battels as the Turks and the Persians and even amongst the Christians we have seen of late divers battels given in Germanie whereof onely one had almost inthralled all the Protestant Princes And an army well-disciplined and which feareth not battel hath a marvellous advantage in all designes of that which feareth it For this reason howsoever the manner of warring at this time be not so frequent in the hazarding of battels as in times past the knowledge of them must not be neglected And a Generall of an army cannot be said to be a good Captain which knoweth not all advantages which may be taken on a day of battel and all disadvantages which ought to be avoyded that so he may well disintangle himself I will not speak of dust the sunne or rain whereof it is observed that many Captains have made use driving them on the face of the enemy by gaining the wind of them because they are casuall things which may change in a moment and which by consequence happen rather by hazard then come by designe but of things more solid He then that will give battel must have regard to seven principall things The first is never to suffer himself to be forced to fight against his will The second to choose a field for the battel fit for the quality and number of his souldiers for if he feareth to be inclosed by a great number he must shelter his flanks or at least one of them by the nature of the place as by a river wood or some other thing equivalent and if he be weak in his Cavalry he must avoid the plains as he must strait passages or enclosed places if stronger The third so to range his army in battel as according to the quality of his souldiers it may be within its own advantage sheltring his horse by his foot if therein he be the weaker and if the contrary his foot by his horse disposing all his souldiers in such order as they may fight divers times before they be wholly defeated for if we well observe the small troups of souldiers which fight not all at once and believe that a hundred horse in two troups wil beat two hundred in one entire troup and have observed in our times that divers battels have been won by him which had made a troup of reserve which was not to fight untill all the rest had fought how much greater effect will a second order of battel produce which will come to the charge after that all the adverse army hath fought against the first order and yet after that a third in imitation of the Romanes if the two former be defeated It is a maxime That every troup how grosse soever i◠be which hath fought is in such a disorder as the least troup that chargeth it is able to defeat it absolutely so that that Generall which can reserve some troups to the last without fighting will with those bear away the victory it being a long work and difficult to go about to rally an army that hath fought into good order to fight afresh some gazing about for pillage others being vexed to return to the danger again and all being so distracted as they do not or will not understand any command on the contrary such as have not as yet fought are under obedience and ready to do whatsoever their Generall shall command them So that the knowledge of a Generall of an army is not so much to rally disordered and defeated troups which is properly but an action of courage as to make his troups fight to good purpose the one after the other and not all at once for he must consider that he cannot be well obeyed by his souldiers but onely untill the houre that he sendeth them to the combat After that all the orations of the world will not stay them when they flie but this troup which is in good order will easily do it The fourth is to have many good commanders it being impossible that a Generall should suffice for all places After that he hath made a good choice of his field for battel and put his army into good order it is altogether impossible for him when it cometh to blows to give order more then in that part where he is present so that if he be not well assisted every-where else aswell amongst the horse as foot though he should work miracles in that place where he himself is he cannot make good the ignorance of those officers which command in the other parts of his army Therefore there must be at least five principall commanders to make an army fight well namely for three bodies of Infantery distinguished by vanguard battel and rearguard and two for the horse which are on the wings The fifth is so to observe your distances in your order of battel that the foremost troups being put to recoil may not fall upon those which should come up to relieve thē nor the second upon the third The sixth is to place the most valiant souldiers on the wings of the army and to begin the battel by that wing which you think to be strongest for if you once break one of the enemies wings you fall upon his flank and rear and it is impossible for him to resist you The seventh and last is not to suffer any to pursue the enemy nor fall to pillaging untill he be routed on all parts and although it be good to give him a hot chace you must ever have some troups in order which must not disband that so you may avoid all inconveniences I will not speak of the advantages which may be met with in a field of battel whereof a good Captain often maketh use with great profit because there can no certain rule be given for it by reason the diversitie of situations is such that you shall never find two every-way alike CHAP. VIII Of Fortresses BEcause the gain and losse of battels draweth such consequences after it as it giveth or taketh away whole Empires at once it hath caused a resolution of opposing the conquers by fortified places to stay their first fury with few men and to ruine their armies But since the invention of the cannon they have been enforced to change their manner of fortifications and even by reason of the invention of petards we have beene constrained to assure the gates of cities by portculices pallisadoes draw-bridges and other inventions because there was no place how strong soever it were which did not runne a hazard to be surprised by this new invention Now the best fortresses against the cannon are those which are made of earth because when they have a sufficient thicknesse to make resistance they are not subject to endamage the besieged as those fortifications are which are made of masons work the shivers whereof do much mischief Neverthelesse when a Prince can be at the cost to line them as high as the rampart leaving the parapet upon it to be of earth cannon-proof it maketh
together which made 32 souldiers those two files so joyned they called Dilochia and the Commander of these two files they called Dilochites Then they doubled the number of those two files which made foure files and 64 souldiers and this troup they called Tetrarchia which had a Commander called Tetrarcha After that they doubled the number of these which made eight files and 128 souldiers and this body was called Taxiarchia and their Commander Taxiarcha Then they doubled those eight files so made them 16 and this body was called Syntagma and the Commander of this body was called Syntagmatarcha To this body they appointed five generall officers An Ensigne a Lieutenant a Trumpeter for they had no Drumme a Cryer and a Sergeant The Ensigne was placed in the middle of the first rank as all will appear by the figure following The second figure Syntagmatarcha Taxiarcha Tetrarcha Dilochites The Phalanx was composed of sixteen bodies like to the foregoing figure This body of 16 files they doubled which made 32 files and called it Pentacosiarchia and the Commander of it Pentacosiarcha Then these 32 files they doubled which made 64 and this body they called Chiliarchia and the Commander Chiliarcha These 64 files being doubled made 128 files and were called Merarchia and their Commander Merarcha And 128 files being doubled make 256 called Phalangia and the Commander Phalangiarchos so that the Phalanx is composed of 4096 souldiers and of one Phalangiarchos which commanded in chief two Merarchas foure Chiliarchas eight Pentacosiarchas 16 Syntagmatarchas 32 Taxiarchas 64 Tetrarchas and 128 Dilochites as the next figure sheweth The third figure Now according to the ability of their Commonwealths they augmented this army by doubling the Phalanx which was called Diphalangarchia and the Commander Diphalangarcha or by doubling the Diphalangarchia and this they called Tetraphalangarchia and the Commander Tetraphalangarchos who then was the highest Commander And this they held to be a complete army which afterward hath been called a Phalanx Neverthelesse it was alwayes divided into foure bodies as foure Phalanges and was composed of 16384 souldiers The fourth figure This is the order of the Grecian phalanx for the heavy-armed called hoplitae namely of pikes and targets which took up allowing six foot for each souldier and without accounting the three intervalls six thousand one hundred fourty foure foot in breadth and ninetie six foot in depth To this army they joyned half that number of light-armed souldiers called Psyllagi which fought from afarre off with flying and casting-weapons and were ordered into battalia behind the Phalanx in equall front but that their files were but eight deep in the same order and with the same officers And when they were to begin the battel they passed through the intervalls and assailed the enemy when the armies were drawn so near each other as to come to the shock they retreated by the same intervalls into their places behind the heavy-armed and over their heads poured a showre of stones darts and arrows upon their enemies and fortified the depth of the Phalanx to sustein the shock being now of 24 men in depth The fifth figure Concerning the cavalrie they alwayes placed them on the wings and whether it were the cavalrie or the infantery they changed the form of their order according to the site of the places or to the number of the enemies forces with whom they had to do or to the order wherein they were ranged into battalia enlarging the front by lessening the depth doubling their front by the half files as Cyrus did in the battel which he fought agaist Cresus for fearing to be overwinged he made his files which were 24 deep but 12 and so augmented the front of his army by the one half Besides they made use of severall orders of battalia according to occasions as the Orb and the light-armed in the middle to sustein a strong charge on all parts or the Wedge the better to enter into a battalion or a Half-moon to enclose or overwing and others which are of no great use in these times And that they might not confound themselves in such orders when occasions served they had publick Schools where all the younger sort of men went to exercise themselves which they called Gymnasia and had Masters to teach the use of arms and motions called Tactici Now to perform all the motions they allowed to every souldier six foot of ground square and for fight three foot and to sustein a violent charge they serried them so as they took up but a foot and a half By this means it was that so many small Commonwealths of the Grecians maintained their liberties so long have performed so brave actions having repulsed so great armies with so small forces and having even planted their tropheys in Asia and elsewhere untill their divisions overthrew them which Philip dextrously laying hold on brought them to subjection and after that Alexander his sonne with them and their Militia conquered a great part of the world It is true indeed that the constitution of those Commonwealths was more proper for a happy mainteining of their liberty then to encrease themselves for howsoever they all addicted themselves to arms so that none were exempted from them yet their poverty and the small number of souldiers of every Commonwealth apart by it self hindred them from making any great progresse so did their divisions it being a hard matter that so many sovereigne Common-wealths should agree together unlesse it were in a common necessity to defend themselves as they did divers times against the Persians but not for a conquest where men cannot agree neither about places of command nor about sharing of what is gotten Concerning their retrenched camp which they called Aplectos they chose rather strong sites then that they fortified them by industry neither had they any certain form as the Romans had but according to the advantage of places they fortified one part more then another and hereof there is nothing certain to be found in writing amongst ancient Authours The Militarie discipline of the Romanes CHAP. I. Of the election of souldiers and their arms ROmulus having built the citie of Rome divided it into centuries and militarie orders every body conteined foure thousand foot and three hundred horse Now because the most valiant were chosen it was called Legio which signifieth as much as a select company The citie being more populous by the addition of the Sabines the Legions were doubled which then became to be of six thousand foot and six hundred horse yet after that they have been of a greater number Tullus Hostilius third king of the Romanes established military exercise and distinguished all the people into five Classes or orders They of the first Classis as being the richest were bound to mount and arm themselves to serve on horseback The three following Classes were imployed on foot and according to their means were Hastati Principes or Triarii and were
the Hastati must then fight at so wide a distance that between two files they might receive two other files which sheweth the weaknesse of this first order which being so ranged in battalia could not be able to repulse nor sustein the adverse battallion And even the files being at so wide a distance from each other were not able to keep themselves right in fight nor to observe their distances but in the other way there are many conveniences to be found First many bodies of a hundred and twenty men apiece or thereabouts assaulting a battallion they may very well defeat it at the worst they may retreat without disordering themselves or loosing their distances And the second order which is embattelled behind the first just over against their intervalls may easily fill them as also in case of necessity the third body may supply those distances which are reserved for them renewing the fight three times And that which confirmeth us the more in this opinion is that in reason it ought to be so next the description of the battel of Zama which Scipio fought against Hannibal where it is said that Scipio to hinder Hannibals elephants from routing his souldiers caused the Cohorts of the Principes which were placed just over against the intervalls of the Hastati to stand just behind them so to leave streets for the passage of the elephants which sheweth plainly that the order of battalia was disposed by Cohorts and not by files I speak not of the Velites in this order of battalia nor of all other light-armed souldiers because they fought not but with casting-weapons and afar off and when the armies approched to give the shock they retired themselves behind the heavie-armed Now to form the said order I will say that the file was alwayes of ten men in depth that a Cohort or Maniple of a Legion of foure thousand two hundred men consisted alwayes of one hundred and twentie souldiers and consequently the Cohort made ten ranks and twelve files conteining at six foot square of ground for every souldier seventy two foot in breadth and sixty in depth and the moity of it when they were at three foot distance The first figure of a Cohort This figure in the Authours copy hath 13 files 11 ranks which I conceioee to be a mistake In each of the three orders howsoever the Legions were weaker or stronger there were alwayes ten Cohorts or Maniples but the Cohorts were either increased or diminished according to the proportion of the Legions The second figure of ten Cohorts The two first orders are of an equall number and the last of half as many and by this example of one Legion you may see how all the troups passed into each other The third figure of a Legion I conceive that between the Legions there was a far greater distance then between the Cohorts that so they might prevent confusion amongst them which I judge to be so necessary as that without the observation thereof it was altogether impossible to observe any good order Concerning the cavalry seeing it was divided into the like number of troups as the Infantery it is like they fought in the same order but the one half were on the right flank and the other on the left Thus the army was composed of six great bodies namely foure bodies of infantery and two bodies of the cavalry and every body divided into small troups as hath been shewed before The order of Battalia of a complete Army The fourth figure So in this figure the intervalls should be 4 times wider if the bodies must be so large but I conceive a generall mistake in the figure and that in Praissac pag. 190. to be much better CHAP. IX Of Sieges NO Romane Commander hath made braver sieges then Cesar nor described them more perfectly He hath left examples for the assailing of all sorts of sites and to maintein a siege against all kinds of reliefs At Brundusium which is upon the sea he constrained Pompey to abandon it for that he shut up the haven by which that town was to be relieved At Cadenac which was a site inexpugnable he constrained the garrison to yield it by taking away their water At Alexia where were 80000 souldiers within the town and which expected two or three times as many he so fortified himself before it both against the town and against the enemy without as he famished it And at Bourges and Marseilles he took the first by assault and constrained the other to yield when it was upon the point of being taken by assault I will not here particularize the engines which they then made use of to force places of strength because the cannon hath taken away the use of them Yet I will onely say that they approched to the walls by degrees as much sheltred as they could and then attempted to batter them down by their engines or by mines to force an assault or at least to lodge upon the breach which I the rather speak to shew that howsoever we have changed the manner of fortifications the better to make resistance against our new thundring engines neverthelesse the ancient maximes for the taking of towns are the same which we make use of at this day Concerning the siege of Alexia it is the modell by which the Prince of Parma the Prince of Orange and the Marquesse Spinola have directed themselves to make theirs And all these great works and circumvallations which we admire and by the help of which they have taken many great cities in sight of greater armies then their own which have not been able to relieve them are nothing in comparison of those which Cesar made at this siege of Alexia To conclude they which come nearest to the manner of warring of the ancient Romanes as well in sieges as in the field are they which prove the most excellent Commanders CHAP. X. Observations vpon some battels of the ancients NOw that we have shewed the ancient Militia of the Grecians and Romanes by means whereof they have obteined so many brave victories we must yet observe two principall causes which their most excellent Commanders have successefully observed to obtein victories in battel namely to strive to overwing their enemy and never to cause their army to fight all at once Cyrus to keep himself from being overwinged in the battel which he fought against Cresus doubled the front of his army by as many more as they were by making the files of his infantery but 12 deep which before were 24 and to enclose his enemy he placed his best men on the wings who having defeated the wings of the adverse army came to assault the body of the battel on their flanks and on their rear At the battel of Cannae Hannibal placed all his best souldiers on the wings and the meaner ones in the middle that so the Romanes finding but little resistance there might insensibly sink into them and by that means they
sorts of offensive arms there be but three much in use namely the pistol sword and carabine The Spaniards onely have continued some few companies of lances which they keep rather for gravitie then reason for the lance doth no effect but by the violence of the carreir of the horse and besides there is but one rank which can make use of it so that their order must be to fight by single ranks which cannot resist the squadrons and if they should fight in squadrons they would rather be troublesome then serviceable And for musketiers on horseback or dragones they are also in a manner left off for that in the civil warres they ruined the Infantery every man desiring to have a nag that so he might be the fitter to rob and pillage neverthelesse some well-ordered troups of this kind in an armie are of very great service either for executions to gain bad passages to guard the quarters of horse or else on a day of battel to cause them to dismount as forlorn hopes before the squadrons of Cavalrie Now the Cavalrie must be proportioned with the Infantery which may be distinguished according to the situation of the countrey where the warre is made or else according to the enemy against whom you are to fight For if you you be in a champain full of forrage and if ye be to make warre against a great Cavalrie as that of the Turk in such a case you must fortifie your self with the greater number of horse But if the warre be in a countrey enclosed either by mountains forrests moores or hedges and ditches and that hath many fortified places for that the warre is rather reduced to sieges then to battels and field-combats in such a case you must strengthen your Infanterie And these two bodies are so necessary the one for the other as an armie cannot be held to be good nor subsist unlesse it be equally provided of both Neverthelesse if I were not induced by some extraordinary reason I would make the proportion of my army for the open countrey of a fourth part of horse to three fourth parts of Infantery as to twentie foure thousand foot eight thousand horse in an inclosed countrey of a sixth part of horse to five parts of foot as to twentie foure thousand foot foure thousand horse It remaineth to give to these two bodies such arms as were before mentioned with the most profitable proportion The Swisses have many more pikes then muskets and for this they have made themselves to be much feared in a champain countrey for in a day of battel where you come to hand the number of pikes hath much advantage of that of muskets Other nations do equally divide the pikes and muskets and because the war in these times is reduced to sieges rather then battels we desire to have a greater number of muskets then of pikes For my self which adde the targets to them my opinion should be to have the regiments of 1440 souldiers namely of 600 pikes 600 muskets and 240 targets For the Cavalrie I would proportion it after this manner I would compose the regiments of 500 horse whereof I would arm 400 with Cuirassiers arms 50 with carabines and 50 to be dragones But this is not all to provide good arms for your souldiers unlesse you oblige them to wear them it being an unsufferable shame to see their delicatenesse in these times and how they disesteem them and to cover this fault they publish that it is want of courage to go armed and that they will go in their doublets into the most dangerous places aswell as they which are armed It is not enough to go into a place to cause ones self there to be knocked on the head we should go thither to conquer and not to be beaten Besides this inconvenience groweth of it that if you use not your self to wear your arms you are so pestered with them as you cannot fight in them on the contrary if you accustome your self to them they are no more troublesome to you and you are at as much libertie in them as if you were in your doublet But the greatest mischief that cometh of it is that the ruine of military discipline followeth on it which a good Captain ought to cause to be exactly observed in every part For if he slacken it in one or in favour of some persons the consequences which follow on it by little and little will be such as they will wholly overthrow it and then he shall find himself without obedience and without respect which he shall never recover without incurring the hatred of those whom he hath too much spared it being most certain that it is easier to prevent a mischief then to help it when it is befallen CHAP. III. Of Militarie Discipline BEsides that which hath been said to incite every one to take upon him the profession of arms rather then any other we must make other observations to make a man worthy thereof which consist in three things namely in the recompense of commendable actions in the punishment of bad ones and in the continuall and exact exercise of militarie discipline for there is no profession in the world which hath more need of such helps then that of warre where for the single pay which hardly affordeth livelyhood and with which the meanest artisan would not be contented the souldier abandoneth himself to all sorts of perils and labours but none are instigated thereunto unlesse it be by emulation of honour or by licence to do evil and as the first aim is vertuous so you shall have good service of such as enter into it for that end But of the other you shall reap nothing but shame for in stead of a good and obedient army you shall find that you have no better then a troup of pillaging rogues which without order or obedience forsake you either after a good boot-haling or in any eminent danger For this reason the election of souldiers is a better way of forming an army then onely to receive voluntaries where all the vagabonds and evil livers and such as cannot live but by robbing cause themselves to be enrolled Therefore to incite such as are vertuous to well-doing and to deterre the vitious from doing evil recompenses and punishments are principally necessary The Romanes have made very profitable use of these two means and if we follow not their way we shall never have good nor well-disciplined souldiers It matters not though we use not the very same remunerations and the same punishments they did it sufficeth that they be equivalent that so we may receive the same benefit by them and these things are diversly done according to time and custome The principall is to be an exact observer of them that so the remunerations may excite brave men to worthy actions and the rigour of punishment may keep cowards from doing basely The manner of decimating the souldiers which the Romanes had is held to be cruel neverthelesse there
those of Autun from affording him such provisions as they had promised he acquainteth Divitiacus with it being his great friend and brother to Dumnorix who confesseth it intercedeth for him and obteineth his pardon After that having learned that the Suisses were incamped at the foot of a hill he causeth it to be viewed and finding it to be of easie accesse he sendeth Labienus thither causing him to march all night to gain the top of the hill and in the morning having put his forces into battalia he dispatcheth Considius to discover who having taken the allarm of Labienus returneth to Cesar that the enemy had seised the top of the hill which stayed him that day from defeating the Suisses The day following he taketh the way of Beaulne to distribute corn to his armie which the Suisses perceiving Bibracte follow him Cesar seeing them coming possesseth himself of a hill embattelleth his army about the middle of the descent on the top he quartereth two new levied legions and all the baggage alighteth and sendeth away his horse and causeth all the rest to do the like to shew them that they must overcome or die The Suisses charge him he defeateth them and pursueth them hotly forbiddeth those of Langres to assist them with victuall Lingones and in the end constraineth them to submit to his discretion He disarmeth them receiveth hostages and forceth them to return to inhabit their countrey and reedifie their houses And of three hundred sixtie eight thousand persons whereof there were ninetie two thousand bearing arms there returned in all but an hundred and ten thousand Observations THe resolution of this people which seemeth to be barbarous and which for the bad successe is universally condemned hath neverthelesse the same principles which all Conquerours have namely the desire of command and enlarging themselves and they are remarkable in their forecast of three yeares preparation in their constancie for not deficting from their designe after the death of their Generall and in the execution thereof burning their goods and houses to the end they might leave themselves no hope of safetie but onely in the sharpnesse of their swords Whence we may gather that we ought not to undertake any great designe timorously nor to look to the means of escape but rather of overcoming For if in the beginning of a dangerous designe you make known a way of escape the impatience or naturall timorousnesse of men maketh them find out that way upon the least accident that befalleth And if the Suisses had not met with the incomparable virtue of Cesar who by his valour industrie diligence and good fortune stayed their furie they might have atteined the scope of their enterprises In the managing of his warre Caesar hath shewed as in all other that that which hath made him fortunate in his exploits hath principally been his invariable order of encamping strongly alwayes entrenching himself that so he might never be compelled to fight but when he pleased and that he might lay hold on such occasions as offered themselves to defeat his enemies also his providence in taking care that his provision of victuall failed not and his continuall keeping of his souldiers in exercise and in breath to make them able to execute his designes readily and in good order The pardon of Dumnorix is observable his naturall clemency induced him to it suffering himself to be overcome by the intreaties of his brother Divitiacus whom he loved Neverthelesse he caused heed to be taken to his deportments that so he might receive no new inconveniences by him afterward The errour of Considius sheweth how much it concerneth to send men of experience to discover an army And the commanding of the Suisses to return and reinhabite their countrie was an act of prudence thereby hindering the Germanes being a most powerfull nation from preoccupation thereof and by that means their neighbourbood to Provence The second warre THe subject of the second warre was this The division of the Auvergnats and Autunois puissant people in Gallia had called in the Germanes Averni Aedui by the help of which the first had overcome the other neverthelesse they all found themselves oppressed and the conquerours much more then the conquered for these were discharged for some tribute and hostages and from the other the Germans took away the greatest part of their lands insomuch that all seeing themselves subdued they hold an assembly of States by the permission of Cesar to desire his aid which he promiseth But having sent to Ariovistus the Generall of the Germanes to this end he received replies so insolent that at last they fell fowl where Cesar defeated him and chaced both him and all the Germanes out of Gallia forcing them to passe the Rhine again These two wars were finished in one summer Observations VVHereby we may observe how dangerous such auxiliarie succours are especially when you require them of a people more powerfull then your own Cesar hath indeed driven out Ariovistus but the Gauls have done nothing but changed maister He imbarked himself in this war for two reasons the first because be suspected that this puissant nation taking footing in Gallia might come to gain upon Provence and so draw near to Italy and the other that thereby he insinuated himself insensibly into the conquest of the said Gauls Which businesse he managed so dextrously by enterteining their divisions amongst them that by the aid of the one he conquered the other and in the end subdued all We must further observe his diligence so much recommended in all his actions to possesse himself of Besancon having prevented his enemies and by this means provided for the nourishment of his armie There it was that a panike fear seised upon his souldiers which began by the voluntiers who desiring to depart discouraged the rest that so they might cover their own shame by the generall delinquencie of the armie which is a most dangerous thing and whereof a Generall of an army ought to take extraordinary care never to hazard any battel untill he hath recovered his souldiers spirits again which Cesar did at this time by making an oration to them wherein he excelled He further helped himself as many other commanders especially Marius by encamping strongly before this terrible armie and making his souldiers know by small skirmishes that their enemies were not invincible nor more valiant then themselves and causing them to conceive that joyning order and militarie discipline to the prudence of their Generall they were their superiours For the Romanes have never conquered other nations by their great number nor by their valour but by their knowledge in warre which they alwayes exercised by the observation of their order and entrenchment of their camp Whereupon we must consider that Ariovistus being encamped between Cesar and the place from whence he had his victuall and that Cesar not being able to draw him to battel in five dayes after that he had well fortified that
had foreseen them which he made to appear to good purpose in this great tempest which shattered all his ships and would have driven any but himself to desperation Thirdly though he were renowned for the Captain which best knew how to make use of his victories and which hath pursued them homest he would not do it here because he was in an unknown countrey and his camp not as yet well fortified Let us consider also that howsoever the scarcity of corn compelled him contrary to his custome to cause his army to make their winter-garrisons in severall places and not all together to the end that they might with more facility be furnished with victuall yet he did it with such judgement as that the places where they quartered were not so far distant but that they could easily relieve each other nor so near but they held divers States in obedience Neverthelesse the successe sheweth us evidently that it is not so good as to be quartered in an intire body because it is easier to assail a small troop then a great which gave encouragement to the Gauls to revolt and to assail the camp of Sabinus Cotta where the artificiall oration of Ambiorix perswading them that the revolt was so generall that at the same instant all the other camps were assaulted and could not relieve each other put them into such a confusion in matter of counsel that fear made them choose the worst which was to forsake their camp and retreat Whence we may learn That he never speedeth well that followeth the counsels of an enemy and That a retreat in view of the enemy is the most dangerous action that can be undertaken Cicero his resistance â—ithiâ— his camp which refused to follow his enemies counsel and resolved to defend himself within his trenches proved for his safetie and great glory and gave time to Cesar to relieve him wherein there be two things remarkable The first of Cesar who having understood that the Gauls came towards him to give him battel finding himself weak maketh choice of an advantageous place fortifieth it maketh his camp very small to the end he might the better defend it and make his enemies believe that he was exceeding weak whom after they had many times provoked him to fight they began to disregard which begot a neglect of all order amongst them so that they assaulted him ever after disorderly having thus lulled them asleep on a day he chargeth them so furiously that he defeateth them without resistance And Labâ—enus one of his Lieutenants by a like stratageme did the like to Induciomarus The second of the Gauls who not being able to force the camp of Cicero shut him up by a retrenchment which conteined ten miles in circuit made in three houres and by men which had nothing to dig with but their swords and nothing to carry earth with but their clothes which argueth they were a great multitude and sheweth what may be done by armies well regulated and well provided The eighth warre The VI. Book CEsar perceiving the affairs of the Gauls to incline to warre fortifieth himself by three Romane Legions and as many other souldiers as he could get which fell out very happily for him for after the death of Induciomarus the Trevois put their government into the hands of his kindred which made league with all that would revolt and particularly with Ambiorix whereof Cesar being advertised joyns foure legions together in winter surprises those of Tournay forceth them to yield deliver hostages And in the spring following causeth the Gauls to assemble at Paris Lutetia from whence on the same day that the assembly brake up he goeth and assaulteth those of Sens Senones Carnutes then those of Chartres who finding themselves surprised yield From thence he prepareth to set upon Ambiorix and those of Triers but first he laboureth to draw away from them their allies To which end he discardeth all his baggage which he commits to Labienus who was in the countrey of Triers with two legions to guard it and himself with five goeth to assail the Gauls For execution whereof he divided his army into three parts for that he well knew they were not able to dispute the champain with him and so burnt and pillaged their countrie that he constrained them to yield to deliver hostages and to forsake Ambiorix At the same time they of Triers assail Labienus who making a shew of fear and retreating as if he had fled draweth them in disorder into places of disadvantage where he defeateth them and taketh the very citie of Triers This expedition being finished Cesar maketh a bridge over the Rhine and passeth it they of Cullen adhere to him he fortifieth his camp and maketh provision of victuall attempteth to compell the Suevians to battel but seeing them retreat into vast and deep forrests he forbeareth to pursue them repasseth the Rhine cutteth off on the Germane side onely 120 foot of his bridge maketh a good tower on the end thereof at the other end on the side of Gallia he buildeth a fort leaving twelve cohorts to guard that and the said bridge In this place Cesar maketh a description of the manners and customes of the Gauls and the Germanes That done he goeth to continue the warre against Ambiorix and the better to surprise him he sendeth L. Minutius Basilius before with all the cavalrie forbidding him the making any fire in his camp to the end his approch might be undiscovered by which means he thought to have seised upon Ambiorix who saved himself miraculously by flying from one place to another Cesar the better to follow him conveys again his baggage into a castle of the Liegeois called Vatucca Eburones Wachtendonck for guard whereof he left Q. Tullius Cicero with one legion commanding him for seven dayes the time which his expedition would take up to look carefully to his guards and not to stirre out of his trenches Then divided he his army into three parts to harrasse all that countrey who meeteth with nothing in the form of an army to oppose him insomuch that his greatest care was to prevent that his souldiers covetous of booty straggled not too far abroad for fear of being cut off by the enemies which lay hidden in forrests and boggs The report reached presently to the other side of the Rhine that Cesar exposed the countrey of Gueldres to pillage Menapii which occasioned the Westfalians to participate of the booty Sicambri they presently get together two thousand horse passe the Rhine pillage without resistance are so well pleased with tast thereof that they resolve to set upon the Romane camp when by misfortune that day being the seventh from Cesars departing Cicero which had observed his command very exactly and having no news nor suspecting an enemie suffered himself by the importunity of his souldiers to give way to them to forrage and at the same instant was unexpectedly assaulted by the
Westfalians against whom he had much ado to defend himself untill that his souldiers returning from forrage part of them made their way through the enemies and regained the camp but the rest were cut in pieces Neverthelesse this relief bereft the enemies of all hope of forcing the camp and so they returned to their countrey with their bootie A while after arrived Cesar who rebuked Cicero for transgressing his command Then he resolveth afresh to expose the countrey of Gueldres to fire and sword and to pursue Ambiorix who had yet escaped after that he sendeth his army to garrison which he supplieth with corn and then goeth into Italy Observations IN this warre Cesar had no great resistance all fleeing before him having nothing to do but to pillage and burn the countrey notwithstanding there be very good observations to be made thereupon for though you learn not hence how to fight a battel or to expugne fortresses yet you may here learn how to deal with such as save themselves by flight and by retiring into inaccessible places wherein many Commanders have failed for the not observing of three principall things which Cesar did First to prevent the enemy by such extraordinary diligence as to surprise them before they be able to retire themselves or their victuall into the forrests so that by this means you may constrain the one to yield and the other to perish through famine The second to divide your army into as many parts as you can with safety that so assayling a countrey in severall places all at once the inhabitants thereof will be doubtfull to what part to retire unto And the last is to hinder the souldiers from disbanding when they go to pillage for fear they be cut off by the enemies By which oversight many great inconveniences have often befallen conquering armies which should teach us never to slacken the severity of military discipline though we believe our selves far from an enemie and in great security The example we have in this book of Q. Cicero is excellent in that kind who received a great losse and had like to have been utterly defeated by suffering himself to be perswaded by the importunity of his souldiers which contrary to Cesars command would needs go out of their trenches to forrage We 〈◊〉 further see the difference between old souldiers and new who for want of experience knew not how to choose what was for their safety and honour but retreated to a hill and there were cut in pieces but the other knowing there was no safetie but by recovering the camp made their way with their swords and saved both themselves and their camp Here we may observe how ingenious sear is to seek out subjects to augment it self for because this place was the same where Titurius and Cotta had been defeated the yeare before they took it for an ill omen Let us further observe that Cesar when he would make an expedition for seven or eight dayes wh re was diligence required discharged himself of his baggage which in truth is a marvellous impediment in a champain it is impossible to conduct an army well if according to occasions you do not strongly intrench your camp or march without baggage Let us also admire the good intelligence Cesar had by spies a thing of such utilitie as that a Prince or Generall ought to spare no cost for it being the most powerfull means to undertake brave designes and to avoid great ruines Neither must we forget his dexterity in dividing those which were entring into a combination against him and his assaulting them severally nor his customary d ligence in surprising them having atteined to the end of the most part of his great designes by these wayes We will conclude the observations of this book with the stratageme of Labienus who desirous to fight with those of Triers before the G rmanes were joyned to them resolved to make it publickly believed that he was afraid of them and that he would retreat knowing right well that there were Gauls in his own army which would discover it to them and in the mean time gave order secretly to retreat with a great noise making shew of much fear whereof they of Triers having intelligence without staying for the Germanes conceiving they ought not to let slip the occasion which offered it self unto them passed the river and came disorderly as to an assured victory but Labienus turneth upon them in good order and defeateth them Yet would I not counsel you at any time to attempt such a stratageme with new-levied souldiers which usually are fearfull when they see men running towards them and without order which on the contrary assureth those which are experienced The ninth warre The VII Book THe affairs of Gallia quieted Cesar goeth into Italy according to his custome where he heareth of the death of Piso and the garboils of Rome which gave new occasion to the Gauls of revolting Chartres began the Auvergnats followed and at length many others Vercingetorix an Auvergnat is chosen Generall for all Cesar hearing this cometh away in the depth of winter Gaballi passeth the mountains of Genaudan covered with snow and appeareth in Auvergne before it was known that he was come from Jtaly which caused many to hold for him and startled those which were revolted With the same diligence he passeth into Burgundy and Champaigne where he assembleth his army cometh to Berry and besiegeth it Bituriges and taketh Vellaudunum from whence he takes 600 hostages then forceth Gien or Orleans where was made a great slaughter Vercingetorix Genabis seeing the successe of his enemie and conceiving his army insufficient to deal with him in the field endeavoureth to conquer him by taking away all means of subsistence and to this purpose burneth more then twenty towns Avaricum preserving onely Bourges and that too against his advise Cesar besieged it where he suffered much and found himself in great difficulties and necessities at length having overcome them he taketh the town putteth to the sword fourty thousand men there refresheth his army During this siege he attempted to surprise Vercingetorix his camp but was repulsed yet was not discouraged at all with all this ill successe but continueth the warre with much resolution and prudence and Vercingetorix to hinder his enemie from passing the river of Alier Elaver breaketh down all the bridges neverthelesse Cesar making shew to passe in one place taketh advantage to do it in another then goeth and besiegeth Clairmont Gergobia Vercingetorix encampeth on the other side where were many assaults and brave combats neverthelesse Cesar is constrained to quit the siege whether for that he made doubt of taking the town or whether to prevent the revolt of the Autunois artificially procured by Litavicus who having procured himself to be chosen Commander of a relief sent to Cesar being but ten leagues from him pretended to have received news from the army that all the
After that the Centurions chose their Vexillarii which are the Ensignes of our times and there were two of them in every Cohort Then they chose twentie Tergiductores which were Rear-commanders of the troups so that in every Cohort there were two commanders for the front and two for the rear CHAP. II. The division of a Legion of 4200 foot and 300 horse A Legion was alwayes divided into five bodies namely the Infantery into foure bodies called Velites Hastati Principes Triarii and the Cavalrie into one Every body was divided into ten troups which amongst the Infantery were called Cohorts or Maniples and amongst the Cavalrie were called Turmes In the three first orders of Infanterie were 1200 souldiers apiece each of which make ten troups of 120 souldiers and in the last namely the Triarii there were onely 600 men which make ten troups of 60 men apeece The body of Cavalrie was of 300 which maketh ten troups of thirtie souldiers apiece Amongst authours there is a diversitie in the names of Cohorts Centuries and Maniples which here do signifie one and the same thing but in some places of Titus Livius you may see the distinction from a Legion to a Cohort from a Cohort to a Centurie from a Centurie to a Maniple Which I conceive grew from this that when the Legions grew to be of 6000 and 7000 men they then made those subdivisions CHAP. III. Of marching WHen they were to march at the first sound of the trumpet they took down their pavilions and packed up the baggage at the second they loded it and at the third they parted away from their quarter But none were allowed to take down their pavilion untill the Consuls and Tribunes had taken down theirs The extraordinaries marched first then the right wing of the Allies and their baggage in their rear then the second Legion and their baggage after them then the left wing of the Allies and their baggage following them the cavalrie was in the van and rear and sometimes in the flanks thereafter as the enemy was to be suspected Every Romane Legion with one wing of the Allies marched in the van by turns that so every one might have the commoditie of arriving first at the camp If in the march there were greater suspicion on the rear then on the van or on the flanks they strengthened themselves there accordingly This was their ordinary manner of marching but I find in Cesar that when he marched in an enemies territories and particularly in a countrey inclosed with hedges and woods he made all the Legions to march in one body then all the baggage together leaving onely some new-levied troups on the rear thereof to guard it When the army marched in three equidistant bodies namely all the Hastati aswell Romanes as Allies together having their baggage before them then the Principes and Triarii in the same order the extraordinaries and cavalrie were to be on the flanks and on the van to secure the baggage or at least on those parts where the most danger was And being so ordered when an occasion of fight befell on what part soever it were on a sudden all the troups could be drawn out very easily without being troubled by the baggage to go and affront the enemy When the army drew near to the quarter the Tribunes and Centurions ordained for that work marched before to consider of the site of the camp Which being made choice of they first marked out the place for the Consuls lodging or of the Generall with a white banner then they distinguished his lodging from others by a red banner then with a second red banner they marked out the Tribunes quarters then with a third they divided and distinguished the lodgings of the Legions from the fore-mentioned ones after that they gave to every one their proportion of ground which they marked with banners of other colours then with a line they quickly marked out and divided all the lodgings because they never changed the measures nor form of the camp and that they were exceeding well accustomed thereunto by having alwayes the same way of encamping When the army arrived every troup took notice of their lodging by the marks and banners so that all went to them without confusion and without mistaking CHAP. IV. Of embattelling the Army THey quartered their foure bodies of Velites Hastati Principes and Triarii under the name onely of the three last and they divided and intermixed the Velites amongst the three other bodies as may be seen in that which followeth Hastati 1200 Velites joyned with the Hastati 480  1680 Principes 1200 Velites joyned with the Principes 480  1680 Triarii 600 Velites joyned with the Triarii 240  840 The Romanes allowed ten foot square of ground to lodge two souldiers insomuch that allowing 100 foot breadth of ground and 1000 in depth there was sufficient to lodge 2000 souldiers and so ten cohorts of Hastati which made but 1680 souldiers were lodged sufficiently and had room enough besides for their baggage The same proportion of ground was allowed to the Principes because they consisted of the same number And the moity of that ground was given to the Triarii because their number was but the half of that To the cavalrie they allowed for thirty horses 100 foot square and for 100 Turms 100 foot in breadth and 100 foot in depth apiece For the allies they allowed the same proportion of ground to their infantery as they did to the Romane legions but because the Consul took the fifth part of the legions of the allies near to himself they cut off also the fifth part of ground in this place which they allowed them elsewhere Concerning the cavalrie of the allies it was alwayes double to that of the Romanes but the Consul taking a third part of thē to lodge round about him there remained in the ordinary lodgings but one fourth part more of them then of the Romanes and because the space of ground was more then sufficient for them their ground was not inlarged but they had 100 foot in breadth and 100 foot in depth as the Romanes This quarter was divided by five streets each of them of fifty foot in breadth and divided in the middle by a street called Quintana of the same length as the other At the front of the quarter there was a great street of 100 foot broad next which the twelve Tribunes were lodged just over against the two Romane legions and the twelve Prefects were quartered just over against the two legions of allies there was 50 foot square allowed to each of these lodgings Then there was the Consuls lodging called the Praetorium which conteined 200 foot square and was placed in the middle of the breadth of the camp On the right and left hand of the Consuls lodging there were two void places the one for the market-place the other for the Questor On each side of these they lodged the 400 horse and 1630
it had failed It must be observed that here onely one Tribune is mentioned which causeth me to believe that the two Tribunes which had the authority for two moneths time did agree to command every day by turns Concerning the guard it was kept day and night and the foure and twentie houres were divided into eight watches First the Consul was guarded by his ordinary Cohort then every body made their guard round about his lodging and besides there were three guards kept one at the Questors lodging and the two other at the lodgings of the Consuls two Lieutenants The Tergiductours or Rear-commanders ordered the guards which drew by lot which should begin first and they which were to begin were led to the Tribune which then commanded who gave them the order of the guard and besides that a little tablet with a mark and all the guards were set after the same manner The rounds were made by the Cavalrie whereof the chief officer commanded foure for the day and foure for the night the first went and took their orders from the Tribune who gave them in writing what guards they were to visit The relieving and visiting of the guards was done eight times in foure and twentie houres at the sound of the trumpet and the first Centurion of the Triarii had the charge to cause them to march when occasion served When the trumpet gave them warning the foure forementioned souldiers drew lots and he to whom it fell to begin took some of his friends with him and if in going the round he found the guards in good order he onely took from them the mark which the Tribune had given them and carried it him back again next morning But if he found the guard abandoned or any sentinels asleep or any other disorder he made his report thereof to the Tribune with his witnesses and presently a councel was called to prove the offense and to punish the delinquent according to his desert The Velites made the guard round about the retrenchment on the outside and inside of it and at the gates The Allies had the same order We find not in writing the number of their Corps-du-guards how they placed their Sentinels round about the camp and how many a day were free from the Guard CHAP. VI. Of punishments and rewards NOne but the Consul could condemne any to death and he had this authoritie as well over the principall commanders of the army as over the meanest souldiers thereof The Tribunes administred military justice which was rigourously practiced The manner of their ordinary punishing was thus So soon as the Tribune had touched the partie condemned with a staff or a rod every souldier laid on upon him with cudgels or battered him with stones and oftentimes before he could get out of the camp he was killed but yet if he escaped he was not received into his countrey again and none of his kindred durst give him enterteinment He that opposed or neglected the orders given for the guard or for the rounds or other service concerning the securitie of the camp or falsely pretended to have done some signall act or had forsaken the place where he had been placed or had lost his arms in the battel or had stolen any thing in the camp or born false witnesse or else had forsaken his ensigne was punished after this manner as also he which committed smaller faults thrice If it happened that many Legions or one Legion or a grosse troup had run away they were punished two wayes the more rigourous way was to make them all draw lots and to punish every tenth man or more or fewer according to the exigence of the cause by this means all were partakers of the fear and a small number of them were punished The more gentle way was to cause them to lodge without the camp and to give them barley in stead of wheat which was a mark of ignominie which many troups have wiped out by performing valourous and memorable acts Concerning their rewards they excited those souldiers by honourable acknowledgements and publick commendations in presence of all the rest which had performed some valourous and extraordinary act Besides that to him that had wounded an enemy in some light skirmish or that voluntarily had gone and assaulted him they gave a dart To him which had killed and disarmed him if he were one that served on foot they gave a target if he were a horseman a horse-furniture To him that at the assault of a town was first got up upon the wall they gave a crown which they called Muralis to him which had rescued a Romane citizen a crown called Civica which was set upon his head by him which was so rescued whom he respected and honoured all his life after as his father The commanders had also their shares of honour by the severall triumphs which they obteined according to the greatnesse of their actions and the felicitie of their victories CHAP. VII Of their Pay COncerning their pay It began not untill three hundred fourty eight years after the foundation of Rome before that every souldier armed and victualled himself at his own charge which was no hard thing in those times because their warre was then extended no further then Rome But when they began to go out of Italy it was necessary to give them pay which at the beginning was very small afterwards it encreased as the Romane empire grew in greatnesse I will not trouble my self to make the valuation of it according to our money it being a thing of no utility onely I will say that the souldiers pay must be so proportioned as he may maintein himself well thereby I will further observe here that the Romanes charged themselves with the furnishing of bread apparel arms and tents for all their souldiers and besides barley for the horsemens horses abating these things out of their pay which I find to be a good order and above all things necessary to make an army subsist for besides that the greater part of souldiers are bad husbands and such as if a care be not taken will never be well clothed nor well fed it is impossible that a souldier should everywhere find bread to be bought and that he should carry all things with him which he standeth in need of CHAP. VIII Of their order of battalia THere is a diversitie of opinions about the order of battel of the Romanes Some would have it that when the Hastati be not able to sustein the enemies charge in their retreat they should fall into the order of the Principes by files and both they into the order of the Triarii and so to renew the fight three times Others will have it to be done by troups whereof I conceive there is much the greater probability holding the first way not onely impossible to be put in practice but also most dangerous the other exceeding feisible and profitable For to fall one into another in that maner by files
must be inforced to begin their work anew as ofttimes as you overthrow it insomuch as the besieger finding himself so enterteined he approcheth with much more ceremonie and at last his souldiers draw back So that in my opinion it is very fit that the besieged should make frequent sallies but they must make them at severall houres that so they may the better surprise the enemy with few men but resolute to avoid the disorder in the retreat and to do no other thing but what is commanded For though you find not resistance at the falling on as is usuall if you stay to little purpose you runne the hazard to be ill led off at the retreat The other particularities of defense depend upon those of assailing the besiegers teaching you by necessitie what you are to do wherein there is nothing but practice and experience which can well direct you CHAP. XIII Of Artillery IT is fit to speak of Artillery after sieges since it is principally by means thereof that towns are taken and that since this hath been in use there are no places found impregnable if they be not inaccessible It hath changed all the form and matter of fortifications for in stead of towers and ancient walls which have not been able to resist it we now make bulwarks and other works of earth We may say that it hath even in a manner altered the manner of making warre Anciently they began their approches to towns where now we end them for on the first day they lodged on the brim of the moat and now adayes we must go a great way before we come at it then the circumvallation was made out of reach of arrows onely now they must be made beyond reach of cannon then it mattered not though the fortresses of the encamped armies were overtopped so as they had their other conveniences now-adayes there must be care taken above all things that they be not In those times two armies were quietly led in batalia at two or three hundred paces distance from each other and remained there whole dayes without being able to be dislodged but by a hazard of a general battel now one cannot be before another but out of the reach of the cannon otherwise he that hath most of them or that hath planted them best beateth out the other without fighting At that time a Generall of an army could know the order of his enemy at a near distance and form his own according to that seeking his advantages upon the defects of another and all without danger now these things can no more be observed but so farre off as you must rather trust to your own good order then upon any defect in that of your enemy Then one army could charge another without losing their order because they had not above two or three hundred paces to march in these times it is impossible to observe it in sight of the enemy for half a league together and to find a plain which shall be even and without hindrances Whereunto I adde further that without a great exercise of marching in battalia you are not able to march a thousand paces without losing all your distances of battalions and squadrons and by consequence without being in confusion Since therefore the cannon is of so great use in warre and hath so great a share in the victory it is necessary that you know how to make good use of it It is an engine which all cannot well imploy for it is of great expense and belongeth onely to great and puissant States to make ordinary use of them They tie them to a great charge for draught there being a hundred draught-horses required to draw one cannon for battery through all kinds of wayes and to shoot onely a hundred bullets By this you may judge according to the number which you mean to imploy what length of ground it taketh up To mannage one piece of battery well there must be eighteen men besides how many smiths carters farriers and other workmen must there be in the train to repair the carriages how many carpenters to make bridges how how many pioners to accommodate the high-wayes Briefly an army which carrieth cannon with it cannot march but leisurely and that which hath none can do no great effect therefore in these times the artillery is an essentiall part of an army but withall if the Generall suffereth himself to be approched too near without entrenching himself it is impossible for him to disintangle himself without fighting or losing it which cannot so happen without losing much of his reputation For this reason he ought to inform himself very particularly of all that dependeth on the artillery and that he may not be deceived he must know the least even of the smallest things namely of the mixture founding proportion weight calibre and carriage of what wood it must be how it must be conducted according to the severall wayes miry or mountainous how to passe rivers how to secure the batteries as well against the cannon of the enemy as against his sallies what ground the cannon must have for his reverse what distance between piece and piece in what manner the platform must be made at what distance the batteries are sufficient and other things whereof I do not here specifie the particulars because others have written of them It sufficeth me to shew the use of artillerie the chargeablenesse of it the turmoil of it and whereunto it engageth you to incite Generals not to rely upon others and to know the benefit and discommoditie thereof so well that they may make use of the one to their advantage and avoid the other by their foresight CHAP. XIV Of the baggage and pioners AFter the great turmoil of the artillery I will speak a word of that of the baggage It is a great shame to lose it but it is also a hard matter to preserve it when it is excessive there being nothing that bringeth so much disorder to an army therefore it is highly necessary to reduce it to the smallest proportion that may be and to make a review of it every moneth for it groweth in the twinkling of an eye We are so delicate now a dayes as we will hardly carry our arms much lesse would we carry a weeks victuall about us So long as such an abuse be suffered in an army it will make it self incapable to do any thing that is good For as in a battel he which can last preserve some troups which have not fought carrieth away the victory so he that last keepeth his army in health complete and accustomed to labour doth the like which he cannot do if the souldiers be so delicate as they cannot carry their baggage Besides that sicknesse and famine getteth not into an army but by this rascalliâ—ie of souldiers boyes and this thing which seemeth to be a thing of nothing is of such importance as it is for the most part the dissipation of the most flourishing yea I
alone are unprofitable If you make more quarters then there be generall officers the ancientest Captain commandeth in the quarter and therein taketh the most ancient quarter-master of his quarter Insomuch that the Generall of the horse giving his orders to the Commissary generall he to the Quarter-master generall and he to the other Quarter-masters which come for them from the other quarters where the same order is observed the commands are carried without confusion and passe through the hands of few persons and when there is any deficiency found it is easie to be verified whence it arose The infantery is the more solid body of an army that of the artillery and victuall alwayes are quartered with it There is not that diversitie between the companies which is between the horse they are all of the same fashion composed of half-pikes half-musketiers Many companies make a regiment which hath its commander and many regiments make a body which we call a Brigado of the army The army is usually divided into three bodies Vanguard Battel and Rearguard Every brigado hath its commander and besides it ought to have a Sergeant Major of a brigado and a Quarter-master of a brigado The first to go and take the orders from the Marshall of the field generall to carry them to the commander of his brigado then he giveth the word to the Sergeant Majors of the regiments and the other to give to every Quarter-master of a regiment either his quarter or the space of ground which is necessary for him to encamp in and he divideth it to the particular Quarter-masters or to the harbengers of every company which afterwards lodgeth them If there be a Colonel generall of all the infantery he may have a care in generall of all the government thereof but in an army he must onely command a brigado otherwise we should not be able to establish the order which we have propounded Moreover there be divers nations which do not judge a Colonell generall of the infantery to be necessary but content themselves with particular Colonels for every regiment which acknowledge onely the commands of the Generall or of his Marshall of the field generall The artillery ought to have a Generall a Lieutenant generall a Quarter-master then other officers And for that all pioners miners enginiers conductours of works smiths carpenters wheelwrights and other workmen depend on him I would establish a commander for every sort of these men which I would take either out of the commissaries of the artillery or other persons apart to addresse my self to them when I had need of such men The Quarter-master must every night go to receive the orders of the Marshall of the field generall The charge of the victuals ought to be performed by a Generall he ought to have his Lieutenant his Quarter-master and his other officers his Quarter-master must every evening go and take the orders of the Marshall of the field generall So then you see how the commands are distributed the Marshall of the field generall receiveth them from the Generall then goeth to his own lodging there the Commissary of horse cometh and receiveth them for the cavalry the Sergeant Major generall for the infantery who delivereth it to the Sergeant Majors of brigadoes for the artillery to the Quarter-master thereof and so to him for the victuals Briefly the Marshall of the field generall speaking with these foure persons giveth the orders to all the army All orders and commands ought to be given in writing The Marshall of the field generall the Generall of the artillery the Fiscall the Controller of the Exchequer the Generall of victuall the Quarter-master generall the Sergeant major generall and the Provost generall must alwayes be lodged within the Generalls quarter If all the army be encamped in bodies the Quarter-master generall giveth to each of these bodies the space of ground which is fitting which is afterwards distributed in every body by the officers thereunto appointed On a day of battel the Marshall of the field generall doth assigne the place for every body afterwards the Sergeant major generall rangeth the infantery into battalia The Marshall of the field generall ought to have three or foure assistants for the field to carry the extraordinary orders but they must not pretend to command any officer in chief unlesse they formerly have been either Colonels or Captains of horse The Sergeant major generall must command the Colonels but that they may the readilier obey him he ought to be taken out of the Colonels and none ought ever to have that place unlesse he hath been one as also the Sergeant majors of brigadoes ought to be taken out of the Sergeant majors of regiments Things being thus regulated and established you shall see a great facilitie in the commands and none shall be able to excuse his fault by putting it off upon another because presently it will be verified whence it proceeded which obligeth every man to be carefull to do that exactly which he shal be coÌ„manded CHAP. XVIII Of the assailing of States according to their forces and situations AFter that you have formed an army you must imploy it either for the conquest of a new countreâ— or for the defense of your own We will begin with the first The Prince which putteth himself upon the offensive must be the stronger or must see some garboils in the State which he assaileth and that he be called thither by a partie otherwise it would be a rash enterprise If the countrey which he assaileth be large and open he must seek in the beginning to hazard a battel or some grand skirmish that so by the reputation of his arms he may affright the enemies If it be a countrey enclosed with mountains or divided by rivers and ditches or sheltered with forrests or full of fortresses it is hard to force an enemy to battel and in this case you must go to sieges and make your conquest by little and little Now he that will make any progresse by this way must at least have two bodies of armies that so with the one he may hold his enemy in play and with the other he may actuate without impeachment For it is most difficult to accomplish the designe of a siege so long as you have a good army encamped near you which shall cut off your victuall If it be a countrey which is hard to enter and that hath but few passages whereby to enter into it you must force one and before you go further you must there fortifie and so well assure your way for your victuall as you may not suffer though the enemy should have burned or carried away that of his countrey into his fortresses If you be called by a faction that is a very great advantage for you because you are instructed of the situation of the countrey and of the defects which are to be found in the â—â—â—tified places and want not spies nor punctuall advertisements of whatsoever passeth amongst the
enemies You must also be very carefull to use this faction very courteously and to engage them by little and little into actions which may make them irreconcilable to their Prince But when you see they make warre with respect and that they will but by halves offend him from whom they have revolted you must have them in great suspicion and march with them with bridle in hand for whether it be the fear of a ruine without recovery or the hope of a reconciliation that hindreth them from putting themselves upon reall extremities the one and other are equally dangerous and at last you may fear they may accommodate themselves to your prejudice wherefore if they will not engage themselves to do extraordinary and irremissible actions at the beginning you ought not to joyn with them but under good pledges You must also use such as do voluntarily yield themselves to you with all humanitie clemencie and liberalitie and such as resist you with all severitie for beneficence towards the one and severitie towards the other are the two principall means which get you obedience A town taken by force and hardly used or one which yieldeth it self of its own accord and favoured openeth the gates of a dozen others as on the other side a town taken by force and spared or which rendred it self voluntarily and is evil intreated shutteth a great many Whence I conclude that a Conquerour must be as good as his word whatsoever he promiseth be it in clemency or severity CHAP. XIX Of the defense of States according to their forces and situations TO treat of this subject well we must divide it into three parts namely into small States those of a middle rank and those which are puissant The small ones are of that nature as they subsist not but by the jealousies which their neighbours have one of another for that if one of them will assail a weak State the other will defend it neverthelesse it is but a tottering condition and ill assured for if the one findeth himself able enough to assail them the other will not find himself sufficient to defend them The counsels of Princes and States are not alwayes governed so equally but for the most part one prevaileth above the other Besides this inconvenience there is yet another that sometimes they agree to divide the prey so that such kind of pettie States which have not strength within themselves for their own defense are alwayes in perill and they must use very much pliantnesse to remove all pretexts from their neighbours of undertaking something against them The onely means which they have is to have one or two towns exceeding well fortified with arms and money enough to defend them well that so they may give leisure to them which will not suffer the growth of him which shall assail you to aid you for if you have no means at all to resist your countrey will be taken before they shall have time to assist you and besides that the happinesse which they conceive of conquering you giveth them a spur to assail you you shall find many more persons disposed to succour you then to reconquer your countrey for that the one is easie with equall forces and the other without greater strength is very difficult To which I adde that there is ofttimes as great danger that he which regaineth your countrey as your friend keep it not for himself as well as he which had taken it as your enemy or if he restore it to you it will be with so hard conditions as you shall possesse but the shadow of a Sovereigntie And thrice happy are they which meet with so good and so generous Princes which do reestablish them into their lost States with the same authoritie and liberty as they possessed them before for such examples are exceeding rare Concerning those States of a middle condition I propound a Prince or common-wealth which for his defense is able to entertein an army of 20000 foot and 3000 horse with all necessary equipage If his countrey be of a difficult accesse and that there be no entrance into it but by certain passages and mountains guarded and fortified he hath a great advantage but they which too much do trust and rest upon them and have neglected other defenses have deceived themselves and have been lost by those wayes wherein they thought themselves most assured If it be encompassed by the sea it is a fair moat notwithstanding he which is stronger will find means to make his descent into the island If it be environed with moorish grounds and rivers yet an enemy will find wayes to passe them especially when he hath artillery to favourise such passages insomuch that the surest way is to trust to your own forces namely a good army and good fortresses I say both joynned together for that the army without fortresses being weak and not daring to hazard any thing leaveth the victuall of the champain to the enemy and so the means to subsist at your charge and at last to ruine you And fortresses without an army are not able to preserve you longer then the time you have made your magazines of victuall for within them but these things being proportioned with judgement you may make a great resistance In these things you must not suffer your self to be led by the fansies of the people which without considering the situations of their towns or the publick good when they see their neighbours fortifie themselves will all imitate them a thing equally dangerous to have more fortresses then you can guard or to have none at all Yet I should rather like the last then the first for that at least by hazarding a battel you put your enemy to half the fear but by the other way you must surely perish without being able to do any other thing but prolong your ruine for the jealousie which you have to preserve all your fortresses by leaving great garrisons in them hindreth you of the means of keeping an army in the field and then the spoil of two or three harvests compelleth you to yield your neck to the halter I know there are some which ground themselves upon this reason That when all the principall places of a State be fortified all the victuall of the champain may be drawn into them so that an army coming thither if it stayeth there it dieth through famine and if it doth but passe through it doth no great hurt insomuch that it is almost impossible to make any great siege there Whereunto I answer that fortresses are principally invented for the weaker that so a few men may resist a great number and if you have so great a number of fortresses and those requiring great guards as the great fortified towns do you must have a greater number of souldiers then he shall have which cometh to assail you otherwise you were not able to provide them all with sufficient garrisons to preserve them from a siege And if you be