we and yet their Foot marched in Armor in hot Climates with large Targets heavy Swords and carried also two Missile Weapons whereas our Soldiers think the Pike or the Musket often without Swords alwayes without Armor to be a Load which only proceeds from our Relaxing the Military Discipline which is not only a Reproach to us but also a great Prejudice I think we are much more usefully Armed than the Greeks or Romans anciently were and in my poor opinion we only want for our Infantry the Target to be excellently Armed The five offensive Arms in use amongst us are the Sword the Pike the Musket the Pistol and the Carrabine Foâ—… I look on the Lance as now wholly laid by and I think with reason for the Lance does little unless it be by the force of the Horses Course or Carreer and even then only the Front is useful so that their best order to Fight in seems to be to charge a Rank at a time which yet can hardly resist Squadrons of Horse especially if Riders be in Armor But if the Lanceers Fight in Squadrons also 't is much more likely they should discompose themselves than hurt those they Fight against which are such apparent inconveniencies as have made me admire that King Henry IV of France most justly Surnam'd the Great Alexander Ferneze Prince of Parma and Charles of Lorrain Duke of Mayen three the greatest Captains of the latter Age nay it may be of any Age would often lament that Lances were then throwing aside as Davâ—…la in his excellent History of the Civil Wars of France does observe with this addition That Henry the Great and all his chief Commanders more apprehended those thousand Lanceers led by Count Egmont at the Battel of Iury than double the number of any of the Leagues of their Cavalry Our Foot Soldiers generally are two thirds Shot and one third Pikes which I have often lamented for methinks the Pikes should be at least half especially in His Majesties Dominions in which are few strong places and consequently Battels and Fightings in the Field are more common than Sieges and without dispute the Pike is the usefullest Weapon for the Foot and a good Stand of them assisted by Shot if the Angles be well guarded are not easily broken by Horse and Shot united The Swissers generally and justly esteemed excellent Foot have more Pikes than Shot which possibly as much as their Valor Discipline and the strength of their Bodies has contributed to their Glory 'T was to their Pikes they owed that famous Retreat they made when in the Hollow of their Battalion they carried King Charles the Ninth of France and almost all that Family Royal from Meanx to Paris though 't were a Champion Countrey though they had no Cavalry to assist them and though Lewis Prince of Conde Gaspar de Coligni the then Admiral of France Andelott and the greatest Horse Commanders of that Age often Charged them in Front Rear and Flanks yet with the heads of their Pikes they forced their way though all the hopes of the Hugonot Lords depended on that dayes Action I had also an Experiment of the goodness of Pikes in the year 1651. when in the last Battel we had in Ireland I had the Honour to command the English Forces against the Irish and though we Fought in an open Countrey and though we had Routed after a smart resistance all the Horse of their Left Wing and above a Thousand of their Musketeers which composed the Left Battalion of their Foot yet about Twelve hundred Pikes of the Enemy without any Shot with them Advanced boldly and Charged our Squadrons of Horse so home after their Horse and Shot of that Wing were Routed that we had more Wounded and Kill'd in that Charge than in the whole Fight besides so that had they Guarded their Angles when we Charged them Round they had done us much more mischief if not recovered the day but by the Angles we broke in and afterwards the resistance was but small nor indeed could it be otherwise But what need I say more of the usefulness of the Pike above the Musket than that all Persons of Quality who put themselves voluntarily or otherwise into the Infantry carry the Pike which they would not do unless it had adjudgedly the Honour to be the Noblest Weapon since the bravest choose and fight with it And therefore I must again say I wish our Companies consisted of fewer Shot and of more Pikes For besides the excellency of that Weapon it is not only alwayes in a readiness for Service but needs no Ammunition to make it do Execution both which cannot be said of the Musket which is often unfixt requires alwayes Powder Bullet and Match and in windy or wet weather often disappoints the Service especially if it be the Match-lock and then to Fire-lock Muskets Maurice Prince of Orange a Famous Captain was exceedingly desirous to introduce the Target among the Infantry and having for his own satisfaction made many tryals of the great usefulness of it experimentally found that Targets though very flippent ones have not only resisted the Push of the Pikes but also that half the number of Targetteers have entred into the Ranks of double their number of Pikes without Targets and have Routed them but he being only General to the States of the United Provinces and not a Sovereign Monarch and Absolute durst not make so great an Alteration fearing the Reproach of some evil Success which whatever might have been the cause of the Defeat would have been attributed to that of Innovation For States oftner judge of the Merit of their General by his Successes than by his Reasons And Henry Duke of Rohan whom I had the Honour to know in the year 1637. a little before he dyed of his Wounds received in Alsatia and who yielded to none of his Age in the Military Art was also exceeding desirous to introduce the Target amongst the Infantry He propos'd to have the principal Body of the Infantry to consist of Pikemen and to each Battalion of Pikes he would have had a small separated Party of a Hundred or an Hundred and twenty Targeteers in the Flanks when the Battalions were ready to join which to use his own words would produce a marvellous effect in a Day Battel These Targetters he would have had composed of the Volunteers who are generally of the bravest and who unless they made a Body apart he thinks would be apt enough to beget Animosities by disputing where their proper stations should be assigned them I think they might also be of very good use in Assaulting and Defending of Breaches especially if they were of proof against small shot some of which sort I have seen and yet they were not very cumbersom for they might be used on the Left Arm by men of ordinary strength I must before I proceed any further mind the great carelesness of those who furnish Pikes to the Companies out of
Prince or are engaged to do it to answer an end worthy the hazard of a Battel or for any such other rational Consideration great care must be alwayes taken to make choice of that Ground which is fittest for you both in respect of your own Forces as also of your Enemies And in a most particular manner if you are weakest in Foot to cover them the best you can with your Horse and on the contrary if you are weakest in Horse to cover them with your Foot V. The Ranging of an Army in Battel to the very best advantage is a great furtherance to the winning of the Victory But the so doing of it depends much not only on the Wisdom and Skill of the General the Nature of the Ground and the Quality of his own Forces but also on those of his Enemies and on the disposition of him who commands them so that although no standing Rules can be given to answer all these varieties yet some positive Maxims may be set down which if punctually observed as things are circumstantiated may beneficially answer all occasions and emergencies And I the rather say this because I have seldom found that the greatest Captains of elder times whose military knowledge and practice the Moderns justly value and extol have ever observed one and the same form in giving Battel but have varied therein considerably according to the occasion Cyrus being to fight against Croesus King of Lydia and in a large Plain fearing to be inviron'd drew up his Army but Twelve deep in File whereas formerly the File was 24 deep Whereby he augmented the Front of his Army double overwing'd Croesus's and won the Victory Caesar at the Battel of Pharsalia against Pompey did quite alter the manner of the Roman Imbattelling For having found that Pompey exceedingly outnumbred him in Horse he covered one of his Flanks with a little River and drew all his Cavalry to the other Flank among the Squadrons whereof he placed Bodies of his best Infantry and there he began the Battel Where by having all his Horse in one Wing and those accompanied by select Legionary Foot he soon Routed that half of Pompey's Horse which opposed all his and then falling into the Flanks and Rear of his Enemy won the Victory These two are very remarkable Instances which among many others verifie what I have said I shall now mention some of those standing Maxims which in my humble Opinion are indispensibly to be observed immediately before and in a day of Battel 1. The first is With great diligence to view so well the Field you will fight in as when you have drawn up your Army on it you may not afterwards alter the Order of it or change your Ground for all such Mutations in the Face of your Enemy are very dangerous and gives him also the greater Confidence and your own Men the less as being an evidence to both of a great Failure in Conduct And it may also be highly hazardous either to remove the whole or even some gross Squadrons or Battalions to the Ground which on second thoughts may be believed the better Ground of the two since your Enemy being then near may take the benefit which such disorders while the alteration is making may give him and may improve it to your total overthrow so that 't is in my poor Opinion more adviseable to keep the Ground and Order you are in though by your oversight neither should be the very best than to alter it in the sight of your Enemy and when he is near And all changes of Grounds or Order in his view ought never to be made in Gross Bodies but almost insensibly to them and your own Army by a few Files at a time and where they cannot be so made 't is better to leave them unmade I had been often told but could scarcely credit it that at the fatal Battel of Naseby after my Lord Fairfax his Army was drawn up in view of His Majesties it having been judged that the Ground a little behind them was better than that they stood upon they removed thither I had the opportunity some time after to discourse on this Subject with Major General Skippon who had the chief ordering of the Lord Fairfax his Army that day and having ask'd him if this were true he could not deny it And when I told him I almost admir'd at it for the Reasons before exprest he averr'd he was against it but he obeyed the Orders for doing it only because he could not get them altered After the Ground to fight on is well chosen and all the advantages of it discovered then to possess and to secure the most useful and commanding Posts of it with all imaginable diligence As King Henry IV. of France did at the Battel of Arques where that great Monarch shewed as much conduct as any of the Greek and Roman Generals ever did in any of their greatest Battels II. The second is If you come near your Enemy but yet so late in the day that the Battel must be defer'd till the next morning then if the Season be sharp to shelter your own Army in the most convenient Villages and Woods adjoining to the Field you will fight in and thereby give them all the cease you can as King Henry IV. of France did the night before the Battel of Iuri But you must not on any terms neglect the safety of your Army for the ease of it and therefore it must be Quarter'd or Camp'd so well as that on the touch of the Drum all may be Embattled and ready to receive your Enemy For which end great Corps de Gards ought to be advanced and many Centinels as covertly as may be placed near the Enemy and every moment visited and relieved by vigilant Officers These Centinels or Perdu's are to give instant Notice to the advanced Guards if the Enemy moves and those Guards with their Seconds or Reserves are to find the Enemy play while your Army is drawing up to receive him But still fresh Troops must be sent to sustain your advanced Corps de Gard if they are vigorously attacked lest by their being totally overthrown your Enemy be encouraged to push at All and your own Men be somewhat disheartned For it may so happen that your Enemy if he finds all the advantages of the Place to fight in are so well secured by your care and diligence as that the next day it may be hazardous to fight in that Field he may make choice in the night if you are not Intrenched to attempt you where the confusion which darkness usually engenders may be equally divided between both Parties this of the two being the more eligible Nor were it amiss but very adviseable if you have to deal with a General who is hot and undertaking or one who by the necessity of his Affairs must put All to hazard that in such Nights when you are near your Enemy and may for the beforementioned Reasons have
Command may be clearly heard and punctually obeyed 'T is observed that the Grecians went alwayes silently to the Battel alledging for it That they had more to do than to say to their Enemies But such Shoutings is a kind of doing for it stirs up your own Men and often damps your Enemies This puts me in mind how that once marching in Battalia in a plain Countrey to fight the Enemies Army and as they marched in the like order to meet us some Musketeers of ours running hastily to a Budge-Barrel to fill their Bandeleers and being careless of their Matches the Budge-Barrel took fire and blew them up at which the Enemies Army shouted and finding our Men did not answer them I rid hastily to the next Squadrons and Battalions and commanded them also to shout which the rest of the Forces taking it from them repeatedly did soon after the like Accident happen'd to the Enemies Army and then our Men shouted but were not answer'd which I bid the next Troops to take notice of as a sign they were disanimated and a proof that their loss was considerable by that blowing up the Soldiers took it as an Omen of that Victory which God soon after was pleased to give us which seems to shew That Shouting according to the Soldiers understanding is a token of joy and the Enemies not answering it an evidence of fear and whatever may cause fear in your Enemy ought not to be omitted by you since Fear is truly said to be a Betrayer of that Succor which Reason else might afford Besides there is in all Mankind a weak Part and Experience has but too clearly evidenced that the difference between the Best and the Worst Men does not consist in those being totally exempted from the Influences and Operations of it but in the degrees of being less liable to it Now this weak Part is affected with Noise and Pageantry and therefore when the shew of danger is thoroughly imprest on the Intellect by the conveyance of the Senses the minds of Men are too much disturbed to be then actuated by the dictates of Reason The putting into Rank and File and the forming into the order of Squadrons and Battalions all the Men and Boyes which attend the Soldiers and can be spared from the Baggage and are not armed may be of good use for all those so ordered and placed at a competent distance as a Grand Reserve in the Rear of all make a formidable shew to your Enemy and inclines him to believe you have a third Line or Battalia to be broken before they can get the Victory Nor is this all the advantage which may be derived from thus disposing of those useless Persons in a day of Battel since thereby also you will hinder them from filching the Soldiers Goods while they are busie a Fighting and will keep the Field clear which you engage in I mention this last Particular having sometimes seen the Soldiers Boyes and the Drivers of Carriages either incited thereto by natural Valor or desire of Pillage or both so closely attend the Rear of their Masters who were fighting that when they were disordered it occasioned much hazard and confusion in the Rallyment But these appearances of Soldiers must alwayes be put at such a distance from the Enemy that he may not see they are unarmed and consequently but a meer show for then that will become ridiculous which otherwise will be terrifying Though I have already said in General That if your Enemy be stronger than you in Cavalry you must cover yours with your Infantry and if he be stronger than you in Infantry you must cover yours with your Cavalry Yet possibly it may not be useless to set down in some Particulars how those General Rules may be best practised If my Enemy did much outnumber me in Horse and I him in Foot I would flank every Battalion of my Shot with Files of Pikes Nay I would so order such of my Battalions as were likeliest to bear the often Charging of the Enemies Cavalry as that the Front and Rear of my Shot in them should be covered with my Pikes as well as my Flanks and under my Pikes my Shot should be still firing either keeping their Ground or Advancing or Retreating as there should be occasion Nor would I omit if my Enemy very much overpower'd me in Cavalry to place small Battalions of Shot and Pike so order'd as is immediately before express'd in the Intervals between my Squadrons of Horse in the first Line of my Wings For to me it seems much more adviseable if you mingle Battalions with Squadrons in your Wings that such Battalions should be of Pike and Shot so ordered than of Shot alone as is the usual method in such Imbattellings For if such small Battalions consist of Shot only the chief advantage you can derive from them is by their firing to disorder your Enemies Squadrons just as you are going to Charge them but if that fails of the hoped-for Event whatever becomes of your Squadrons these small Battalions are too much exposed to Ruine for Shot onely will not resist Horse in an open Field especially when those Shot also are disanimated by the Flight or Routing of the Horse that had fought on their side Besides I have found experimentally That private Soldiers never fight with the needful Courage when they are led on such a piece of Service as this of Firing on an Enemy and after to shift for themselves if that Volly does not the Work for then they do it in haste and too often timerously for even while they are firing they are looking which is the best Way to flie when they have done firing which would too much distract Men of more setled minds than private Soldiers are usually blest with To which I shall further add That Musketeers so imbattled and chequer'd as it were with Squadrons of Horse may too likely on the disordering of your first Line of Cavalry be so shuffled together by those of it that are Routed by those of your Enemy which pursue the Rout and by those of your second Line which advance to stop the Enemies pursuit that the poor Shot can neither be useful to their Friends nor offensive to their Enemies Whereas if those small Battalions be composed of Pike as well as Shot and be ordered as is formerly set down they will in the Spaces or Intervals between your Squadrons not only make almost as great Fire on your Enemies but also firing under the Pikes do it with less apprehension and consequently take their Aim the better and thereby do the more Execution Besides fighting with a Resolution to make good their Ground composes their Minds and makes them the more Resolute against their Enemies and the more obedient to their Officers Commands but what is most material of all is If your Squadrons should be disordered nay routed yet such Battalions as these will for some time at least keep their Ground and with
their Shot if not with their Pikes gaul your Enemy while under their Covert your Horse may Rally and come again and again to the Charge and possibly recover the day Nay it makes your Cavalry fight with more Confidence when they know that one or more disastrous Charges may by thus ordering some of your Infantry be repaired by their own Rallying in the Rear of them and those who know what belongs to War will not be over-forward to Charge the second Line of your Wing leaving at once such Battalions of Infantry and the disorder'd Cavalry Rallying at their backs but on the contrary will hardly judge it adviseable to attempt your second Line till they have intirely swept out of the Field your whole first Line I did frequently though unworthy of the Honour command Forces in Chief and therefore I esteem'd it my duty to be often thinking and arguing how they might be employed to the best advantage and though in the Wars I was in we alwayes were or at least thought our selves to be superior to the Enemy in Cavalry Yet I was not seldom busying my thoughts how we might best fight in case he should be at any time stronger than I in Horse and I stronger than he in Foot The Result of those Thoughts I will presume to Present my Reader with The Checquering my first Line of Cavalry with small Battalions of Shot I judg'd was not the most secure or the most effectual way and therefore I concluded the Impaling as it were my Musketeers by my Pikes as is before-mentioned was much the better And because whatever is new and surprising to your Enemy is still of considerable advantage especially at the instant in which you are going to Charge him I resolved had I ever had an occasion to do it to have acted when the Ground allow'd of it as followeth I. I would have drawn up all my Cavalry a-breast either two or three deep as I should have esteem'd it the best as things were circumstantiated II. I would have appointed previously what Squadrons should have composed my first Line and what Squadrons should have composed my second Line and what Officers should lead or be in the Rear of every Squadron in both Lines and have communicated to them respectively my Orders therein III. I would then have drawn up those small Battalions of Pike and Shot order'd as I formerly mentioned just in the Rear of every such Squadron only as was to compose the first Line of my Wing and just as many in a Rank as might fill up the intended Interval when it was made and have caused my Pike-men to trail their Pikes that they might not have been seen by the Enemy which if shoulder'd or ported they would be IV. I would then have advanced towards the Enemy as if I had had no second Line or Reserved Squadrons but just when I was come so near him as that it was time to form my first and second Line I would at the Trumpets sounding the Charge which should be the Signal for the doing it have composed my said two Lines of my Wing by the Squadrons of the Front Line continuing their motion and by the Squadrons of the second Line making a Stand or Halt V. As the first Lines would be forming it self by the Squadrons of it continuing their motion and the second Lines would be forming it self by standing I would in the Interval of Ground made thereby have caused my small Battalions of Pike and Shot behind every Squadron of the first Line to march up and made an even Front with the fame Squadrons in whose Rear they had till then marched and so have begun the Battel advancing with the Horse and those Foot my Shot firing under their Pikes inoessantly This I esteem'd would have been both new and surprizing for it would have been thought strange by the Enemy and likely have given him an ill opinion of my Conduct to see me bring all my Cavalry to fight at onde which the first Form of my advancing would probably make him believe was my intention But when he unexpectedly saw that I composed my two Lines orderly in my advancing it might amaze and surprize him And in all likelihood both those Productions might he heightned when he should also see my small Battalions of Pike and Shot appear unexpectedly from behind my Squadron and advance in an even Front with them to the Charge so that his Horse singly must endure the joint shock of my Horse Pikes and Musketeers If this method of Checquering my Squadrons in the first Line of my Wing with small Battalions of Pike and Shot order'd as I have set it down should be approved and that you have Infantry enough so to Checquer your second Line also and that you shall esteem it necessary to have it done by reason of your Enemies exceedingly overpowring you with Horse you may also observe the like method of doing it in your second Line as you did in your first by having such small Battalions of Pike and Shot drawn up and marching in the Rear of those Squadrons which are to compose your second Line who may advance by the Interval Ground between the Squadrons to the Front of them when by your first Lines continued motion they have left the Ground free In the doing of all this there are some Particulars I would recommend to be alwayes observed I. That your Pikes which are to be trail'd during your advancing behind the Squadrons that the Enemy may not discover by those long Weapons what you would conceal from his sight be ported as soon as ever you begin to appear between the Intervals between which you are to march up to make an even Front with your Cavalry that thereby they may be the readier to be Charged against the Enemy who will by that time be very near and therefore such preparative readiness to receive him is very needful II. I would have all my Firelocks load their Muskets with Pistol Bullets for the Enemy against whom you Fire will be alwayes very near and therefore several Pistol Bullets out of one Gun will do as much Execution as one Musket Bullet at a time out of many Guns III. Those commanded Pikemen which are to impale your Shot ought to be of the resolutest and strongest men for on their Courages will depend much of the safety of your Horse and of your Shot and therefore if I had Pikemen armed defensively with Back Breast Pott and Faces I would choose to place them there since they are also to endure the shock of your Enemies Cavalry IV. The shot of these small Battalions must be still bestowed on those Squadrons of your Enemies Wing which compose his first Line for those are the nearest and the most pressing and the Muskets being loaden with Pistol Bullets they will not do certain Execution on any Squadrons of the Wing of his second Line which are usually about 100 Yards less advanced than his first Line
acknowledge I would have every private Trooper have his Sword or Long Tuck his Case of Pistols and Carabine and for defence his Back Breast and Pott at least I would have the Front and Flanks of every Troop in such Armor For besides the Terror it gives to an Enemy in his Doublet to fight with men of Iron and the encouragement it gives our own men none knows what proof the Armor is of And 't is most certain that in Combat as well as Pursuit the Sword does most Execution and no Armor is less than Sword proof I therefore earnestly wish that the Officers the Troopers and the Pikemen were bound under severe Penalties to fight in Armor and constantly to march in Armor which piece of Discipline if it were revived by strict Commands and if broken punish'd Exemplarily I am confident the advantages would be considerable Nor do I much value what our young Gallants say that in their Doublets they will Charge as far as any in their Armor since to that I answer First it may spring as much from Laziness as Courage But secondly a wise Commander ought to have more care of his Soldiers safeties than they will have of their own and ought not to let his men expose themselves but where there is need and then to use the best means he can for their safety as well as their success since the business is not who dares go to be kill'd but who dares venture his Life on the best terms to obtain the Victory and if men will go on boldly without Armor 't is likelier they will Charge the bravelier with Armor since their Bodies by it have the greater defence and by accustoming themselves to wear Iron it will become habitual to them If I might follow my own opinion I would have every Regiment of Horse consist of seven Troops six whereof should be Armed with Back Breast and Pott and for offence should have Swords or Tucks with Pistols and Carabines and the seventh Troop should be of Firelocks or Dragoons whose duty should be to guard the Quarter of the Regiment to secure Passes with Celerity to force Passes possest by the Enemy to assist the Horse when they fight in enclosed Countries and in Battels to alight and marching up in the outermost Flank of the Regiment should in two Ranks the first kneeling the second standing a little before the Squadrons Charged Fire upon the Enemy their Guns loaden with Pistol Bullets which I have sometimes practised and found it attended with great success every tenth man while the rest were on such service was to hold the Horses of those who were thus employed and if the Enemy were Routed they were all to mount again and to follow the execution But if the Enemy Routed us they were to shelter themselves behind the next Squadrons of our Horse which were entire or the next Battalion of our Foot and when Rallied to serve as they should be commanded by the chief Officer of that Squadron or Battalion under the countenance of which they should Rally I know the French Spaniards and other Nations have had distinct Troops of Carabines but in my poor opinion Carabines are best in the Troopers hands who are Armed and have Pistols especially if every Regiment of Horse has one Troop of Firelocks or Dragoons and I have ground to believe that Dragoons thus annexed to the Horse are much better than they are when Regimented entire and by themselves First Because they are constantly with the Horse and being in effect a part of their Body are alwayes the more careful of them the more ready to serve with them and the more concern'd for them Secondly Being under the Command of the Field Officers and Captains of Horse they are more obedient to them than if they belonged to other Colonels and were only a commanded Party to answer a present need Thirdly The Horse Commandeâ—…s when the Dragoons belong to their own Regiments are more careful of them and will not needlesly harass them by extraordinary and unequal duty which when they have their assistance but on emergent occasions I have often seen them do Fourthly The Horse Officers knowing all their Dragoons by name and they knowing particularly all the Horse Officers they are the more likely to fight chearfully for them or not to escape unpunished if they be remiss for every one being known none can escape by ignorance the contrary to which is often experimented in commanded Parties when the Officers are unknown to the Soldiers and the Soldiers to the Officers Lastly To omit many other particulars some have observed that as the Dragoons are commonly the briskest and daringst of the private Soldiers so they are also the least sober and 't is likelier to wean them from that fault when they are but a seventh part of the Regiments than when they are an entire Regiment and all Birds of one Feather And the Troopers being generally a more civilized orderly People than the Dragoons 't is probable that the major part by much of the Regiment should win the minor by good example than that the minor by much should seduce the major part To conclude this Head of my Essay I will only add It is not sufficient to make good Rules unless the Prince or General see them punctually obey'd or severely punish'd if broken For besides the evil which attends the omitting of what is good the contempt of Authority is of fatal consequence in all Humane Affairs and most of all in Military where though what is commanded might have been indifferent it self yet it ceases to be so when it is commanded and if a Soldier of himself may break one Rule of the Generals unpunish'd he may believe thereby that he may as well break any nay all the rest for the stamp of Authority is alike on all of which when a private person or many private men make themselves the Judges they bid defiance to all Discipline without which no Society can subsist and Military ones the least of any In one word it were much better that good Rules were not made than if made that they should not be observed and the breakers of them 'scape unpunish'd The Disciplining of the Soldiery I Shall not under this Head amuse my self to speak of the Handling of Arms nor of the several Postures and Motions taught the Soldiers nor of the divers wayes of Exercising of a Troop or Company since we have in our own Language so many printed Books on that subject And I am also the less curious in doing it because though there be many fine things taught in those particulars which are graceful to the sight and make Soldiers the more ready yet when we come in earnest to fight few of them are practised but to keep their Ranks even and close their Files right to fire nimbly and but breast high to charge boldly with the Pikes and through with the Horse to be watchful of the word of Command from the Officer
exactly obedient to it to keep silence And when the Parties are numerous enough to compose Battalions and Squadrons to observe in going to the Charge the just wideness of the Intervals for the Reserves or second Line to relieve the first Line But if there must be any Error therein to be sure the Interval ground be rather inlarged than streightned For 't is better the Reserves should have too much room to march up to the Front than too little since the latter will render them almost useless But before I come to Treat of that part of Disciplining the Soldiery which consists in drawing them up into Battalions and Squadrons which I intend to discourse of when I come to Treat of Battels I shall crave leave to offer some Considerations on what we generally observe and seldom or never alter whatever the occasion requires And that is the drawing up our Shot and Pike six deep and our Horse three deep And this I should not presume to do had not I been emboldened to it by some Experiments of my own which God did bless with success For when I found my self over-winged by the Enemy they drawing up their Foot six deep and their Horse three deep I judged it best for me to Fight my Foot four deep and my Horse two deep whereby I added one third of more hands to the Front and Breadth of my Battalions and Squadrons For I was fully satisfied that it was likelier I should be worsted by the Enemy if he fell into my Flanks and Rear holding me also to equal Play in the Front than if four Ranks of my Foot should be broken or two Ranks of my Horse that the third Rank of the Horse and the fifth and sixth Ranks of my Foot should recover all again for I had often seen Battalions and Squadrons defeated by being overwinged But I never saw the last Rank of the Horse and the two last Ranks of the Foot restore the Field when the four first Ranks of the Foot and the two first Ranks of the Horse were Routed For commonly if the two first Ranks of the Horse are Routed they themselves for they still are broken inward Rout the third Rank and though the like cannot truly be said of the Foot in all points yet in a great measure it usually follows But I must confess that he who makes such an alteration in Military Discipline unless he be a Sovereign Prince or have sufficient Orders to do it ought to resolve his success only must Apologize for it that is to be victorious or be kill'd I should therefore humbly desire that fighting no deeper than four for the Foot and two for the Horse where the ground is fit might well be considered and then let true Reason give the Rule For my own part I will ingeniously acknowledge that after having as throughly weighed all the Arguments for and against it as my weak judgment could suggest to me I would without hesitation if it were left to my own Election fight my Foot and Horse no deeper than four and two in any case where the ground would admit me to extend my Battalions and Squadrons to the full For if I fight against equal Numbers and equally good Soldiers to my own 't is more likely falling into their Flanks and as much into their Rear also as I overwing them the depth of a File in each Flank that I shall Rout them then it is that before I perform that they shall have pierced through my four Ranks since Rank to Rank of equally good Soldiers and equal in Number will more probably hold longer play one with the other than Soldiers equally good can defend themselves at once if briskly charged in Front Flanks and Rear and since the Flanks and Rear of Foot them selves fight with great disadvantage against those who Charge them there all at once but when Horse are Charged in the Flanks and in the Rear 't is next of kin to a miracle if they 'scape being broken For the Troopers in the Ranks when they go to Charge are as close as the Riders knees can endure it and therefore 't is impossible for the Flanks to do any thing or the last Rank to face about and consequently they must have their backs expos'd to the Shot and Swords of their Enemy The Foot indeed will easily face about but then if the depth of Files be the advantage I have it who Charge every where four deep and they every way defend but three deep at the most If this way of fighting will afford me solid and great advantages against an Enemy equal to me in the goodness and number of his Soldiers I do not think it can be denied but if I fight against fewer or worse men than mine but greater and more certain benefits will result from it The chief Objection to this way of fighting that I know of is as to the Musketeers who being but four deep and advancing firing the first Rank cannot have loaded their Muskets again by that time the fourth Rank has done firing so that there will be an intermission of shooting To that I answer Let the Musketeers Charge their Muskets with such Cartridges as I have mentioned and the first Rank will be as soon ready if you are but four deep as the first Rank will be if you are six deep loading with Bandeleers especially if I use the Fire-lock and the Enemy the Match-lock Besides you will still have a Rank to fire till you fall in if you begin to fire but at a short distance which I would do to choose if I were six deep Lastly were both these denied which yet I must say I have on Experiment found to be true and a demonstration is the strongest proof It is not enough to say one method hath such Objections to it which the other hath not but all Objections to both methods are to be examined and that Rule is to be observed which on the whole matter has the least For how few things in the world would be entertained as best if only such were so against which no Objection could be made The first of the Ancients which I have read of who found it much more advantageous when the ground allowed it rather to extend the Ranks than deepen the Files was that great Captain Cyrus in his famous Battel against Cressus King of Lydia for Cyrus finding himself over numbred took off half the depth of his Files and added them to his Front whereby he won the Victory by overwinging Cressus As the drawing up the Infantry but four deep and the Cavalry but two deep where the ground will allow it has great advantages in Fight over those who draw up the Foot six deep and the Horse three deep so it has in marching for the shallower the Files are in the several Divisions the shorter the Army or Regiment must be in their long march which is a great ease to the Soldiers in and towards the Rear of
ground to believe he will attempt you during the obscurity and while you are unintrenched to cause great Piles of Wood or Fagots or some such combustible stuff to be ready to be kindled in fit places and at fit distances that if he advances you may the better see how to point your Cannon and dispose of your small Shot most effectually and by such Fires also terrifie and disorder his Horses which generally are frighted at the sight of Fire especially in the Night This I find was practised near Lorges in Beausse by Anthony King of Navarre Francis Duke of Guise and the Constable Montmorancy when Lewis Prince of Conde and the Admiral of Chastillion prest by the necessity of their Affairs went to attack the Royal Army by Night and which so much disheartned the Assaulters as they retreated The Quartering of your Army at all times but especially when that of the Enemies is very near ought to be in such manner as that the Soldiers may be soonest in Battalia to receive him and therefore to lodge it in the Form you will fight is still the very best that is that such Forces as compose your Wings and Body may have only to go out of their Hutts Tents Villages or Houses to be in the Figure you will fight in else in case of an Alarm the disorders will be many and dangerous but this way there can be but few if any The nearer you draw towards your Enemy or your Enemy to you your Quarters must alwayes be brought closer and your advanced Guards of Horse and Foot the stronger and your discovery the more vigilant III. The third is To be the first drawn up on the Ground you will fight in which is constantly attended with three considerable benefits The point of Honor which you gain by being the earliest on the spot which animates your own Party and often daunts your Enemies The being thereby enabled without opposition to possess all the advantages of the Ground either for the planting of your Cannon or for casting up Parapetts on some Eminencies which command all about it as Sir Francis Vere did at the Battel of Newport or by drawing up your Carriages or making a Ditch to cover one or both the Flanks of your Wings which you cannot well do if your Enemy be earlier or as early as you on the place The being thereby sometimes in a posture to fall upon and cut off your Enemies Squadrons and Battalions or to Rake them with your Cannon while they are drawing up which is an advantage when it may be taken that is of great use IV. The fourth is That your Squadrons of Horse ought not to be too great for the Reasons which I have formerly mentioned in that Chapter which Treats of the Disciplining of your Soldiery Yet if that need requires two nay three of the small ones may be put into one great one but still I would advise that the same Officers should command the same Squadrons when united as they did before By which means they will retain the Agility which is in small Parties and yet when there is need have the force of great ones and this I propound to be observed because whoever has been practically versed in fighting will hardly deny but that 150 Horse in two Squadrons will be likely to rout and beat 200 Horse in one Squadron And the reason to me seems very evident for besides the opportunity you have thereby to fall into his Flank and Rear whatever Body of Men does fight or has fought disorders it self though it gets the better and being disorder'd a less Number that is not to speak humanely must if the Men be equally good overthrow a greater that is And daily Experience shews how difficult if possible it is suddenly to Rally great Squadrons when by Fighting they have been disorder'd especially if but a small Squadron is at hand to fall on them and improve their being so discomposed Nor indeed can great Squadrons march many Paces though the Ground be clear and level without disordering their Ranks but if it be uneven or rugged they are almost out of their fighting Order before they come to fight which are mischiefs that less Squadrons are not so liable unto But Battalions of Foot as being more Governable may be large according to the occasion and need especially those which are composed of Pikes for a great Battalion or Stand of those in the Vanguard the Battel and the Rearguard of the Infantry are the safety of the whole and under their shelter All Rallyings may be best made V. The fifth is A General must never omit in the drawing up of his Army so to dispose of his Squadrons and Battalions as probably every one of them may come to fight again and again if the need requires before they are totally overthrown It is also observable that in a Battel whoever keeps in Reserve a Body of Men that are not led to fight until all the Enemies Squadrons have fought rarely misses to carry away the Victory and whoever has the last Reserves is very likely at last to be the Victorious One signal Illustration of this Truth among many I shall instance At the Battel of Dreux in France where the Constable Montmorancy assisted by Francis Duke of Guise the greatest Captains of that Age commanded the Royallists and Lewis Prince of Condé and the Admiral the Protestants He and the Admiral defeated all the Forces they saw took the Constable Prisoner past over the Bellies of the Swissers who made almost a miraculous resistance and concluded they had therefore won the Victory In the mean while the Duke of Guise who led the Left Wing of the French King's Army either by design as his Enemies said or as an act of high conduct so cover'd his Troops with the Village of Blainville and the Trees and Shrubs about it that he was not so much as seen by the Protestants nor moved from thence until the Constable was taken Prisoner the Mareschal de St. André killed and all those Forces which were considered by the Protestants as the whole Army of the Royalists were intirely routed and so confusedly flying as he was in no danger to have his Squadrons disordered by the Runawayes of his own Party but then advancing his Troops which were entire he soon turned the Fortune of the day took the Prince of Condé Prisoner and overthrew all that opposed him For 't is a tedious and difficult if not an impossible task to put into good order again an Army that has newly fought so as to bring it suddenly to fight again some being busied about the Pillage and Prisoners they have taken or are pursuing others being loth to return to new dangers and all in effect being so heated and disordered that they do not or will not hear the Commands of their Superiors VI. A sixth is A General must never bring all his Troops to fight at once and therefore is still to draw up his
the Battel on that side where you judge your self the strongest and your Enemy the weakest and with those Troops to advance as expeditiously as you can without disordering them while the rest of your Army moves as slowly as they may For if your first Impression be successful you may fall into the Flank and part of the Rear of your Enemies while the Residue of your whole Army is marching to attack them in the Front but then the motion of your Army must be quicker as soon as ever they see your advanced Wing is successful I would recommend to Practice one thing more which I have on tryal found very beneficial it is this During the motion of your advanced Wing to edge it by degrees and insensibly towards the outward Flank of that Wing of the Enemies which you go to charge so as by that time you mingle you may outwing them and thereby attack them at once in Front Flank and Rear if he has omitted to cover that Flank And therefore to begin the Battel with that Wing of yours which is the strongest is not only most adviseable but also to place your best men in that Wing of yours which is opposite to that Wing of his which has the Flank of it uncover'd if by neglect or want of time or means either of his Flanks are not secured I have known great advantage obtain'd thereby and if your Enemy be not very timely aware of this it may more than likely contribute considerably to win you the day I mention very timely aware of this because if he discover not your design until you are on the Point to execute it it will be too late to prevent it since no alteration can be made when you are ready to join but it will in all likelihood be ruinous to him who in that juncture of time shall attempt to make it When I mention your beginning the Battel with that Wing in which you have placed your valiantest Soldiers I intend thereby that the second Line of that Wing shall advance as well as the first else while you fall in the Flank and Rear of your Enemies Wing his second Line may fall into the Flank and Rear of as many of your first Line as are so employed unless your own second Line be ready to prevent it and to improve all the Advantages which your first Impression shall give you The placing the best Men in the Wings of an Army is very ancient and seldom has been omitted but to the loss of those who were guilty of such Omission the Reason is the Troops on your Wings are not wedg'd in as the Troops in your main Battel are but are at liberty to take all advantages that by accident or by the ill conduct of your Enemy or by your own good may be offer'd you and you cannot so much as rationally hope to fall into his Flank and Rear but by attacking one of his Wings because you cannot overwing him but only by falling upon one of his outward Flanks Hannibal who was so excellent a Captain to win Victories though possibly not to make the best use of them at the famous Battel of Cannes placed all his valiantest Men in both his Wings and the worst Men in the midst of his Battel whereby when the Romans came to the Charge who had placed their choicest Legions in their main Battel they soon pierced into the Body of Hannibals Army which was what he designed they should do for then with his two Wings in which were all his choicest Troops he immediately incompassed the Romans and totally defeated them But at the Battel of Zama or as some call it Nadagara which â—…e fought against Scipio though the Fate of Carthage depended on the issue of that day yet he totally altered the Order he had observed at Cannes and lost the Victory For at Zama he placed all his new raised Men by themselves to endure the first Attack of the Romans and of all his old Soldiers who had so memorably served him in his Wars in Italy he made as it were an Army apart and drew them up a few Furlongs behind his new raised Africans who were therefore soon cut in pieces as his reserve Army was not long after whereas if he had observed the like order of Battel at Nadagara as he did at Cannes he might have had the like success IX The ninth thing is To prohibit under the severest Penalties the absolute Chace or the Pillage until the Enemy is totally Routed on all sides and then have those Troops only to pursue which are expresly appointed for it alwayes having Squadrons to march after the Pursuers as near and in as good order as if they were going to the Charge that if the Pursued should Rally and Face about you may have those ready to fall on and break them a second time How many Victories seemingly won have in an instant been lost for want of due care in these two Particulars of such high concernment which therefore ought never to be omitted Neither is there any thing which more encourages flying Enemies to rally and fight again than the seeing a disorderly Pursuit of them for in such a Pursuit all the advantage of the prevailing Party is immediately vanished when the Chaced do but turn about for such an evidence of restored Valor too often daunts those who are to oppose it Nor can any thing more deterr the flying Party from doing that than to see several Bodies in good order ready to make them repent that confidence and though brave Officers will not cease pressing promising and threatning their Men that flie to Face about yet the Private Soldier who sees those Bodies are ready to fall on them conclude it is more dangerous to do so than to run and therefore are too often deaf to all Oratory or Menaces of that Nature for the frighted Soldier as well as the hungry Belly has no Ears These Nine Particulars may not improperly be called Maxims in War and therefore ought to be still practised before a Battel in a Battel and after the Enemy is Routed I know many of the Ancients and not a few of the Moderns have with much industry alwayes endeavored to gain the Sun and the Wind of their Enemy in the day of Battel and doubtless both are very desirable to be on our backs when they may be obtained without losing thereby more certain Advantages from the Nature of the Ground you are to fight on For those are mutable especially the latter and the former is still in motion so that no Precaution can ascertain the keeping of them when they are gotten and therefore one must not lose the stable Advantages in hope to gain the unstable but if both may be had at once they must never be neglected I shall now proceed to set down several other Particulars which I hope will be useful to whoever has the Curiosity and Patience to read them VVhen an Enemies Army advances to
Lastly If it be on your Right Wing that these small Battalions of Pike and Shot are placed then I would have them when they advance to Front even with your Squadrons alwayes to do it to the Right of the Squadron they marched in the Rear of and if it be on the Left Wing alwayes to the Left For thereby your Flanks of your outward Squadrons in each Wing will be cover'd with Pike and Shot and the innermost Squadrons of your Wings will be flank'd with the Battalions of the Foot of your Army Therefore if this be not stedily observed your outmost Squadron of both your Wings will be needlesly left unflank'd by a small Battalion of Pikes and Shot which when you are much outnumbred in Horse will be too hazardous and therefore the preventing it highly adviseable I acknowledge I never practised this against an Enemy but it was meerly because I never had need to do it neither did I ever exercise my Men to it and that proceeded only from an apprehension that it might discover what I intended in case there had been need and thereby probably have made it less effectual But I am confident it is very easily practicable and to be made of very advantageous use in case the Enemy were much my superior in Cavalry and I stronger than he in Infantry But I submit this Notion to the judgment of those who are better able to determine of it than I. If your Army be stronger by much in Cavalry than your Enemies and his stronger by much than yours in Infantry I would then earnestly endeavor to fight both or at least one of his Wings with both or one of my Wings which I once did and I would make all my Infantry move as slowly towards the Enemy as they could while I advanced a round trot with my Cavalry and Charged that of my Enemies And if I had success in both my Wings against both his or in one of my Wings against one of his then I would make the next innermost Squadrons of my second Line of that Wing which had beaten the Enemies or of both my Wings if they had defeated both the Enemies Wings immediately march to flank my Battalions of Foot but not to hazard Infantry to Infantry till mine were Wing'd by some Squadrons of my second Line and then advance to the Charge as expeditiously as I could without disordering my Battalions thereby making my Squadrons doubly useful And the Enemies Infantry must be resolute men indeed when all their Horse are routed and that they are to be Charged with all my Infantry and divers Squadrons of my Cavalry and are to be raked with my Cannon which then may be drawn up for that end if they are not soon reduced to furl their Colours order their Pikes and crave Quarter I would further in case I were strong enough in Cavalry to do it even before my Wings were fighting against the Enemies Wings appoint some Squadrons of mine to draw up in the Rear of my Battalions both to countenance my own Infantry and the more to deter the Enemies from Charging them during the Engagement of all the Horse of both Armies For it is the duty of a General to order all things as safely as he may and to leave as little to what is called Fortune as possibly he can The clearing of the Ground you intend to imbattel on of all such Squadrons or Battalions as your Enemy may have advanced on it before you bring up your Battalions and Cannon on it ought never to be omitted and ought still to be done by your Horse and Dragoons or with few if any of your Infantry For the neglect of this may hazard your Army since the Enemy having the start of you by getting part of his Army in the Field of Battel before you get any of yours he may thereby cut you off by peece-meal while you are forming your Imbattelling This I observed was carefully practised by the Prince of Conde before the Battel of Rocroy and Monsieur de Gassion was commanded with his Cavalry to do that Work which being effectually done it did not a little contribute to the Princes Victory In the Imbattelling of your Army I would still do it where the Ground admits it by drawing up in one Line only all the Cavalry and Infantry and not as I have seen some unexpert Commanders do Draw up first a Squadron of a Wing which was to compose part of your first Line and then a Squadron of Reserve to it which was to compose part of your second Line and so in Sequence all your Squadrons and Battalions of your whole Army for that method is tedious and the just spaces of your Intervals between Squadron and Squadron and between Battalion and Battalion cannot be so well adjusted by the Eye as by the first filling up those spaces with the Soldiery for the first is but Guessing but the last is Certainty I would observe this method not only in order to the better and more expeditious Imbattelling my Army if the Ground allow'd it but I would also observe it as much as orderly I could in my advancing to the Charge until I saw it time to form my two Lines by the continued motion of those Troops which are to compose my first Line and by Alting of those Troops which were to compose my second Line and of my third Line if the Ground were so scanty as my two first could more than employ it all And this not singly for the Reasons before exprest but for this additional one also viz. It being very difficult for many and great Squadrons which have Intervals between every two of them to preserve the just Wideness of the Intervals if they march far and if those Intervals are not duly observed 't is impossible to avoid one of these two mischiefs either if they are contracted during your Advance the Troops which at need are to march up through them will be disabled from doing it or at least so many of them as cannot will in their separating from those which can be disorder'd and too likely remain useless Or if these Intervals be inlarged your Flanks are thereby exposed to be fallen into by the Enemy therefore in my poor judgment that way is the very best which will most likely prevent your being involved in either of them and that is practicable and attainable I believe by not making any Intervals till almost you may have need of them which by advancing all your Army in one Line until you come so nigh the Enemy as you judge is a fit time to form your Lines in the manner before set down And then the distance being so little between you and your Enemy 't is not likely if but ordinary care is taken that the Interval Ground can be either much contracted or much enlarged at least 't is not so likely that either of those Ills will be run into marching over but a little Ground as marching over
can well endure so that it will be impossible for the Officers to fall into the Rank if it be well wedged up or if it be not thereby to give them admittance it may leave such Gaps in it as may hinder the close uniting of the Rank which is so necessary to make the Charge effectual and commonly the Officers Horses being of the best and of the highest mettle when they come among strange Horses especially backwards may by their fighting and kicking so disorder the Rank that the Enemy is more likely to come in at the breach than they I would also strictly forbid all those who have the chief Command of a Squadron to fight against any of the Enemies Squadron who should come out in a bravery to fight For who knows but the Enemy may send an ordinary Person but valiant on such an Exploit and if your chief Officer of a Squadron should engage with him his killing of the other will signifie little but his being kill d would much prejudice the whole Squadron and possibly thereby the whole Wing if not the whole Army Therefore still in such Pickeerings if they shall be judged necessary at all when Troops are ready to mingle only such young Gallants should be allowed to be the Actors whose deaths if they should happen will not be of such a Consequence as the Fall of an Officer who has the Honour and Trust to command a whole Squadron For in War I am an utter Enemy for the sake of Showes to hazard Substances And since the Nature of War â—…ves but too much to Uncertainty I would expose as little as might be of it to Choice or Capriciousness A second thing which I offer to Consideration is That your Standards or Cornets Colours in a day of Battel be in the second Rank For these Reasons They are safer there than in the first Rank and thereby the briskest of your Enemy has the least invitation to attempt the winning of them The chief and solid Ends of having Standards or Cornets flying is That Troopers if they are disordered in the Charge may see under what they are to Rally and it being a high disgrace to lose their Colours it makes Men fight the heartilier against those who would cast it on them therefore in my opinion those Cornets should still be placed in a Battel both for the greater safety of them and the better to answer the speedy Rallying under them where they are most useful and most secure which last I think will be in the second Rank For there every way that your Troop can be attack'd it has a Rank between it and the Enemy to defend them and all the Troop also to do it being it is in the Centre of it A third thing I offer to Consideration is That when your Enemy does very much overpower your Infantry that the Battalions of Pikes which are in your first Line may have only so many Colours flying at the head of them as will serve to let the Soldiers see where respectively they are to Rally in case of their being disorder'd or routed For nothing does more excite an Enemy to push for Colours than to see many and near him and since a few will serve to answer the need of orderly Rallying why should there be more in the first Line All the rest of the Colours I would have flying at the head of your Pikes in your second Line where they will be much safer and when the smoke of the Cannon and of the Small Shot is driven away by the Wind or so attenuated that your Enemies may see through it the sight of so many Colours flying at the head of your Battalions or Stands of Pikes casts a kind of dread on the Soldiery of your Enemy who having been accustomed to see Colours guarded by full Companies conclude those are the Pikes of so many intire Companies in your second Line as they see Colours flying at the head of those Pikes and makes them thereby even despair of vanquishing such a Force in your second Line especially if they have been vigorously opposed and much shatter'd by your first Line If in Objection to this it be said That in case you win the day though you should for a time lose any of your Colours yet as one of the many consequences of your Victory you will recover the Colours you lost and if you lose the Field they will as certainly be lost in the second Line as if they had been in the first To that I answer It is a disgrace to have had for any time any of your Colours in your Enemies possession and who knows also as soon as any of them are taken but some may convey them so expeditiously out of the Field as though you get the day you cannot get again your lost Colours Besides I have known a defeated Army at the close of the day which has had some success in the beginning of it and had then taken some Colours by shewing which in Places and Countries they retreated into have persuaded the People they were the Victorious and thereby have gotten the Recruits for their shatter'd Troops which nothing but such a Belief grounded on such Evidences could have procured for them During a Battel or in it it is the duty of the General still to send timely Succor to any of his Battalions or Squadrons and rather a little before than one moment after they need it And for that end to have several Gentlemen about him well known to the chief Officers of the Army to carry to them on the spur the necessary Orders from time to time It is also his duty when he sees a breach in his Army which nothing but his own presence can probably repair resolutely in person to lead those Troops which are to do it but as soon as ever it is made up then to return in person to that station from whence he may see how all things go that from thence he may timely send alwayes his requisite Orders He ought also neither too hastily to believe the Enemies Army is Routed and therefore to command the general pursuit for thereby he may hazard his dawning Victory nor too slowly to order the Follow of the Rout when he is satisfied it is Real and General for else he may lose the best advantages of his success A General ought when he sees a Wing of his Enemies Army palpably Routed by a Wing of his to draw as many as he can well spare from the second Line of his successful Wing to the rest of his Army leaving the rest to follow the execution that by such help and such order he may intirely and more safely both defeat such of his Enemies as yet make head and pursue those which are Routed He ought also never to think upon much less order his Army in a plain Field to receive the Charge but still to meet the Enemy in giving it Pompey in the decisive Battel of Pharsalia by the
the Stores and those Officers who receive them For 't is but too common amongst us to have in one Regiment Pikes of several Lengths and only arm'd at the Points with Lozange heads whereas sixteen Foot and a half ought to be the general length and standard of all the Pikes as 't is among the Switzers which if the Staff be made of feason'd Ash is not heavy for any ordinary man and less heavy to Pikemen who are usually the properest and strongest men in our Companies If our Pikes were All of sixteen Foot and a half long besides the decency of that uniformity the advantages will be great For at sixteen Foot and a half distance they of the first Rank will keep off or gall the Enemies Horse and few ordinary Ammunition Pistols do certain Execution much farther off the second and third Rank of the Pikes being so long will also effectually serve to keep off the Enemies Horse should the first Rank be killed or disordered nay the fourth and fifth Ranks of the Pikes will not be useless For allowing but three Foot distance between every Rank when Battalions front as the first Rank will keep the Enemies Horse off at sixteen Foot and a half so the second Rank will keep them off at thirteen Foot and a half the third Rank at ten Foot and a half the fourth Rank at seven Foot and a half and the fifth Rank at four Foot and a half whereby an Enemies Cavalry will have as it were five Ranks at once to break ere they can make their impression which therefore will be no easie task to perform especially the last Ranks of Pikes being ready to supply those of the first five Ranks who shall fall by wounds or death The Pikes arm'd at the Points with Lozange heads if the cheeks or sides of the Pikes are not armed with thin Plates of Iron four Foot deep are very apt to be broken off near the Heads if the Push be vigorous and the Resistance considerable Nor is this all for unless the Pikes be armed with those thin Iron Plates they are easily cut off with sharp Swords for the Pike especially toward the end is carried tapering to poise it the better and thereby renders it the more flippent for those who use it so that the slenderer part of the Pike if unarm'd is the more liable to be cut off it being there nearest the Enemy whereas if the Pikes were armed with those thin Plates and four Foot deep no cutting Swords which are alwayes of the shortest could destroy the Pikes since that part of the Staff of the Pike which is unarmed would be out of the reach of the Horsemans sharp cutting Sword I remember we once carried a Fort by storm because the Enemies Pikes had not those Plates whereby the Heads of them were cut off I therefore am very desirous that all our Pikes may be sixteen Foot and a half long the Staves to be of seasoned Ash which are strong and light and that from the Iron heads of the Pikes there may be thin Iron Plates for four Foot deep Lozange Heads I like well both because they are sharp to enter and when entred broad to wound with I would seriously recommend the Arming of our Pikemen with Back Breast Pott and Tases For since the Pikes ought to make the principal Battalion and indeed the solid strength of the Infantry of an Army in a day Battel I would have them Armed accordingly for 't is under their Battalion that the Routed must Rally and 't is by the points of their Weapons that the most obstructed passages to Victory must be opened they are still to be as it were the Fortress of the Field and are not like the Horse and Shot which move every way and follow the Execution after the Enemy is broken but being still to advance slowly with the Colours and under their Forrest to cover all Misadventures they ought to be substantially Armed defensively to answer those ends effectually Some Historians tell us That when the Emperor Charles the Fifth that great Captain was to give Battel near Vienna to Sultan Solyman the Magnificent the Christian Emperor had one Stand of Eighty thousand Pikes many of them carried by Reformado Officers and by the Flower of the Christian Nobility and Gentry in which Battalion under God he had repos'd his greatest confidence and which the Turks did so apprehend that after all the noise of a decisive Battel the Mahometans retreated though they had double the number of the Christians and above One hundred and fifty thousand Horse It is both a grief and a shame to see how few Pikemen in most of our ordinary Companies have Swords by their sides and the Musketeers seldom any when a man looks not like a Soldier without a Sword and 't is the Sword which does the chiefest Execution either in the Battel or after the Routing of an Enemy The Greeks and Romans made it ignominious for a Soldier to lose his Sword even in Fight I wish we would make it the like for a Soldier to go to Fight without his Sword or indeed so much as to see a Soldier without his Sword I offer to consideration That all Companies when first Inlisted ought to be completely Armed at the Princes charge and ever afterward to be kept completely Armed at the Soldiers charge unless in actual Fight his Arms be broken in which case the Kings Arsenals should furnish them But whatever Captain of a Company or inferiour Commissioned Officer allow'd his Soldier to appear on Duty without his complete Arms or ever to stir without his Sword in the Streets of his Garison or in the Camp if he punisht not the Soldier should be punishable for it himself And if any Soldier broke his Sword or other Arms by his own negligence or default the chief Officer of the Company should not only punish him for it but forthwith supply him to be defaulked out of the Soldiers growing Pay whereby these three advantages would be gained That the Soldiers would be more careful of their Arms That they would never be unarmed And that the King would be at no unnecessary charge in emptying his Arsenals for them As to the Musket and what is useful to it I find many things in my poor judgment worthy consideration and redress As first That all our Muskets be of one Bore or at most of two sorts of certain Bores the bigger for the stronger the lesser for the weaker Bodies For want of this I have seen much hazard undergone for generally our Musket shot is of one certain size and the Bores of Muskets are of various sizes whereby having been once engaged in a Fight which by reason of the many Inclosures in which we fought the Musketeers were to be supplied with more shot than they carried in their Pouches and Barrels of Musket Bullets being opened few of the shot in them would fit the Muskets but were a size too large whereby we had
a better or more prosperous Conduct of Affairs than that under the late Administration has been Now whether that Conduct shall consist in acting by Maxims diametrically opposite to the former or in heightning considerably of those does depend upon the judgment or inclinations of him that sits at the Helm or on the state of things as they are then circumstantiated But that Don Iohn should attempt or hope to incline his Master to a separate Peace is not very likely since to do it nay perhaps but to attempt it will be dangerous in it self ungrateful to the Confederates and in all likelihood is not solidly and durably attainable And to endeavor to gain all the rest of the Union to it or the major or weightier number of them looks more unlikely to be effected for neither has there ever yet been made so numerous or so strong an Union against France as this now is and it may be no Age has seen that so many Monarchs and States and of such various Interests and Religions should be at once so firmly Confederated which perhaps nothing could have brought about had not the Examples of the Duke of Lorrain and some other Sovereigns of the lesser size filled all of them with so great apprehensions of the like usage as nothing could allay but such a League which since they have after the employing of much time treasure and industry so happily made 't is not probable they will dissolve it especially when their Affairs seem more promising and that notwithstanding this stupendious League they have hitherto lost Ground Whereby none of them all nor no less than all of them can judge himself safe til by the Forces of all they have by Arms reduced this deluge of France into its first and natural Channel For to think to do this by a Treaty looks very improbable to me because the French King is yet too high in his hopes and strength to fall so low as to give more by a Treaty than it may be he can lose by a War and none of his Enemies can well think themselves secure but by keeping fast this knot which was so long a tying and which experimentally they have found has been their common safety and that in nothing less can it well be found so that the continuance of the War appearing to be the likeliest measure that can be taken 't is hardly to be believed that Don Iohn whose Genius is for Arms and his Education has been in them will draw his Masters Sword but half out but if he unsheaths it 't will be to purpose which yet as I think can hardly be done but by being at the head of a brave Army and possibly getting his young Monarch to be personally present and thereby making an effective Invasion on the Southwest parts of France For no Ministry that preceded his did of late attempt it and yet the only attempting it may give more solid Advantages to the whole Union than hitherto all the Arms of Spain has done as they have been order'd nor may he in any other way more acceptably Apologize to the Emperor in particular and to the rest of the Union in general for having got the Queen Regent out of the Government than by his own being more beneficial to him and them in it Besides the present complexion of the Affairs of Spain seems such that it may be his only true interest to be considerable in Arms which he can never be but by being great with the Sword-men and that he can never hope for but by being at the head of them and leading them to daring and high Attempts All this seems to manifest 't is not improbable he may invade the French Pyrenean Frontiers for there only he can be so considerable and at once both so useful abroad and safe at home on which last there seems a necessity on him to fix one Eye as the other on the humbling of France lest otherwise the late Ministry of Spain get again into the Saddle I beg the Reader 's pardon for this long digression which perhaps I may the sooner obtain when he shall be pleased to consider that I was partly drawn into it by observing how useful this revived Part of the Art of War of posting Armies in Intrench'd Camps has lately been to those who have well understood and on fit occasions practised it And though all which I have now said is not properly congruous to the Title I have given to this one Chapter yet it may not be altogether impertinent to what the whole Book treats of for the successful active part of the Art of War has no less dependency on the considerative part of it than the effect has on the cause and what I have so weakly and disorderly exposed may yet furnish a solid and fertile judgment with no ill Reflections and Notions on this Great Subject Of Battels ALL who have commanded Armies or written of the Military Art have universally agreed That no one Act of War is so great in it self or in the Consequences of it as Fighting a Battel since the winning of one has not only been the cause of taking of the Place besieged if in the Field the Army is defeated which comes to relieve it but also by the gaining of the Victory a Province nay a Kingdom has often been the Reward of the Victorious But as the Advantages are eminent to him who wins it so the Prejudices are no less to him who loses it and therefore nothing ought to be more exactly consider'd and weigh'd in War than whether a decisive Battel shall be given before the resolution to fight it is taken There is hardly any thing which seems to me more essentially needful to a great Captain than perfectly to know and lay hold of all advantages in a day of Battel and to know all the disadvantages that he may avoid them I shall therefore in what I write on this Subject specifie some general Rules or Principles which in my opinion ought never to be unknown or unpractised by a General or Commander in chief I. The first is to be so vigilant and careful as not to be forced against his will to come to a Battel but if he is so unhappy or faulty as not to avoid it then to be sure to disguise it from his Army by his words looks and actions since for a chief Commander to evidence Fear or Amazement or to own he has been over-reach'd by his Enemy before he is gotten out of the ill consequences and effects of 〈◊〉 â—…oes to that degree deject his own men that they are half conquer'd before they fight For the Generality of the Soldiery in an Army have their Senses much better than their Understanding and consequently take their Omen of Victory usually from the chearful looks and words of their General who ought therefore in no wise to seem disanimated or doubtful but alwayes chearful and confident II. The second is That no General
should resolve to give his Enemy Battel but on rational or at least very probable Grounds that he shall win it and also when the advantages of gaining it will be greater than the prejudices will be if he should lose it for whoever elects to fight a Battel on other Considerations cannot answer the doing it to his Prince to the Army he leads or to his own Judgment and Conscience III. The third is Whoever has his Enemy at such an advantage as he must submit in a short time without hazarding a Field ought on no terms to expose his Army to a Battel but should derive that from Time and Patience which else he must leave to the decision of Fortune As within my own memory I have known That a General greedy of Honour and impatient of Delay when by the wise conduct of those under him or the ill conduct of those against him his Enemies Army was so coop'd up that it could not long subsist nor Force its way he drew his own Army off of the Passes which shut up his Adversary that he might come out and decide it by a Battel which he lost and deservedly For the turns in a Battel are so many and are often occasion'd by such unexpected Accidents which also proceed from such minute Causes that a wise and great Captain will expose to Chance only as much as the very Nature of War requires IV. The fourth is When a Battel is resolved upon the Field to fight it in ought to be answerable to the Numbers of your Army and the quality of your Forces As for Example You should never choose a Ground to fight on if you can possibly avoid it which you cannot fill up with your fighting and reserve Squadrons and Battalions or as 't is now usually call'd your first and second Line That is you must still endeavor to cover the outward flanks of your Wings with a River a Wood a moorish Ground or something equivalent for else you will expose your Army too much if your Enemy does overwing you Whereas if you cannot be charg'd but in front you will have the less to fear and your Adversary the less to hope For Instance If I found my Army drawn up in Battalia would take up in its utmost extent but 15000 Foot I would not choose to fight in a Plain that was 20000 Foot wide if my Enemies Army were either more numerous than mine or were stronger in Cavalry than I But if by some Accident which I could not foresee or possibly avoid I were to fight on such a Ground I would immediately cover one or if possibly both of my Flanks with what the Nature of the Place afforded as besides a River a Brook a moorish Ground a Wood or Coppice or a steep Ground with a Ditch or Trench or some place so incumbred as my Adversaries Horse could not fall on that Flank without disordering himself before and in his doing of it But in case the Ground was so level and clear as it afforded me none of those Advantages which would be an extraordinary thing I would then by my Carriages or by immediately casting up a long and large Ditch or Trench on my Flanks supply by industry what I could not otherwise attain And if I had leisure at the two ends of each of these Ditches or Barricade of Wagons especially at the Front end I would cast up a Sconce Redoubt or Fort and stuff it with Musketeers whereby the Flank of my Wings would be covered and the Front and Rear of them defended by those Musketeers 'T was almost thus that Lewis Prince of Conde acted in the Battel at St. Denis in the Reign of King Francis the First of France And had not only thereby the Resolution with an handful of the French Protestants to fight the Constable of Montmorancy whose Army was three times as great as his but also to make it so disputable who had the Victory that the Historians of those Times give it without seruple to the Party they were of and wrote for And it seems indeed but doubtful who had the Victory for the next morning the Prince and the Admiral Chastillion by Andelot's being joined with them who brought them not above 1000 men with which until then he made the River of Seine useless to the Parisians drew up their Army again in the Field of Battel and shot some Peals of Cannon even into Paris yet none of that King's Forces came out to fight them so that the Protestants having for a few hours brav'd the French King's Forces and that vast City marched away towards Champagne to meet their German Relief But on the other hand the Historians who were Royallists attribute this wholly to the death of the Constable and not only to the Consternation which it caused but also to the Irresolution of the Counsels who should succeed him since the Duke of Anjou who at last did was by many judged too young for so weighty a Charge and it is reasonably to be believed he would not then have been nominated but that the Queen Regent was irremoveably setled not to lodge in such intricate times the absolute Military Power in any of the House of Guise or in that of Montmorancy but in one who intirely depended on her and would be guided by her And 't is probable that the Protestants who doubtless had been much disordered in the Battel durst not have made that Bravade depending only on their own strength but at least as much on the irresolution and disputes of their Enemies who should be their new General And therefore having set the best face they could on their tottering Affairs for a short time judged it not adviseable to continue playing that part any longer than they believed they might do it safely by the King's Army being without a Head I have only instanced this Particular to manifest how a lesser Army may oppose a much greater in Battel if the Flanks of the lesser be so well covered as that it can only be charged in Front which ought alwayes indispensibly to be provided for Nor is it only needful where a Battel is to be fought to pitch on a Ground answerable to the Number of your Army but also answerable to the quality of those Forces which compose it and to those of your Enemies with whom you must have to do As if my Enemy were stronger than I in Cavalry I would avoid all I might fighting him in a Plain or if I were the stronger in Horse I would use my utmost industry to engage him in an open Countrey And on the contrary if I were stronger in Infantry I would shun the Combat unless it were in an inclosed Country or incumbred by Woods Brooks Coppices Rocks or moorish Grounds so if he were the stronger in Foot I would avoid fighting in a place where he who has the most Infantry may therefore have the most hopes of Victory But if you are commanded to fight by your
Army at least in two Lines or orders of Battel and in three in case the Ground and the Number of his Forces allow it For those Lines are in effect so many Armies and the second Line being intire though the first should be broken often recovers the day especially if the second Line be at so just a distance behind the first as if the first be overthrown it does not disorder the second and also so near that some Squadrons of the second Line can come up timely enough to redress any beginning of a breach in the first without too much discomposing it self The Romans constantly fought their Infantry in three Lines or orders of Battel the one behind the other if the Hostatii were worsted they fell between the Intervals of the Principi and there Rallied again while the Principi advanced to give a check to the Pursuers and if both the Hostatii and Principi were Routed they fell in between the Intervals of the Triarii but if those could not sustain the shock the day was lost VII A seventh is To have expert vigilant and valiant Commanders to be at the Head of those five Gross Bodies of which an Army is usually composed in a day of Battel that is to say the three Tertia's of the Infantry which as they march we usually call Van Battle and Rear and the two Wings of the Cavalry they ought to be Men of great Judgment Authority and Presence of Mind to remedy all Disasters and to improve all Advantages in the nick of time for in such Actions the least delay or remisness is too usually irrecoverable To these five chief Officers whose Stations ought to be in the first Line there ought also to be five others to command in the second Line for this is of equal importance if not of greater since t is easier to give the Attack well while all is in Order than to recover a Disorder when it once has happened In my opinion it is a Duty in a General which he ought never to omit not only to appoint before the Armies Engage what Persons by Name shall command in chief the five Gross Bodies of the first Line and of the second Line but also what Commander in every of the said Gross Bodies shall in course succeed in the Conduct of every such Body in case the Person whose right it is to do it or who is appointed to do it should be kill'd or so wounded as he is thereby disabled to discharge so weighty a Trust and to declare openly to every Gross Body who by Name is to lead them and who by Name is to succeed him who shall be killed or disabled from discharging his Function that no Man may be ignorant or pretend ignorance therein For if this be not done before Troops are mingled in the Fight it will be too late to do it afterwards and I have known sad Disasters occasioned for want of this necessary Precaution Some who have been guilty of this Omission have as their Excuse alledged that when he who commanded that Gross was killed or put out of Fight by his hurts or his Horse being killed the eldest Officer or Colonel in course was to supply his room But that is not in all Cases a sufficient and full Answer for sometimes Regiments of Horse and Regiments of Foot have made up one Gross and though a Colonel of Foot has been the elder Colonel yet in the Field a younger Colonel of Horse has claimed the right of doing it and thereby Disputes amongst themselves have risen when they should have only disputed against the Enemy Besides I have also known that the elder Colonel has not been so fit to command a Gross as a younger Colonel has been and the Soldiery also have known it who will not be a little troubled to be lead by one who they all know was not so capable of that Honor and Trust. Neither do all the inferior Officers or private Soldiers know the dates of every Colonels Commission and if their own Colonel pretends to the Seniority they will not desert him in his pretence by immediately submitting to be led by and obey another But by the method I propound these Uncertainties and dangerous Disputes will be avoided else if they are ever run into it may too probably be fatal And since a General in the Field may appoint on the death of a General Officer who shall act in his place till the King's pleasure therein be known which is usual enough and in making this choice acts not alwayes by the rule of Seniority but by the fitness of the Person and yet therein does no Wrong to an elder Colonel I see no solid Reason why a General may not temporarily Nominate who shall command a Gross Body in case he who did it is killed or disabled especially in a day of Battel when All is at stake and when no Advantage ought to be lost in Nominating the ablest Person for the vacant Charge lest thereby the Victory be lost I am fully of opinion that the greatest Captain that ever was or will be is not or can be of himself sufficient to redress all Disorders and lay hold of all Advantages in an instant when Armies are once engaged The utmost he can do is to choose well the Field of Battel to draw up his Army according thereunto to most Advantage to give his General Orders and to give the best Orders wherever he is in Person but he cannot be Ubiquitary nor send Orders to every place timely enough to have them obey'd successfully And therefore 't is indisputably necessary that he have under him expert chief Officers at the Head of all Gross Bodies who may supply what it is impossible for him singly to command for he can be well obey'd but to the time he sends his Troops to the charge after that those only who lead them and are with them can actuate them according to the General Orders or as the occasion requires which those under him must have the judgment to lay hold of as it were in the twinkling of an Eye so short are the moments to acquire the Victory Together with those chief Officers who command Tertia's and Wings of Armies it is of high importance to have an able General of the Artillery and that he have sufficient Officers under him for the Carriages well disposed and the Cannon early and well planted do not a little contribute to the Victory and if it may be I would never have the Cannon fired so as the Bullet if it take place can only carry away a File especially also now our Files are so shallow but alwayes to point your Artillery so as the shot may rake thwart the Squadrons and Battalions of the Enemy and then it does not only do execution while it has any force but also disorders whole Bodies of Infantry or Cavalry VIII An eighth thing is to place alwayes your best Soldiery in the Wings of your Army and to begin
raise the Siege of a place which otherwise can hardly hold out longer in my poor judgment it is not adviseable to defend the ordinary Line of Circumvallation but to draw out of it and give the Enemy Battel if your Men be as good your Numbers as great as his and that your Ground you fight on be as fit for you as him Some of the Reasons and Experiments which induce me to be of this Belief I shall here express If the place be large which you besiege your Line of Circumvallation must of necessity be many Miles about for it ought to be out of the reach of your Enemies Artillery else you will too much expose to the mercy of it your Army that is lodged within it All this Line must be equally defended unless it be where the situation of it secures it self or does it but thinly mann'd for not knowing in what part or places of it he will attempt to force it you must secure every Foot of it which in consequence does so disperse your Army that if he once enters it will be impossible to draw it together expeditiously enough to beat him out again for as soon as ever he is gotten within it he flings down immediately such parts of it as are near him that the Squadrons and Battalions of his Army may come in and they marching on the heels of each other will certainly be imbattelled and rout all the small Forces which may be in readiness near that place and will also hinder those further off from imbodying Besides if the place besieged is seated on an unfordable River or that may be so in a rainy season as most commonly considerable Fortresses are 't is not to be doubted but you will cast over it Bridges of Boats or fixed Bridges that you may surround the place which else might with safety be every day or night relieved and thereby also have free intercourse between both parts of your Army which are divided by the River and 't is as little to be doubted but as soon as he has enter'd your Line his first care will be to make himself Master of all those Bridges that such as are as it were in a Pound may not escape and that having defeated half your Army he may march over them to destroy the rest who seem then but too ripe for Ruin when half their Friends are cut off and all their Enemies are marching against them and the Besieged by their Sallies ready to assist them This seems to me to be the usual and fatal Consequences if your Enemies Army entring your ordinary Line of Circumvallation which being most frequently but a Parapet with a narrow and shallow Ditch is but too easily forced and indeed not to be held tenable of it self If the Forts Redoubts and other Works which flank it and which are usually raised a Musket-shot from one another with many hands to mann it did not in a good degree secure it But those Works usually are such slight things especially when an Enemy is entred that few of the Resolutest which are posted in them to guard them stay to do it after for commonly the attempt on such a Line is made a little before the break of day that the Obscurity may the less expose the Assailants while they advance to storm it and that the day-light may help them soon after they are gotten in to improve all advantages which are offer'd them thereby and 't is in this twilight ordinarily that those in the Works to defend the Line steal out of them when they find the Enemy is entred as those who then expect more safety from their feet than from their hands He who resolves to force an ordinary Line of Circumvallation either does it without any noise or else alarms it round and often most warmly where he means not to make his attempt while small Parties are doing this in the dark he is drawing all the rest of his Army to the place or places which still are near each other where he intends to make his real impression and does it with that silence as the Defendants cannot discover his intentions till usually it be too late successfully to oppose them I must therefore frankly acknowledge since the defences of such a Line are so inconsiderable since the equally manning them so dissipates the Army which does it since it cannot hopefully be defended otherwise And since it cannot be safely defended that way I have almost wonder'd at those who rather choose to make good such a Line than to give Battel to the Enemy who comes to raise the Siege This being a more hopeful thing a more glorious action and whose Consequences if Success attends the Besiegers in the Field will be much more great than to defend the Line can possibly be for thereby you can at last but carry the place But by a Battel gain'd over the Relievers you usually carry the Fortress but as one of the many good effects of getting the Victory for few if any Towns hold out after the relief sent them is defeated What I have said on this Subject proceeds from my taking two things for granted the first is that the Circumvallation Line is after the usual and common Form that is but a Parapet and that the Works which defend it are very inconsiderable either towards the Field or within the Line The second is that the besieging Army has as good Men and more than the Relievers bring for 't is necessary he leave his best and most advanced Works well guarded during the Battel both to preserve them against his return with Victory as also by them to hinder the Besieged from sallying on their backs while they are fighting with the Relief but indeed if the Line need not be of much circumference if it be high and the Graft large and deep if your Army is not strong enough both to fight the Enemy in the Field and to secure at the same time your most advanced and most necessary Works if the place you must fight in is an open Countrey and that your Enemy does much exceed you in Cavalry or if it be an inclosed incumbred Countrey and he does much exceed you in Infantry if you have Victuals and Forage enough within your Line and your Enemy have little with him or without it so that he can stay but a few dayes and that you may probably in fewer dayes take the place by Assault or have it surrendred by Capitulation I say in a Case thus Circumstantiated I would not admire a General would justifie his Line but rather admire if he should draw out of it to give Battel to the Relievers I shall therefore now instance some Examples of famous Captains who have kept within their Lines of Circumvallation when the Enemies Army came to relieve the Besieged and in them have resisted their Attempts and as a consequence of that success have gain'd the places I shall also give Examples of some other great Generals
whoever does well understand the Trade of War will never put Affairs to the greatest hazard when they can be carried on with the less In our sinful Times in England when Robert Earl of Essex marched to the Relief of Glocester his Highness Prince Rupert whose high Genius in War admirable Valor and great Judgment has made him justly to be esteemed both by his Friends and Enemies a General of the very first Form would not stay in his Works before that City but leaving most of his Infantry in them advanced with his Cavalry to meet the relieving Army on the Downes which doubtless he had defeated as several of the chief Officers of it have owned to me had not some Brigades of the Earl of Essex's Infantry done almost Wonders on that occasion These and many other the like Instances make it seem to me even a kind of Maxim in War That a besieging Army which has onely an ordinary and vast Line of Circumvallation to cover it ought not to stay in it but to give the Relief Battel or raise the Siege before the Relief be too near it being in my poor opinion altogether unadviseable to stay as if you would fight when you are resolved not to do it for whatever Army retreats from another thereby evidences that he apprehends his Enemies which highly encourages them and does not a little deject your own Forces who therefore are the more prone to be disorder'd if vigorously push'd and to be disorder'd is almost the next step to being defeated so that early Retreats where the Resolution is taken not to fight is most eligible for why should you hazard to be engaged when you resolve to avoid it Though I cannot say that the besieging Army quitting an ordinary Line has alway had success in giving or offering Battel to the Relieving Army for that depends on many Circumstances and unforeseeable Accidents yet the Arguments appear to me very strong for the doing of it and Actions ought not to be judged of onely by the Event but by the Reasons which make them to be undertaken I cannot observe in all the Wars which Caesar madâ—… that he committed any one oversight so clearly deserving that name as when at Dirachium he enclosed with a prodigious Line for its circumference the Army of Pompey which was much greater than his own and consequently might when he would force his passage in one part of it because all Caesar's vast Line was to be equally mann'd and provided for where Nature made it not inaccessible which could not but disperse his Troops to such a distance as render'd them not only useless when Pompey should attack any one place of them from within with his whole Forces but exposed them to be cut off by parts when Pompey got out So that it was believed the War had that day been ended had Pompey been a General who had known how to improve a Victory And if Caesar whose own Conduct was so excellent whose Soldiers were so valiant and expert as he himself writes That their knowledge and experience was such as they could prescribe unto themselves what was to be done as well as any Commander could teach them could not on tryal justifie so vast yet weak a Line when it could then only be assaulted from those within it how should any other General rationally hope to justifie an ordinary Line and of great Circuit when it is at once vigorously attempted both from the Field and from the Town for the strongest Sallies from the Town are when the Relief fights the besieging Army Experiment might teach what Reason did not But lest some who peruse this Treatise may think I have forgot how much I have already spoken of the great advantages which are derived from an Armies being intrenched though but as it were within a Parapet well flank'd by my now writing so much against an Armies trusting to an ordinary Line of Circumvallation I shall desire him to consider there is a very great difference between an Army which is posted in an Intrenched Camp and one which is posted within such a Line of Circumvallation though the Works should be of equal strength For an Army intrenched lodges so compactly and close and has comparatively so little Ground to defend and no Enemy to attack them from within that all the Forces of it are at hand in a moment to justifie their Intrenchment against all Assaults from without but an Army within such a Line of Circumvallation is necessarily so far disperst to make good every part of it not knowing where the real Impression will be made and has so many Troops only to attend the Sallies of the Garison that if once the Line be entred it is impossible to bring Forces from such remote distances so expeditiously to drive them out as the assaulting General can bring his in to prevent all considerable Imbodyings to resist him without which it were unadviseable for the defending General to design it and ruinous to attempt it Having thus set down my own opinion for giving Battel to a relieving Army rather than to oppose it in a large and ordinary Line of Circumvallation with the needful Cautions to be observed in choosing to do it and having both by the reason of the thing and by examples endeavor'd to manifest why my opinion therein is taken up and having also given my Reader nine general Maxims which are to be observed in giving Battel I shall now close this Chapter and this Tome with some other Particulars which in my belief are not unworthy his perusal and seem to me fit to be observed before in and after a Battel as being built on Reason or Experiment Before the fighting of a Battel the Field Mark and the Field Word ought still to be given to every one of your men the first is That you may be able to distinguish afar off who are Friends and who are Enemies the second is That when you come to Rally you may make your Rallyment of those onely who are of your own Troops which else might consist partly of your Enemies men who might to shelter themselves get into your Ranks as if they were of your Army And thereby not only preserve themselves but also when you fight again contribute to destroy you by killing some of your Officers which lead you on or by breaking your Ranks just as you were going to Charge and thereby also save themselves when they had done you all the mischief they could For in the hurry and confusion of a Fight private Soldiers must have some very apparent Field Mark to enable them to distinguish Foes from Friends else much mischief may too likely ensue And because such Field Marks wherever you place them are not still visible on all sides of the Head or Body of every one who wears them The Field Word is also given For it often happens that in a Battel the Field Mark is by accident lost by many out of their Helmets or Hats
and then if they had not the Field Word they might be kill'd by those of their own Party who knew them not personally Besides the Field Mark of each Army is seen by All of both Armies before they engage and the matter of it being to be had in all places by private Soldiers as a green Branch a piece of Fern or a handful of Grass or a piece of white Paper c. If you Rout your Enemy he may while he is pursued take off his own Field Mark put up yours in the stead of it and so scape if not do you hurt But the Field Word he cannot know unless it be told him by some of your own men and therefore the giving of both before the Battel must never be omitted I remember once when some Forces I had the Honor to Command obtained by the blessing of God the Victory against the Enemy an Officer of mine having kill'd an Officer of the Enemies and finding he had a good Beaver he tyed his own Helmet to his Saddle Bow and put on so hastily the dead Mans Beaver as he forgot to take out of it the green Branch which was their Field Mark and to put on a white Paper which was our Field Mark and following the Execution with his Sword all bloody a Captain of Horse of my own Regiment taking him by his Field Mark for one of the Enemy and judging he had done no little slaughter by his Sword being all gored to the Hilt undertook him in the pursuit and turning short on him before he could see his face ran him through and through with his Tuck whereof he dyed in a few minutes But finding the Enemies 〈◊〉 Mark had caused his death he own'd his fault and so acquitted my Captain from any Guilt Whatever can be done before a Battel to distract or intimidate your Enemies Army ought not to be omitted some Examples of this way of proceeding I shall mention The Archdâ—…ke before the Battel of Newport having cut off several Companies of the Prince of Orange's Army sent undeâ—… Count 〈◊〉 to secure some Passes on the way the Enemy was to march caused a Trooper of his on purpose to be taken Prisoner just as the Armies were going to Engage who being brought to the Prince did with a loud voice tell him That Count â—…st was defeated and that immediately the Battel would be given him and exceedingly magnified in the hearing of all which were present the Numbers Bravery and Resolution of his own side and though the Prince immediately caused his mouth to be stopped yet so many had heard what he said as it was in an instant diffus d over the States Army and struck into it no little damp if not terror If the Ground admits of it it were adviseable if it can be done safely the Night before the Battel to lodge in a Wood or Coppice or hollow Ground some of your men concealed on the Flank or towards the Rear of your Enemies Army who by falling on just as you are engaging or newly after you are engaged may be of great benefit to you and prejudice to him as it was done in that great Battel between Ieroboam and Abijah and in many others But then great Caution must be had that the Enemy discover not this Ambush lest he cut it off before the Battel and thereby weaken you and animate his own Party as it hapned to the Suedes near Lindâ—…w in the Year 1632 and to many other parts of Armies in other Countries For whoever goes upon designs whose success depends on very fine and nice management must be exceeding wary else he had better never attempt them and therefore though they may be and have been practised with good success yet I am in my own private judgment no over-great Friend to any such Policies in War where I may in the management of them be discovered and not possibly know of it timely enough to receive no detriment thereby For where the Fate of a Kingdom and the Lives of thousands are at stake as in Battels the first too usually is and the last alwayes is I would still act on solid Reasons and Principles and in Stratagems embrace such methods only as if they had success would be of great advantage and if they failed yet I should thereby lose nothing but my hopes The making a Speech by a General to a whole Army before a Battel is often read of in our best Histories as well as Romances but ought in my belief to be onely found in the latter since 't is impossible for any General to speak audibly in an open Field to above a Regiment at once and if he makes an Harangue to every Regiment he will employ that time in talk which is more usefully spent in ordering his Forces and in Action Not but that I think it highly useful that the Officers and Soldiers of an Army before the Battel should be told all that may heighten their Courages as the Goodness of the Quarrel they fight in the beneficial Consequences of their Victory the fatal Effects which must attend their being worsted the Honour they have gained in many an Action which is too precious to be all lost in one c. But because I esteem such Orations impossible to be made by one to many thousands at once therefore I think it is the duty of a General to infuse these Incentives to Victory into his chief Officers first and then to order their imparting them convincingly to the subordinate ones and those to inculcate them on all occasions into the private Soldiers and especially on their Guards and a little before they go to fight and to do it but to a Troop or a Company at a time and in these wayes I do not only approve of such Oratory but esteem it very practicable and highly useful before a Battel Besides when all the Officers thus discourse to their Soldiers it shews an Unanimity which cannot be so practicably evidenced when the General singly speaks to them The Shouting to the Battel is very ancient and we read of the practice of it in most Warlike Nations as amongst the Iews in the time of David amongst the Romans in the time of Caesar c. The English are so much inclined to it as I have but once in those Actions I have been in seen them omit the doing it as soon as ever they came within Cannon-shot of the Enemy they were to fight with and then I minded them of that Neglect which they immediately amended such shoutings bring not only a kind of terror on the Nations which do not use them as being commonly an evidence of great joy in those who make them but also it stirs up the blood and spirits before and heats them during the Fight But though such Shoutings are useful going towards the Enemy yet a deep silence must be observed by the Soldiery when you are about to engage that the Officers Orders and the Words of
much and if but moving a few paces the mischief is probably in some degree to be run into then so much the more care ought to be taken that as few paces may be so marched as possibly you can contrive I cannot see any solid Objection can be made hereunto in reference to your Artillery for those usually being drawn in the Front of your Battalions till you come to place them where they are to do execution they may be advanced still before the Front of your Army though you should march it but in one Line till you come near the Enemy but this as all things I write I shall chearfully submit to better judgments If you are desirous to come to a Battel with your Enemy and that he endeavors to shun it by constant Intrenched Campings and by having good Magazines and Arsenals with or near him and a plentiful Countrey at his devotion behind him which is usually the best Game of him whose Countrey is invaded for he has little reason to give you Battel when by keeping unfought with you cannot safely enter far into his Countrey leaving his Army intire behind you I say in such a case you ought by often Removings to try for an opportunity to give him Battel for since he is to attend your motions sometimes an occasion to fight him unexpectedly both to him and you may be offer'd you Sometimes also by your suddenly sitting down before a Garison of his and endangering the taking of it he may be induced to give you Battel which he would not do but in hope to prevent such a loss Sometimes it may be adviseable for you if you are much his Superior in strength with as little Baggage as possible and with as much Bread as your Men can carry and with Herds of fat Cattle to be driven with you which last is a Provision that carries it self to make Inroads into his Countrey both to destroy and pillage it this may provoke him to follow you lest his Countrey esteem him careless in the defence of it and thereby you may find opportunities to fight him And sometimes by your invading parts of his Territories at a considerable distance from those places where he has formed his Magazines either necessitate him to remove from them or else expose to your Army those Countries of his which you fall upon As Caesar by the like method drew Pompe from his Magazines and Fleet at Dirachium and made him follow him into Thessaly by which means Caesar won his famous Battel of Pharsalia I look upon it as a Maxim in War never to have the Army of the Invaded Countrey to give Battel to the Invading Army but on very great necessity or on very great advantages for the Invaded by losing a Battel may lose his Countrey but the Invader by losing one will but lose his Hopes his Baggage and as many Men as are kill'd in the defeat and few discreet Gamesters will play their All against little or nothing comparatively Therefore as the Invaded must still be careful to avoid a Battel so the Invader must still be forward to offer it on any fitting terms for should he not nothing else will keep up his Reputation which of all humane things ought most carefully and jealously to be kept up and increased in War In my private thoughts I cannot readily believe that any Kingdom can easily be Conquer'd where the true Principles and Methods of War are alwayes observed unless some great internal Revolutions of Affairs or general Revolts of Subjects should occasion such a misery And therefore whatever I have heard to the contrary I freely own I cannot be brought to believe that this present fatal War kindled almost all over Europe will have such great Progresses as some of more sanguine Complexions than I am have believed or rather fancied for though France has the formidablest League against it that perhaps was ever yet made in Europe against any one Monarch of it yet I cannot find the Advances of his Confederated Enemies are very considerable nor can I believe they will be for the Reasons formerly mentioned in this Book and also because he does by Intrenched Incampings and providing timely and plentifully for his Armies to eat frustrate in effect all the great Enterprises of his Enemies which is practicably to perform the solidest Maxims of War and whoever he be that can stedily observe them will find the necessary benefits which will result to him thereby unless a higher Power does turn the Wisdom of Man into Foolishness and against that stroke there neither is or can be any defence I shall now offer to Consideration three Particulars more which are I think useful to be observed previously to a Battel The first is That Orders be given that no chief Officer who commands a Squadron or Commissioned Officer who leads one with him have that Horse he Charges on advanced above the length of his head before the Front Rank of his Troopers My Reason for it is this Because if those who lead Squadrons to the Charge be before the Front Rank they either without cause adventure to be shot by their own Men behind them or hinder some of them from firing or which is far worse when both Bodies come to the shock such as are out of the Ranks and between both Bodies are needlesly exposed even when they are of most use to those Men they command and consequently the whole Army In answer to this I know some have said It does not a little animate the Squadrons to see the Officers which command them lead them on eight or ten Paces before the first Rank and then just as they are going to mingle to fall into it But I must say I believe good Soldiers need not such Airy Animations and the Bad will not fight well though they have more substantial ones Besides I believe it does rather Disanimate than Encourage Soldiers who have any consideration when they see those Officers whose Conduct they relie upon â—…ive them so ill an impression of it as doing a vain thing by which also they may too probably incapacitate themselves to command their Men when they are likely to have most need of being order'd to the best advantage either as to their Rallying if discomposed in the Charge or an orderly Pursuit if successful To which also may be added these two other Considerarations If the Officers advancing some Paces before their Men be a great Animating them may it not be a greater Disanimating of the Soldiery to see them when ready to Charge put themselves into the first Rank For their going before their Squadrons while there is no danger and the returning when there is will in all likelihood make the latter Action dishearten more than the former can encourage for all Animations are more effectual when the danger is at hand than when it is remote When the Squadrons advance to Charge the Troopers Horses and their own Knees are as close as they
advice of Triarius commanded his Soldiers to receive Caesar's Assault and to undergo the shock of his Army without removing from the place whereon they stood alledging that Caesar's men would be disorder'd in their Advance and Pompev's by not moving keep their Order on which Caesar himself sayes viz. In my Opinion this was against all Reason for there is a certain Incitation and Alacrity of Spirit naturally planted in every Man who is inflamed with a desire to fight and therefore no Commander should repress or restrain it but rather increase and set it forward And the Event justified Caesar's Opinion therein was well grounded A General ought when he sees the day irrecoverably losing having first done his very utmost to recover it to get together as many of his Soldiers as possibly he can especially Horse and with them to bring up the Rear and make his ill success as easie as he can to his own Party and if he have any Garisons which he doubts his Enemy may attempt in the heat of his Victory to fling into such Garisons those of his Infantry which are left amazed at their defeat thereby to stop the current and give some check to the Victorious while he is getting together the residue of his Army the sooner to recruit it and to try to recover afterwards what then he lost After the Battel is fought and the Victory apparently won a General ought to take great care as is before set down that the Pursuit be orderly made and consequently the safelier for which end I offer to consideration That the Cornets Squadron of every Troop be expresly forbidden ever to be of the loose Pursuers but to keep alwayes intire and follow as fast in order as they can those of the other two Squadrons of it which are on the execution This I have practised and found these three Benefits thereby First Thereby the Standards of all Troops are still well secured which ought alwayes to be carefully minded for I have known those of them of the victorious Party often in hazard to be lost when out of too eager an haste to pursue a flying Enemy the Troopers of the Cornets Squadron have follow'd the Pursuit and left their Colours unattended or but slenderly guarded Secondly The Cornets Squadrons of the first Line of your Wing being still kept in order and by being the nearest to a flying Enemy are much fitter to follow in a Body to countenance and if need requires actually to justifie your Pursuers than any Squadrons of your second Line of your Wing can possibly be for the Enemy by his flight having got the start and Men who run for their lives doing it with their best speed it will be almost impossible for those which are so much behind them as your second Line is behind your first ever to overtake them wherefore such as are the nearest to them when they first begin to Run are those only who most properly and most hopefully are to march in a Body after those who dispersedly pursue that the Enemy may immediately be Routed if he begin to Rally which nothing does more frighten him from attempting than to see so near him so many Parties in good order to make him smart for it Thirdly The more of the first Line of your Wing which in orderly Bodies can follow to countenance and protect your Pursuers the more you can spare of your second Line of your Wing to join with others of your Army to defeat those of your Enemies which remain unbroken and though in the Battel you should fight the Cavalry three deep yet after your Men have absolutely Routed those they Charged I would have every Cornets Squadron follow your Pursuers but two deep whereby a Troop of 90 Horse having in every Squadron of it 30 Men the Cornets Squadron being drawn up two deep will have 15 in each Rank and having a Standard at the head of them will appear a full Troop to those who flie and shall have but now and then time to cast a sudden look behind them when seeing so many seeming entire Troops as there are Squadrons in a Wing of your Army it will be so terrifying a Prospect as few will dare to Rally while they see it and so near them After the Chace is finished which ought still to be continued as warmly and as far as may be I esteem it an indispensible duty in a General even in the Field of Battel to draw together all his Forces that he can and with them cause to be returned to Almighty God their most humble and hearty thanks for his blessing in his bestowing on them the Victory and his preserving so many of them from death for an unfeigned and publick Gratitude to God is not only what Piety but even what the light of Nature does teach and nothing does more incline God to bestow future blessings than to have Men really thankful for the present and to own him to be the onely Author and Finisher of them A Generals next care ought to be to have his Wounded Men well tended his Dead honourably buried his Prisoners strictly but civilly kept and to have a true List of all to take publick notice of those who behaved themselves well to rebuke such as did the contrary to send Spies to discover what measures his Enemies will take in their Calamity the better and more advantageously to form his own Counsels and Actions and most vigorously to pursue his Point while the terror of a Defeat is fresh in the minds of his Enemies since 't is as essential to a General to make the best use of a Victory as to know how to obtain it I confess I have the more minutely insisted upon the protractive or fencing parts of War by Intrenched Incampings c. because few of my Countreymen have made it muâ—…h their study but being carried on by the natural Genius and Hereditary Gallantry of the Nation they are alwayes ready by true Valor expeditiously to determine their quarrels and though this is highly estimable yet I would not be ignorant of other useful methods for I know few Men use to travel on foot that would not be willing to have Horses to lead in their hands that when they are weary of Walking they may by Riding on them come to their Journies end And since Battels are what our Countreymen most breathe after and long for in War I have also the more particularly insisted in this Chapter on what seems most materially if not essentially to be known Before In and After they are fought But after all that I have said on Battels nay possibly after all that has been said or has been practised in them could both those be known it is my firm belief that still very much will be nay must be left to the Judgment and Presence of Mind of a General and the chief Officers under him whose actings must be order'd according to the circumstances present in doing whereof most advantageously no set Rules previously can be given for they must be taken as the occasion is offer'd and then resolutely and speedily pursued yet what I have written may possibly be of some use to such of our less experienced Officers as shall well remember weigh and practise them who may by their own more illuminated Reasoning do as the Spaniards did who though they ow'd the first discovery of America to Columbus yet they ow'd the Riches they deriv'd from it to their own further improving of what he had but laid the Foundation And if this should be the Result of my Endeavors I should esteem them happily employ'd FINIS
who have chose rather to draw out of their Lines to give the Relieving Army Battel than to stay within their Lines and in them to oppose the Relief I shall then enumerate some of the many Reasons why I believe such various and opposite methods have been practised by such celebrated Chiefs in War nay sometimes by the very self-same General though I must say I find many more Examples in Histories and in my own time for drawing out of ordinary Lines of Circumvallation to give Battel to the Relievers Army than for opposing the Succors by continuing within them Caesar who I esteem the famousest Captain of the Universe in the famousest of all his Sieges that of Alâ—…sia in France chose to stay within his Lines to oppose the Relief of the united Gaules or at least fought them in the Field only with his Cavalry which on occasion he drew out of his Lines and in which Services he owns his German Horse did him most service who have been famous for their Valor even as long as Historians have recorded any great Actions of War in which that Nation had a share But because this memorable Siege is so minutely and particularly related by Caesar himself and does thereby imply he thought it even his Master-piece in that kind and since by his Conduct there the most eminent Captains of the Moderns as I have been credibly informed have model'd the design of their Sieges viz. the Prince of Orange the Duke of Parma and the Marquiss of Spinola in their great Sieges of Maestricht Antwerp and Breda I hope those who read this Book will at least judge me worthy of their Pardon if I stay a little in the Relation of this prodigious Siege of Alesia since also no less an Author than Paterculus when he treats of it has these very expressions viz. So great things were done at Alesia that they might seem too great for any Man to attempt or any but a god to effect Caesar having defeated the Cavalry of the Gaules whose Army was led by Vercingetorix a Person worthy to command a National Army Vercingetorix shuts himself up in Alesia with 80000 of his chosen Soldiers sends away the Reliques of his Cavalry as useless in that Siege and requires all the Nations of the whole Countrey of Gallia to come to his Relief which he conjures them to hasten having but 30 dayes Corn in the Town to feed his Men which in all probability by the frugallest management and the carefullest distribution could not suffice for above six Weeks Caesar immediately resolves to besiege this great General and greater Army in hope to reduce both before the Relief could come yet admirably well fortifying himself against the Relief if it should come early enough to succor the Besieged What these stupendious Works were both as to the Circumvallation to oppose the Relievers and as to the Countervallation to resist the Attempts of the Besieged you shall have briefly related and from his own Commentaries wherein he writes viz. That he made round about the Town a Ditch of 20 foot wide and 20 foot deep with upright sides as broad at the top as at the bottom 40 foot behind this Ditch he made his first Works behind them he made two other Ditches of 15 foot in breadth and 15 foot deep and behind all these he made a Ditch 12 foot wide and 12 foot deep with a Rampard and Parapet thereon and erected Towers round about the whole Work at every 80 foot distance the one from the other besides the Palisadoes Stockadoes and those other Fortifications which he comprehends under the name of Cippi of which there were five Ranks and of Stimuli of which there were eight Courses or Rows round about his whole Camp So that it seems to me none of his Enemies could come to attack his Works but must run on several Ranks of sharp Stakes or into Holes or on Galthrops which were also covered or hid with Branches of Osiers Caesar further adds That after the inner Fortifications were thus perfected he took in 14 Miles of Circuit and made the like Fortifications in All Points against the Enemy without as he had done against the Town which are his own words These are the first Lines of Circumvallation and Countervallation which I ever read of in any Siege and I fully believe the making of both as ordinarily they are made in our modern Sieges when we equally apprehend the numerous Sallies of the Besieged and the strong Attempts of the Relievers was taken from this Model of Caesars but the Copies are very much short of the Original as to the quantities and qualities of the Lines so many prodigious Works of 11 Miles about towards Alesia and 14 Miles about towards the Armies which came to succor it with the several Rows of Stakes Holes in the Ground and other Traps to destroy and catch the Gaules I think is admirable and to perfect them one would judge must be the labour of some years though a vast Army undertook it whereas indeed as I believe it could not possibly be the labour of many days For though Caesar mentions not how many days it was before the Relieving Army came Yet since he expresly says Vercingetorix found scarce 30 days Corn in the place when he shut up himself in it with his 80000 chosen Men and that he surrendred it not till the Relief had made three Attempts to succor it it is undeniable 't was not Famine only which made Vercingetorix yield And therefore it could not be many days in which Caesar began and perfected all these wonderful Works This being the true Narrative of the strength of his Lines both towards the Town and towards the Field it is not to be thought strange he elected to withstand his Enemy within such Fortifications and that he repulsed their General Assaults though three times made nor can any one reasonably believe Caesar's Army could have justified 11 miles of a Line against 80000 men within the Countervallation and of 14 miles against 248000 men without the Circumvallation had not the multiplicity of his Works the one within the other and the strength of them every way made them defensible enough for the paucity of the hands which were to justifie them Yet the finishing of these amazing Works were not the onely Labours of Caesar's Army but to do the constant Duty Night and Day of the Camp especially most strongly until the Line of Countervallation was finish't the providing not only Forage and Victuals from hand to mouth but also to lay in besides Magazines of both for 30 days which Caesar writes by his Orders were done That thereby as I suppose he might not be necessitated to stir out of his Lines when the Relief should Incamp it self close by them which else might have hazarded the cutting off his Army by piece-meel going to Forage or forced him to have come to a decisive Battel whereby all his Labour on his Lines would have
been needless as also by carrying into his Leaguer what was in the Villages and Countrey Neighbouring on his Works to deprive his Enemies Army of all sustenance but what they brought along with them or were daily to be fetch'd by them to their Camp from a great distance And lastly to have still in his Leaguer more Victuals than the Besieged could then have within the Town thereby to compel the Relieving Army to attack those almost unconquerable Works or the Town to surrender for want of Food in the sight of the Army which came for the Succor These necessary performances together with his often fighting against such Forces as almost hourly Night and Day made numerous Sallies and were obliged to do it both to harass and lessen Caesar's Army and to retard the finishing of his Works which when compleated would render it highly difficult if possible to relieve the Besieged I say and I think with reason all these Economies of War were at least as difficult in the Actings as the making those laborious Fortifications Yet all were to be done and done at one and the same time and in so short a space that I scarce know to which of the two my Admiration is justlier due At length the Relieving Army appear'd which consisted of 248000 men as Caesar who condescended to be the Commissary of their Musters reckons them to be and also writes how many every State of Gallia did particularly send so that at once he was to withstand 320000 of his Enemies and which was more to fight with them at the same time when they attacked him in Front and Rear This formidable Relieving Army was led by four Generals viz. Comius Veridomarus Eporedorix and Vergesilaunus All great Captains and accustomed to make War even against Caesar himself where they could not but have learn'd much having to do with such a General and yet for many Years continued the War against him and one of them viz. Comius had learn'd the Rudiments of War under Caesar himself and acquired so much Honour in serving the Romans that Caesar rewarded him with the Principality over the Morini The Gaules seated their Camp on a Hill half a mile from Caesar's Works and sent their Cavalry into a Plain under it and their nimblest Archers conceal'd behind their Troops Caesar makes his Cavalry match out to fight them lest the Gaules by having their Cavalry unfought with even under Caesar's Works might grow too insolent and his own Army be intimidated The Roman Horse were worsted by the help of the Gaules Archers but Caesar's German Horse Relieved them Routed the Gaules and cut in pieces their Archers and then all Caesar's Troops return d within their Line The Gaules made three several General Assaults on Caesar's Camp the first by Day the second by Night and the third at full Noon Vercingetorix every time Sallying out at the same hour with his Army In these three Attacks all that Valor Skill and Industry could perform on both sides was not omitted Some Particulars I shall enumerate the Gaules finding the Rows of Stakes and Holes and the Galthorps destroyd many of their Men flung up so much Earth over them as covered them and thereby made them useless to the Romans Then filling their Ditches with Fagots Hurdles and Earth raised the Outside on which they went to the Assaults higher than the Line they assaulted and so went on advantageous Ground to the Attack and Caesar when he found his Men distressed in Front by the Enemies over-numbring him and fighting on equal Ground would often command his Cavalry sometimes his Legionary Infantry to sally out of his Line and to fall on them in the Rear whereby he routed them The last dayes Attack seem'd several Battels rather than one General Assault such great Bodies fighting at once both within and without the first Lines towards the Field and towards the Town for the Gaules having discover'd the weakest or more properly the least strong part of Caesar's Line while all the residue of their Army were assaulting the rest of the Works Vergesilaunus who was Vercingetorix's near Kinsman in the obscurity of the preceding Night had marched behind a Hill and concealed himself there with 60000 select men who at Noon-day when the Romans were with all their Forces defending their Works both against the Besieged and Comius c. assaulted them unexpectedly entred the Line whose Ditch they had filled and with many shouts daunted Caesar's Soldiers as he himself confesses But Caesar at last by the Valor and Expertness of his men and by his excellent Conduct relieving them in all parts where they were oppressed and leading them in Person to many Charges was Victorious and Chaced the Gaules to the very Works of their Camp and to the Gates of the Town and adds If his Soldiers had not been quite spent with that dayes hot Service few of all the Gaules had scaped They lost in that last dayes attempt above 60000 men so that despairing to perform what they came for they did that Night abandon their Camp and many were kill'd by Caesar's Cavalry who pursued them in the obscurity and the next day Vercingetorix capitulated and yielded he himself gallantly mounted and armed at all points having first leisurely rid round about the Chair of State in which Caesar sate to receive him alighted off of his Horse and as an evidence of his being Conquer'd disarm'd himself and then went and sate down on the Ground at Caeâ—…ar's feet without speaking one word Some of those many Reasons which induced Caesar in my opinion to continue within his Lines and not to give the Enemy Battel in the Field I shall here set down I. He could not shut up in Alesia a much greater Army than his own without making very strong Lines of Countervallation against it II. Having made these wonderful â—…ines and knowing of the vast Relief which was certainly hastening to succor the Besieged he with so small an Army as his own which probably could not consist of above 30000 Foot and 6000 Horse for he never had above 10 Legions at once in all Gallia could not reasonably hope both to keep in Vercingetorix with 80000 chosen men and fight against Comius c. with 248000 good men unless by prodigious Works he could supply what he wanted in Numbers of men and also by so posting his Army between his Lines of Circumvallation and â—…ountervallation as to be thereby ready to resist both wayes and often with the same Reserve Battalions and Squadrons For whatever Justus Lâ—…psius computes That the space between these two Lines must be 5000 Foot yet in reason I am fully convinced they were much nearer each other for else they could not answer the end for which they were made since no Squadrons of Reserve can 〈◊〉 answer both wayes a distance of a Mile much less do it as often as need requires and our modern Lines of Circumvallation and Countervallation which are but Copies after