Command may be clearly heard and punctually obeyed 'T is observed that the Grecians went alwayes silently to the Battel alledging for it That they had more to do than to say to their Enemies But such Shoutings is a kind of doing for it stirs up your own Men and often damps your Enemies This puts me in mind how that once marching in Battalia in a plain Countrey to fight the Enemies Army and as they marched in the like order to meet us some Musketeers of ours running hastily to a Budge-Barrel to fill their Bandeleers and being careless of their Matches the Budge-Barrel took fire and blew them up at which the Enemies Army shouted and finding our Men did not answer them I rid hastily to the next Squadrons and Battalions and commanded them also to shout which the rest of the Forces taking it from them repeatedly did soon after the like Accident happen'd to the Enemies Army and then our Men shouted but were not answer'd which I bid the next Troops to take notice of as a sign they were disanimated and a proof that their loss was considerable by that blowing up the Soldiers took it as an Omen of that Victory which God soon after was pleased to give us which seems to shew That Shouting according to the Soldiers understanding is a token of joy and the Enemies not answering it an evidence of fear and whatever may cause fear in your Enemy ought not to be omitted by you since Fear is truly said to be a Betrayer of that Succor which Reason else might afford Besides there is in all Mankind a weak Part and Experience has but too clearly evidenced that the difference between the Best and the Worst Men does not consist in those being totally exempted from the Influences and Operations of it but in the degrees of being less liable to it Now this weak Part is affected with Noise and Pageantry and therefore when the shew of danger is thoroughly imprest on the Intellect by the conveyance of the Senses the minds of Men are too much disturbed to be then actuated by the dictates of Reason The putting into Rank and File and the forming into the order of Squadrons and Battalions all the Men and Boyes which attend the Soldiers and can be spared from the Baggage and are not armed may be of good use for all those so ordered and placed at a competent distance as a Grand Reserve in the Rear of all make a formidable shew to your Enemy and inclines him to believe you have a third Line or Battalia to be broken before they can get the Victory Nor is this all the advantage which may be derived from thus disposing of those useless Persons in a day of Battel since thereby also you will hinder them from filching the Soldiers Goods while they are busie a Fighting and will keep the Field clear which you engage in I mention this last Particular having sometimes seen the Soldiers Boyes and the Drivers of Carriages either incited thereto by natural Valor or desire of Pillage or both so closely attend the Rear of their Masters who were fighting that when they were disordered it occasioned much hazard and confusion in the Rallyment But these appearances of Soldiers must alwayes be put at such a distance from the Enemy that he may not see they are unarmed and consequently but a meer show for then that will become ridiculous which otherwise will be terrifying Though I have already said in General That if your Enemy be stronger than you in Cavalry you must cover yours with your Infantry and if he be stronger than you in Infantry you must cover yours with your Cavalry Yet possibly it may not be useless to set down in some Particulars how those General Rules may be best practised If my Enemy did much outnumber me in Horse and I him in Foot I would flank every Battalion of my Shot with Files of Pikes Nay I would so order such of my Battalions as were likeliest to bear the often Charging of the Enemies Cavalry as that the Front and Rear of my Shot in them should be covered with my Pikes as well as my Flanks and under my Pikes my Shot should be still firing either keeping their Ground or Advancing or Retreating as there should be occasion Nor would I omit if my Enemy very much overpower'd me in Cavalry to place small Battalions of Shot and Pike so order'd as is immediately before express'd in the Intervals between my Squadrons of Horse in the first Line of my Wings For to me it seems much more adviseable if you mingle Battalions with Squadrons in your Wings that such Battalions should be of Pike and Shot so ordered than of Shot alone as is the usual method in such Imbattellings For if such small Battalions consist of Shot only the chief advantage you can derive from them is by their firing to disorder your Enemies Squadrons just as you are going to Charge them but if that fails of the hoped-for Event whatever becomes of your Squadrons these small Battalions are too much exposed to Ruine for Shot onely will not resist Horse in an open Field especially when those Shot also are disanimated by the Flight or Routing of the Horse that had fought on their side Besides I have found experimentally That private Soldiers never fight with the needful Courage when they are led on such a piece of Service as this of Firing on an Enemy and after to shift for themselves if that Volly does not the Work for then they do it in haste and too often timerously for even while they are firing they are looking which is the best Way to flie when they have done firing which would too much distract Men of more setled minds than private Soldiers are usually blest with To which I shall further add That Musketeers so imbattled and chequer'd as it were with Squadrons of Horse may too likely on the disordering of your first Line of Cavalry be so shuffled together by those of it that are Routed by those of your Enemy which pursue the Rout and by those of your second Line which advance to stop the Enemies pursuit that the poor Shot can neither be useful to their Friends nor offensive to their Enemies Whereas if those small Battalions be composed of Pike as well as Shot and be ordered as is formerly set down they will in the Spaces or Intervals between your Squadrons not only make almost as great Fire on your Enemies but also firing under the Pikes do it with less apprehension and consequently take their Aim the better and thereby do the more Execution Besides fighting with a Resolution to make good their Ground composes their Minds and makes them the more Resolute against their Enemies and the more obedient to their Officers Commands but what is most material of all is If your Squadrons should be disordered nay routed yet such Battalions as these will for some time at least keep their Ground and with
Lastly If it be on your Right Wing that these small Battalions of Pike and Shot are placed then I would have them when they advance to Front even with your Squadrons alwayes to do it to the Right of the Squadron they marched in the Rear of and if it be on the Left Wing alwayes to the Left For thereby your Flanks of your outward Squadrons in each Wing will be cover'd with Pike and Shot and the innermost Squadrons of your Wings will be flank'd with the Battalions of the Foot of your Army Therefore if this be not stedily observed your outmost Squadron of both your Wings will be needlesly left unflank'd by a small Battalion of Pikes and Shot which when you are much outnumbred in Horse will be too hazardous and therefore the preventing it highly adviseable I acknowledge I never practised this against an Enemy but it was meerly because I never had need to do it neither did I ever exercise my Men to it and that proceeded only from an apprehension that it might discover what I intended in case there had been need and thereby probably have made it less effectual But I am confident it is very easily practicable and to be made of very advantageous use in case the Enemy were much my superior in Cavalry and I stronger than he in Infantry But I submit this Notion to the judgment of those who are better able to determine of it than I. If your Army be stronger by much in Cavalry than your Enemies and his stronger by much than yours in Infantry I would then earnestly endeavor to fight both or at least one of his Wings with both or one of my Wings which I once did and I would make all my Infantry move as slowly towards the Enemy as they could while I advanced a round trot with my Cavalry and Charged that of my Enemies And if I had success in both my Wings against both his or in one of my Wings against one of his then I would make the next innermost Squadrons of my second Line of that Wing which had beaten the Enemies or of both my Wings if they had defeated both the Enemies Wings immediately march to flank my Battalions of Foot but not to hazard Infantry to Infantry till mine were Wing'd by some Squadrons of my second Line and then advance to the Charge as expeditiously as I could without disordering my Battalions thereby making my Squadrons doubly useful And the Enemies Infantry must be resolute men indeed when all their Horse are routed and that they are to be Charged with all my Infantry and divers Squadrons of my Cavalry and are to be raked with my Cannon which then may be drawn up for that end if they are not soon reduced to furl their Colours order their Pikes and crave Quarter I would further in case I were strong enough in Cavalry to do it even before my Wings were fighting against the Enemies Wings appoint some Squadrons of mine to draw up in the Rear of my Battalions both to countenance my own Infantry and the more to deter the Enemies from Charging them during the Engagement of all the Horse of both Armies For it is the duty of a General to order all things as safely as he may and to leave as little to what is called Fortune as possibly he can The clearing of the Ground you intend to imbattel on of all such Squadrons or Battalions as your Enemy may have advanced on it before you bring up your Battalions and Cannon on it ought never to be omitted and ought still to be done by your Horse and Dragoons or with few if any of your Infantry For the neglect of this may hazard your Army since the Enemy having the start of you by getting part of his Army in the Field of Battel before you get any of yours he may thereby cut you off by peece-meal while you are forming your Imbattelling This I observed was carefully practised by the Prince of Conde before the Battel of Rocroy and Monsieur de Gassion was commanded with his Cavalry to do that Work which being effectually done it did not a little contribute to the Princes Victory In the Imbattelling of your Army I would still do it where the Ground admits it by drawing up in one Line only all the Cavalry and Infantry and not as I have seen some unexpert Commanders do Draw up first a Squadron of a Wing which was to compose part of your first Line and then a Squadron of Reserve to it which was to compose part of your second Line and so in Sequence all your Squadrons and Battalions of your whole Army for that method is tedious and the just spaces of your Intervals between Squadron and Squadron and between Battalion and Battalion cannot be so well adjusted by the Eye as by the first filling up those spaces with the Soldiery for the first is but Guessing but the last is Certainty I would observe this method not only in order to the better and more expeditious Imbattelling my Army if the Ground allow'd it but I would also observe it as much as orderly I could in my advancing to the Charge until I saw it time to form my two Lines by the continued motion of those Troops which are to compose my first Line and by Alting of those Troops which were to compose my second Line and of my third Line if the Ground were so scanty as my two first could more than employ it all And this not singly for the Reasons before exprest but for this additional one also viz. It being very difficult for many and great Squadrons which have Intervals between every two of them to preserve the just Wideness of the Intervals if they march far and if those Intervals are not duly observed 't is impossible to avoid one of these two mischiefs either if they are contracted during your Advance the Troops which at need are to march up through them will be disabled from doing it or at least so many of them as cannot will in their separating from those which can be disorder'd and too likely remain useless Or if these Intervals be inlarged your Flanks are thereby exposed to be fallen into by the Enemy therefore in my poor judgment that way is the very best which will most likely prevent your being involved in either of them and that is practicable and attainable I believe by not making any Intervals till almost you may have need of them which by advancing all your Army in one Line until you come so nigh the Enemy as you judge is a fit time to form your Lines in the manner before set down And then the distance being so little between you and your Enemy 't is not likely if but ordinary care is taken that the Interval Ground can be either much contracted or much enlarged at least 't is not so likely that either of those Ills will be run into marching over but a little Ground as marching over
we and yet their Foot marched in Armor in hot Climates with large Targets heavy Swords and carried also two Missile Weapons whereas our Soldiers think the Pike or the Musket often without Swords alwayes without Armor to be a Load which only proceeds from our Relaxing the Military Discipline which is not only a Reproach to us but also a great Prejudice I think we are much more usefully Armed than the Greeks or Romans anciently were and in my poor opinion we only want for our Infantry the Target to be excellently Armed The five offensive Arms in use amongst us are the Sword the Pike the Musket the Pistol and the Carrabine Foâ—… I look on the Lance as now wholly laid by and I think with reason for the Lance does little unless it be by the force of the Horses Course or Carreer and even then only the Front is useful so that their best order to Fight in seems to be to charge a Rank at a time which yet can hardly resist Squadrons of Horse especially if Riders be in Armor But if the Lanceers Fight in Squadrons also 't is much more likely they should discompose themselves than hurt those they Fight against which are such apparent inconveniencies as have made me admire that King Henry IV of France most justly Surnam'd the Great Alexander Ferneze Prince of Parma and Charles of Lorrain Duke of Mayen three the greatest Captains of the latter Age nay it may be of any Age would often lament that Lances were then throwing aside as Davâ—…la in his excellent History of the Civil Wars of France does observe with this addition That Henry the Great and all his chief Commanders more apprehended those thousand Lanceers led by Count Egmont at the Battel of Iury than double the number of any of the Leagues of their Cavalry Our Foot Soldiers generally are two thirds Shot and one third Pikes which I have often lamented for methinks the Pikes should be at least half especially in His Majesties Dominions in which are few strong places and consequently Battels and Fightings in the Field are more common than Sieges and without dispute the Pike is the usefullest Weapon for the Foot and a good Stand of them assisted by Shot if the Angles be well guarded are not easily broken by Horse and Shot united The Swissers generally and justly esteemed excellent Foot have more Pikes than Shot which possibly as much as their Valor Discipline and the strength of their Bodies has contributed to their Glory 'T was to their Pikes they owed that famous Retreat they made when in the Hollow of their Battalion they carried King Charles the Ninth of France and almost all that Family Royal from Meanx to Paris though 't were a Champion Countrey though they had no Cavalry to assist them and though Lewis Prince of Conde Gaspar de Coligni the then Admiral of France Andelott and the greatest Horse Commanders of that Age often Charged them in Front Rear and Flanks yet with the heads of their Pikes they forced their way though all the hopes of the Hugonot Lords depended on that dayes Action I had also an Experiment of the goodness of Pikes in the year 1651. when in the last Battel we had in Ireland I had the Honour to command the English Forces against the Irish and though we Fought in an open Countrey and though we had Routed after a smart resistance all the Horse of their Left Wing and above a Thousand of their Musketeers which composed the Left Battalion of their Foot yet about Twelve hundred Pikes of the Enemy without any Shot with them Advanced boldly and Charged our Squadrons of Horse so home after their Horse and Shot of that Wing were Routed that we had more Wounded and Kill'd in that Charge than in the whole Fight besides so that had they Guarded their Angles when we Charged them Round they had done us much more mischief if not recovered the day but by the Angles we broke in and afterwards the resistance was but small nor indeed could it be otherwise But what need I say more of the usefulness of the Pike above the Musket than that all Persons of Quality who put themselves voluntarily or otherwise into the Infantry carry the Pike which they would not do unless it had adjudgedly the Honour to be the Noblest Weapon since the bravest choose and fight with it And therefore I must again say I wish our Companies consisted of fewer Shot and of more Pikes For besides the excellency of that Weapon it is not only alwayes in a readiness for Service but needs no Ammunition to make it do Execution both which cannot be said of the Musket which is often unfixt requires alwayes Powder Bullet and Match and in windy or wet weather often disappoints the Service especially if it be the Match-lock and then to Fire-lock Muskets Maurice Prince of Orange a Famous Captain was exceedingly desirous to introduce the Target among the Infantry and having for his own satisfaction made many tryals of the great usefulness of it experimentally found that Targets though very flippent ones have not only resisted the Push of the Pikes but also that half the number of Targetteers have entred into the Ranks of double their number of Pikes without Targets and have Routed them but he being only General to the States of the United Provinces and not a Sovereign Monarch and Absolute durst not make so great an Alteration fearing the Reproach of some evil Success which whatever might have been the cause of the Defeat would have been attributed to that of Innovation For States oftner judge of the Merit of their General by his Successes than by his Reasons And Henry Duke of Rohan whom I had the Honour to know in the year 1637. a little before he dyed of his Wounds received in Alsatia and who yielded to none of his Age in the Military Art was also exceeding desirous to introduce the Target amongst the Infantry He propos'd to have the principal Body of the Infantry to consist of Pikemen and to each Battalion of Pikes he would have had a small separated Party of a Hundred or an Hundred and twenty Targeteers in the Flanks when the Battalions were ready to join which to use his own words would produce a marvellous effect in a Day Battel These Targetters he would have had composed of the Volunteers who are generally of the bravest and who unless they made a Body apart he thinks would be apt enough to beget Animosities by disputing where their proper stations should be assigned them I think they might also be of very good use in Assaulting and Defending of Breaches especially if they were of proof against small shot some of which sort I have seen and yet they were not very cumbersom for they might be used on the Left Arm by men of ordinary strength I must before I proceed any further mind the great carelesness of those who furnish Pikes to the Companies out of
such an Art of the Enemy and such a Negligence of our own In great Garisons I have seen Guards kept constantly from the opening to the shutting of the Gates at the further end of the Bridge over the Graft which is much the safest way if the Garison be numerous enough to admit of it for this Out-Guard examined all Comers and Goers before they came to that Bridge whereby much of the danger of a Surprisal was avoided The having double Vaulted Arsenals especially for preserving the Powder against accidental or design'd Fires or the execution by the shells of Mortar-pieces are very requisite and if possibly to have Mills for making Gun-powder within the Garison since nothing better does keep an Enemy far off than freely shooting against him and the best furnish'd Arsenals will be too soon exhausted if all be spent constantly upon the main stock and that be not recruited from within These being some of the most essential things for the Well-ordering of Garisons I shall defer the enumerating of the rest till I come to that Chapter which treats of Sieges The Marching of an Army IN the Marching of an Army there are many important Particulars worthy to be throughly known and diligently observed Whether I marched in a Friends or Enemies Countrey Whether I believed the Enemy near or far off I would still observe the like order and have the same care for a General may be mistaken in his Intelligence or Intelligencers nay may think those are Friends which want but an advantageous opportunity to declare themselves Foes and therefore all imaginable caution ought to be observed in all times and places because War is a Profession of so ticklish a Nature that 't is rare for any chief Commander to be capable of erring twice in any essentials and therefore he ought to be the more vigilant not to do it once But were there nothing else as a Motive to it but the keeping up exactly the Military Discipline yet for that Reason singly I would constantly do it These following Particulars I would therefore recommend to consideration and practice having my self constantly since I knew any thing of the Profession punctually observed them and found the good of doing it All the Regiments should in course take their turns to be in the Van Rear and other parts of the Body of the Army For where there is equality of Duty there must be also universal satisfaction therein the Generals Regiment the first day are still to have the Van of all so daily every Regiment to have its turn according to its Priority being a General Officers or Antiquity being a Colonels The Regiments of Horse and Foot that are at Night to have the Guard of the Camp or Quarter is still allowed to have the Van. First Since they are to have the Duty at Night they ought to have the place of greatest ease in the dayes march which doubtless the Van is Secondly Being to watch at Night they ought to be the earliest on the ground where the Army is to Camp oâ—… Quarter the better to view it and for the placing of their Centinels and Guards and for the chief Officer to order where his Patrouils and Parties which scowre the Countrey may most usefully move for the safety of the whole Thirdly Such of the Van as are not employed in those Functions having first of all which must be still indispensibly done set out their Out-Centinels in those places from whence they may clearliest and farthest discover their several Guards for these are the eyes as it were of the Camp are to draw up into Squadrons and Battalions ready to fight if need require it till the whole Army be encamped or quartered and upon no consideration whatever to exempt the Regiments of the Van Horse and Foot from that Duty since the hopefullest time for an Enemy to fall into a Camp especially not entrenched as ours alas seldom or rather indeed never are is just as the Camp is beginning to settle For men then are commonly weary or busied in pitching their Tents or making their Hutts if they have not Tents or in getting Fuel dressing their Meat providing of Forage looking after their Baggage and a hundred other little but necessary employments to the Oeconomy of Soldiers and therefore this nick of time being busily employed by all who have not the Guard those who have it must be in their turns the more vigilant for all the rest Fourthly Those who have the Van ought to be the earliest on the ground to Camp or Quarter in because if there be any Woods Mountains or other covert places at any reasonable distance from the ground to Camp in they ought to have those places thoroughly searched ere it be dark for then it may be too late to do it I have known sad Defeats given to Forces for want of these essential Circumspections I will not trouble the Reader with many other Reasons for it since it is a thing made evident enough by what has been already said if it be not so of it self If it be possible I would every morning before the Army marches draw it up in Battalia if that will take up too much time or the ground permits it not I would draw up as much of the Army as I could into gross Bodies or rather than fail into many lesser as the place and time would allow me the more to accustom the Soldiers to march in Body and also to be the more ready to resist an Enemy should he attempt me for the best opportunity of doing it next to that of an Armies lodging is to do it as it dislodges Out of the Van Regiments of Horse and Foot I would still draw out a Forlorn Hope of Horse and Foot who under careful Officers should march a good distance before the Van and should carefully search and discover all covert places fit to conceal an Enemy whether right forward or on either Flank and send speedy notice of what they discover to the General and other general Officers that they may give timely orders thereon It is in my own poor opinion very fit a new Word should be given to all the Commissioned and Non-Commissioned Officers and a Field mark to the private Soldiers every morning just as the Army is ready to march for if there be no need of both it does no harm if there be it does much good especially if an Army or any part of it be suddenly attacked during its march for on such sudden occasions it may be too late to do either and then the Field Word being given to all the Commissioned and Non-Commissioned Officers it may by them in an insant if there be occasion be communicated to the private Soldiers I know it is usual that the Regiments of Horse and Foot which are to have the Guard at Night have the Van of the Horse and of the Foot during the dayes march But I offer it to consideration whether that practice may
not with Reason be altered I have sometimes done it and found good effects by it For I have made the Horse and Foot which were to have the Guard the succeeding Night lead the Van of the Army all the dayes march and not as is the usual custom given those Horse which were to have the Guard at Night the Van of the Horse and those Foot which were to have the Guard with them the Van of the Foot but made both the Horse and Foot which were to have the Guard march in one Body in the Van of all the rest of the Army for I could not see any one inconvenience by it but I found it had many advantages especially if the Army were numerous or the Countrey through which we marched was inclosed or full of Passes since if the Army were great and the wayes narrow or full of bad steps it would usually take up two miles distance from the Van of the Horse to the Van of the Foot whereby if the Regiment or Regiments of Foot which were to have the Guard at Night marched but in the Van of the Foot they would be long ere they came to the ground where they were that Night to do the Duty and consequently might probably fail of those advantages which by early coming they would have had In the next place if the Countrey have narrow wayes or many Passes all the Horse which march in the Van of the Army if assaulted by the Enemies Foot might be too much exposed while the Foot are coming up from the Van of the Foot to relieve them whereas if the Regiments of Horse and Foot which are to have the Guard march together in the Van of all the Foot are as it were at hand to shelter the Horse of the Van. Lastly there may be some Bridge Cause-wayes or Passes to be secured for the better marching of the Army which possibly the Enemy when he finds which way you move may attempt to seize upon and though your Horse should get thither before them yet if you have not Foot or Dragoons to justifie it the Enemy will quickly beat you from it especially if he has Ordnance Probably also your march may lie thorow Woods or Copses or Moorish Grounds where the Van of the Horse may suffer much unless the Foot be with them and because the Horse are useless in Woods Copses and deep Moorish Grounds if your Enemy understands his work he will in such places fall on your Horse with his Foot and do it with safety to his Men and certainty of success unless you have Foot ready to hold his Foot play till the rest of the Army comes up When ever I marched with Horse and Foot thorough Woods Copses or deep Moorish Grounds I still sent out wings of shot to the right and left hand above a Musket shot from the Road in which I marched my Horse the better to shelter them These are some of the many advantages which follow from having the Horse and Foot which are to be on the Guard at night to march all the day in a Body in the Van of all but as to the inconveniences of doing it I leave it to those to set them down who have found or shall find them out for I am therein to seek The having of many good Guides and to distribute them well and on their informations diligently compared to resolve on the way to march are very requisite things especially if you march to attack an Enemy in the night I say many good Guides and well distributed for want of both which I have known some great designs not only fail but those who were to attempt them run great hazard and suffer the loss of many Men For if you have but one Guide or two Guides at most that are taken up in the Countrey they may be corrupted or give you the slip unless you be very careful and if they be the first or do the last not only you lose your design but may also lose your selves therefore I would always if I could never have less than three Guides one with the Forlorn one in the Van of the Army and one with the General who may have many things to ask him and to be informed of by him during the march which it might well be impossible for him to have inquired into till he saw the Countrey through which he marches but if you have but two Guides or but one and that you are not on certain grounds secure of his or their honesty you must be more careful to keep him safe lest if he or they should escape the prejudice and danger be great I earnestly recommended the ordering the daily marches of any Army in such manner as alwayes to come early to the place you will Camp or Quarter in but in a most especial manner indeed if the Enemy be near you or that you march in a Countrey that belongs to the Enemy or is better inclined to him than to you or is at best a doubtful Countrey for so many mischiefs and inconveniences have hapned and may happen thereby that nothing but down-right and meer necessity should ever make me do otherwise I shall enumerate a few that by the Pattern one may judge of the Piece Your Horse generally are by late coming to Quarters unprovided of Forage and one dayes march with the succeeding nights Fasting and Duty does cast them down more than six dayes ease and good Feeding will raise them again If they ramble out of the Camp to seek it 't is ten to one it being in the dark they fail of it and if any Enemy be near twenty to one he fails not to cut them off Your Men generally will want firing both for the dressing of their meat and for the Guards the hindmost and straglers having no Guides usually lose their way and if the Countrey be false or the Enemy near themselves also The confusion will be great in every Regiments finding and taking down his Baggage in the night but if you have not Tents and must Hutt or lie open 't is more than odds you do the latter The danger of overthrowing the Cannon or Wagons in the dark which may also happen in such places as it may stop the whole march of that part of the Army which is hindermost as I have known it sometimes do and thereby expose both the Van and the Rear to be cut off by being divided and in the dark Lastly not any longer to attempt to make that evident which is in it self but too plain if when you are incamped or quartered and are in the night assaulted by your Enemy on all parts though having well viewed the ground and disposed of your men in case of a real Attack it be difficult and uneasie enough to make a fitting defence judge what it must be when to the brisk Attack on all sides from an Enemy without is added the confusion and disorder within the Camp And if your Enemy
ground to believe he will attempt you during the obscurity and while you are unintrenched to cause great Piles of Wood or Fagots or some such combustible stuff to be ready to be kindled in fit places and at fit distances that if he advances you may the better see how to point your Cannon and dispose of your small Shot most effectually and by such Fires also terrifie and disorder his Horses which generally are frighted at the sight of Fire especially in the Night This I find was practised near Lorges in Beausse by Anthony King of Navarre Francis Duke of Guise and the Constable Montmorancy when Lewis Prince of Conde and the Admiral of Chastillion prest by the necessity of their Affairs went to attack the Royal Army by Night and which so much disheartned the Assaulters as they retreated The Quartering of your Army at all times but especially when that of the Enemies is very near ought to be in such manner as that the Soldiers may be soonest in Battalia to receive him and therefore to lodge it in the Form you will fight is still the very best that is that such Forces as compose your Wings and Body may have only to go out of their Hutts Tents Villages or Houses to be in the Figure you will fight in else in case of an Alarm the disorders will be many and dangerous but this way there can be but few if any The nearer you draw towards your Enemy or your Enemy to you your Quarters must alwayes be brought closer and your advanced Guards of Horse and Foot the stronger and your discovery the more vigilant III. The third is To be the first drawn up on the Ground you will fight in which is constantly attended with three considerable benefits The point of Honor which you gain by being the earliest on the spot which animates your own Party and often daunts your Enemies The being thereby enabled without opposition to possess all the advantages of the Ground either for the planting of your Cannon or for casting up Parapetts on some Eminencies which command all about it as Sir Francis Vere did at the Battel of Newport or by drawing up your Carriages or making a Ditch to cover one or both the Flanks of your Wings which you cannot well do if your Enemy be earlier or as early as you on the place The being thereby sometimes in a posture to fall upon and cut off your Enemies Squadrons and Battalions or to Rake them with your Cannon while they are drawing up which is an advantage when it may be taken that is of great use IV. The fourth is That your Squadrons of Horse ought not to be too great for the Reasons which I have formerly mentioned in that Chapter which Treats of the Disciplining of your Soldiery Yet if that need requires two nay three of the small ones may be put into one great one but still I would advise that the same Officers should command the same Squadrons when united as they did before By which means they will retain the Agility which is in small Parties and yet when there is need have the force of great ones and this I propound to be observed because whoever has been practically versed in fighting will hardly deny but that 150 Horse in two Squadrons will be likely to rout and beat 200 Horse in one Squadron And the reason to me seems very evident for besides the opportunity you have thereby to fall into his Flank and Rear whatever Body of Men does fight or has fought disorders it self though it gets the better and being disorder'd a less Number that is not to speak humanely must if the Men be equally good overthrow a greater that is And daily Experience shews how difficult if possible it is suddenly to Rally great Squadrons when by Fighting they have been disorder'd especially if but a small Squadron is at hand to fall on them and improve their being so discomposed Nor indeed can great Squadrons march many Paces though the Ground be clear and level without disordering their Ranks but if it be uneven or rugged they are almost out of their fighting Order before they come to fight which are mischiefs that less Squadrons are not so liable unto But Battalions of Foot as being more Governable may be large according to the occasion and need especially those which are composed of Pikes for a great Battalion or Stand of those in the Vanguard the Battel and the Rearguard of the Infantry are the safety of the whole and under their shelter All Rallyings may be best made V. The fifth is A General must never omit in the drawing up of his Army so to dispose of his Squadrons and Battalions as probably every one of them may come to fight again and again if the need requires before they are totally overthrown It is also observable that in a Battel whoever keeps in Reserve a Body of Men that are not led to fight until all the Enemies Squadrons have fought rarely misses to carry away the Victory and whoever has the last Reserves is very likely at last to be the Victorious One signal Illustration of this Truth among many I shall instance At the Battel of Dreux in France where the Constable Montmorancy assisted by Francis Duke of Guise the greatest Captains of that Age commanded the Royallists and Lewis Prince of Condé and the Admiral the Protestants He and the Admiral defeated all the Forces they saw took the Constable Prisoner past over the Bellies of the Swissers who made almost a miraculous resistance and concluded they had therefore won the Victory In the mean while the Duke of Guise who led the Left Wing of the French King's Army either by design as his Enemies said or as an act of high conduct so cover'd his Troops with the Village of Blainville and the Trees and Shrubs about it that he was not so much as seen by the Protestants nor moved from thence until the Constable was taken Prisoner the Mareschal de St. André killed and all those Forces which were considered by the Protestants as the whole Army of the Royalists were intirely routed and so confusedly flying as he was in no danger to have his Squadrons disordered by the Runawayes of his own Party but then advancing his Troops which were entire he soon turned the Fortune of the day took the Prince of Condé Prisoner and overthrew all that opposed him For 't is a tedious and difficult if not an impossible task to put into good order again an Army that has newly fought so as to bring it suddenly to fight again some being busied about the Pillage and Prisoners they have taken or are pursuing others being loth to return to new dangers and all in effect being so heated and disordered that they do not or will not hear the Commands of their Superiors VI. A sixth is A General must never bring all his Troops to fight at once and therefore is still to draw up his
Army at least in two Lines or orders of Battel and in three in case the Ground and the Number of his Forces allow it For those Lines are in effect so many Armies and the second Line being intire though the first should be broken often recovers the day especially if the second Line be at so just a distance behind the first as if the first be overthrown it does not disorder the second and also so near that some Squadrons of the second Line can come up timely enough to redress any beginning of a breach in the first without too much discomposing it self The Romans constantly fought their Infantry in three Lines or orders of Battel the one behind the other if the Hostatii were worsted they fell between the Intervals of the Principi and there Rallied again while the Principi advanced to give a check to the Pursuers and if both the Hostatii and Principi were Routed they fell in between the Intervals of the Triarii but if those could not sustain the shock the day was lost VII A seventh is To have expert vigilant and valiant Commanders to be at the Head of those five Gross Bodies of which an Army is usually composed in a day of Battel that is to say the three Tertia's of the Infantry which as they march we usually call Van Battle and Rear and the two Wings of the Cavalry they ought to be Men of great Judgment Authority and Presence of Mind to remedy all Disasters and to improve all Advantages in the nick of time for in such Actions the least delay or remisness is too usually irrecoverable To these five chief Officers whose Stations ought to be in the first Line there ought also to be five others to command in the second Line for this is of equal importance if not of greater since t is easier to give the Attack well while all is in Order than to recover a Disorder when it once has happened In my opinion it is a Duty in a General which he ought never to omit not only to appoint before the Armies Engage what Persons by Name shall command in chief the five Gross Bodies of the first Line and of the second Line but also what Commander in every of the said Gross Bodies shall in course succeed in the Conduct of every such Body in case the Person whose right it is to do it or who is appointed to do it should be kill'd or so wounded as he is thereby disabled to discharge so weighty a Trust and to declare openly to every Gross Body who by Name is to lead them and who by Name is to succeed him who shall be killed or disabled from discharging his Function that no Man may be ignorant or pretend ignorance therein For if this be not done before Troops are mingled in the Fight it will be too late to do it afterwards and I have known sad Disasters occasioned for want of this necessary Precaution Some who have been guilty of this Omission have as their Excuse alledged that when he who commanded that Gross was killed or put out of Fight by his hurts or his Horse being killed the eldest Officer or Colonel in course was to supply his room But that is not in all Cases a sufficient and full Answer for sometimes Regiments of Horse and Regiments of Foot have made up one Gross and though a Colonel of Foot has been the elder Colonel yet in the Field a younger Colonel of Horse has claimed the right of doing it and thereby Disputes amongst themselves have risen when they should have only disputed against the Enemy Besides I have also known that the elder Colonel has not been so fit to command a Gross as a younger Colonel has been and the Soldiery also have known it who will not be a little troubled to be lead by one who they all know was not so capable of that Honor and Trust. Neither do all the inferior Officers or private Soldiers know the dates of every Colonels Commission and if their own Colonel pretends to the Seniority they will not desert him in his pretence by immediately submitting to be led by and obey another But by the method I propound these Uncertainties and dangerous Disputes will be avoided else if they are ever run into it may too probably be fatal And since a General in the Field may appoint on the death of a General Officer who shall act in his place till the King's pleasure therein be known which is usual enough and in making this choice acts not alwayes by the rule of Seniority but by the fitness of the Person and yet therein does no Wrong to an elder Colonel I see no solid Reason why a General may not temporarily Nominate who shall command a Gross Body in case he who did it is killed or disabled especially in a day of Battel when All is at stake and when no Advantage ought to be lost in Nominating the ablest Person for the vacant Charge lest thereby the Victory be lost I am fully of opinion that the greatest Captain that ever was or will be is not or can be of himself sufficient to redress all Disorders and lay hold of all Advantages in an instant when Armies are once engaged The utmost he can do is to choose well the Field of Battel to draw up his Army according thereunto to most Advantage to give his General Orders and to give the best Orders wherever he is in Person but he cannot be Ubiquitary nor send Orders to every place timely enough to have them obey'd successfully And therefore 't is indisputably necessary that he have under him expert chief Officers at the Head of all Gross Bodies who may supply what it is impossible for him singly to command for he can be well obey'd but to the time he sends his Troops to the charge after that those only who lead them and are with them can actuate them according to the General Orders or as the occasion requires which those under him must have the judgment to lay hold of as it were in the twinkling of an Eye so short are the moments to acquire the Victory Together with those chief Officers who command Tertia's and Wings of Armies it is of high importance to have an able General of the Artillery and that he have sufficient Officers under him for the Carriages well disposed and the Cannon early and well planted do not a little contribute to the Victory and if it may be I would never have the Cannon fired so as the Bullet if it take place can only carry away a File especially also now our Files are so shallow but alwayes to point your Artillery so as the shot may rake thwart the Squadrons and Battalions of the Enemy and then it does not only do execution while it has any force but also disorders whole Bodies of Infantry or Cavalry VIII An eighth thing is to place alwayes your best Soldiery in the Wings of your Army and to begin
the Battel on that side where you judge your self the strongest and your Enemy the weakest and with those Troops to advance as expeditiously as you can without disordering them while the rest of your Army moves as slowly as they may For if your first Impression be successful you may fall into the Flank and part of the Rear of your Enemies while the Residue of your whole Army is marching to attack them in the Front but then the motion of your Army must be quicker as soon as ever they see your advanced Wing is successful I would recommend to Practice one thing more which I have on tryal found very beneficial it is this During the motion of your advanced Wing to edge it by degrees and insensibly towards the outward Flank of that Wing of the Enemies which you go to charge so as by that time you mingle you may outwing them and thereby attack them at once in Front Flank and Rear if he has omitted to cover that Flank And therefore to begin the Battel with that Wing of yours which is the strongest is not only most adviseable but also to place your best men in that Wing of yours which is opposite to that Wing of his which has the Flank of it uncover'd if by neglect or want of time or means either of his Flanks are not secured I have known great advantage obtain'd thereby and if your Enemy be not very timely aware of this it may more than likely contribute considerably to win you the day I mention very timely aware of this because if he discover not your design until you are on the Point to execute it it will be too late to prevent it since no alteration can be made when you are ready to join but it will in all likelihood be ruinous to him who in that juncture of time shall attempt to make it When I mention your beginning the Battel with that Wing in which you have placed your valiantest Soldiers I intend thereby that the second Line of that Wing shall advance as well as the first else while you fall in the Flank and Rear of your Enemies Wing his second Line may fall into the Flank and Rear of as many of your first Line as are so employed unless your own second Line be ready to prevent it and to improve all the Advantages which your first Impression shall give you The placing the best Men in the Wings of an Army is very ancient and seldom has been omitted but to the loss of those who were guilty of such Omission the Reason is the Troops on your Wings are not wedg'd in as the Troops in your main Battel are but are at liberty to take all advantages that by accident or by the ill conduct of your Enemy or by your own good may be offer'd you and you cannot so much as rationally hope to fall into his Flank and Rear but by attacking one of his Wings because you cannot overwing him but only by falling upon one of his outward Flanks Hannibal who was so excellent a Captain to win Victories though possibly not to make the best use of them at the famous Battel of Cannes placed all his valiantest Men in both his Wings and the worst Men in the midst of his Battel whereby when the Romans came to the Charge who had placed their choicest Legions in their main Battel they soon pierced into the Body of Hannibals Army which was what he designed they should do for then with his two Wings in which were all his choicest Troops he immediately incompassed the Romans and totally defeated them But at the Battel of Zama or as some call it Nadagara which â—…e fought against Scipio though the Fate of Carthage depended on the issue of that day yet he totally altered the Order he had observed at Cannes and lost the Victory For at Zama he placed all his new raised Men by themselves to endure the first Attack of the Romans and of all his old Soldiers who had so memorably served him in his Wars in Italy he made as it were an Army apart and drew them up a few Furlongs behind his new raised Africans who were therefore soon cut in pieces as his reserve Army was not long after whereas if he had observed the like order of Battel at Nadagara as he did at Cannes he might have had the like success IX The ninth thing is To prohibit under the severest Penalties the absolute Chace or the Pillage until the Enemy is totally Routed on all sides and then have those Troops only to pursue which are expresly appointed for it alwayes having Squadrons to march after the Pursuers as near and in as good order as if they were going to the Charge that if the Pursued should Rally and Face about you may have those ready to fall on and break them a second time How many Victories seemingly won have in an instant been lost for want of due care in these two Particulars of such high concernment which therefore ought never to be omitted Neither is there any thing which more encourages flying Enemies to rally and fight again than the seeing a disorderly Pursuit of them for in such a Pursuit all the advantage of the prevailing Party is immediately vanished when the Chaced do but turn about for such an evidence of restored Valor too often daunts those who are to oppose it Nor can any thing more deterr the flying Party from doing that than to see several Bodies in good order ready to make them repent that confidence and though brave Officers will not cease pressing promising and threatning their Men that flie to Face about yet the Private Soldier who sees those Bodies are ready to fall on them conclude it is more dangerous to do so than to run and therefore are too often deaf to all Oratory or Menaces of that Nature for the frighted Soldier as well as the hungry Belly has no Ears These Nine Particulars may not improperly be called Maxims in War and therefore ought to be still practised before a Battel in a Battel and after the Enemy is Routed I know many of the Ancients and not a few of the Moderns have with much industry alwayes endeavored to gain the Sun and the Wind of their Enemy in the day of Battel and doubtless both are very desirable to be on our backs when they may be obtained without losing thereby more certain Advantages from the Nature of the Ground you are to fight on For those are mutable especially the latter and the former is still in motion so that no Precaution can ascertain the keeping of them when they are gotten and therefore one must not lose the stable Advantages in hope to gain the unstable but if both may be had at once they must never be neglected I shall now proceed to set down several other Particulars which I hope will be useful to whoever has the Curiosity and Patience to read them VVhen an Enemies Army advances to
can well endure so that it will be impossible for the Officers to fall into the Rank if it be well wedged up or if it be not thereby to give them admittance it may leave such Gaps in it as may hinder the close uniting of the Rank which is so necessary to make the Charge effectual and commonly the Officers Horses being of the best and of the highest mettle when they come among strange Horses especially backwards may by their fighting and kicking so disorder the Rank that the Enemy is more likely to come in at the breach than they I would also strictly forbid all those who have the chief Command of a Squadron to fight against any of the Enemies Squadron who should come out in a bravery to fight For who knows but the Enemy may send an ordinary Person but valiant on such an Exploit and if your chief Officer of a Squadron should engage with him his killing of the other will signifie little but his being kill d would much prejudice the whole Squadron and possibly thereby the whole Wing if not the whole Army Therefore still in such Pickeerings if they shall be judged necessary at all when Troops are ready to mingle only such young Gallants should be allowed to be the Actors whose deaths if they should happen will not be of such a Consequence as the Fall of an Officer who has the Honour and Trust to command a whole Squadron For in War I am an utter Enemy for the sake of Showes to hazard Substances And since the Nature of War â—…ves but too much to Uncertainty I would expose as little as might be of it to Choice or Capriciousness A second thing which I offer to Consideration is That your Standards or Cornets Colours in a day of Battel be in the second Rank For these Reasons They are safer there than in the first Rank and thereby the briskest of your Enemy has the least invitation to attempt the winning of them The chief and solid Ends of having Standards or Cornets flying is That Troopers if they are disordered in the Charge may see under what they are to Rally and it being a high disgrace to lose their Colours it makes Men fight the heartilier against those who would cast it on them therefore in my opinion those Cornets should still be placed in a Battel both for the greater safety of them and the better to answer the speedy Rallying under them where they are most useful and most secure which last I think will be in the second Rank For there every way that your Troop can be attack'd it has a Rank between it and the Enemy to defend them and all the Troop also to do it being it is in the Centre of it A third thing I offer to Consideration is That when your Enemy does very much overpower your Infantry that the Battalions of Pikes which are in your first Line may have only so many Colours flying at the head of them as will serve to let the Soldiers see where respectively they are to Rally in case of their being disorder'd or routed For nothing does more excite an Enemy to push for Colours than to see many and near him and since a few will serve to answer the need of orderly Rallying why should there be more in the first Line All the rest of the Colours I would have flying at the head of your Pikes in your second Line where they will be much safer and when the smoke of the Cannon and of the Small Shot is driven away by the Wind or so attenuated that your Enemies may see through it the sight of so many Colours flying at the head of your Battalions or Stands of Pikes casts a kind of dread on the Soldiery of your Enemy who having been accustomed to see Colours guarded by full Companies conclude those are the Pikes of so many intire Companies in your second Line as they see Colours flying at the head of those Pikes and makes them thereby even despair of vanquishing such a Force in your second Line especially if they have been vigorously opposed and much shatter'd by your first Line If in Objection to this it be said That in case you win the day though you should for a time lose any of your Colours yet as one of the many consequences of your Victory you will recover the Colours you lost and if you lose the Field they will as certainly be lost in the second Line as if they had been in the first To that I answer It is a disgrace to have had for any time any of your Colours in your Enemies possession and who knows also as soon as any of them are taken but some may convey them so expeditiously out of the Field as though you get the day you cannot get again your lost Colours Besides I have known a defeated Army at the close of the day which has had some success in the beginning of it and had then taken some Colours by shewing which in Places and Countries they retreated into have persuaded the People they were the Victorious and thereby have gotten the Recruits for their shatter'd Troops which nothing but such a Belief grounded on such Evidences could have procured for them During a Battel or in it it is the duty of the General still to send timely Succor to any of his Battalions or Squadrons and rather a little before than one moment after they need it And for that end to have several Gentlemen about him well known to the chief Officers of the Army to carry to them on the spur the necessary Orders from time to time It is also his duty when he sees a breach in his Army which nothing but his own presence can probably repair resolutely in person to lead those Troops which are to do it but as soon as ever it is made up then to return in person to that station from whence he may see how all things go that from thence he may timely send alwayes his requisite Orders He ought also neither too hastily to believe the Enemies Army is Routed and therefore to command the general pursuit for thereby he may hazard his dawning Victory nor too slowly to order the Follow of the Rout when he is satisfied it is Real and General for else he may lose the best advantages of his success A General ought when he sees a Wing of his Enemies Army palpably Routed by a Wing of his to draw as many as he can well spare from the second Line of his successful Wing to the rest of his Army leaving the rest to follow the execution that by such help and such order he may intirely and more safely both defeat such of his Enemies as yet make head and pursue those which are Routed He ought also never to think upon much less order his Army in a plain Field to receive the Charge but still to meet the Enemy in giving it Pompey in the decisive Battel of Pharsalia by the
advice of Triarius commanded his Soldiers to receive Caesar's Assault and to undergo the shock of his Army without removing from the place whereon they stood alledging that Caesar's men would be disorder'd in their Advance and Pompev's by not moving keep their Order on which Caesar himself sayes viz. In my Opinion this was against all Reason for there is a certain Incitation and Alacrity of Spirit naturally planted in every Man who is inflamed with a desire to fight and therefore no Commander should repress or restrain it but rather increase and set it forward And the Event justified Caesar's Opinion therein was well grounded A General ought when he sees the day irrecoverably losing having first done his very utmost to recover it to get together as many of his Soldiers as possibly he can especially Horse and with them to bring up the Rear and make his ill success as easie as he can to his own Party and if he have any Garisons which he doubts his Enemy may attempt in the heat of his Victory to fling into such Garisons those of his Infantry which are left amazed at their defeat thereby to stop the current and give some check to the Victorious while he is getting together the residue of his Army the sooner to recruit it and to try to recover afterwards what then he lost After the Battel is fought and the Victory apparently won a General ought to take great care as is before set down that the Pursuit be orderly made and consequently the safelier for which end I offer to consideration That the Cornets Squadron of every Troop be expresly forbidden ever to be of the loose Pursuers but to keep alwayes intire and follow as fast in order as they can those of the other two Squadrons of it which are on the execution This I have practised and found these three Benefits thereby First Thereby the Standards of all Troops are still well secured which ought alwayes to be carefully minded for I have known those of them of the victorious Party often in hazard to be lost when out of too eager an haste to pursue a flying Enemy the Troopers of the Cornets Squadron have follow'd the Pursuit and left their Colours unattended or but slenderly guarded Secondly The Cornets Squadrons of the first Line of your Wing being still kept in order and by being the nearest to a flying Enemy are much fitter to follow in a Body to countenance and if need requires actually to justifie your Pursuers than any Squadrons of your second Line of your Wing can possibly be for the Enemy by his flight having got the start and Men who run for their lives doing it with their best speed it will be almost impossible for those which are so much behind them as your second Line is behind your first ever to overtake them wherefore such as are the nearest to them when they first begin to Run are those only who most properly and most hopefully are to march in a Body after those who dispersedly pursue that the Enemy may immediately be Routed if he begin to Rally which nothing does more frighten him from attempting than to see so near him so many Parties in good order to make him smart for it Thirdly The more of the first Line of your Wing which in orderly Bodies can follow to countenance and protect your Pursuers the more you can spare of your second Line of your Wing to join with others of your Army to defeat those of your Enemies which remain unbroken and though in the Battel you should fight the Cavalry three deep yet after your Men have absolutely Routed those they Charged I would have every Cornets Squadron follow your Pursuers but two deep whereby a Troop of 90 Horse having in every Squadron of it 30 Men the Cornets Squadron being drawn up two deep will have 15 in each Rank and having a Standard at the head of them will appear a full Troop to those who flie and shall have but now and then time to cast a sudden look behind them when seeing so many seeming entire Troops as there are Squadrons in a Wing of your Army it will be so terrifying a Prospect as few will dare to Rally while they see it and so near them After the Chace is finished which ought still to be continued as warmly and as far as may be I esteem it an indispensible duty in a General even in the Field of Battel to draw together all his Forces that he can and with them cause to be returned to Almighty God their most humble and hearty thanks for his blessing in his bestowing on them the Victory and his preserving so many of them from death for an unfeigned and publick Gratitude to God is not only what Piety but even what the light of Nature does teach and nothing does more incline God to bestow future blessings than to have Men really thankful for the present and to own him to be the onely Author and Finisher of them A Generals next care ought to be to have his Wounded Men well tended his Dead honourably buried his Prisoners strictly but civilly kept and to have a true List of all to take publick notice of those who behaved themselves well to rebuke such as did the contrary to send Spies to discover what measures his Enemies will take in their Calamity the better and more advantageously to form his own Counsels and Actions and most vigorously to pursue his Point while the terror of a Defeat is fresh in the minds of his Enemies since 't is as essential to a General to make the best use of a Victory as to know how to obtain it I confess I have the more minutely insisted upon the protractive or fencing parts of War by Intrenched Incampings c. because few of my Countreymen have made it muâ—…h their study but being carried on by the natural Genius and Hereditary Gallantry of the Nation they are alwayes ready by true Valor expeditiously to determine their quarrels and though this is highly estimable yet I would not be ignorant of other useful methods for I know few Men use to travel on foot that would not be willing to have Horses to lead in their hands that when they are weary of Walking they may by Riding on them come to their Journies end And since Battels are what our Countreymen most breathe after and long for in War I have also the more particularly insisted in this Chapter on what seems most materially if not essentially to be known Before In and After they are fought But after all that I have said on Battels nay possibly after all that has been said or has been practised in them could both those be known it is my firm belief that still very much will be nay must be left to the Judgment and Presence of Mind of a General and the chief Officers under him whose actings must be order'd according to the circumstances present in doing whereof most advantageously no set Rules previously can be given for they must be taken as the occasion is offer'd and then resolutely and speedily pursued yet what I have written may possibly be of some use to such of our less experienced Officers as shall well remember weigh and practise them who may by their own more illuminated Reasoning do as the Spaniards did who though they ow'd the first discovery of America to Columbus yet they ow'd the Riches they deriv'd from it to their own further improving of what he had but laid the Foundation And if this should be the Result of my Endeavors I should esteem them happily employ'd FINIS
understands his business he will never fail of making his attempt that night in which you come late and consequently tired and disordered into your Camp especially when it has no Line about it To prevent therefore this fatal mischief of coming late to Quarter I would practise three things indispensibly The first is to be moving very early The second is to send the Carpenters of the Train and most of the Pioneers with the Van to mend Bridges that need it to support and prop such as without those helps shall be judged insufficient to bear the Wagons Ammuninition and Cannon And when there are any bad steps for the Horse or Train to mend them against the Army comes up And when the wayes are narrow to leave those wayes if it be possible only for the Cannon and Baggage and to make several large gaps to the right and left hand of the Highwayes for the Troops to march in the Fields Thirdly whenever the ground allows it to march in Battalia and if all the Army cannot yet at least that the Horse and Foot march in as large Squadrons and Battalions as the Countrey will admit which will not only hasten your march by shortning the length of your Army but also habituate your Soldiers to march orderly in Bodies against there is need Yet if all these Precautions do not accelerate your intended dayes march as that you apparently see you cannot come early enough to your intended place to Camp or Quarter in for many such Accidents may happen then I would much rather Camp short of the station I intended in the first convenient Ground I found for Fire Water and Foâ—…age which three must still be minded than expose my Men to all the fatal mischiefs and inconveniences of a late Incamping or Quartering If I am to Camp or Quarter at night in an Enemies Countrey or a doubtful one or that an Enemy be near I would strictly observe these two following particulars First That none should know the Ground I intend to Camp or Quarter in at night but the chief Officers Secondly That if my Guide or Guides be not of my Army or Men thorowly known to me and trusted by me I would let him or them speak with none after I concluded they might guess at the way I intended to march and consequently near what place I intended to Camp or Quarter in and to have them in safe custody all the march I would allow no Soldiers during the march to straggle much less to stay behind unless on meer necessity and by his Officers leave and this I would firmly observe whether I marched through a Friend or Enemies Countrey not only to keep up that excellent part of Military Discipline but also to preserve my Men from receiving or doing the Country any harm since Soldiers but too generally are apt to do amiss when they have the power to do it especially if not under the eye of their Officers And I have known Countries which being ill us'd by the Soldiers of their own Party but well by those of the Enemy have therefore been Friends to their Foes and Enemies to their Friends who in effect made themselves their Enemies for the People of the Countrey judge chiefly by their senses As the Van has a Forlorn of Horse and Foot so the Rear should have a Rear-guard of Horse and Foot to be composed out of such as were the precedent night on duty and I would still send out small Parties of Horse on the wings to discover By this method the Van Rear and Flanks cannot be attacked without having timely notice to put themselves into order to resist an Enemy As to the Baggage I know 't is too usually practised for the convenience of the Regiments to have the Baggage of every Regiment march in the Rear of the Regiment which I think very unfit especially if an Army marches in an enclosed Countrey or where there are Woods Copses Moorish Grounds Rivers Bridges or Passes since the Baggage so placed must hinder the Regiments from coming up expeditious to oppose the Enemy and second such as may be assaulted in the Van or Rear whereby the ruine of the Army may probably ensue Iulius Caesar when he marched especially in an Enemies Countrey that was enclosed or cumbersom to move in by reason of Woods Copses Bridges c. made all his Legions march in a Body and in the Rear of them disposed of his Baggage leaving only for their Guard some new raised Men. This did well where he was sure the Enemy could only attempt him in the Van but not knowing where he will make his impression yet being certain he is likeliest to make it where he will find least resistance and where he may do most mischief in my opinion 't is best to have the Baggage as also the Cannon and Ammunition march in the Centre of the Foot where they are likeliest to be safe from all attempts and if the Attack be in the Van or Rear or both half the Army will be free from the incumbrances of the Carriages and will be ready to make head where the need requires The Romans were so exact in the order of their marches as that every Morning at the first sounding of the Trumpet every one took down his Tent and began to make up his Baggage at the second sounding every one loaded his Baggage and at the third sounding the Legions moved out of their Quarters and put themselves in the form and order they were that day to march in But none were to take down their Tents till the Consul and Military Tribunes had first took down theirs whether for the greater respect or because their Tents and Baggage being larger than the rest they should be the first at work and thereby have their Baggage as ready to march at the third sound of the Trumpet as the private Soldiers For Commanders who give Rules to all the rest ought to be the most exact themselves in observing them since if they break their own orders they encourage others to lose their reverence to them and Example operates more than Precepts for most men see better than they understand as when among Clergymen vicious Livers are good Preachers many think they themselves do not believe what they seem to inculcate since they practise contrary to what they teach Therefore it seems to me exceeding requisite that whatever Rules are made in an Army by a General he and his servants ought most punctually to observe them for else with what justice can he punish in another for the breach of the same orders which he himself does violate But when the Soldiery finds the General keeps strictly the Rules he gives they do the more inviolably observe them also for they conclude since he will not therein indulge to himself he will not do it to others And they implicitely believe such orders are good and necessary because he that gave is so punctual an observer of them In
imitation of the Roman Discipline when the Army or Forces were to march I observed these following Rules where I had the Honour to command in Chief Soon after the Reveill was beaten I caused all the Troopers and Wagoners or Men that tended the Baggage to take up their Horses and Oxen and to make ready to load At the sounding to saddle all began to take down their Tents and to load At the sounding to Horse all the Troopers did mount and the Foot Soldiers draw into Arms under their Colours When the Trumpets sounded to the Standard all the Soldiery marched out of the Ground they Quartered or Camped on into the Field or Fields appointed to draw up in and there were formed into as many and large Squadrons and Battalions as the time and ground would admit still those Forces of Horse and Foot having the Right which were to have the Van all day and the Guard at night all the Ordnance Wagons and Baggage being drawn up on one side by themselves ready to fall into the centre of the Foot as the Army or Forces marched off Those which had had the Guard the preceding night being drawn up in Battalia till the Army fell into their marching order and till the Ground was cleared and then they brought up the Rear all that day and commanded out a Rear-guard of Horse and Foot during that dayes march who were still to bring up all sick or lame Soldiers who could not keep pace with the Body And where any was unable to go to carry him behind a Trooper till he came to the Camp and then to deliver him to his Captain also to seize upon and secure all straglers and to give them to the Provost Marshal that they might be punish'd If I march'd through a Countrey which had narrow Cause-wayes Bridges Rivers or Passes I made those Forces which were on those Cause-wayes Bridges and Passes double the quickness of their march till they were gotten out or over them and then immediately draw up on the right or left hand as the Ground would permit till all the rest were got over in case I suspected the Enemy was near or watched my motion If I did not apprehend an Enemy then I made only every Regiment of Horse and Foot draw up when they had passed over those straights till the intire Regiment were got over and then to continue their march the like I practised over any fordable Rivers But still when the stream was rapid or above knee-deep I made the strongest Horse by turns in Files stand firm in the River on the upper and lower sides of the Ford that the Foot might pass the safelier between them the upper Files breaking much the rapidness of the stream and the lower catching up those Foot Soldiers who might be cast down by the violence of the Current by which means many Foot Soldiers Lives have been saved I did also order the Horse in the Van of all when they had gotten over the Ford to send out small Parties to discover while the rest of the Army were marching over the Fords or Bridges and if the Countrey were enclosed or hilly to be the more diligent and expeditious in such searchings and discovery For an Enemy cannot wish for a greater advantage than to fall upon an Army which is separated by a Ford Bridge or such narrow passage since then they are his at a cheap price therefore great and constant circumspection must be observed in all such cases and all the Forces as fast as they get over must be in a posture to fight in formed Squadrons and Battalions while the rest are getting over It ought also to be the constant care in a chief Commander especially marching through an Enemies Countrey or when an Enemy is near often to make short halts that the Army may not march disorderly and that it may be as short in its long march as possible for 't is better to make short and sure dayes marches than long ones and hazardous 'T is impossible to give one certain and standing Rule for the most advantageous and safe way of marching an Army for the form must vary according to the Country you march in and the Enemy you have to do with If I suspect he means to assault me during my march in my Front Rear or Flanks I must fortifie those several parts accordingly If he be an Enemy not strong enough to give me Battel and will only by his Horse and Dragoons possess the Passes and Bridges and Fords to obstruct and retard my march I would then have some Ordnance with their Necessaries march with the Foot which are in the Van of all the better and sooner to drive him from his Defences and I would march my Army in two or three several Bodies divers wayes which the French call Columes but we and I think more properly Lines yet still no farther distant the one from the other than to be ready speedily to unite if the need require and at evening all to Camp in one Field or quarter it conveniently whereby the whole would move the more expeditiously safely and at ease and the Enemy would be the less encouraged to defend a Bridge Ford or narrow Pass against one of the three Lines since while he is doing that one or both the others may encompass him and cut off his retreat There are several other Cases which must be provided against as the emergencies happen by the care knowledge and foresight of the Commander in chief for which no positive Rules can be set down but the Orders must be given on the place and proportionably to the Ground the Enemy and the Occasion In an Enemies or doubtful Countrey especially I would still have a general Officer with the Quartermaster general attended upon by the Quartermasters of the respective Regiments of Foot and Troops of Horse and Train to be on the ground to Camp on at night some convenient space of time before the Van of the Army comes up both to view the Ground thorowly to take all the advantages of it and to appoint the several places for the Guards for the general Officers the Regiments and Train to incamp in that against the Army comes up every one may know where to pitch his Tent for which end the several Quartermasters should near the first Avenue of the Camp attend and be ready to shew their men respectively as they come up where the Ground is and how much is allowed them to lodge in that all may go readily and without confusion to their several stations and that there may be no dispute those should be staked or marked out else too often quarrels or animosities do arise on those occasions And if an Enemy be near I would have the several Regiments draw up within the Camp or near it till the Rear be ready to enter into it to be the fitter to resist if assaulted or to relieve the Rear if fallen upon and only admit some of every
Regiment to employ themselves in pitching the Tents of the rest and the other requisite actions whereby all may be in a forwardness to lodge when safely they may do it The Roman Discipline in this particular was thus When their Army approached near the place where they were to encamp the Tribunes and Centurions appointed for that work advanced before all the rest diligently to view and consider the scituation of the place and having chosen the Ground in the first place the Consuls or Generals quarter of the Camp was marked with a white Flag or Streamer and the Boundaries of it were at the same time set out Then the several quarters of the Tribunes were also appointed and then those of the several Legions all with distinct Flags or Streamers of several Colours only the Tribunes were red Then every Legion as well of the Allies as of the Romans had their portion of Ground assigned and mark'd out for drawing the Line about the Camp which was forthwith done many hands making light work and all were expert in it by constant practice for they never alter'd the measures nor the form of their Camps being never allow'd to Camp in the Fields but in Camps intrench'd though it were but for one nights quarter so safe and excellent was their Military Discipline which in my humble opinion the closer we keep our selves unto in most things the greater advantage and security we shall thereby enjoy I shall close up this Section by only adding to it That an Army but of 10000 Foot though they march 10 in a Rank and of 1000 Horse though they march 5 in a Rank having as slender Baggage as Men can march with and having but a Train of 10 Cannon with an Equipage to them for shooting but a hundred shot round takes up in their long march near 28000 foot in length which is five measured Miles and three fifths of a Mile so that so small an Army taking up in length near half a dayes march you thereby see how exceeding necessary it is for an Army that is to march to be moving early and to march as often as they can in Battalia or in great formed Squadrons and Battalions and in three Lines or two if possible to shorten the length of your Army and to draw up often as soon as they are got over Causewayes Fords Bridges Rivers c. lest if attaqued during their march the Enemy cut them off by parts the distance from Van to Rear being so great though your Army be so small Lastly If you make long marches especially in enclosed Countries or full of Passes judge how probable 't is if you have a knowing active Enemy that you may be defeated unless you be very vigilant and have constantly small Parties abroad to discover at a good distance and to give timely notice that accordingly you may be ready to oppose him and therefore to march in several Lines by several wayes yet still as I said before near enough to join or relieve one another seems very requisite as also where there is but one way over narrow Passes if possible by your Train Carpenters and Pioneers to make more I mention nothing how to defend your selves if attacked in a Pass or narrow or moorish wayes though much and many things may be said on that Subject because I take it to be the duty of a good Commander to avoid by his foresight and care the possibility of being engaged in so great a difficulty for if it be run into 't is hard if possible well to extricate ones self out of it and were all that which has been experimented in those fatal cases set down yet still the remedy will chiefly depend on the quality of the place and of the Enemy you have to deal with and on that essential part of a chief Commander which is called Presence of Mind which must actuate him according to the ground the Enemy possesses or he himself is so unhappily engaged in Only this in general is undoubtedly true in such an affair that quickness and courage in designing and acting are essential but still the best way is not to fall into such Traps which are easilier avoided than got out of when you are in Of Camping an Army within a Line or Intrenchment THere are three sorts of Camps The Temporary Camp which is for a Night or some short space The Standing Camp whereby Countries are kept in subjection which have been Conquer'd or in which Armies are lodged for some time either to avoid being necessitated to Fight till they saw a fitting time or for some other great design And the Besieging Camp Of which latter I intend to discourse in that Chapter which concerns Sieges it seeming to be best reserved till then And now only to speak of such a Camp with a Line or Intrenchment about it as is of extent and capacity sufficient to lodge an Army within it both for the accommodation of your own Soldiers and resisting the Enemy if he assaults you The Camping of an Army within a Line or Intrenchment is attended with so many solid Advantages and the neglect of it accompanied with so many Dangers and Inconveniences that by as much as the Roman Discipline which constantly obliged their Armies to lodge tho' but for one Night in intrenched Camps is to be praised by so much the neglect of it ought to be avoided I shall enumerate some of the most material Benefits which are inseparable from the doing it in which by the Rule of Contraries the Mischiefs of omitting it may be the clearlier and more convincingly inferr'd First Such an Intrenchment of an Army keeps it safe and frees it from those Dangers which it is alwayes exposed unto by Quartering in open Towns and Villages where if your Enemy be awake he will every Night endanger the carrying or beating up of some quarter of it which by its being lodged in a Body and within a Line it is exempted from since to assault an Army so Retrenched is so daring an Act and so dangerous that we hear of few who undertake it and of much fewer who are successful in it Secondly It eases the Army from keeping many and great Guards since a few serves the turn for All when all are at hand in case of the Enemies attempt whereas if they are Quartered Dispersed in Villages and without a Line every Quarter must do almost as great and as hard Duty for its own security as if the Army were well encamped would suffice for the whole But above all it eases and secures the Cavalry which if Quartered in open places must be mounted the most part of every Night Thirdly Your Army is better than within a strong Town for there you are mingled with Inhabitants some of which are too likely to be Spies for your Enemy but usually are Corrupters of that excellent Discipline of which Sobriety is a chief Ingredient both which great Evils are not only avoided in Camps but from
them also you may go secretly and with what numbers of Soldiers you please on all great designs and leave your Train Baggage and Sickmen c. secure during your absence Fourthly In an Intrenched Camp none can compel you to Fight but when you please and Woe be to that Army which by an Enemy is made to Fight against its Will Lastly to omit many other material Advantages an Intrenched Camp by reason of the open Air the healthiness of its scituation which alwayes must be minded and the cleanness which may and ought to be kept in it is exceedingly less subject to Infection and Sickness than Villages are insomuch that some great Captains have concluded an Army will be likelier preserved and kept sound and untainted three months in a well seated and regulated Camp than three weeks in the ordinary Villages and Countrey Towns All which seems to prove that one of the most necessary and beneficial parts of the Military Art is to know how to Incamp well and constantly to practice it Nor could I ever hear of any Objection against it which did not relish chiefly of Laziness for such as disuse it take for their pretence the over-harassing of the Soldiers and consequently often casting them thereby into sicknesses when on the contrary Idleness does oftner produce the last and the former by practice will soon be overcome for no mens bodies are usually so sound and continue long so as the daily Labourers For as to the charge of buying Pickaxes Shovels Spades and Wheelbarrows c. and the Horses or Oxen Carts or Wagons to carry them in it is insignificant if weighed with the real advantages an Army derives from the good employing of them and as to the Labour it ought to be without wages since none do it but those who find their own safety and ease of Duty by it And since we make the Soldiers carry their Arms for their Defence and their Knapsacks for their Food which all do willingly because 't is rational and they are accustomed to it so it being as reasonable that men should sleep safe and keep fewer and less Guards with security if what conduced thereunto were made habitual to them they would as contentedly undergo it If one should say that the Roman private Soldiers were better than ours are and fitter for War we should take it as an Affront and yet 't is evident that in this laborious and advantageous part of War they excell'd us we should either not deny it by our words or contradict it by our actions At least if we would do no more I could wish we did but so much as when ever we Camp though but for a night we would at the Angles of those great Inclosures we lodge in raise little Bastions or Flankers of Earth and Sod And where the sides of such Inclosures were longer than a Musket would carry point blank make little Ravelins or Redoubts to clear them it would be a great safety to the Camp and would ease the Duty of the Guards who would not need to be so many or so strong And if you came to Camp in an open place only but raise little Bastions or small Redoubts round the Ground you Camp on in a Musquet shot the one from the other And instead of a Line draw Carts Wagons and Carriages between the several Redoubts leaving Avenues which is done in a little time and with much ease for those Redoubts need not be above Parapet-high and the Grafts of them no broader nor deeper than the Earth rais'd out of them will suffice to fill between your Sod-work which faces and lines the Redoubts nor need they be larger within than will serve to contain 60 men apiece but if you Incamp for some time 't will be worth the pains of making a Graft and a Line and enlarging and heightning your Flankers These little Labours would be exceeding useful and safe and would so accustom the Soldiers to work for their own safety and ease that in time of necessity they would be the fitter and abler to undergo and answer it I do not find that the Greeks ever tyed themselves to make the Line about their Camps equal or regular but drew them according to the benefit and advantages of the ground The Romans seldom or never varied the form and figure of their Camp but alwayes made their Rampards higher and the Graft broader and deeper according to the apprehension they had of the Enemy I think it is not amiss here to set down the form of a Roman Camp for there are many particulars in it worthy the imitation and some things which our late Experience has with much Reason alter'd and amended The Line and Rampard which consisted of four equal sides was equally distributed to be raised by the two Roman Legions and to the two Legions of their Allies who without intermission perfected it which was their first work and 't is probable when they Camped but for one Night in a place and fear'd not to be Attacked they made the Line but low and the Graft but broad and deep enough to fill Earth enough between the facing and lining of it I observe they did not use Sods commonly if at all for those Works but they drove double Rows of Stakes of a sufficient thickness and length into the Earth leaving so much of the length above ground as the heighth of their Work was to be of then wattled them like our Hurdles and raised them by degrees as they fill'd them with the Earth rising out of the Graft This way was expeditious enough if they Incamped still in places where they were certain to find those Materials And where they wanted them I suppose they made use of Sods to face and line their Ram pards with as the Moderns do But their way of Stakingand Wattling having many Iron Crows or other like Tools to make Holes for their Stakes if the Materials were ready was more quick than ours for our way requires much time both to pare the Sods and to ram the earth and the tayles of the Sods sufficiently and without both the Work is very apt to belly and then to slide which also it will very often do if the earth have not time to settle and that cannot be allowed when Men come to the place of Camping but for one Night whereas when the Rampard is faced and lined with strong Stakes and good Wattles the Work cannot slide till either the Stakes or Wattles rott and that they will not do in many months neither is there need to ram the earth for it being firmly shut up on both sides it will settle of it self without endangering the sliding of the Rampard and 't is in this manner that we do in sandy and gravelly Grounds secure our Lines of Circumvallations which proves it is firmer than Sod work can be Between the inside of the Rampard and the outside of the outwardmost Tents there was an open place or street of 200
of a Consular Army could hardly if possible buy in a day what the Market afforded because the place it was kept in was so small and the few streets to it so narrow Sextus Iulius Frontinius in his 4th Book of Stratagems sayes That till the Romans had vanquish'd Pyrrhus King of the Epirots they never used a Line about their Camp but lay in the open Fields but having found that Princes Army intrench'd they liked it so well as that ever afterwards they practised it themselves The modern way of Camping which I have seen within a Line or Intrenchment is as followeth By Retrenchments I do not only mean the Line cast up about the whole Circuit of the Camp but also all sort of Works by which the Camp is invironed and shut up as Redoubts Bastions Ravelins Forts Tennailes Hornworks Crownworks and all other sorts which flank and defend the Outside of the Line and such of them as are closed the Infide of the Line as Forts and Redoubts do The Ordinary Line cast up to inviron a Temporary Camp is about six Foot high and three Foot broad at the top which is in effect but a Parapett or Breast-work 1. The Basis or Breadth of the bottom from the Outside of the Out-Sod to the Inside of the Inward-Sod about seven Foot 2. The sloping battering or Talud Exterior about two Foot and an half 3. Of the Inside but one Foot 4. The Exterior height of the Line five Foot 5. The Interior height of it six Foot 6. The Breadth of the Foot Bank or Banquet three Foot 7. The Height of it one Foot and an half 8. The Breadth of the Ditch or Graft eight Foot 9. The Battering or Talud Exterior and Interior of the Ditch four Foot 10. The Depth of the Graft five Foot 11. The Breadth of the bottom of the Graft four Foot 12. The Lisiere or distance between the first Outwardmost Sod and the Brink of the Graft two Foot These are the Ordinary Dimensions of the Line and Ditch of a Camp intrench'd but if the necessity require it the one may be raised higher and of greater thickness and the other made deeper and broader accordingly 'T is to be observed as a standing Rule That at the distance of every Musket-shot point blank a Flanker must be made either a Redoubt or a Ravelin or Bastion c. and at every Angle where the Line turns a Bastion or Fort they being the fittest Works to secure the said Angle and to command the Lines on both sides And those Flanker Works are commonly more high and thick and the Ditch of them more broad and deep than the Lines are for they are the defence of those Lines since without them when the Enemy came to the Ditch they could not be offended considerably The raising of this Line and these Flankers is to be equally distributed between the Regiments of Foot which are not in Guard for those which are to Watch and Fight for all the rest till they come up and the Horse Regiments are exempted usually from these Works being to provide Forage for their Horses and to Scout but they are to make their own Hutts themselves to fetch in Forage and to scour the Countrey The Work therefore of Intrenching the Camp is to be equally divided among all the Foot Regiments every Regiment taking according to its number of Men his equal proportion of the whole every Division of each Regiment relieving by turns the other Divisions of it As if a Regiment consist of 1200 effective Private Soldiers 600 must be at Work for one hour and the other 600 must at the hours end relieve them and so by Spells till the Work be done which must never be given off till it be finished Every 100 Soldiers ought to have one Commission'd Officer one Serjeant and one Corporal to supervise those 100 Soldiers and see that they lose no time nor do their Work carelesly Some must be employ'd to cut Sods others to carry them to the Work either in Wheel or Handbarrows some must be appointed to lay them others to ram them and cut or pare them with a broad Spade some must break up the Earth of the Ditch others with Shovels must cast it up within the Sod Work always filling the Earth between the Sod as fast as the Sod Work rises and some must cut and bring Frith to mingle with the Earth which is cast up betwixt the exterior and interior facing of Sods which will hinder the Earth from sliding Some Generals allow half the Regiments which are off the Guard to be making the Hutts for themselves and for those which Work at the Line that thereby when they have done the Line they may have their Hutts ready to rest in and that their Comrades may provide for them their Straw and their Suppers This may well be allow'd in two Cases The first where the Army is so numerous and well provided that half the Soldiers of it may suddenly compleat the Line Secondly where you are certain no Enemy can assault you while your Line is a making But where you are not certain of both these especially of the latter all other Advantages must yield to that of the general Safety Whatever Utensils as Spades Shovels Pickaxes Wheel-barrows Handbarrows c. are the Kings and only lent to the Soldiers to make the Works the Commissary of those Stores is to give them by tail to the Commission'd Officer who first supervises the Soldiers who are to Work who is to give his receipt for them as the Officer who relieves him in that Duty must do the like to him who is relieved and the Officer of the last relief of all is to go with the Soldiers who are to carry them and deliver them up by tail to the Commissary who is thereupon to deliver up the first Officers receipt which the last Officer is to send or carry to him that night else the Kings Utensils would be imbezel'd to his damage and that of the service As to the Hutting and Camping of the Regiments when the Line is finished these Rules may be observed All along the four sides of the Line I would still leave the space of 300 Foot for the drawing up the Soldiers which are to defend the Line in case it be attacqued and for small Parties of Horse to scour it in case it be entred A Foot Company is to be lodged as follows supposing it to consist of 100 Men which will also serve for a general Rule for the Lodgment of one Regiment or 20 Regiments if the Army to be Camp'd consist of so many The Ground to lodge 100 Men in within an Intrench'd Camp is 300 Foot in length and 24 Foot in breadth out of which 300 Foot in length 40 Foot in length and 24 in breadth is taken for the Lodgment of the Captain between which Lodgment and the first of the Soldiers Hutts or Tents a void space is left of 20 Foot in length
or pitching their Tents punctually observed according  feet A Foot Regim t of 8 Comp. euery one 100 men bredth of its Lodgm t 276 B Foot Regim t of 9 such Companyes breadth 300 C Foot Regim t of 10 such Comp. breadth 324 D Foot Regim t of 11 such Comp. breadth 348 E Foot Reg t. of 12 such Comp. breadth 372 F Foot Reg t. of 13 such Comp. breadth 396 G Foot Reg t. of 14 such Comp. breadth 420 H Foot Reg t. of 15 such Comp. breadth 444 Souldiers 9200 Breadth of Lodgm t s 2880 foot 〈◊〉 Foot Reg t. of 8 Comp. euery one 150 men bredth 404 〈◊〉 Foot Reg t. of 9 such Comp. breadth 444 〈◊〉 Foot Reg t. of 10 such Comp. breadth 484 〈◊〉 Foot Reg t. of 11 such Comp. breadth 524 〈◊〉 Foot Reg t. of 12 such Comp. breadth 564 〈◊〉 Foot Reg t. of 13 such Comp. breadth 604 〈◊〉 Foot Reg t. of 14 such Comp. breadth 644 〈◊〉 Foot Reg t. of 15 such Comp. breadth 684 〈◊〉 Foot Reg t. of 16 such Comp. breadth 724 Soldiers of these 9 Reg t s 16200 Breadth of the Lodgm t. 5076 foot 〈◊〉 Horse Reg t. of 4 Troopes each 100 men bredth 388 〈◊〉 Horse Reg t. of 5 such Troops breadth 458 〈◊〉 Horse Reg t. of 6 such Troops breadth 528 〈◊〉 Horse Reg t. of 7 such Troops breadth 598 〈◊〉 Horse Reg t. of 8 such Troops breadth 668 〈◊〉 Horse Reg t. of 9 such Troops breadth 738 〈◊〉 Horse Reg t. of 10 such Troops breadth 808 â—…orse 4900 Breadth of the 7 Lodgem t s 4186 foot 〈◊〉 Generalls owne Lodgm t. breadth 600 〈◊〉 One Officer Generall Lodgm t. breadth 400 〈◊〉 One other Generall Officer Lodgm t breadth 300 〈◊〉 One other Gen ll Officer Lodgm t breadth 300 〈◊〉 Strangers Lodgment breadth 300 〈◊〉 Generall of y e Ordance Lodgm t breadth 450 〈◊〉 Lodgm t for y e sick breadth 300 〈◊〉 Lodgem t for y e Artilerye breadth 400 〈◊〉 Lodgem t s for y e Waggons Carts c breadth 500 〈◊〉 Lodgem t for y e Magazine of Victuall breadth 500 〈◊〉 Place for y e Markett breadth 400 〈◊〉 Piazza before y e Generalls Lodgm t breadth 400 â—…tall of y e breadth of these 12 Lodgements 4850 foot â—…e Numbers which are sett down in the â—…uerall Lodgem t s are the Numbers of feet â—…ontained in y e breadth of each Lodgem t Figure six This is the Lodgement of an Arâ—…y in six Lines of Lodgements the whole Consisting 7 Regimt s. of Horse which make in all 49â—…â—…n and 17 Reg t s of â—…oote which make in all 25400 The Generalls Lodgement 〈◊〉 Oâ—…ers Gen ll Gen ll of the Ordnance Traine Waggons Piazza Lodgem t s for strangers for the sick 〈◊〉 â—…gazines and Market place Place this foll â—…20 to the beforementioned Rules and that no time be lost The Romans in hot Weather made the Soldiers by turns to sprinkle well with Water all those Streets round their Line as also the Piazza other Streets and void places where the Officers and Soldiers use to walk all the day long and if something like this were done in Camps it would be of good use The distributing the Guards the Word and going the Rounds I would recommend to have observed in the Camp as in the Garison only if you suspect to be assaulted in your Camp you must have Parties of Horse Day and Night especially in the Night beating the wayes and scouring the Countrey on all sides that you may have timely notice for your defence And if you believe your Enemy will attempt you in the Night it would be adviseable to have great Piles of Wood and Fagots a convenient distance without your Line to set them on Fire when your Enemy is ready to begin his Work the better to see how effectively to bestow your small and great shot amongst them and still in case of Alarums or Assaults those Regiments must be led to defend that part of the Line which they are the nearest unto the like for the Horse and every Regiment must know the portion of the Line which they are to make good before there be need lest then it may be too late There seems to be ten Particulars which ought if they be attainable to be minded in Incamping an Army in a standing Camp I. That the Camp be setled in a safe place that is to say that no heighths or eminent Grounds be so near it as that an Enemy seizing on them on a sudden may both by seeing into your Camp or planting his Cannon and Mortar-pieces on those heighths annoy and disturb it II. If it be possible that it be seated on a Navigable River for by the benefit thereof the expences of bringing Victuals Ammunition and Forage will be cheap and expeditious but otherwise dear and slow if all be brought on the Axel-tree or Backs of Beasts for whatever is so brought the Bringers when it is for Sale so heighten the price as the poor Soldiers are hardly able to buy what they need But if you cannot Camp near a Navigable River you must never omit to have your standing Camp by a River for the dung of the Horses and the stanch of the Butcheries will else hazard the infecting the very Air of the Camp besides Water must still be at hand for the Soldiers the Horses and the Beasts of draught to drink and if Water can be brought about the Graff of your standing Camp or a great part of it it will thereby become the more safe and defensible I would still have the Butchers Quarter near the brink of the River that they may with the less pains rid their Quarters of all the filth which else will soon be nauseous in them III. Great care must be taken that no Woods or large Coppices be too near your Camp lest your Enemy lodging in them may from thence too safely annoy you and accommodate himself IV. A flat Champaign Ground is the most eligible to Incamp in because in such a Scituation the Enemy may be discover'd and seen afar off the Cannon of your Camp will be the more useful to you and prejudicial to him and when you find your opportunity you may the sooner and the more easily draw out your Army and put them in Battalia to fight V. A standing Camp though it be best posted in a Plain yet there must be no moorish or wet Ground in it for the Vapors which will thence incessantly arise may soon infect your Army VI. Great and strict Inquiry must be made whether the Plain your standing Camp is to be in cannot be overflow'd by the River near it if great Rains should happen and your own Engineers must diligently view if your Enemy in case he be the stronger by making great Dams below your Camp cannot force the River to overflow it though the greatest Rains will not do it as also whether your Enemy being in effect the powerfuller in the Field
may not turn the River from above your Camp into it in which cases if Floods if Dams below or turning of the River above may drown your Camp such a Scituation must not be made use of VII In scituating of a standing Camp you are to elect a place near to which you may have good Grazing for your Horses and Cattle Grounds proper for Medow which usually are near a River and Wood and Coppice both for Fuel and making your Hutts VIII If the River adjoining be Navigable or not alwayes fordable Bridges of Boats must be cast over it else you will be soon streightned by your Enemy and probably he will raise Mounts and Batteries on the other side the River which shall play into your Camp and exceedingly annoy it if not force you to abandon it and in disorder too whereby he will have too fair an opportunity to defeat you therefore before your Bridges of Boats are cast over the River you must immediately provide to secure them against they are cast over by raising Forts and Lines between the Forts in which you may draw up safely your Battalions and Squadrons and likewise furnish those Forts with good Artillery and man them alwayes sufficiently Also a competent distance above your standing Camp you must have a Boom or Cable under Water or Chain ready to draw across the River and cover and well defend them at both ends together with Boats well mann'd thereby to defeat any design of your Enemies by floating Engines he may make to destroy the Bridges of Boats IX The standing Camp must not be too scant nor too large but duly proportionate to the Army Train and Baggage you are to lodge in it and all the wayes unto it you must with your best industry secure and what you cannot secure you must spoil and make them useless to your Enemy X. Lastly If there be any Eminencies of Ground near your standing Camp and yet without your Line that invirons it you must secure those heighths not only by making Redoubts or Forts on the tops of them but also by making a Line if you have men enough to do it round about the foot of those heighths and you must make cover'd wayes from your Camp to those Redoubts or Forts the more safely to relieve them in case your Enemy vigorously should attack them nor is it amiss to have Mines under them to blow them up should your Enemy enter them whereby he will be the more endamaged if they enter or the more deterr'd from entring All Coppices and Woods which are at too much distance to be secured by a Line ought to be cut down or burnt to prevent those advantages which else in many wayes your Enemy will draw from them In making your Line you may have sometimes unequal Grounds through which you run it some being high and some low on the heighths of a standing Camp which are natural Cavaleers I would still make Forts and plant my longest Cannon on them Where the Ground is sandy or gravelly or for any cause apt to slide I would not depend on the facing of Sods but drive Poles into the Ground Wattle between them and fling the Earth which arises out of your Graft between the outwardmost and innermost Wattlings Where the Ground is Moorish on the Verge of your Line and is sometimes in dry Seasons passable by Horse or Foot I would with Pallisadoes and Stockades secure it or by many join'd Turnspikes or Chevaleers de Freze and without these I would during the whole length of the Moorish Grounds at a competent distance cut two or three broad and deep Ditches which will fill themselves with Water and thereby discourage your Enemy to attack you in the weakest part of your Line or if he did assault you there much incommodate him and render it almost impossible for him to make use of his Horse in the attempt I have also known in such cases several Lines of deep and pretty large holes without but near your Line made at unequal distances and cover'd with slight Hurdles with a little Earth strew'd over them both to intangle an assaulting Enemy if he know it not or discourage him if he knows or has cause to suspect it for it were Temerity with Foot only to enter the Line of an inviron'd Camp where Horse and Foot and Cannon are ready to welcome them and by the immediately beforemention'd methods it will be difficult if possible for him in case his Foot enter to have them seconded by his Cavalry without which they are much likelier to be driven out than to be successful I would likewise for the better defence of those feebler parts of your Line erect Batteries and Redoubts within it the better to defend them and to rake your Enemy should he enter There are several Cares indispensably incumbent on a Commander in chief who posts himself in an intrenched standing Camp I shall enumerate some I. To have a Countrey behind his standing Camp to supply it constantly and at reasonable Rates with Victuals Forage and all other Necessaries and to preserve it both from the incursions of the Enemy and from the insultings or injury of his own Army II. To secure throughly those Towns Forts or Fortresses nearest to his Camp and in which he lodges his Magazines which are to supply him when the Countrey cannot or will not do it longer and therefore he ought alwayes before his Enemies are near whereby they may awe the Countrey from supplying him or the People of it may make that the pretence to get into those places with great diligence all the Victuals and Forage he can and from thence to furnish himself with what his Camp cannot contain or cannot be laid up dry in it but still to have as much Provision within the Line of his Camp as possibly he can for there 't is safest and at hand for Bisket Cheese Butter Meal and such like meats may be long kept in good condition in little room and are ready for food without Cookery if the Countrey be not perfectly well affected to the General he ought to take Hostages from it to supply the Victuals Forage and other Necessaries at the rates times and quantities which shall be agreed upon these Hostages if well chosen and diligently kept within the Camp will make the Countrey punctual in performing and be a sufficient answer to make those of it who would starve the Camp or the Enemy who else might frighten them from supplying it that they dare not but obey because their Hostages else will suffer As the chief Commander of such a standing Camp must make his agreement on equal terms with the Countrey for his sustenance out of it and see to their punctual performance of it so he must as punctually pay the Country according to his Contract since Fear and Gain are usually the most operative motives with the People to make good all Agreements III. The Convoys of Horse and Foot which are to
secure those who must supply your Camp must never omit their duties in punctually meeting rather before than after the hour and in carefully conveying what is brought to the Camp and must be strong in proportion to the need for should such Parties fail of meeting the Countrey at the set time and place it might discompose all your Affairs discourage the Bringers of Necessaries and give them but too much cause to fail by your example or should the Convoys by being weak or negligent be defeated by the Enemy or the disaffected of the Countrey you would not only lose that one Supply but too probably deter the Countrey from coming with another IV. The Major General and Commissary General of the Horse must make all the Regiments of Horse and Foot do equal and proportionate duty according to their Numbers in going on such Convoys for which end they ought to keep exact and written Lists of all the Parties they send on such employments from time to time and inform the General of them else if by favor any be exempted or favor'd the duty will be the heavier and the discontents the higher V. If the places in which the standing Magazines are setled which must supply the Camp be at a great distance from it or may have the Wayes infested by the Enemy Forts ought to be erected and well mann'd at competent distances the one from the other into which should any of your Convoys be unexpectedly fallen upon they may shelter themselves and what they Convoy till relieved from the Camp for all such attempts from the Enemy are sudden and by surprize and they dare not stay to force such a Fort lest they draw the Camp upon them besides when every two or three miles there are such Forts erected in the fittest places they do not only make the Convoys march the more securely and discourage your Enemy from attempting them but also the Countrey People without Convoys are the more invited to bring their Provisions for your sustenance VI. If I foresaw my Enemy would endeavor to straiten my standing Camp by possessing the Countrey about it I would immediately burn and drive whatever I could not secure in my Magazines or within my Line the sooner to necessitate him to dislodge so that no two Particulars are more carefully and speedily to be perform'd than to secure your own Victuals and Forage and to destroy all that your Enemy will otherwise be Master of and doubtless the first and most important duty of a General is to provide Food and Ammunition for his Army for men can live and fight without Pay but can do neither without Food and Ammunition and he who intrenches well his Camp and hath Food the longest must in time have the better of that War without fighting though his Enemy be his Superior in strength Gaspar de Coligny Admiral of France and who in military knowledge has been exceeded by few if by any Captains in past Ages would often say War is a great Monster which begins to be form'd by the Belly meaning that Food ought to be the very first care of a General for his Army A standing Camp thus situated fortified and provided for may truly be said to be in a good posture but in regard all these desirable Particulars beforemention'd are not usually to be compassed in all places whatever is defective by Nature must be supplied by Art and Industry There are several Orders for the well regulating a Camp within it self which ought to be given punctually observed and the Breakers of them indispensibly punish'd I. That all Cursing Swearing Lying Stealing Drawing a Sword and Quarrelling be exemplarily punish'd both in those who are the Guilty and in those who knowing it do not detect it for which end daily Court Martials ought to be held that the Faulty may as soon suffer as their Offences are proved that the Officers and Soldiers daily come to the Service of God at the times the several Chaplains of the Regiments are appointed to officiate for without the blessing of Almighty God how can any so much as hope to prosper Yet alas how debauch'd are the Generality of the Soldiery who hourly as it were carrying their lives in their hands ought most of all men to be prepared for death yet they of all other Vocations are too frequently the least fitted for it and though God himself does at all times and on all persons forbid Wickedness yet he repeatedly does it to the Soldiery in the XXIII Chapter of Deuteronomy and the 9th Verse viz. When the Host goeth forth against thine Enemies then keep thee from every wicked thing If we own God to be our General which who dares deny he is since he is pleas'd to call himself the Lord of Hosts we ought to obey his commands and punish those who break them else we shall be found to be more obedient to a General than to our God II. That the Camp be kept exceeding clean which is not only decent but healthy That none of the Soldiers do their Easements within it but in some convenient places at least 100 Foot without it as the Martials of every Regiment shall appoint either in the River or Brook or in some Pits to be digged by every Regiment for that end That the Troopers every morning and evening be made carry out of the Line all the dung of their Horses That the Butchers do the like as to all the filth in their Shambles and be made kill their Beeves Sheep c. out of the Camp and that all dung and filth be buried and that the Suttlers and Victuallers keep their Cellars and Kitchins sweet and that the latter be still cover'd with Sods or raw Hides for fear of Fire III. No man without express leave of his Officer is to go further than Cannon-shot out of the Camp nor lie out of the Camp under a most severe Penalty IV. That none be admitted who are Suttlers or Victuallers to entertain Soldiers at Night after the Warning-piece is gone off nor in the morning until the Reveille be beaten V. That none be admitted Suttlers or Victuallers but by the Martial General who is with his Under-Officers to take care that no bad Meat or Drink be sold to the Soldiers or good sold at unreasonable Rates That he set the price on all the Camp Provisions which are daily sold and are not supplied out of the Magazine nor must any thing be sold amongst the private Soldiery but by his or his Officers Licence and by sound of Drum to prevent the sale of stol'n Goods to detect the Thieves and to hinder many other mischiefs Many such and other Orders are given in standing Camps and Leaguers according to the Wisdom of the General the Discipline of the Army or the present condition of the Countrey I have the longer and more particularly insisted on this part of the Art of War of intrench'd Incampings because it is what in England we have not been much
accustomed unto and therefore are generally the less knowing in it for I have seen eminent Commanders there when they came with Armies for the War of Ireland so great Strangers to the Rules of it as their Camps appeared to me to be like Fairs and some of them not only have ingeniously acknowledged to me they were to seek in that great part of War but condescended to inform themselves from me what I could tell them on that Subject choosing rather to confess their ignorance that they might mend it than to continue under it though I heartily wished them a better Instructer I also have been convinced by reading the Greek and Roman Histories that they ow'd as much of their Conquests to their well Incamping as to their other excellent Military Discipline and their Valor it would be almost endless to enumerate what Kingdoms and Provinces they kept in obedience by their standing Camps and how often they stop'd the invasions of Torrents of barbarous Nations as they were pleas'd to term them by the same proceeding and having first wearied out their Enemies by such safe and beneficial delayes then on some great advantages they would give them Battel and defeat them none of which they could have effected or rationally have attempted but by their thoroughly knowing how to Incamp advantageously by constantly practising it and by a timely providing of Food and Forage I have likewise observed these few last Years that the French who have not only many eminent Commanders if not the most of any one Nation and daily improve the Art of making War have begun to revive and with great benefit to themselves this almost obsolete part of it For I take the Prince of Conde to be one of the famousest Captains that any Age hath produced and I observed when the Prince of Orange the Imperialists under the Count de Souches and the Flemish Forces were united the Prince of Conde who was sent to oppose them would not give them Battel but Incamped himself advantageously on the French Frontiers so that they justly apprehended to enter them and leave him at their backs whereby he kept them long at a Bay and when he found his opportunity gave them at Seneff so considerable a blow as the French from having been on the defensive they became afterwards the Assaulters and closed that Campagne by taking some of their Enemies Garisons The Mareschal de Turenne also who was sent General to the War in Germany and who in the Military Art had hardly a Superior having there to do with the Count de Montecuculi who I believe has not been excell'd by any Captain in any Age would still by intrench'd Incampings when the Germans were the strongest preserve himself and Army by spinning out the time and cover those Territories and places he had won while he had been the most powerful and to me it seems a thing very worthy observation that after by the Mareschal de Turenne's being kill'd when the French King sent the Prince of Conde from the Army in Flanders to command his Army in Germany he did also by intrench'd Incampings weather that Storm which in it self was so threatning not only by the sudden loss of so great a Captain but also by the Germans being led by the Count de Montecuculi and the present Duke of Lorrain two persons as considerable as the very Forces they lead I say it seems to me very worthy of observation that two such justly celebrated Commanders as the Prince of Conde and Monsieur Turenne should observe the very same methods in managing the same War whereas usually when one General succeeds another in heading the same Army and ordering the same War the last Comer judges it a kind of diminution to his own skill to tread in the very paths of his Predecessors but the Prince of Conde not doing so thereby in my poor opinion renders three things evident I. That he truly judged himself so justly secure in his own Reputation as it could receive no diminution in following the steps of the dead General especially he having done the like before and successfully in Flanders II. That a wise and great Captain will rather by his actings confirm that course to be best if it be so in it self by imitating his Predecessor than try new methods of War whereby out of but a meer hope to do the like thing by a different way he may hazard his Reputation his Army and the Countrey he is to cover and protect III. What two such Generals have practised all circumstances consider'd is to me an Evincement that by Camps intrenched and well posted a Countrey may be best secured an invading Enemy may be best resisted and in time all advantages being taken in the nick may be defeated or made retire As the French King manages his Wars on the German side by his Captains and makes it oftner defensive there than invasive so on the Flanders side he makes it generally offensive and leads his Armies himself which is the solidest way to be successful some few of the many Reasons why I believe it is the very best way for a King to lead his own Armies I shall here set down I. It evidences he has a Genius to the Wars else he would not himself be at the head of his own Armies and that makes the Nobility and Gentry of his Kingdom Warlike since all Subjects of Quality generally addict themselves to what they find their Prince is most inclined II. No Prince is likely to be so well served or is so well served as he who with his own eyes sees who are active or remiss in their duties to reward the first and punish the last III. How many opportunities to be victorious are lost by a Generals sending for and staying to receive Orders from his Prince all which by his own being on the place are laid hold of and improved IV. How many brave men will not go to the War if the Prince be not there in person who if he be cannot then be kept from the honour and duty of waiting on him V. How many valiant men of his Guards are to attend his person which if it be not with his Army is thereby deprived of so many good Fighters VI. How many good heads may be consulted with in the Army when the King is there who would not be drawn thither unless he were there either by reason of their crazy healths or believing it below them to be in an Army where any commanded but themselves or some such other Considerations VII How many Garisons may be bought and Commanders bought off from the Enemy when the King in person is the Merchant which otherwise would not listen to or trust to the Bargains offer d by his General It were endless to enumerate all the real advantages which a Sovereign has who makes War in person against Enemies which make War only by their Generals nor can there be almost a larger illustration of the truth
of what I have said than what we have seen with our own eyes these three last Years even that the French King singly not only makes War in effect against all the Continents of Europe but also gains rather than loses Ground which possibly could hardly be done by him though he is a great and brave Prince himself though he has a large and noble Monarchy many eminent Commanders and almost an innumerable company of good subaltern Officers and is absolute and has all his Territories united and fronting upon the Countries of almost all his Enemies If to all these advantages he did not in person often lead his Armies where he means to make his chief impressions and if he did not by intrench'd Incampings oppose by his Generals those of his Enemies who else might invade his Dominions and if he did not also excellently manage the Wars on his side and if he were not also help'd by his Confederated Enemies being intangled under many inconveniencies and hinder'd by many obstructions I say if all these did not concur it would seem to me almost impossible to do as he does especially since he hath also at the same time engaged himself in the protection of the Messineses with his Maritine and Land Forces whose Militia he must not only pay but what is worse feed the useless mouths of both Sexes and of all Ages and which perhaps is more than all this he must send all things to them in his Fleets by a long Navigation and hinder'd therein by the joint Naval Forces of Spain and the United Provinces so that many conclude he may gain more fame by extending his Arms so far abroad even while he has so much need of them near home than solid benefit by engaging in that revolted Peoples defence unless some considerable Emergencies be favourable unto him but yet on the other side why may it not be believed that the inuring his Subjects to Navigation and Sea-fights is singly worth the expence of that Sicilian War and indeed all things rightly consider'd perhaps he could not more usefully attempt the attaining that end than by making War in the Mediterranean Sea against Spain for thereby he gives His Majesty and the States of the United Provinces less jealousie than if he managed it in any other of the European Seas he makes the War laborious chargeable and tedious to the States if they pay their Mediterranean Fleet or to Spain if that King be at the sole expence of doing it It is also no little augmentation of his Glory that France which till his Reign was so little considerable at Sea and that Spain which though during the Reign of King Philip the Second made Europe and the Ottoman empire apprehend his Armada's yet cannot now even in conjunction with the Fleet of the States hinder France from frequently relieving of Messina and the other revolted places of the Island of Sicily nay in Sea-Battels has forced his way to that end so that all things duely weighed perhaps the French Monarch could not make a more hopeful War by Sea than this to train up his Subjects to fight on that Element if he aspires to be as formidable on it as he is actually on the Land which may not be unreasonably presumed he does by the Stupendious and Royal Foundations he has laid for the building of Ships and equipping them and for the educating his Subjects to Navigation and encouraging them to pursue that Calling and by the numerous and stately Navy he has built in a very few Years which is such as some believe may at the present equal for Number and size even the Fleet Royal of England or the Navy of the States and should this be true may it not be more likely that he may ten Years hence if not sooner attempt to give the Law at Sea then that ten Years past he should be so strong in Ships of War as now he is especially if while his Navy is growing he can render his own Subjects capable to manage it for 't is easier to increase Fleets than at first to build them So that this Messinese War which some consider as a blemish in his Politicks may be none of the least depths of them But since I have asserted two particulars viz. the French Kings excellent management of his Wars and the advantage he reaps by the intanglements and difficulties which his Confederated Enemies are under I esteem my self obliged to set down some of my Grounds for those two Assertions I. I find that having so many formidable Armies to deal with and being thereby unable to have Forces both to face every one of them and reserve Armies also he is very cautious to avoid a general decisive Battel lest the loss of it might hazard his Monarchy II. He has been usually in the Field about the beginning of March and by having his Armies excellently well provided and frankly hazarding his Soldiery he has taken in 18 or 19 Weeks before the whole Confederacy can imbody more Countries and important Garisons than they have retaken in the six succeeding Months after they are imbodied III. Being an absolute Monarch and having none in his Armies but such as depend on his Will he may alwayes pursue the Councel which is in it self best and may execute it with expedition and secresie so that having resolved where to make his impression in the very opening of the Spring he provides in the Neighbouring Territories his Magazines for Victuals and Forage accordingly and thereby what supplies him with both doth disable those Territories to supply his Enemies on the place should they come to raise any of his Sieges with an Army formed of the Forces of the whole Confederacy And by his having formerly secured or consumed all Meat and Forage near his Leageurs makes it impossible for the other in that ill season of the Year to carry all of both forts on the Axle-tree sufficient for themselves though it were but for a few dayes and having by his Lines of Circumvallation made it almost an act of Temerity to attempt to force them he makes it also an impossibility to constrain him to raise his Sieges by a diversion For what place can they besiege in a Season when the earth yields no sustenance for Man or Horse and when they have not Magazines of both laid in beforehand to supply them And if they should attempt to raise his Sieges but by such part of the Forces of the Confederacy as can carry Provision and Forage with them on the Axle-tree or by Boats 't is much more than an even Wager that they will repent it sooner than he IV. Since the Germans are the greatest force of the Confederacy by his so early in the Year attacking the Spaniards Flemish Territories he renders the German assistance useless to those Countries in that Season since 't is almost a Winters march to lead Armies timely enough from the Centre or remote parts of the Empire where commonly
the defensive and cover what they have took and in my weak judgment they do at least as much by their alwayes providing well to eat and by their intrenched Incampings as by their good Fighting which questionless is the most hopeful and the most solid way of making War for it has been for many Ages a standing Military Axiom That the lesser Army if it can feed and avoid being forced to fight it will weary out the greater Army in no long time These are some of the many Reasons which induced me to commend the French Kings excellent manner of managing this War and why I cannot readily believe the results of this ensuing Summer will be so great as many think I shall now mention some of those Inconveniences and Intanglements which his Confederated Enemies seem to me to lie under and which are so helpful to him I. That Union being made up of many absolute Sovereigns and States some of the highest some of the middle and some of the lesser size nothing can be designed much less attempted by them but by joint consent and after long consultations at which since the Sovereigns cannot be personally present they must be carried on by their Ministers whereby before any thing can be finally resolved much time is consumed motions are much slower than the Nature of War requires the due secresie of designs cannot be observed on which depends the life of all Military Action and such Resolutions as possibly in themselves are the very best are usually opposed by those of them who find not their particular Interests in the observing and pursuing them II. When after much time and labour during a whole Winter all the Confederates agree how the War shall be best managed the ensuing Summer it is great odds but all or the most considerable measures then taken will be broken again for they only knowing their own Project for the Campania and not their Enemies his early actings may necessitate them to alter theirs in which case most of the Summer will be consumed in concerting how it shall be employed This uncertainty during which their Armies are at a gaze does not only give great Advantages to an active and vigilant Enemy who is resolved what to do and vigorously prosecutes his designs but also slackens the courage of their own Soldiery towards which no one thing can more contribute than Irresolution in their Superiors Nor is it a possible thing at least in my humble opinion to order a War as it ought to be when those who command in it must on all Emergencies send to their Masters for new directions And therefore the Romans as jealous as they were of their liberty never were imbark'd in a dangerous War indeed but they created a Dictator who was absolute for the time being and who was not fetter'd with the necessity of sending to the Senate for new Orders on new Accidents but was at his liberty to improve them on the place All which confirms on the account of Reason what Experiment in all Ages has clearly evinced which is That a Monarch who is at the Head of his own Armies has a hopefuller Game to play in War than many mighty Princes who compose a League and act by several Generals and are acted by various Interests III. Though the opposing the formidable and growing Power of France was the true Cement of the present Confederacy and Union yet as by the greatness of their own strength their fears of France lessen so many of it cool in their first vigor lest by too much humbling their Enemy abroad they may too much heighten their greatest Allies at home and so what in shew renders the League the stronger does in effect weaken the actings of it IV. Oftentimes they can neither agree to divide what they have gotten nor how they shall divide what they may get though possibly the dividing of the Bears skin is more easily agreed unto before he is kill'd than after and possibly also those of the Confederacy which are weary of the War had rather make their being unsatisfied with their Partition past or to come the pretence of their withdrawing or remissness than to own they are tyred with the charge trouble and hazard they undergo and then how apt are such Princes or States to listen to a Neutrality if offer'd by the French V. What differences are and must be raised every Winter how the Armies shall be then quarter'd for some Sovereigns which are the least rich and have the scantest Territories yet have the fittest to make Winter Quarters in and whereby posting great Bodies of the Soldiery they may be the better able to resist the incursions of their Enemy and to make successful ones into his Territories but if such Winter Quarters be granted by the lesser Princes and States than those who are to be least Gainers by the War undergo the greatest burthen of it and suffer the most considerable damage by it And if they will not quarter the Forces where they are most useful then not only the whole Union suffers thereby but also those lesser Princes themselves and their Subjects who not being willing to be eaten up by their Friends and unable to resist with their own Forces those of France become a Prey unto the latter to avoid being devoured by the former Nay sometimes the necessity of the common safety and benefit makes the stronger of the Confederacy take Winter Quarters on the weaker without or against the permission of the Princes themselves whereby Animosities are raised in which Friends to the Wrong'd or fear of being in the future under the like usage makes others share in the discontents and resentments And such Forces as are quarter'd in any Princes Territories against his leave are thereby all the Winter put on double duty that against the Enemy and that against the People of the Countrey who else would by surprize revenge their Princes Affront and prevent their own farther Sufferings So that their Winter-quarters which should be to refresh them against the Spring is frequently more harassing to them than all the Summer Service is or can be VI. Since the War is pursued by several Armies at once and consequently a greater Monarchs Forces is to be often united with those of a lesser many difficulties arise about the chief Command in an Army so composed and greater mischiefs are too frequently the inseparable consequences of its being so composed For where the two Sovereign Powers whose Troops make that Body have their distinct Generals in it though one of them be made the Superior as to Command yet Battels are not to be given nor Sieges undertook or continued without the concurrence of the other General who perhaps if the hazards both Armies are to undergo be to redound to the benefit of his own Master singly or chiefly will be more inclined to embark in them than he will be if the result of the Success be more for the advantage of his Colleague whereby
a better or more prosperous Conduct of Affairs than that under the late Administration has been Now whether that Conduct shall consist in acting by Maxims diametrically opposite to the former or in heightning considerably of those does depend upon the judgment or inclinations of him that sits at the Helm or on the state of things as they are then circumstantiated But that Don Iohn should attempt or hope to incline his Master to a separate Peace is not very likely since to do it nay perhaps but to attempt it will be dangerous in it self ungrateful to the Confederates and in all likelihood is not solidly and durably attainable And to endeavor to gain all the rest of the Union to it or the major or weightier number of them looks more unlikely to be effected for neither has there ever yet been made so numerous or so strong an Union against France as this now is and it may be no Age has seen that so many Monarchs and States and of such various Interests and Religions should be at once so firmly Confederated which perhaps nothing could have brought about had not the Examples of the Duke of Lorrain and some other Sovereigns of the lesser size filled all of them with so great apprehensions of the like usage as nothing could allay but such a League which since they have after the employing of much time treasure and industry so happily made 't is not probable they will dissolve it especially when their Affairs seem more promising and that notwithstanding this stupendious League they have hitherto lost Ground Whereby none of them all nor no less than all of them can judge himself safe til by the Forces of all they have by Arms reduced this deluge of France into its first and natural Channel For to think to do this by a Treaty looks very improbable to me because the French King is yet too high in his hopes and strength to fall so low as to give more by a Treaty than it may be he can lose by a War and none of his Enemies can well think themselves secure but by keeping fast this knot which was so long a tying and which experimentally they have found has been their common safety and that in nothing less can it well be found so that the continuance of the War appearing to be the likeliest measure that can be taken 't is hardly to be believed that Don Iohn whose Genius is for Arms and his Education has been in them will draw his Masters Sword but half out but if he unsheaths it 't will be to purpose which yet as I think can hardly be done but by being at the head of a brave Army and possibly getting his young Monarch to be personally present and thereby making an effective Invasion on the Southwest parts of France For no Ministry that preceded his did of late attempt it and yet the only attempting it may give more solid Advantages to the whole Union than hitherto all the Arms of Spain has done as they have been order'd nor may he in any other way more acceptably Apologize to the Emperor in particular and to the rest of the Union in general for having got the Queen Regent out of the Government than by his own being more beneficial to him and them in it Besides the present complexion of the Affairs of Spain seems such that it may be his only true interest to be considerable in Arms which he can never be but by being great with the Sword-men and that he can never hope for but by being at the head of them and leading them to daring and high Attempts All this seems to manifest 't is not improbable he may invade the French Pyrenean Frontiers for there only he can be so considerable and at once both so useful abroad and safe at home on which last there seems a necessity on him to fix one Eye as the other on the humbling of France lest otherwise the late Ministry of Spain get again into the Saddle I beg the Reader 's pardon for this long digression which perhaps I may the sooner obtain when he shall be pleased to consider that I was partly drawn into it by observing how useful this revived Part of the Art of War of posting Armies in Intrench'd Camps has lately been to those who have well understood and on fit occasions practised it And though all which I have now said is not properly congruous to the Title I have given to this one Chapter yet it may not be altogether impertinent to what the whole Book treats of for the successful active part of the Art of War has no less dependency on the considerative part of it than the effect has on the cause and what I have so weakly and disorderly exposed may yet furnish a solid and fertile judgment with no ill Reflections and Notions on this Great Subject Of Battels ALL who have commanded Armies or written of the Military Art have universally agreed That no one Act of War is so great in it self or in the Consequences of it as Fighting a Battel since the winning of one has not only been the cause of taking of the Place besieged if in the Field the Army is defeated which comes to relieve it but also by the gaining of the Victory a Province nay a Kingdom has often been the Reward of the Victorious But as the Advantages are eminent to him who wins it so the Prejudices are no less to him who loses it and therefore nothing ought to be more exactly consider'd and weigh'd in War than whether a decisive Battel shall be given before the resolution to fight it is taken There is hardly any thing which seems to me more essentially needful to a great Captain than perfectly to know and lay hold of all advantages in a day of Battel and to know all the disadvantages that he may avoid them I shall therefore in what I write on this Subject specifie some general Rules or Principles which in my opinion ought never to be unknown or unpractised by a General or Commander in chief I. The first is to be so vigilant and careful as not to be forced against his will to come to a Battel but if he is so unhappy or faulty as not to avoid it then to be sure to disguise it from his Army by his words looks and actions since for a chief Commander to evidence Fear or Amazement or to own he has been over-reach'd by his Enemy before he is gotten out of the ill consequences and effects of 〈◊〉 â—…oes to that degree deject his own men that they are half conquer'd before they fight For the Generality of the Soldiery in an Army have their Senses much better than their Understanding and consequently take their Omen of Victory usually from the chearful looks and words of their General who ought therefore in no wise to seem disanimated or doubtful but alwayes chearful and confident II. The second is That no General
should resolve to give his Enemy Battel but on rational or at least very probable Grounds that he shall win it and also when the advantages of gaining it will be greater than the prejudices will be if he should lose it for whoever elects to fight a Battel on other Considerations cannot answer the doing it to his Prince to the Army he leads or to his own Judgment and Conscience III. The third is Whoever has his Enemy at such an advantage as he must submit in a short time without hazarding a Field ought on no terms to expose his Army to a Battel but should derive that from Time and Patience which else he must leave to the decision of Fortune As within my own memory I have known That a General greedy of Honour and impatient of Delay when by the wise conduct of those under him or the ill conduct of those against him his Enemies Army was so coop'd up that it could not long subsist nor Force its way he drew his own Army off of the Passes which shut up his Adversary that he might come out and decide it by a Battel which he lost and deservedly For the turns in a Battel are so many and are often occasion'd by such unexpected Accidents which also proceed from such minute Causes that a wise and great Captain will expose to Chance only as much as the very Nature of War requires IV. The fourth is When a Battel is resolved upon the Field to fight it in ought to be answerable to the Numbers of your Army and the quality of your Forces As for Example You should never choose a Ground to fight on if you can possibly avoid it which you cannot fill up with your fighting and reserve Squadrons and Battalions or as 't is now usually call'd your first and second Line That is you must still endeavor to cover the outward flanks of your Wings with a River a Wood a moorish Ground or something equivalent for else you will expose your Army too much if your Enemy does overwing you Whereas if you cannot be charg'd but in front you will have the less to fear and your Adversary the less to hope For Instance If I found my Army drawn up in Battalia would take up in its utmost extent but 15000 Foot I would not choose to fight in a Plain that was 20000 Foot wide if my Enemies Army were either more numerous than mine or were stronger in Cavalry than I But if by some Accident which I could not foresee or possibly avoid I were to fight on such a Ground I would immediately cover one or if possibly both of my Flanks with what the Nature of the Place afforded as besides a River a Brook a moorish Ground a Wood or Coppice or a steep Ground with a Ditch or Trench or some place so incumbred as my Adversaries Horse could not fall on that Flank without disordering himself before and in his doing of it But in case the Ground was so level and clear as it afforded me none of those Advantages which would be an extraordinary thing I would then by my Carriages or by immediately casting up a long and large Ditch or Trench on my Flanks supply by industry what I could not otherwise attain And if I had leisure at the two ends of each of these Ditches or Barricade of Wagons especially at the Front end I would cast up a Sconce Redoubt or Fort and stuff it with Musketeers whereby the Flank of my Wings would be covered and the Front and Rear of them defended by those Musketeers 'T was almost thus that Lewis Prince of Conde acted in the Battel at St. Denis in the Reign of King Francis the First of France And had not only thereby the Resolution with an handful of the French Protestants to fight the Constable of Montmorancy whose Army was three times as great as his but also to make it so disputable who had the Victory that the Historians of those Times give it without seruple to the Party they were of and wrote for And it seems indeed but doubtful who had the Victory for the next morning the Prince and the Admiral Chastillion by Andelot's being joined with them who brought them not above 1000 men with which until then he made the River of Seine useless to the Parisians drew up their Army again in the Field of Battel and shot some Peals of Cannon even into Paris yet none of that King's Forces came out to fight them so that the Protestants having for a few hours brav'd the French King's Forces and that vast City marched away towards Champagne to meet their German Relief But on the other hand the Historians who were Royallists attribute this wholly to the death of the Constable and not only to the Consternation which it caused but also to the Irresolution of the Counsels who should succeed him since the Duke of Anjou who at last did was by many judged too young for so weighty a Charge and it is reasonably to be believed he would not then have been nominated but that the Queen Regent was irremoveably setled not to lodge in such intricate times the absolute Military Power in any of the House of Guise or in that of Montmorancy but in one who intirely depended on her and would be guided by her And 't is probable that the Protestants who doubtless had been much disordered in the Battel durst not have made that Bravade depending only on their own strength but at least as much on the irresolution and disputes of their Enemies who should be their new General And therefore having set the best face they could on their tottering Affairs for a short time judged it not adviseable to continue playing that part any longer than they believed they might do it safely by the King's Army being without a Head I have only instanced this Particular to manifest how a lesser Army may oppose a much greater in Battel if the Flanks of the lesser be so well covered as that it can only be charged in Front which ought alwayes indispensibly to be provided for Nor is it only needful where a Battel is to be fought to pitch on a Ground answerable to the Number of your Army but also answerable to the quality of those Forces which compose it and to those of your Enemies with whom you must have to do As if my Enemy were stronger than I in Cavalry I would avoid all I might fighting him in a Plain or if I were the stronger in Horse I would use my utmost industry to engage him in an open Countrey And on the contrary if I were stronger in Infantry I would shun the Combat unless it were in an inclosed Country or incumbred by Woods Brooks Coppices Rocks or moorish Grounds so if he were the stronger in Foot I would avoid fighting in a place where he who has the most Infantry may therefore have the most hopes of Victory But if you are commanded to fight by your
Prince or are engaged to do it to answer an end worthy the hazard of a Battel or for any such other rational Consideration great care must be alwayes taken to make choice of that Ground which is fittest for you both in respect of your own Forces as also of your Enemies And in a most particular manner if you are weakest in Foot to cover them the best you can with your Horse and on the contrary if you are weakest in Horse to cover them with your Foot V. The Ranging of an Army in Battel to the very best advantage is a great furtherance to the winning of the Victory But the so doing of it depends much not only on the Wisdom and Skill of the General the Nature of the Ground and the Quality of his own Forces but also on those of his Enemies and on the disposition of him who commands them so that although no standing Rules can be given to answer all these varieties yet some positive Maxims may be set down which if punctually observed as things are circumstantiated may beneficially answer all occasions and emergencies And I the rather say this because I have seldom found that the greatest Captains of elder times whose military knowledge and practice the Moderns justly value and extol have ever observed one and the same form in giving Battel but have varied therein considerably according to the occasion Cyrus being to fight against Croesus King of Lydia and in a large Plain fearing to be inviron'd drew up his Army but Twelve deep in File whereas formerly the File was 24 deep Whereby he augmented the Front of his Army double overwing'd Croesus's and won the Victory Caesar at the Battel of Pharsalia against Pompey did quite alter the manner of the Roman Imbattelling For having found that Pompey exceedingly outnumbred him in Horse he covered one of his Flanks with a little River and drew all his Cavalry to the other Flank among the Squadrons whereof he placed Bodies of his best Infantry and there he began the Battel Where by having all his Horse in one Wing and those accompanied by select Legionary Foot he soon Routed that half of Pompey's Horse which opposed all his and then falling into the Flanks and Rear of his Enemy won the Victory These two are very remarkable Instances which among many others verifie what I have said I shall now mention some of those standing Maxims which in my humble Opinion are indispensibly to be observed immediately before and in a day of Battel 1. The first is With great diligence to view so well the Field you will fight in as when you have drawn up your Army on it you may not afterwards alter the Order of it or change your Ground for all such Mutations in the Face of your Enemy are very dangerous and gives him also the greater Confidence and your own Men the less as being an evidence to both of a great Failure in Conduct And it may also be highly hazardous either to remove the whole or even some gross Squadrons or Battalions to the Ground which on second thoughts may be believed the better Ground of the two since your Enemy being then near may take the benefit which such disorders while the alteration is making may give him and may improve it to your total overthrow so that 't is in my poor Opinion more adviseable to keep the Ground and Order you are in though by your oversight neither should be the very best than to alter it in the sight of your Enemy and when he is near And all changes of Grounds or Order in his view ought never to be made in Gross Bodies but almost insensibly to them and your own Army by a few Files at a time and where they cannot be so made 't is better to leave them unmade I had been often told but could scarcely credit it that at the fatal Battel of Naseby after my Lord Fairfax his Army was drawn up in view of His Majesties it having been judged that the Ground a little behind them was better than that they stood upon they removed thither I had the opportunity some time after to discourse on this Subject with Major General Skippon who had the chief ordering of the Lord Fairfax his Army that day and having ask'd him if this were true he could not deny it And when I told him I almost admir'd at it for the Reasons before exprest he averr'd he was against it but he obeyed the Orders for doing it only because he could not get them altered After the Ground to fight on is well chosen and all the advantages of it discovered then to possess and to secure the most useful and commanding Posts of it with all imaginable diligence As King Henry IV. of France did at the Battel of Arques where that great Monarch shewed as much conduct as any of the Greek and Roman Generals ever did in any of their greatest Battels II. The second is If you come near your Enemy but yet so late in the day that the Battel must be defer'd till the next morning then if the Season be sharp to shelter your own Army in the most convenient Villages and Woods adjoining to the Field you will fight in and thereby give them all the cease you can as King Henry IV. of France did the night before the Battel of Iuri But you must not on any terms neglect the safety of your Army for the ease of it and therefore it must be Quarter'd or Camp'd so well as that on the touch of the Drum all may be Embattled and ready to receive your Enemy For which end great Corps de Gards ought to be advanced and many Centinels as covertly as may be placed near the Enemy and every moment visited and relieved by vigilant Officers These Centinels or Perdu's are to give instant Notice to the advanced Guards if the Enemy moves and those Guards with their Seconds or Reserves are to find the Enemy play while your Army is drawing up to receive him But still fresh Troops must be sent to sustain your advanced Corps de Gard if they are vigorously attacked lest by their being totally overthrown your Enemy be encouraged to push at All and your own Men be somewhat disheartned For it may so happen that your Enemy if he finds all the advantages of the Place to fight in are so well secured by your care and diligence as that the next day it may be hazardous to fight in that Field he may make choice in the night if you are not Intrenched to attempt you where the confusion which darkness usually engenders may be equally divided between both Parties this of the two being the more eligible Nor were it amiss but very adviseable if you have to deal with a General who is hot and undertaking or one who by the necessity of his Affairs must put All to hazard that in such Nights when you are near your Enemy and may for the beforementioned Reasons have
raise the Siege of a place which otherwise can hardly hold out longer in my poor judgment it is not adviseable to defend the ordinary Line of Circumvallation but to draw out of it and give the Enemy Battel if your Men be as good your Numbers as great as his and that your Ground you fight on be as fit for you as him Some of the Reasons and Experiments which induce me to be of this Belief I shall here express If the place be large which you besiege your Line of Circumvallation must of necessity be many Miles about for it ought to be out of the reach of your Enemies Artillery else you will too much expose to the mercy of it your Army that is lodged within it All this Line must be equally defended unless it be where the situation of it secures it self or does it but thinly mann'd for not knowing in what part or places of it he will attempt to force it you must secure every Foot of it which in consequence does so disperse your Army that if he once enters it will be impossible to draw it together expeditiously enough to beat him out again for as soon as ever he is gotten within it he flings down immediately such parts of it as are near him that the Squadrons and Battalions of his Army may come in and they marching on the heels of each other will certainly be imbattelled and rout all the small Forces which may be in readiness near that place and will also hinder those further off from imbodying Besides if the place besieged is seated on an unfordable River or that may be so in a rainy season as most commonly considerable Fortresses are 't is not to be doubted but you will cast over it Bridges of Boats or fixed Bridges that you may surround the place which else might with safety be every day or night relieved and thereby also have free intercourse between both parts of your Army which are divided by the River and 't is as little to be doubted but as soon as he has enter'd your Line his first care will be to make himself Master of all those Bridges that such as are as it were in a Pound may not escape and that having defeated half your Army he may march over them to destroy the rest who seem then but too ripe for Ruin when half their Friends are cut off and all their Enemies are marching against them and the Besieged by their Sallies ready to assist them This seems to me to be the usual and fatal Consequences if your Enemies Army entring your ordinary Line of Circumvallation which being most frequently but a Parapet with a narrow and shallow Ditch is but too easily forced and indeed not to be held tenable of it self If the Forts Redoubts and other Works which flank it and which are usually raised a Musket-shot from one another with many hands to mann it did not in a good degree secure it But those Works usually are such slight things especially when an Enemy is entred that few of the Resolutest which are posted in them to guard them stay to do it after for commonly the attempt on such a Line is made a little before the break of day that the Obscurity may the less expose the Assailants while they advance to storm it and that the day-light may help them soon after they are gotten in to improve all advantages which are offer'd them thereby and 't is in this twilight ordinarily that those in the Works to defend the Line steal out of them when they find the Enemy is entred as those who then expect more safety from their feet than from their hands He who resolves to force an ordinary Line of Circumvallation either does it without any noise or else alarms it round and often most warmly where he means not to make his attempt while small Parties are doing this in the dark he is drawing all the rest of his Army to the place or places which still are near each other where he intends to make his real impression and does it with that silence as the Defendants cannot discover his intentions till usually it be too late successfully to oppose them I must therefore frankly acknowledge since the defences of such a Line are so inconsiderable since the equally manning them so dissipates the Army which does it since it cannot hopefully be defended otherwise And since it cannot be safely defended that way I have almost wonder'd at those who rather choose to make good such a Line than to give Battel to the Enemy who comes to raise the Siege This being a more hopeful thing a more glorious action and whose Consequences if Success attends the Besiegers in the Field will be much more great than to defend the Line can possibly be for thereby you can at last but carry the place But by a Battel gain'd over the Relievers you usually carry the Fortress but as one of the many good effects of getting the Victory for few if any Towns hold out after the relief sent them is defeated What I have said on this Subject proceeds from my taking two things for granted the first is that the Circumvallation Line is after the usual and common Form that is but a Parapet and that the Works which defend it are very inconsiderable either towards the Field or within the Line The second is that the besieging Army has as good Men and more than the Relievers bring for 't is necessary he leave his best and most advanced Works well guarded during the Battel both to preserve them against his return with Victory as also by them to hinder the Besieged from sallying on their backs while they are fighting with the Relief but indeed if the Line need not be of much circumference if it be high and the Graft large and deep if your Army is not strong enough both to fight the Enemy in the Field and to secure at the same time your most advanced and most necessary Works if the place you must fight in is an open Countrey and that your Enemy does much exceed you in Cavalry or if it be an inclosed incumbred Countrey and he does much exceed you in Infantry if you have Victuals and Forage enough within your Line and your Enemy have little with him or without it so that he can stay but a few dayes and that you may probably in fewer dayes take the place by Assault or have it surrendred by Capitulation I say in a Case thus Circumstantiated I would not admire a General would justifie his Line but rather admire if he should draw out of it to give Battel to the Relievers I shall therefore now instance some Examples of famous Captains who have kept within their Lines of Circumvallation when the Enemies Army came to relieve the Besieged and in them have resisted their Attempts and as a consequence of that success have gain'd the places I shall also give Examples of some other great Generals
been needless as also by carrying into his Leaguer what was in the Villages and Countrey Neighbouring on his Works to deprive his Enemies Army of all sustenance but what they brought along with them or were daily to be fetch'd by them to their Camp from a great distance And lastly to have still in his Leaguer more Victuals than the Besieged could then have within the Town thereby to compel the Relieving Army to attack those almost unconquerable Works or the Town to surrender for want of Food in the sight of the Army which came for the Succor These necessary performances together with his often fighting against such Forces as almost hourly Night and Day made numerous Sallies and were obliged to do it both to harass and lessen Caesar's Army and to retard the finishing of his Works which when compleated would render it highly difficult if possible to relieve the Besieged I say and I think with reason all these Economies of War were at least as difficult in the Actings as the making those laborious Fortifications Yet all were to be done and done at one and the same time and in so short a space that I scarce know to which of the two my Admiration is justlier due At length the Relieving Army appear'd which consisted of 248000 men as Caesar who condescended to be the Commissary of their Musters reckons them to be and also writes how many every State of Gallia did particularly send so that at once he was to withstand 320000 of his Enemies and which was more to fight with them at the same time when they attacked him in Front and Rear This formidable Relieving Army was led by four Generals viz. Comius Veridomarus Eporedorix and Vergesilaunus All great Captains and accustomed to make War even against Caesar himself where they could not but have learn'd much having to do with such a General and yet for many Years continued the War against him and one of them viz. Comius had learn'd the Rudiments of War under Caesar himself and acquired so much Honour in serving the Romans that Caesar rewarded him with the Principality over the Morini The Gaules seated their Camp on a Hill half a mile from Caesar's Works and sent their Cavalry into a Plain under it and their nimblest Archers conceal'd behind their Troops Caesar makes his Cavalry match out to fight them lest the Gaules by having their Cavalry unfought with even under Caesar's Works might grow too insolent and his own Army be intimidated The Roman Horse were worsted by the help of the Gaules Archers but Caesar's German Horse Relieved them Routed the Gaules and cut in pieces their Archers and then all Caesar's Troops return d within their Line The Gaules made three several General Assaults on Caesar's Camp the first by Day the second by Night and the third at full Noon Vercingetorix every time Sallying out at the same hour with his Army In these three Attacks all that Valor Skill and Industry could perform on both sides was not omitted Some Particulars I shall enumerate the Gaules finding the Rows of Stakes and Holes and the Galthorps destroyd many of their Men flung up so much Earth over them as covered them and thereby made them useless to the Romans Then filling their Ditches with Fagots Hurdles and Earth raised the Outside on which they went to the Assaults higher than the Line they assaulted and so went on advantageous Ground to the Attack and Caesar when he found his Men distressed in Front by the Enemies over-numbring him and fighting on equal Ground would often command his Cavalry sometimes his Legionary Infantry to sally out of his Line and to fall on them in the Rear whereby he routed them The last dayes Attack seem'd several Battels rather than one General Assault such great Bodies fighting at once both within and without the first Lines towards the Field and towards the Town for the Gaules having discover'd the weakest or more properly the least strong part of Caesar's Line while all the residue of their Army were assaulting the rest of the Works Vergesilaunus who was Vercingetorix's near Kinsman in the obscurity of the preceding Night had marched behind a Hill and concealed himself there with 60000 select men who at Noon-day when the Romans were with all their Forces defending their Works both against the Besieged and Comius c. assaulted them unexpectedly entred the Line whose Ditch they had filled and with many shouts daunted Caesar's Soldiers as he himself confesses But Caesar at last by the Valor and Expertness of his men and by his excellent Conduct relieving them in all parts where they were oppressed and leading them in Person to many Charges was Victorious and Chaced the Gaules to the very Works of their Camp and to the Gates of the Town and adds If his Soldiers had not been quite spent with that dayes hot Service few of all the Gaules had scaped They lost in that last dayes attempt above 60000 men so that despairing to perform what they came for they did that Night abandon their Camp and many were kill'd by Caesar's Cavalry who pursued them in the obscurity and the next day Vercingetorix capitulated and yielded he himself gallantly mounted and armed at all points having first leisurely rid round about the Chair of State in which Caesar sate to receive him alighted off of his Horse and as an evidence of his being Conquer'd disarm'd himself and then went and sate down on the Ground at Caeâ—…ar's feet without speaking one word Some of those many Reasons which induced Caesar in my opinion to continue within his Lines and not to give the Enemy Battel in the Field I shall here set down I. He could not shut up in Alesia a much greater Army than his own without making very strong Lines of Countervallation against it II. Having made these wonderful â—…ines and knowing of the vast Relief which was certainly hastening to succor the Besieged he with so small an Army as his own which probably could not consist of above 30000 Foot and 6000 Horse for he never had above 10 Legions at once in all Gallia could not reasonably hope both to keep in Vercingetorix with 80000 chosen men and fight against Comius c. with 248000 good men unless by prodigious Works he could supply what he wanted in Numbers of men and also by so posting his Army between his Lines of Circumvallation and â—…ountervallation as to be thereby ready to resist both wayes and often with the same Reserve Battalions and Squadrons For whatever Justus Lâ—…psius computes That the space between these two Lines must be 5000 Foot yet in reason I am fully convinced they were much nearer each other for else they could not answer the end for which they were made since no Squadrons of Reserve can 〈◊〉 answer both wayes a distance of a Mile much less do it as often as need requires and our modern Lines of Circumvallation and Countervallation which are but Copies after
Caesar's Original are generally no farther asunder than to leave space to Camp the Army in and that the Battalions and Squadrons may be drawn up between them so near as timely enough to relieve either or both Lines and to me 't is inferredly evident that Caesar had this in his prospect by acknowledging he was necessitated to run that part of his Line which Vergesilaunus assaulted as the weakest on the hanging of a Hill for had he ran it on the top of the Hill it would have taken up too much Ground that is have made his â—…ine of Circumvallation too far distant from his Line of Countervallation and thereby rendered the Reserve Battalions between both Lines useless to one or both III. Caesar seeing that Vercingetorix not designedly but compelled by necessity had cast himself into Alesia with 80000 chosen men for the Gaules Cavalry having been defeated the day before by the Italian and German on which Cavalry of the Gaules Vercingetorix most depended and losing their support despaired of retreating in the face of the Roman Horse and of the Legionary Infantry had no better Game to play than to get into Alesia which was very near him Caesar therefore had abundant reason to believe the Town had not wherewithall long to feed so many mouths for I conclude it was not a Magazine of the Gaules since Caesar particularly mentions that the Manubii by whose interest only Vercingetorix was admitted into it were by him expelled out of it the longer to enable his Army to eat which sure he would not have been so ungrateful to have done if they had been his Garison and also had not meer want of Corn constrained him to it I say since Caesar by their want of Corn had probable hopes to reduce them by Famine before their expected Relief could come for a League of many petty States are not overwarm to adventure their Forces to relieve the Defeated but are more inclined to make their Peaces apart and therefore having shut them up with prodigious Works he was afterwards compelled as it were to make as vast Works against the Relief when he foresaw the Besieged could hold out till the Succor came for else all he had thitherto done had been uneffectual to answer his final end since the full manning of those Lines against the Besieged must take up too many of his small Army to leave him enough Forces to fight the vast Succors in the Field and therefore he resolved to continue within his Lines IV. Since he could lay up one months Magazine of Victuals within his Works which was more than Vercingetorix could have in Alesia after Comius c. came with the Relief Caesar had all the reason imaginable to justifie his Lines and not to draw out of them to give his Enemy Battel for he might justly believe that if the Relief had hopes of cutting him off from all Provisions which he had not got into his Camp before their coming they would only design to block him up within his Works and then he might sooner starve Vercingetorix than Comius c. could starve him And by having ruined the flower of the Gaules Forces and their Generalissimo he should be the better able to fight the rest in the Field when the Consumption of his Magazines within his Camp necessitated him to issue out of it Or if the Gaules soon after their Arrival should endeavor to storm and force his Camp on the Field-side of it and Vercingetorix at the same time on the Town-side of it he might be the better able to resist and repel both being within such Works so that which soever way they acted Caesar had great cause to keep within such stupendious Works by the help of which he at last defeated his Enemies Field Army and reduced to his mercy their besieged Army and did it both at one and the same time Nor had Caesar left Comius and the Relievers any probable hopes to besiege him successfully while he was besieging Vercingetorix could he have been fed within the Town longer than 30 or 40 dayes for Caesar had furnished his Camp for one month and had thereby brought into it all the Provisions which were near it in the Countrey and more than probably destroyed by his Cavalry all he could not bring within his Line and when 248000 Soldiers with the many useless mouths as to Fighting which in the best regulated Armies attend such Forces must be fed and all this Victual and Forage must be brought far off it would have been very difficult if possible to have supplied them for any considerable time with Food I beg the Readers pardon that I have thus largely insisted on this one Instance which in some degree to repair I will almost but name the subsequent ones The Example of Caesar's keeping within such excellent Lines and in them resisting and defeating the Relief being very ancient I will give the Reader a recent one to evidence that in parallel Cases equal Success has been the Consequence Henry Prince of Orange a most excellent Captain did in the Year 1632. besiege Maestricht the Spaniards apprehending they should not be able with their own Armies onely to force his Lines which were as strong in needful places as the very Fortifications of the Town prevailed with the Emperor to join with them for that Service the German Army commanded by Count Papenheim a brave and adventurous General and to heighten his endeavors to relieve the place he was promised 100000 Crowns and the Order of the Golden Fleece if he effected it But the Prince of Orange had made such Lines about his Camp and against the Town and so well furnished his Leaguer as thereby he resisted all their Assaults and when the Relief drew off Maestricht Capitulated and Surrendred The Reasons which in my poor opinion did engage the Prince of Orange to stay within and justifie his Lines were That his Works were almost as tenable as those of Maestricht That his Enemies did greatly exceed him in Cavalry and the Countrey about it was Champion That he was well furnished with Horse-meat and Mans-meat within his Leaguer That his Enemies Armies were ill furnished with both That he knew Papenheim could not long be spared by the Emperor and that the other Commanders without his help durst not attempt to force such extraordinary Lines And that if he had raised his Siege and retreated before the Enemy advanced he had not only lost all the Blood Treasure and Time which were consumed in this Siege but also had given the Enemy leisure and means to repair those defects in the place which his knowledge of had been a chief invitation to him to besiege it I shall now Present my Reader with two remarkable Instances of famous Generals who even in our own memories chose within an ordinary Line of Circumvallation to oppose the Army commanded to relieve the Besieged and were thereby defeated and forced hastily to abandon their Design The Archduke assisted by
the Prince of Conde now living besieged Arras and raised one of the ordinary Lines of Circumvallation about it Monsieur de Turenne assisted by His Royal Highness the Duke of York came to relieve that place The Archduke and the chief Spanish Commanders resolve to justifie their Line but as I have been assured the Prince of Conde was absolutely either for giving the French Army Battel or retreating before the Relief was near this wholsom advice was not followd His Royal Highness and Monsieur de Turenne assault and carry the Line being themselves two of the very first which entred it and doubtless had intirely cut off the Spanish Army had those Bridges been immediately secured by the French by which the Spaniards held communication I was positively told by a Person of great Honour who was present that His Royal Highness whose judgment in War in so green an Age was almost as much admired as his Valor exceedingly pressed to have it done which being a while omitted the Prince of Conde in Person with almost incredible diligence got together many Squadrons of Horse then caused their own Bridges to be destroyed and with his usual Conduct his Sword in his hand made the Retreat and saved the residue of that broken Army In what the Prince of Conde then did we may learn one very observable Lesson That a great Commander when a fatal mischief is fallen into which his advice had it been followed would probably have prevented is notwithstanding obliged to hazard his Person and employ his best Conduct to make the Loss as easie as possibly he can to his own Party A second Instance of the like ill Success by pursuing the like method is in the same Monsieur de Turenne's besieging Valenciennes jointly with the Mareschal de la Ferte and resolving within an ordinary Line of Circumvallation to oppose the Spanish Relief led by Don Iohn of Austria who forced the Line on the Mareschal de la Ferte's side of the River As soon as this was known to Monsieur de Turenne he instantly broke his own Bridges over it sent away his Cannon and Baggage and marched after it as expeditiously as he could and therein acted the best part which in such a Case was left him to manage These two Instances so fresh in our memories seem to me no ill Evidence That whatever Besieging General shall stay within such an ordinary Line and of great Circumference when an Army comes to attack it 't is great odds but he suffers thereby considerable loss and disgrace By the French forcing such a Line justified by the Spaniards before Arras And by the Spaniards forcing such a Line justified by the French before Valenciennes it looks as if the Victory were not won so much by the Conduct and Valor of either Army as by the Difficulty of defending such a Line And therefore whatever Nation does play the like Game will too probably sustain the like Loss I might particularize several other Examples of this Nature even within our own Times but to avoid cloying my Reader I purposely omit them and will rather employ his patience in giving him some instances of great Captains who chose to quit their ordinary Lines to give the Relieving Army Battel and were successful therein Maurice Prince of Orange in the Year 1600 had besieged Newport believing that the mutiny of many of the Spanish Forces would disable the Archduke from relieving it but those Mutineers being unexpectedly pacified and the Archduke marching with his Army to relieve the Place that Prince though always loth to come to a decisive Battel yet in this Case having had onely time enough to make an ordinary Line of Circumvallation quitted it led thereunto by his own judgment and the concurrent advice of our Noble Sir Francis Vere and advanced to meet the Archduke gave him Battel in the open Field won the Victory with 116 Ensigns and 5 Standards and perhaps had also won Newport had he in earnest again besieged it which he forbore to do partly because la Burlotte had cast into it three Regiments with great Conduct and Celerity In the Year 1633 the Duke of Lunenburg with Milander and Mareschal Kniphausen had besieged Hamelen a strong and considerable place seated on the River Vessâ—…r in Germany and having reduced it to great Wants the Germans resolved to relieve it and Rendezvous'd a great Army for that end under the Comand of General Merodes and Count Cronesfield The Besiegers on their Enemies Army drawing near left some Regiments for the defence of their most advanced Approaches and to hinder the Garisons sallying during the Battel and with 9500 Horse near as many Foot with 42 pieces of Cannon Field and Battering went to fight the Relief which consisted of near the like Numbers The Battel was long and bloody it lasted above 9 hours but at length the Protestant and besieging Army got the Victory the marks whereof were the Duke of Lunenburgs Milanders and Kniphausens taking 50 Ensigns and Standards 800 Wagons 13 Cannon 2000 Prisoners and Merodes the General who soon after dyed of his Wounds as 5000 of his Men did on the spot The Victorious immediately returned to the Siege and the Garison soon surrendred In the Year 1638 Duke Bernard Weymar on a sudden sits down before Rhinefield in Alsatia and reduces it almost to the last Extremity the Imperialists send Duke Savelle and General John de Wert with an Army to relieve it Duke Weymar following his own solid Opinion and being seconded therein by the advice of Henry Duke of Rohan one of the greatest Captains of that Age who went a Volunteer to that Action to wipe off some Calumnies which his Enemies had unjustly laid to his Charge quits his Lines to give the Enemy Battel but leaves some Regiments of Foot and Troops of Horse to justifie his Works and beat in the Besieged if they should sally Savelle and Wert accept the Battel and after a sharp dispute Weymar got the day cuts in pieces the best of the Imperial Troops takes all their Baggage and Cannon and Duke Savelle General Wert and Spureter Prisoners then returns to Rhinefield which soon after surrendred unto him Monsieur de Turenne a few Years since besieged Dunkirk Don John of Austria came with an Army to relieve it Monsieur de Turenne abandons his Line gives Don John Battel wins the Victory and as a consequence of it had Dunkirk yielded to him in which Battel our Countreymen did great Service King Henry the Great of France when Alexander Ferneze Duke of Parma and Charles Duke of Mayenne came to the Relief of Paris with the United Forces of the League and of Philip II. of Spain would not stay within his Lines but drew out of them to give his Enemy Battel which those two excellent Captains would not accept of but by a rare Conduct having forced Lainy in the sight of the French Army by that way flung the wanted Relief into Paris For
whoever does well understand the Trade of War will never put Affairs to the greatest hazard when they can be carried on with the less In our sinful Times in England when Robert Earl of Essex marched to the Relief of Glocester his Highness Prince Rupert whose high Genius in War admirable Valor and great Judgment has made him justly to be esteemed both by his Friends and Enemies a General of the very first Form would not stay in his Works before that City but leaving most of his Infantry in them advanced with his Cavalry to meet the relieving Army on the Downes which doubtless he had defeated as several of the chief Officers of it have owned to me had not some Brigades of the Earl of Essex's Infantry done almost Wonders on that occasion These and many other the like Instances make it seem to me even a kind of Maxim in War That a besieging Army which has onely an ordinary and vast Line of Circumvallation to cover it ought not to stay in it but to give the Relief Battel or raise the Siege before the Relief be too near it being in my poor opinion altogether unadviseable to stay as if you would fight when you are resolved not to do it for whatever Army retreats from another thereby evidences that he apprehends his Enemies which highly encourages them and does not a little deject your own Forces who therefore are the more prone to be disorder'd if vigorously push'd and to be disorder'd is almost the next step to being defeated so that early Retreats where the Resolution is taken not to fight is most eligible for why should you hazard to be engaged when you resolve to avoid it Though I cannot say that the besieging Army quitting an ordinary Line has alway had success in giving or offering Battel to the Relieving Army for that depends on many Circumstances and unforeseeable Accidents yet the Arguments appear to me very strong for the doing of it and Actions ought not to be judged of onely by the Event but by the Reasons which make them to be undertaken I cannot observe in all the Wars which Caesar madâ—… that he committed any one oversight so clearly deserving that name as when at Dirachium he enclosed with a prodigious Line for its circumference the Army of Pompey which was much greater than his own and consequently might when he would force his passage in one part of it because all Caesar's vast Line was to be equally mann'd and provided for where Nature made it not inaccessible which could not but disperse his Troops to such a distance as render'd them not only useless when Pompey should attack any one place of them from within with his whole Forces but exposed them to be cut off by parts when Pompey got out So that it was believed the War had that day been ended had Pompey been a General who had known how to improve a Victory And if Caesar whose own Conduct was so excellent whose Soldiers were so valiant and expert as he himself writes That their knowledge and experience was such as they could prescribe unto themselves what was to be done as well as any Commander could teach them could not on tryal justifie so vast yet weak a Line when it could then only be assaulted from those within it how should any other General rationally hope to justifie an ordinary Line and of great Circuit when it is at once vigorously attempted both from the Field and from the Town for the strongest Sallies from the Town are when the Relief fights the besieging Army Experiment might teach what Reason did not But lest some who peruse this Treatise may think I have forgot how much I have already spoken of the great advantages which are derived from an Armies being intrenched though but as it were within a Parapet well flank'd by my now writing so much against an Armies trusting to an ordinary Line of Circumvallation I shall desire him to consider there is a very great difference between an Army which is posted in an Intrenched Camp and one which is posted within such a Line of Circumvallation though the Works should be of equal strength For an Army intrenched lodges so compactly and close and has comparatively so little Ground to defend and no Enemy to attack them from within that all the Forces of it are at hand in a moment to justifie their Intrenchment against all Assaults from without but an Army within such a Line of Circumvallation is necessarily so far disperst to make good every part of it not knowing where the real Impression will be made and has so many Troops only to attend the Sallies of the Garison that if once the Line be entred it is impossible to bring Forces from such remote distances so expeditiously to drive them out as the assaulting General can bring his in to prevent all considerable Imbodyings to resist him without which it were unadviseable for the defending General to design it and ruinous to attempt it Having thus set down my own opinion for giving Battel to a relieving Army rather than to oppose it in a large and ordinary Line of Circumvallation with the needful Cautions to be observed in choosing to do it and having both by the reason of the thing and by examples endeavor'd to manifest why my opinion therein is taken up and having also given my Reader nine general Maxims which are to be observed in giving Battel I shall now close this Chapter and this Tome with some other Particulars which in my belief are not unworthy his perusal and seem to me fit to be observed before in and after a Battel as being built on Reason or Experiment Before the fighting of a Battel the Field Mark and the Field Word ought still to be given to every one of your men the first is That you may be able to distinguish afar off who are Friends and who are Enemies the second is That when you come to Rally you may make your Rallyment of those onely who are of your own Troops which else might consist partly of your Enemies men who might to shelter themselves get into your Ranks as if they were of your Army And thereby not only preserve themselves but also when you fight again contribute to destroy you by killing some of your Officers which lead you on or by breaking your Ranks just as you were going to Charge and thereby also save themselves when they had done you all the mischief they could For in the hurry and confusion of a Fight private Soldiers must have some very apparent Field Mark to enable them to distinguish Foes from Friends else much mischief may too likely ensue And because such Field Marks wherever you place them are not still visible on all sides of the Head or Body of every one who wears them The Field Word is also given For it often happens that in a Battel the Field Mark is by accident lost by many out of their Helmets or Hats
and then if they had not the Field Word they might be kill'd by those of their own Party who knew them not personally Besides the Field Mark of each Army is seen by All of both Armies before they engage and the matter of it being to be had in all places by private Soldiers as a green Branch a piece of Fern or a handful of Grass or a piece of white Paper c. If you Rout your Enemy he may while he is pursued take off his own Field Mark put up yours in the stead of it and so scape if not do you hurt But the Field Word he cannot know unless it be told him by some of your own men and therefore the giving of both before the Battel must never be omitted I remember once when some Forces I had the Honor to Command obtained by the blessing of God the Victory against the Enemy an Officer of mine having kill'd an Officer of the Enemies and finding he had a good Beaver he tyed his own Helmet to his Saddle Bow and put on so hastily the dead Mans Beaver as he forgot to take out of it the green Branch which was their Field Mark and to put on a white Paper which was our Field Mark and following the Execution with his Sword all bloody a Captain of Horse of my own Regiment taking him by his Field Mark for one of the Enemy and judging he had done no little slaughter by his Sword being all gored to the Hilt undertook him in the pursuit and turning short on him before he could see his face ran him through and through with his Tuck whereof he dyed in a few minutes But finding the Enemies 〈◊〉 Mark had caused his death he own'd his fault and so acquitted my Captain from any Guilt Whatever can be done before a Battel to distract or intimidate your Enemies Army ought not to be omitted some Examples of this way of proceeding I shall mention The Archdâ—…ke before the Battel of Newport having cut off several Companies of the Prince of Orange's Army sent undeâ—… Count 〈◊〉 to secure some Passes on the way the Enemy was to march caused a Trooper of his on purpose to be taken Prisoner just as the Armies were going to Engage who being brought to the Prince did with a loud voice tell him That Count â—…st was defeated and that immediately the Battel would be given him and exceedingly magnified in the hearing of all which were present the Numbers Bravery and Resolution of his own side and though the Prince immediately caused his mouth to be stopped yet so many had heard what he said as it was in an instant diffus d over the States Army and struck into it no little damp if not terror If the Ground admits of it it were adviseable if it can be done safely the Night before the Battel to lodge in a Wood or Coppice or hollow Ground some of your men concealed on the Flank or towards the Rear of your Enemies Army who by falling on just as you are engaging or newly after you are engaged may be of great benefit to you and prejudice to him as it was done in that great Battel between Ieroboam and Abijah and in many others But then great Caution must be had that the Enemy discover not this Ambush lest he cut it off before the Battel and thereby weaken you and animate his own Party as it hapned to the Suedes near Lindâ—…w in the Year 1632 and to many other parts of Armies in other Countries For whoever goes upon designs whose success depends on very fine and nice management must be exceeding wary else he had better never attempt them and therefore though they may be and have been practised with good success yet I am in my own private judgment no over-great Friend to any such Policies in War where I may in the management of them be discovered and not possibly know of it timely enough to receive no detriment thereby For where the Fate of a Kingdom and the Lives of thousands are at stake as in Battels the first too usually is and the last alwayes is I would still act on solid Reasons and Principles and in Stratagems embrace such methods only as if they had success would be of great advantage and if they failed yet I should thereby lose nothing but my hopes The making a Speech by a General to a whole Army before a Battel is often read of in our best Histories as well as Romances but ought in my belief to be onely found in the latter since 't is impossible for any General to speak audibly in an open Field to above a Regiment at once and if he makes an Harangue to every Regiment he will employ that time in talk which is more usefully spent in ordering his Forces and in Action Not but that I think it highly useful that the Officers and Soldiers of an Army before the Battel should be told all that may heighten their Courages as the Goodness of the Quarrel they fight in the beneficial Consequences of their Victory the fatal Effects which must attend their being worsted the Honour they have gained in many an Action which is too precious to be all lost in one c. But because I esteem such Orations impossible to be made by one to many thousands at once therefore I think it is the duty of a General to infuse these Incentives to Victory into his chief Officers first and then to order their imparting them convincingly to the subordinate ones and those to inculcate them on all occasions into the private Soldiers and especially on their Guards and a little before they go to fight and to do it but to a Troop or a Company at a time and in these wayes I do not only approve of such Oratory but esteem it very practicable and highly useful before a Battel Besides when all the Officers thus discourse to their Soldiers it shews an Unanimity which cannot be so practicably evidenced when the General singly speaks to them The Shouting to the Battel is very ancient and we read of the practice of it in most Warlike Nations as amongst the Iews in the time of David amongst the Romans in the time of Caesar c. The English are so much inclined to it as I have but once in those Actions I have been in seen them omit the doing it as soon as ever they came within Cannon-shot of the Enemy they were to fight with and then I minded them of that Neglect which they immediately amended such shoutings bring not only a kind of terror on the Nations which do not use them as being commonly an evidence of great joy in those who make them but also it stirs up the blood and spirits before and heats them during the Fight But though such Shoutings are useful going towards the Enemy yet a deep silence must be observed by the Soldiery when you are about to engage that the Officers Orders and the Words of
their Shot if not with their Pikes gaul your Enemy while under their Covert your Horse may Rally and come again and again to the Charge and possibly recover the day Nay it makes your Cavalry fight with more Confidence when they know that one or more disastrous Charges may by thus ordering some of your Infantry be repaired by their own Rallying in the Rear of them and those who know what belongs to War will not be over-forward to Charge the second Line of your Wing leaving at once such Battalions of Infantry and the disorder'd Cavalry Rallying at their backs but on the contrary will hardly judge it adviseable to attempt your second Line till they have intirely swept out of the Field your whole first Line I did frequently though unworthy of the Honour command Forces in Chief and therefore I esteem'd it my duty to be often thinking and arguing how they might be employed to the best advantage and though in the Wars I was in we alwayes were or at least thought our selves to be superior to the Enemy in Cavalry Yet I was not seldom busying my thoughts how we might best fight in case he should be at any time stronger than I in Horse and I stronger than he in Foot The Result of those Thoughts I will presume to Present my Reader with The Checquering my first Line of Cavalry with small Battalions of Shot I judg'd was not the most secure or the most effectual way and therefore I concluded the Impaling as it were my Musketeers by my Pikes as is before-mentioned was much the better And because whatever is new and surprising to your Enemy is still of considerable advantage especially at the instant in which you are going to Charge him I resolved had I ever had an occasion to do it to have acted when the Ground allow'd of it as followeth I. I would have drawn up all my Cavalry a-breast either two or three deep as I should have esteem'd it the best as things were circumstantiated II. I would have appointed previously what Squadrons should have composed my first Line and what Squadrons should have composed my second Line and what Officers should lead or be in the Rear of every Squadron in both Lines and have communicated to them respectively my Orders therein III. I would then have drawn up those small Battalions of Pike and Shot order'd as I formerly mentioned just in the Rear of every such Squadron only as was to compose the first Line of my Wing and just as many in a Rank as might fill up the intended Interval when it was made and have caused my Pike-men to trail their Pikes that they might not have been seen by the Enemy which if shoulder'd or ported they would be IV. I would then have advanced towards the Enemy as if I had had no second Line or Reserved Squadrons but just when I was come so near him as that it was time to form my first and second Line I would at the Trumpets sounding the Charge which should be the Signal for the doing it have composed my said two Lines of my Wing by the Squadrons of the Front Line continuing their motion and by the Squadrons of the second Line making a Stand or Halt V. As the first Lines would be forming it self by the Squadrons of it continuing their motion and the second Lines would be forming it self by standing I would in the Interval of Ground made thereby have caused my small Battalions of Pike and Shot behind every Squadron of the first Line to march up and made an even Front with the fame Squadrons in whose Rear they had till then marched and so have begun the Battel advancing with the Horse and those Foot my Shot firing under their Pikes inoessantly This I esteem'd would have been both new and surprizing for it would have been thought strange by the Enemy and likely have given him an ill opinion of my Conduct to see me bring all my Cavalry to fight at onde which the first Form of my advancing would probably make him believe was my intention But when he unexpectedly saw that I composed my two Lines orderly in my advancing it might amaze and surprize him And in all likelihood both those Productions might he heightned when he should also see my small Battalions of Pike and Shot appear unexpectedly from behind my Squadron and advance in an even Front with them to the Charge so that his Horse singly must endure the joint shock of my Horse Pikes and Musketeers If this method of Checquering my Squadrons in the first Line of my Wing with small Battalions of Pike and Shot order'd as I have set it down should be approved and that you have Infantry enough so to Checquer your second Line also and that you shall esteem it necessary to have it done by reason of your Enemies exceedingly overpowring you with Horse you may also observe the like method of doing it in your second Line as you did in your first by having such small Battalions of Pike and Shot drawn up and marching in the Rear of those Squadrons which are to compose your second Line who may advance by the Interval Ground between the Squadrons to the Front of them when by your first Lines continued motion they have left the Ground free In the doing of all this there are some Particulars I would recommend to be alwayes observed I. That your Pikes which are to be trail'd during your advancing behind the Squadrons that the Enemy may not discover by those long Weapons what you would conceal from his sight be ported as soon as ever you begin to appear between the Intervals between which you are to march up to make an even Front with your Cavalry that thereby they may be the readier to be Charged against the Enemy who will by that time be very near and therefore such preparative readiness to receive him is very needful II. I would have all my Firelocks load their Muskets with Pistol Bullets for the Enemy against whom you Fire will be alwayes very near and therefore several Pistol Bullets out of one Gun will do as much Execution as one Musket Bullet at a time out of many Guns III. Those commanded Pikemen which are to impale your Shot ought to be of the resolutest and strongest men for on their Courages will depend much of the safety of your Horse and of your Shot and therefore if I had Pikemen armed defensively with Back Breast Pott and Faces I would choose to place them there since they are also to endure the shock of your Enemies Cavalry IV. The shot of these small Battalions must be still bestowed on those Squadrons of your Enemies Wing which compose his first Line for those are the nearest and the most pressing and the Muskets being loaden with Pistol Bullets they will not do certain Execution on any Squadrons of the Wing of his second Line which are usually about 100 Yards less advanced than his first Line
much and if but moving a few paces the mischief is probably in some degree to be run into then so much the more care ought to be taken that as few paces may be so marched as possibly you can contrive I cannot see any solid Objection can be made hereunto in reference to your Artillery for those usually being drawn in the Front of your Battalions till you come to place them where they are to do execution they may be advanced still before the Front of your Army though you should march it but in one Line till you come near the Enemy but this as all things I write I shall chearfully submit to better judgments If you are desirous to come to a Battel with your Enemy and that he endeavors to shun it by constant Intrenched Campings and by having good Magazines and Arsenals with or near him and a plentiful Countrey at his devotion behind him which is usually the best Game of him whose Countrey is invaded for he has little reason to give you Battel when by keeping unfought with you cannot safely enter far into his Countrey leaving his Army intire behind you I say in such a case you ought by often Removings to try for an opportunity to give him Battel for since he is to attend your motions sometimes an occasion to fight him unexpectedly both to him and you may be offer'd you Sometimes also by your suddenly sitting down before a Garison of his and endangering the taking of it he may be induced to give you Battel which he would not do but in hope to prevent such a loss Sometimes it may be adviseable for you if you are much his Superior in strength with as little Baggage as possible and with as much Bread as your Men can carry and with Herds of fat Cattle to be driven with you which last is a Provision that carries it self to make Inroads into his Countrey both to destroy and pillage it this may provoke him to follow you lest his Countrey esteem him careless in the defence of it and thereby you may find opportunities to fight him And sometimes by your invading parts of his Territories at a considerable distance from those places where he has formed his Magazines either necessitate him to remove from them or else expose to your Army those Countries of his which you fall upon As Caesar by the like method drew Pompe from his Magazines and Fleet at Dirachium and made him follow him into Thessaly by which means Caesar won his famous Battel of Pharsalia I look upon it as a Maxim in War never to have the Army of the Invaded Countrey to give Battel to the Invading Army but on very great necessity or on very great advantages for the Invaded by losing a Battel may lose his Countrey but the Invader by losing one will but lose his Hopes his Baggage and as many Men as are kill'd in the defeat and few discreet Gamesters will play their All against little or nothing comparatively Therefore as the Invaded must still be careful to avoid a Battel so the Invader must still be forward to offer it on any fitting terms for should he not nothing else will keep up his Reputation which of all humane things ought most carefully and jealously to be kept up and increased in War In my private thoughts I cannot readily believe that any Kingdom can easily be Conquer'd where the true Principles and Methods of War are alwayes observed unless some great internal Revolutions of Affairs or general Revolts of Subjects should occasion such a misery And therefore whatever I have heard to the contrary I freely own I cannot be brought to believe that this present fatal War kindled almost all over Europe will have such great Progresses as some of more sanguine Complexions than I am have believed or rather fancied for though France has the formidablest League against it that perhaps was ever yet made in Europe against any one Monarch of it yet I cannot find the Advances of his Confederated Enemies are very considerable nor can I believe they will be for the Reasons formerly mentioned in this Book and also because he does by Intrenched Incampings and providing timely and plentifully for his Armies to eat frustrate in effect all the great Enterprises of his Enemies which is practicably to perform the solidest Maxims of War and whoever he be that can stedily observe them will find the necessary benefits which will result to him thereby unless a higher Power does turn the Wisdom of Man into Foolishness and against that stroke there neither is or can be any defence I shall now offer to Consideration three Particulars more which are I think useful to be observed previously to a Battel The first is That Orders be given that no chief Officer who commands a Squadron or Commissioned Officer who leads one with him have that Horse he Charges on advanced above the length of his head before the Front Rank of his Troopers My Reason for it is this Because if those who lead Squadrons to the Charge be before the Front Rank they either without cause adventure to be shot by their own Men behind them or hinder some of them from firing or which is far worse when both Bodies come to the shock such as are out of the Ranks and between both Bodies are needlesly exposed even when they are of most use to those Men they command and consequently the whole Army In answer to this I know some have said It does not a little animate the Squadrons to see the Officers which command them lead them on eight or ten Paces before the first Rank and then just as they are going to mingle to fall into it But I must say I believe good Soldiers need not such Airy Animations and the Bad will not fight well though they have more substantial ones Besides I believe it does rather Disanimate than Encourage Soldiers who have any consideration when they see those Officers whose Conduct they relie upon â—…ive them so ill an impression of it as doing a vain thing by which also they may too probably incapacitate themselves to command their Men when they are likely to have most need of being order'd to the best advantage either as to their Rallying if discomposed in the Charge or an orderly Pursuit if successful To which also may be added these two other Considerarations If the Officers advancing some Paces before their Men be a great Animating them may it not be a greater Disanimating of the Soldiery to see them when ready to Charge put themselves into the first Rank For their going before their Squadrons while there is no danger and the returning when there is will in all likelihood make the latter Action dishearten more than the former can encourage for all Animations are more effectual when the danger is at hand than when it is remote When the Squadrons advance to Charge the Troopers Horses and their own Knees are as close as they
who have chose rather to draw out of their Lines to give the Relieving Army Battel than to stay within their Lines and in them to oppose the Relief I shall then enumerate some of the many Reasons why I believe such various and opposite methods have been practised by such celebrated Chiefs in War nay sometimes by the very self-same General though I must say I find many more Examples in Histories and in my own time for drawing out of ordinary Lines of Circumvallation to give Battel to the Relievers Army than for opposing the Succors by continuing within them Caesar who I esteem the famousest Captain of the Universe in the famousest of all his Sieges that of Alâ—…sia in France chose to stay within his Lines to oppose the Relief of the united Gaules or at least fought them in the Field only with his Cavalry which on occasion he drew out of his Lines and in which Services he owns his German Horse did him most service who have been famous for their Valor even as long as Historians have recorded any great Actions of War in which that Nation had a share But because this memorable Siege is so minutely and particularly related by Caesar himself and does thereby imply he thought it even his Master-piece in that kind and since by his Conduct there the most eminent Captains of the Moderns as I have been credibly informed have model'd the design of their Sieges viz. the Prince of Orange the Duke of Parma and the Marquiss of Spinola in their great Sieges of Maestricht Antwerp and Breda I hope those who read this Book will at least judge me worthy of their Pardon if I stay a little in the Relation of this prodigious Siege of Alesia since also no less an Author than Paterculus when he treats of it has these very expressions viz. So great things were done at Alesia that they might seem too great for any Man to attempt or any but a god to effect Caesar having defeated the Cavalry of the Gaules whose Army was led by Vercingetorix a Person worthy to command a National Army Vercingetorix shuts himself up in Alesia with 80000 of his chosen Soldiers sends away the Reliques of his Cavalry as useless in that Siege and requires all the Nations of the whole Countrey of Gallia to come to his Relief which he conjures them to hasten having but 30 dayes Corn in the Town to feed his Men which in all probability by the frugallest management and the carefullest distribution could not suffice for above six Weeks Caesar immediately resolves to besiege this great General and greater Army in hope to reduce both before the Relief could come yet admirably well fortifying himself against the Relief if it should come early enough to succor the Besieged What these stupendious Works were both as to the Circumvallation to oppose the Relievers and as to the Countervallation to resist the Attempts of the Besieged you shall have briefly related and from his own Commentaries wherein he writes viz. That he made round about the Town a Ditch of 20 foot wide and 20 foot deep with upright sides as broad at the top as at the bottom 40 foot behind this Ditch he made his first Works behind them he made two other Ditches of 15 foot in breadth and 15 foot deep and behind all these he made a Ditch 12 foot wide and 12 foot deep with a Rampard and Parapet thereon and erected Towers round about the whole Work at every 80 foot distance the one from the other besides the Palisadoes Stockadoes and those other Fortifications which he comprehends under the name of Cippi of which there were five Ranks and of Stimuli of which there were eight Courses or Rows round about his whole Camp So that it seems to me none of his Enemies could come to attack his Works but must run on several Ranks of sharp Stakes or into Holes or on Galthrops which were also covered or hid with Branches of Osiers Caesar further adds That after the inner Fortifications were thus perfected he took in 14 Miles of Circuit and made the like Fortifications in All Points against the Enemy without as he had done against the Town which are his own words These are the first Lines of Circumvallation and Countervallation which I ever read of in any Siege and I fully believe the making of both as ordinarily they are made in our modern Sieges when we equally apprehend the numerous Sallies of the Besieged and the strong Attempts of the Relievers was taken from this Model of Caesars but the Copies are very much short of the Original as to the quantities and qualities of the Lines so many prodigious Works of 11 Miles about towards Alesia and 14 Miles about towards the Armies which came to succor it with the several Rows of Stakes Holes in the Ground and other Traps to destroy and catch the Gaules I think is admirable and to perfect them one would judge must be the labour of some years though a vast Army undertook it whereas indeed as I believe it could not possibly be the labour of many days For though Caesar mentions not how many days it was before the Relieving Army came Yet since he expresly says Vercingetorix found scarce 30 days Corn in the place when he shut up himself in it with his 80000 chosen Men and that he surrendred it not till the Relief had made three Attempts to succor it it is undeniable 't was not Famine only which made Vercingetorix yield And therefore it could not be many days in which Caesar began and perfected all these wonderful Works This being the true Narrative of the strength of his Lines both towards the Town and towards the Field it is not to be thought strange he elected to withstand his Enemy within such Fortifications and that he repulsed their General Assaults though three times made nor can any one reasonably believe Caesar's Army could have justified 11 miles of a Line against 80000 men within the Countervallation and of 14 miles against 248000 men without the Circumvallation had not the multiplicity of his Works the one within the other and the strength of them every way made them defensible enough for the paucity of the hands which were to justifie them Yet the finishing of these amazing Works were not the onely Labours of Caesar's Army but to do the constant Duty Night and Day of the Camp especially most strongly until the Line of Countervallation was finish't the providing not only Forage and Victuals from hand to mouth but also to lay in besides Magazines of both for 30 days which Caesar writes by his Orders were done That thereby as I suppose he might not be necessitated to stir out of his Lines when the Relief should Incamp it self close by them which else might have hazarded the cutting off his Army by piece-meel going to Forage or forced him to have come to a decisive Battel whereby all his Labour on his Lines would have