I fancy I see it drawn up before my eyes which gives me an ardent desire to see it engaged I would not for any thing in the world that you should prove a Fabius Maximus and endeavour no more than to avoid Fighting and keep the Enemy in suspence for I should blame you more than the Romans did him CHAP. VI. The description of a Battel Fabr. DO not question it Hark do not you hear the Artillery Ours have fired already but done little execution upon the Enemy the Velites extraordinary together with the light Horse advance to the charge in Troops with the greatest shout and fury imaginable The Enemies Artillery has fired once and the shot passed over the head of our Foot without any prejudice at all That it might not have time for a second Volley our Velites and our Cavalry have marched up in great haste to possess it and the Enemy advancing in its defence they are come so close that neither the Artillery of one side or the other can do any mischief See with what courage and bravery our Souldiers charge with what discipline and dexterity they demean themselves thanks to the exercise to which they have been used and the confidence that they have in our Army See our Battalions marching up with their Drums beating Colours flying and men at Arms in their wings in great order to the charge Observe our Artillery which to give place and make room for our men is drawn off by that ground which was left by the Velites See how the General encourages his men and assures them of Victory See how our Velites and light Horse are extended and returned to the flanks of our Army to see if there they can find any advantage to make an impression upon the Enemy Now now they are met See with what firmness our Battalions have received the charge without the least noise or confusion Observe the General how he commands his men at Arms to make good their ground not to advance upon the Enemy nor desert the Foot upon any occasion whatever See our light Horse marching to charge a Body of the Enemies Harquebussiers that was firing upon our flank and how the Enemies Horse come in to their rescue so that being enclosed betwixt the Cavalry of one side and the other they cannot fire but are forced to retreat behind their Battalia's See with what fury our Pikes addresâ— themselves to the Fight and our Foot advanced already so near that the Pikes are become unserviceable so that according to our Discipline the Pikes retire by little and little among the Shields See in the mean time how a Body of the Enemies men at Arms has disordered our men at Arms in the left wing and how according to our Discipline retiring under the protection of our Pikes extraordinary by their assistance they have repulsed the pursuers and killed most of them upon the place See the Pikes in ordinary of the first Battalia's how they have sheltred themselves under the Scudati and left them to make good the fight See with what courage with what security with what leisure they put the Enemy to the Sword Behold how they close their ranks in the Fight and are come up so near they have scarce room left to manage their Swords See with what fury the Enemy slyes because being armed only with Pike and with Sword both of them are become unserviceable one because of its length the other because the Enemy is too well armed See how they throw down their Arms how they are wounded killed or dispersed See how they run in the right wing see how they fly in the left So now we are safe and the Victory our own CHAP. VII The Authors reasons for the occurrences in the Battel Fabr. WHat do you think now have we not got the Victory very fortunately but we would have had it with more advantage had I been permitted to have put all things in execution You see there is no necessity of making use either of the second or third order because our Van was sufficient to overcome the Enemy so that I am enclined to speak no farther upon this Subject unless it be to resolve any doubt that may arise in your mind Luigi You have gain'd this Victory with so much courage and gallantry that I fear my transport will not give me leave to explain my self whether I have any scruple or not Nevertheless presuming upon your quickness I shall take the boldness to tell you what I think First therefore let me desire you to inform me why you made use of your Artillery but once why you caused them to be drawn off into your Army and made no mention of them afterward It seems to me that you placed the Enemies too high and ordered them as you fancied which might possibly be true but if their Cannon should be so placed as I do not question but many times they are as that they should play among your Troops I would fain understand what remedy you would prescribe and since I have begun to speak of the Artillery I shall propose all my scruples in this place that I may have no occasion to mention them hereafter I have heard many persons find fault with the Arms and orders of the ancients as things of little or no use in our days in respect of the fury of our Cannon because they break all ranks and pierce all Arms at such a rate that it seems to them no less than madness to oppose any ranks or orders of men against them and to tire your Souldiers with the carriage of Arms that will not be able to defend them Fabr. Your demand consisting of many heads requires a large answer 'T is true I caused my Artillery to play but once and I was in doubt whether they should do that and the reason is because it concerns a man more to keep himself from being hurt than to mischief his Enemy You must understand that to provide against the fury of great Guns it is necessary to keep where they cannot reach you or to place your self behind some wall or bank that may shelter you for there is nothing else that can secure you and then you must be sure that either the one oâ— the other are able to protect you Those Generals who put themselves into a posture to give battel cannot place their Armies behind a wall or a bank or at a distance where the Enemies Cannon cannot reach them and therefore seeing they have no way to defend themselves absolutely the best course is to secure themselves as well as they can and that is by possessing their Cannon with as much speed as is possible The way to possess themselves of it is to march up to it suddenly and in as wide an order as is convehient suddenly that they may fire but once and wide that the execution may be the less This is not to be done by a band of Souldiers in order for if they march any
the Romans marched in an Enemies Country and in what manner they are to be imitated Fabr. I Have shown you how an Army is drawn up and marshalled in order to a Battel I have told you how an Enemy is overcome and several circumstances which occur therein So that it is time now to inform you how an Army is to be ordered which has not an Enemy in view but is in continual probability of an assault This may happen when an Army marches in an Enemies Country or at least a Country that is suspected And first you must understand the Roman Armies had always some Troops of Horse which were scouting abroad in order to the discovery of the Roads After which followed the right Wing and after them the Carriages which belonged to that Squadron Then followed a Legion and after them their Carriages Then another Legion and their Carriages and after them the left Wing and the remainder of the Cavalry after them This in short was the manner in which the Romans marched most commonly and if it hapned in their march that their Army was assaulted either in the front or the rear they caused all their Carriages to withdraw to the right wing or the left as they found it convenient and most agreeable with the nature of the place and then when they were cleared of their Baggage and disincumber'd all of them unanimously make head against the Enemy If they were assaulted in the flank they drew their Carriages on that side where they were like to be most safe and then addressed themselves against the Enemy This way being good and well govern'd ought in my judgment to be imitated by sending your light Horse to scout about the Country and having four Battalions of Foot they are to follow one the other successively each of them with its Carriages in the rear And because Carriages are of two sorts one belonging to particular persons and others for the common use of the Camp I would divide the publick Carriages into four parts and assign one to every Battalion I would likewise divide the Artillery and the followers of the Camp into four parts that each Battalion should have equal share in their impediments and Carriages Bnt because it happens many times that you march thorow a Country not only suspected but so openly your Enemy that you expect every hour to be assaulted it will be necessary that to secure your self you change the form of your march and put your self into such a posture as that neither the Paisants nor the Enemies Army may be able to offend you though they come upon you never so suddenly In these cases your Generals of old were wont to march in a square order which they called a square not that it was exactly of that figure but because it was ordered so as it was able to fight in four places at once and by that means they were always ready either to march or to fight I shall follow this model for ordering my two Battalions which I have chosen to that purpose in stead of a compleat Army CHAP. II How an Army is to be Marshalled to march in an Enemies Country Fabr. TO march therefore securely in an Enemies Country and to be able to make good every part when surprized and assaulted by the Enemy I am to reduce my Army into a square according to the model of the ancients I would have a square whose area or vacuity within should consist of 212 yards in this manner I would first place my flanks distant one from the other 212 yards I would have five Battalia's in each flank marching length ways in files and at three yards distance the one Battalia from the other so that each Company taking up forty yards all of them together with the spaces betwixt them shall take up 212 yards Between the front and the rear of these two flanks I would dispose the other ten Companies in each of them five ordering them so that four of them should be placed in the front of the right flank and four in the rear of the left flank leaving a space of four yards betwixt each Company and of the two Companies that are left I would have one placed at the head of the left flank and the other in the rear of the right And because the space betwixt one flank and the other consists of 212 yards and these Battalia's drawn sideways in breadth rather than length will take up intervals and all 134 yards there will remain a space of 78 yards betwixt the four Companies in the front of the right flank and the same space will be possessed by the four Companies in the rear nor will there be any difference but that one space will be behind towards the right wing and the other before towards the left In the space of 78 yards before I would put my ordinary Velites in the space behind my Velites extraordinary which would not amount to a thousand for each space But to contrive it so that the great space within should consist of 212 yards square it would be convenient that the five Companies which are placed in the front and the five Companies in the rear should take up none of that space which belongs to the flanks wherefore it is necessary that the five Companies behind should with their front touch the rear of the flanks and those five Companies in the Van with their rear should touch the front of the flanks so that there should remain on each side of the Army a distance sufficient to receive another Company And because there are four spaces I would take four Ensigns of the Pikes extraordinary and place one in each of them and the two Ensigns which would remain I would place in the midst of the space of my whole Army in a square Battalion at the head of which the General of the Army should stand with his Officers about him But because these Battalia's thus ordered do march all of them one way at once but do not so when they fight when they are drawn up those sides are to be put into a fighting posture which are not guarded by other Battalia's And therefore it is to be considered that the five Battalions in the front are defended on all sides but just in the front so that they are to be drawn up in great order with the Pikes before them The five Companies behind are guarded on all sides but behind so as they are likewise to be ordered with Pikes in their rear as we shall show in its place The five Companies in the right flank are guarded on every side but only on the right flank The five in the left flank are the same only on the left flank they are open and therefore in the managing your Army you must observe to place your Pikes so as they may turn about to that flank which is naked and exposed and your Corporals are to be in the front and in the rear that being to
that he would not stir from Monte-Carlo thereby to draw them into his Clutches and make them hast with all speed to gain the avenues to the Val de Nievole and this plot of his jump'd exactly with the Florentine design For they having no mind that Pistoia should be the Theatre of the War and being willing to remove it into the Vale they encamped above Seravalle with intention to have passed the Streights the next day not imagining in the least that the Castle was surprized Castruccio having notice of their motion about midnight drew his Army out of their quarters and stole privately before break of day to the foot of Seravalle The accident was odd for as he marched up the Hill on one side the Enemy marched up on the other caused his Foot to advance by the way of the common Road but he drew out a party of Four hundred Horse and commanded them towards the left on that side towards the Castle There were Four hundred of the Enemies Horse that were a Forlorn to their Army and the whole Infantry followed them but their Scouts were no sooner upon the top of the Hill when on a sudden they fell foul upon the Troops of Castruccio They were strangely surprized for knowing nothing of the taking of the Castle they could not imagine the Enemy would come to meet them Insomuch that before they had leisure to put themselves into a posture they were constrained to engage tumultuosly with those Troops which were drawn up in good Order but they in confusion Not but some of the Florentine Cavaliers behaved themselves gallantly but the noise of so unexpected an Encounter put them presently to a stand and being defused in the Army it put all into great disorder and fear The Horse and the Foot fell foul upon one another and both upon the baggage Want of ground rendered the Experience of the Officers of no use and the streightness of the pass confounded all their Military cunning The first Troops that Castruccio charged upon the top of the Hill were immediately routed and the small resistance they made was not so much the defect of their courage as the effect of the place with the incommodity of which and the strangeness of the surprize they were constrained to give ground There was no way left for them to run on their Flanks the Mountains were inaccessable their Enemies were in the Front and their own Army in the reer In the mean time as this first charge of Castruccio was not sufficient to stagger the enemies Battel he drew out a party of Foot and sent them to joyn with the Horse in the Castle of Seravalle this body in reserve having possession of the Hills and falling upon the flank of the Florentines forced them to give ground and yield to the wild incommodity of the place and the violence and fierceness of the enemy The Reer-guard ran and having got into the plain that looks towards Pistoia every man shifted as well as he could This defeat was bloody and great among the multitude of prisoners there were many of the principal Officers among the rest three Noble Florentines Bandino di Rossi Francesco Brunilleschi and Giovanni della Tosa without mentioning several considerable Tuscans and many of the King of Naples his Subjects who by their Princes order were in the service of the Florentine Upon the first tidings of their defeat the Pistoians turned the Guelfs Faction out of Town and came with their keys and presented them to Castruccio who pursuing his Victory carried Prato and all the Town in that plain as well beyond as on this side the Arno after which he encamped with his Army in the plain of Peretola two miles from Florence where he continued braving the City and passed several days in the enjoyment of his good fortune parting the spoil and coining of mony thereby exercising with great ostentation a kind of Soveraign right over their Territory and releasing something of the rigour of his discipline he gave his Soldiers liberty to insult as they pleased over the conquered and to make his triumph the more remarkable nothing could serve the turn but naked women must run Courses on horse-back under the very walls of the City But this gallantry and ostentation entertained him but lightly or rather served but as a colour to hide his greater designs for in the mean time he found a way to corrupt Lupacci Frescobaldi and some certain other Gentlemen in the Town who were to have delivered him a Gate and brought him into Florence in the night had not their Conspiracy been discovered and defeated afterward by the punishment of the accomplices This great Town being so streightned and so long block'd up that the Inhabitants seeing no other way of preserving their liberty than by engagiâ—g it to the King of Naples sent Embassadors to that Prince and offered to throw themselves into his arms It was not only for his honour to accept of their proffer but for the general interest of the whole Faction of the Guelfs which without that could subsist no longer in Tuscany The terms being agreed the treaty concluded and the Florentines to pay him annually two hundred thousand Florens he sent them four thousand Horse under the Command of Prince Carlo his Son During this negotiation an unexpected accident hapned which put Castruccio into a cooler temper and made him give the Florentines breath in spight of his teeth there was a new Conspiracy against him at Pisa not to be suppressed by his presence Benedetto Lanfranchi one of the chief Citizens in the Town was the author of it Benedetto troubled to see his Country subject to the tyranny of a Lucchese undertook to surprize the Citadel force out the Garison and cut the throats of all that were friends to Castruccio But as in those kind of conjurations if a small number be able to keep things secret it is not sufficient to put them in execution and therefore whilst Lanfranchi was endeavouring to hook in more associates he met with those who were false and discovered all to Castruccio Two Noble Florentines Cecchi and Guidi who were fled to Pisa were suspected to be the Traitors and the suspicion of that perfidy left an ill stain upon their reputation which way soever it was Castruccio put Lanfranchi to death banished his whole Family and several of the chief Pisans were left shorter by the head This plot discovering to Castruccio that the fidelity of the Towns of Pistoia and Pisa would be always easily shaken he put all things in practice that cunning or open force could suggest to keep them in their duties but whilst his thoughts were upon the tenters about so important a care the Florentines had some respite to recover their Senses and expect the Neapolitan Succours which being at length arrived under the Conduct of Prince Carlo a general Counsel was held of the whole Faction of the Guelfs Upon the resolution taken there an Army was
thing wide they disorder themselves and if they run on in a huddle it will be no hard matter for the Enemy to break them And therefore I ordered my Battel so that it might do both the one and the other for having placed 1000 of the Velites in the wings I commanded that as soon as our Artillery had fired they should advance with the light Horse to seize upon their Cannon for which reason our Artillery was shot off but once and that the Enemy might not have time to charge the second time and fire upon us again for we could not take so much time our selves but they would have had as much to do the same wherefore the reason why I fired not my Cannon the second time was that if the Enemy fired once they might not have leisure to fire any more To render therefore the Enemies Artillery unserviceable the best remedy is to attack it with all possible speed for if the Enemy deserts it 't is your own if he undertakes to defend it he must advance before it and then being betwixt it and us they cannot fire but upon their own men I should think these reasons sufficient without farther examples yet having plenty of them from the ancients I will afford you some of them Ventidius being to fight the Parthians whose strength consisted principally in their bows and arrows was so subtil as to let them come up close to his Camp before he would draw out his Army which he did that he might charge them on a sudden before they had leisure to shoot their arrows Caesar tells us that when he was in France being to engage with the enemy he was charged so briskly and so suddenly by them that his men had not time to deliver their darts according to the custom of the Romans You see therefore that to frustrate a thing in the field which is to be discharged at a distance and to prevent its doing you any hurt there is no better way than to march up to it with all speed and possess it if you can Another reason moved me likewise to fire my Artillery no more which may seem trivial to you yet to me it is not so contemptible There is nothing obstructs an Army and puts it into greater confusion than to take away or hinder their sight for several great Armies have been broken and defeated by having their sight obstructed either with the dust or the Sun now there is nothing that causes greater obscurity or is a greater impediment to the sight than the smoke of Artillery and therefore I think it more wisdom to let the Enemy be blind by himself than for you to be blind too and endeavour to find him These things considered I would either not fire my Artillery at all or else because that perhaps would not be approved in respect of the reputation which those great Guns have obtained in the World I would place them in the wings of my Army that when they fire the smoke might not fly in the faces of my front which is the flower and hopes of my Army And to prove that to trouble the sight of an Enemy is a thing of more than ordinary advantage I need bring no more than the example of Epaminondas who to blind the eyes of his Enemy before he advanced to charge them caused his light horse to gallop up and down before their front to raise the dust and hinder their sight which was done so effectually that he got the Victory thereby As to your opinion that I placed the Enemies Cannon and directed their bullets as I pleased causing them to pass over the heads of my Foot I answer that great Guns do without comparison oftner miss the Infantry than hit them because the Foot are so low and the Artillery so hard to be pointed that if they be placed never so little too high they shoot over and never so little too low they graze and never come near them The inequality of the ground does likewise preserve the Foot very much for every little hill or bank betwixt the Artillery and them shelters them exceedingly As to the Horse especially the Men at arms because their order is closer than the order of the light horse and they are to keep firmer in a body they are more obnoxious to the Cannon and are therefore to be kept in the rear of the Army till the Enemy has fir'd 〈…〉 This is most certain your small Field-pieces and your small shot does more execution than your great pieces against which the best remedy is to come to 〈◊〉 blows as soon as you can and though in the first some men fell as be sure there always will yet a good General and a good Army are not to consider a particular loss so much as a General but rather are to imitate the Swissers who never refused a Battel for fear of great Guns but punished them with capital punishment who for fear of them forsook their ranks or gave any other sign or expression of fear I caused my Artillery to be drawn off as soon as I had Fired them that they might leave the Field clear for my Battalions to advance and I made no mention of them afterwards as being quite useless when the Armies were joyned You have said likewise that in respect of the violence and impetuosity of those Guns many do judge the arms and the orders of the ancients to be altogether useless and it seems by that that the people of late have found out arms and orders which are sufficient to secure them if you know any such thing you will oblige me to impart it for as yet I know none nor can I believe that there is any to be found So that I would know of them why the Infantry of our times do carry Corslets of Iron upon their breasts and the horse are arm'd Cap a pied for seeing they condemn the ancient way of arming as useless in respect of the Artillery they may as well condemn what is practised now-a-days I would understand likewise why the Swizzers according to the custom of the ancients make their Battalions to consist of six or eight thousand foot and why other Nations have imitated them seeing that order is exposed to the same danger upon account of the Artillery as others are I think it cannot easily be answered yet if you should propose it to Souldiers of any judgment and experience they would tell you first that they go so arm'd because though their arms will not defend them against great Guns yet they will secure them against small Shot and Pikes and Swords and Stones and all such things They would tell you likewise that they keep that close order like the Swisses that they may more easily engage the Enemies Foot that they may better sustain their Horse and put fairer to break them So that we see Souldiers are afraid of many things besides Artillery against which they are to provide by their arms
one rank and the other so as there remains but six yards that can be used In the third rank for the same reasons there remains but four yards and an half in the fourth three yards and in the fift but one and an half The other ranks therefore are not able to reach the Enemy yet they serve to recruit the first ranks as we have said before and are as a rampart and bulwark to the other five If then five of their ranks are sufficient to sustain the Enemies horse why may not five of ours do as much having other ranks behind to reinforce them and give them the same support though their Pikes be not so long And if the ranks of extraordinary Pikes which are placed in the flanks should be thought too thin they may be put into a square and disposed in the flank by the two Battalia's which I place in the last squadron of the Army from whence they may with ease relieve both the front or the rear and give assistance to the horse as occasion requires Luigi Would you always use this order when-ever you were to give the Enemy Battel Fabr. No by no means for the form of your Army is to be changed according to the situation of the place and the strength or number of the Enemy as I shall shew by example before I finish my discourse But this form or model is recommended to you not as the best though in effect it is so but as a rule from whence you may take your other orders and by which you may understand the other ways of drawing up an Army for every Science has its Generalities upon which it is most commonly founded Only one thing I would press upon you to remember and that is That you never draw your Army up so as that your front cannot be relieved by your rear for whoever is guilty of that error renders the greatest part of his Army unserviceable and can never overcome if he meets with the least opposition and courage Luigi I have a new scruple that is risen in my mind I have observed that in the disposing of your Battalia's you make your front of five Battalia's drawn up by the sides one of another your middle of three and your rear of two and I should think it would have been better to have done quite contrary because in my opinion an Army is broken with more difficulty when the Enemy which charges it finds more firmness and resistance the further he enters it whereas it seems to me that according to your order the farther he enters it the weaker he finds it Fabr. If you remembred how the Triarii which were the third order of the Roman Legions consisted only of 600 men you would be better satisfied when you understood they were placed always in the rear for you would see that I according to that example have placed two Battalia's in the rear which consist of 900 men so that I choose rather in my imitation of the Romans to erre in taking more men than fewer And though this example might be sufficient to content you yet I shall give you the reason and it is this The front of the Army is made thick and solid because it is that which is to endure the first shock and insult of the Enemy and being not to receive any recruits from elsewhere it is convenient that it be well man'd for a few would leave it too weak and the ranks too thin But the second Squadron being to receive its friends into it before it is to engage with the Enemy it is necessary that it has two great intervals and by consequence must consist of a less number than the first For should it consist of a greater number or be but equal to the first either there must be no spaces or intervals at all which would occasion disorder or by leaving of spaces they would exceed the proportion of the first Squadron which would make your Army look very imperfect As to what you say touching the impression of the Enemy That the farther he enters your Army the weaker he finds it it is clearly a mistake for the Enemy cannot engage the second body before the first is fallen into it so that he finds the middle Battalion rather stronger than weaker being to fight both with the first and second together And it is the same thing when the Enemy advances to the last Squadron for there he has to encounter not only two fresh Battalia's but with all the Battalions united and entire And because this last Battalion is to receive more men it is necessary the distances be greater and by consequence that their number be less Luigi I am very well satisfied with what you have said but pray answer me this If the five first Battalia's retire into the three Battalia's which are in the middle and then those eight into the two Battalia's in the rear I cannot conceive it possible that the eight Battalia's first and afterwards the ten can be comprehended when eight or ten in the same space as when they were but five Fabr. The first thing I answer is this That the space is not the same for the five Battalia's in the front were drawn up with four spaces in the middle which were closed up when they fell in with the three Battalia's in the midst or the two in the rear Besides there remains the space betwixt the Battalions and that also which is betwixt the Battalia's and the Pikes extraordinary which space altogether do give them room enough To this it may be added That the Battalia's take up another place when they are drawn up in order before their retreat than they do after they are pressed for in their retreat they either contract or extend their Orders They open their orders when they fly they contract them when they retreat so that in this case it would be best to contract Besides the five ranks of Pikes in the Van having received the first charge are to fall back thorow the Battalia's into the rear of the Army and give way to the Scudati or Shields to advance and those Pikes falling into the rear of the Army may be ready for any Service in which their Captain shall think fit to employ them whereas did they not retire after the Battel was joyned they would be altogether useless And by this means the spaces which were left to that purpose are made big enough to receive all forces that are remaining And yet if those spaces were not sufficient the flanks on both sides are men and not walls which opening and enlarging their ranks can make such distances as will be able to receive them Luigi The ranks of Pikes extraordinary which you place in the flank of your Army when the Battalia's in the front fall back into the Battalia's in the middle would you have them stand firm and continue as two wings to the Army or would you have them retire with the Battalia's If you
they are great impediments to your sight one with its beams and the other by raising the dust and carrying the powder into your eyes besides the wind being contrary is a great disadvantage in rendring the blows which they give the Enemy more languid and weak and as to the Sun your must not only take care that it be not in your face nor does you no prejudice in the beginning of the Fight but that it does you no injury when it gets up wherefore the best way is when you draw up your men to have it if possible on their backs that many hours may pass before it can come about into their faces Hanibal knew this advantage very well and made use of it in the Battel of Cannas and Marius did the same against the Cimbrians If you be weaker in Horse it is your best way to draw up among the Vines or the Woods and such other impediments as in our times the Spaniards did when they beat the French in the Kingdom of Naples near Cirignuola And it has been many times seen that the same Soldiers which have been worsted and bastled before by only changing their order and shifting their ground have recovered the Victory Thus it was with the Cartbaginians who having been many times worsted by Marcus Regulus were afterwards Victorious by the Conduct of Kantippus the Lacedemonian who caused them to come down into the plain where they might have room for their Horse and their Elephants and by so doing they were too hard for the Romans According to the practice of the Ancients I have observed That all great Generals when they have known which quarter of the Enemy was the strongest and where they have fortified most they have not opposed the strongest part of their Army against it but have chose rather to confront it with the weakest of their divisions and with their strongest attack the weakest of the Enemies When afterwards they came to engage they commanded the strongest of their Squadrons that they should not only stand firm and receive the charge without making any advance whilst the weaker parts had orders to suffer themselves to be overcome and by giving ground gradually to fall behind the rear of the Army The Artifice procures two great disorders to the Enemy The first is that the strongest part of his Army is environ'd insensibly the other is that imagining their Victory certain by the retreat of their Enemy they fall frequently into disorder which many times robs them of that Victory of which they thought themselves so certain Cornelius Scipio being in Spain against the Carthaginians under the command of Asdrubal and knowing that Asdrubal understood very well that in the drawing up his Army he put the Roman Legions which were the strength and flower of his Army in the midst and that Asdrubal in probability would do the like When they came afterwards to Fight he changed his order put his Legions in the Wings and his light arm'd men in the Body When the Battel was joyned he commanded his Body to slacken their march on a sudden and the Wings to double their pace so that only the Wings on both sides engaged and the Bodies on both sides being at a distance one from the other came not up to one another and the strongest part of Scipio's Army fighting better than the weakest of Asdrubal's he overcame them In those days that stratagem was well enough but in our days by reason of our Artillery it is unpracticable for the space which would be left betwixt the two Bodies would give opportunity to the Artillery to play which as we said before would be very dangerous So then that way is to be laid aside and the way which I recommended before is to be used which is to charge with your whole Army and let your weakest Squadrons retire When a General finds his Army stronger than his Enemies if he would encompass it insensibly and that the Enemy may not prevent him let him draw up his Army to an equal front with the Adversary afterwards in the heat of the Fight let him order by little and little to retire in the front and let the Wings advance as gradually and it will always happen that the Enemy shall be encompassed before he is aware When a General would fight and be sure not to be routed let him draw up his Army near some place of retreat or security as either Fens Mountains or some strong inexpugnable Town for in that case he may pursue the Enemy but the Enemy cannot pursue him Hanibal made use of this cunning when his fortune began to decline and he began to apprehend the Conduct of Marcellus Some Generals to disturb the orders of the Enemy have commanded their light armed men to begin the Battel and when it is once joyned to retire among the ranks When afterwards it grows hotter and both sides are thorowly engaged they have had orders to draw forth out of the flanks of the Army and having flanked the Enemy unexpectedly they have disordered and broke him If any one finds himself weaker in Horse besides the ways proposed before he may place a Battalia of Pikes behind them and draw them up in such manner that in the heat of the Battel they may open and give way for the Pikes to pass thorow them and by so doing he shall be sure to prevail Several have accustomed their light armed men to fight among their Horse and they have been found to give the Horse very good assistance Of all those who are famous for drawing up Battels Hanibal and Scipio are the most renowned for the great skill that both of them expressed in their conflict in Africa but because Hanibals Army was composed of Carthaginians and Auxiliaries of several Nations he placed 80 Elephants in his front behind them he placed his Auxiliaries next them his Carthaginians and last of all his Italians in whom he could not safely conside and the reason why he ordered them so was because the Auxiliaries having the Enemy in their faces and finding themselves closed up with Carthaginians at their backs should not think of flying but being under a necessity to fight he did hope they might either overcome or so harrass the Enemy that when he came up with his fresh men he might the more easily overthrow them Against this order Scipio placed his Hastati Principes and Triarii in his accustomed manner so as upon occasion they might be received one into the other The front of his Army he made up with great spaces but that it might appear close and united to the Enemy he filled them up with his Velites with order that as soon as the Elephants come upon them they should retire and entring among the Legions by the ordinary spaces leave a way open for the Elephants to pass by which means the fury and execution of the Elephants being evaded they came presently to handy-blows and the Carthaginians were overcome Zanobi
apprehended of all those that accused Castruccio with that abominable ambition Opizi was of opinion that the death of Francesco Guinigi head of the adverse party would leave him Master of the Town but he quickly found that the single reputation oâ— Castruccio would be a new impediment to his usurpation so that thinking to rob him of the affections of the people he spread false reports and aspersed him where-ever he came At first these calumniations troubled Castruccio but little but at length they alarm'd him to the purpose for he suspected that Opizi would not fail to set him at odds with the Lieutenant which Robert King of Naples had settled in Lucca and that if that Governor was his enemy he should in a short time be turned out of the Town And against so great danger his provision was this The Town of Pisa was then under the Government of Huguccione de Fagivola originally of the Town of Arrezzo being chosen Captain by the Pisans he had made himself their Soveraign and having given protection to certain Ghibilins who were banished from Lucca Castruccio entred into secret intelligence by the privity of Huguccione and being assured of his assistance he resolved the poor Exiles should be restored To this effect he agreed with his friends in Lucca who were of his Counsel and jealous as himself of the power of the Opizi All necessary measures were taken by the Conspirators Castruccio had the care of fortifying privately a Tower in the City called the Tower of Honour He furnished it with ammunition in case he should be forced to defend it and having appointed the night for the execution of their design Huguccione failed not at the precise hour to be at the Rendezvous betwixt Lucca and the neighbouring Mountains Upon a signal given to Castruccio he advanced towards the Gate of St. Peter and set fire to the Antiport next the â—ields whilst Castruccio broke down another on the other side of the Town In the mean time his associates cryed out To your Arms to excite the people to rise and thereby put all things into confusion Huguccione entred with his Troops and having seized upon the Town he caused all the Opizi to be murdered and all the rest of their party which fell into their hands The Governor for the King of Naples was turned out and the Government of the Town altered as Huguccione directed who to compleat the desolations of Lucca banished no less than a hundred of the best Families that belonged to it The miserable Exiles fled part to Florence and part to Pistoia two Towns of the Faction of the Guelfs and for that reason enemies to Huguccione and the prevailing party in Lucca The Florentines and whole Faction of the Guelfs apprehending this great success would hazard to re-establish the power of the Ghibilins in Tuscany they entred into consultation which way those Exiles might be restored They set out a considerable Army and encamped at Monte Carlo to open themselves a passage to Lucca Huguccione on his side drew the Lucca Troops together and put them under the Command of Castruccio and then joyning them with his own from Pisa and reinforcing them with a Squadron of German Horse which he got out of Lombardy he marched out to encounter the Florentines Whereupon the Florentines quitted their Post at Monte Carlo and entrenching betwixt Monte-Catino and Pescia Huguccione possessed himself of the quarter which they had left Their Armies being within two miles distance one from the other their Horse met daily and skirmished and they had come certainly to a peremptory Battel had not Huguccione fallen ill just in the nick His disposition forcing him from the Camp to look out for better accommodation in Monte-carlo he left the Command of the Army to Castruccio his retirement which discouraged his own men and made them think of protracting the Battel animated the Florentines but brought no great advantage to their affairs In short the Florentines perceiving their Enemies without a General began to despise them and Castruccio observing how much they were elated endeavoured to augment it He pretended great Consternation and to make his fear the more credible he gave Orders that his Troops should be drawn up within the Lines but with positive inhibition for any of them to go forth though not a moment passed but the Florentines provoked them but all to no purpose Besides that this pretended terror in Castruccio redoubled the rashness of the Enemy and perfectly blinded them he drew another advantage from it which was to discover exactly the disposition of their Army and the Order of their March When he had well observed them and tempted their temerity as much as he thought fit he resolved to fight them the next Bravado they made and omitting nothing that might encourage his Soldiers he assured them of Victory if they followed his Commands He had observed that the weakest and worst arm'd of their Soldiers were disposed still in their wings and their best placed in the Body Castruccio drew up in the same Order but distributed his Soldiers quite contrary for the worst and most unserviceable he placed in the Body and his best men in the wings In this posture he drew out of the Trenches and had scarce form'd his Battalia before the Enemy appeared and with his usual insolence Castruccio Commanded that the Body should march slowly but the two wings were to advance as fast as they could so that when they came to engage there was only the wings that could fight for Castruccio's Body having lagged by Command the Florentine Body had too far to march before they could charge them so as they remained idle being neither able to do any thing against the Main Body that was design'd to oppose them nor sustain those who were engaged in the wings so it hapned that the Florentine wings composed of the refuse of their Soldiers were easily broken by Castruccio's which consisted of his best and when the wings of the Enemy which were drawn up before their Body so as the whole Army was ranged in the figure of a half Moon were routed they turn'd tail ran among their own Body which was marching behind them and put all into Confusion The loss was very great to the Florentines they left above 10000 men dead upon the place Their best Officers and the bravest of the Guelfs perished there unfortunately and to make the defeat the more lamentable there were several Reformades which died there of extraodinary quality Among the rest Piero Brother to Robert King of Naples Carlo Nephew to the said King Philip Lord of Tarentum who were all come in Gallantry to make that Compania with the Florentines But that which made all the more wonderful was that Castruccio lost not above 300 men though unhappily one of Hugucciones Sons were of that Number his Name was Francesco who sighting briskly at the head of the Voluntiers for want of good Conduct was slain at the very first
thousand unexpected accidents fall in to hasten its destruction CHAP. XVIII Nothing is more honourable in a General than to foresee the Designs of his Enemy IT was the saying of Epaminondas the Theban that no one quality was more useful and necessary in a General than to be able to know the resolutions and designs of his Enemy and discover that by conjecture which he could not do by any certain intelligence Nor is it difficult only to understand his designs but his actions and of those actions not only such as are perform'd privately or at a distance but such as are done as it were before his Face For it many times falls out that when a Battel continues till night he who has the better believes he has the worst and who has lost all supposes he has the Victory Which mistakes has put the Generals many times upon pernicious counsels as it hapned betwixt Brutus and Cassius for Brutus having defeated the Enemy with his Wing Cassius supposing he had been lost and his whole Body dispers'd killed himself in despair In our times at the Battel of S. Cilicia in Lombardy Francis King of France coming to an engagement with the Swizzers the Fight continued till night a body of the Swizzers remaining entire and hearing nothing of the defeat and execution of their Comrades concluded the Victory was theirs which error was the occasion that they marched not off as they might have done but kept their ground till the next morning at which time they were charged again and overthrown The same error had almost ruined the Armies of the Pope and King of Spain who upon a false alarm of the Victory of the Swizzers passed the Po and advanced so far that ere they were aware they had like to have fallen into the mouths of the victorious French The like fell out of old in the Camps of the Romans and Aequi Sempronius the Consul being commanded out with an Army against the enemy and forcing him to a Battel it continued till night without any visible advantage on either side Night coming on and both Armies sufficiently spent neither of them retir'd to their Camps but betook themselves to the neighbouring hills where they believed they should be more safe The Roman Army divided into two parts one went with the Consul and the other with Tempanius the Centurion by whose courage the Roman Army was preserved that day The next morning the Consul hearing no more of the enemy retreated towards Rome the Aequi with their Army did the same for both of them though they had been beaten and marched away without regarding the loss or plunder of their Camps it hapned that Tempanius being behind with his squadron and marching off as the rest he took certain of the wounded Aequi prisoners who inform'd him that their Generals were gone out of the field and had quitted their Camps Upon enquiry finding it to be true he entred into the Roman and secured it but the enemies Camp was given in prey to the Souldier after which he returned with Victory to Rome which Victory consisted only in having the first intelligence of the enemies disorder from whence it is observable that two Armies engaged may be each of them in the same distress and despair and that that Army goes away with the Victory which has first notice of the necessities of the other and of this I shall give a pregnant example of late days and at home In the year 1498 the Florentines had a great Army in the Country of Pisa and had besieged that City very close The Venetian having undertaken its protection and seeing no other way to relieve it to divert the enemy and remove the war they resolved to invade the Territory of the Florentine to which purpose they raised a strong Army marched into their Country by the Val di Lamona possessed themselves of the Town of Marradi and besieged the Castle of Castiglione which stands above upon an hill The Florentines upon the alarm resolved to relieve Maradi and yet not weaken their Army before Pisa whereupon they raised a new Army both Horse and Foot and sent them thither under the Command of Iacopo Quarto Appiano Lord of Piombino and the Count Rinuccio da Marciano The Florentine Army being conducted to the hills the Venetian raised his siege before Castiglione and retreated into the Town the Armies being in this posture and facing one another for several days both of them suffered exceedingly for want of all manner of Provisions at length neither of them being very earnest to come to a Battel and each of them being ignorant of the others distress they resolved the next morning to break up their Camp and each of them to retire the Venetian towards Berzighella and Faenza and the Florentine towards Casaglia and Mugello The morning being come and the Baggage sent away before a poor Woman hapned to come into the Florentine Camp from Marradi to see some of her Relations who were in the service of the Florentine by this Woman the Florentine Generals had notice that the Venetians were gone whereupon reassuming their courage they altered their counsels pursued the enemy and writ Letters to Florence that they had not only beaten the Venetians but made an end of the War Which Victory proceeded from nothing but because they had the first news of the retreat of the Enemy which if it had come to the other side as it did to them the consequence would have been the same and the Florentines have been beaten CHAP. XIX Whether for the Government of the multitude obsequiousness and iâ—dulgence be more necessary than punishment THe Roman Commonwealth was perplexed with the dissentions betwixt the Nobility and the people nevertheless their foreign Wars requiring it they sent forth with their Armies Quintius and Appius Claudius Appius being rough and cruel in his commands was so ill obeyed by his Soldiers that he was defeated and fled out of his Province Quintius being more gentle and benign was better obeyed and carried the Victory where he was from whence it appears more conducing to the well governing of a multitude to be rather obliging than proud and pitiful than cruel However Cornelius Tacitus tells us and many others are of his mind In multitudine regendâ— plus paena quam obsequium valet That to the managing of a multitude severity is more requisite than mildness And I think both may be true to his distinction of Companions and Subjects if those under your command be Companions and fellow Citizens with you you cannot securely use them with that severity of which Tacitus speaks for the people of Rome having equal authority with the Nobility was not to be used ruggedly by any man that was put over them for but a while And it has been many times seen that the Roman Generals who behaved themselves amicably towards their Souldiers and governed them with mildness have done greater things than those who used them with austerity and
you have me blame them Cosimo Because several wise men have always condemn'd them Fabritio I think you are in a mistake to say a wise man can be against training of Souldiers a man may be thought wise 't is possible and be no such thing Cosimo The ill success which those Trained-bands have always had is a great argument of the truth of that opinion Fabritio Have a care the fault was not more in you than in them of which perhaps you may be convinced before I have done my discourse Cosimo You will do us a very great favour But I will tell you first in what it is this Militia is condemn'd that you may afterwards justifie it the better CHAP. VII Of the inconvenience and convenience of Trained-Bands or a settled Militia Cosimo IT is objected that either they are experienced and useless and then to rely upon them is to ruine the State Or else they are ready and skilful and strong and then he who has the command of them may do what he pleases They instance in the Romans who lost their liberty by these kind of men They instance likewise in the Venetian and the King of France the first of which makes use only of foreign Arms lest some time or other they should fall under the subjection of some of their Citizens and the latter has disarmed his Subjects with the more ease to keep them under command But those who are against these Trained-Bands are more fearful when they are raw and inexperienced than otherwise and to this purpose they give two considerable reasons One is because they are unskilful the other is because they are unwilling and they say that people any thing in years never learn any thing well and a man never does good when he is forced to the Wars Fabritio The reasons which you have alledged are produced only by persons who understand things at a distance as I shall demonstrate plainly And first as to their unserviceableness I say there are no Souldiers more useful than ones own Subjects and no Subjects can be ordered a better way And this being clear and indisputable I will not spend time in proving it farther because I have the concurrence of all ancient History to confirm it As to the inexperience and force wherewith they are charged I say and it is true that inexperience makes a man cowardly and force makes a man Mutinous but courage and experience both are infused into them by arming and exercising and accommodating them well as shall be shown in my following discourse But as to the point of force you must know that such persons as are raised by the command of a Prince are neither to be altogether press'd nor altogether Voluntiers because to have them altogether Voluntiers would be to incur the inconveniences which I have mentioned before it would not be a fair election and there would be very few go a long with you and wholly to force them would be as dangerous on the other side therefore a middle way is to be taken neither too forcible on the one side nor too frank on the other but such a one as may tempt them to the War out of their respect to their Prince whose displeasure they fear above all other punishments such a course as this tempered so cunningly betwixt fair means and foul cannot be dangerous nor produce that discontent and mutiny which occasions so much mischief I do not say that an army so chosen and exercised is absolutely invincible for the Roman Armies were many times overcome and Hannibal's Army was defeated wherefore an Army cannot be so ordered and disciplin'd that one may promise himself it shall never be broken The wise men therefore of whom you speak are not to calculate the uselesness of an Army from the loss of one Battle but are rather to believe that having miscarried once they will be more cautious afterwards and do something as occasion offers to expiate their disgrace and if the business should be thorowly examined it would not be found to be the defect of the form so much as want of perfection in their Order And this as I said before is to be provided against not by blaming or exploding the way of train'd men but by improving and correcting it where it shall be found amiss and how that is done I will show you particularly As to your doubt that such an order of Souldiers meeting with an Officer equally disposed may usurp upon you and turn you out of your Government I answer that Arms put orderly and legally into the hands of Citizens or Subjects never did nor will do any harm And Cities are kept longer innocent and incorrupt with those than any other forces nay than they are commonly without them Rome had its Citizens in Arms four hundred years together and yet kept its liberty intire Sparta preserved its liberty 800 years in the same posture several Cities have been disarmed and kept their liberties but how long Not forty years any of them and the reason is because great Cities have occasion for Soldiers and when they have none of their own they are forced to entertain Strangers which commonly do much more mischief than their own for they are more easily debauched and a popular Citizen may more easily corrupt and employ them as Instruments of Usurpation and Tyranny when they have nothing but naked and unarmed people to destroy Besides a City ought in reason to be more fearful of two Enemies than one For in entertaining of Strangers a City is to have an eye over her Mercenaries and her Natives and to prove that this jealousie is natural and reasonable remember what I said before of Francis Sforza whereas a City which employs only her own inhabitants fears nobody else But to use one reason for all let me tell you no man ever established a Commonwealth or Kingdom who did not believe that the inhabitants if arm'd would be willing to defend it And had the Venetians been as wise in this as other Counsels they would have set up a new Monarchy in the World and they are the more inexcusable that have not because their first Legislators put arms into their hands and gave them ability to defend themselves But their territory being little at land they employed their arms only at Sea where they performed many great things to the enlargement of their Country But in process of time being forced to take arms by land for the relief of vicenza they entertained the Marquess of Mantoua into their service and made him their General whereas they should rather have committed that charge to one of their own Citizens and sent him to have engaged the enemy at land This unhappy resolution was that which clip'd the wings of their success and kept them from extending their Empire if they did it out of an opinion that their experience was not so great in Land as in Sea affairs their diffidence was imprudent for a Sea Captain accustomed to
you the way of ordering a Battel or Army you may not find your self confounded I say therefore that a King or Commonwealth is to order his subjects which he designs for the wars with these arms and into these divisions and raise as many Battalions as his Country will afford And when he has disposed them so being to exercise them in order he is to exercise them in their several divisions And although the number of each of them cannot bear the form of a just Army yet thereby every man may learn what belongs to his own duty because in Armies there are two orders observed one what men are to do in every battel or division distinctly and the other what they are to do when united with the rest and those men who know the first well will easily learn the other but without knowledg of the first they will never arrive at the discipline of the second Every one then of these Companies may learn by it self to keep the order of their ranks in all motions and places to open and close and understand the direction of their Drums by which all things are commanded in a battel for by beating of that as by the whistle in the Gallies every man knows what he is to do whether to stand firm to his ground to advance or fall back and which way they are to turn their faces and arms So that understanding the order of their files in that exactness that no motion nor no place can disorder them understanding the commands of their Officer derived to them by his Drum and how to advance fall back into their places these Companies as I have said before as soon as joyned may easily be taught what an united body of all the Battalions is obliged to do when they are drawn together into an Army And because this universal practice is of no slight importance in time of peace it would be convenient once or twice in a year to bring them to a general Rendezvous and give them the form of an Army exercising them for some days as if they were to fight a battel with an enemy drawing them up and disposing them into front flank and reserve And because a General orders his Army for a battel either upon the sight or apprehension of an enemy he is to exercise his Army accordingly and teach them how to behave themselves upon a march and how in a battel and how upon a charge either upon one side or other When they are exercised as if an enemy was before them they are to be taught how they are to begin the fight how they are to retreat upon a repulse who are to succeed in their places what Colours what Drums what words of commands they are to obey and so to train them up and accustom them to these false alarms and counterfeit battels that at length they become impatient to be at it in earnest For an Army is not made valiant and couragious for having brave and valiant men in it but for the good order which is observed for if I be in the forlorn and know being beaten whither I am to retire and who are to succeed in my place I shall fight boldly because my relief is at hand If I be of the second body that is to engage the distress or repulse of the first will not fright me because I considered it might happen before and perhaps desired it that I might have the honour of the Victory and not they Where an Army is new this way of exercising is absolutely necessary and where it is old it is convenient for we see the Roman Captains before they brought them to fight continually exercised their men after this manner though they had been brought up to their Arms. Iosephus tells us in his History that this continual exercising in the Roman Army was the cause that all the multitude of idle people which followed the Camp either for Traffick or gain were made useful and serviceable because they understood their orders and ranks and how to preserve them in time of Battel But if you have raised an Army of young men never in the Wars before whether you intend them for present Service or to establish them as Militia and engage them afterwards without this way of exercising by single Companies and sometimes a conjunction of them all you do nothing For order being perfectly necessary it is convenient with double industry and labour to teach such as are not skilful already and practise such as are as we have seen several excellent Commanders to practise and instruct their Soldiers take extraordinary pains without any respect to their dignities Cosimo It seems to me that this discourse has a little transported you for before you have told us the way of exercising by Companies you have treated of entire Armies and the managing of a Battel Fabritio You say right and the true reason is the affection I bear to those orders and the trouble I am under that they are no more used yet do not think but I will recollect my self and return As I told you before in the exercising of a Company the first thing of importance is to know how to keep your ranks to do this it is necessary to exercise them in that order which they call Chiocciole or the Snail order And because I have said that one of these Battalias or Companies is to consist of four hundred Foot compleatly armed I will keep to that number These four hundred men then are to be reduced into 80 files five in a file after which they are to be carried forward upon a quick march or a slow wheeling and doubling charging or retreating which indeed is more demonstrable to the eye than the understanding But this Snail way of exercising a Company is not so necessary because every one that knows any thing of an Army knows how 't is to be done and indeed it is not considerable in any respect but to teach Soldiers how to move their files but let us now draw up one of these Companies and dispose them into their ranks CHAP. VIII Of three principal ways of drawing up a Company and putting them into a posture to fight I Say that there are three principal forms of drawing up men the first and most useful is to draw them up close in the figure of two Squares The second is to draw them up in a square with two wings The third is to draw them up with a vacuity in the middle which they call Piazza To draw them up in the first figure there are two ways One is to double their files that is the second file entring into the first the fourth into the third the sixt into the fift and so successively so that whereas they were 80 files of five in a file they may become forty files of 10 ih a file After this you are to double them again in the same manner thrusting one file into another and then they will be
numbers were written upon their Helmets in great Characters calling them the first second third and fourth c. And not content with this every Soldier had the number of his File and the number of his place in that File engraven upon his Buckler Your Companies being in this manner made distinguishable by their Colours and accustomed to their Ranks and Files by practice and experience it is no hard matter though they be disordered to rally and reduce them suddenly again for as soon as the Colours are stuck down in the ground they are immediately visible and the Captains and Officers knowing which are their own repair themselves and dispose their Soldiers immediately to their places and when those on the left have placed themselves on the left hand and those which belong to the right hand on the right the Soldiers directed by their rules and the difference of their Colours fall immediately into their Ranks as easily as we put together the Staffes of a Barrel when we have marked them before These things if learned with diligence and exercise at first are quickly attained and hardly forgot for your raw men are directed by the old and in time a Province by these exercises might be made very fit for the War It is necessary therefore to teach them how to turn all together when to face about in the Rear or the Flanks and make Rear and Flank of the first Ranks when occasion is offered And this is no hard matter to do seeing it is sufficient that every man faces to that side he is commanded and where they turn their faces that is the Front True it is when they face to the Flank their Ranks do not hold their proportion because the distance betwixt the Front and the Rear is thereby much lessened and the distance betwixt the extremity of the Flanks is much encreased which is quite contrary to the genuine order of a Battalia for which cause great practice and discretion is required to rectifie it and yet this may be remedied by themselves But that which is of greater consequence and which requires more practice is when an Officer would turn his whole Company together as if it were a single man or a solid and massy body of it self And this requires longer experience than the other For if you would have it turn to the left the left corner must stand still and they who are next them march so leisurely that they in the right may not be put to run if they be it will breed confusion But because it always happens that when an Army marches from place to place that the Companies which are not in the Front are forced to fight in the Flanks or Rear so that one and the same Company is many times compelled to face about to the Flanks and Rear at one and the same time that these Companies therefore may in this exigence hold their old proportion according to what is said before it is necessary that they have Pikes in that Flank which is most likely to be attacked and Capidieci Captains and other Officers in their proper places CHAP. X. To range a Company in such order that it may be ready to face the Enemy on which side soever he comes Fabr. WHen you have marshalled your fourscore Files five in a File you are to put all your Pikes into the first twenty Files and place five of your Corporals in the head of them and five in the Rear The other 60 Files which follow are Bucklers all and consist of 300 men So then the first and last File of every Company are to be Corporals The Captain with his Ensign and Drum is to stand in the midst of the first hundred of Bucklers and every Centurion at the head of his Division When they are in this order if you desire to have your Pikes on the left hand you are to double them Company by Company from the right Flank if you would have them on the right you are to double from the left and this is the way by which a Company turns with the Pikes upon one Flank with their Officers at the Head and the Rear of them and their Captain in the midst and it is the form which is observed in a march But upon the approach of an Enemy when they would make a Front of a Flank they have no more to do but to command that all of them face about to that Flank where the Pikes are and in so doing the whole Battalia turns with its Files and Officers at the same time in the manner aforesaid for unless it be the Centurions they are all in their old places and the Centurions can quickly be there But when a Battalia marches in the Front and is in danger to be engaged in the Rear the Files are to be so ordered that the Pikes may be readily behind and to do this there needs no more but whereas usually in every Battalia every Century has five Files of Pikes in the Front those five Files may be placed in the Rear and in all other places the same order to be observed as before Cosimo If my memory fails not you said that this way of exercise is in order to the uniting these Battalia's into an Army and that this practice is sufficient to direct them in that But if it should happen this Squadron of 450 Foot should be to fight singly and by its self how would you order it then Fabritio He who commands them is to judge where his Pikes are to be disposed and place them as he thinks fit which is not at all consistant with what I have prescribed before for though that be a way to be observed in Battel upon an union or conjunction of several Squadrons yet it may serve as a rule in what ever condition you fall into But in showing you the two other ways which I recommended for the ordering of a Battalia I will satisfie you farther CHAP. XI To draw up a Company with two horns or another with a Piazza or vacuity in the middle TO come to the way of drawing up a Battalia or Squadron with two horns or points I say you must order your 80 Files five in a File after this manner In the midst you must place a Centurion with 25 Files two of Pikes to the left and three of Bucklers to the right when those five are disposed bring up the other twenty with twenty Files and File-leaders all of them to be placed betwixt the Pikes and the Bucklers only those who carry Pikes are to stand with the Pikes After these twenty five Files are so placed draw up another Centurion with fifteen Files of Bucklers after which the Constable or Captain is to draw into the middle with his Drum and his Colours with other fifteen Files of Bucklers This being performed the next to march up is the third Centurion who is to be at the head of 25 Files of 5 in a File three Bucklers to the left
that each of these two Companies should be ranged directly behind the extremity of the three precedent Companies and the space left betwixt them should be 91 yards By these means all the Companies thus disposed should extend themselves in front 161 yards and in depth 20. After this I would extend the Pikes extraordinary along the flanks of all the Companies on the left hand at about twenty yards distance and I would make of them 140 ranks of seven in a rank so that they should secure all the left flank in depth of the ten Battalia's drawn up as I said before and I would reserve forty files of them to guard the Baggage and the unarmed people in the rear distributing their Corporals and other Officers in their respective places The three Constables or Captains I would place one at the head of them another in the midst and a third in the rear who should execute the Office of a Tergiductor who was always placed in the rear of the Army But to return to the front of the Army I say that after the Pikes extraordinary I would place the Velites extraordinary which are 500 and allow them a space of forty yards By the side of these on the left hand I would place my men at Arms with a space of 150 yards after them I would advance my light Horse at the same distance as I allowed to my men at Arms. As to the Velites in ordinary I would leave them about their Battalia's which should take up the space which I left betwixt each Company unless I found it more expedient to put them under the Pikes extraordinary which I would do or not do as I found it more or less for my advantage The Captain General of the Battalion should be placed in the space betwixt the first and second orders of Battalia's or else at the head of them or else in the space betwixt the last of the first five Battalia's and the Pikes extraordinary as I found it most convenient he should have about him 30 or 40 select men all brave and experienc'd and such as understood how to execute their Commission with prudence and how to receive and repel a charge and I would have the Captain General in the midst of the Drums and the Colours This is the order in which I would dispose my Battalion on the left wing which should contain half the Army and take up in breadth 511 yards and in depth as much as I have said before without reckoning the space that was possessed by the Pikes extraordinary which should be as a Shield to the people without Arms and take up a space of about a hundred yards The other Battalion I would dispose on the right side leaving betwixt the two Battalions a distance of about 30 yards having order'd it as the other At the head of that space I would place some pieces of Artillery behind which should stand the Captain General of the whole Army with the Drums the Standard or chief Ensign and two hundred choice men about him most of them on foot and amongst them ten or more fit to execute any command The General himself should be so mounted and so arm'd that he might be on Horseback and on foot as necessity required As to the Artillery ten pieces of Cannon would be enough for the taking of a Town In the Field I would use them more for defence of my Camp than for any Service in Battel My smaller pieces should be of 10 or 15 pound carriage and I would place them in the front of the whole Army unless the Country was such that I could dispose them securely in the flank where the Enemy could not come at them This form and manner of ranging an Army and putting it in order may do the same things in a Battel as was done either in the Macedonian Phalanx or the Legion of the Romans for the Pikes are in the front and all the foot placed in their ranks so that upon any charge or engagement with the Enemy they are able not only to bear and sustain them but according to the custom of the Phalanx to recruit and reinforce their first rank out of those which are behind On the other side if they be over-power'd and attack'd with such violence that they are forced to give ground they may fall back into the intervals of the second Battalia behind them and uniting with them make up their body and charge them briskly again And if the second Battalia is not strong enough to relieve them they may retire to the third and fight all together in conjunction so that by this order as to the business of a Battel we may supply and preserve our selves according to the Grecian and the Roman way both As to the strength of an Army it cannot be ordered more strong because the two wings are exactly well fortified with Officers and Arms nor is there any thing weak but the rear where the people which follow the Camp without Arms are disposed and they are guarded with the Pikes extraordinary so that the Enemy cannot assault them any where but he will find them in very good order neither is the rear in any great danger because an Enemy can be hardly so strong as to assault you equally on all sides if you found he was so strong you would never take the Field against him But if he was three times as many and as well ordered as you if he divides and weakens himself to attack you in several places beat him in one and his whole enterprize is lost As to the Enemies Cavalry though they out-number you you are safe enough for the Pikes which encompass you will defend you from any impression from them though your own Horse be repulsed The chief Officers are moreover plac'd in the flank so as they may commodiously command and as readily obey and the spaces which are left betwixt one Battalia and the other and betwixt one rank and another serve not only to receive those who are distressed but gives room for such persons as are sent forward and backward with orders from the Captain Add as I told you at first as the Romans had in their Army about 24000 men I would have our Army consist of the same number and as the Auxiliaries took their method of Fighting and their manner of drawing up from the Legions so those Soldiers which you would joyn to your two Battalions should take their form and discipline from them These things would be very easie to imitate should you have but one example for by joyning either two other Battalions to your Army or adding as many Auxiliaries you are in no confusion you have no more to do but to double your ranks and whereas before you put ten Battalia's in the left wing put twenty now or else you may contract or extend them as your place and Enemy will give leave Luigi In earnest Sir I am so well possess'd of your Army that
of the one Nation and the other I would have therefore the Trumpets placed by the Lieutenant-General as Instruments not only proper to excite and enflame your Army but fitter to be heard and by consequence apter to derive your Commands than any of the other The rest of those kind of Instruments I would have placed about the Captains and Colonels of the Battalions I would have also a smaller sort of Drums and Flutes which should be beaten and played upon not as we do now in our fights but as our Tabours and Flagelets do in our Feasts The General with his Trumpets should signifie when his Army is to make a stand when to advance when to wheel when to retire when to make use of the Artillery when the Velites extraordinary are to move and by the variation of the sounds to direct his Army in all the Marches and Counter-marches that are generally used and I would have the Trumpets followed afterwards by the Drums And because this exercise is of great consequence in an Army it imports very much that it be frequently taught As to the Horse they should have Trumpets too but of a lesser and different sound from those about the Lieutenant-General And this is all that has occurred to my memory in the ordering and exercising of an Army Luigi I beseech you Sir let me not trouble you too much if I desire to be satisfied in one thing more and that is for what reason you caused your light Horse and Velites extraordinary to advance against the Enemy with great shouts and clamours and cries and when afterwards the Body and remainder of the Army came to charge they did it with extraordinary silence I confess I cannot comprehend the reason and therefore I beg your explanation Fabr. The opinions of the Ancient Generals have been different in that point whether an Enemy was to be charged silently and without noise or with all the clamour could be made The silent way is best to keep your men firm in their orders and to signifie the Commands of the General but the obstreperous way is best to excite the courage of your Soldiers and dismay the Enemy and because I thought in both cases there was something of advantage I made use of them both and caused those to advance with clamour and these with silence for I cannot think that an universal and perpetual noise can be any advantage because it hinders orders from being derived which is a most pernicious thing nor is it likely that the Romans used those shouts after the first shock for History tells us that many times by the exhortation and encouragement of their Officers the Souldiers which were flying were stopped and rallyed and disposed immediately into new Orders which could not be where the Officers could not have been heard THE FOURTH BOOK CHAP. I. The considerations and subtleties to be used in the drawing up an Army to fight Luigi SEeing the Victory has been so honourably obtained under my Conduct I think it discretion to tempt fortune no farther knowing how much she is variable and inconstant Wherefore my desire is to resign my Authority and that Zanobi may take it upon him according to the Order proposed of transferring it to the youngest and I know he will not refuse that honour or rather trouble both in complacency to me and as being naturally the more couragious of the two for he fears not to engage in these kind of conflicts though there be as much likelihood of his miscarriage as conquest Zanobi I shall refuse no Office into which you shall put me though I must needs say I could more willingly have been an auditor for your scruples and demands have hitherto given me more satisfaction than any thing I could have objected my self But I think Seignor Fabritio it would be better if you proceed provided your patience will serve and that we do not tire you with our Ceremonies Fabritio You rather oblige me Sir for this variety of Interrogators gives me to understand the vanity of your judgments and appetites But is there any thing behind that you would have added to what has been spoken before Zanobi There are two things of which I would willingly be satisfied before we pass any farther One is whether you have any other way of drawing up an Army The other is what reflections or considerations a General is to have before he comes to a Battel and when any accident intervenes how it is to be avoided Fabr. I shall endeavour to satisfie you but not by answering distinctly to your demands for whilst I answer to one it happens many times that I seem to answer to the other I have told you how I would have my Army drawn up that according to that model any other figure may be taken as the number of the Enemy and the nature of your ground does require for in that case one is to act according to the condition both of the one and the other But take notice of this That there is no way more dangerous than to extend the front of your Army too much unless it be very numerous and strong Otherwise you are to draw it up close and thick rather than wide and thin For when your Forces are few in respect of the Enemy you must look out for other remedies as by drawing your Army up so as it may be fortified by some River or Fen that may secure you behind or fortified in the flanks by some Ditch or Entrenchment as Caesar's was in France and this ought to be a general rule to you that you extend or contract your front according both to your own number and the number of your Enemy If the Enemy be not so numerous and your men as well disciplin'd as they you are to make choice of an open place where you may not only encompass the Enemy but distend your own ranks For in streight and narrow places not being able to make use of your orders you cannot make use of your advantage For this reason the Romans did most commonly make choice of open and clear places and avoided such as were difficult and close But if your Army be small or your men inexperienced you must do quite contrary as I said before and must find out some place where your few men may defend themselves or where their inexperience may do you no hurt In that case you are to choose some hill or eminence from whence you may come down upon the Enemy with more force yet must you have this caution not to draw up your Army upon any Strand or Sea-coast nor under the command of any Hill of which the Enemy may possess himself because you will be exposed thereby to the Enemies Cannon without remedy and be unable to do them mischief with any convenience In the drawing up an Army for Battel great regard is likewise to be had to the Sun and the Wind that neither the one nor the other be in your face for
advance than others Nevertheless in making a front of your right flank your Velites are to enter into the intervals betwixt the wings of the Army and the horse should approach to the left flank into whose place the two Companies of Pikes extraordinary which were placed in the middle should succeed but the carriages should remove and the unarm'd people by the great space and overture that is made and retire behind the left flank which is now become the rear of the whole Army and the other Velites who were placed in the rear at first are not to budge in this case because that place should not remain open being of the rear become the flanks all other things are to be done as in my first directions for the making of a front What is said before of making a front of the right flank will serve for making a front of the left flank for the same order is to be used if the Enemy comes upon you so strong that he is able to attack you on both sides you must fortify the places where you suspect he will charge by doubling your ranks from the place where he does not appear to fall on by dividing your Artillery your Velites and your Horse distributing them equally in both places If he assaults you in three or four sides at once you or he must be very imprudent for had you been wise you would never have put your self into a place where an enemy could have come at you on so many sides especially with a form'd and well ordered Army For to ruine you securely it is necessary the Enemy be strong enough to attack you on all sides and with as many men in every place almost as in your whole Army and if you be so indiscreet to march into his Country or put your self into the power of an enemy whose men are three times as many and as well experienced as yours if you miscarry you can blame no body but your self but if misfortune happens not by your fault but by accident of war no body will condemn you and it will fair with you as it did with Scipio in Spain and Asdrubal in Italy But if the Enemy be not much stronger than you and yet ventures to assault you in several places the rashness will be on his side and the success in all probability on yours for of necessity he must so weaken himself that you may receive him in one place and charge him briskly in another and then you will easily ruine him This way of ordering an Army against an enemy that is not in sight but is hourly expected is very necessary and it is very useful to accustom your Souldiers to close and change and march in this order and in their march to shew them how to fight according to my first front and then falling into their march again upon a new alarm in the rear to turn that into a front and then each of the flanks and so in their first posture again and these exercises are very necessary if you would have your Army ready and well disciplin'd For which cause I would recommend it to all Princes and great Captains to restore these practices of the ancients for what is military discipline but to know how to command and execute these things well what is a well disciplin'd Army but an Army train'd up well in these kind of exercises and he who in our times would but frame his discipline to this I am confident could never be worsted But to continue our discourse if this square figure be difficult it is not to be laid aside for that for that difficulty is necessary nevertheless exercise will make it easy for having learn'd how to draw your self up and preserve your figure you will easily understand afterwards how to maintain other figures in which there is not so much difficulty Zanobi I am of your mind that those orders are necessary and cannot tell as to my self what can be added or substracted Yet I would willingly be satisfied in two things One is when you would make a front of your rear or one of your flanks and would have your men face about how you do signify your commands whether by word of mouth or sound of trumpet The other is whether those you send before to plain the ways and make them passable for your Army are to be Souldiers drawn out of your Battalia's or other Country people designed on purpose for that work CHAP. IV. Of Commands derived by word of mouth by Drums and Trumpets and of the nature of Pioneers Fabr. YOur first demand is of very great importance for many Armies have been ruined when the Captain 's orders have been mistaken or not heard for which reason the words of Command in such great dangers ought to be clear and intelligible and if you would signify your commands by the sound of your Trumpets or Drums great care is to be taken that the sounds be so different and distinguishable one from the other that they cannot be mistaken If your commands are by word of mouth you must use particular and be sure to avoid general terms and in your particular words you must be cautious to use none that may be liable to an ill interpretation Many times the crying back back has been the loss of an Army wherefore that word is to be avoided and instead of it you are to say retreat If you would change your front and make it either in the flank or the rear you must not say turn but face about to the right or the left to the front or the rear and in like manner all the words of command are to be plain and intelligible as march on stand firm advance retreat and what ever may be done by word of mouth clearly and distinctly is to be signified that way what cannot be done that way is to be done by the Trumpet and Drum As to the Pioneers which is your second demand I would have that office performed by my own Souldiers as well because it was the practice of ancient times as because thereby I should have fewer idle persons in my Army and by consequence fewer impediments I would command out of every Battalia what number I thought necessary I would furnish them with Pickaxes and Spades and cause them to leave their arms with their next ranks who should carry them for them so that when the enemy appeared they should have no more to do but to fall back to their ranks and take them again Zanobi But who should carry their Pickaxes and Spades Fabr. There should be Waggons on purpose Zanobi I fear you would never prevail with your Souldiers to work Fabr. We will talk of that in its proper place at present I shall lay it aside and discourse of the way how they are to be supplyed with provisions for having tired them thus long 't is but reasonable to refresh them with victuals CHAP. V. Of the Provisions that are
fortified Fabr. YOU must understand that Towns and Castles are strong two ways by Nature or by Art They are strong by Nature which are encompassed by Rivers or Fens as Mantua and Ferrara or seated upon some Rock or craggy Mountain as Monaco and Sanleo for other places seated upon Mountains if not difficult of access are in our days rather weaker than otherwise in respect of our Artillery and Mines and therefore at present being to build a City or erect a Fort that may be strong we choose to do it in a Plain and fortifie it artificially with Ramparts and Bastions and our first care is to make the Walls crooked and retort with several Vaults and places of receipt that if the Enemy attempts to approach he may be opposed and repulsed as well in the flank as the front If your Walls be made too high they are too obnoxious to the Cannon if they be too low they are easily scaled if you make a Ditch before the VVall to make the Scalado more difficult the Enemy fills it up which with a great Army is no hard matter and makes himself Master immediately My opinion therefore is this but with submission to better judgments that to provide against both inconveniencies the best way will be to make your VVall high and a Ditch on the inside rather than without and this is the strongest way that you can build because it keeps you both from their Artillery and assaults and gives the Enemy no capacity of filling up the Ditch Your VVall then is to be of the best height you can contrive three yards thick at the least to resist their Batteries it is to have Towers and Bulwarks at the distance of every 200 yards The Ditch within is to be thirty yards broad at least and twelve in depth and all the earth which is taken out of the Ditch is to be thrown towards the Town against a Wall which is to be brought for that purpose from the bottom of the Ditch and carried up a man's height above the ground which will make the Ditch more deep and secure Towards the bottom of the Ditch every two hundred yards I would have a Casemat from whence the Artillery may scour and play upon any body that shall descend The great Guns which are used for the defence of a Town are to be planted behind the Wall on the inside of the Ditch for to defend the first wall Falcons and such small Pieces are easier managed and do as good Execution If the Enemy comes to scale you the height of the first Wall defends you easily If he comes with his Artillery he must batter down the first Wall and when he has done that it being Natural in all Batteries for the Wall and rubbish to fall outward there being no Ditch without to swallow and receive it the ruines of the Wall will encrease the Depth of the Ditch in such manner as that you cannot get forward being obstructed by the Ruines hindred by the Ditch and interrupted by the Enemies great Guns within the Walls that do great slaughter upon you The only remedy in this case is to fill up the Ditch which is very hard in respect of its dimensions and the danger in coming to it the Wall being crooked and Vaulted and full of Angles among which there is no coming without manifest hazard for the reasons abovesaid and to think to march with Faggots over the ruines and to fill it up that way is a chimerical thing so that I conclude a City so fortified is not to be taken Battista If one should make a Ditch without besides that within the Wall would not your Town be the stronger Fabr. Yes without doubt but my meaning is if one Ditch only be to be made it is better within than without Battista Would you have Water in your Ditch or would you rather have it dry Fabr. Opinions are divided in that point for Ditches with water are more secure against Mines and Ditches without are harder to be filled up But upon consideration of the whole I would have them without water because they are more secure for it has been seen that the freezing of the Ditch in the Winter has been the taking of many a Town as it hapned at Mirandola when Pope Iulius besieged it And to prevent Mines I would carry my Ditch so low that whoever would think to work under it should come to the water Castles I would build as to my Ditches and Walls in the same manner that they might have as much trouble who stormed them But let me give one caution to any man who defends a City and it is this that he makes no redoubts without at any distance from the Wall and another to him that builds and fortifies a Castle and that is that he makes no works within for retreats in case the first Wall be taken The reason that makes me give this Counsel is because no man ought to do that which may lessen his reputation at first for the dimunition of that makes all his other orders contemptible and discourages those who have undertaken his defence And this that I say will always happen when you make Bastions without and oblige your self to defend them they will certainly be lost for such small things being now adays to contend with the fury of Artillery 't is impossible they should hold out and the loss of them being a lessening to your reputation the lessening of your reputation will be the loss of the place When Genoa rebelled against Lewis King of France he caused certain Bastions to be erected upon the Hills which were about the Walls which Bastions were no sooner lost and they were lost presently but the City was taken As to my second advice I do affirm that there is nothing so pernicious to a Castle as to have those works of retreat for the hopes that men have of preserving themselves by deserting their Posts makes them abandon them often and the loss of their Posts is afterwards the loss of the Fort. We have a fresh example of this in the taking of the Castle at Furli when the Countess Catharina defended it against Caesar Borgia the Son of Alexander VI. who had brought the French Army before it This Castle was full of those retreats for first there was a Citadel then a Fortress and betwixt both a good Ditch with a draw bridge The Castle within was divided into three parts and each part strongly separated from the other with Ditches and Water and Draw-bridges by which they communicated As soon as the Duke had made his approaches he with his great Guns battered one part of the Castle and laid open a good part of the Wall whereupon Giovanni da Casale who had the command of that quarter never stood to make good the breach but left it to retire into another part so that the Enemy having entred the first quarter with little difficulty it was not long before they made themselves