the Enemy or the disaffected of the Countrey you would not only lose that one Supply but too probably deter the Countrey from coming with another IV. The Major General and Commissary General of the Horse must make all the Regiments of Horse and Foot do equal and proportionate duty according to their Numbers in going on such Convoys for which end they ought to keep exact and written Lists of all the Parties they send on such employments from time to time and inform the General of them else if by favor any be exempted or favor'd the duty will be the heavier and the discontents the higher V. If the places in which the standing Magazines are setled which must supply the Camp be at a great distance from it or may have the Wayes infested by the Enemy Forts ought to be erected and well mann'd at competent distances the one from the other into which should any of your Convoys be unexpectedly fallen upon they may shelter themselves and what they Convoy till relieved from the Camp for all such attempts from the Enemy are sudden and by surprize and they dare not stay to force such a Fort lest they draw the Camp upon them besides when every two or three miles there are such Forts erected in the fittest places they do not only make the Convoys march the more securely and discourage your Enemy from attempting them but also the Countrey People without Convoys are the more invited to bring their Provisions for your sustenance VI. If I foresaw my Enemy would endeavor to straiten my standing Camp by possessing the Countrey about it I would immediately burn and drive whatever I could not secure in my Magazines or within my Line the sooner to necessitate him to dislodge so that no two Particulars are more carefully and speedily to be perform'd than to secure your own Victuals and Forage and to destroy all that your Enemy will otherwise be Master of and doubtless the first and most important duty of a General is to provide Food and Ammunition for his Army for men can live and fight without Pay but can do neither without Food and Ammunition and he who intrenches well his Camp and hath Food the longest must in time have the better of that War without fighting though his Enemy be his Superior in strength Gaspar de Coligny Admiral of France and who in military knowledge has been exceeded by few if by any Captains in past Ages would often say War is a great Monster which begins to be form'd by the Belly meaning that Food ought to be the very first care of a General for his Army A standing Camp thus situated fortified and provided for may truly be said to be in a good posture but in regard all these desirable Particulars beforemention'd are not usually to be compassed in all places whatever is defective by Nature must be supplied by Art and Industry There are several Orders for the well regulating a Camp within it self which ought to be given punctually observed and the Breakers of them indispensibly punish'd I. That all Cursing Swearing Lying Stealing Drawing a Sword and Quarrelling be exemplarily punish'd both in those who are the Guilty and in those who knowing it do not detect it for which end daily Court Martials ought to be held that the Faulty may as soon suffer as their Offences are proved that the Officers and Soldiers daily come to the Service of God at the times the several Chaplains of the Regiments are appointed to officiate for without the blessing of Almighty God how can any so much as hope to prosper Yet alas how debauch'd are the Generality of the Soldiery who hourly as it were carrying their lives in their hands ought most of all men to be prepared for death yet they of all other Vocations are too frequently the least fitted for it and though God himself does at all times and on all persons forbid Wickedness yet he repeatedly does it to the Soldiery in the XXIII Chapter of Deuteronomy and the 9th Verse viz. When the Host goeth forth against thine Enemies then keep thee from every wicked thing If we own God to be our General which who dares deny he is since he is pleas'd to call himself the Lord of Hosts we ought to obey his commands and punish those who break them else we shall be found to be more obedient to a General than to our God II. That the Camp be kept exceeding clean which is not only decent but healthy That none of the Soldiers do their Easements within it but in some convenient places at least 100 Foot without it as the Martials of every Regiment shall appoint either in the River or Brook or in some Pits to be digged by every Regiment for that end That the Troopers every morning and evening be made carry out of the Line all the dung of their Horses That the Butchers do the like as to all the filth in their Shambles and be made kill their Beeves Sheep c. out of the Camp and that all dung and filth be buried and that the Suttlers and Victuallers keep their Cellars and Kitchins sweet and that the latter be still cover'd with Sods or raw Hides for fear of Fire III. No man without express leave of his Officer is to go further than Cannon-shot out of the Camp nor lie out of the Camp under a most severe Penalty IV. That none be admitted who are Suttlers or Victuallers to entertain Soldiers at Night after the Warning-piece is gone off nor in the morning until the Reveille be beaten V. That none be admitted Suttlers or Victuallers but by the Martial General who is with his Under-Officers to take care that no bad Meat or Drink be sold to the Soldiers or good sold at unreasonable Rates That he set the price on all the Camp Provisions which are daily sold and are not supplied out of the Magazine nor must any thing be sold amongst the private Soldiery but by his or his Officers Licence and by sound of Drum to prevent the sale of stol'n Goods to detect the Thieves and to hinder many other mischiefs Many such and other Orders are given in standing Camps and Leaguers according to the Wisdom of the General the Discipline of the Army or the present condition of the Countrey I have the longer and more particularly insisted on this part of the Art of War of intrench'd Incampings because it is what in England we have not been much
such an Art of the Enemy and such a Negligence of our own In great Garisons I have seen Guards kept constantly from the opening to the shutting of the Gates at the further end of the Bridge over the Graft which is much the safest way if the Garison be numerous enough to admit of it for this Out-Guard examined all Comers and Goers before they came to that Bridge whereby much of the danger of a Surprisal was avoided The having double Vaulted Arsenals especially for preserving the Powder against accidental or design'd Fires or the execution by the shells of Mortar-pieces are very requisite and if possibly to have Mills for making Gun-powder within the Garison since nothing better does keep an Enemy far off than freely shooting against him and the best furnish'd Arsenals will be too soon exhausted if all be spent constantly upon the main stock and that be not recruited from within These being some of the most essential things for the Well-ordering of Garisons I shall defer the enumerating of the rest till I come to that Chapter which treats of Sieges The Marching of an Army IN the Marching of an Army there are many important Particulars worthy to be throughly known and diligently observed Whether I marched in a Friends or Enemies Countrey Whether I believed the Enemy near or far off I would still observe the like order and have the same care for a General may be mistaken in his Intelligence or Intelligencers nay may think those are Friends which want but an advantageous opportunity to declare themselves Foes and therefore all imaginable caution ought to be observed in all times and places because War is a Profession of so ticklish a Nature that 't is rare for any chief Commander to be capable of erring twice in any essentials and therefore he ought to be the more vigilant not to do it once But were there nothing else as a Motive to it but the keeping up exactly the Military Discipline yet for that Reason singly I would constantly do it These following Particulars I would therefore recommend to consideration and practice having my self constantly since I knew any thing of the Profession punctually observed them and found the good of doing it All the Regiments should in course take their turns to be in the Van Rear and other parts of the Body of the Army For where there is equality of Duty there must be also universal satisfaction therein the Generals Regiment the first day are still to have the Van of all so daily every Regiment to have its turn according to its Priority being a General Officers or Antiquity being a Colonels The Regiments of Horse and Foot that are at Night to have the Guard of the Camp or Quarter is still allowed to have the Van. First Since they are to have the Duty at Night they ought to have the place of greatest ease in the dayes march which doubtless the Van is Secondly Being to watch at Night they ought to be the earliest on the ground where the Army is to Camp oâ—… Quarter the better to view it and for the placing of their Centinels and Guards and for the chief Officer to order where his Patrouils and Parties which scowre the Countrey may most usefully move for the safety of the whole Thirdly Such of the Van as are not employed in those Functions having first of all which must be still indispensibly done set out their Out-Centinels in those places from whence they may clearliest and farthest discover their several Guards for these are the eyes as it were of the Camp are to draw up into Squadrons and Battalions ready to fight if need require it till the whole Army be encamped or quartered and upon no consideration whatever to exempt the Regiments of the Van Horse and Foot from that Duty since the hopefullest time for an Enemy to fall into a Camp especially not entrenched as ours alas seldom or rather indeed never are is just as the Camp is beginning to settle For men then are commonly weary or busied in pitching their Tents or making their Hutts if they have not Tents or in getting Fuel dressing their Meat providing of Forage looking after their Baggage and a hundred other little but necessary employments to the Oeconomy of Soldiers and therefore this nick of time being busily employed by all who have not the Guard those who have it must be in their turns the more vigilant for all the rest Fourthly Those who have the Van ought to be the earliest on the ground to Camp or Quarter in because if there be any Woods Mountains or other covert places at any reasonable distance from the ground to Camp in they ought to have those places thoroughly searched ere it be dark for then it may be too late to do it I have known sad Defeats given to Forces for want of these essential Circumspections I will not trouble the Reader with many other Reasons for it since it is a thing made evident enough by what has been already said if it be not so of it self If it be possible I would every morning before the Army marches draw it up in Battalia if that will take up too much time or the ground permits it not I would draw up as much of the Army as I could into gross Bodies or rather than fail into many lesser as the place and time would allow me the more to accustom the Soldiers to march in Body and also to be the more ready to resist an Enemy should he attempt me for the best opportunity of doing it next to that of an Armies lodging is to do it as it dislodges Out of the Van Regiments of Horse and Foot I would still draw out a Forlorn Hope of Horse and Foot who under careful Officers should march a good distance before the Van and should carefully search and discover all covert places fit to conceal an Enemy whether right forward or on either Flank and send speedy notice of what they discover to the General and other general Officers that they may give timely orders thereon It is in my own poor opinion very fit a new Word should be given to all the Commissioned and Non-Commissioned Officers and a Field mark to the private Soldiers every morning just as the Army is ready to march for if there be no need of both it does no harm if there be it does much good especially if an Army or any part of it be suddenly attacked during its march for on such sudden occasions it may be too late to do either and then the Field Word being given to all the Commissioned and Non-Commissioned Officers it may by them in an insant if there be occasion be communicated to the private Soldiers I know it is usual that the Regiments of Horse and Foot which are to have the Guard at Night have the Van of the Horse and of the Foot during the dayes march But I offer it to consideration whether that practice may
not with Reason be altered I have sometimes done it and found good effects by it For I have made the Horse and Foot which were to have the Guard the succeeding Night lead the Van of the Army all the dayes march and not as is the usual custom given those Horse which were to have the Guard at Night the Van of the Horse and those Foot which were to have the Guard with them the Van of the Foot but made both the Horse and Foot which were to have the Guard march in one Body in the Van of all the rest of the Army for I could not see any one inconvenience by it but I found it had many advantages especially if the Army were numerous or the Countrey through which we marched was inclosed or full of Passes since if the Army were great and the wayes narrow or full of bad steps it would usually take up two miles distance from the Van of the Horse to the Van of the Foot whereby if the Regiment or Regiments of Foot which were to have the Guard at Night marched but in the Van of the Foot they would be long ere they came to the ground where they were that Night to do the Duty and consequently might probably fail of those advantages which by early coming they would have had In the next place if the Countrey have narrow wayes or many Passes all the Horse which march in the Van of the Army if assaulted by the Enemies Foot might be too much exposed while the Foot are coming up from the Van of the Foot to relieve them whereas if the Regiments of Horse and Foot which are to have the Guard march together in the Van of all the Foot are as it were at hand to shelter the Horse of the Van. Lastly there may be some Bridge Cause-wayes or Passes to be secured for the better marching of the Army which possibly the Enemy when he finds which way you move may attempt to seize upon and though your Horse should get thither before them yet if you have not Foot or Dragoons to justifie it the Enemy will quickly beat you from it especially if he has Ordnance Probably also your march may lie thorow Woods or Copses or Moorish Grounds where the Van of the Horse may suffer much unless the Foot be with them and because the Horse are useless in Woods Copses and deep Moorish Grounds if your Enemy understands his work he will in such places fall on your Horse with his Foot and do it with safety to his Men and certainty of success unless you have Foot ready to hold his Foot play till the rest of the Army comes up When ever I marched with Horse and Foot thorough Woods Copses or deep Moorish Grounds I still sent out wings of shot to the right and left hand above a Musket shot from the Road in which I marched my Horse the better to shelter them These are some of the many advantages which follow from having the Horse and Foot which are to be on the Guard at night to march all the day in a Body in the Van of all but as to the inconveniences of doing it I leave it to those to set them down who have found or shall find them out for I am therein to seek The having of many good Guides and to distribute them well and on their informations diligently compared to resolve on the way to march are very requisite things especially if you march to attack an Enemy in the night I say many good Guides and well distributed for want of both which I have known some great designs not only fail but those who were to attempt them run great hazard and suffer the loss of many Men For if you have but one Guide or two Guides at most that are taken up in the Countrey they may be corrupted or give you the slip unless you be very careful and if they be the first or do the last not only you lose your design but may also lose your selves therefore I would always if I could never have less than three Guides one with the Forlorn one in the Van of the Army and one with the General who may have many things to ask him and to be informed of by him during the march which it might well be impossible for him to have inquired into till he saw the Countrey through which he marches but if you have but two Guides or but one and that you are not on certain grounds secure of his or their honesty you must be more careful to keep him safe lest if he or they should escape the prejudice and danger be great I earnestly recommended the ordering the daily marches of any Army in such manner as alwayes to come early to the place you will Camp or Quarter in but in a most especial manner indeed if the Enemy be near you or that you march in a Countrey that belongs to the Enemy or is better inclined to him than to you or is at best a doubtful Countrey for so many mischiefs and inconveniences have hapned and may happen thereby that nothing but down-right and meer necessity should ever make me do otherwise I shall enumerate a few that by the Pattern one may judge of the Piece Your Horse generally are by late coming to Quarters unprovided of Forage and one dayes march with the succeeding nights Fasting and Duty does cast them down more than six dayes ease and good Feeding will raise them again If they ramble out of the Camp to seek it 't is ten to one it being in the dark they fail of it and if any Enemy be near twenty to one he fails not to cut them off Your Men generally will want firing both for the dressing of their meat and for the Guards the hindmost and straglers having no Guides usually lose their way and if the Countrey be false or the Enemy near themselves also The confusion will be great in every Regiments finding and taking down his Baggage in the night but if you have not Tents and must Hutt or lie open 't is more than odds you do the latter The danger of overthrowing the Cannon or Wagons in the dark which may also happen in such places as it may stop the whole march of that part of the Army which is hindermost as I have known it sometimes do and thereby expose both the Van and the Rear to be cut off by being divided and in the dark Lastly not any longer to attempt to make that evident which is in it self but too plain if when you are incamped or quartered and are in the night assaulted by your Enemy on all parts though having well viewed the ground and disposed of your men in case of a real Attack it be difficult and uneasie enough to make a fitting defence judge what it must be when to the brisk Attack on all sides from an Enemy without is added the confusion and disorder within the Camp And if your Enemy
understands his business he will never fail of making his attempt that night in which you come late and consequently tired and disordered into your Camp especially when it has no Line about it To prevent therefore this fatal mischief of coming late to Quarter I would practise three things indispensibly The first is to be moving very early The second is to send the Carpenters of the Train and most of the Pioneers with the Van to mend Bridges that need it to support and prop such as without those helps shall be judged insufficient to bear the Wagons Ammuninition and Cannon And when there are any bad steps for the Horse or Train to mend them against the Army comes up And when the wayes are narrow to leave those wayes if it be possible only for the Cannon and Baggage and to make several large gaps to the right and left hand of the Highwayes for the Troops to march in the Fields Thirdly whenever the ground allows it to march in Battalia and if all the Army cannot yet at least that the Horse and Foot march in as large Squadrons and Battalions as the Countrey will admit which will not only hasten your march by shortning the length of your Army but also habituate your Soldiers to march orderly in Bodies against there is need Yet if all these Precautions do not accelerate your intended dayes march as that you apparently see you cannot come early enough to your intended place to Camp or Quarter in for many such Accidents may happen then I would much rather Camp short of the station I intended in the first convenient Ground I found for Fire Water and Foâ—…age which three must still be minded than expose my Men to all the fatal mischiefs and inconveniences of a late Incamping or Quartering If I am to Camp or Quarter at night in an Enemies Countrey or a doubtful one or that an Enemy be near I would strictly observe these two following particulars First That none should know the Ground I intend to Camp or Quarter in at night but the chief Officers Secondly That if my Guide or Guides be not of my Army or Men thorowly known to me and trusted by me I would let him or them speak with none after I concluded they might guess at the way I intended to march and consequently near what place I intended to Camp or Quarter in and to have them in safe custody all the march I would allow no Soldiers during the march to straggle much less to stay behind unless on meer necessity and by his Officers leave and this I would firmly observe whether I marched through a Friend or Enemies Countrey not only to keep up that excellent part of Military Discipline but also to preserve my Men from receiving or doing the Country any harm since Soldiers but too generally are apt to do amiss when they have the power to do it especially if not under the eye of their Officers And I have known Countries which being ill us'd by the Soldiers of their own Party but well by those of the Enemy have therefore been Friends to their Foes and Enemies to their Friends who in effect made themselves their Enemies for the People of the Countrey judge chiefly by their senses As the Van has a Forlorn of Horse and Foot so the Rear should have a Rear-guard of Horse and Foot to be composed out of such as were the precedent night on duty and I would still send out small Parties of Horse on the wings to discover By this method the Van Rear and Flanks cannot be attacked without having timely notice to put themselves into order to resist an Enemy As to the Baggage I know 't is too usually practised for the convenience of the Regiments to have the Baggage of every Regiment march in the Rear of the Regiment which I think very unfit especially if an Army marches in an enclosed Countrey or where there are Woods Copses Moorish Grounds Rivers Bridges or Passes since the Baggage so placed must hinder the Regiments from coming up expeditious to oppose the Enemy and second such as may be assaulted in the Van or Rear whereby the ruine of the Army may probably ensue Iulius Caesar when he marched especially in an Enemies Countrey that was enclosed or cumbersom to move in by reason of Woods Copses Bridges c. made all his Legions march in a Body and in the Rear of them disposed of his Baggage leaving only for their Guard some new raised Men. This did well where he was sure the Enemy could only attempt him in the Van but not knowing where he will make his impression yet being certain he is likeliest to make it where he will find least resistance and where he may do most mischief in my opinion 't is best to have the Baggage as also the Cannon and Ammunition march in the Centre of the Foot where they are likeliest to be safe from all attempts and if the Attack be in the Van or Rear or both half the Army will be free from the incumbrances of the Carriages and will be ready to make head where the need requires The Romans were so exact in the order of their marches as that every Morning at the first sounding of the Trumpet every one took down his Tent and began to make up his Baggage at the second sounding every one loaded his Baggage and at the third sounding the Legions moved out of their Quarters and put themselves in the form and order they were that day to march in But none were to take down their Tents till the Consul and Military Tribunes had first took down theirs whether for the greater respect or because their Tents and Baggage being larger than the rest they should be the first at work and thereby have their Baggage as ready to march at the third sound of the Trumpet as the private Soldiers For Commanders who give Rules to all the rest ought to be the most exact themselves in observing them since if they break their own orders they encourage others to lose their reverence to them and Example operates more than Precepts for most men see better than they understand as when among Clergymen vicious Livers are good Preachers many think they themselves do not believe what they seem to inculcate since they practise contrary to what they teach Therefore it seems to me exceeding requisite that whatever Rules are made in an Army by a General he and his servants ought most punctually to observe them for else with what justice can he punish in another for the breach of the same orders which he himself does violate But when the Soldiery finds the General keeps strictly the Rules he gives they do the more inviolably observe them also for they conclude since he will not therein indulge to himself he will not do it to others And they implicitely believe such orders are good and necessary because he that gave is so punctual an observer of them In
which seems to be the best form of distributing the Lodgments of the three Field Officers and in my poor opinion will sooner and better answer the service on a sudden for by the new Form of Incamping all the Field Officers and Captains of the Regiment being lodged in the Rear of the Lodgment are consequently farthest from the Alarum place and Line of Circumvallation and can hasten to it with their Soldiers but through Lanes 8 Foot broad where but 3 Men at most can pass a-breast and therefore I offer to consideration the Lodgment of the Lieutenant Colonels and Majors with their Companies to be on the right and left flanks of the Regiment for all gross Lodgments are to be divided the one from the other by Streets at least 50 Foot wide through which Street on either flank of the Regiments Lodgments the two Field Officers of it may readily march their Men up to the Alarum place about 18 a-breast when as by their own and their Companies being lodged the usual way the Lieutenant Colonel on the right hand of the second Division and the Major on the left hand of the first they and their Companies have but 8 Foot passage to that place of action where 't is to be wish'd they were still the very first and well follow'd But since this is not according to the practised Form I only propound it to consideration with some of the Reasons which makes me do it Having thus shewed the several wayes of Incamping a Regiment I shall now proceed to shew how an Army may be Incamped within a Line or Intrenchment with the several gross Lodgments for the General the General Officers Train of Artillery Carriages the Regiments of Horse and Foot and all other gross Lodgments and Requisites belonging to an Army Only I would first recommend to Consideration That the Lodgment for the Powder Fireworks and other combustible things be at one of the Angles next the Alarum places because two parts of four of that Ground is not near other Lodgments and in which if Fire should take by accident or design unless the Wind blows maliciously they may the better avoid the danger of it I would still have the Powder and Fireworks in the General of the Artilleries own Lodgment and in a Redoubt apart cover'd with Hair-cloth or Sod where his own eye and the immediate care of his own Officers may prevent or remedy much mischief I would also recommend that the Lodgments for the Cannon and Wagons of the Train might be next to one of the sides of the Alarum place that the bringing them in and drawing them out on any occasion may be with less incumbrance to the rest of the Camp which will follow if the 300 foot wideness of the Alarum place and not the 50 foot streets be made the passage to their Lodgments When the Ground for Incamping is pitch'd upon the usual way to put the doing of it in practice is That the Quartermaster General and the Officers belonging to him or who are to receive their Orders from him together with the Engineer General and his Assistants do forthwith meet and on fine Pasteboard draw several parallel Lines by a small Scale at 300 foot distance for that is the standing measure of the length of every gross Lodgment and then besides the said 300 foot parallel Lines to draw other parallel Lines of 50 or 100 foot asunder for the streets between the first Line of the gross Lodgments and the second Line of them and so in sequence till they have Lodgment Lines and street Lines for all the Army to be Incamped then calculating what breadth every Lodgment is to consist of according to the exact numbers of every Regiment both as to the quantity of the Companies and Troops and as to the true number of every Troop and Company to divide the said parallel Lines at 300 foot distance into the due breadth of every Regiments Lodgment respectively and so of all other gross Lodgments and to write in the square for the Lodgment the name of the gross Lodgment or of the Regiments with the number of feet allow'd in breadth to every Lodgment and an Alphabetical Letter in it to which reference is to be made This being done to cut off of the Pasteboard every Lodgment and then to turn them to and fro until you have adjusted them on a large sheet of Paper into a long Square with the Streets between every Line of the Lodgments which are to be at least 50 foot wide the whole breadth of the Armies Incamping and then the other Streets of the like wideness where it may be between every gross Lodgment and gross Lodgment the length of the Armies Incamping and observing these following Rules First That the four Outsides of the whole Incamping which are next to the Alarum places be in even Lines for else your Alarum places would not be 300 or 206 foot wide as you like best in the clear which must regularly be observed both for the decency and the usefulness Secondly That from the proper front of the whole Incamping there be but one Line of Lodgments between the Alarum place and the Generals own Lodgment Thirdly That from the Alarum place next the front of the Generals own Lodgment even till you come at it there be a Piazza or space of 400 foot wide and on each side of his own Lodgment a Street of 200 foot wide the whole length of his Lodgment for the more State and Honour and for the Officers and others to walk in who resort unto him for business or out of respect and duty and for his Guards to draw up in in case of danger from the Enemy or tumult within the Camp Fourthly The Lodgments for the General Officers and for Strangers and Volunteers of Quality are usually to be in the same Line of the Generals own Lodgment and on the right and left hand of it that they may be the nearer on all sudden occasions to be advised with and to receive his Orders but the General of the Artilleries Lodgment to be at one of the Angles of the whole Incamping which is probably farthest from and the unlikeliest to be attacked by the Enemy for the Reasons before exprest Lastly whereas the unequal Numbers of Regiments and the various breadth of other gross Lodgments renders it impossible to make the intire Camping of the Army on the four sides of it an exact long Square if the breadth of every Street between gross Lodgment and gross Lodgment be kept to 50 foot therefore they may be inlarged or shortned to a breadth sufficient to answer the making of the four outsides of the general incamping in right Lines which last must never be omitted These are the usual Rules and in this manner are adjusted your several Pasteboard gross Lodgments with the Piazza and all their Streets on a sheet of large Paper to which with some Mouth Glew they may be fasten'd so that you may be certain if
we and yet their Foot marched in Armor in hot Climates with large Targets heavy Swords and carried also two Missile Weapons whereas our Soldiers think the Pike or the Musket often without Swords alwayes without Armor to be a Load which only proceeds from our Relaxing the Military Discipline which is not only a Reproach to us but also a great Prejudice I think we are much more usefully Armed than the Greeks or Romans anciently were and in my poor opinion we only want for our Infantry the Target to be excellently Armed The five offensive Arms in use amongst us are the Sword the Pike the Musket the Pistol and the Carrabine Foâ—… I look on the Lance as now wholly laid by and I think with reason for the Lance does little unless it be by the force of the Horses Course or Carreer and even then only the Front is useful so that their best order to Fight in seems to be to charge a Rank at a time which yet can hardly resist Squadrons of Horse especially if Riders be in Armor But if the Lanceers Fight in Squadrons also 't is much more likely they should discompose themselves than hurt those they Fight against which are such apparent inconveniencies as have made me admire that King Henry IV of France most justly Surnam'd the Great Alexander Ferneze Prince of Parma and Charles of Lorrain Duke of Mayen three the greatest Captains of the latter Age nay it may be of any Age would often lament that Lances were then throwing aside as Davâ—…la in his excellent History of the Civil Wars of France does observe with this addition That Henry the Great and all his chief Commanders more apprehended those thousand Lanceers led by Count Egmont at the Battel of Iury than double the number of any of the Leagues of their Cavalry Our Foot Soldiers generally are two thirds Shot and one third Pikes which I have often lamented for methinks the Pikes should be at least half especially in His Majesties Dominions in which are few strong places and consequently Battels and Fightings in the Field are more common than Sieges and without dispute the Pike is the usefullest Weapon for the Foot and a good Stand of them assisted by Shot if the Angles be well guarded are not easily broken by Horse and Shot united The Swissers generally and justly esteemed excellent Foot have more Pikes than Shot which possibly as much as their Valor Discipline and the strength of their Bodies has contributed to their Glory 'T was to their Pikes they owed that famous Retreat they made when in the Hollow of their Battalion they carried King Charles the Ninth of France and almost all that Family Royal from Meanx to Paris though 't were a Champion Countrey though they had no Cavalry to assist them and though Lewis Prince of Conde Gaspar de Coligni the then Admiral of France Andelott and the greatest Horse Commanders of that Age often Charged them in Front Rear and Flanks yet with the heads of their Pikes they forced their way though all the hopes of the Hugonot Lords depended on that dayes Action I had also an Experiment of the goodness of Pikes in the year 1651. when in the last Battel we had in Ireland I had the Honour to command the English Forces against the Irish and though we Fought in an open Countrey and though we had Routed after a smart resistance all the Horse of their Left Wing and above a Thousand of their Musketeers which composed the Left Battalion of their Foot yet about Twelve hundred Pikes of the Enemy without any Shot with them Advanced boldly and Charged our Squadrons of Horse so home after their Horse and Shot of that Wing were Routed that we had more Wounded and Kill'd in that Charge than in the whole Fight besides so that had they Guarded their Angles when we Charged them Round they had done us much more mischief if not recovered the day but by the Angles we broke in and afterwards the resistance was but small nor indeed could it be otherwise But what need I say more of the usefulness of the Pike above the Musket than that all Persons of Quality who put themselves voluntarily or otherwise into the Infantry carry the Pike which they would not do unless it had adjudgedly the Honour to be the Noblest Weapon since the bravest choose and fight with it And therefore I must again say I wish our Companies consisted of fewer Shot and of more Pikes For besides the excellency of that Weapon it is not only alwayes in a readiness for Service but needs no Ammunition to make it do Execution both which cannot be said of the Musket which is often unfixt requires alwayes Powder Bullet and Match and in windy or wet weather often disappoints the Service especially if it be the Match-lock and then to Fire-lock Muskets Maurice Prince of Orange a Famous Captain was exceedingly desirous to introduce the Target among the Infantry and having for his own satisfaction made many tryals of the great usefulness of it experimentally found that Targets though very flippent ones have not only resisted the Push of the Pikes but also that half the number of Targetteers have entred into the Ranks of double their number of Pikes without Targets and have Routed them but he being only General to the States of the United Provinces and not a Sovereign Monarch and Absolute durst not make so great an Alteration fearing the Reproach of some evil Success which whatever might have been the cause of the Defeat would have been attributed to that of Innovation For States oftner judge of the Merit of their General by his Successes than by his Reasons And Henry Duke of Rohan whom I had the Honour to know in the year 1637. a little before he dyed of his Wounds received in Alsatia and who yielded to none of his Age in the Military Art was also exceeding desirous to introduce the Target amongst the Infantry He propos'd to have the principal Body of the Infantry to consist of Pikemen and to each Battalion of Pikes he would have had a small separated Party of a Hundred or an Hundred and twenty Targeteers in the Flanks when the Battalions were ready to join which to use his own words would produce a marvellous effect in a Day Battel These Targetters he would have had composed of the Volunteers who are generally of the bravest and who unless they made a Body apart he thinks would be apt enough to beget Animosities by disputing where their proper stations should be assigned them I think they might also be of very good use in Assaulting and Defending of Breaches especially if they were of proof against small shot some of which sort I have seen and yet they were not very cumbersom for they might be used on the Left Arm by men of ordinary strength I must before I proceed any further mind the great carelesness of those who furnish Pikes to the Companies out of
the Stores and those Officers who receive them For 't is but too common amongst us to have in one Regiment Pikes of several Lengths and only arm'd at the Points with Lozange heads whereas sixteen Foot and a half ought to be the general length and standard of all the Pikes as 't is among the Switzers which if the Staff be made of feason'd Ash is not heavy for any ordinary man and less heavy to Pikemen who are usually the properest and strongest men in our Companies If our Pikes were All of sixteen Foot and a half long besides the decency of that uniformity the advantages will be great For at sixteen Foot and a half distance they of the first Rank will keep off or gall the Enemies Horse and few ordinary Ammunition Pistols do certain Execution much farther off the second and third Rank of the Pikes being so long will also effectually serve to keep off the Enemies Horse should the first Rank be killed or disordered nay the fourth and fifth Ranks of the Pikes will not be useless For allowing but three Foot distance between every Rank when Battalions front as the first Rank will keep the Enemies Horse off at sixteen Foot and a half so the second Rank will keep them off at thirteen Foot and a half the third Rank at ten Foot and a half the fourth Rank at seven Foot and a half and the fifth Rank at four Foot and a half whereby an Enemies Cavalry will have as it were five Ranks at once to break ere they can make their impression which therefore will be no easie task to perform especially the last Ranks of Pikes being ready to supply those of the first five Ranks who shall fall by wounds or death The Pikes arm'd at the Points with Lozange heads if the cheeks or sides of the Pikes are not armed with thin Plates of Iron four Foot deep are very apt to be broken off near the Heads if the Push be vigorous and the Resistance considerable Nor is this all for unless the Pikes be armed with those thin Iron Plates they are easily cut off with sharp Swords for the Pike especially toward the end is carried tapering to poise it the better and thereby renders it the more flippent for those who use it so that the slenderer part of the Pike if unarm'd is the more liable to be cut off it being there nearest the Enemy whereas if the Pikes were armed with those thin Plates and four Foot deep no cutting Swords which are alwayes of the shortest could destroy the Pikes since that part of the Staff of the Pike which is unarmed would be out of the reach of the Horsemans sharp cutting Sword I remember we once carried a Fort by storm because the Enemies Pikes had not those Plates whereby the Heads of them were cut off I therefore am very desirous that all our Pikes may be sixteen Foot and a half long the Staves to be of seasoned Ash which are strong and light and that from the Iron heads of the Pikes there may be thin Iron Plates for four Foot deep Lozange Heads I like well both because they are sharp to enter and when entred broad to wound with I would seriously recommend the Arming of our Pikemen with Back Breast Pott and Tases For since the Pikes ought to make the principal Battalion and indeed the solid strength of the Infantry of an Army in a day Battel I would have them Armed accordingly for 't is under their Battalion that the Routed must Rally and 't is by the points of their Weapons that the most obstructed passages to Victory must be opened they are still to be as it were the Fortress of the Field and are not like the Horse and Shot which move every way and follow the Execution after the Enemy is broken but being still to advance slowly with the Colours and under their Forrest to cover all Misadventures they ought to be substantially Armed defensively to answer those ends effectually Some Historians tell us That when the Emperor Charles the Fifth that great Captain was to give Battel near Vienna to Sultan Solyman the Magnificent the Christian Emperor had one Stand of Eighty thousand Pikes many of them carried by Reformado Officers and by the Flower of the Christian Nobility and Gentry in which Battalion under God he had repos'd his greatest confidence and which the Turks did so apprehend that after all the noise of a decisive Battel the Mahometans retreated though they had double the number of the Christians and above One hundred and fifty thousand Horse It is both a grief and a shame to see how few Pikemen in most of our ordinary Companies have Swords by their sides and the Musketeers seldom any when a man looks not like a Soldier without a Sword and 't is the Sword which does the chiefest Execution either in the Battel or after the Routing of an Enemy The Greeks and Romans made it ignominious for a Soldier to lose his Sword even in Fight I wish we would make it the like for a Soldier to go to Fight without his Sword or indeed so much as to see a Soldier without his Sword I offer to consideration That all Companies when first Inlisted ought to be completely Armed at the Princes charge and ever afterward to be kept completely Armed at the Soldiers charge unless in actual Fight his Arms be broken in which case the Kings Arsenals should furnish them But whatever Captain of a Company or inferiour Commissioned Officer allow'd his Soldier to appear on Duty without his complete Arms or ever to stir without his Sword in the Streets of his Garison or in the Camp if he punisht not the Soldier should be punishable for it himself And if any Soldier broke his Sword or other Arms by his own negligence or default the chief Officer of the Company should not only punish him for it but forthwith supply him to be defaulked out of the Soldiers growing Pay whereby these three advantages would be gained That the Soldiers would be more careful of their Arms That they would never be unarmed And that the King would be at no unnecessary charge in emptying his Arsenals for them As to the Musket and what is useful to it I find many things in my poor judgment worthy consideration and redress As first That all our Muskets be of one Bore or at most of two sorts of certain Bores the bigger for the stronger the lesser for the weaker Bodies For want of this I have seen much hazard undergone for generally our Musket shot is of one certain size and the Bores of Muskets are of various sizes whereby having been once engaged in a Fight which by reason of the many Inclosures in which we fought the Musketeers were to be supplied with more shot than they carried in their Pouches and Barrels of Musket Bullets being opened few of the shot in them would fit the Muskets but were a size too large whereby we had
acknowledge I would have every private Trooper have his Sword or Long Tuck his Case of Pistols and Carabine and for defence his Back Breast and Pott at least I would have the Front and Flanks of every Troop in such Armor For besides the Terror it gives to an Enemy in his Doublet to fight with men of Iron and the encouragement it gives our own men none knows what proof the Armor is of And 't is most certain that in Combat as well as Pursuit the Sword does most Execution and no Armor is less than Sword proof I therefore earnestly wish that the Officers the Troopers and the Pikemen were bound under severe Penalties to fight in Armor and constantly to march in Armor which piece of Discipline if it were revived by strict Commands and if broken punish'd Exemplarily I am confident the advantages would be considerable Nor do I much value what our young Gallants say that in their Doublets they will Charge as far as any in their Armor since to that I answer First it may spring as much from Laziness as Courage But secondly a wise Commander ought to have more care of his Soldiers safeties than they will have of their own and ought not to let his men expose themselves but where there is need and then to use the best means he can for their safety as well as their success since the business is not who dares go to be kill'd but who dares venture his Life on the best terms to obtain the Victory and if men will go on boldly without Armor 't is likelier they will Charge the bravelier with Armor since their Bodies by it have the greater defence and by accustoming themselves to wear Iron it will become habitual to them If I might follow my own opinion I would have every Regiment of Horse consist of seven Troops six whereof should be Armed with Back Breast and Pott and for offence should have Swords or Tucks with Pistols and Carabines and the seventh Troop should be of Firelocks or Dragoons whose duty should be to guard the Quarter of the Regiment to secure Passes with Celerity to force Passes possest by the Enemy to assist the Horse when they fight in enclosed Countries and in Battels to alight and marching up in the outermost Flank of the Regiment should in two Ranks the first kneeling the second standing a little before the Squadrons Charged Fire upon the Enemy their Guns loaden with Pistol Bullets which I have sometimes practised and found it attended with great success every tenth man while the rest were on such service was to hold the Horses of those who were thus employed and if the Enemy were Routed they were all to mount again and to follow the execution But if the Enemy Routed us they were to shelter themselves behind the next Squadrons of our Horse which were entire or the next Battalion of our Foot and when Rallied to serve as they should be commanded by the chief Officer of that Squadron or Battalion under the countenance of which they should Rally I know the French Spaniards and other Nations have had distinct Troops of Carabines but in my poor opinion Carabines are best in the Troopers hands who are Armed and have Pistols especially if every Regiment of Horse has one Troop of Firelocks or Dragoons and I have ground to believe that Dragoons thus annexed to the Horse are much better than they are when Regimented entire and by themselves First Because they are constantly with the Horse and being in effect a part of their Body are alwayes the more careful of them the more ready to serve with them and the more concern'd for them Secondly Being under the Command of the Field Officers and Captains of Horse they are more obedient to them than if they belonged to other Colonels and were only a commanded Party to answer a present need Thirdly The Horse Commandeâ—…s when the Dragoons belong to their own Regiments are more careful of them and will not needlesly harass them by extraordinary and unequal duty which when they have their assistance but on emergent occasions I have often seen them do Fourthly The Horse Officers knowing all their Dragoons by name and they knowing particularly all the Horse Officers they are the more likely to fight chearfully for them or not to escape unpunished if they be remiss for every one being known none can escape by ignorance the contrary to which is often experimented in commanded Parties when the Officers are unknown to the Soldiers and the Soldiers to the Officers Lastly To omit many other particulars some have observed that as the Dragoons are commonly the briskest and daringst of the private Soldiers so they are also the least sober and 't is likelier to wean them from that fault when they are but a seventh part of the Regiments than when they are an entire Regiment and all Birds of one Feather And the Troopers being generally a more civilized orderly People than the Dragoons 't is probable that the major part by much of the Regiment should win the minor by good example than that the minor by much should seduce the major part To conclude this Head of my Essay I will only add It is not sufficient to make good Rules unless the Prince or General see them punctually obey'd or severely punish'd if broken For besides the evil which attends the omitting of what is good the contempt of Authority is of fatal consequence in all Humane Affairs and most of all in Military where though what is commanded might have been indifferent it self yet it ceases to be so when it is commanded and if a Soldier of himself may break one Rule of the Generals unpunish'd he may believe thereby that he may as well break any nay all the rest for the stamp of Authority is alike on all of which when a private person or many private men make themselves the Judges they bid defiance to all Discipline without which no Society can subsist and Military ones the least of any In one word it were much better that good Rules were not made than if made that they should not be observed and the breakers of them 'scape unpunish'd The Disciplining of the Soldiery I Shall not under this Head amuse my self to speak of the Handling of Arms nor of the several Postures and Motions taught the Soldiers nor of the divers wayes of Exercising of a Troop or Company since we have in our own Language so many printed Books on that subject And I am also the less curious in doing it because though there be many fine things taught in those particulars which are graceful to the sight and make Soldiers the more ready yet when we come in earnest to fight few of them are practised but to keep their Ranks even and close their Files right to fire nimbly and but breast high to charge boldly with the Pikes and through with the Horse to be watchful of the word of Command from the Officer
exactly obedient to it to keep silence And when the Parties are numerous enough to compose Battalions and Squadrons to observe in going to the Charge the just wideness of the Intervals for the Reserves or second Line to relieve the first Line But if there must be any Error therein to be sure the Interval ground be rather inlarged than streightned For 't is better the Reserves should have too much room to march up to the Front than too little since the latter will render them almost useless But before I come to Treat of that part of Disciplining the Soldiery which consists in drawing them up into Battalions and Squadrons which I intend to discourse of when I come to Treat of Battels I shall crave leave to offer some Considerations on what we generally observe and seldom or never alter whatever the occasion requires And that is the drawing up our Shot and Pike six deep and our Horse three deep And this I should not presume to do had not I been emboldened to it by some Experiments of my own which God did bless with success For when I found my self over-winged by the Enemy they drawing up their Foot six deep and their Horse three deep I judged it best for me to Fight my Foot four deep and my Horse two deep whereby I added one third of more hands to the Front and Breadth of my Battalions and Squadrons For I was fully satisfied that it was likelier I should be worsted by the Enemy if he fell into my Flanks and Rear holding me also to equal Play in the Front than if four Ranks of my Foot should be broken or two Ranks of my Horse that the third Rank of the Horse and the fifth and sixth Ranks of my Foot should recover all again for I had often seen Battalions and Squadrons defeated by being overwinged But I never saw the last Rank of the Horse and the two last Ranks of the Foot restore the Field when the four first Ranks of the Foot and the two first Ranks of the Horse were Routed For commonly if the two first Ranks of the Horse are Routed they themselves for they still are broken inward Rout the third Rank and though the like cannot truly be said of the Foot in all points yet in a great measure it usually follows But I must confess that he who makes such an alteration in Military Discipline unless he be a Sovereign Prince or have sufficient Orders to do it ought to resolve his success only must Apologize for it that is to be victorious or be kill'd I should therefore humbly desire that fighting no deeper than four for the Foot and two for the Horse where the ground is fit might well be considered and then let true Reason give the Rule For my own part I will ingeniously acknowledge that after having as throughly weighed all the Arguments for and against it as my weak judgment could suggest to me I would without hesitation if it were left to my own Election fight my Foot and Horse no deeper than four and two in any case where the ground would admit me to extend my Battalions and Squadrons to the full For if I fight against equal Numbers and equally good Soldiers to my own 't is more likely falling into their Flanks and as much into their Rear also as I overwing them the depth of a File in each Flank that I shall Rout them then it is that before I perform that they shall have pierced through my four Ranks since Rank to Rank of equally good Soldiers and equal in Number will more probably hold longer play one with the other than Soldiers equally good can defend themselves at once if briskly charged in Front Flanks and Rear and since the Flanks and Rear of Foot them selves fight with great disadvantage against those who Charge them there all at once but when Horse are Charged in the Flanks and in the Rear 't is next of kin to a miracle if they 'scape being broken For the Troopers in the Ranks when they go to Charge are as close as the Riders knees can endure it and therefore 't is impossible for the Flanks to do any thing or the last Rank to face about and consequently they must have their backs expos'd to the Shot and Swords of their Enemy The Foot indeed will easily face about but then if the depth of Files be the advantage I have it who Charge every where four deep and they every way defend but three deep at the most If this way of fighting will afford me solid and great advantages against an Enemy equal to me in the goodness and number of his Soldiers I do not think it can be denied but if I fight against fewer or worse men than mine but greater and more certain benefits will result from it The chief Objection to this way of fighting that I know of is as to the Musketeers who being but four deep and advancing firing the first Rank cannot have loaded their Muskets again by that time the fourth Rank has done firing so that there will be an intermission of shooting To that I answer Let the Musketeers Charge their Muskets with such Cartridges as I have mentioned and the first Rank will be as soon ready if you are but four deep as the first Rank will be if you are six deep loading with Bandeleers especially if I use the Fire-lock and the Enemy the Match-lock Besides you will still have a Rank to fire till you fall in if you begin to fire but at a short distance which I would do to choose if I were six deep Lastly were both these denied which yet I must say I have on Experiment found to be true and a demonstration is the strongest proof It is not enough to say one method hath such Objections to it which the other hath not but all Objections to both methods are to be examined and that Rule is to be observed which on the whole matter has the least For how few things in the world would be entertained as best if only such were so against which no Objection could be made The first of the Ancients which I have read of who found it much more advantageous when the ground allowed it rather to extend the Ranks than deepen the Files was that great Captain Cyrus in his famous Battel against Cressus King of Lydia for Cyrus finding himself over numbred took off half the depth of his Files and added them to his Front whereby he won the Victory by overwinging Cressus As the drawing up the Infantry but four deep and the Cavalry but two deep where the ground will allow it has great advantages in Fight over those who draw up the Foot six deep and the Horse three deep so it has in marching for the shallower the Files are in the several Divisions the shorter the Army or Regiment must be in their long march which is a great ease to the Soldiers in and towards the Rear of
imitation of the Roman Discipline when the Army or Forces were to march I observed these following Rules where I had the Honour to command in Chief Soon after the Reveill was beaten I caused all the Troopers and Wagoners or Men that tended the Baggage to take up their Horses and Oxen and to make ready to load At the sounding to saddle all began to take down their Tents and to load At the sounding to Horse all the Troopers did mount and the Foot Soldiers draw into Arms under their Colours When the Trumpets sounded to the Standard all the Soldiery marched out of the Ground they Quartered or Camped on into the Field or Fields appointed to draw up in and there were formed into as many and large Squadrons and Battalions as the time and ground would admit still those Forces of Horse and Foot having the Right which were to have the Van all day and the Guard at night all the Ordnance Wagons and Baggage being drawn up on one side by themselves ready to fall into the centre of the Foot as the Army or Forces marched off Those which had had the Guard the preceding night being drawn up in Battalia till the Army fell into their marching order and till the Ground was cleared and then they brought up the Rear all that day and commanded out a Rear-guard of Horse and Foot during that dayes march who were still to bring up all sick or lame Soldiers who could not keep pace with the Body And where any was unable to go to carry him behind a Trooper till he came to the Camp and then to deliver him to his Captain also to seize upon and secure all straglers and to give them to the Provost Marshal that they might be punish'd If I march'd through a Countrey which had narrow Cause-wayes Bridges Rivers or Passes I made those Forces which were on those Cause-wayes Bridges and Passes double the quickness of their march till they were gotten out or over them and then immediately draw up on the right or left hand as the Ground would permit till all the rest were got over in case I suspected the Enemy was near or watched my motion If I did not apprehend an Enemy then I made only every Regiment of Horse and Foot draw up when they had passed over those straights till the intire Regiment were got over and then to continue their march the like I practised over any fordable Rivers But still when the stream was rapid or above knee-deep I made the strongest Horse by turns in Files stand firm in the River on the upper and lower sides of the Ford that the Foot might pass the safelier between them the upper Files breaking much the rapidness of the stream and the lower catching up those Foot Soldiers who might be cast down by the violence of the Current by which means many Foot Soldiers Lives have been saved I did also order the Horse in the Van of all when they had gotten over the Ford to send out small Parties to discover while the rest of the Army were marching over the Fords or Bridges and if the Countrey were enclosed or hilly to be the more diligent and expeditious in such searchings and discovery For an Enemy cannot wish for a greater advantage than to fall upon an Army which is separated by a Ford Bridge or such narrow passage since then they are his at a cheap price therefore great and constant circumspection must be observed in all such cases and all the Forces as fast as they get over must be in a posture to fight in formed Squadrons and Battalions while the rest are getting over It ought also to be the constant care in a chief Commander especially marching through an Enemies Countrey or when an Enemy is near often to make short halts that the Army may not march disorderly and that it may be as short in its long march as possible for 't is better to make short and sure dayes marches than long ones and hazardous 'T is impossible to give one certain and standing Rule for the most advantageous and safe way of marching an Army for the form must vary according to the Country you march in and the Enemy you have to do with If I suspect he means to assault me during my march in my Front Rear or Flanks I must fortifie those several parts accordingly If he be an Enemy not strong enough to give me Battel and will only by his Horse and Dragoons possess the Passes and Bridges and Fords to obstruct and retard my march I would then have some Ordnance with their Necessaries march with the Foot which are in the Van of all the better and sooner to drive him from his Defences and I would march my Army in two or three several Bodies divers wayes which the French call Columes but we and I think more properly Lines yet still no farther distant the one from the other than to be ready speedily to unite if the need require and at evening all to Camp in one Field or quarter it conveniently whereby the whole would move the more expeditiously safely and at ease and the Enemy would be the less encouraged to defend a Bridge Ford or narrow Pass against one of the three Lines since while he is doing that one or both the others may encompass him and cut off his retreat There are several other Cases which must be provided against as the emergencies happen by the care knowledge and foresight of the Commander in chief for which no positive Rules can be set down but the Orders must be given on the place and proportionably to the Ground the Enemy and the Occasion In an Enemies or doubtful Countrey especially I would still have a general Officer with the Quartermaster general attended upon by the Quartermasters of the respective Regiments of Foot and Troops of Horse and Train to be on the ground to Camp on at night some convenient space of time before the Van of the Army comes up both to view the Ground thorowly to take all the advantages of it and to appoint the several places for the Guards for the general Officers the Regiments and Train to incamp in that against the Army comes up every one may know where to pitch his Tent for which end the several Quartermasters should near the first Avenue of the Camp attend and be ready to shew their men respectively as they come up where the Ground is and how much is allowed them to lodge in that all may go readily and without confusion to their several stations and that there may be no dispute those should be staked or marked out else too often quarrels or animosities do arise on those occasions And if an Enemy be near I would have the several Regiments draw up within the Camp or near it till the Rear be ready to enter into it to be the fitter to resist if assaulted or to relieve the Rear if fallen upon and only admit some of every
of a Consular Army could hardly if possible buy in a day what the Market afforded because the place it was kept in was so small and the few streets to it so narrow Sextus Iulius Frontinius in his 4th Book of Stratagems sayes That till the Romans had vanquish'd Pyrrhus King of the Epirots they never used a Line about their Camp but lay in the open Fields but having found that Princes Army intrench'd they liked it so well as that ever afterwards they practised it themselves The modern way of Camping which I have seen within a Line or Intrenchment is as followeth By Retrenchments I do not only mean the Line cast up about the whole Circuit of the Camp but also all sort of Works by which the Camp is invironed and shut up as Redoubts Bastions Ravelins Forts Tennailes Hornworks Crownworks and all other sorts which flank and defend the Outside of the Line and such of them as are closed the Infide of the Line as Forts and Redoubts do The Ordinary Line cast up to inviron a Temporary Camp is about six Foot high and three Foot broad at the top which is in effect but a Parapett or Breast-work 1. The Basis or Breadth of the bottom from the Outside of the Out-Sod to the Inside of the Inward-Sod about seven Foot 2. The sloping battering or Talud Exterior about two Foot and an half 3. Of the Inside but one Foot 4. The Exterior height of the Line five Foot 5. The Interior height of it six Foot 6. The Breadth of the Foot Bank or Banquet three Foot 7. The Height of it one Foot and an half 8. The Breadth of the Ditch or Graft eight Foot 9. The Battering or Talud Exterior and Interior of the Ditch four Foot 10. The Depth of the Graft five Foot 11. The Breadth of the bottom of the Graft four Foot 12. The Lisiere or distance between the first Outwardmost Sod and the Brink of the Graft two Foot These are the Ordinary Dimensions of the Line and Ditch of a Camp intrench'd but if the necessity require it the one may be raised higher and of greater thickness and the other made deeper and broader accordingly 'T is to be observed as a standing Rule That at the distance of every Musket-shot point blank a Flanker must be made either a Redoubt or a Ravelin or Bastion c. and at every Angle where the Line turns a Bastion or Fort they being the fittest Works to secure the said Angle and to command the Lines on both sides And those Flanker Works are commonly more high and thick and the Ditch of them more broad and deep than the Lines are for they are the defence of those Lines since without them when the Enemy came to the Ditch they could not be offended considerably The raising of this Line and these Flankers is to be equally distributed between the Regiments of Foot which are not in Guard for those which are to Watch and Fight for all the rest till they come up and the Horse Regiments are exempted usually from these Works being to provide Forage for their Horses and to Scout but they are to make their own Hutts themselves to fetch in Forage and to scour the Countrey The Work therefore of Intrenching the Camp is to be equally divided among all the Foot Regiments every Regiment taking according to its number of Men his equal proportion of the whole every Division of each Regiment relieving by turns the other Divisions of it As if a Regiment consist of 1200 effective Private Soldiers 600 must be at Work for one hour and the other 600 must at the hours end relieve them and so by Spells till the Work be done which must never be given off till it be finished Every 100 Soldiers ought to have one Commission'd Officer one Serjeant and one Corporal to supervise those 100 Soldiers and see that they lose no time nor do their Work carelesly Some must be employ'd to cut Sods others to carry them to the Work either in Wheel or Handbarrows some must be appointed to lay them others to ram them and cut or pare them with a broad Spade some must break up the Earth of the Ditch others with Shovels must cast it up within the Sod Work always filling the Earth between the Sod as fast as the Sod Work rises and some must cut and bring Frith to mingle with the Earth which is cast up betwixt the exterior and interior facing of Sods which will hinder the Earth from sliding Some Generals allow half the Regiments which are off the Guard to be making the Hutts for themselves and for those which Work at the Line that thereby when they have done the Line they may have their Hutts ready to rest in and that their Comrades may provide for them their Straw and their Suppers This may well be allow'd in two Cases The first where the Army is so numerous and well provided that half the Soldiers of it may suddenly compleat the Line Secondly where you are certain no Enemy can assault you while your Line is a making But where you are not certain of both these especially of the latter all other Advantages must yield to that of the general Safety Whatever Utensils as Spades Shovels Pickaxes Wheel-barrows Handbarrows c. are the Kings and only lent to the Soldiers to make the Works the Commissary of those Stores is to give them by tail to the Commission'd Officer who first supervises the Soldiers who are to Work who is to give his receipt for them as the Officer who relieves him in that Duty must do the like to him who is relieved and the Officer of the last relief of all is to go with the Soldiers who are to carry them and deliver them up by tail to the Commissary who is thereupon to deliver up the first Officers receipt which the last Officer is to send or carry to him that night else the Kings Utensils would be imbezel'd to his damage and that of the service As to the Hutting and Camping of the Regiments when the Line is finished these Rules may be observed All along the four sides of the Line I would still leave the space of 300 Foot for the drawing up the Soldiers which are to defend the Line in case it be attacqued and for small Parties of Horse to scour it in case it be entred A Foot Company is to be lodged as follows supposing it to consist of 100 Men which will also serve for a general Rule for the Lodgment of one Regiment or 20 Regiments if the Army to be Camp'd consist of so many The Ground to lodge 100 Men in within an Intrench'd Camp is 300 Foot in length and 24 Foot in breadth out of which 300 Foot in length 40 Foot in length and 24 in breadth is taken for the Lodgment of the Captain between which Lodgment and the first of the Soldiers Hutts or Tents a void space is left of 20 Foot in length
it be exactly done in the Tent or Chamber it will be exactly done in the Field due care being taken But though the way of preparing the Camping of an Army on Pasteboard and drawing parallel Lines for gross Lodgments and for Streets is the most usual and generally practised yet I must own I have found it so very tedious and uncertain that it put me upon finding out another which whether it be in it self more expeditious and exact or whether my being byassed towards a method I lighted upon and have often practised made me more approve of it I will not determine but shall submit it to those whose judgments I more value than my own And first I shall say that what render'd the Pasteboard method tedious and intricate was that since the Standard of the parallel Lines for Streets was 50 foot in wideness as well between gross and gross Lodgment as between Line and Line of Lodgments I found it after many tryals unpracticable and was forced to make many Calculations For 't is impossible where almost every gross Lodgment differs in the breadth if the Street between every gross Lodgment be 50 foot that ever you can keep your second third fourth fifth and sixth Line of Lodgment if your Incamping must consist of so many Lines equal in extent with the first which still must be done else your long square in the whole Incamping cannot be kept nor consequently the exact breadth of the four alarum places on the four sides which are round the Camp which would be both uniform and very incommodious And if the Streets between gross and gross Lodgment be more or less than 50 foot wide which 't is impossible to avoid then your paralled Street Lines of 50 foot wideness are useless and you must calculate the wideness of the Streets between most gross and gross Lodgments and fling away your Pasteboard parallel Street Lines This is what on tryal will be found true and it made me for my own ease endeavour to find out a better method which to my satisfaction I did and I shall set it down as follows Suppose I am to incamp within a Line an Army which consists of 17 Regiments of Foot every one of them of different numbers but make in all 25400 men and of seven Regiments of Horse every one of them of different numbers but make in all 4900 Horse and that I have besides 12 other gross Lodgments to be within my general Incamping viz. the Generals three other General Officers the General of the Ordnances the Strangers the Piazza before the Generals own Lodgment the Sick the Magazine the Market-place the Train and the Wagons and Carriages The Ichnographie of which is in the ensuing Map Figure VI. The first thing I do is to calculate the breadth of every one of all these 36 gross Lodgments viz. the 24 Regiments and the 12 Lodgments that are not for Regiments but General Officers c. every one of which Lodgments I mark with Alphabetical Letters to which I have reference and to every Regiments Lodgment I set down with it the number of Troops and Companies how many Soldiers every one consists of and what is the exact breadth of every such Lodgment for the length is still 300 foot Secondly Having sum'd up all their breadths I allow by way of estimate 50 foot wideness for every Street between every gross and gross Lodgment and 50 foot wideness for every Street between every Line of Lodgments or 100 foot wideness for the Street between every Line of Lodgments as I would do if my Army be great and my Camp be intended for a long time If my whole Incamping be to consist of six Lines of Lodgments then there must be five Streets the whole breadth of the Incamping of 50 or 100 foot wide all which wideness of Streets between gross and gross Lodgment and between Line and Line of Lodgments I add to the breadth of the 36 gross Lodgments which I sum up all together and divide by six which is the number of Lines of Lodgments I intend to make and the Quotient shews me the breadth of every Line of Lodgments As for Example I find the breadth of all the Lodgments for my 17 Regiments of Foot and 7 Regiments of Horse to take up 12142 Foot I find my 12 other gross Lodgments reckoning the Piazza for one takes up in breadth 4850 foot my five Streets between Line and Line of Lodgments take up at 50 foot to each Street 250 foot and my 36 Streets between my 36 gross Lodgments at 50 foot breadth for each Street takes 1800 foot all these sum'd together makes 19042 foot which being divided by six the Quotient is 3173 which may be the breadth of every of my six Lines of Lodgments but in regard I leave 200 foot Street on each side of the Generals own Lodgment and a wide Street between the next Generals Officers Lodgment on the right and left hand of the Generals and a very wide Street on each side of the Magazine where all the Army are to attend in course to take out their Provisions as is evident in the said Map I make still my first Line of Lodgment less in extent by some feet than it need to be because I may thereby make the Streets in the other Line of Lodgments wider between some gross and gross Lodgment which otherwise I could not well do for the breadth of the first Line of Lodgments gives the Rule to the five subsequent Lines which must be exactly of the like extent with it Therefore though I might make every Line 3173 foot in extent yet for the foregoing Reasons I make the said first Line of less extent I begin the first of my six Lines of Lodgments on the proper front of the whole Incamping which usually is that which fronts towards the Enemies Countrey or where he is likeliest to attack you and I begin that Line First from the midst of it with the Piazza which is still to be 400 foot in breadth and to be before the Generals own Lodgment which I alwayes place in the second Line of Lodgments I then lodge on the right hand of the said Piazza the Regiment of Foot R. which may be the Generals Regiment of Guards and contains 16 Foot Companies every one of 150 Soldiers and takes up in breadth 724 foot Then on the left hand of the said Piazza I lodge the Regiment of Foot P. which contains 14 Companies every one of 150 Soldiers and takes up in breadth 644 foot Then I leave a Street on the right hand of Regiment R. of 50 foot wide and on the left hand of the Regiment P. of 50 foot wide and on the right of the 50 foot Street and on the right of Regiment R. I lodge the Foot Regiment O. which consists of 13 Companies every one of 150 men and takes up in breadth 604 foot and on the left of the left-hand Street of 50 foot I lodge the
therefore allow 50 Foot to each of the two Streets on the right of the Magazine for Victuals and 50 Foot for the one Street on the left hand of the said Magazine between the Regiment of Horse T. and the Regiment of Foot L. which closes the left end of the Line and I allow 136 Foot for each of the Streets on the right and left of the said Magazine K. K. because of the constant resort of the Carriages to it and of the crowd of the Soldiery which come to receive Provisions for Man and Horse-meat as also that if Fire should happen the more hands may come to quench it All which six Lodgments and the five Streets between them make up in all 3156 Foot in breadth which is the due Extent of my 5th Line of Lodgments In my sixth and last Line I must place seven Gross Lodgments viz. in the midst of it the Regiment of Foot H. the three other Lodgments on the right of Regiment H. I place the Foot Regiment K. next to it the Lodgment H. H. for the Artillery and next to it the Lodgment F. F. for the General of the Artillery the Powder and the Fireworks with which I close the right end of that Line for the Reasons before set down and then on the left of the Foot Regiment H. I place the other three Gross Lodgments that of the Foot Regiment G. next on the left of Regiment H. next on the left of Regiment G. the Foot Regiment F. and next on the left of it the Foot Regiment C. with which I close the Line on the left end All which seven Gross Lodgments take up in all 2878 Foot viz. Regiment of Foot C. 324. Regiment of Foot F. 396 Foot Regiment of Foot G. 420 Foot Regiment of Foot H. 444. Regiment of Foot K. 444. Lodgment for the Artillery H. H. 400 Foot Lodgment for the General of the Ordnance Powder and Fireworks F. F. 450 Foot so that there remains but 278 Foot for the six treets between the said seven Gross Lodgments which I thus divide 50 Foot to each Street on the right and left of Regiment of Foot H. 49 Foot for each Street between Regiment K. and Lodgment H. H. and between Regiment G. and Regiment F. and 40 Foot for each Street between Lodgment H H. and Regiment F. F. and between Foot Regiment F. and Foot Regiment C. all which makes 3156 Foot which is the due Extent of my sixth and last Line of Lodgments and exactly compleats the long square of the intire Lodgment of the 36 Gross Lodgments Either of these two ways before set down may be practised but I still find the latter more expeditious and therefore make oftnest use of it Though the Figure Number VI. does consist of six Lines of Lodgments yet according to the nature advantage or disadvantages of the Ground your standing Camp is to be in you may make your Camp consist of more or fewer Lines as you find it most advantageous As for Example If I am limited to a certain Ground for my standing Camp by reason that it is to command some beneficial Pass or that it is to bridle a considerable City or Town where your Enemy has his Arcenals Magazines or Bridges over some Navigable River and that by so placing my standing Camp before his Army is Rendezvouz'd in or near that City or Town I may make it of little use to him as to his invading the Countrey I am to defend for if I am posted so near it as that he cannot imbattle his Army but under the reach of my Artillery or march his Squadrons and Battalions over his Bridges but so as I may attack as many of them as I think fit and which are come over while the rest are on the other side or marching to those which are got over I say if in these two Cases or in other the like Cases I am limited to a set proportion of Ground to incamp in I will make the length and depth of my Lines of Lodgments accordingly As for instance if by making my standing Camp to consist but of four Lines of Lodgments I thereby get some Eminences of Ground within my Camp which if I made it consist of five or six Lines I should be necessitated to leave out and consequently must secure such heighths by making Forts on the top of them and Lines about the foot of them which will be a prejudice to me if done and by the Enemies possessing them a disadvantage to me if not done I would make the Number of my Lodgment Lines but four and on the other side if the Ground for my standing Camp be such that if I should make but four or five Lines of Lodgments I should thereby inclose within my Camp or border upon it some Moorish Lands I would make it consist of 6 or 7 Lines of Lodgments to avoid that mischief These two Instances will evidence no standing Rule can be given of how many Lines of Lodgments the setled Incamping shall consist for that must still depend upon the judgment of the General and nature of the Ground wherefore the Romans manner of making their standing Camps alwayes an exact Square and the usual modern way of making it a long Square may neither of them be alwayes the best After the Ground for the standing Camp is resolved on and that in Pasteboard or Double Paper the Lodgments are agreed upon with how many Lines of Lodgments deep the whole shall consist of it is the duty of the Quartermaster General and of the Engineer General to wait on the General with it who approving of it the Quartermaster General with his Assistants and the Quartermasters of every Foot Regiment and of every Troop of Horse with those appointed to take care of the Lodgments for the General Officers the Train the Strangers the Sick and the Market-place if you will have it within the Intrenchment are to receive from him respectively their Number of Foot in breadth for the length never alters which every one of their Lodgments is to consist of and also in what Line of Lodgments and who is or what is next on their right or left hand to be lodged or left void with the breadth of the Street on each side of the Lodgment when it varies from the usual wideness of 50 Foot and then the four Angles of the whole Camp and afterwards of every Lodgment are to be staked out with the Streets which are to run the whole breadth of the Camp as also between Gross Lodgment and Gross Lodgment after which every Gross Lodgment is to be gone upon by those appointed to work on the Hutts and the Breast-work which is to inviron every Gross Lodgment yet so as no hands must be diverted of the Foot Regiments from intrenching the whole Army for that of all things must be the very first gone about and finished then the Engineer General leaving the 300 or 206 Foot wideness for the Alarum place
or pitching their Tents punctually observed according  feet A Foot Regim t of 8 Comp. euery one 100 men bredth of its Lodgm t 276 B Foot Regim t of 9 such Companyes breadth 300 C Foot Regim t of 10 such Comp. breadth 324 D Foot Regim t of 11 such Comp. breadth 348 E Foot Reg t. of 12 such Comp. breadth 372 F Foot Reg t. of 13 such Comp. breadth 396 G Foot Reg t. of 14 such Comp. breadth 420 H Foot Reg t. of 15 such Comp. breadth 444 Souldiers 9200 Breadth of Lodgm t s 2880 foot 〈◊〉 Foot Reg t. of 8 Comp. euery one 150 men bredth 404 〈◊〉 Foot Reg t. of 9 such Comp. breadth 444 〈◊〉 Foot Reg t. of 10 such Comp. breadth 484 〈◊〉 Foot Reg t. of 11 such Comp. breadth 524 〈◊〉 Foot Reg t. of 12 such Comp. breadth 564 〈◊〉 Foot Reg t. of 13 such Comp. breadth 604 〈◊〉 Foot Reg t. of 14 such Comp. breadth 644 〈◊〉 Foot Reg t. of 15 such Comp. breadth 684 〈◊〉 Foot Reg t. of 16 such Comp. breadth 724 Soldiers of these 9 Reg t s 16200 Breadth of the Lodgm t. 5076 foot 〈◊〉 Horse Reg t. of 4 Troopes each 100 men bredth 388 〈◊〉 Horse Reg t. of 5 such Troops breadth 458 〈◊〉 Horse Reg t. of 6 such Troops breadth 528 〈◊〉 Horse Reg t. of 7 such Troops breadth 598 〈◊〉 Horse Reg t. of 8 such Troops breadth 668 〈◊〉 Horse Reg t. of 9 such Troops breadth 738 〈◊〉 Horse Reg t. of 10 such Troops breadth 808 â—…orse 4900 Breadth of the 7 Lodgem t s 4186 foot 〈◊〉 Generalls owne Lodgm t. breadth 600 〈◊〉 One Officer Generall Lodgm t. breadth 400 〈◊〉 One other Generall Officer Lodgm t breadth 300 〈◊〉 One other Gen ll Officer Lodgm t breadth 300 〈◊〉 Strangers Lodgment breadth 300 〈◊〉 Generall of y e Ordance Lodgm t breadth 450 〈◊〉 Lodgm t for y e sick breadth 300 〈◊〉 Lodgem t for y e Artilerye breadth 400 〈◊〉 Lodgem t s for y e Waggons Carts c breadth 500 〈◊〉 Lodgem t for y e Magazine of Victuall breadth 500 〈◊〉 Place for y e Markett breadth 400 〈◊〉 Piazza before y e Generalls Lodgm t breadth 400 â—…tall of y e breadth of these 12 Lodgements 4850 foot â—…e Numbers which are sett down in the â—…uerall Lodgem t s are the Numbers of feet â—…ontained in y e breadth of each Lodgem t Figure six This is the Lodgement of an Arâ—…y in six Lines of Lodgements the whole Consisting 7 Regimt s. of Horse which make in all 49â—…â—…n and 17 Reg t s of â—…oote which make in all 25400 The Generalls Lodgement 〈◊〉 Oâ—…ers Gen ll Gen ll of the Ordnance Traine Waggons Piazza Lodgem t s for strangers for the sick 〈◊〉 â—…gazines and Market place Place this foll â—…20 to the beforementioned Rules and that no time be lost The Romans in hot Weather made the Soldiers by turns to sprinkle well with Water all those Streets round their Line as also the Piazza other Streets and void places where the Officers and Soldiers use to walk all the day long and if something like this were done in Camps it would be of good use The distributing the Guards the Word and going the Rounds I would recommend to have observed in the Camp as in the Garison only if you suspect to be assaulted in your Camp you must have Parties of Horse Day and Night especially in the Night beating the wayes and scouring the Countrey on all sides that you may have timely notice for your defence And if you believe your Enemy will attempt you in the Night it would be adviseable to have great Piles of Wood and Fagots a convenient distance without your Line to set them on Fire when your Enemy is ready to begin his Work the better to see how effectively to bestow your small and great shot amongst them and still in case of Alarums or Assaults those Regiments must be led to defend that part of the Line which they are the nearest unto the like for the Horse and every Regiment must know the portion of the Line which they are to make good before there be need lest then it may be too late There seems to be ten Particulars which ought if they be attainable to be minded in Incamping an Army in a standing Camp I. That the Camp be setled in a safe place that is to say that no heighths or eminent Grounds be so near it as that an Enemy seizing on them on a sudden may both by seeing into your Camp or planting his Cannon and Mortar-pieces on those heighths annoy and disturb it II. If it be possible that it be seated on a Navigable River for by the benefit thereof the expences of bringing Victuals Ammunition and Forage will be cheap and expeditious but otherwise dear and slow if all be brought on the Axel-tree or Backs of Beasts for whatever is so brought the Bringers when it is for Sale so heighten the price as the poor Soldiers are hardly able to buy what they need But if you cannot Camp near a Navigable River you must never omit to have your standing Camp by a River for the dung of the Horses and the stanch of the Butcheries will else hazard the infecting the very Air of the Camp besides Water must still be at hand for the Soldiers the Horses and the Beasts of draught to drink and if Water can be brought about the Graff of your standing Camp or a great part of it it will thereby become the more safe and defensible I would still have the Butchers Quarter near the brink of the River that they may with the less pains rid their Quarters of all the filth which else will soon be nauseous in them III. Great care must be taken that no Woods or large Coppices be too near your Camp lest your Enemy lodging in them may from thence too safely annoy you and accommodate himself IV. A flat Champaign Ground is the most eligible to Incamp in because in such a Scituation the Enemy may be discover'd and seen afar off the Cannon of your Camp will be the more useful to you and prejudicial to him and when you find your opportunity you may the sooner and the more easily draw out your Army and put them in Battalia to fight V. A standing Camp though it be best posted in a Plain yet there must be no moorish or wet Ground in it for the Vapors which will thence incessantly arise may soon infect your Army VI. Great and strict Inquiry must be made whether the Plain your standing Camp is to be in cannot be overflow'd by the River near it if great Rains should happen and your own Engineers must diligently view if your Enemy in case he be the stronger by making great Dams below your Camp cannot force the River to overflow it though the greatest Rains will not do it as also whether your Enemy being in effect the powerfuller in the Field
may not turn the River from above your Camp into it in which cases if Floods if Dams below or turning of the River above may drown your Camp such a Scituation must not be made use of VII In scituating of a standing Camp you are to elect a place near to which you may have good Grazing for your Horses and Cattle Grounds proper for Medow which usually are near a River and Wood and Coppice both for Fuel and making your Hutts VIII If the River adjoining be Navigable or not alwayes fordable Bridges of Boats must be cast over it else you will be soon streightned by your Enemy and probably he will raise Mounts and Batteries on the other side the River which shall play into your Camp and exceedingly annoy it if not force you to abandon it and in disorder too whereby he will have too fair an opportunity to defeat you therefore before your Bridges of Boats are cast over the River you must immediately provide to secure them against they are cast over by raising Forts and Lines between the Forts in which you may draw up safely your Battalions and Squadrons and likewise furnish those Forts with good Artillery and man them alwayes sufficiently Also a competent distance above your standing Camp you must have a Boom or Cable under Water or Chain ready to draw across the River and cover and well defend them at both ends together with Boats well mann'd thereby to defeat any design of your Enemies by floating Engines he may make to destroy the Bridges of Boats IX The standing Camp must not be too scant nor too large but duly proportionate to the Army Train and Baggage you are to lodge in it and all the wayes unto it you must with your best industry secure and what you cannot secure you must spoil and make them useless to your Enemy X. Lastly If there be any Eminencies of Ground near your standing Camp and yet without your Line that invirons it you must secure those heighths not only by making Redoubts or Forts on the tops of them but also by making a Line if you have men enough to do it round about the foot of those heighths and you must make cover'd wayes from your Camp to those Redoubts or Forts the more safely to relieve them in case your Enemy vigorously should attack them nor is it amiss to have Mines under them to blow them up should your Enemy enter them whereby he will be the more endamaged if they enter or the more deterr'd from entring All Coppices and Woods which are at too much distance to be secured by a Line ought to be cut down or burnt to prevent those advantages which else in many wayes your Enemy will draw from them In making your Line you may have sometimes unequal Grounds through which you run it some being high and some low on the heighths of a standing Camp which are natural Cavaleers I would still make Forts and plant my longest Cannon on them Where the Ground is sandy or gravelly or for any cause apt to slide I would not depend on the facing of Sods but drive Poles into the Ground Wattle between them and fling the Earth which arises out of your Graft between the outwardmost and innermost Wattlings Where the Ground is Moorish on the Verge of your Line and is sometimes in dry Seasons passable by Horse or Foot I would with Pallisadoes and Stockades secure it or by many join'd Turnspikes or Chevaleers de Freze and without these I would during the whole length of the Moorish Grounds at a competent distance cut two or three broad and deep Ditches which will fill themselves with Water and thereby discourage your Enemy to attack you in the weakest part of your Line or if he did assault you there much incommodate him and render it almost impossible for him to make use of his Horse in the attempt I have also known in such cases several Lines of deep and pretty large holes without but near your Line made at unequal distances and cover'd with slight Hurdles with a little Earth strew'd over them both to intangle an assaulting Enemy if he know it not or discourage him if he knows or has cause to suspect it for it were Temerity with Foot only to enter the Line of an inviron'd Camp where Horse and Foot and Cannon are ready to welcome them and by the immediately beforemention'd methods it will be difficult if possible for him in case his Foot enter to have them seconded by his Cavalry without which they are much likelier to be driven out than to be successful I would likewise for the better defence of those feebler parts of your Line erect Batteries and Redoubts within it the better to defend them and to rake your Enemy should he enter There are several Cares indispensably incumbent on a Commander in chief who posts himself in an intrenched standing Camp I shall enumerate some I. To have a Countrey behind his standing Camp to supply it constantly and at reasonable Rates with Victuals Forage and all other Necessaries and to preserve it both from the incursions of the Enemy and from the insultings or injury of his own Army II. To secure throughly those Towns Forts or Fortresses nearest to his Camp and in which he lodges his Magazines which are to supply him when the Countrey cannot or will not do it longer and therefore he ought alwayes before his Enemies are near whereby they may awe the Countrey from supplying him or the People of it may make that the pretence to get into those places with great diligence all the Victuals and Forage he can and from thence to furnish himself with what his Camp cannot contain or cannot be laid up dry in it but still to have as much Provision within the Line of his Camp as possibly he can for there 't is safest and at hand for Bisket Cheese Butter Meal and such like meats may be long kept in good condition in little room and are ready for food without Cookery if the Countrey be not perfectly well affected to the General he ought to take Hostages from it to supply the Victuals Forage and other Necessaries at the rates times and quantities which shall be agreed upon these Hostages if well chosen and diligently kept within the Camp will make the Countrey punctual in performing and be a sufficient answer to make those of it who would starve the Camp or the Enemy who else might frighten them from supplying it that they dare not but obey because their Hostages else will suffer As the chief Commander of such a standing Camp must make his agreement on equal terms with the Countrey for his sustenance out of it and see to their punctual performance of it so he must as punctually pay the Country according to his Contract since Fear and Gain are usually the most operative motives with the People to make good all Agreements III. The Convoys of Horse and Foot which are to
should resolve to give his Enemy Battel but on rational or at least very probable Grounds that he shall win it and also when the advantages of gaining it will be greater than the prejudices will be if he should lose it for whoever elects to fight a Battel on other Considerations cannot answer the doing it to his Prince to the Army he leads or to his own Judgment and Conscience III. The third is Whoever has his Enemy at such an advantage as he must submit in a short time without hazarding a Field ought on no terms to expose his Army to a Battel but should derive that from Time and Patience which else he must leave to the decision of Fortune As within my own memory I have known That a General greedy of Honour and impatient of Delay when by the wise conduct of those under him or the ill conduct of those against him his Enemies Army was so coop'd up that it could not long subsist nor Force its way he drew his own Army off of the Passes which shut up his Adversary that he might come out and decide it by a Battel which he lost and deservedly For the turns in a Battel are so many and are often occasion'd by such unexpected Accidents which also proceed from such minute Causes that a wise and great Captain will expose to Chance only as much as the very Nature of War requires IV. The fourth is When a Battel is resolved upon the Field to fight it in ought to be answerable to the Numbers of your Army and the quality of your Forces As for Example You should never choose a Ground to fight on if you can possibly avoid it which you cannot fill up with your fighting and reserve Squadrons and Battalions or as 't is now usually call'd your first and second Line That is you must still endeavor to cover the outward flanks of your Wings with a River a Wood a moorish Ground or something equivalent for else you will expose your Army too much if your Enemy does overwing you Whereas if you cannot be charg'd but in front you will have the less to fear and your Adversary the less to hope For Instance If I found my Army drawn up in Battalia would take up in its utmost extent but 15000 Foot I would not choose to fight in a Plain that was 20000 Foot wide if my Enemies Army were either more numerous than mine or were stronger in Cavalry than I But if by some Accident which I could not foresee or possibly avoid I were to fight on such a Ground I would immediately cover one or if possibly both of my Flanks with what the Nature of the Place afforded as besides a River a Brook a moorish Ground a Wood or Coppice or a steep Ground with a Ditch or Trench or some place so incumbred as my Adversaries Horse could not fall on that Flank without disordering himself before and in his doing of it But in case the Ground was so level and clear as it afforded me none of those Advantages which would be an extraordinary thing I would then by my Carriages or by immediately casting up a long and large Ditch or Trench on my Flanks supply by industry what I could not otherwise attain And if I had leisure at the two ends of each of these Ditches or Barricade of Wagons especially at the Front end I would cast up a Sconce Redoubt or Fort and stuff it with Musketeers whereby the Flank of my Wings would be covered and the Front and Rear of them defended by those Musketeers 'T was almost thus that Lewis Prince of Conde acted in the Battel at St. Denis in the Reign of King Francis the First of France And had not only thereby the Resolution with an handful of the French Protestants to fight the Constable of Montmorancy whose Army was three times as great as his but also to make it so disputable who had the Victory that the Historians of those Times give it without seruple to the Party they were of and wrote for And it seems indeed but doubtful who had the Victory for the next morning the Prince and the Admiral Chastillion by Andelot's being joined with them who brought them not above 1000 men with which until then he made the River of Seine useless to the Parisians drew up their Army again in the Field of Battel and shot some Peals of Cannon even into Paris yet none of that King's Forces came out to fight them so that the Protestants having for a few hours brav'd the French King's Forces and that vast City marched away towards Champagne to meet their German Relief But on the other hand the Historians who were Royallists attribute this wholly to the death of the Constable and not only to the Consternation which it caused but also to the Irresolution of the Counsels who should succeed him since the Duke of Anjou who at last did was by many judged too young for so weighty a Charge and it is reasonably to be believed he would not then have been nominated but that the Queen Regent was irremoveably setled not to lodge in such intricate times the absolute Military Power in any of the House of Guise or in that of Montmorancy but in one who intirely depended on her and would be guided by her And 't is probable that the Protestants who doubtless had been much disordered in the Battel durst not have made that Bravade depending only on their own strength but at least as much on the irresolution and disputes of their Enemies who should be their new General And therefore having set the best face they could on their tottering Affairs for a short time judged it not adviseable to continue playing that part any longer than they believed they might do it safely by the King's Army being without a Head I have only instanced this Particular to manifest how a lesser Army may oppose a much greater in Battel if the Flanks of the lesser be so well covered as that it can only be charged in Front which ought alwayes indispensibly to be provided for Nor is it only needful where a Battel is to be fought to pitch on a Ground answerable to the Number of your Army but also answerable to the quality of those Forces which compose it and to those of your Enemies with whom you must have to do As if my Enemy were stronger than I in Cavalry I would avoid all I might fighting him in a Plain or if I were the stronger in Horse I would use my utmost industry to engage him in an open Countrey And on the contrary if I were stronger in Infantry I would shun the Combat unless it were in an inclosed Country or incumbred by Woods Brooks Coppices Rocks or moorish Grounds so if he were the stronger in Foot I would avoid fighting in a place where he who has the most Infantry may therefore have the most hopes of Victory But if you are commanded to fight by your
Prince or are engaged to do it to answer an end worthy the hazard of a Battel or for any such other rational Consideration great care must be alwayes taken to make choice of that Ground which is fittest for you both in respect of your own Forces as also of your Enemies And in a most particular manner if you are weakest in Foot to cover them the best you can with your Horse and on the contrary if you are weakest in Horse to cover them with your Foot V. The Ranging of an Army in Battel to the very best advantage is a great furtherance to the winning of the Victory But the so doing of it depends much not only on the Wisdom and Skill of the General the Nature of the Ground and the Quality of his own Forces but also on those of his Enemies and on the disposition of him who commands them so that although no standing Rules can be given to answer all these varieties yet some positive Maxims may be set down which if punctually observed as things are circumstantiated may beneficially answer all occasions and emergencies And I the rather say this because I have seldom found that the greatest Captains of elder times whose military knowledge and practice the Moderns justly value and extol have ever observed one and the same form in giving Battel but have varied therein considerably according to the occasion Cyrus being to fight against Croesus King of Lydia and in a large Plain fearing to be inviron'd drew up his Army but Twelve deep in File whereas formerly the File was 24 deep Whereby he augmented the Front of his Army double overwing'd Croesus's and won the Victory Caesar at the Battel of Pharsalia against Pompey did quite alter the manner of the Roman Imbattelling For having found that Pompey exceedingly outnumbred him in Horse he covered one of his Flanks with a little River and drew all his Cavalry to the other Flank among the Squadrons whereof he placed Bodies of his best Infantry and there he began the Battel Where by having all his Horse in one Wing and those accompanied by select Legionary Foot he soon Routed that half of Pompey's Horse which opposed all his and then falling into the Flanks and Rear of his Enemy won the Victory These two are very remarkable Instances which among many others verifie what I have said I shall now mention some of those standing Maxims which in my humble Opinion are indispensibly to be observed immediately before and in a day of Battel 1. The first is With great diligence to view so well the Field you will fight in as when you have drawn up your Army on it you may not afterwards alter the Order of it or change your Ground for all such Mutations in the Face of your Enemy are very dangerous and gives him also the greater Confidence and your own Men the less as being an evidence to both of a great Failure in Conduct And it may also be highly hazardous either to remove the whole or even some gross Squadrons or Battalions to the Ground which on second thoughts may be believed the better Ground of the two since your Enemy being then near may take the benefit which such disorders while the alteration is making may give him and may improve it to your total overthrow so that 't is in my poor Opinion more adviseable to keep the Ground and Order you are in though by your oversight neither should be the very best than to alter it in the sight of your Enemy and when he is near And all changes of Grounds or Order in his view ought never to be made in Gross Bodies but almost insensibly to them and your own Army by a few Files at a time and where they cannot be so made 't is better to leave them unmade I had been often told but could scarcely credit it that at the fatal Battel of Naseby after my Lord Fairfax his Army was drawn up in view of His Majesties it having been judged that the Ground a little behind them was better than that they stood upon they removed thither I had the opportunity some time after to discourse on this Subject with Major General Skippon who had the chief ordering of the Lord Fairfax his Army that day and having ask'd him if this were true he could not deny it And when I told him I almost admir'd at it for the Reasons before exprest he averr'd he was against it but he obeyed the Orders for doing it only because he could not get them altered After the Ground to fight on is well chosen and all the advantages of it discovered then to possess and to secure the most useful and commanding Posts of it with all imaginable diligence As King Henry IV. of France did at the Battel of Arques where that great Monarch shewed as much conduct as any of the Greek and Roman Generals ever did in any of their greatest Battels II. The second is If you come near your Enemy but yet so late in the day that the Battel must be defer'd till the next morning then if the Season be sharp to shelter your own Army in the most convenient Villages and Woods adjoining to the Field you will fight in and thereby give them all the cease you can as King Henry IV. of France did the night before the Battel of Iuri But you must not on any terms neglect the safety of your Army for the ease of it and therefore it must be Quarter'd or Camp'd so well as that on the touch of the Drum all may be Embattled and ready to receive your Enemy For which end great Corps de Gards ought to be advanced and many Centinels as covertly as may be placed near the Enemy and every moment visited and relieved by vigilant Officers These Centinels or Perdu's are to give instant Notice to the advanced Guards if the Enemy moves and those Guards with their Seconds or Reserves are to find the Enemy play while your Army is drawing up to receive him But still fresh Troops must be sent to sustain your advanced Corps de Gard if they are vigorously attacked lest by their being totally overthrown your Enemy be encouraged to push at All and your own Men be somewhat disheartned For it may so happen that your Enemy if he finds all the advantages of the Place to fight in are so well secured by your care and diligence as that the next day it may be hazardous to fight in that Field he may make choice in the night if you are not Intrenched to attempt you where the confusion which darkness usually engenders may be equally divided between both Parties this of the two being the more eligible Nor were it amiss but very adviseable if you have to deal with a General who is hot and undertaking or one who by the necessity of his Affairs must put All to hazard that in such Nights when you are near your Enemy and may for the beforementioned Reasons have
Army at least in two Lines or orders of Battel and in three in case the Ground and the Number of his Forces allow it For those Lines are in effect so many Armies and the second Line being intire though the first should be broken often recovers the day especially if the second Line be at so just a distance behind the first as if the first be overthrown it does not disorder the second and also so near that some Squadrons of the second Line can come up timely enough to redress any beginning of a breach in the first without too much discomposing it self The Romans constantly fought their Infantry in three Lines or orders of Battel the one behind the other if the Hostatii were worsted they fell between the Intervals of the Principi and there Rallied again while the Principi advanced to give a check to the Pursuers and if both the Hostatii and Principi were Routed they fell in between the Intervals of the Triarii but if those could not sustain the shock the day was lost VII A seventh is To have expert vigilant and valiant Commanders to be at the Head of those five Gross Bodies of which an Army is usually composed in a day of Battel that is to say the three Tertia's of the Infantry which as they march we usually call Van Battle and Rear and the two Wings of the Cavalry they ought to be Men of great Judgment Authority and Presence of Mind to remedy all Disasters and to improve all Advantages in the nick of time for in such Actions the least delay or remisness is too usually irrecoverable To these five chief Officers whose Stations ought to be in the first Line there ought also to be five others to command in the second Line for this is of equal importance if not of greater since t is easier to give the Attack well while all is in Order than to recover a Disorder when it once has happened In my opinion it is a Duty in a General which he ought never to omit not only to appoint before the Armies Engage what Persons by Name shall command in chief the five Gross Bodies of the first Line and of the second Line but also what Commander in every of the said Gross Bodies shall in course succeed in the Conduct of every such Body in case the Person whose right it is to do it or who is appointed to do it should be kill'd or so wounded as he is thereby disabled to discharge so weighty a Trust and to declare openly to every Gross Body who by Name is to lead them and who by Name is to succeed him who shall be killed or disabled from discharging his Function that no Man may be ignorant or pretend ignorance therein For if this be not done before Troops are mingled in the Fight it will be too late to do it afterwards and I have known sad Disasters occasioned for want of this necessary Precaution Some who have been guilty of this Omission have as their Excuse alledged that when he who commanded that Gross was killed or put out of Fight by his hurts or his Horse being killed the eldest Officer or Colonel in course was to supply his room But that is not in all Cases a sufficient and full Answer for sometimes Regiments of Horse and Regiments of Foot have made up one Gross and though a Colonel of Foot has been the elder Colonel yet in the Field a younger Colonel of Horse has claimed the right of doing it and thereby Disputes amongst themselves have risen when they should have only disputed against the Enemy Besides I have also known that the elder Colonel has not been so fit to command a Gross as a younger Colonel has been and the Soldiery also have known it who will not be a little troubled to be lead by one who they all know was not so capable of that Honor and Trust. Neither do all the inferior Officers or private Soldiers know the dates of every Colonels Commission and if their own Colonel pretends to the Seniority they will not desert him in his pretence by immediately submitting to be led by and obey another But by the method I propound these Uncertainties and dangerous Disputes will be avoided else if they are ever run into it may too probably be fatal And since a General in the Field may appoint on the death of a General Officer who shall act in his place till the King's pleasure therein be known which is usual enough and in making this choice acts not alwayes by the rule of Seniority but by the fitness of the Person and yet therein does no Wrong to an elder Colonel I see no solid Reason why a General may not temporarily Nominate who shall command a Gross Body in case he who did it is killed or disabled especially in a day of Battel when All is at stake and when no Advantage ought to be lost in Nominating the ablest Person for the vacant Charge lest thereby the Victory be lost I am fully of opinion that the greatest Captain that ever was or will be is not or can be of himself sufficient to redress all Disorders and lay hold of all Advantages in an instant when Armies are once engaged The utmost he can do is to choose well the Field of Battel to draw up his Army according thereunto to most Advantage to give his General Orders and to give the best Orders wherever he is in Person but he cannot be Ubiquitary nor send Orders to every place timely enough to have them obey'd successfully And therefore 't is indisputably necessary that he have under him expert chief Officers at the Head of all Gross Bodies who may supply what it is impossible for him singly to command for he can be well obey'd but to the time he sends his Troops to the charge after that those only who lead them and are with them can actuate them according to the General Orders or as the occasion requires which those under him must have the judgment to lay hold of as it were in the twinkling of an Eye so short are the moments to acquire the Victory Together with those chief Officers who command Tertia's and Wings of Armies it is of high importance to have an able General of the Artillery and that he have sufficient Officers under him for the Carriages well disposed and the Cannon early and well planted do not a little contribute to the Victory and if it may be I would never have the Cannon fired so as the Bullet if it take place can only carry away a File especially also now our Files are so shallow but alwayes to point your Artillery so as the shot may rake thwart the Squadrons and Battalions of the Enemy and then it does not only do execution while it has any force but also disorders whole Bodies of Infantry or Cavalry VIII An eighth thing is to place alwayes your best Soldiery in the Wings of your Army and to begin
been needless as also by carrying into his Leaguer what was in the Villages and Countrey Neighbouring on his Works to deprive his Enemies Army of all sustenance but what they brought along with them or were daily to be fetch'd by them to their Camp from a great distance And lastly to have still in his Leaguer more Victuals than the Besieged could then have within the Town thereby to compel the Relieving Army to attack those almost unconquerable Works or the Town to surrender for want of Food in the sight of the Army which came for the Succor These necessary performances together with his often fighting against such Forces as almost hourly Night and Day made numerous Sallies and were obliged to do it both to harass and lessen Caesar's Army and to retard the finishing of his Works which when compleated would render it highly difficult if possible to relieve the Besieged I say and I think with reason all these Economies of War were at least as difficult in the Actings as the making those laborious Fortifications Yet all were to be done and done at one and the same time and in so short a space that I scarce know to which of the two my Admiration is justlier due At length the Relieving Army appear'd which consisted of 248000 men as Caesar who condescended to be the Commissary of their Musters reckons them to be and also writes how many every State of Gallia did particularly send so that at once he was to withstand 320000 of his Enemies and which was more to fight with them at the same time when they attacked him in Front and Rear This formidable Relieving Army was led by four Generals viz. Comius Veridomarus Eporedorix and Vergesilaunus All great Captains and accustomed to make War even against Caesar himself where they could not but have learn'd much having to do with such a General and yet for many Years continued the War against him and one of them viz. Comius had learn'd the Rudiments of War under Caesar himself and acquired so much Honour in serving the Romans that Caesar rewarded him with the Principality over the Morini The Gaules seated their Camp on a Hill half a mile from Caesar's Works and sent their Cavalry into a Plain under it and their nimblest Archers conceal'd behind their Troops Caesar makes his Cavalry match out to fight them lest the Gaules by having their Cavalry unfought with even under Caesar's Works might grow too insolent and his own Army be intimidated The Roman Horse were worsted by the help of the Gaules Archers but Caesar's German Horse Relieved them Routed the Gaules and cut in pieces their Archers and then all Caesar's Troops return d within their Line The Gaules made three several General Assaults on Caesar's Camp the first by Day the second by Night and the third at full Noon Vercingetorix every time Sallying out at the same hour with his Army In these three Attacks all that Valor Skill and Industry could perform on both sides was not omitted Some Particulars I shall enumerate the Gaules finding the Rows of Stakes and Holes and the Galthorps destroyd many of their Men flung up so much Earth over them as covered them and thereby made them useless to the Romans Then filling their Ditches with Fagots Hurdles and Earth raised the Outside on which they went to the Assaults higher than the Line they assaulted and so went on advantageous Ground to the Attack and Caesar when he found his Men distressed in Front by the Enemies over-numbring him and fighting on equal Ground would often command his Cavalry sometimes his Legionary Infantry to sally out of his Line and to fall on them in the Rear whereby he routed them The last dayes Attack seem'd several Battels rather than one General Assault such great Bodies fighting at once both within and without the first Lines towards the Field and towards the Town for the Gaules having discover'd the weakest or more properly the least strong part of Caesar's Line while all the residue of their Army were assaulting the rest of the Works Vergesilaunus who was Vercingetorix's near Kinsman in the obscurity of the preceding Night had marched behind a Hill and concealed himself there with 60000 select men who at Noon-day when the Romans were with all their Forces defending their Works both against the Besieged and Comius c. assaulted them unexpectedly entred the Line whose Ditch they had filled and with many shouts daunted Caesar's Soldiers as he himself confesses But Caesar at last by the Valor and Expertness of his men and by his excellent Conduct relieving them in all parts where they were oppressed and leading them in Person to many Charges was Victorious and Chaced the Gaules to the very Works of their Camp and to the Gates of the Town and adds If his Soldiers had not been quite spent with that dayes hot Service few of all the Gaules had scaped They lost in that last dayes attempt above 60000 men so that despairing to perform what they came for they did that Night abandon their Camp and many were kill'd by Caesar's Cavalry who pursued them in the obscurity and the next day Vercingetorix capitulated and yielded he himself gallantly mounted and armed at all points having first leisurely rid round about the Chair of State in which Caesar sate to receive him alighted off of his Horse and as an evidence of his being Conquer'd disarm'd himself and then went and sate down on the Ground at Caeâ—…ar's feet without speaking one word Some of those many Reasons which induced Caesar in my opinion to continue within his Lines and not to give the Enemy Battel in the Field I shall here set down I. He could not shut up in Alesia a much greater Army than his own without making very strong Lines of Countervallation against it II. Having made these wonderful â—…ines and knowing of the vast Relief which was certainly hastening to succor the Besieged he with so small an Army as his own which probably could not consist of above 30000 Foot and 6000 Horse for he never had above 10 Legions at once in all Gallia could not reasonably hope both to keep in Vercingetorix with 80000 chosen men and fight against Comius c. with 248000 good men unless by prodigious Works he could supply what he wanted in Numbers of men and also by so posting his Army between his Lines of Circumvallation and â—…ountervallation as to be thereby ready to resist both wayes and often with the same Reserve Battalions and Squadrons For whatever Justus Lâ—…psius computes That the space between these two Lines must be 5000 Foot yet in reason I am fully convinced they were much nearer each other for else they could not answer the end for which they were made since no Squadrons of Reserve can 〈◊〉 answer both wayes a distance of a Mile much less do it as often as need requires and our modern Lines of Circumvallation and Countervallation which are but Copies after
the Prince of Conde now living besieged Arras and raised one of the ordinary Lines of Circumvallation about it Monsieur de Turenne assisted by His Royal Highness the Duke of York came to relieve that place The Archduke and the chief Spanish Commanders resolve to justifie their Line but as I have been assured the Prince of Conde was absolutely either for giving the French Army Battel or retreating before the Relief was near this wholsom advice was not followd His Royal Highness and Monsieur de Turenne assault and carry the Line being themselves two of the very first which entred it and doubtless had intirely cut off the Spanish Army had those Bridges been immediately secured by the French by which the Spaniards held communication I was positively told by a Person of great Honour who was present that His Royal Highness whose judgment in War in so green an Age was almost as much admired as his Valor exceedingly pressed to have it done which being a while omitted the Prince of Conde in Person with almost incredible diligence got together many Squadrons of Horse then caused their own Bridges to be destroyed and with his usual Conduct his Sword in his hand made the Retreat and saved the residue of that broken Army In what the Prince of Conde then did we may learn one very observable Lesson That a great Commander when a fatal mischief is fallen into which his advice had it been followed would probably have prevented is notwithstanding obliged to hazard his Person and employ his best Conduct to make the Loss as easie as possibly he can to his own Party A second Instance of the like ill Success by pursuing the like method is in the same Monsieur de Turenne's besieging Valenciennes jointly with the Mareschal de la Ferte and resolving within an ordinary Line of Circumvallation to oppose the Spanish Relief led by Don Iohn of Austria who forced the Line on the Mareschal de la Ferte's side of the River As soon as this was known to Monsieur de Turenne he instantly broke his own Bridges over it sent away his Cannon and Baggage and marched after it as expeditiously as he could and therein acted the best part which in such a Case was left him to manage These two Instances so fresh in our memories seem to me no ill Evidence That whatever Besieging General shall stay within such an ordinary Line and of great Circumference when an Army comes to attack it 't is great odds but he suffers thereby considerable loss and disgrace By the French forcing such a Line justified by the Spaniards before Arras And by the Spaniards forcing such a Line justified by the French before Valenciennes it looks as if the Victory were not won so much by the Conduct and Valor of either Army as by the Difficulty of defending such a Line And therefore whatever Nation does play the like Game will too probably sustain the like Loss I might particularize several other Examples of this Nature even within our own Times but to avoid cloying my Reader I purposely omit them and will rather employ his patience in giving him some instances of great Captains who chose to quit their ordinary Lines to give the Relieving Army Battel and were successful therein Maurice Prince of Orange in the Year 1600 had besieged Newport believing that the mutiny of many of the Spanish Forces would disable the Archduke from relieving it but those Mutineers being unexpectedly pacified and the Archduke marching with his Army to relieve the Place that Prince though always loth to come to a decisive Battel yet in this Case having had onely time enough to make an ordinary Line of Circumvallation quitted it led thereunto by his own judgment and the concurrent advice of our Noble Sir Francis Vere and advanced to meet the Archduke gave him Battel in the open Field won the Victory with 116 Ensigns and 5 Standards and perhaps had also won Newport had he in earnest again besieged it which he forbore to do partly because la Burlotte had cast into it three Regiments with great Conduct and Celerity In the Year 1633 the Duke of Lunenburg with Milander and Mareschal Kniphausen had besieged Hamelen a strong and considerable place seated on the River Vessâ—…r in Germany and having reduced it to great Wants the Germans resolved to relieve it and Rendezvous'd a great Army for that end under the Comand of General Merodes and Count Cronesfield The Besiegers on their Enemies Army drawing near left some Regiments for the defence of their most advanced Approaches and to hinder the Garisons sallying during the Battel and with 9500 Horse near as many Foot with 42 pieces of Cannon Field and Battering went to fight the Relief which consisted of near the like Numbers The Battel was long and bloody it lasted above 9 hours but at length the Protestant and besieging Army got the Victory the marks whereof were the Duke of Lunenburgs Milanders and Kniphausens taking 50 Ensigns and Standards 800 Wagons 13 Cannon 2000 Prisoners and Merodes the General who soon after dyed of his Wounds as 5000 of his Men did on the spot The Victorious immediately returned to the Siege and the Garison soon surrendred In the Year 1638 Duke Bernard Weymar on a sudden sits down before Rhinefield in Alsatia and reduces it almost to the last Extremity the Imperialists send Duke Savelle and General John de Wert with an Army to relieve it Duke Weymar following his own solid Opinion and being seconded therein by the advice of Henry Duke of Rohan one of the greatest Captains of that Age who went a Volunteer to that Action to wipe off some Calumnies which his Enemies had unjustly laid to his Charge quits his Lines to give the Enemy Battel but leaves some Regiments of Foot and Troops of Horse to justifie his Works and beat in the Besieged if they should sally Savelle and Wert accept the Battel and after a sharp dispute Weymar got the day cuts in pieces the best of the Imperial Troops takes all their Baggage and Cannon and Duke Savelle General Wert and Spureter Prisoners then returns to Rhinefield which soon after surrendred unto him Monsieur de Turenne a few Years since besieged Dunkirk Don John of Austria came with an Army to relieve it Monsieur de Turenne abandons his Line gives Don John Battel wins the Victory and as a consequence of it had Dunkirk yielded to him in which Battel our Countreymen did great Service King Henry the Great of France when Alexander Ferneze Duke of Parma and Charles Duke of Mayenne came to the Relief of Paris with the United Forces of the League and of Philip II. of Spain would not stay within his Lines but drew out of them to give his Enemy Battel which those two excellent Captains would not accept of but by a rare Conduct having forced Lainy in the sight of the French Army by that way flung the wanted Relief into Paris For
Command may be clearly heard and punctually obeyed 'T is observed that the Grecians went alwayes silently to the Battel alledging for it That they had more to do than to say to their Enemies But such Shoutings is a kind of doing for it stirs up your own Men and often damps your Enemies This puts me in mind how that once marching in Battalia in a plain Countrey to fight the Enemies Army and as they marched in the like order to meet us some Musketeers of ours running hastily to a Budge-Barrel to fill their Bandeleers and being careless of their Matches the Budge-Barrel took fire and blew them up at which the Enemies Army shouted and finding our Men did not answer them I rid hastily to the next Squadrons and Battalions and commanded them also to shout which the rest of the Forces taking it from them repeatedly did soon after the like Accident happen'd to the Enemies Army and then our Men shouted but were not answer'd which I bid the next Troops to take notice of as a sign they were disanimated and a proof that their loss was considerable by that blowing up the Soldiers took it as an Omen of that Victory which God soon after was pleased to give us which seems to shew That Shouting according to the Soldiers understanding is a token of joy and the Enemies not answering it an evidence of fear and whatever may cause fear in your Enemy ought not to be omitted by you since Fear is truly said to be a Betrayer of that Succor which Reason else might afford Besides there is in all Mankind a weak Part and Experience has but too clearly evidenced that the difference between the Best and the Worst Men does not consist in those being totally exempted from the Influences and Operations of it but in the degrees of being less liable to it Now this weak Part is affected with Noise and Pageantry and therefore when the shew of danger is thoroughly imprest on the Intellect by the conveyance of the Senses the minds of Men are too much disturbed to be then actuated by the dictates of Reason The putting into Rank and File and the forming into the order of Squadrons and Battalions all the Men and Boyes which attend the Soldiers and can be spared from the Baggage and are not armed may be of good use for all those so ordered and placed at a competent distance as a Grand Reserve in the Rear of all make a formidable shew to your Enemy and inclines him to believe you have a third Line or Battalia to be broken before they can get the Victory Nor is this all the advantage which may be derived from thus disposing of those useless Persons in a day of Battel since thereby also you will hinder them from filching the Soldiers Goods while they are busie a Fighting and will keep the Field clear which you engage in I mention this last Particular having sometimes seen the Soldiers Boyes and the Drivers of Carriages either incited thereto by natural Valor or desire of Pillage or both so closely attend the Rear of their Masters who were fighting that when they were disordered it occasioned much hazard and confusion in the Rallyment But these appearances of Soldiers must alwayes be put at such a distance from the Enemy that he may not see they are unarmed and consequently but a meer show for then that will become ridiculous which otherwise will be terrifying Though I have already said in General That if your Enemy be stronger than you in Cavalry you must cover yours with your Infantry and if he be stronger than you in Infantry you must cover yours with your Cavalry Yet possibly it may not be useless to set down in some Particulars how those General Rules may be best practised If my Enemy did much outnumber me in Horse and I him in Foot I would flank every Battalion of my Shot with Files of Pikes Nay I would so order such of my Battalions as were likeliest to bear the often Charging of the Enemies Cavalry as that the Front and Rear of my Shot in them should be covered with my Pikes as well as my Flanks and under my Pikes my Shot should be still firing either keeping their Ground or Advancing or Retreating as there should be occasion Nor would I omit if my Enemy very much overpower'd me in Cavalry to place small Battalions of Shot and Pike so order'd as is immediately before express'd in the Intervals between my Squadrons of Horse in the first Line of my Wings For to me it seems much more adviseable if you mingle Battalions with Squadrons in your Wings that such Battalions should be of Pike and Shot so ordered than of Shot alone as is the usual method in such Imbattellings For if such small Battalions consist of Shot only the chief advantage you can derive from them is by their firing to disorder your Enemies Squadrons just as you are going to Charge them but if that fails of the hoped-for Event whatever becomes of your Squadrons these small Battalions are too much exposed to Ruine for Shot onely will not resist Horse in an open Field especially when those Shot also are disanimated by the Flight or Routing of the Horse that had fought on their side Besides I have found experimentally That private Soldiers never fight with the needful Courage when they are led on such a piece of Service as this of Firing on an Enemy and after to shift for themselves if that Volly does not the Work for then they do it in haste and too often timerously for even while they are firing they are looking which is the best Way to flie when they have done firing which would too much distract Men of more setled minds than private Soldiers are usually blest with To which I shall further add That Musketeers so imbattled and chequer'd as it were with Squadrons of Horse may too likely on the disordering of your first Line of Cavalry be so shuffled together by those of it that are Routed by those of your Enemy which pursue the Rout and by those of your second Line which advance to stop the Enemies pursuit that the poor Shot can neither be useful to their Friends nor offensive to their Enemies Whereas if those small Battalions be composed of Pike as well as Shot and be ordered as is formerly set down they will in the Spaces or Intervals between your Squadrons not only make almost as great Fire on your Enemies but also firing under the Pikes do it with less apprehension and consequently take their Aim the better and thereby do the more Execution Besides fighting with a Resolution to make good their Ground composes their Minds and makes them the more Resolute against their Enemies and the more obedient to their Officers Commands but what is most material of all is If your Squadrons should be disordered nay routed yet such Battalions as these will for some time at least keep their Ground and with
their Shot if not with their Pikes gaul your Enemy while under their Covert your Horse may Rally and come again and again to the Charge and possibly recover the day Nay it makes your Cavalry fight with more Confidence when they know that one or more disastrous Charges may by thus ordering some of your Infantry be repaired by their own Rallying in the Rear of them and those who know what belongs to War will not be over-forward to Charge the second Line of your Wing leaving at once such Battalions of Infantry and the disorder'd Cavalry Rallying at their backs but on the contrary will hardly judge it adviseable to attempt your second Line till they have intirely swept out of the Field your whole first Line I did frequently though unworthy of the Honour command Forces in Chief and therefore I esteem'd it my duty to be often thinking and arguing how they might be employed to the best advantage and though in the Wars I was in we alwayes were or at least thought our selves to be superior to the Enemy in Cavalry Yet I was not seldom busying my thoughts how we might best fight in case he should be at any time stronger than I in Horse and I stronger than he in Foot The Result of those Thoughts I will presume to Present my Reader with The Checquering my first Line of Cavalry with small Battalions of Shot I judg'd was not the most secure or the most effectual way and therefore I concluded the Impaling as it were my Musketeers by my Pikes as is before-mentioned was much the better And because whatever is new and surprising to your Enemy is still of considerable advantage especially at the instant in which you are going to Charge him I resolved had I ever had an occasion to do it to have acted when the Ground allow'd of it as followeth I. I would have drawn up all my Cavalry a-breast either two or three deep as I should have esteem'd it the best as things were circumstantiated II. I would have appointed previously what Squadrons should have composed my first Line and what Squadrons should have composed my second Line and what Officers should lead or be in the Rear of every Squadron in both Lines and have communicated to them respectively my Orders therein III. I would then have drawn up those small Battalions of Pike and Shot order'd as I formerly mentioned just in the Rear of every such Squadron only as was to compose the first Line of my Wing and just as many in a Rank as might fill up the intended Interval when it was made and have caused my Pike-men to trail their Pikes that they might not have been seen by the Enemy which if shoulder'd or ported they would be IV. I would then have advanced towards the Enemy as if I had had no second Line or Reserved Squadrons but just when I was come so near him as that it was time to form my first and second Line I would at the Trumpets sounding the Charge which should be the Signal for the doing it have composed my said two Lines of my Wing by the Squadrons of the Front Line continuing their motion and by the Squadrons of the second Line making a Stand or Halt V. As the first Lines would be forming it self by the Squadrons of it continuing their motion and the second Lines would be forming it self by standing I would in the Interval of Ground made thereby have caused my small Battalions of Pike and Shot behind every Squadron of the first Line to march up and made an even Front with the fame Squadrons in whose Rear they had till then marched and so have begun the Battel advancing with the Horse and those Foot my Shot firing under their Pikes inoessantly This I esteem'd would have been both new and surprizing for it would have been thought strange by the Enemy and likely have given him an ill opinion of my Conduct to see me bring all my Cavalry to fight at onde which the first Form of my advancing would probably make him believe was my intention But when he unexpectedly saw that I composed my two Lines orderly in my advancing it might amaze and surprize him And in all likelihood both those Productions might he heightned when he should also see my small Battalions of Pike and Shot appear unexpectedly from behind my Squadron and advance in an even Front with them to the Charge so that his Horse singly must endure the joint shock of my Horse Pikes and Musketeers If this method of Checquering my Squadrons in the first Line of my Wing with small Battalions of Pike and Shot order'd as I have set it down should be approved and that you have Infantry enough so to Checquer your second Line also and that you shall esteem it necessary to have it done by reason of your Enemies exceedingly overpowring you with Horse you may also observe the like method of doing it in your second Line as you did in your first by having such small Battalions of Pike and Shot drawn up and marching in the Rear of those Squadrons which are to compose your second Line who may advance by the Interval Ground between the Squadrons to the Front of them when by your first Lines continued motion they have left the Ground free In the doing of all this there are some Particulars I would recommend to be alwayes observed I. That your Pikes which are to be trail'd during your advancing behind the Squadrons that the Enemy may not discover by those long Weapons what you would conceal from his sight be ported as soon as ever you begin to appear between the Intervals between which you are to march up to make an even Front with your Cavalry that thereby they may be the readier to be Charged against the Enemy who will by that time be very near and therefore such preparative readiness to receive him is very needful II. I would have all my Firelocks load their Muskets with Pistol Bullets for the Enemy against whom you Fire will be alwayes very near and therefore several Pistol Bullets out of one Gun will do as much Execution as one Musket Bullet at a time out of many Guns III. Those commanded Pikemen which are to impale your Shot ought to be of the resolutest and strongest men for on their Courages will depend much of the safety of your Horse and of your Shot and therefore if I had Pikemen armed defensively with Back Breast Pott and Faces I would choose to place them there since they are also to endure the shock of your Enemies Cavalry IV. The shot of these small Battalions must be still bestowed on those Squadrons of your Enemies Wing which compose his first Line for those are the nearest and the most pressing and the Muskets being loaden with Pistol Bullets they will not do certain Execution on any Squadrons of the Wing of his second Line which are usually about 100 Yards less advanced than his first Line
Lastly If it be on your Right Wing that these small Battalions of Pike and Shot are placed then I would have them when they advance to Front even with your Squadrons alwayes to do it to the Right of the Squadron they marched in the Rear of and if it be on the Left Wing alwayes to the Left For thereby your Flanks of your outward Squadrons in each Wing will be cover'd with Pike and Shot and the innermost Squadrons of your Wings will be flank'd with the Battalions of the Foot of your Army Therefore if this be not stedily observed your outmost Squadron of both your Wings will be needlesly left unflank'd by a small Battalion of Pikes and Shot which when you are much outnumbred in Horse will be too hazardous and therefore the preventing it highly adviseable I acknowledge I never practised this against an Enemy but it was meerly because I never had need to do it neither did I ever exercise my Men to it and that proceeded only from an apprehension that it might discover what I intended in case there had been need and thereby probably have made it less effectual But I am confident it is very easily practicable and to be made of very advantageous use in case the Enemy were much my superior in Cavalry and I stronger than he in Infantry But I submit this Notion to the judgment of those who are better able to determine of it than I. If your Army be stronger by much in Cavalry than your Enemies and his stronger by much than yours in Infantry I would then earnestly endeavor to fight both or at least one of his Wings with both or one of my Wings which I once did and I would make all my Infantry move as slowly towards the Enemy as they could while I advanced a round trot with my Cavalry and Charged that of my Enemies And if I had success in both my Wings against both his or in one of my Wings against one of his then I would make the next innermost Squadrons of my second Line of that Wing which had beaten the Enemies or of both my Wings if they had defeated both the Enemies Wings immediately march to flank my Battalions of Foot but not to hazard Infantry to Infantry till mine were Wing'd by some Squadrons of my second Line and then advance to the Charge as expeditiously as I could without disordering my Battalions thereby making my Squadrons doubly useful And the Enemies Infantry must be resolute men indeed when all their Horse are routed and that they are to be Charged with all my Infantry and divers Squadrons of my Cavalry and are to be raked with my Cannon which then may be drawn up for that end if they are not soon reduced to furl their Colours order their Pikes and crave Quarter I would further in case I were strong enough in Cavalry to do it even before my Wings were fighting against the Enemies Wings appoint some Squadrons of mine to draw up in the Rear of my Battalions both to countenance my own Infantry and the more to deter the Enemies from Charging them during the Engagement of all the Horse of both Armies For it is the duty of a General to order all things as safely as he may and to leave as little to what is called Fortune as possibly he can The clearing of the Ground you intend to imbattel on of all such Squadrons or Battalions as your Enemy may have advanced on it before you bring up your Battalions and Cannon on it ought never to be omitted and ought still to be done by your Horse and Dragoons or with few if any of your Infantry For the neglect of this may hazard your Army since the Enemy having the start of you by getting part of his Army in the Field of Battel before you get any of yours he may thereby cut you off by peece-meal while you are forming your Imbattelling This I observed was carefully practised by the Prince of Conde before the Battel of Rocroy and Monsieur de Gassion was commanded with his Cavalry to do that Work which being effectually done it did not a little contribute to the Princes Victory In the Imbattelling of your Army I would still do it where the Ground admits it by drawing up in one Line only all the Cavalry and Infantry and not as I have seen some unexpert Commanders do Draw up first a Squadron of a Wing which was to compose part of your first Line and then a Squadron of Reserve to it which was to compose part of your second Line and so in Sequence all your Squadrons and Battalions of your whole Army for that method is tedious and the just spaces of your Intervals between Squadron and Squadron and between Battalion and Battalion cannot be so well adjusted by the Eye as by the first filling up those spaces with the Soldiery for the first is but Guessing but the last is Certainty I would observe this method not only in order to the better and more expeditious Imbattelling my Army if the Ground allow'd it but I would also observe it as much as orderly I could in my advancing to the Charge until I saw it time to form my two Lines by the continued motion of those Troops which are to compose my first Line and by Alting of those Troops which were to compose my second Line and of my third Line if the Ground were so scanty as my two first could more than employ it all And this not singly for the Reasons before exprest but for this additional one also viz. It being very difficult for many and great Squadrons which have Intervals between every two of them to preserve the just Wideness of the Intervals if they march far and if those Intervals are not duly observed 't is impossible to avoid one of these two mischiefs either if they are contracted during your Advance the Troops which at need are to march up through them will be disabled from doing it or at least so many of them as cannot will in their separating from those which can be disorder'd and too likely remain useless Or if these Intervals be inlarged your Flanks are thereby exposed to be fallen into by the Enemy therefore in my poor judgment that way is the very best which will most likely prevent your being involved in either of them and that is practicable and attainable I believe by not making any Intervals till almost you may have need of them which by advancing all your Army in one Line until you come so nigh the Enemy as you judge is a fit time to form your Lines in the manner before set down And then the distance being so little between you and your Enemy 't is not likely if but ordinary care is taken that the Interval Ground can be either much contracted or much enlarged at least 't is not so likely that either of those Ills will be run into marching over but a little Ground as marching over