exactly obedient to it to keep silence And when the Parties are numerous enough to compose Battalions and Squadrons to observe in going to the Charge the just wideness of the Intervals for the Reserves or second Line to relieve the first Line But if there must be any Error therein to be sure the Interval ground be rather inlarged than streightned For 't is better the Reserves should have too much room to march up to the Front than too little since the latter will render them almost useless But before I come to Treat of that part of Disciplining the Soldiery which consists in drawing them up into Battalions and Squadrons which I intend to discourse of when I come to Treat of Battels I shall crave leave to offer some Considerations on what we generally observe and seldom or never alter whatever the occasion requires And that is the drawing up our Shot and Pike six deep and our Horse three deep And this I should not presume to do had not I been emboldened to it by some Experiments of my own which God did bless with success For when I found my self over-winged by the Enemy they drawing up their Foot six deep and their Horse three deep I judged it best for me to Fight my Foot four deep and my Horse two deep whereby I added one third of more hands to the Front and Breadth of my Battalions and Squadrons For I was fully satisfied that it was likelier I should be worsted by the Enemy if he fell into my Flanks and Rear holding me also to equal Play in the Front than if four Ranks of my Foot should be broken or two Ranks of my Horse that the third Rank of the Horse and the fifth and sixth Ranks of my Foot should recover all again for I had often seen Battalions and Squadrons defeated by being overwinged But I never saw the last Rank of the Horse and the two last Ranks of the Foot restore the Field when the four first Ranks of the Foot and the two first Ranks of the Horse were Routed For commonly if the two first Ranks of the Horse are Routed they themselves for they still are broken inward Rout the third Rank and though the like cannot truly be said of the Foot in all points yet in a great measure it usually follows But I must confess that he who makes such an alteration in Military Discipline unless he be a Sovereign Prince or have sufficient Orders to do it ought to resolve his success only must Apologize for it that is to be victorious or be kill'd I should therefore humbly desire that fighting no deeper than four for the Foot and two for the Horse where the ground is fit might well be considered and then let true Reason give the Rule For my own part I will ingeniously acknowledge that after having as throughly weighed all the Arguments for and against it as my weak judgment could suggest to me I would without hesitation if it were left to my own Election fight my Foot and Horse no deeper than four and two in any case where the ground would admit me to extend my Battalions and Squadrons to the full For if I fight against equal Numbers and equally good Soldiers to my own 't is more likely falling into their Flanks and as much into their Rear also as I overwing them the depth of a File in each Flank that I shall Rout them then it is that before I perform that they shall have pierced through my four Ranks since Rank to Rank of equally good Soldiers and equal in Number will more probably hold longer play one with the other than Soldiers equally good can defend themselves at once if briskly charged in Front Flanks and Rear and since the Flanks and Rear of Foot them selves fight with great disadvantage against those who Charge them there all at once but when Horse are Charged in the Flanks and in the Rear 't is next of kin to a miracle if they 'scape being broken For the Troopers in the Ranks when they go to Charge are as close as the Riders knees can endure it and therefore 't is impossible for the Flanks to do any thing or the last Rank to face about and consequently they must have their backs expos'd to the Shot and Swords of their Enemy The Foot indeed will easily face about but then if the depth of Files be the advantage I have it who Charge every where four deep and they every way defend but three deep at the most If this way of fighting will afford me solid and great advantages against an Enemy equal to me in the goodness and number of his Soldiers I do not think it can be denied but if I fight against fewer or worse men than mine but greater and more certain benefits will result from it The chief Objection to this way of fighting that I know of is as to the Musketeers who being but four deep and advancing firing the first Rank cannot have loaded their Muskets again by that time the fourth Rank has done firing so that there will be an intermission of shooting To that I answer Let the Musketeers Charge their Muskets with such Cartridges as I have mentioned and the first Rank will be as soon ready if you are but four deep as the first Rank will be if you are six deep loading with Bandeleers especially if I use the Fire-lock and the Enemy the Match-lock Besides you will still have a Rank to fire till you fall in if you begin to fire but at a short distance which I would do to choose if I were six deep Lastly were both these denied which yet I must say I have on Experiment found to be true and a demonstration is the strongest proof It is not enough to say one method hath such Objections to it which the other hath not but all Objections to both methods are to be examined and that Rule is to be observed which on the whole matter has the least For how few things in the world would be entertained as best if only such were so against which no Objection could be made The first of the Ancients which I have read of who found it much more advantageous when the ground allowed it rather to extend the Ranks than deepen the Files was that great Captain Cyrus in his famous Battel against Cressus King of Lydia for Cyrus finding himself over numbred took off half the depth of his Files and added them to his Front whereby he won the Victory by overwinging Cressus As the drawing up the Infantry but four deep and the Cavalry but two deep where the ground will allow it has great advantages in Fight over those who draw up the Foot six deep and the Horse three deep so it has in marching for the shallower the Files are in the several Divisions the shorter the Army or Regiment must be in their long march which is a great ease to the Soldiers in and towards the Rear of
imitation of the Roman Discipline when the Army or Forces were to march I observed these following Rules where I had the Honour to command in Chief Soon after the Reveill was beaten I caused all the Troopers and Wagoners or Men that tended the Baggage to take up their Horses and Oxen and to make ready to load At the sounding to saddle all began to take down their Tents and to load At the sounding to Horse all the Troopers did mount and the Foot Soldiers draw into Arms under their Colours When the Trumpets sounded to the Standard all the Soldiery marched out of the Ground they Quartered or Camped on into the Field or Fields appointed to draw up in and there were formed into as many and large Squadrons and Battalions as the time and ground would admit still those Forces of Horse and Foot having the Right which were to have the Van all day and the Guard at night all the Ordnance Wagons and Baggage being drawn up on one side by themselves ready to fall into the centre of the Foot as the Army or Forces marched off Those which had had the Guard the preceding night being drawn up in Battalia till the Army fell into their marching order and till the Ground was cleared and then they brought up the Rear all that day and commanded out a Rear-guard of Horse and Foot during that dayes march who were still to bring up all sick or lame Soldiers who could not keep pace with the Body And where any was unable to go to carry him behind a Trooper till he came to the Camp and then to deliver him to his Captain also to seize upon and secure all straglers and to give them to the Provost Marshal that they might be punish'd If I march'd through a Countrey which had narrow Cause-wayes Bridges Rivers or Passes I made those Forces which were on those Cause-wayes Bridges and Passes double the quickness of their march till they were gotten out or over them and then immediately draw up on the right or left hand as the Ground would permit till all the rest were got over in case I suspected the Enemy was near or watched my motion If I did not apprehend an Enemy then I made only every Regiment of Horse and Foot draw up when they had passed over those straights till the intire Regiment were got over and then to continue their march the like I practised over any fordable Rivers But still when the stream was rapid or above knee-deep I made the strongest Horse by turns in Files stand firm in the River on the upper and lower sides of the Ford that the Foot might pass the safelier between them the upper Files breaking much the rapidness of the stream and the lower catching up those Foot Soldiers who might be cast down by the violence of the Current by which means many Foot Soldiers Lives have been saved I did also order the Horse in the Van of all when they had gotten over the Ford to send out small Parties to discover while the rest of the Army were marching over the Fords or Bridges and if the Countrey were enclosed or hilly to be the more diligent and expeditious in such searchings and discovery For an Enemy cannot wish for a greater advantage than to fall upon an Army which is separated by a Ford Bridge or such narrow passage since then they are his at a cheap price therefore great and constant circumspection must be observed in all such cases and all the Forces as fast as they get over must be in a posture to fight in formed Squadrons and Battalions while the rest are getting over It ought also to be the constant care in a chief Commander especially marching through an Enemies Countrey or when an Enemy is near often to make short halts that the Army may not march disorderly and that it may be as short in its long march as possible for 't is better to make short and sure dayes marches than long ones and hazardous 'T is impossible to give one certain and standing Rule for the most advantageous and safe way of marching an Army for the form must vary according to the Country you march in and the Enemy you have to do with If I suspect he means to assault me during my march in my Front Rear or Flanks I must fortifie those several parts accordingly If he be an Enemy not strong enough to give me Battel and will only by his Horse and Dragoons possess the Passes and Bridges and Fords to obstruct and retard my march I would then have some Ordnance with their Necessaries march with the Foot which are in the Van of all the better and sooner to drive him from his Defences and I would march my Army in two or three several Bodies divers wayes which the French call Columes but we and I think more properly Lines yet still no farther distant the one from the other than to be ready speedily to unite if the need require and at evening all to Camp in one Field or quarter it conveniently whereby the whole would move the more expeditiously safely and at ease and the Enemy would be the less encouraged to defend a Bridge Ford or narrow Pass against one of the three Lines since while he is doing that one or both the others may encompass him and cut off his retreat There are several other Cases which must be provided against as the emergencies happen by the care knowledge and foresight of the Commander in chief for which no positive Rules can be set down but the Orders must be given on the place and proportionably to the Ground the Enemy and the Occasion In an Enemies or doubtful Countrey especially I would still have a general Officer with the Quartermaster general attended upon by the Quartermasters of the respective Regiments of Foot and Troops of Horse and Train to be on the ground to Camp on at night some convenient space of time before the Van of the Army comes up both to view the Ground thorowly to take all the advantages of it and to appoint the several places for the Guards for the general Officers the Regiments and Train to incamp in that against the Army comes up every one may know where to pitch his Tent for which end the several Quartermasters should near the first Avenue of the Camp attend and be ready to shew their men respectively as they come up where the Ground is and how much is allowed them to lodge in that all may go readily and without confusion to their several stations and that there may be no dispute those should be staked or marked out else too often quarrels or animosities do arise on those occasions And if an Enemy be near I would have the several Regiments draw up within the Camp or near it till the Rear be ready to enter into it to be the fitter to resist if assaulted or to relieve the Rear if fallen upon and only admit some of every
the Battel on that side where you judge your self the strongest and your Enemy the weakest and with those Troops to advance as expeditiously as you can without disordering them while the rest of your Army moves as slowly as they may For if your first Impression be successful you may fall into the Flank and part of the Rear of your Enemies while the Residue of your whole Army is marching to attack them in the Front but then the motion of your Army must be quicker as soon as ever they see your advanced Wing is successful I would recommend to Practice one thing more which I have on tryal found very beneficial it is this During the motion of your advanced Wing to edge it by degrees and insensibly towards the outward Flank of that Wing of the Enemies which you go to charge so as by that time you mingle you may outwing them and thereby attack them at once in Front Flank and Rear if he has omitted to cover that Flank And therefore to begin the Battel with that Wing of yours which is the strongest is not only most adviseable but also to place your best men in that Wing of yours which is opposite to that Wing of his which has the Flank of it uncover'd if by neglect or want of time or means either of his Flanks are not secured I have known great advantage obtain'd thereby and if your Enemy be not very timely aware of this it may more than likely contribute considerably to win you the day I mention very timely aware of this because if he discover not your design until you are on the Point to execute it it will be too late to prevent it since no alteration can be made when you are ready to join but it will in all likelihood be ruinous to him who in that juncture of time shall attempt to make it When I mention your beginning the Battel with that Wing in which you have placed your valiantest Soldiers I intend thereby that the second Line of that Wing shall advance as well as the first else while you fall in the Flank and Rear of your Enemies Wing his second Line may fall into the Flank and Rear of as many of your first Line as are so employed unless your own second Line be ready to prevent it and to improve all the Advantages which your first Impression shall give you The placing the best Men in the Wings of an Army is very ancient and seldom has been omitted but to the loss of those who were guilty of such Omission the Reason is the Troops on your Wings are not wedg'd in as the Troops in your main Battel are but are at liberty to take all advantages that by accident or by the ill conduct of your Enemy or by your own good may be offer'd you and you cannot so much as rationally hope to fall into his Flank and Rear but by attacking one of his Wings because you cannot overwing him but only by falling upon one of his outward Flanks Hannibal who was so excellent a Captain to win Victories though possibly not to make the best use of them at the famous Battel of Cannes placed all his valiantest Men in both his Wings and the worst Men in the midst of his Battel whereby when the Romans came to the Charge who had placed their choicest Legions in their main Battel they soon pierced into the Body of Hannibals Army which was what he designed they should do for then with his two Wings in which were all his choicest Troops he immediately incompassed the Romans and totally defeated them But at the Battel of Zama or as some call it Nadagara which â—…e fought against Scipio though the Fate of Carthage depended on the issue of that day yet he totally altered the Order he had observed at Cannes and lost the Victory For at Zama he placed all his new raised Men by themselves to endure the first Attack of the Romans and of all his old Soldiers who had so memorably served him in his Wars in Italy he made as it were an Army apart and drew them up a few Furlongs behind his new raised Africans who were therefore soon cut in pieces as his reserve Army was not long after whereas if he had observed the like order of Battel at Nadagara as he did at Cannes he might have had the like success IX The ninth thing is To prohibit under the severest Penalties the absolute Chace or the Pillage until the Enemy is totally Routed on all sides and then have those Troops only to pursue which are expresly appointed for it alwayes having Squadrons to march after the Pursuers as near and in as good order as if they were going to the Charge that if the Pursued should Rally and Face about you may have those ready to fall on and break them a second time How many Victories seemingly won have in an instant been lost for want of due care in these two Particulars of such high concernment which therefore ought never to be omitted Neither is there any thing which more encourages flying Enemies to rally and fight again than the seeing a disorderly Pursuit of them for in such a Pursuit all the advantage of the prevailing Party is immediately vanished when the Chaced do but turn about for such an evidence of restored Valor too often daunts those who are to oppose it Nor can any thing more deterr the flying Party from doing that than to see several Bodies in good order ready to make them repent that confidence and though brave Officers will not cease pressing promising and threatning their Men that flie to Face about yet the Private Soldier who sees those Bodies are ready to fall on them conclude it is more dangerous to do so than to run and therefore are too often deaf to all Oratory or Menaces of that Nature for the frighted Soldier as well as the hungry Belly has no Ears These Nine Particulars may not improperly be called Maxims in War and therefore ought to be still practised before a Battel in a Battel and after the Enemy is Routed I know many of the Ancients and not a few of the Moderns have with much industry alwayes endeavored to gain the Sun and the Wind of their Enemy in the day of Battel and doubtless both are very desirable to be on our backs when they may be obtained without losing thereby more certain Advantages from the Nature of the Ground you are to fight on For those are mutable especially the latter and the former is still in motion so that no Precaution can ascertain the keeping of them when they are gotten and therefore one must not lose the stable Advantages in hope to gain the unstable but if both may be had at once they must never be neglected I shall now proceed to set down several other Particulars which I hope will be useful to whoever has the Curiosity and Patience to read them VVhen an Enemies Army advances to
Command may be clearly heard and punctually obeyed 'T is observed that the Grecians went alwayes silently to the Battel alledging for it That they had more to do than to say to their Enemies But such Shoutings is a kind of doing for it stirs up your own Men and often damps your Enemies This puts me in mind how that once marching in Battalia in a plain Countrey to fight the Enemies Army and as they marched in the like order to meet us some Musketeers of ours running hastily to a Budge-Barrel to fill their Bandeleers and being careless of their Matches the Budge-Barrel took fire and blew them up at which the Enemies Army shouted and finding our Men did not answer them I rid hastily to the next Squadrons and Battalions and commanded them also to shout which the rest of the Forces taking it from them repeatedly did soon after the like Accident happen'd to the Enemies Army and then our Men shouted but were not answer'd which I bid the next Troops to take notice of as a sign they were disanimated and a proof that their loss was considerable by that blowing up the Soldiers took it as an Omen of that Victory which God soon after was pleased to give us which seems to shew That Shouting according to the Soldiers understanding is a token of joy and the Enemies not answering it an evidence of fear and whatever may cause fear in your Enemy ought not to be omitted by you since Fear is truly said to be a Betrayer of that Succor which Reason else might afford Besides there is in all Mankind a weak Part and Experience has but too clearly evidenced that the difference between the Best and the Worst Men does not consist in those being totally exempted from the Influences and Operations of it but in the degrees of being less liable to it Now this weak Part is affected with Noise and Pageantry and therefore when the shew of danger is thoroughly imprest on the Intellect by the conveyance of the Senses the minds of Men are too much disturbed to be then actuated by the dictates of Reason The putting into Rank and File and the forming into the order of Squadrons and Battalions all the Men and Boyes which attend the Soldiers and can be spared from the Baggage and are not armed may be of good use for all those so ordered and placed at a competent distance as a Grand Reserve in the Rear of all make a formidable shew to your Enemy and inclines him to believe you have a third Line or Battalia to be broken before they can get the Victory Nor is this all the advantage which may be derived from thus disposing of those useless Persons in a day of Battel since thereby also you will hinder them from filching the Soldiers Goods while they are busie a Fighting and will keep the Field clear which you engage in I mention this last Particular having sometimes seen the Soldiers Boyes and the Drivers of Carriages either incited thereto by natural Valor or desire of Pillage or both so closely attend the Rear of their Masters who were fighting that when they were disordered it occasioned much hazard and confusion in the Rallyment But these appearances of Soldiers must alwayes be put at such a distance from the Enemy that he may not see they are unarmed and consequently but a meer show for then that will become ridiculous which otherwise will be terrifying Though I have already said in General That if your Enemy be stronger than you in Cavalry you must cover yours with your Infantry and if he be stronger than you in Infantry you must cover yours with your Cavalry Yet possibly it may not be useless to set down in some Particulars how those General Rules may be best practised If my Enemy did much outnumber me in Horse and I him in Foot I would flank every Battalion of my Shot with Files of Pikes Nay I would so order such of my Battalions as were likeliest to bear the often Charging of the Enemies Cavalry as that the Front and Rear of my Shot in them should be covered with my Pikes as well as my Flanks and under my Pikes my Shot should be still firing either keeping their Ground or Advancing or Retreating as there should be occasion Nor would I omit if my Enemy very much overpower'd me in Cavalry to place small Battalions of Shot and Pike so order'd as is immediately before express'd in the Intervals between my Squadrons of Horse in the first Line of my Wings For to me it seems much more adviseable if you mingle Battalions with Squadrons in your Wings that such Battalions should be of Pike and Shot so ordered than of Shot alone as is the usual method in such Imbattellings For if such small Battalions consist of Shot only the chief advantage you can derive from them is by their firing to disorder your Enemies Squadrons just as you are going to Charge them but if that fails of the hoped-for Event whatever becomes of your Squadrons these small Battalions are too much exposed to Ruine for Shot onely will not resist Horse in an open Field especially when those Shot also are disanimated by the Flight or Routing of the Horse that had fought on their side Besides I have found experimentally That private Soldiers never fight with the needful Courage when they are led on such a piece of Service as this of Firing on an Enemy and after to shift for themselves if that Volly does not the Work for then they do it in haste and too often timerously for even while they are firing they are looking which is the best Way to flie when they have done firing which would too much distract Men of more setled minds than private Soldiers are usually blest with To which I shall further add That Musketeers so imbattled and chequer'd as it were with Squadrons of Horse may too likely on the disordering of your first Line of Cavalry be so shuffled together by those of it that are Routed by those of your Enemy which pursue the Rout and by those of your second Line which advance to stop the Enemies pursuit that the poor Shot can neither be useful to their Friends nor offensive to their Enemies Whereas if those small Battalions be composed of Pike as well as Shot and be ordered as is formerly set down they will in the Spaces or Intervals between your Squadrons not only make almost as great Fire on your Enemies but also firing under the Pikes do it with less apprehension and consequently take their Aim the better and thereby do the more Execution Besides fighting with a Resolution to make good their Ground composes their Minds and makes them the more Resolute against their Enemies and the more obedient to their Officers Commands but what is most material of all is If your Squadrons should be disordered nay routed yet such Battalions as these will for some time at least keep their Ground and with
acknowledge I would have every private Trooper have his Sword or Long Tuck his Case of Pistols and Carabine and for defence his Back Breast and Pott at least I would have the Front and Flanks of every Troop in such Armor For besides the Terror it gives to an Enemy in his Doublet to fight with men of Iron and the encouragement it gives our own men none knows what proof the Armor is of And 't is most certain that in Combat as well as Pursuit the Sword does most Execution and no Armor is less than Sword proof I therefore earnestly wish that the Officers the Troopers and the Pikemen were bound under severe Penalties to fight in Armor and constantly to march in Armor which piece of Discipline if it were revived by strict Commands and if broken punish'd Exemplarily I am confident the advantages would be considerable Nor do I much value what our young Gallants say that in their Doublets they will Charge as far as any in their Armor since to that I answer First it may spring as much from Laziness as Courage But secondly a wise Commander ought to have more care of his Soldiers safeties than they will have of their own and ought not to let his men expose themselves but where there is need and then to use the best means he can for their safety as well as their success since the business is not who dares go to be kill'd but who dares venture his Life on the best terms to obtain the Victory and if men will go on boldly without Armor 't is likelier they will Charge the bravelier with Armor since their Bodies by it have the greater defence and by accustoming themselves to wear Iron it will become habitual to them If I might follow my own opinion I would have every Regiment of Horse consist of seven Troops six whereof should be Armed with Back Breast and Pott and for offence should have Swords or Tucks with Pistols and Carabines and the seventh Troop should be of Firelocks or Dragoons whose duty should be to guard the Quarter of the Regiment to secure Passes with Celerity to force Passes possest by the Enemy to assist the Horse when they fight in enclosed Countries and in Battels to alight and marching up in the outermost Flank of the Regiment should in two Ranks the first kneeling the second standing a little before the Squadrons Charged Fire upon the Enemy their Guns loaden with Pistol Bullets which I have sometimes practised and found it attended with great success every tenth man while the rest were on such service was to hold the Horses of those who were thus employed and if the Enemy were Routed they were all to mount again and to follow the execution But if the Enemy Routed us they were to shelter themselves behind the next Squadrons of our Horse which were entire or the next Battalion of our Foot and when Rallied to serve as they should be commanded by the chief Officer of that Squadron or Battalion under the countenance of which they should Rally I know the French Spaniards and other Nations have had distinct Troops of Carabines but in my poor opinion Carabines are best in the Troopers hands who are Armed and have Pistols especially if every Regiment of Horse has one Troop of Firelocks or Dragoons and I have ground to believe that Dragoons thus annexed to the Horse are much better than they are when Regimented entire and by themselves First Because they are constantly with the Horse and being in effect a part of their Body are alwayes the more careful of them the more ready to serve with them and the more concern'd for them Secondly Being under the Command of the Field Officers and Captains of Horse they are more obedient to them than if they belonged to other Colonels and were only a commanded Party to answer a present need Thirdly The Horse Commandeâ—…s when the Dragoons belong to their own Regiments are more careful of them and will not needlesly harass them by extraordinary and unequal duty which when they have their assistance but on emergent occasions I have often seen them do Fourthly The Horse Officers knowing all their Dragoons by name and they knowing particularly all the Horse Officers they are the more likely to fight chearfully for them or not to escape unpunished if they be remiss for every one being known none can escape by ignorance the contrary to which is often experimented in commanded Parties when the Officers are unknown to the Soldiers and the Soldiers to the Officers Lastly To omit many other particulars some have observed that as the Dragoons are commonly the briskest and daringst of the private Soldiers so they are also the least sober and 't is likelier to wean them from that fault when they are but a seventh part of the Regiments than when they are an entire Regiment and all Birds of one Feather And the Troopers being generally a more civilized orderly People than the Dragoons 't is probable that the major part by much of the Regiment should win the minor by good example than that the minor by much should seduce the major part To conclude this Head of my Essay I will only add It is not sufficient to make good Rules unless the Prince or General see them punctually obey'd or severely punish'd if broken For besides the evil which attends the omitting of what is good the contempt of Authority is of fatal consequence in all Humane Affairs and most of all in Military where though what is commanded might have been indifferent it self yet it ceases to be so when it is commanded and if a Soldier of himself may break one Rule of the Generals unpunish'd he may believe thereby that he may as well break any nay all the rest for the stamp of Authority is alike on all of which when a private person or many private men make themselves the Judges they bid defiance to all Discipline without which no Society can subsist and Military ones the least of any In one word it were much better that good Rules were not made than if made that they should not be observed and the breakers of them 'scape unpunish'd The Disciplining of the Soldiery I Shall not under this Head amuse my self to speak of the Handling of Arms nor of the several Postures and Motions taught the Soldiers nor of the divers wayes of Exercising of a Troop or Company since we have in our own Language so many printed Books on that subject And I am also the less curious in doing it because though there be many fine things taught in those particulars which are graceful to the sight and make Soldiers the more ready yet when we come in earnest to fight few of them are practised but to keep their Ranks even and close their Files right to fire nimbly and but breast high to charge boldly with the Pikes and through with the Horse to be watchful of the word of Command from the Officer
understands his business he will never fail of making his attempt that night in which you come late and consequently tired and disordered into your Camp especially when it has no Line about it To prevent therefore this fatal mischief of coming late to Quarter I would practise three things indispensibly The first is to be moving very early The second is to send the Carpenters of the Train and most of the Pioneers with the Van to mend Bridges that need it to support and prop such as without those helps shall be judged insufficient to bear the Wagons Ammuninition and Cannon And when there are any bad steps for the Horse or Train to mend them against the Army comes up And when the wayes are narrow to leave those wayes if it be possible only for the Cannon and Baggage and to make several large gaps to the right and left hand of the Highwayes for the Troops to march in the Fields Thirdly whenever the ground allows it to march in Battalia and if all the Army cannot yet at least that the Horse and Foot march in as large Squadrons and Battalions as the Countrey will admit which will not only hasten your march by shortning the length of your Army but also habituate your Soldiers to march orderly in Bodies against there is need Yet if all these Precautions do not accelerate your intended dayes march as that you apparently see you cannot come early enough to your intended place to Camp or Quarter in for many such Accidents may happen then I would much rather Camp short of the station I intended in the first convenient Ground I found for Fire Water and Foâ—…age which three must still be minded than expose my Men to all the fatal mischiefs and inconveniences of a late Incamping or Quartering If I am to Camp or Quarter at night in an Enemies Countrey or a doubtful one or that an Enemy be near I would strictly observe these two following particulars First That none should know the Ground I intend to Camp or Quarter in at night but the chief Officers Secondly That if my Guide or Guides be not of my Army or Men thorowly known to me and trusted by me I would let him or them speak with none after I concluded they might guess at the way I intended to march and consequently near what place I intended to Camp or Quarter in and to have them in safe custody all the march I would allow no Soldiers during the march to straggle much less to stay behind unless on meer necessity and by his Officers leave and this I would firmly observe whether I marched through a Friend or Enemies Countrey not only to keep up that excellent part of Military Discipline but also to preserve my Men from receiving or doing the Country any harm since Soldiers but too generally are apt to do amiss when they have the power to do it especially if not under the eye of their Officers And I have known Countries which being ill us'd by the Soldiers of their own Party but well by those of the Enemy have therefore been Friends to their Foes and Enemies to their Friends who in effect made themselves their Enemies for the People of the Countrey judge chiefly by their senses As the Van has a Forlorn of Horse and Foot so the Rear should have a Rear-guard of Horse and Foot to be composed out of such as were the precedent night on duty and I would still send out small Parties of Horse on the wings to discover By this method the Van Rear and Flanks cannot be attacked without having timely notice to put themselves into order to resist an Enemy As to the Baggage I know 't is too usually practised for the convenience of the Regiments to have the Baggage of every Regiment march in the Rear of the Regiment which I think very unfit especially if an Army marches in an enclosed Countrey or where there are Woods Copses Moorish Grounds Rivers Bridges or Passes since the Baggage so placed must hinder the Regiments from coming up expeditious to oppose the Enemy and second such as may be assaulted in the Van or Rear whereby the ruine of the Army may probably ensue Iulius Caesar when he marched especially in an Enemies Countrey that was enclosed or cumbersom to move in by reason of Woods Copses Bridges c. made all his Legions march in a Body and in the Rear of them disposed of his Baggage leaving only for their Guard some new raised Men. This did well where he was sure the Enemy could only attempt him in the Van but not knowing where he will make his impression yet being certain he is likeliest to make it where he will find least resistance and where he may do most mischief in my opinion 't is best to have the Baggage as also the Cannon and Ammunition march in the Centre of the Foot where they are likeliest to be safe from all attempts and if the Attack be in the Van or Rear or both half the Army will be free from the incumbrances of the Carriages and will be ready to make head where the need requires The Romans were so exact in the order of their marches as that every Morning at the first sounding of the Trumpet every one took down his Tent and began to make up his Baggage at the second sounding every one loaded his Baggage and at the third sounding the Legions moved out of their Quarters and put themselves in the form and order they were that day to march in But none were to take down their Tents till the Consul and Military Tribunes had first took down theirs whether for the greater respect or because their Tents and Baggage being larger than the rest they should be the first at work and thereby have their Baggage as ready to march at the third sound of the Trumpet as the private Soldiers For Commanders who give Rules to all the rest ought to be the most exact themselves in observing them since if they break their own orders they encourage others to lose their reverence to them and Example operates more than Precepts for most men see better than they understand as when among Clergymen vicious Livers are good Preachers many think they themselves do not believe what they seem to inculcate since they practise contrary to what they teach Therefore it seems to me exceeding requisite that whatever Rules are made in an Army by a General he and his servants ought most punctually to observe them for else with what justice can he punish in another for the breach of the same orders which he himself does violate But when the Soldiery finds the General keeps strictly the Rules he gives they do the more inviolably observe them also for they conclude since he will not therein indulge to himself he will not do it to others And they implicitely believe such orders are good and necessary because he that gave is so punctual an observer of them In
been needless as also by carrying into his Leaguer what was in the Villages and Countrey Neighbouring on his Works to deprive his Enemies Army of all sustenance but what they brought along with them or were daily to be fetch'd by them to their Camp from a great distance And lastly to have still in his Leaguer more Victuals than the Besieged could then have within the Town thereby to compel the Relieving Army to attack those almost unconquerable Works or the Town to surrender for want of Food in the sight of the Army which came for the Succor These necessary performances together with his often fighting against such Forces as almost hourly Night and Day made numerous Sallies and were obliged to do it both to harass and lessen Caesar's Army and to retard the finishing of his Works which when compleated would render it highly difficult if possible to relieve the Besieged I say and I think with reason all these Economies of War were at least as difficult in the Actings as the making those laborious Fortifications Yet all were to be done and done at one and the same time and in so short a space that I scarce know to which of the two my Admiration is justlier due At length the Relieving Army appear'd which consisted of 248000 men as Caesar who condescended to be the Commissary of their Musters reckons them to be and also writes how many every State of Gallia did particularly send so that at once he was to withstand 320000 of his Enemies and which was more to fight with them at the same time when they attacked him in Front and Rear This formidable Relieving Army was led by four Generals viz. Comius Veridomarus Eporedorix and Vergesilaunus All great Captains and accustomed to make War even against Caesar himself where they could not but have learn'd much having to do with such a General and yet for many Years continued the War against him and one of them viz. Comius had learn'd the Rudiments of War under Caesar himself and acquired so much Honour in serving the Romans that Caesar rewarded him with the Principality over the Morini The Gaules seated their Camp on a Hill half a mile from Caesar's Works and sent their Cavalry into a Plain under it and their nimblest Archers conceal'd behind their Troops Caesar makes his Cavalry match out to fight them lest the Gaules by having their Cavalry unfought with even under Caesar's Works might grow too insolent and his own Army be intimidated The Roman Horse were worsted by the help of the Gaules Archers but Caesar's German Horse Relieved them Routed the Gaules and cut in pieces their Archers and then all Caesar's Troops return d within their Line The Gaules made three several General Assaults on Caesar's Camp the first by Day the second by Night and the third at full Noon Vercingetorix every time Sallying out at the same hour with his Army In these three Attacks all that Valor Skill and Industry could perform on both sides was not omitted Some Particulars I shall enumerate the Gaules finding the Rows of Stakes and Holes and the Galthorps destroyd many of their Men flung up so much Earth over them as covered them and thereby made them useless to the Romans Then filling their Ditches with Fagots Hurdles and Earth raised the Outside on which they went to the Assaults higher than the Line they assaulted and so went on advantageous Ground to the Attack and Caesar when he found his Men distressed in Front by the Enemies over-numbring him and fighting on equal Ground would often command his Cavalry sometimes his Legionary Infantry to sally out of his Line and to fall on them in the Rear whereby he routed them The last dayes Attack seem'd several Battels rather than one General Assault such great Bodies fighting at once both within and without the first Lines towards the Field and towards the Town for the Gaules having discover'd the weakest or more properly the least strong part of Caesar's Line while all the residue of their Army were assaulting the rest of the Works Vergesilaunus who was Vercingetorix's near Kinsman in the obscurity of the preceding Night had marched behind a Hill and concealed himself there with 60000 select men who at Noon-day when the Romans were with all their Forces defending their Works both against the Besieged and Comius c. assaulted them unexpectedly entred the Line whose Ditch they had filled and with many shouts daunted Caesar's Soldiers as he himself confesses But Caesar at last by the Valor and Expertness of his men and by his excellent Conduct relieving them in all parts where they were oppressed and leading them in Person to many Charges was Victorious and Chaced the Gaules to the very Works of their Camp and to the Gates of the Town and adds If his Soldiers had not been quite spent with that dayes hot Service few of all the Gaules had scaped They lost in that last dayes attempt above 60000 men so that despairing to perform what they came for they did that Night abandon their Camp and many were kill'd by Caesar's Cavalry who pursued them in the obscurity and the next day Vercingetorix capitulated and yielded he himself gallantly mounted and armed at all points having first leisurely rid round about the Chair of State in which Caesar sate to receive him alighted off of his Horse and as an evidence of his being Conquer'd disarm'd himself and then went and sate down on the Ground at Caeâ—…ar's feet without speaking one word Some of those many Reasons which induced Caesar in my opinion to continue within his Lines and not to give the Enemy Battel in the Field I shall here set down I. He could not shut up in Alesia a much greater Army than his own without making very strong Lines of Countervallation against it II. Having made these wonderful â—…ines and knowing of the vast Relief which was certainly hastening to succor the Besieged he with so small an Army as his own which probably could not consist of above 30000 Foot and 6000 Horse for he never had above 10 Legions at once in all Gallia could not reasonably hope both to keep in Vercingetorix with 80000 chosen men and fight against Comius c. with 248000 good men unless by prodigious Works he could supply what he wanted in Numbers of men and also by so posting his Army between his Lines of Circumvallation and â—…ountervallation as to be thereby ready to resist both wayes and often with the same Reserve Battalions and Squadrons For whatever Justus Lâ—…psius computes That the space between these two Lines must be 5000 Foot yet in reason I am fully convinced they were much nearer each other for else they could not answer the end for which they were made since no Squadrons of Reserve can 〈◊〉 answer both wayes a distance of a Mile much less do it as often as need requires and our modern Lines of Circumvallation and Countervallation which are but Copies after
Lastly If it be on your Right Wing that these small Battalions of Pike and Shot are placed then I would have them when they advance to Front even with your Squadrons alwayes to do it to the Right of the Squadron they marched in the Rear of and if it be on the Left Wing alwayes to the Left For thereby your Flanks of your outward Squadrons in each Wing will be cover'd with Pike and Shot and the innermost Squadrons of your Wings will be flank'd with the Battalions of the Foot of your Army Therefore if this be not stedily observed your outmost Squadron of both your Wings will be needlesly left unflank'd by a small Battalion of Pikes and Shot which when you are much outnumbred in Horse will be too hazardous and therefore the preventing it highly adviseable I acknowledge I never practised this against an Enemy but it was meerly because I never had need to do it neither did I ever exercise my Men to it and that proceeded only from an apprehension that it might discover what I intended in case there had been need and thereby probably have made it less effectual But I am confident it is very easily practicable and to be made of very advantageous use in case the Enemy were much my superior in Cavalry and I stronger than he in Infantry But I submit this Notion to the judgment of those who are better able to determine of it than I. If your Army be stronger by much in Cavalry than your Enemies and his stronger by much than yours in Infantry I would then earnestly endeavor to fight both or at least one of his Wings with both or one of my Wings which I once did and I would make all my Infantry move as slowly towards the Enemy as they could while I advanced a round trot with my Cavalry and Charged that of my Enemies And if I had success in both my Wings against both his or in one of my Wings against one of his then I would make the next innermost Squadrons of my second Line of that Wing which had beaten the Enemies or of both my Wings if they had defeated both the Enemies Wings immediately march to flank my Battalions of Foot but not to hazard Infantry to Infantry till mine were Wing'd by some Squadrons of my second Line and then advance to the Charge as expeditiously as I could without disordering my Battalions thereby making my Squadrons doubly useful And the Enemies Infantry must be resolute men indeed when all their Horse are routed and that they are to be Charged with all my Infantry and divers Squadrons of my Cavalry and are to be raked with my Cannon which then may be drawn up for that end if they are not soon reduced to furl their Colours order their Pikes and crave Quarter I would further in case I were strong enough in Cavalry to do it even before my Wings were fighting against the Enemies Wings appoint some Squadrons of mine to draw up in the Rear of my Battalions both to countenance my own Infantry and the more to deter the Enemies from Charging them during the Engagement of all the Horse of both Armies For it is the duty of a General to order all things as safely as he may and to leave as little to what is called Fortune as possibly he can The clearing of the Ground you intend to imbattel on of all such Squadrons or Battalions as your Enemy may have advanced on it before you bring up your Battalions and Cannon on it ought never to be omitted and ought still to be done by your Horse and Dragoons or with few if any of your Infantry For the neglect of this may hazard your Army since the Enemy having the start of you by getting part of his Army in the Field of Battel before you get any of yours he may thereby cut you off by peece-meal while you are forming your Imbattelling This I observed was carefully practised by the Prince of Conde before the Battel of Rocroy and Monsieur de Gassion was commanded with his Cavalry to do that Work which being effectually done it did not a little contribute to the Princes Victory In the Imbattelling of your Army I would still do it where the Ground admits it by drawing up in one Line only all the Cavalry and Infantry and not as I have seen some unexpert Commanders do Draw up first a Squadron of a Wing which was to compose part of your first Line and then a Squadron of Reserve to it which was to compose part of your second Line and so in Sequence all your Squadrons and Battalions of your whole Army for that method is tedious and the just spaces of your Intervals between Squadron and Squadron and between Battalion and Battalion cannot be so well adjusted by the Eye as by the first filling up those spaces with the Soldiery for the first is but Guessing but the last is Certainty I would observe this method not only in order to the better and more expeditious Imbattelling my Army if the Ground allow'd it but I would also observe it as much as orderly I could in my advancing to the Charge until I saw it time to form my two Lines by the continued motion of those Troops which are to compose my first Line and by Alting of those Troops which were to compose my second Line and of my third Line if the Ground were so scanty as my two first could more than employ it all And this not singly for the Reasons before exprest but for this additional one also viz. It being very difficult for many and great Squadrons which have Intervals between every two of them to preserve the just Wideness of the Intervals if they march far and if those Intervals are not duly observed 't is impossible to avoid one of these two mischiefs either if they are contracted during your Advance the Troops which at need are to march up through them will be disabled from doing it or at least so many of them as cannot will in their separating from those which can be disorder'd and too likely remain useless Or if these Intervals be inlarged your Flanks are thereby exposed to be fallen into by the Enemy therefore in my poor judgment that way is the very best which will most likely prevent your being involved in either of them and that is practicable and attainable I believe by not making any Intervals till almost you may have need of them which by advancing all your Army in one Line until you come so nigh the Enemy as you judge is a fit time to form your Lines in the manner before set down And then the distance being so little between you and your Enemy 't is not likely if but ordinary care is taken that the Interval Ground can be either much contracted or much enlarged at least 't is not so likely that either of those Ills will be run into marching over but a little Ground as marching over
like to have been worsted for the Soldiers were forced to gnaw off much of the Lead others to cut their Bullets in which much time was lost the Bullets flew a less way and more uncertainly and which was worse so many pauses animated the Enemy by making him think our Courages cooled If there be two sizes of Muskets and shot on both ends of the Barrels which hold the shot should be written Lesser and Bigger that in the hurry of a Fight there might be no mistake but that Bullets be distributed according to the Bores of the Muskets I would also propound That in all Field Engagements especially in those where we intend not to cheapen an Enemy but to fall on merrily that the Musketeers would load their Muskets only with five or six Pistol Bullets which will do great Execution especially Fired near and then to fall in at Club Musket I have Experimented this and found it attended with great Success I would recommend the Fire-lock Musket above the Match-lock Musket for several Reasons some of which I shall mention First It is exceedingly more ready For with the Fire-lock you have only to Cock and you are prepared to Shoot but with your Match-lock you have several motions the least of which is as long a performing as but that one of the other and oftentimes much more hazardous besides if you Fire not the Match-lock Musket as soon as you have blown your Match which often especially in Hedge Fights and in Sieges you cannot do you must a second time blow your Match or the Ashes it gathers hinders it from Firing Secondly The Match is very dangerous either where Bandeleers are used or where Soldiers run hastily in Fight to the Budge-barrel to refill their Bandeleers I have often seen sad instances thereof Thirdly Marching in the Nights to avoid an Enemy or to surprize one or to assault a Fortress the Matches often discover you and informs the Enemy where you are whereby you suffer much and he obtains much Fourthly In wet weather the Pan of the Musket being made wide open for awhile the Rain often deads the Powder and the Match too and in windy weather blows away the Powder ere the Match can touch the Pan nay often in very high Winds I have seen the Sparks blown from the Match Fire the Musket ere the Soldier meant it and either thereby lose his Shot or wound or kill some one before him Whereas in the Fire-lock the motion is so sudden that what makes the Cock fall on the Hammer strikes the Fire and opens the Pan at once Lastly To omit many other Reasons the quantity of Match used in an Army does much add to the Baggage and being of a very dry quality naturally draws the moisture of the Air which makes it relax and consequently less fit though carried in close Wagons but if you march without Waggons the Match is the more expos'd and without being dried again in Ovens is but of half the use which otherwise it would be of And which is full as bad the Skeans you give the Corporals and the Links you give the private Soldiers of which near an Enemy or on the ordinary Guard duty they must never be unfurnished if they Lodge in Hutts or Tents or if they keep Guard in the open Field as most often it happens all the Match for instant service is too often render'd uncertain or useless nothing of all which can be said of the Flint but much of it to the contrary And then the Soldiers generally wearing their Links of Match near the bottom of the Belt on which their Bandeleers are fastened in wet weather generally spoil the Match they have and if they are to fight on a sudden and in the Rain you lose the use of your Small Shot which is sometimes of irreparable prejudice I am also on long experience an Enemy to the use of Bandeleers but a great Approver of Boxes of Cartridges for then but by biting off the bottom of the Cartridge you charge your Musket for service with one Ramming I would have these Cartridge Boxes of Tin as the Carabines use them because they are not so apt to break as the Wooden ones are and do not in wet Weather or lying in the Tents relax Besides I have often seen much prejudice in the use of Bandeleers which being worn in the Belts for them above the Soldiers Coats are often apt to take Fire especially if the Match-lock Musket be used and when they take Fire they commonly wound and often kill he that wears them and those near him For likely if one Bandeleer take Fire all the rest do in that Collar they often tangle those which use them on Service when they have Fired and are falling off by the Flanks of the Files of the Intervals to get into the Rear to Charge again To which I shall add that in secret attempts in the night their Ratling often discovers the design and enables the Enemy to prevent it And in the day time on service especially if the Weather be windy their Ratling also too frequently hinders the Soldiers from hearing and consequently obeying the Officers word of Command which must be fatal when it happens whereas the Cartridge Boxes exempt those who use them from all these dangers and prejudices they enable the Soldiers on Service to Fire more expeditiously they are also usually worn about the Waste of the Soldier the Skirts of whose Doublet and his Coat doubly defend them from all Rain that does not pierce both and being worn close to his body the heat thereof keeps the Powder dryer and therefore more fit to be fired on service Besides all this whoever loads his Musket with Cartridges is sure the Bullet will not drop out though he takes his aim under breast high for the paper of the Cartridge keeps it in whereas those Soldiers which on service take their Bullets out of their Mouths which is the nimblest way or out of their Pouches which is slow seldom put any Paper Tow or Grass to ram the Bullet in whereby if they fire above breast high the Bullet passes over the head of the Enemy and if they aim low the Bullet drops out ere the Musket is fired and 't is to this that I attribute the little Execution I have seen Musketeers do in time of Fight though they fired at great Battalions and those also reasonable near It might also do well if the Soldiers tyed their Links of Match about their middle and under their Coats and Doublets instead of tying them to their Bandeleer Belt or Collar for by that means the Match would be kept dryer and fitter for service in time of Action As to the Arming of the Cavalry both for Offence and Defence I am of opinion the Arms we use are as good as any viz. the Swords Pistols and Carabines And if in the Front of our Squadrons we had some Blunderbushes they might be of good use in Fight I
Regiment to employ themselves in pitching the Tents of the rest and the other requisite actions whereby all may be in a forwardness to lodge when safely they may do it The Roman Discipline in this particular was thus When their Army approached near the place where they were to encamp the Tribunes and Centurions appointed for that work advanced before all the rest diligently to view and consider the scituation of the place and having chosen the Ground in the first place the Consuls or Generals quarter of the Camp was marked with a white Flag or Streamer and the Boundaries of it were at the same time set out Then the several quarters of the Tribunes were also appointed and then those of the several Legions all with distinct Flags or Streamers of several Colours only the Tribunes were red Then every Legion as well of the Allies as of the Romans had their portion of Ground assigned and mark'd out for drawing the Line about the Camp which was forthwith done many hands making light work and all were expert in it by constant practice for they never alter'd the measures nor the form of their Camps being never allow'd to Camp in the Fields but in Camps intrench'd though it were but for one nights quarter so safe and excellent was their Military Discipline which in my humble opinion the closer we keep our selves unto in most things the greater advantage and security we shall thereby enjoy I shall close up this Section by only adding to it That an Army but of 10000 Foot though they march 10 in a Rank and of 1000 Horse though they march 5 in a Rank having as slender Baggage as Men can march with and having but a Train of 10 Cannon with an Equipage to them for shooting but a hundred shot round takes up in their long march near 28000 foot in length which is five measured Miles and three fifths of a Mile so that so small an Army taking up in length near half a dayes march you thereby see how exceeding necessary it is for an Army that is to march to be moving early and to march as often as they can in Battalia or in great formed Squadrons and Battalions and in three Lines or two if possible to shorten the length of your Army and to draw up often as soon as they are got over Causewayes Fords Bridges Rivers c. lest if attaqued during their march the Enemy cut them off by parts the distance from Van to Rear being so great though your Army be so small Lastly If you make long marches especially in enclosed Countries or full of Passes judge how probable 't is if you have a knowing active Enemy that you may be defeated unless you be very vigilant and have constantly small Parties abroad to discover at a good distance and to give timely notice that accordingly you may be ready to oppose him and therefore to march in several Lines by several wayes yet still as I said before near enough to join or relieve one another seems very requisite as also where there is but one way over narrow Passes if possible by your Train Carpenters and Pioneers to make more I mention nothing how to defend your selves if attacked in a Pass or narrow or moorish wayes though much and many things may be said on that Subject because I take it to be the duty of a good Commander to avoid by his foresight and care the possibility of being engaged in so great a difficulty for if it be run into 't is hard if possible well to extricate ones self out of it and were all that which has been experimented in those fatal cases set down yet still the remedy will chiefly depend on the quality of the place and of the Enemy you have to deal with and on that essential part of a chief Commander which is called Presence of Mind which must actuate him according to the ground the Enemy possesses or he himself is so unhappily engaged in Only this in general is undoubtedly true in such an affair that quickness and courage in designing and acting are essential but still the best way is not to fall into such Traps which are easilier avoided than got out of when you are in Of Camping an Army within a Line or Intrenchment THere are three sorts of Camps The Temporary Camp which is for a Night or some short space The Standing Camp whereby Countries are kept in subjection which have been Conquer'd or in which Armies are lodged for some time either to avoid being necessitated to Fight till they saw a fitting time or for some other great design And the Besieging Camp Of which latter I intend to discourse in that Chapter which concerns Sieges it seeming to be best reserved till then And now only to speak of such a Camp with a Line or Intrenchment about it as is of extent and capacity sufficient to lodge an Army within it both for the accommodation of your own Soldiers and resisting the Enemy if he assaults you The Camping of an Army within a Line or Intrenchment is attended with so many solid Advantages and the neglect of it accompanied with so many Dangers and Inconveniences that by as much as the Roman Discipline which constantly obliged their Armies to lodge tho' but for one Night in intrenched Camps is to be praised by so much the neglect of it ought to be avoided I shall enumerate some of the most material Benefits which are inseparable from the doing it in which by the Rule of Contraries the Mischiefs of omitting it may be the clearlier and more convincingly inferr'd First Such an Intrenchment of an Army keeps it safe and frees it from those Dangers which it is alwayes exposed unto by Quartering in open Towns and Villages where if your Enemy be awake he will every Night endanger the carrying or beating up of some quarter of it which by its being lodged in a Body and within a Line it is exempted from since to assault an Army so Retrenched is so daring an Act and so dangerous that we hear of few who undertake it and of much fewer who are successful in it Secondly It eases the Army from keeping many and great Guards since a few serves the turn for All when all are at hand in case of the Enemies attempt whereas if they are Quartered Dispersed in Villages and without a Line every Quarter must do almost as great and as hard Duty for its own security as if the Army were well encamped would suffice for the whole But above all it eases and secures the Cavalry which if Quartered in open places must be mounted the most part of every Night Thirdly Your Army is better than within a strong Town for there you are mingled with Inhabitants some of which are too likely to be Spies for your Enemy but usually are Corrupters of that excellent Discipline of which Sobriety is a chief Ingredient both which great Evils are not only avoided in Camps but from
should resolve to give his Enemy Battel but on rational or at least very probable Grounds that he shall win it and also when the advantages of gaining it will be greater than the prejudices will be if he should lose it for whoever elects to fight a Battel on other Considerations cannot answer the doing it to his Prince to the Army he leads or to his own Judgment and Conscience III. The third is Whoever has his Enemy at such an advantage as he must submit in a short time without hazarding a Field ought on no terms to expose his Army to a Battel but should derive that from Time and Patience which else he must leave to the decision of Fortune As within my own memory I have known That a General greedy of Honour and impatient of Delay when by the wise conduct of those under him or the ill conduct of those against him his Enemies Army was so coop'd up that it could not long subsist nor Force its way he drew his own Army off of the Passes which shut up his Adversary that he might come out and decide it by a Battel which he lost and deservedly For the turns in a Battel are so many and are often occasion'd by such unexpected Accidents which also proceed from such minute Causes that a wise and great Captain will expose to Chance only as much as the very Nature of War requires IV. The fourth is When a Battel is resolved upon the Field to fight it in ought to be answerable to the Numbers of your Army and the quality of your Forces As for Example You should never choose a Ground to fight on if you can possibly avoid it which you cannot fill up with your fighting and reserve Squadrons and Battalions or as 't is now usually call'd your first and second Line That is you must still endeavor to cover the outward flanks of your Wings with a River a Wood a moorish Ground or something equivalent for else you will expose your Army too much if your Enemy does overwing you Whereas if you cannot be charg'd but in front you will have the less to fear and your Adversary the less to hope For Instance If I found my Army drawn up in Battalia would take up in its utmost extent but 15000 Foot I would not choose to fight in a Plain that was 20000 Foot wide if my Enemies Army were either more numerous than mine or were stronger in Cavalry than I But if by some Accident which I could not foresee or possibly avoid I were to fight on such a Ground I would immediately cover one or if possibly both of my Flanks with what the Nature of the Place afforded as besides a River a Brook a moorish Ground a Wood or Coppice or a steep Ground with a Ditch or Trench or some place so incumbred as my Adversaries Horse could not fall on that Flank without disordering himself before and in his doing of it But in case the Ground was so level and clear as it afforded me none of those Advantages which would be an extraordinary thing I would then by my Carriages or by immediately casting up a long and large Ditch or Trench on my Flanks supply by industry what I could not otherwise attain And if I had leisure at the two ends of each of these Ditches or Barricade of Wagons especially at the Front end I would cast up a Sconce Redoubt or Fort and stuff it with Musketeers whereby the Flank of my Wings would be covered and the Front and Rear of them defended by those Musketeers 'T was almost thus that Lewis Prince of Conde acted in the Battel at St. Denis in the Reign of King Francis the First of France And had not only thereby the Resolution with an handful of the French Protestants to fight the Constable of Montmorancy whose Army was three times as great as his but also to make it so disputable who had the Victory that the Historians of those Times give it without seruple to the Party they were of and wrote for And it seems indeed but doubtful who had the Victory for the next morning the Prince and the Admiral Chastillion by Andelot's being joined with them who brought them not above 1000 men with which until then he made the River of Seine useless to the Parisians drew up their Army again in the Field of Battel and shot some Peals of Cannon even into Paris yet none of that King's Forces came out to fight them so that the Protestants having for a few hours brav'd the French King's Forces and that vast City marched away towards Champagne to meet their German Relief But on the other hand the Historians who were Royallists attribute this wholly to the death of the Constable and not only to the Consternation which it caused but also to the Irresolution of the Counsels who should succeed him since the Duke of Anjou who at last did was by many judged too young for so weighty a Charge and it is reasonably to be believed he would not then have been nominated but that the Queen Regent was irremoveably setled not to lodge in such intricate times the absolute Military Power in any of the House of Guise or in that of Montmorancy but in one who intirely depended on her and would be guided by her And 't is probable that the Protestants who doubtless had been much disordered in the Battel durst not have made that Bravade depending only on their own strength but at least as much on the irresolution and disputes of their Enemies who should be their new General And therefore having set the best face they could on their tottering Affairs for a short time judged it not adviseable to continue playing that part any longer than they believed they might do it safely by the King's Army being without a Head I have only instanced this Particular to manifest how a lesser Army may oppose a much greater in Battel if the Flanks of the lesser be so well covered as that it can only be charged in Front which ought alwayes indispensibly to be provided for Nor is it only needful where a Battel is to be fought to pitch on a Ground answerable to the Number of your Army but also answerable to the quality of those Forces which compose it and to those of your Enemies with whom you must have to do As if my Enemy were stronger than I in Cavalry I would avoid all I might fighting him in a Plain or if I were the stronger in Horse I would use my utmost industry to engage him in an open Countrey And on the contrary if I were stronger in Infantry I would shun the Combat unless it were in an inclosed Country or incumbred by Woods Brooks Coppices Rocks or moorish Grounds so if he were the stronger in Foot I would avoid fighting in a place where he who has the most Infantry may therefore have the most hopes of Victory But if you are commanded to fight by your
Prince or are engaged to do it to answer an end worthy the hazard of a Battel or for any such other rational Consideration great care must be alwayes taken to make choice of that Ground which is fittest for you both in respect of your own Forces as also of your Enemies And in a most particular manner if you are weakest in Foot to cover them the best you can with your Horse and on the contrary if you are weakest in Horse to cover them with your Foot V. The Ranging of an Army in Battel to the very best advantage is a great furtherance to the winning of the Victory But the so doing of it depends much not only on the Wisdom and Skill of the General the Nature of the Ground and the Quality of his own Forces but also on those of his Enemies and on the disposition of him who commands them so that although no standing Rules can be given to answer all these varieties yet some positive Maxims may be set down which if punctually observed as things are circumstantiated may beneficially answer all occasions and emergencies And I the rather say this because I have seldom found that the greatest Captains of elder times whose military knowledge and practice the Moderns justly value and extol have ever observed one and the same form in giving Battel but have varied therein considerably according to the occasion Cyrus being to fight against Croesus King of Lydia and in a large Plain fearing to be inviron'd drew up his Army but Twelve deep in File whereas formerly the File was 24 deep Whereby he augmented the Front of his Army double overwing'd Croesus's and won the Victory Caesar at the Battel of Pharsalia against Pompey did quite alter the manner of the Roman Imbattelling For having found that Pompey exceedingly outnumbred him in Horse he covered one of his Flanks with a little River and drew all his Cavalry to the other Flank among the Squadrons whereof he placed Bodies of his best Infantry and there he began the Battel Where by having all his Horse in one Wing and those accompanied by select Legionary Foot he soon Routed that half of Pompey's Horse which opposed all his and then falling into the Flanks and Rear of his Enemy won the Victory These two are very remarkable Instances which among many others verifie what I have said I shall now mention some of those standing Maxims which in my humble Opinion are indispensibly to be observed immediately before and in a day of Battel 1. The first is With great diligence to view so well the Field you will fight in as when you have drawn up your Army on it you may not afterwards alter the Order of it or change your Ground for all such Mutations in the Face of your Enemy are very dangerous and gives him also the greater Confidence and your own Men the less as being an evidence to both of a great Failure in Conduct And it may also be highly hazardous either to remove the whole or even some gross Squadrons or Battalions to the Ground which on second thoughts may be believed the better Ground of the two since your Enemy being then near may take the benefit which such disorders while the alteration is making may give him and may improve it to your total overthrow so that 't is in my poor Opinion more adviseable to keep the Ground and Order you are in though by your oversight neither should be the very best than to alter it in the sight of your Enemy and when he is near And all changes of Grounds or Order in his view ought never to be made in Gross Bodies but almost insensibly to them and your own Army by a few Files at a time and where they cannot be so made 't is better to leave them unmade I had been often told but could scarcely credit it that at the fatal Battel of Naseby after my Lord Fairfax his Army was drawn up in view of His Majesties it having been judged that the Ground a little behind them was better than that they stood upon they removed thither I had the opportunity some time after to discourse on this Subject with Major General Skippon who had the chief ordering of the Lord Fairfax his Army that day and having ask'd him if this were true he could not deny it And when I told him I almost admir'd at it for the Reasons before exprest he averr'd he was against it but he obeyed the Orders for doing it only because he could not get them altered After the Ground to fight on is well chosen and all the advantages of it discovered then to possess and to secure the most useful and commanding Posts of it with all imaginable diligence As King Henry IV. of France did at the Battel of Arques where that great Monarch shewed as much conduct as any of the Greek and Roman Generals ever did in any of their greatest Battels II. The second is If you come near your Enemy but yet so late in the day that the Battel must be defer'd till the next morning then if the Season be sharp to shelter your own Army in the most convenient Villages and Woods adjoining to the Field you will fight in and thereby give them all the cease you can as King Henry IV. of France did the night before the Battel of Iuri But you must not on any terms neglect the safety of your Army for the ease of it and therefore it must be Quarter'd or Camp'd so well as that on the touch of the Drum all may be Embattled and ready to receive your Enemy For which end great Corps de Gards ought to be advanced and many Centinels as covertly as may be placed near the Enemy and every moment visited and relieved by vigilant Officers These Centinels or Perdu's are to give instant Notice to the advanced Guards if the Enemy moves and those Guards with their Seconds or Reserves are to find the Enemy play while your Army is drawing up to receive him But still fresh Troops must be sent to sustain your advanced Corps de Gard if they are vigorously attacked lest by their being totally overthrown your Enemy be encouraged to push at All and your own Men be somewhat disheartned For it may so happen that your Enemy if he finds all the advantages of the Place to fight in are so well secured by your care and diligence as that the next day it may be hazardous to fight in that Field he may make choice in the night if you are not Intrenched to attempt you where the confusion which darkness usually engenders may be equally divided between both Parties this of the two being the more eligible Nor were it amiss but very adviseable if you have to deal with a General who is hot and undertaking or one who by the necessity of his Affairs must put All to hazard that in such Nights when you are near your Enemy and may for the beforementioned Reasons have
ground to believe he will attempt you during the obscurity and while you are unintrenched to cause great Piles of Wood or Fagots or some such combustible stuff to be ready to be kindled in fit places and at fit distances that if he advances you may the better see how to point your Cannon and dispose of your small Shot most effectually and by such Fires also terrifie and disorder his Horses which generally are frighted at the sight of Fire especially in the Night This I find was practised near Lorges in Beausse by Anthony King of Navarre Francis Duke of Guise and the Constable Montmorancy when Lewis Prince of Conde and the Admiral of Chastillion prest by the necessity of their Affairs went to attack the Royal Army by Night and which so much disheartned the Assaulters as they retreated The Quartering of your Army at all times but especially when that of the Enemies is very near ought to be in such manner as that the Soldiers may be soonest in Battalia to receive him and therefore to lodge it in the Form you will fight is still the very best that is that such Forces as compose your Wings and Body may have only to go out of their Hutts Tents Villages or Houses to be in the Figure you will fight in else in case of an Alarm the disorders will be many and dangerous but this way there can be but few if any The nearer you draw towards your Enemy or your Enemy to you your Quarters must alwayes be brought closer and your advanced Guards of Horse and Foot the stronger and your discovery the more vigilant III. The third is To be the first drawn up on the Ground you will fight in which is constantly attended with three considerable benefits The point of Honor which you gain by being the earliest on the spot which animates your own Party and often daunts your Enemies The being thereby enabled without opposition to possess all the advantages of the Ground either for the planting of your Cannon or for casting up Parapetts on some Eminencies which command all about it as Sir Francis Vere did at the Battel of Newport or by drawing up your Carriages or making a Ditch to cover one or both the Flanks of your Wings which you cannot well do if your Enemy be earlier or as early as you on the place The being thereby sometimes in a posture to fall upon and cut off your Enemies Squadrons and Battalions or to Rake them with your Cannon while they are drawing up which is an advantage when it may be taken that is of great use IV. The fourth is That your Squadrons of Horse ought not to be too great for the Reasons which I have formerly mentioned in that Chapter which Treats of the Disciplining of your Soldiery Yet if that need requires two nay three of the small ones may be put into one great one but still I would advise that the same Officers should command the same Squadrons when united as they did before By which means they will retain the Agility which is in small Parties and yet when there is need have the force of great ones and this I propound to be observed because whoever has been practically versed in fighting will hardly deny but that 150 Horse in two Squadrons will be likely to rout and beat 200 Horse in one Squadron And the reason to me seems very evident for besides the opportunity you have thereby to fall into his Flank and Rear whatever Body of Men does fight or has fought disorders it self though it gets the better and being disorder'd a less Number that is not to speak humanely must if the Men be equally good overthrow a greater that is And daily Experience shews how difficult if possible it is suddenly to Rally great Squadrons when by Fighting they have been disorder'd especially if but a small Squadron is at hand to fall on them and improve their being so discomposed Nor indeed can great Squadrons march many Paces though the Ground be clear and level without disordering their Ranks but if it be uneven or rugged they are almost out of their fighting Order before they come to fight which are mischiefs that less Squadrons are not so liable unto But Battalions of Foot as being more Governable may be large according to the occasion and need especially those which are composed of Pikes for a great Battalion or Stand of those in the Vanguard the Battel and the Rearguard of the Infantry are the safety of the whole and under their shelter All Rallyings may be best made V. The fifth is A General must never omit in the drawing up of his Army so to dispose of his Squadrons and Battalions as probably every one of them may come to fight again and again if the need requires before they are totally overthrown It is also observable that in a Battel whoever keeps in Reserve a Body of Men that are not led to fight until all the Enemies Squadrons have fought rarely misses to carry away the Victory and whoever has the last Reserves is very likely at last to be the Victorious One signal Illustration of this Truth among many I shall instance At the Battel of Dreux in France where the Constable Montmorancy assisted by Francis Duke of Guise the greatest Captains of that Age commanded the Royallists and Lewis Prince of Condé and the Admiral the Protestants He and the Admiral defeated all the Forces they saw took the Constable Prisoner past over the Bellies of the Swissers who made almost a miraculous resistance and concluded they had therefore won the Victory In the mean while the Duke of Guise who led the Left Wing of the French King's Army either by design as his Enemies said or as an act of high conduct so cover'd his Troops with the Village of Blainville and the Trees and Shrubs about it that he was not so much as seen by the Protestants nor moved from thence until the Constable was taken Prisoner the Mareschal de St. André killed and all those Forces which were considered by the Protestants as the whole Army of the Royalists were intirely routed and so confusedly flying as he was in no danger to have his Squadrons disordered by the Runawayes of his own Party but then advancing his Troops which were entire he soon turned the Fortune of the day took the Prince of Condé Prisoner and overthrew all that opposed him For 't is a tedious and difficult if not an impossible task to put into good order again an Army that has newly fought so as to bring it suddenly to fight again some being busied about the Pillage and Prisoners they have taken or are pursuing others being loth to return to new dangers and all in effect being so heated and disordered that they do not or will not hear the Commands of their Superiors VI. A sixth is A General must never bring all his Troops to fight at once and therefore is still to draw up his
raise the Siege of a place which otherwise can hardly hold out longer in my poor judgment it is not adviseable to defend the ordinary Line of Circumvallation but to draw out of it and give the Enemy Battel if your Men be as good your Numbers as great as his and that your Ground you fight on be as fit for you as him Some of the Reasons and Experiments which induce me to be of this Belief I shall here express If the place be large which you besiege your Line of Circumvallation must of necessity be many Miles about for it ought to be out of the reach of your Enemies Artillery else you will too much expose to the mercy of it your Army that is lodged within it All this Line must be equally defended unless it be where the situation of it secures it self or does it but thinly mann'd for not knowing in what part or places of it he will attempt to force it you must secure every Foot of it which in consequence does so disperse your Army that if he once enters it will be impossible to draw it together expeditiously enough to beat him out again for as soon as ever he is gotten within it he flings down immediately such parts of it as are near him that the Squadrons and Battalions of his Army may come in and they marching on the heels of each other will certainly be imbattelled and rout all the small Forces which may be in readiness near that place and will also hinder those further off from imbodying Besides if the place besieged is seated on an unfordable River or that may be so in a rainy season as most commonly considerable Fortresses are 't is not to be doubted but you will cast over it Bridges of Boats or fixed Bridges that you may surround the place which else might with safety be every day or night relieved and thereby also have free intercourse between both parts of your Army which are divided by the River and 't is as little to be doubted but as soon as he has enter'd your Line his first care will be to make himself Master of all those Bridges that such as are as it were in a Pound may not escape and that having defeated half your Army he may march over them to destroy the rest who seem then but too ripe for Ruin when half their Friends are cut off and all their Enemies are marching against them and the Besieged by their Sallies ready to assist them This seems to me to be the usual and fatal Consequences if your Enemies Army entring your ordinary Line of Circumvallation which being most frequently but a Parapet with a narrow and shallow Ditch is but too easily forced and indeed not to be held tenable of it self If the Forts Redoubts and other Works which flank it and which are usually raised a Musket-shot from one another with many hands to mann it did not in a good degree secure it But those Works usually are such slight things especially when an Enemy is entred that few of the Resolutest which are posted in them to guard them stay to do it after for commonly the attempt on such a Line is made a little before the break of day that the Obscurity may the less expose the Assailants while they advance to storm it and that the day-light may help them soon after they are gotten in to improve all advantages which are offer'd them thereby and 't is in this twilight ordinarily that those in the Works to defend the Line steal out of them when they find the Enemy is entred as those who then expect more safety from their feet than from their hands He who resolves to force an ordinary Line of Circumvallation either does it without any noise or else alarms it round and often most warmly where he means not to make his attempt while small Parties are doing this in the dark he is drawing all the rest of his Army to the place or places which still are near each other where he intends to make his real impression and does it with that silence as the Defendants cannot discover his intentions till usually it be too late successfully to oppose them I must therefore frankly acknowledge since the defences of such a Line are so inconsiderable since the equally manning them so dissipates the Army which does it since it cannot hopefully be defended otherwise And since it cannot be safely defended that way I have almost wonder'd at those who rather choose to make good such a Line than to give Battel to the Enemy who comes to raise the Siege This being a more hopeful thing a more glorious action and whose Consequences if Success attends the Besiegers in the Field will be much more great than to defend the Line can possibly be for thereby you can at last but carry the place But by a Battel gain'd over the Relievers you usually carry the Fortress but as one of the many good effects of getting the Victory for few if any Towns hold out after the relief sent them is defeated What I have said on this Subject proceeds from my taking two things for granted the first is that the Circumvallation Line is after the usual and common Form that is but a Parapet and that the Works which defend it are very inconsiderable either towards the Field or within the Line The second is that the besieging Army has as good Men and more than the Relievers bring for 't is necessary he leave his best and most advanced Works well guarded during the Battel both to preserve them against his return with Victory as also by them to hinder the Besieged from sallying on their backs while they are fighting with the Relief but indeed if the Line need not be of much circumference if it be high and the Graft large and deep if your Army is not strong enough both to fight the Enemy in the Field and to secure at the same time your most advanced and most necessary Works if the place you must fight in is an open Countrey and that your Enemy does much exceed you in Cavalry or if it be an inclosed incumbred Countrey and he does much exceed you in Infantry if you have Victuals and Forage enough within your Line and your Enemy have little with him or without it so that he can stay but a few dayes and that you may probably in fewer dayes take the place by Assault or have it surrendred by Capitulation I say in a Case thus Circumstantiated I would not admire a General would justifie his Line but rather admire if he should draw out of it to give Battel to the Relievers I shall therefore now instance some Examples of famous Captains who have kept within their Lines of Circumvallation when the Enemies Army came to relieve the Besieged and in them have resisted their Attempts and as a consequence of that success have gain'd the places I shall also give Examples of some other great Generals
and then if they had not the Field Word they might be kill'd by those of their own Party who knew them not personally Besides the Field Mark of each Army is seen by All of both Armies before they engage and the matter of it being to be had in all places by private Soldiers as a green Branch a piece of Fern or a handful of Grass or a piece of white Paper c. If you Rout your Enemy he may while he is pursued take off his own Field Mark put up yours in the stead of it and so scape if not do you hurt But the Field Word he cannot know unless it be told him by some of your own men and therefore the giving of both before the Battel must never be omitted I remember once when some Forces I had the Honor to Command obtained by the blessing of God the Victory against the Enemy an Officer of mine having kill'd an Officer of the Enemies and finding he had a good Beaver he tyed his own Helmet to his Saddle Bow and put on so hastily the dead Mans Beaver as he forgot to take out of it the green Branch which was their Field Mark and to put on a white Paper which was our Field Mark and following the Execution with his Sword all bloody a Captain of Horse of my own Regiment taking him by his Field Mark for one of the Enemy and judging he had done no little slaughter by his Sword being all gored to the Hilt undertook him in the pursuit and turning short on him before he could see his face ran him through and through with his Tuck whereof he dyed in a few minutes But finding the Enemies 〈◊〉 Mark had caused his death he own'd his fault and so acquitted my Captain from any Guilt Whatever can be done before a Battel to distract or intimidate your Enemies Army ought not to be omitted some Examples of this way of proceeding I shall mention The Archdâ—…ke before the Battel of Newport having cut off several Companies of the Prince of Orange's Army sent undeâ—… Count 〈◊〉 to secure some Passes on the way the Enemy was to march caused a Trooper of his on purpose to be taken Prisoner just as the Armies were going to Engage who being brought to the Prince did with a loud voice tell him That Count â—…st was defeated and that immediately the Battel would be given him and exceedingly magnified in the hearing of all which were present the Numbers Bravery and Resolution of his own side and though the Prince immediately caused his mouth to be stopped yet so many had heard what he said as it was in an instant diffus d over the States Army and struck into it no little damp if not terror If the Ground admits of it it were adviseable if it can be done safely the Night before the Battel to lodge in a Wood or Coppice or hollow Ground some of your men concealed on the Flank or towards the Rear of your Enemies Army who by falling on just as you are engaging or newly after you are engaged may be of great benefit to you and prejudice to him as it was done in that great Battel between Ieroboam and Abijah and in many others But then great Caution must be had that the Enemy discover not this Ambush lest he cut it off before the Battel and thereby weaken you and animate his own Party as it hapned to the Suedes near Lindâ—…w in the Year 1632 and to many other parts of Armies in other Countries For whoever goes upon designs whose success depends on very fine and nice management must be exceeding wary else he had better never attempt them and therefore though they may be and have been practised with good success yet I am in my own private judgment no over-great Friend to any such Policies in War where I may in the management of them be discovered and not possibly know of it timely enough to receive no detriment thereby For where the Fate of a Kingdom and the Lives of thousands are at stake as in Battels the first too usually is and the last alwayes is I would still act on solid Reasons and Principles and in Stratagems embrace such methods only as if they had success would be of great advantage and if they failed yet I should thereby lose nothing but my hopes The making a Speech by a General to a whole Army before a Battel is often read of in our best Histories as well as Romances but ought in my belief to be onely found in the latter since 't is impossible for any General to speak audibly in an open Field to above a Regiment at once and if he makes an Harangue to every Regiment he will employ that time in talk which is more usefully spent in ordering his Forces and in Action Not but that I think it highly useful that the Officers and Soldiers of an Army before the Battel should be told all that may heighten their Courages as the Goodness of the Quarrel they fight in the beneficial Consequences of their Victory the fatal Effects which must attend their being worsted the Honour they have gained in many an Action which is too precious to be all lost in one c. But because I esteem such Orations impossible to be made by one to many thousands at once therefore I think it is the duty of a General to infuse these Incentives to Victory into his chief Officers first and then to order their imparting them convincingly to the subordinate ones and those to inculcate them on all occasions into the private Soldiers and especially on their Guards and a little before they go to fight and to do it but to a Troop or a Company at a time and in these wayes I do not only approve of such Oratory but esteem it very practicable and highly useful before a Battel Besides when all the Officers thus discourse to their Soldiers it shews an Unanimity which cannot be so practicably evidenced when the General singly speaks to them The Shouting to the Battel is very ancient and we read of the practice of it in most Warlike Nations as amongst the Iews in the time of David amongst the Romans in the time of Caesar c. The English are so much inclined to it as I have but once in those Actions I have been in seen them omit the doing it as soon as ever they came within Cannon-shot of the Enemy they were to fight with and then I minded them of that Neglect which they immediately amended such shoutings bring not only a kind of terror on the Nations which do not use them as being commonly an evidence of great joy in those who make them but also it stirs up the blood and spirits before and heats them during the Fight But though such Shoutings are useful going towards the Enemy yet a deep silence must be observed by the Soldiery when you are about to engage that the Officers Orders and the Words of
their Shot if not with their Pikes gaul your Enemy while under their Covert your Horse may Rally and come again and again to the Charge and possibly recover the day Nay it makes your Cavalry fight with more Confidence when they know that one or more disastrous Charges may by thus ordering some of your Infantry be repaired by their own Rallying in the Rear of them and those who know what belongs to War will not be over-forward to Charge the second Line of your Wing leaving at once such Battalions of Infantry and the disorder'd Cavalry Rallying at their backs but on the contrary will hardly judge it adviseable to attempt your second Line till they have intirely swept out of the Field your whole first Line I did frequently though unworthy of the Honour command Forces in Chief and therefore I esteem'd it my duty to be often thinking and arguing how they might be employed to the best advantage and though in the Wars I was in we alwayes were or at least thought our selves to be superior to the Enemy in Cavalry Yet I was not seldom busying my thoughts how we might best fight in case he should be at any time stronger than I in Horse and I stronger than he in Foot The Result of those Thoughts I will presume to Present my Reader with The Checquering my first Line of Cavalry with small Battalions of Shot I judg'd was not the most secure or the most effectual way and therefore I concluded the Impaling as it were my Musketeers by my Pikes as is before-mentioned was much the better And because whatever is new and surprising to your Enemy is still of considerable advantage especially at the instant in which you are going to Charge him I resolved had I ever had an occasion to do it to have acted when the Ground allow'd of it as followeth I. I would have drawn up all my Cavalry a-breast either two or three deep as I should have esteem'd it the best as things were circumstantiated II. I would have appointed previously what Squadrons should have composed my first Line and what Squadrons should have composed my second Line and what Officers should lead or be in the Rear of every Squadron in both Lines and have communicated to them respectively my Orders therein III. I would then have drawn up those small Battalions of Pike and Shot order'd as I formerly mentioned just in the Rear of every such Squadron only as was to compose the first Line of my Wing and just as many in a Rank as might fill up the intended Interval when it was made and have caused my Pike-men to trail their Pikes that they might not have been seen by the Enemy which if shoulder'd or ported they would be IV. I would then have advanced towards the Enemy as if I had had no second Line or Reserved Squadrons but just when I was come so near him as that it was time to form my first and second Line I would at the Trumpets sounding the Charge which should be the Signal for the doing it have composed my said two Lines of my Wing by the Squadrons of the Front Line continuing their motion and by the Squadrons of the second Line making a Stand or Halt V. As the first Lines would be forming it self by the Squadrons of it continuing their motion and the second Lines would be forming it self by standing I would in the Interval of Ground made thereby have caused my small Battalions of Pike and Shot behind every Squadron of the first Line to march up and made an even Front with the fame Squadrons in whose Rear they had till then marched and so have begun the Battel advancing with the Horse and those Foot my Shot firing under their Pikes inoessantly This I esteem'd would have been both new and surprizing for it would have been thought strange by the Enemy and likely have given him an ill opinion of my Conduct to see me bring all my Cavalry to fight at onde which the first Form of my advancing would probably make him believe was my intention But when he unexpectedly saw that I composed my two Lines orderly in my advancing it might amaze and surprize him And in all likelihood both those Productions might he heightned when he should also see my small Battalions of Pike and Shot appear unexpectedly from behind my Squadron and advance in an even Front with them to the Charge so that his Horse singly must endure the joint shock of my Horse Pikes and Musketeers If this method of Checquering my Squadrons in the first Line of my Wing with small Battalions of Pike and Shot order'd as I have set it down should be approved and that you have Infantry enough so to Checquer your second Line also and that you shall esteem it necessary to have it done by reason of your Enemies exceedingly overpowring you with Horse you may also observe the like method of doing it in your second Line as you did in your first by having such small Battalions of Pike and Shot drawn up and marching in the Rear of those Squadrons which are to compose your second Line who may advance by the Interval Ground between the Squadrons to the Front of them when by your first Lines continued motion they have left the Ground free In the doing of all this there are some Particulars I would recommend to be alwayes observed I. That your Pikes which are to be trail'd during your advancing behind the Squadrons that the Enemy may not discover by those long Weapons what you would conceal from his sight be ported as soon as ever you begin to appear between the Intervals between which you are to march up to make an even Front with your Cavalry that thereby they may be the readier to be Charged against the Enemy who will by that time be very near and therefore such preparative readiness to receive him is very needful II. I would have all my Firelocks load their Muskets with Pistol Bullets for the Enemy against whom you Fire will be alwayes very near and therefore several Pistol Bullets out of one Gun will do as much Execution as one Musket Bullet at a time out of many Guns III. Those commanded Pikemen which are to impale your Shot ought to be of the resolutest and strongest men for on their Courages will depend much of the safety of your Horse and of your Shot and therefore if I had Pikemen armed defensively with Back Breast Pott and Faces I would choose to place them there since they are also to endure the shock of your Enemies Cavalry IV. The shot of these small Battalions must be still bestowed on those Squadrons of your Enemies Wing which compose his first Line for those are the nearest and the most pressing and the Muskets being loaden with Pistol Bullets they will not do certain Execution on any Squadrons of the Wing of his second Line which are usually about 100 Yards less advanced than his first Line