those of Autun from affording him such provisions as they had promised he acquainteth Divitiacus with it being his great friend and brother to Dumnorix who confesseth it intercedeth for him and obteineth his pardon After that having learned that the Suisses were incamped at the foot of a hill he causeth it to be viewed and finding it to be of easie accesse he sendeth Labienus thither causing him to march all night to gain the top of the hill and in the morning having put his forces into battalia he dispatcheth Considius to discover who having taken the allarm of Labienus returneth to Cesar that the enemy had seised the top of the hill which stayed him that day from defeating the Suisses The day following he taketh the way of Beaulne to distribute corn to his armie which the Suisses perceiving Bibracte follow him Cesar seeing them coming possesseth himself of a hill embattelleth his army about the middle of the descent on the top he quartereth two new levied legions and all the baggage alighteth and sendeth away his horse and causeth all the rest to do the like to shew them that they must overcome or die The Suisses charge him he defeateth them and pursueth them hotly forbiddeth those of Langres to assist them with victuall Lingones and in the end constraineth them to submit to his discretion He disarmeth them receiveth hostages and forceth them to return to inhabit their countrey and reedifie their houses And of three hundred sixtie eight thousand persons whereof there were ninetie two thousand bearing arms there returned in all but an hundred and ten thousand Observations THe resolution of this people which seemeth to be barbarous and which for the bad successe is universally condemned hath neverthelesse the same principles which all Conquerours have namely the desire of command and enlarging themselves and they are remarkable in their forecast of three yeares preparation in their constancie for not deficting from their designe after the death of their Generall and in the execution thereof burning their goods and houses to the end they might leave themselves no hope of safetie but onely in the sharpnesse of their swords Whence we may gather that we ought not to undertake any great designe timorously nor to look to the means of escape but rather of overcoming For if in the beginning of a dangerous designe you make known a way of escape the impatience or naturall timorousnesse of men maketh them find out that way upon the least accident that befalleth And if the Suisses had not met with the incomparable virtue of Cesar who by his valour industrie diligence and good fortune stayed their furie they might have atteined the scope of their enterprises In the managing of his warre Caesar hath shewed as in all other that that which hath made him fortunate in his exploits hath principally been his invariable order of encamping strongly alwayes entrenching himself that so he might never be compelled to fight but when he pleased and that he might lay hold on such occasions as offered themselves to defeat his enemies also his providence in taking care that his provision of victuall failed not and his continuall keeping of his souldiers in exercise and in breath to make them able to execute his designes readily and in good order The pardon of Dumnorix is observable his naturall clemency induced him to it suffering himself to be overcome by the intreaties of his brother Divitiacus whom he loved Neverthelesse he caused heed to be taken to his deportments that so he might receive no new inconveniences by him afterward The errour of Considius sheweth how much it concerneth to send men of experience to discover an army And the commanding of the Suisses to return and reinhabite their countrie was an act of prudence thereby hindering the Germanes being a most powerfull nation from preoccupation thereof and by that means their neighbourbood to Provence The second warre THe subject of the second warre was this The division of the Auvergnats and Autunois puissant people in Gallia had called in the Germanes Averni Aedui by the help of which the first had overcome the other neverthelesse they all found themselves oppressed and the conquerours much more then the conquered for these were discharged for some tribute and hostages and from the other the Germans took away the greatest part of their lands insomuch that all seeing themselves subdued they hold an assembly of States by the permission of Cesar to desire his aid which he promiseth But having sent to Ariovistus the Generall of the Germanes to this end he received replies so insolent that at last they fell fowl where Cesar defeated him and chaced both him and all the Germanes out of Gallia forcing them to passe the Rhine again These two wars were finished in one summer Observations VVHereby we may observe how dangerous such auxiliarie succours are especially when you require them of a people more powerfull then your own Cesar hath indeed driven out Ariovistus but the Gauls have done nothing but changed maister He imbarked himself in this war for two reasons the first because be suspected that this puissant nation taking footing in Gallia might come to gain upon Provence and so draw near to Italy and the other that thereby he insinuated himself insensibly into the conquest of the said Gauls Which businesse he managed so dextrously by enterteining their divisions amongst them that by the aid of the one he conquered the other and in the end subdued all We must further observe his diligence so much recommended in all his actions to possesse himself of Besancon having prevented his enemies and by this means provided for the nourishment of his armie There it was that a panike fear seised upon his souldiers which began by the voluntiers who desiring to depart discouraged the rest that so they might cover their own shame by the generall delinquencie of the armie which is a most dangerous thing and whereof a Generall of an army ought to take extraordinary care never to hazard any battel untill he hath recovered his souldiers spirits again which Cesar did at this time by making an oration to them wherein he excelled He further helped himself as many other commanders especially Marius by encamping strongly before this terrible armie and making his souldiers know by small skirmishes that their enemies were not invincible nor more valiant then themselves and causing them to conceive that joyning order and militarie discipline to the prudence of their Generall they were their superiours For the Romanes have never conquered other nations by their great number nor by their valour but by their knowledge in warre which they alwayes exercised by the observation of their order and entrenchment of their camp Whereupon we must consider that Ariovistus being encamped between Cesar and the place from whence he had his victuall and that Cesar not being able to draw him to battel in five dayes after that he had well fortified that
together which made 32 souldiers those two files so joyned they called Dilochia and the Commander of these two files they called Dilochites Then they doubled the number of those two files which made foure files and 64 souldiers and this troup they called Tetrarchia which had a Commander called Tetrarcha After that they doubled the number of these which made eight files and 128 souldiers and this body was called Taxiarchia and their Commander Taxiarcha Then they doubled those eight files so made them 16 and this body was called Syntagma and the Commander of this body was called Syntagmatarcha To this body they appointed five generall officers An Ensigne a Lieutenant a Trumpeter for they had no Drumme a Cryer and a Sergeant The Ensigne was placed in the middle of the first rank as all will appear by the figure following The second figure Syntagmatarcha Taxiarcha Tetrarcha Dilochites The Phalanx was composed of sixteen bodies like to the foregoing figure This body of 16 files they doubled which made 32 files and called it Pentacosiarchia and the Commander of it Pentacosiarcha Then these 32 files they doubled which made 64 and this body they called Chiliarchia and the Commander Chiliarcha These 64 files being doubled made 128 files and were called Merarchia and their Commander Merarcha And 128 files being doubled make 256 called Phalangia and the Commander Phalangiarchos so that the Phalanx is composed of 4096 souldiers and of one Phalangiarchos which commanded in chief two Merarchas foure Chiliarchas eight Pentacosiarchas 16 Syntagmatarchas 32 Taxiarchas 64 Tetrarchas and 128 Dilochites as the next figure sheweth The third figure Now according to the ability of their Commonwealths they augmented this army by doubling the Phalanx which was called Diphalangarchia and the Commander Diphalangarcha or by doubling the Diphalangarchia and this they called Tetraphalangarchia and the Commander Tetraphalangarchos who then was the highest Commander And this they held to be a complete army which afterward hath been called a Phalanx Neverthelesse it was alwayes divided into foure bodies as foure Phalanges and was composed of 16384 souldiers The fourth figure This is the order of the Grecian phalanx for the heavy-armed called hoplitae namely of pikes and targets which took up allowing six foot for each souldier and without accounting the three intervalls six thousand one hundred fourty foure foot in breadth and ninetie six foot in depth To this army they joyned half that number of light-armed souldiers called Psyllagi which fought from afarre off with flying and casting-weapons and were ordered into battalia behind the Phalanx in equall front but that their files were but eight deep in the same order and with the same officers And when they were to begin the battel they passed through the intervalls and assailed the enemy when the armies were drawn so near each other as to come to the shock they retreated by the same intervalls into their places behind the heavy-armed and over their heads poured a showre of stones darts and arrows upon their enemies and fortified the depth of the Phalanx to sustein the shock being now of 24 men in depth The fifth figure Concerning the cavalrie they alwayes placed them on the wings and whether it were the cavalrie or the infantery they changed the form of their order according to the site of the places or to the number of the enemies forces with whom they had to do or to the order wherein they were ranged into battalia enlarging the front by lessening the depth doubling their front by the half files as Cyrus did in the battel which he fought agaist Cresus for fearing to be overwinged he made his files which were 24 deep but 12 and so augmented the front of his army by the one half Besides they made use of severall orders of battalia according to occasions as the Orb and the light-armed in the middle to sustein a strong charge on all parts or the Wedge the better to enter into a battalion or a Half-moon to enclose or overwing and others which are of no great use in these times And that they might not confound themselves in such orders when occasions served they had publick Schools where all the younger sort of men went to exercise themselves which they called Gymnasia and had Masters to teach the use of arms and motions called Tactici Now to perform all the motions they allowed to every souldier six foot of ground square and for fight three foot and to sustein a violent charge they serried them so as they took up but a foot and a half By this means it was that so many small Commonwealths of the Grecians maintained their liberties so long have performed so brave actions having repulsed so great armies with so small forces and having even planted their tropheys in Asia and elsewhere untill their divisions overthrew them which Philip dextrously laying hold on brought them to subjection and after that Alexander his sonne with them and their Militia conquered a great part of the world It is true indeed that the constitution of those Commonwealths was more proper for a happy mainteining of their liberty then to encrease themselves for howsoever they all addicted themselves to arms so that none were exempted from them yet their poverty and the small number of souldiers of every Commonwealth apart by it self hindred them from making any great progresse so did their divisions it being a hard matter that so many sovereigne Common-wealths should agree together unlesse it were in a common necessity to defend themselves as they did divers times against the Persians but not for a conquest where men cannot agree neither about places of command nor about sharing of what is gotten Concerning their retrenched camp which they called Aplectos they chose rather strong sites then that they fortified them by industry neither had they any certain form as the Romans had but according to the advantage of places they fortified one part more then another and hereof there is nothing certain to be found in writing amongst ancient Authours The Militarie discipline of the Romanes CHAP. I. Of the election of souldiers and their arms ROmulus having built the citie of Rome divided it into centuries and militarie orders every body conteined foure thousand foot and three hundred horse Now because the most valiant were chosen it was called Legio which signifieth as much as a select company The citie being more populous by the addition of the Sabines the Legions were doubled which then became to be of six thousand foot and six hundred horse yet after that they have been of a greater number Tullus Hostilius third king of the Romanes established military exercise and distinguished all the people into five Classes or orders They of the first Classis as being the richest were bound to mount and arm themselves to serve on horseback The three following Classes were imployed on foot and according to their means were Hastati Principes or Triarii and were
the Hastati must then fight at so wide a distance that between two files they might receive two other files which sheweth the weaknesse of this first order which being so ranged in battalia could not be able to repulse nor sustein the adverse battallion And even the files being at so wide a distance from each other were not able to keep themselves right in fight nor to observe their distances but in the other way there are many conveniences to be found First many bodies of a hundred and twenty men apiece or thereabouts assaulting a battallion they may very well defeat it at the worst they may retreat without disordering themselves or loosing their distances And the second order which is embattelled behind the first just over against their intervalls may easily fill them as also in case of necessity the third body may supply those distances which are reserved for them renewing the fight three times And that which confirmeth us the more in this opinion is that in reason it ought to be so next the description of the battel of Zama which Scipio fought against Hannibal where it is said that Scipio to hinder Hannibals elephants from routing his souldiers caused the Cohorts of the Principes which were placed just over against the intervalls of the Hastati to stand just behind them so to leave streets for the passage of the elephants which sheweth plainly that the order of battalia was disposed by Cohorts and not by files I speak not of the Velites in this order of battalia nor of all other light-armed souldiers because they fought not but with casting-weapons and afar off and when the armies approched to give the shock they retired themselves behind the heavie-armed Now to form the said order I will say that the file was alwayes of ten men in depth that a Cohort or Maniple of a Legion of foure thousand two hundred men consisted alwayes of one hundred and twentie souldiers and consequently the Cohort made ten ranks and twelve files conteining at six foot square of ground for every souldier seventy two foot in breadth and sixty in depth and the moity of it when they were at three foot distance The first figure of a Cohort This figure in the Authours copy hath 13 files 11 ranks which I conceioee to be a mistake In each of the three orders howsoever the Legions were weaker or stronger there were alwayes ten Cohorts or Maniples but the Cohorts were either increased or diminished according to the proportion of the Legions The second figure of ten Cohorts The two first orders are of an equall number and the last of half as many and by this example of one Legion you may see how all the troups passed into each other The third figure of a Legion I conceive that between the Legions there was a far greater distance then between the Cohorts that so they might prevent confusion amongst them which I judge to be so necessary as that without the observation thereof it was altogether impossible to observe any good order Concerning the cavalry seeing it was divided into the like number of troups as the Infantery it is like they fought in the same order but the one half were on the right flank and the other on the left Thus the army was composed of six great bodies namely foure bodies of infantery and two bodies of the cavalry and every body divided into small troups as hath been shewed before The order of Battalia of a complete Army The fourth figure So in this figure the intervalls should be 4 times wider if the bodies must be so large but I conceive a generall mistake in the figure and that in Praissac pag. 190. to be much better CHAP. IX Of Sieges NO Romane Commander hath made braver sieges then Cesar nor described them more perfectly He hath left examples for the assailing of all sorts of sites and to maintein a siege against all kinds of reliefs At Brundusium which is upon the sea he constrained Pompey to abandon it for that he shut up the haven by which that town was to be relieved At Cadenac which was a site inexpugnable he constrained the garrison to yield it by taking away their water At Alexia where were 80000 souldiers within the town and which expected two or three times as many he so fortified himself before it both against the town and against the enemy without as he famished it And at Bourges and Marseilles he took the first by assault and constrained the other to yield when it was upon the point of being taken by assault I will not here particularize the engines which they then made use of to force places of strength because the cannon hath taken away the use of them Yet I will onely say that they approched to the walls by degrees as much sheltred as they could and then attempted to batter them down by their engines or by mines to force an assault or at least to lodge upon the breach which I the rather speak to shew that howsoever we have changed the manner of fortifications the better to make resistance against our new thundring engines neverthelesse the ancient maximes for the taking of towns are the same which we make use of at this day Concerning the siege of Alexia it is the modell by which the Prince of Parma the Prince of Orange and the Marquesse Spinola have directed themselves to make theirs And all these great works and circumvallations which we admire and by the help of which they have taken many great cities in sight of greater armies then their own which have not been able to relieve them are nothing in comparison of those which Cesar made at this siege of Alexia To conclude they which come nearest to the manner of warring of the ancient Romanes as well in sieges as in the field are they which prove the most excellent Commanders CHAP. X. Observations vpon some battels of the ancients NOw that we have shewed the ancient Militia of the Grecians and Romanes by means whereof they have obteined so many brave victories we must yet observe two principall causes which their most excellent Commanders have successefully observed to obtein victories in battel namely to strive to overwing their enemy and never to cause their army to fight all at once Cyrus to keep himself from being overwinged in the battel which he fought against Cresus doubled the front of his army by as many more as they were by making the files of his infantery but 12 deep which before were 24 and to enclose his enemy he placed his best men on the wings who having defeated the wings of the adverse army came to assault the body of the battel on their flanks and on their rear At the battel of Cannae Hannibal placed all his best souldiers on the wings and the meaner ones in the middle that so the Romanes finding but little resistance there might insensibly sink into them and by that means they
battels as the Turks and the Persians and even amongst the Christians we have seen of late divers battels given in Germanie whereof onely one had almost inthralled all the Protestant Princes And an army well-disciplined and which feareth not battel hath a marvellous advantage in all designes of that which feareth it For this reason howsoever the manner of warring at this time be not so frequent in the hazarding of battels as in times past the knowledge of them must not be neglected And a Generall of an army cannot be said to be a good Captain which knoweth not all advantages which may be taken on a day of battel and all disadvantages which ought to be avoyded that so he may well disintangle himself I will not speak of dust the sunne or rain whereof it is observed that many Captains have made use driving them on the face of the enemy by gaining the wind of them because they are casuall things which may change in a moment and which by consequence happen rather by hazard then come by designe but of things more solid He then that will give battel must have regard to seven principall things The first is never to suffer himself to be forced to fight against his will The second to choose a field for the battel fit for the quality and number of his souldiers for if he feareth to be inclosed by a great number he must shelter his flanks or at least one of them by the nature of the place as by a river wood or some other thing equivalent and if he be weak in his Cavalry he must avoid the plains as he must strait passages or enclosed places if stronger The third so to range his army in battel as according to the quality of his souldiers it may be within its own advantage sheltring his horse by his foot if therein he be the weaker and if the contrary his foot by his horse disposing all his souldiers in such order as they may fight divers times before they be wholly defeated for if we well observe the small troups of souldiers which fight not all at once and believe that a hundred horse in two troups wil beat two hundred in one entire troup and have observed in our times that divers battels have been won by him which had made a troup of reserve which was not to fight untill all the rest had fought how much greater effect will a second order of battel produce which will come to the charge after that all the adverse army hath fought against the first order and yet after that a third in imitation of the Romanes if the two former be defeated It is a maxime That every troup how grosse soever i◠be which hath fought is in such a disorder as the least troup that chargeth it is able to defeat it absolutely so that that Generall which can reserve some troups to the last without fighting will with those bear away the victory it being a long work and difficult to go about to rally an army that hath fought into good order to fight afresh some gazing about for pillage others being vexed to return to the danger again and all being so distracted as they do not or will not understand any command on the contrary such as have not as yet fought are under obedience and ready to do whatsoever their Generall shall command them So that the knowledge of a Generall of an army is not so much to rally disordered and defeated troups which is properly but an action of courage as to make his troups fight to good purpose the one after the other and not all at once for he must consider that he cannot be well obeyed by his souldiers but onely untill the houre that he sendeth them to the combat After that all the orations of the world will not stay them when they flie but this troup which is in good order will easily do it The fourth is to have many good commanders it being impossible that a Generall should suffice for all places After that he hath made a good choice of his field for battel and put his army into good order it is altogether impossible for him when it cometh to blows to give order more then in that part where he is present so that if he be not well assisted every-where else aswell amongst the horse as foot though he should work miracles in that place where he himself is he cannot make good the ignorance of those officers which command in the other parts of his army Therefore there must be at least five principall commanders to make an army fight well namely for three bodies of Infantery distinguished by vanguard battel and rearguard and two for the horse which are on the wings The fifth is so to observe your distances in your order of battel that the foremost troups being put to recoil may not fall upon those which should come up to relieve thē nor the second upon the third The sixth is to place the most valiant souldiers on the wings of the army and to begin the battel by that wing which you think to be strongest for if you once break one of the enemies wings you fall upon his flank and rear and it is impossible for him to resist you The seventh and last is not to suffer any to pursue the enemy nor fall to pillaging untill he be routed on all parts and although it be good to give him a hot chace you must ever have some troups in order which must not disband that so you may avoid all inconveniences I will not speak of the advantages which may be met with in a field of battel whereof a good Captain often maketh use with great profit because there can no certain rule be given for it by reason the diversitie of situations is such that you shall never find two every-way alike CHAP. VIII Of Fortresses BEcause the gain and losse of battels draweth such consequences after it as it giveth or taketh away whole Empires at once it hath caused a resolution of opposing the conquers by fortified places to stay their first fury with few men and to ruine their armies But since the invention of the cannon they have been enforced to change their manner of fortifications and even by reason of the invention of petards we have beene constrained to assure the gates of cities by portculices pallisadoes draw-bridges and other inventions because there was no place how strong soever it were which did not runne a hazard to be surprised by this new invention Now the best fortresses against the cannon are those which are made of earth because when they have a sufficient thicknesse to make resistance they are not subject to endamage the besieged as those fortifications are which are made of masons work the shivers whereof do much mischief Neverthelesse when a Prince can be at the cost to line them as high as the rampart leaving the parapet upon it to be of earth cannon-proof it maketh
must be inforced to begin their work anew as ofttimes as you overthrow it insomuch as the besieger finding himself so enterteined he approcheth with much more ceremonie and at last his souldiers draw back So that in my opinion it is very fit that the besieged should make frequent sallies but they must make them at severall houres that so they may the better surprise the enemy with few men but resolute to avoid the disorder in the retreat and to do no other thing but what is commanded For though you find not resistance at the falling on as is usuall if you stay to little purpose you runne the hazard to be ill led off at the retreat The other particularities of defense depend upon those of assailing the besiegers teaching you by necessitie what you are to do wherein there is nothing but practice and experience which can well direct you CHAP. XIII Of Artillery IT is fit to speak of Artillery after sieges since it is principally by means thereof that towns are taken and that since this hath been in use there are no places found impregnable if they be not inaccessible It hath changed all the form and matter of fortifications for in stead of towers and ancient walls which have not been able to resist it we now make bulwarks and other works of earth We may say that it hath even in a manner altered the manner of making warre Anciently they began their approches to towns where now we end them for on the first day they lodged on the brim of the moat and now adayes we must go a great way before we come at it then the circumvallation was made out of reach of arrows onely now they must be made beyond reach of cannon then it mattered not though the fortresses of the encamped armies were overtopped so as they had their other conveniences now-adayes there must be care taken above all things that they be not In those times two armies were quietly led in batalia at two or three hundred paces distance from each other and remained there whole dayes without being able to be dislodged but by a hazard of a general battel now one cannot be before another but out of the reach of the cannon otherwise he that hath most of them or that hath planted them best beateth out the other without fighting At that time a Generall of an army could know the order of his enemy at a near distance and form his own according to that seeking his advantages upon the defects of another and all without danger now these things can no more be observed but so farre off as you must rather trust to your own good order then upon any defect in that of your enemy Then one army could charge another without losing their order because they had not above two or three hundred paces to march in these times it is impossible to observe it in sight of the enemy for half a league together and to find a plain which shall be even and without hindrances Whereunto I adde further that without a great exercise of marching in battalia you are not able to march a thousand paces without losing all your distances of battalions and squadrons and by consequence without being in confusion Since therefore the cannon is of so great use in warre and hath so great a share in the victory it is necessary that you know how to make good use of it It is an engine which all cannot well imploy for it is of great expense and belongeth onely to great and puissant States to make ordinary use of them They tie them to a great charge for draught there being a hundred draught-horses required to draw one cannon for battery through all kinds of wayes and to shoot onely a hundred bullets By this you may judge according to the number which you mean to imploy what length of ground it taketh up To mannage one piece of battery well there must be eighteen men besides how many smiths carters farriers and other workmen must there be in the train to repair the carriages how many carpenters to make bridges how how many pioners to accommodate the high-wayes Briefly an army which carrieth cannon with it cannot march but leisurely and that which hath none can do no great effect therefore in these times the artillery is an essentiall part of an army but withall if the Generall suffereth himself to be approched too near without entrenching himself it is impossible for him to disintangle himself without fighting or losing it which cannot so happen without losing much of his reputation For this reason he ought to inform himself very particularly of all that dependeth on the artillery and that he may not be deceived he must know the least even of the smallest things namely of the mixture founding proportion weight calibre and carriage of what wood it must be how it must be conducted according to the severall wayes miry or mountainous how to passe rivers how to secure the batteries as well against the cannon of the enemy as against his sallies what ground the cannon must have for his reverse what distance between piece and piece in what manner the platform must be made at what distance the batteries are sufficient and other things whereof I do not here specifie the particulars because others have written of them It sufficeth me to shew the use of artillerie the chargeablenesse of it the turmoil of it and whereunto it engageth you to incite Generals not to rely upon others and to know the benefit and discommoditie thereof so well that they may make use of the one to their advantage and avoid the other by their foresight CHAP. XIV Of the baggage and pioners AFter the great turmoil of the artillery I will speak a word of that of the baggage It is a great shame to lose it but it is also a hard matter to preserve it when it is excessive there being nothing that bringeth so much disorder to an army therefore it is highly necessary to reduce it to the smallest proportion that may be and to make a review of it every moneth for it groweth in the twinkling of an eye We are so delicate now a dayes as we will hardly carry our arms much lesse would we carry a weeks victuall about us So long as such an abuse be suffered in an army it will make it self incapable to do any thing that is good For as in a battel he which can last preserve some troups which have not fought carrieth away the victory so he that last keepeth his army in health complete and accustomed to labour doth the like which he cannot do if the souldiers be so delicate as they cannot carry their baggage Besides that sicknesse and famine getteth not into an army but by this rascalliâ—ie of souldiers boyes and this thing which seemeth to be a thing of nothing is of such importance as it is for the most part the dissipation of the most flourishing yea I
alone are unprofitable If you make more quarters then there be generall officers the ancientest Captain commandeth in the quarter and therein taketh the most ancient quarter-master of his quarter Insomuch that the Generall of the horse giving his orders to the Commissary generall he to the Quarter-master generall and he to the other Quarter-masters which come for them from the other quarters where the same order is observed the commands are carried without confusion and passe through the hands of few persons and when there is any deficiency found it is easie to be verified whence it arose The infantery is the more solid body of an army that of the artillery and victuall alwayes are quartered with it There is not that diversitie between the companies which is between the horse they are all of the same fashion composed of half-pikes half-musketiers Many companies make a regiment which hath its commander and many regiments make a body which we call a Brigado of the army The army is usually divided into three bodies Vanguard Battel and Rearguard Every brigado hath its commander and besides it ought to have a Sergeant Major of a brigado and a Quarter-master of a brigado The first to go and take the orders from the Marshall of the field generall to carry them to the commander of his brigado then he giveth the word to the Sergeant Majors of the regiments and the other to give to every Quarter-master of a regiment either his quarter or the space of ground which is necessary for him to encamp in and he divideth it to the particular Quarter-masters or to the harbengers of every company which afterwards lodgeth them If there be a Colonel generall of all the infantery he may have a care in generall of all the government thereof but in an army he must onely command a brigado otherwise we should not be able to establish the order which we have propounded Moreover there be divers nations which do not judge a Colonell generall of the infantery to be necessary but content themselves with particular Colonels for every regiment which acknowledge onely the commands of the Generall or of his Marshall of the field generall The artillery ought to have a Generall a Lieutenant generall a Quarter-master then other officers And for that all pioners miners enginiers conductours of works smiths carpenters wheelwrights and other workmen depend on him I would establish a commander for every sort of these men which I would take either out of the commissaries of the artillery or other persons apart to addresse my self to them when I had need of such men The Quarter-master must every night go to receive the orders of the Marshall of the field generall The charge of the victuals ought to be performed by a Generall he ought to have his Lieutenant his Quarter-master and his other officers his Quarter-master must every evening go and take the orders of the Marshall of the field generall So then you see how the commands are distributed the Marshall of the field generall receiveth them from the Generall then goeth to his own lodging there the Commissary of horse cometh and receiveth them for the cavalry the Sergeant Major generall for the infantery who delivereth it to the Sergeant Majors of brigadoes for the artillery to the Quarter-master thereof and so to him for the victuals Briefly the Marshall of the field generall speaking with these foure persons giveth the orders to all the army All orders and commands ought to be given in writing The Marshall of the field generall the Generall of the artillery the Fiscall the Controller of the Exchequer the Generall of victuall the Quarter-master generall the Sergeant major generall and the Provost generall must alwayes be lodged within the Generalls quarter If all the army be encamped in bodies the Quarter-master generall giveth to each of these bodies the space of ground which is fitting which is afterwards distributed in every body by the officers thereunto appointed On a day of battel the Marshall of the field generall doth assigne the place for every body afterwards the Sergeant major generall rangeth the infantery into battalia The Marshall of the field generall ought to have three or foure assistants for the field to carry the extraordinary orders but they must not pretend to command any officer in chief unlesse they formerly have been either Colonels or Captains of horse The Sergeant major generall must command the Colonels but that they may the readilier obey him he ought to be taken out of the Colonels and none ought ever to have that place unlesse he hath been one as also the Sergeant majors of brigadoes ought to be taken out of the Sergeant majors of regiments Things being thus regulated and established you shall see a great facilitie in the commands and none shall be able to excuse his fault by putting it off upon another because presently it will be verified whence it proceeded which obligeth every man to be carefull to do that exactly which he shal be coÌ„manded CHAP. XVIII Of the assailing of States according to their forces and situations AFter that you have formed an army you must imploy it either for the conquest of a new countreâ— or for the defense of your own We will begin with the first The Prince which putteth himself upon the offensive must be the stronger or must see some garboils in the State which he assaileth and that he be called thither by a partie otherwise it would be a rash enterprise If the countrey which he assaileth be large and open he must seek in the beginning to hazard a battel or some grand skirmish that so by the reputation of his arms he may affright the enemies If it be a countrey enclosed with mountains or divided by rivers and ditches or sheltered with forrests or full of fortresses it is hard to force an enemy to battel and in this case you must go to sieges and make your conquest by little and little Now he that will make any progresse by this way must at least have two bodies of armies that so with the one he may hold his enemy in play and with the other he may actuate without impeachment For it is most difficult to accomplish the designe of a siege so long as you have a good army encamped near you which shall cut off your victuall If it be a countrey which is hard to enter and that hath but few passages whereby to enter into it you must force one and before you go further you must there fortifie and so well assure your way for your victuall as you may not suffer though the enemy should have burned or carried away that of his countrey into his fortresses If you be called by a faction that is a very great advantage for you because you are instructed of the situation of the countrey and of the defects which are to be found in the â—â—â—tified places and want not spies nor punctuall advertisements of whatsoever passeth amongst the
camp be goeth with all his army in battaglia to fortifie a small one in a place of advantage two miles distant from the first and which favoured the way for his victuall making the third part of his army to work whilest the other two thirds stood in battaglia which repulsed the troups which Ariovistus sent to hinder the said fortification which being made he leaveth two legions there and leadeth away the rest into his old camp The next day Cesar putteth himself into battaglia between the two camps but being retired Ariovistus assaulteth the small one and is repulsed Cesar having thus reconfirmed the courages of his souldiers sallieth out with his whole armie in battaglia and goeth up to the very trenches of Ariovistus provoketh him to fight who sallieth out and is defeated The third warre The II. Book CEsars third warre was against the Belgae the third part of Gallia and at that time the most warlike The principall causes were that seeing the rest of the Gaules in peace with the Romanes they feared an assault besides they were solicited by certain Gauls discontented or ambitious the one of which took as little pleasure to see the Romanes as Germanes in their countrey and the other apprehensive that during their abode they should not be able to possesse themselves of any principalitie or dominion The number of their forces amounted to two hundred eighty and one thousand fighting men Cesar having understood these great preparations Bellouaci causeth those of Beauvais to be assailed by Divitiacus and those of Autun and being assured of those of Rhems which declared themselves for him he goeth encampeth upon the river Daisne near to Soissons relieveth Brenne Axona Suessones Bibrax and the enemy attempting to passe that river he opposeth and killeth a great number of them After that victuall growing short for so great an armie and they of Beauvais understanding that Divitiacus harried their countrey they resolved to return every man to his own home and be in a readinesse to relieve the first that should be assaulted But they retreated in such disorder that Cesar had leisure to overtake them who charging on the rear routed them where he made a great massacre Noviodunum and in pursuit of them he besiegeth and taketh Noyon All these submitted except they of Tournay Nervii esteemed the most valiant of al who having disposed of their old men women and children resolved to defend themselves Cesar goeth to them who assault him so furiously as he was going to his quarters that they had like to have defeated him so that he confessed that in this conflict his good fortune had equall share with his valour and industrie Neverthelesse he defeated them after which he findeth no more resistance the renown of whose victories made him dreadfull even as farre as Germanie and gained him all Normandy and Bretain which Publius Crassus one of his Lieutenants subjected to the Romanes with onely one Legion Observations VVE must here observe the judgement of Cesar who by his diligence assured himself of those of Rhems by his industrie and affabilitie held them faithfull and by his foresight prepared a diversion against those of Beauvois a bold and stout people which redounded much to his profit Further it is to be considered that an army of thirtie or fourtie thousand men trained and well disciplined is able with patience well intrenching and encamping it self to discomfit the most numerous armies which for want of victuall destroy themselves and if they fight provided that you avoid being surrounded on all parts their disorders and confusion will also break them The warres of the Romanes do prove this true who have never defeated their enemies but with lesser number nor were ever forced to sallie out of their retrenched camp to give battel against their wills and particularly this present wherein Cesar hath had more to do against one Province â—lone of the Belgae then against all the rest together having very particularly described the battel which he had against those of Tournay as one of the most dangerous which he ever had wherein there be diverse things worthy consideration The first That those of Tournay being advertised that Cesar caused every Legion to march with its baggage after it they resolved to lay an Embuscado and to fight with them truly judging that the baggage separating the Legions in an inclosed countrey they should not be able to relieve each other and that otherwise they might with all their forces set upon each Legion apart The second That they found themselves deceived in their presupposition because that though Cesar commanded his army to march so in a countrey of securitie for the commodiousnesse thereof neverthelesse when he was in a suspected countrey he caused six Legions to march together then all the baggage and in the rear of that two Legions newly levied And it was in this order and upon his encamping when they charged him The third is the confession of Cesar who freely acknowledgeth that his armie was assaulted so unexspectedly and couragiously and in a countrey so inclosed that it was neither his customary order which saved him for he had no leisure to embattel nor his exhortations nor his appearance in all parts for he was forced to fight in the place he then was in but he attributed the safetie thereof onely to the continued discipline of his souldiers which knew of themselves to range where they ought to that that he ever made all his officers exactly observe the performance of their duties whilest the intrenchment of the camp was a making so that in all parts were found some ready to command and others to obey which made good the resistance and hindred the affrightment The fourth That a rash resolution is oftentimes to be feared and to avoid it must never be omitted whatsoever dependeth on military discipline And the fifth That the treason which those of Bolduc whom he had besieged in the best of their fortresses would have committed against him after they had yielded themselves Aduatici should teach us that we should alwaies distrust an enemy and keep our selves so much the more upon our guards the nearer we are to overcome The fourth warre The III. Book THe first exploit of arms was against Servius Galba one of Cesars Lieutenants who having sent him with a Legion and some horse into the countreyes of Aelen Antuates Veragri Seduni Allobroges Lacus Lemanus Valias and Sion which extendeth from Savoy to the lake of Geneva to assure the traffick of merchants after some successefull combats made peace with that people received their hostages and having left two companies in the countrey of Aelen he goeth with the rest of the Legion to quarter at the town of Martanach situated in a valley Octodurus and divided into two by a little river called the Branse on the one side whereof he intrencheth his camp and on the other he quartereth the Gauls
Island he giveth them combat and defeateth them Which forceth them afresh to desire peace he granteth it taketh hostages of those that would readily deliver them and carrieth back his armie into Gallia safe and sound onely two shippes with three hundred souldiers which landed a little lower were set upon by those of Teraenne which Cesar being informed of hastneth thither with his cavalrie rescueth them and defeateth the enemies Observations IT is to be observed that to beginne a warre in autumne without apparent advantage in a countrey undiscovered not having any intelligence there and the Ocean to passe is an enterprise in my opinion well worthy the invincible courage of Cesar but not of his accustomed prudence Neverthelesse this escape must be attributed to his good fortune which he had subjected to his will For in this designe where it seemed that men and elements were conjured against him the earth refusing him victuall the sea battering his ships the air furnishing tempests and the countrey where he landed conspiring his ruine he constantly resisted all this opposing against famine his providence of making provisâ—â—n for his armie against the wracks of the sea his diligence in repairing his vessels against the assaults of his enemies his armies to resist them insomuch that he constrained them to beg for peace and so he returned gloriously from a bad countrey where any else would have suffered extremely Let us also consider that before he departed from France he took care to provide what was necessarie to keep it in obedience and for the securitie of his return Let us further note how abundant Cesar was in his inventions for the advantagious taking of his time in the very occasion it self for perceiving that his souldiers not accustomed to sea-fights were distracted at their landing he in the very action changeth his first order and with his galleys approcheth nearer the coast and in spite of his enemies landeth and they seeing a kind of vessels they knew not were affrighted and betook themselves to their heels Also we ought to admire in Cesar two things which he had to perfection and which render a commander excellent namely that he forecast and provided for all things which might either further or hinder this designe before he undertook it and that in the very execution be sailed not to take his advantage when occasion presented it or to remedy upon the instant such unexpected accidents as befell wherein he hath been inimitable The seventh warre The V. Book CEsar not satisfied with his first voyage into Britain imployeth the winter to cause such equipage to be prepared as was necessarie for his passage thither the second time and according to his custome goeth into Lombardy from whence before his return he passeth into Sclavonia to quiet some seditions which were there befallen Illyricum afterwards returneth to his armie findeth all in good order commendeth every man for their diligence in getting all things in readinesse But before his departure he goes to Triers a very powerfull people about a division fallen between Induciomarus and Cingentorix the two great men of the town The last cometh to him and promiseth him all obedience the other prepareth for warre neverthelesse fearing to be abandoned yieldeth himself Cesar receiveth him but diminisheth his authoritie and augmenteth that of Cingentorix whom he believeth best affected to him which done he continueth his designe takes along with him the principall men of Gallia in this warre Dumnorix of Autun makes difficulties Cesar presseth him he excuseth himself then attempts to seduce the Gauls at last he flies Cesar sendeth after him but refusing to return Iccius is slain He imbarkt at Calice where he left Labienus with three legions and two thousand horse he passeth into Britain and landeth without resistance he fortifieth a camp to guard his vessels leaveth Q. Atrius there and passeth further forceth the camp of the Britains not farre distant from thence The next day Atrius sendeth him word that the tempests had shattered the greater part of his navie he returneth thither imployeth ten whole dayes about repairing them draws them on shore causeth the camp to be well fortified commandeth Labienus to cause nâ—w ships to be built then advanceth towards Cassivellanus declared Generall for the Britains who dares not assail him but when he goes to forrage which causeth him to go strong and in good order after he had triall of his manner of fight by some skirmishes he defeated him by C. Trebonius one of his Lieutenants who went thither with three legions and all the cavalry After this defeat there appeared no more enemies in grosse and Cesar being come to the river Thames passeth it at the onely place where it was fordable in despite of the Britains who endeavoured to their utmost to hinder him which so astonished Cassivellanus that all his care was to hide himself in the woods seeing that divers towns had yielded themselves to Cesar he also sent to him who received him giving hostages imposing a certain tribute upon the countrey TheÌ„ seeing the season much spent and fearing some tumults in France he repasseth the sea bringing back his armie gloriously which contrary to his custome he was constrained by reason of the barrennesse of the yeare to separate into divers garrisons to keep it alive But before he could go into Italie Ambiorix and Cativulcus instigated by Induciomarus take arms assail Sabinus and Cotta two of his Lieutenants defeat and kill them as they were removing from their camp from thence they go and assail Cicero in his camp another of his Lieutenants which defendeth himself with much difficulty Cesar relieveth him and defeateth the Gauls The report of the defeat of two Romane legions inciteth the other Gauls to revolt insomuch that Labienus is assaulted in his camp by Induciomarus he withstandeth the assault afterwards conquereth and killeth him As the first defeat of the Romane legions moved all the Gauls to revolt so these two last overthrows made them lay down their arms Observations IN this second voyage of Cesar into Britain though he went thither with greater forces and better prepared then at first having supplied those defects which were wanting before neverthelesse going into a countrey which he could not come to but by sea where he had no intelligence and going from another newly conquered subject to revoltings and which grudgingly endured subjection he rather therein satisfied his own ambition then that he added any great profit to the Romanes Wherein we will first observe his dexterity and prudence in that he carried along with him as voluntaries all the stirring spiritâ— amongst the Gauls which served as hostages for him But it appears his naturall clemency made him commit an errour in contenting himself to have diminished the authority of Induciomarus when indeed he should have ruined him whereof he found the inconvenience afterward Secondly that he never was moved at any unexpected accidents for which he was prepared as if he
had foreseen them which he made to appear to good purpose in this great tempest which shattered all his ships and would have driven any but himself to desperation Thirdly though he were renowned for the Captain which best knew how to make use of his victories and which hath pursued them homest he would not do it here because he was in an unknown countrey and his camp not as yet well fortified Let us consider also that howsoever the scarcity of corn compelled him contrary to his custome to cause his army to make their winter-garrisons in severall places and not all together to the end that they might with more facility be furnished with victuall yet he did it with such judgement as that the places where they quartered were not so far distant but that they could easily relieve each other nor so near but they held divers States in obedience Neverthelesse the successe sheweth us evidently that it is not so good as to be quartered in an intire body because it is easier to assail a small troop then a great which gave encouragement to the Gauls to revolt and to assail the camp of Sabinus Cotta where the artificiall oration of Ambiorix perswading them that the revolt was so generall that at the same instant all the other camps were assaulted and could not relieve each other put them into such a confusion in matter of counsel that fear made them choose the worst which was to forsake their camp and retreat Whence we may learn That he never speedeth well that followeth the counsels of an enemy and That a retreat in view of the enemy is the most dangerous action that can be undertaken Cicero his resistance â—ithiâ— his camp which refused to follow his enemies counsel and resolved to defend himself within his trenches proved for his safetie and great glory and gave time to Cesar to relieve him wherein there be two things remarkable The first of Cesar who having understood that the Gauls came towards him to give him battel finding himself weak maketh choice of an advantageous place fortifieth it maketh his camp very small to the end he might the better defend it and make his enemies believe that he was exceeding weak whom after they had many times provoked him to fight they began to disregard which begot a neglect of all order amongst them so that they assaulted him ever after disorderly having thus lulled them asleep on a day he chargeth them so furiously that he defeateth them without resistance And Labâ—enus one of his Lieutenants by a like stratageme did the like to Induciomarus The second of the Gauls who not being able to force the camp of Cicero shut him up by a retrenchment which conteined ten miles in circuit made in three houres and by men which had nothing to dig with but their swords and nothing to carry earth with but their clothes which argueth they were a great multitude and sheweth what may be done by armies well regulated and well provided The eighth warre The VI. Book CEsar perceiving the affairs of the Gauls to incline to warre fortifieth himself by three Romane Legions and as many other souldiers as he could get which fell out very happily for him for after the death of Induciomarus the Trevois put their government into the hands of his kindred which made league with all that would revolt and particularly with Ambiorix whereof Cesar being advertised joyns foure legions together in winter surprises those of Tournay forceth them to yield deliver hostages And in the spring following causeth the Gauls to assemble at Paris Lutetia from whence on the same day that the assembly brake up he goeth and assaulteth those of Sens Senones Carnutes then those of Chartres who finding themselves surprised yield From thence he prepareth to set upon Ambiorix and those of Triers but first he laboureth to draw away from them their allies To which end he discardeth all his baggage which he commits to Labienus who was in the countrey of Triers with two legions to guard it and himself with five goeth to assail the Gauls For execution whereof he divided his army into three parts for that he well knew they were not able to dispute the champain with him and so burnt and pillaged their countrie that he constrained them to yield to deliver hostages and to forsake Ambiorix At the same time they of Triers assail Labienus who making a shew of fear and retreating as if he had fled draweth them in disorder into places of disadvantage where he defeateth them and taketh the very citie of Triers This expedition being finished Cesar maketh a bridge over the Rhine and passeth it they of Cullen adhere to him he fortifieth his camp and maketh provision of victuall attempteth to compell the Suevians to battel but seeing them retreat into vast and deep forrests he forbeareth to pursue them repasseth the Rhine cutteth off on the Germane side onely 120 foot of his bridge maketh a good tower on the end thereof at the other end on the side of Gallia he buildeth a fort leaving twelve cohorts to guard that and the said bridge In this place Cesar maketh a description of the manners and customes of the Gauls and the Germanes That done he goeth to continue the warre against Ambiorix and the better to surprise him he sendeth L. Minutius Basilius before with all the cavalrie forbidding him the making any fire in his camp to the end his approch might be undiscovered by which means he thought to have seised upon Ambiorix who saved himself miraculously by flying from one place to another Cesar the better to follow him conveys again his baggage into a castle of the Liegeois called Vatucca Eburones Wachtendonck for guard whereof he left Q. Tullius Cicero with one legion commanding him for seven dayes the time which his expedition would take up to look carefully to his guards and not to stirre out of his trenches Then divided he his army into three parts to harrasse all that countrey who meeteth with nothing in the form of an army to oppose him insomuch that his greatest care was to prevent that his souldiers covetous of booty straggled not too far abroad for fear of being cut off by the enemies which lay hidden in forrests and boggs The report reached presently to the other side of the Rhine that Cesar exposed the countrey of Gueldres to pillage Menapii which occasioned the Westfalians to participate of the booty Sicambri they presently get together two thousand horse passe the Rhine pillage without resistance are so well pleased with tast thereof that they resolve to set upon the Romane camp when by misfortune that day being the seventh from Cesars departing Cicero which had observed his command very exactly and having no news nor suspecting an enemie suffered himself by the importunity of his souldiers to give way to them to forrage and at the same instant was unexpectedly assaulted by the
Westfalians against whom he had much ado to defend himself untill that his souldiers returning from forrage part of them made their way through the enemies and regained the camp but the rest were cut in pieces Neverthelesse this relief bereft the enemies of all hope of forcing the camp and so they returned to their countrey with their bootie A while after arrived Cesar who rebuked Cicero for transgressing his command Then he resolveth afresh to expose the countrey of Gueldres to fire and sword and to pursue Ambiorix who had yet escaped after that he sendeth his army to garrison which he supplieth with corn and then goeth into Italy Observations IN this warre Cesar had no great resistance all fleeing before him having nothing to do but to pillage and burn the countrey notwithstanding there be very good observations to be made thereupon for though you learn not hence how to fight a battel or to expugne fortresses yet you may here learn how to deal with such as save themselves by flight and by retiring into inaccessible places wherein many Commanders have failed for the not observing of three principall things which Cesar did First to prevent the enemy by such extraordinary diligence as to surprise them before they be able to retire themselves or their victuall into the forrests so that by this means you may constrain the one to yield and the other to perish through famine The second to divide your army into as many parts as you can with safety that so assayling a countrey in severall places all at once the inhabitants thereof will be doubtfull to what part to retire unto And the last is to hinder the souldiers from disbanding when they go to pillage for fear they be cut off by the enemies By which oversight many great inconveniences have often befallen conquering armies which should teach us never to slacken the severity of military discipline though we believe our selves far from an enemie and in great security The example we have in this book of Q. Cicero is excellent in that kind who received a great losse and had like to have been utterly defeated by suffering himself to be perswaded by the importunity of his souldiers which contrary to Cesars command would needs go out of their trenches to forrage We 〈◊〉 further see the difference between old souldiers and new who for want of experience knew not how to choose what was for their safety and honour but retreated to a hill and there were cut in pieces but the other knowing there was no safetie but by recovering the camp made their way with their swords and saved both themselves and their camp Here we may observe how ingenious sear is to seek out subjects to augment it self for because this place was the same where Titurius and Cotta had been defeated the yeare before they took it for an ill omen Let us further observe that Cesar when he would make an expedition for seven or eight dayes wh re was diligence required discharged himself of his baggage which in truth is a marvellous impediment in a champain it is impossible to conduct an army well if according to occasions you do not strongly intrench your camp or march without baggage Let us also admire the good intelligence Cesar had by spies a thing of such utilitie as that a Prince or Generall ought to spare no cost for it being the most powerfull means to undertake brave designes and to avoid great ruines Neither must we forget his dexterity in dividing those which were entring into a combination against him and his assaulting them severally nor his customary d ligence in surprising them having atteined to the end of the most part of his great designes by these wayes We will conclude the observations of this book with the stratageme of Labienus who desirous to fight with those of Triers before the G rmanes were joyned to them resolved to make it publickly believed that he was afraid of them and that he would retreat knowing right well that there were Gauls in his own army which would discover it to them and in the mean time gave order secretly to retreat with a great noise making shew of much fear whereof they of Triers having intelligence without staying for the Germanes conceiving they ought not to let slip the occasion which offered it self unto them passed the river and came disorderly as to an assured victory but Labienus turneth upon them in good order and defeateth them Yet would I not counsel you at any time to attempt such a stratageme with new-levied souldiers which usually are fearfull when they see men running towards them and without order which on the contrary assureth those which are experienced The ninth warre The VII Book THe affairs of Gallia quieted Cesar goeth into Italy according to his custome where he heareth of the death of Piso and the garboils of Rome which gave new occasion to the Gauls of revolting Chartres began the Auvergnats followed and at length many others Vercingetorix an Auvergnat is chosen Generall for all Cesar hearing this cometh away in the depth of winter Gaballi passeth the mountains of Genaudan covered with snow and appeareth in Auvergne before it was known that he was come from Jtaly which caused many to hold for him and startled those which were revolted With the same diligence he passeth into Burgundy and Champaigne where he assembleth his army cometh to Berry and besiegeth it Bituriges and taketh Vellaudunum from whence he takes 600 hostages then forceth Gien or Orleans where was made a great slaughter Vercingetorix Genabis seeing the successe of his enemie and conceiving his army insufficient to deal with him in the field endeavoureth to conquer him by taking away all means of subsistence and to this purpose burneth more then twenty towns Avaricum preserving onely Bourges and that too against his advise Cesar besieged it where he suffered much and found himself in great difficulties and necessities at length having overcome them he taketh the town putteth to the sword fourty thousand men there refresheth his army During this siege he attempted to surprise Vercingetorix his camp but was repulsed yet was not discouraged at all with all this ill successe but continueth the warre with much resolution and prudence and Vercingetorix to hinder his enemie from passing the river of Alier Elaver breaketh down all the bridges neverthelesse Cesar making shew to passe in one place taketh advantage to do it in another then goeth and besiegeth Clairmont Gergobia Vercingetorix encampeth on the other side where were many assaults and brave combats neverthelesse Cesar is constrained to quit the siege whether for that he made doubt of taking the town or whether to prevent the revolt of the Autunois artificially procured by Litavicus who having procured himself to be chosen Commander of a relief sent to Cesar being but ten leagues from him pretended to have received news from the army that all the
in his way as it was almost impossible for him to unite his legions In so great difficulties he findeth no other means but to surmount them by incomparable labour wherewith he maketh way over the mountains covered six foot thick with snow and affrighteth his enemies more appearing in the middest of them when they believed him still in Italy and out of possibility to get to them then by his great forces He also added to this astonishment by industry causing his cavalry to shew it self in severall places at one and the same time to cause a belief that he was very powerfull Let us further consider that Cesar seeing the fashion of the warre changed and that the enemy avoided battel applyeth himself to sieges wherein he sheweth himself no lesse a master then in his other actions of warre For all that which the most excellent modern Generalls put in practice is drawn from his actions and whatsoever we admire of Ostend Breda The Busse â— Bolduc and many other sieges of the late Prince Maurice who hath surpassed all others in that matter is infinitely inferiour to the two circumvallations of Alexia where the industry the labour and the short time in which they were finished farre exceedeth all that hath been done elsewhere I am not ignorant that the invention of powder and of artillery hath changed the manner of fortifications of assaults and of the defense of towns but not in such sort but that the principall foundations whereupon they are established are particularly taken from Cesar who in that hath far surpassed all the Romane Generalls He is also admirable in his inventions and stratagemes in the undauntednesse of his enterprises who when he intended an assault upon the trenches which were about Clermont he put a jealousie into them by a body which he made of the horse-boyes and baggages of the camp which he caused to march in their sight towards that part which he meant not to assault but not at so near a distance that they might discover what kind of people they were and having laid a legion in embuscado in the night-time and caused some selected souldiers to convey themselves into the little camp which was nearer to the town he assaulteth them so at unawares that he made himself master of all their trenches When he would have passed the river of Alliers which Vercingetorix attempted to oppose he caused some legions to lie in ambush near to a bridge which had been broken and with the rest of the army which he made shew as if it had been intire he passeth along the river as if he had sought some other passage by which means he so deluded the enemies as that he caused the bridge to be repaired before it could be taken notice of and so passed over without any hindrance When Vercingetorix in the time of the siege of Burges was gone out with his cavalry he departed by night and went and assaulted his infantery within the camp and wanted little of defeating it When at the siege of Clermont he understood of the revolt of ten thousand Autunois which came to his relief he taketh foure legions marcheth day and night to overtake them which he doth and took them all and returneth time enough to defend his camp which was assailed by Vercingetorix Whereby we may observe by the way the benefit of having a camp alwayes well fortified to the end we may be ever in a readinesse to attempt upon the enemy as occasions shall offer themselves I cannot forget his great modesty Comius whom he had favoured raised to wealth honour and on whom he much trusted he rather excuseth then blameth for revolting alledging that he was forced to comply with the generall resolution for recovering the liberty and glory of all Gallia Let us speak a word or two of Labienus one of his Lieutenants who finding himself in a strait with foure of Cesars legions in this generall revolt encircled on all parts with enemies and being to passe the river Seine upon boats to joyn himself to Cesar opposed by strong forces which encreased every houre in this extremity be imployeth both his courage and industry divideth his troups into three parts maketh great appearance of passing over in two places where indeed he intended it not by which means having separated their forces into divers troups not knowing where to attend to oppose him he passeth over by night with three legions or lesse with which he fought with the first troups that came against him and defeated them insomuch that having passed the rest of his troups at their ease joyned them without further inconvenience to Cesar Whereupon I will make this observation namely That he which is not very carefull and diligent in the guarding of a passage of a river or mountain is for the most part circumvented because he which hath the possession thereof sleepeth securely upon the advantage he hath and he which would have it searcheth out all possible means and at last findeth them to remove all obstacles The tenth warre The VIII Book THe Gauls desirous to make one attempt more to shake off their yoke of servitude divers towns conspired together to revolt whereof Cesar being advertised surpriseth them so unexpectedly as that he continued those in their fidelity which were not as yet revolted and reduced the rest Eighteen daies after his return to his winter-garrisons they of Bourges gave him knowledge that they were assaulted by those of Castres he goeth to relieve them notwithstanding the unseasonable weather bringeth them to submission After that those of Rhems desired his assistance against the people of Beauvois the most powerfull and valiant of Gallia led by Corbeius and Comius two brave Commanders he marcheth thither taketh care to get intelligence from them encampeth himself before them where his souldiers receive an affront going to forrage but after that Corbeius had charged his camp and better fortified his quarters he understood that he had laid an embuscado for his souldiers which went to forrage whither he goeth so strong that he defeateth and killeth him This victorie obliged those of Beauvois to yield themselves But Comius fled not daring to trust himself amongst the Romanes because that a little before Labienus would have caused him to have been made away by Vollusenus contrary to publick faith This warre thus ended Cesar goeth and wasteth Ambiorix his countrey to procure him hatred amongst his own people under the command of Fabius one of his Lieutenants he relieveth Limoges which was assaulted by Dumnacus Lemovicum whom he pursueth and as he hasted to gain the river Loyre to put himself into safetie he defeateth him Then subjugated those of Chartres and Bretagne with great promptitude and alacritie Under the command of Caninius he besiegeth Drapes and Luterius in the citie of Cadenac Uxellodunum who sallying out to provide corn for the town Luterius going about to convey it in is defeated and at length
Drapes is assaulted and taken in his camp After this he really formed the siege whither Cesar came in person who found means to hinder them from water so that this poore people yielded themselves to his discretion with whom he dealt rigorously causing their hands to be cut off which had born arms which so went to the heart of Drapes then their prisoner as that he wilfully starved himself and a few dayes after Luterius was taken and brought to Cesar At the same time Labienus defeated those of Triers and the Germanes and took all their Commanders After so many happy victories of Cesar obteined by himself or his Lieutenants he finisheth that summer by visiting the towns of Gallia the better to assure his conquest especially in Gasconie where he had been but little and disperseth his army composed of ten legions into such places as he conceived most advantageous which served him for a strong support to maintein himself in the civil broils of his native countrey which he was going into Observations SOme attribute the so frequent revolts of the Gauls to their changeable and impatient humour which cannot endure to be lorded over by strangers and others to the too great clemency of Cesar I grant that clemency apt to pardon emboldens to revolt for that we easily forget all benefits which do not intirely establish our liberty but if cruelty causeth them lesse frequent yet it renders them more dangerous for that when despair driveth men thereunto and that the hope of safety resteth onely in victory the revolted become all valiant obstinate constant and faithfull to the end which never falleth out where there is hope of the enemies clemency We have here plentifull examples thereof Cesar in the greater part of the revolts of the Gauls hath often found great facilities to reduce them to his obedience by reason of his clemency which hath been a powerfull means for him to make divisions amongst themselves and to prevent obstinacy in their revolts and if sometimes it hath so happened that he hath used severity it hath been occasioned by fowl and unworthy acts as when they of Vannes under publick faith imprisoned the Romane officers which came to them to buy corn for the sustenance of the army but I cannot excuse that of Cadenac On the contrary the cruelties of the King of Spain executed by the Duke of Alba drove poore fishermen so into despair that they have shaked off his insupportable yoke and with an admirable constancie have mainteined and enriched themselves and are grown so potent as that they are able to resist him by land and by sea take from him his treasure in the Indies Cesar sheweth us also by â—â—s care and industry to get intelligence of the enemies proceedings whether by taking prisoners in the field or by having good spies the advantage which may be made thereof many of his successefull designes having been founded thereupon there being great advantage in the attempting them for that he which assaileth hath more courage then he which is assailed and alwayes believeth the assaliant to be the stronger not knowing what part he will assail and ever jealous that he hath some secret intelligence Briefly all that a well exercised and well disciplined army is able to do in such a case is to defend it self but where are new-levied souldiers fall out great disorders which was the reason he took so much care to fortifie his camp very strongly to the end he might defend it all his baggage with a few men might without danger execute many brave designes being alwayes assured of his retreat Let us further take view of the siege of Cadenaci which Cesar judging to be impregnable by force and knowing it to be well provided of corn undertaketh by a great and dangerous labour to keep them from water which was from a fountain without the town from whence they were onely supplyed which the besiâ—ged perceiving having set fire on Cesars works by a salley they hindred him from quenching it Cesar not being able to repulse them by reason of the advantage of the place resolveth to make an assault upon the town which apprehension caused them to retreat The Abbridgement of the civil wars of Cesars Commentaries The I. Book THe true cause of the civil warre between Pompey and Cesar was because the one would have no companion and the other could not endure a superiour but that which appeared was the refusall made to Cesar of admitting his solicitation for the Consuâ—ship being absent though it had been promised him or else because they would have him alone disarm and that they which were his declared enemies should continue still armed a forced resolution and contrary to the will of the Commons insomuch that the Tribunes of the people were constrained to quit the citie and to go find out Cesar Who taking occasion by the forelock of his private cause he maketh a publick declaring to his souldiers that he is not in arms to other purpose but to restore the people now oppressed by the Senate to their libertie and having well incouraged them thereupon he departeth from Rimini Ariminum which was yet part of his goveâ—nment and possesseth himself of all the marches of Ancona which caused a great astonishment at Rome Pompey and the Consuls forsake the citie and dare not gather their grosse nearer then Capua mean time Cesar continuing his march besiegeth Domitius Aenobarbus within Corfinium who with all the Senatours which accompanied him were delivered unto him by his own souldiers which adhere to Cesars partie He gave leave to Domitius and the Senatours to dispose of themselves where they pleased causing all to be restored that belonged unto them Following his designe he besiegeth Pompey in Brundusium who unwilling to sustein the siege crosseth the seas with his armie which he could not do but at two times for want of shipping yet used he much art and precaution to conceal his retreat from Cesar and to prevent those of Brundusium from giving means to his enemie to entrap him Cesar not being able to follow him for want of vessels sendeth Valerius into the Island of Sardinia and Curio into that of Sicilia Cotta abandoned the one and Cato the other complaining that Pompey had very inconsiderately imbarked them in this warre and so went into Africa Mean while Cesar cometh to Rome justifieth his actions and offereth to condescend to a reasonable peace but seeing that his enemies protracted time he passeth into Gallia to strengthen his armie with Gauls Mâ—ssitia Marseilles refuseth him entrance he besiegeth it and in the mean time sendeth C. Fabius to possesse himself of the passages of the Pyrenean mountains which he doth bravely Then approcheth to Petreius and Afranius which had their camp below Ilerda and encampeth on the river Segre Sicoris where he maketh two bridges At first there passed onely slight skirmishes between them untill that two of Fabius his Legions being gone to forrage
by that bridge which was furthest from the camp it happened to break whereof the enemies being advertised they go with foure Legions and all their cavalrie to give on upon them but being retreated to a hill of advantage and Fabius misdeeming something going to relieve them delivered them out of that danger While these things were a doing Cesar having left C. Trebonius Lieutenant Generall at the siege of Marseilles and D. Brutus commander of his naval armie arrived in his camp where being he would encamp himself between Ilerda and his enemies camp buâ— after a long fight whereof either of them made advantage both the one and the other retreated into their camp Presently after the continuall rain carried away both these bridges and made the river altogether unpassable which drave him to extreme necessities not being able to supply himself with victuall nor receive those new forces which came to him out of Gallia nor repair his bridges by reason of the violence of the waters and the hindrance which his enemies gave him which were on the other side of the river At last he caused boats to be made and whilest the Pompeians busied themselves to entrap certain Gauls which came to joyn with him he carrieth boats on wagons twentie miles from his camp putteth them into the river causeth some souldiers to passe over to the other side and without losing time conveyeth thither two legions more by favour whereof he maketh his bridge and by that means recovereth his way and safe passage for his victuall and receiveth those troups which came to relieve him This action reassured his army astonished the enemy and gave so much reputation to his affairs with the news which he received at the same time that Brutus had defeated the Marseillians at sea that five good cities yielded themselves and divers others came to parle But following this good successe he maketh divers trenches to cut off the water from his enemies camp and to make the Segre fordable Afranius and Petreius fearing the prosperitie of his designes resolved to gain Octogesa sited upon the river Iberus whither they had beforehand sent to have a bridge made To this end they depart at midnight Cesar causeth them to be pursued by his cavalrie which he maketh to ford over because his bridge was a great way off afterward leaving his baggage within his camp he followeth with his Infantery and pursueth them so hotly that he overthroweth their designe hindring them from going whither they intended and returning from whence they came insomuch that he drave them into such extremitie of hunger and thirst that without striking one blow they were constrained to yield themselves to his mercy He dismisseth them all and winneth them by incredible courtesies never used elsewhere towards enemies Thus he remaineth master of Spain sending away his enemies laden with disgrace and also with obligations to publish though unwillingly his clemency and valour Observations IT is a most dangerous thing for a people a Generall of an army or an army it self to be surprised with fear for that it is alwayes seconded with perverse and ruinous accidents which all Leaders and Commanders of armies ought to foresee and carefully to prevent There be three not able examples in this book on this subject The first when Cesar passed the Rubicon for before that they declared him enemy to the weal-publick Pompey undertaketh with a stamp with his foot to raise an armie to him that at his approch Cesars own souldiers shall deliver their Generall into his hands neither doth he think him worthie consideration such as dare but name Cesar are driven out of Rome briefly he is proceeded against as a criminall offender Notwithstanding so soon as he had but set the first step to declare the warre and though he did the same at Pezaro which he did at Rimini having not the fourth part of his armie every man was amazed Pompey and the Consuls betake them to their heels the care of leavying of souldiers is cast aside and Rome it self abandoned The causes of this great change proceeded from this that Pompey never imagined that Cesar durst have undertaken so high a designe grounding upon a presumption which his vertues and good fortune had added unto him which made him rather thoughtfull how to maintein his partie in the citie then provide for defense thereof Insomuch that when he saw things go otherwise then he had published he stood amased It was therefore no great wonder if an ignorant people which toke assurance or fear from the good or bad countenance of him into whose protection they had delivered themselves did the like Whereupon I will say that in affairs of such importance we ought in imitation of Cesar before we enter into them to consider maturely the worst that can befall so that evil successe dismayeth us not but when we are imbarked we must not check at whatsoever happeneth but with constancie go on to the end The second example is when Domitius Aenobarbus being out of hope of being relieved by Pompey took a resolution to save himself within Corfinium where he was besieged but for that his countenance was sadder then usuall his speeches lesse resolute then the time required and by some neglect of the necessary works for the common defense he discovered to his souldiers that which he would have concealed from them so that preventing his flight they delivered him unto Cesar It is a fair lesson for a commander to teach him that in greatest danger he ought to shew most resolution for his souldiers become courageous or fearfull according to that they observe in his countenance The third is when Cesar discovered the fear of Afranius and Petreius souldiers in that they seconded not each other that they scarcely had received the brunt of the cavalrie but their ensignes were all on a heap that they made not good their ranks nor distances and that they stirred not from the field of battel where they could not subsist for want of water And howsoever in these times armies approch not so near each other as then they did by reason of the canon neverthelesse experimented Captains will make profitable use of such judgements I have seen Henry the Great chase eight hundred horse with lesse then two hundred judging they would not dare to combat him because of their confusion and not observing distanceâ— which fell out as he had foretold it And howsoever to retreat from a besieged citie by a port of the sea seemeth to be no very hard matter neverthelesse the precautions which Pompey used to retire himself into Brundusium was that which saved him For having to do with a people which he abandoned and an enemy vigilant he had been lost if he had not walled up the gates and barricadoed up all the entries into Brundusium except onely two which were covert enough by which his men issued to the haven because when his last men departed from the walls the inhabitants at the
same instant of time cause◠those of Cesars to mount them for which reason in all kinds of retreats a captain cannot take too much care t◠make it safe and orderly and though he may do it whe◠he pleaseth himself yet must he do it in so good time an◠so readily as that he be not engaged to fight In this place I will relate a dispute between Afranius and Petreius the one being for retreat by night the other by day They which were for the night alledged that they should gai◠the mountains and places of safetie before they should be discovered but the others judged that having to do with Cesar and he strong in cavalrie they should never be able to get off from him without fighting and in such a case the day was to be preferred to the night which alwayes causeth disorders in retreats which opinion prevailed but not at all to their advantage For my part I hold the other opinion the better for besides that it is a most dangerous thing to retreat in the day time in the presence of an enemy a well advised Captain will never engage himself to pursue an army by night for that it is hard for him to prevent falling into an ambush The second Book WHilest things passed thus in Spain Caius Trebonius continueth the siege of Marseilles to the relief whereof Pompey sendeth L. Nassidius who joyning his navall forces with those of the Marseillians gave battel to Brutus where he was beaten The losse fell upon the Marseillians because they fought more obstinately then the rest as being more interessed having to conserve both goods and libertie and that which afflicted them most was that they had conceived too great hope of deliverance howsoever they forbare not to continue a resolute resistance Neverthelesse the industry of Trebonius was such that with mantilets and other engines he approched a Towre which he sapped Vincae and overthrew part of it which so affrighted the Marseillians as they promised to yield themselves so soon as Cesar should return and desired a truce till then Trebonius granteth it whose souldiers negligent of their guard upon confidence of the truce on a very windy day the Marseillians make a sudden salley and burn all the engines of the Romanes Trebonius was but little discouraged for all this and diligently repaireth them whereby Domitius was forced to save himself by sea before Cesar's arrivall who though the affairs of Italy called upon him would not leave Spain untill it was all at his devotion There onely remained M. Varro who at first spake of Cesar with great respect but when he conceived his affairs stood doubtfull he alienated himself and those of his partie from him in so much that after the defeat of Afranius and Petreius he found himself engaged to sustein the warre But Cesar having called an assembly at Cordova Corduba all came thither to attend and acknowledge him and divers towns forced from them Varro's garrisons who found himself so farre forsaken that of two Legions which he had the one fell absolutely from him insomuch that he was constrained to have recourse to Cesars mercy as well as the rest That done he left L. Cassius Longinus in Spain and passeth to Marseilles which yieldeth to him then goeth to Rome At the same time Curio passeth from Sicilia into Africk with two Legions onely and five hundred horse encampeth himself in a place called Cornelius camp near Vtica where Petreius Accius Varus had his camp against whom he had an advantageous battel with his cavalry Neverthelesse upon some discourses which one S. Quintilius Varus had with Curio's souldiers there grew a panike fear amongst them which taken away by an oration he made unto them he went and presented battel and beat Varus again and drove him to retreat into Vtica where with help of the ill will the inhabitants bore him he put him hard to it and understanding that king Juba was coming to relieve him Curio retireth himself into his camp with resolution there to attend the coming of the rest of his army which was in Sicilie But having intelligence that king Juba came not in person and that he onely sent a weak supply under the cōmand of Saburra it caused him to change that so good a resolution Then puffed up with his former victorie and having been more exercised in making orations to the people of Rome then in commanding their armies he marcheth night and day to encounter this relief his cavalrie in the night meeteth with some of the Numidian horse and beateth them This successe heighteneth him more and more insomuch that he marcheth as if he had pursued a victory but thus wearied and in disorder he meeteth with a fresh and complete army which defeateth him whereupon he concludeth it his best course to expiate his rashnesse by his death and so died a better souldier then commander Observations IT is a maxime held by all and neglected by most That in the time of truce there ought to be a better guard then at any other time We have here a notable example thereof Trebonius by a marvellous labour had brought the Marseillians to the last gasp when during the time of a truce which out of pitie he had granted them his souldiers so neglected their guards that they invited the enemie to their ruine and he saw in one houre burnt what had cost him the labour of many moneths Which should teach us in warre never to slacken the severitie of military discipline though the souldiers grumble never so much for you ought rather to content them by any other means then that and when they shall see their commanders share the dangers and labours of the warre with them they will undergo them chearfully For we may reade that by the exact observation of military discipline many commanders have surmounted great difficulties and obteined glorious victories and that many others for disregarding it have been shamefully defeated but it hath never been read that the observation thereof hath been the cause of the losse of one battel or of the overthrow of any one enterprise A great courage without experience is likelier to commit a great errour in warre then a more temperate one for the first is usually accompanied with presumption and is more incapable of counsel then the other especially when he hath made his entrie into armies by some happy successe Curio is a fair example thereof who of a Tribune of the people seeing himself a Generall of an armie committed many errours and those not small ones for after that he had the good hap to beat his enemies to shut them up into Utica and upon the news of king Juba his coming to resolve for the best which was to retreat into his camp on the sea-side well fortified and well provided of munitions there to attend the rest of his armie upon the first news that was brought him that the relief was weak and that Juba was not there
in person without staying for confirmation thereof refusing to advise with or give credit to any he crosseth his first resolution and goeth to give them battel after which his cavalrie meeting with some of Juba's horse of which foure were brought prisoners to him he asked who commanded them they answering that it was Saburra he presupposeth that Juba was not there so confirmeth himself in the first errour and marcheth so fast and so farre as that he findeth himself five and twentie miles from his camp in a countrey which he knew not with part of his forces the rest not being able to follow much hurried and in disorder which was the cause that Juba easily defeated them Which sheweth us plainly that neither a great courage alone maketh a good commander however it helpeth well thereto nor the reading of books nor abilitie of discourse but it must be atteined by long experience and the being present at many overthrows as well as victories for he that hath not had his share therein is not able to imagine what belongeth thereto the bravest souldiers sometimes doing the poorest actions as it happened here where though the residue of this armie was retreated into a well-fortified camp and not assaulted yet these imbarked themselves so confusedly and disorderly as that a great part of them were drowned Therefore I conclude that it is much better to make lesse haste and to know whither to go then to be forced shamefully to run away or perish The III. Book CEsar being chosen Dictatour provideth for the affairs of the city of Rome causeth himself to be published Consul with P. Servilius giveth over his dictatourship at the end of eleven daies and after imbarketh himself at Brundusium whither he had sent seven legions to attend him but found not shipping enough for half his army insomuch that he was constrained to passe over with fifteen thousand foot and five hundred horse leaving Marcus Antonius there with the rest to whom he promiseth to send back the shipping Pompey who had all the yeare to prepare himself had gathered together great store of men victuall and shipping so that Cesar passed over not without trouble and danger and instantly sent back his vessels to Antonie but Bibulus chief Commander of all Pompey's navie took a squadron of thirty of them which he fired and put to death all the mariners to the end to deterre the rest from undertaking that passage and did so obstinately continue his designe notwithstanding the winter-season as that he hindred Antonie from passing over At the same time M. Octavius Pompey's Lieutenant besiegeth Salones in Dalmatia which defendeth it self so couragiously as without help of any it compelleth him to raise his siege and by a sallie beateth him shamfully from thence from whence he retireth to Pompey at Durazzo Dyrrachium On the other side Cesar having possessed himself of divers towns upon the shore hindred him also from refreshing himself At last Bibulus dieth and the sea not being so exacty guarded Antonie passeth over where the winds so favour the good fortune of Cesar as that they change in the just instant to put his navie into safetie to cast away that which pursued it This news coming both to him and to Pompey at one and the same instant because they were encamped near each other the one goeth to joyn himself to Antony which he doeth and the other to oppose him which though he might have done yet returneth to encamp himself at Asperagne Asparagus belonging to the territory of Durrazo and sendeth to Scipio to bring his forces and joyn with him Cesar seing that the warre was like to be drawn out at length sendeth part of his army into Macedonia and Thessaly to make provision of corn because that Pompey having the command of the sea he was to expect none from out of Italy But Scipio in his passage meeting at the same time with an opportunitie thought to have cut in pieces L. C. Longinus with some of Cesars legions which he had done had not M. Favonius whom he had left to guard his baggage with eight cohorts sent to him that unlesse he made hast to relieve him Domitius was coming to defeat him So he desisted from than purpose and arrived oportunely for the relief of Favonius At the same time young Pompey having understood that Cesar now the third time was sending his shipping to Brundusium and having left some few at Oricum under the charge of Caninius with three cohorts he came and assailed them and either took or fired them all That done Cesar goeth and encampeth himself between Durazzo and Pompeys camp to hinder him the benefit of Durazzo but Pompey encamped at a place called Petra on the sea-side where being a small haven by means of his shipping he receiveth some benefit by it Then Cesar attempteth to enclose him by trenches and Pompey by other trenches enlargeth himself as much as possibly he could who finding himself the stronger in forces assaileth the trenches and in two encounters had the best on t and hoped to have defeated him Cesar not being able to abide here longer retreateth towards Apollonia and Oricum where having mustered his army and taken order for those two places he passeth into Thessaly to joyn with Domitius his armie Pompey followeth him who also joyneth Scipio's forces to his own The two armies whereon the decision of the whole Romane Empire depended encamp themselves in sight of each other Cesar sought all occasions to fight and Pompey evaded them at last he suffered himself to be overruled first by the revilings of his souldiers and afterward by the valour of Cesar who pursued him so fiercely after the victory of the battel of Pharsale Pharsalia as he gave him no leisure to rally his forces arriving in Egypt almost assoon as himself where king Ptolomee violating the right of hospitality forgetting the benefits which his father had received from Pompey caused him to be murdered thinking by this wicked act to gain the victours favour who revenged it as we shall see in the book following At the same time Cassius Generall of the forces of Syria Phenicia and Cilicia set on fire the shipping which Pomponius kept in the port of Messina and Lalius took a little island before the port of Brundusium as Libo had done in former times But the news of Pompey's defeat overthrew all the designes of the Lieutenants Observations IF the clemency and liberality of Cesar be so much recommended in all the course of his life it seemeth that in this civil warre he hath out-done himself To refuse to defeat whole and intire armies in Spain by the sword and having reduced them to yield to his mercy to let them go with their Commanders not so much as binding them from making war against him any more To satisfie his enemies their stipends whilest he borroweth money of his captains to pay his own souldiers restoring to Domitius Aenobarbus a
hundred and fifty thousand crowns at a clap which Pompey had given him out of the publick treasury to make warre against him To release all the prisoners he took without ransome and even to cause all to be restored which belonged unto them whilest Bibulus Labienus and others put to the sword as many of his as they could take are actions in my observation rather to be admired then like to be imitated especially in an age whose practice is much contrary to this generosity and even to that which he used in Gallia where sometimes he practiced great severity Therefore searching into the reasons which caused in him this blind clemency who seemed cruel to his own I conceive we ought to distinguish the designes In Gallia he was a conquerour in such sort as when they abused his first and naturall clemency he used severity to keep those in aw through fear which by affability could not be made pliant But here is a civil warre wherein under pretext of mainteining the libertie of the people he intendeth to bring both people and Senate into subjection For this end he depresseth all passions to attein the height of his designes The mâ—â—e cruel his enemies are towards him the lesse he spleeneth them insomuch that they which make warre against him fear him not but in battel and not despairing of pardon become the more inclinable to yield upon the first reverse of fortune which befalleth them It is not so in a civil warre which we make not but for the defense of our person or religion for then having no designe to possesse your self of the State you are obliged to repell cruelty by cruelty otherwise you should find none to take part with you But when you fight for rule and domination you must to attein it appear such a one as that they may not suspect either revenge or cruelty in you and that they believe you to abound in liberality and all other sorts of vertues for no man at any time desireth change of condition but to better his own So by this liberall resolution and clemency not continuing his Dictatourship above eleven dayes doin nothing but by the usuall order alwayes justifying his actions as a Protectour of the Common-wealth shewing himself so much the more affectionated to peace by how much Pompey held off from it that so he might the easilier work the indignation of his citizens and souldiers against him and by that means go the better through with the warres he atteined the end of the highest and most glorious designe that ever was undertaken by man Cesar having drawn all his forces together attempteth to fight with Pompey and not being able to draw him to it he undertaketh a high designe namely to besiege him in his camp though he were the weaker of the two This was near Durazzo where he goeth about to enclose him with trenches helping himself with the advantage of little hills of difficult accesse which in my opinion induced him to this designe The reasons which he alleadgeth are that being weak in cavalry and wanting corn he could not get it if Pompey's horse were at liberty from which he should also take away the benefit of forraging and render it unprofitable to all the offices of war Besides it was a way to diminish the reputation of Pompey throughout the whole Empire and encrease his own when it should be reported that Cesar kept him besieged and that he durst not fight with him a matter of great consequence for that men usually turn to that side which is strongest On the other side Pompey being unwilling to quit the sea-side or Durazzo where he had made his Arcenall Magazine resolveth not to budge and seeing that his cavalry might suffer too much if it were hindred from forrage he maketh an enclosure of trenches of fifteen miles compasse on his side So both Generallâ— omit nothing that maketh for their designes In the end Pompey finding himself discommodated by being thus cooped up setteth upon one of the angles of Cesars trenches where he had such advantage in two encounters which fell both in a day that Cesar confessed if he had known how to have prosecuted his victory he had defeated him By this may be seen how necessary retrenchments are how by means thereof may be prevented to fight with an army one is fearfull of one may also reassure affrighted forces and famish a more potent army then ones own For the art of warre consisteth principally in not fighting but when men are willing and to this end you must take good order for your victuall you must well exercise your souldiers in the use of their arms and in the observation of all orders and know very well how to make their retrenchments And if Cesar had had to do with any but Pompey who shut himself up from the very beginning he had either ruined his army or else compelled him to fight Cesar seeing that he could not continue Pompey longer in that strait nor stay so near him without a great discommodity for want of victuall he undertaketh to make a long retreat and for many dayes To this end he causeth all the baggage to be sent away over-night with one legion about midnight all the rest of his army saving two legions and his cavalry wherewith himself marched at break of day Pompey followeth him with all diligence finding him quartered where he had been encamped before and lodgeth himself also within his own old camp close by him But upon Cesars making shew of sending his cavalry to forrage causing them to return secretly into the camp again Pompey sendeth out his horse to the same purpose in good earnest and then also the greatest part of his souldiers being returned to their old camp to look for baggage which they had left behind them Cesar departeth suddenly in the same order as the day before Insomuch that Pompey not being able to pursue him for the present he continually marching by great journeys in the same order leaving him no possible means to overtake him at the end of foure dayes gave over his pursuit This is a fair lesson to teach us how dangerous it is for armies to retreat in view of an enemy besides how carefully we ought to avoid fighting when we retreat and what order ought to be given that we be not pestered with the baggage and that also a retreat is better made with a part of the army then with the whole For if Cesar were afraid to retreat in the view of Pompey with an army so â—ell exercised and accustomed to overcome being redoubted by Pompey himself what should then the captains of these times do which command armies newly levied without order without obedience overlaid with baggage the souldiers not knowing how to use their arms nor the captains themselves to teach them Yet neverthelesse they would think it a blemish to their honour to make a private retreat Certainly presumption and ignorance are two bad
counsellers in warre At the battel of Pharsalia Pompey was twice as strong as Cesar especially in cavalry whereupon he principally grounded his victory but he had not an army so well disciplined nor so exercised to fight as Cesar had insomuch that fearing that if his gave the charge they would do it disorderly he commanded them to attend the giving on of the enemy with charge not to â—â—rre from their places Cesar disliking that course commanded his souldiers to give on upon the adverse army alledging that this exciteth the courage of souldiers to play the men which ought rather to be increased then abated not disapproving the ancient custome of beginning the fight with a generall shout And experience teacheth us that in all actions of warre he which giveth the charge redoubleth his courage and he which is charged diminisheth his Touching Pompey's order of battel Having a river on his right hand he placed all his horse on the left promising to himself that after he had repulsed Cesars cavalry he should enclose his army Cesar judging his cavalry not of sufficient strength to resist that of Pompey strâ—â—gtheneth it by foot which were fitted for that purpose and mingled amongst them Besides that he taketh from every battalion one troup whereof he composed a battalion to be as a reserve which he placeth without the ranks of the three orders of infantery and commandeth them not to stirre to the conflict untill he appointed so that when Pompey's horse had repulsed Cesars which they could not do without putting themselves into disorder they met with this battalion which put them to a sudden stop and afterward to shew their backs and wholly to abandon the left wing of Pompey's army by which means Cesar following his advantage easily putteth all the rest to rout Whereupon we ought to observe two things the one That we ought never to hazard all our troups upon one onely charge but make a reserve of the one to relieve the other and the other That we ought so well to observe the distances or intervalls as well to the flanks as the rear that the first troups happening to be reversed they reverse not those which should relieve them but to leave them a convenient space to fall back and to rally themselves again in the rear If Cesar knew how to conquer he knew better how to prosecute and make his benefit thereof but in none like to this of Pharsalia where he contented not himself to force the camp to besiege the rest of the army on a hill whither they retired nor to pursue Pompey's person certain dayes journeys but with three or foure thousand men onely followed him so close both by sea and land that he found him dead in Egypt where he arrived almost assoon as the other never giving him leisure to recollect himself or reinforce his troups Which serveth to teach us to make use of occasion when it offereth it self favourable unto us not to deferre that to another time which may be presently executed for the affairs of the world are subject to great revolutions And the affairs which Cesar yet had after the death of Pompey give us occasion enough to judge that if in imitation of many great personages he had gathered the fruits of his victories before they had been ripe or tasted of repose before he had been secured he might full well have repented thereof Of the Alexandrine warre written by Aulus Hircius or Oppius The IIII. Book ASsoon as Cesar was arrived in Alexandria with three thousand two hundred foot eight hundred horse ten Rhodian galleys and some ships of Asia he understood of the death of Pompey and upon the bad quarter he perceived was between the souldiers of Pompey and the people of the city he sent for new Legions into Asia Mean time he required to be informed of the testament of the late king Ptolemee who had made the people of Rome his executours and to this end ordained that Ptolemee the eldest son Cleopatra the eldest daughter should discharge their army come to him to give an account of their rights But Ptolemee's Counsel did not approve of this way of accommodation and underhand sendeth for his troups which were at Pelusium under the command of Achillas whereof Cesar being advertised and that the King himself had intelligence with the said Achillas he deteineth him and prepareth for defense he giveth them the repulse at their first approch then cantons himself in one part of the city and the rest in the other part Arsinoe the Kings second sister causeth Achillas to be slain putteth Ganymedes into his place and possesseth her self of the authoritie who continuing the former designe putteth Cesar to great extremities infecting his fresh waters which he readily remedied by digging great store of pits He also sendeth for souldiers ships and arms from all parts and upon the news which he received that the thirty seventh Legion with great provisions of victuall and arms was arrived on the coast of Africa but could not get to him by reason of contrary winds he putteth himself alone into a ship taketh all his shipping with his mariners onely and putteth to sea in the very face of them The enemies knowing him to be without souldiers assail him he beateth them and without other relief getteth to his legion then returneth to Alexandria This first conflict affrighted the Alexandrians neverthelesse they make their naval army stronger then ever which Cesar defeateth the second time where Euphranor Captain of the Rhodian galleys behaved himself very bravely There is an isle before the haven of Alexandria built and inhabited which sheltreth the town and is joyned to the city by the peer which is 900 paces long and 60 broad upon which there were two forts Cesar thinketh it necessarie to take this isle that so he may have the sea at liberty He taketh it then taketh one of the forts of the peer but at the other he had a hot skirmish and was repulsed with so great disorder as not being able to hinder the souldiers from casting themselves abord he saveth himself by swimming rather then to perish The Alexandrians astonished by these brunts betake them to their subtilties demand of Cesar their King who delivereth him to them hoping it would be a means to facilitate agreement Whilest these things were in agitation Mithridates a Pergamenian a man of high descent a great souldier of great valour and most faithfull to Cesar arriveth to his relief with goodly forces taketh Pelusium in his way cometh to passe the Nile at a place called Delta Whereof Ptolemee being advertised goeth in person to oppose him and Cesar on the other side goeth to relieve Mithridates who before the arrivall of either of them had already encountred with and beaten Ptolemee's forces and Cesar also before he could come to Mithridates had defeated others After which he goeth and assaulteth a small fort which was between his camp and that of Ptolemee's
were taken At last his troups come from divers parts he beginneth with purging his army of some seditious persons and libertines then resolveth upon a definitive battel To this end he goeth and encampeth before Thapsus which he environeth with trenches not doubting but Scipio would come and relieve the town who having caused king Juba to return again they come and encamp near Cesar in three severall camps And there was the battel fought which Cesar gained with losse of fiftie souldiers onely and some few hurt but on the other side were ten thousand slain and the three camps taken Thapsus on the report of this victory was yielded to C. Rebilius Cato seeing he could not prevail with his men to resolve to defend themselves killeth himself Vtica openeth her gates to the Victour Adrumetum doth the like Zama shutteth hers against her conquered king and calleth in Cesar all the rest of Juba his kingdome revolteth he and Petreius kill each other through despair Sitius having defeated and killed Saburra Juba's Lieutenant and coming to Cesar meeteth with Afranius and Faustus Sylla which were going for Spain these he defeateth and taketh prisoners who afterwards in an uprore were both slain Scipio and divers Senatours having imbarked themselves for Spain were by a tempest cast amongst Sitius his fleet where all perished or killed themselves This was the sequele of that battel wherein all things concurred as if by consent to smooth the way to Cesars absolute victory who pardoned all that had recourse unto his clemencie and after that returned to Rome Observations CEsar hath done three things in this warre which came near to rashnesse the first to passe into Africa in the dead of winter with a small force not having any assured port there for which cause he was not able to appoint any Rendes-vous for his shipping which thing was imputed him as a want of foresight Neverthelesse after his passage his manner of proceeding was altogether admirable He maketh choice to encamp himself near the citie Ruspina which was within half a league of the port which he joyneth to the citie and his camp and fortifieth it exceedingly for from thence he had one foot on land and the other on the Sea and could as occasions should require act by either sea or land and be secured from being shut up whatsoever should befall This is a good lesson for such as enterprise upon a forrein countrey being weak at the beginning for in this posture great attempts may be withstood and in all extremitie a good retreat may be made The second to leave his army near Ruspina and without giving knowledge to any man to cast himself abord to go seek his shipping And the third having news of the defeat of his fleet to leave his camp to hasten in full carier to Leptis to cast himself into a ship and to rally others and assault the enemies and although he perished in none of them there can be nothing said in his defense but that he trusted wholly to his good fortune and that he never was wearied or disheartned in the most dangerous or laborious designes It is observable that Cesar in all his warres hath alwayes been inferiour to his enemies in number for which cause he hath alwayes helped himself by fortifications more then ever any other hath done which he made much the better when he found himself not sufficiently strong to give battel as he was a long time in Africa insomuch that Scipio himself wondered at his coldnesse neverthelesse he alwayes continued his souldiers in exercise and himself exercised new-levied men and entred them by small skirmishes wherein by his industry for the most part he had the best and alwayes attempted something upon his enemy Which is an excellent maxime to give courage to your souldiers and secure you from being surprised The Spanish warre against Pompey's sonnes The VI. Book THe reliques of the Africane troups reassemble themselves once more in Spain under Cneus and Sextus the sonnes of Pompey Cesar goeth thither He findeth the one laying siege to Vlla and the other in Cordova He sendeth relief into the first and goeth and encampeth himself before the other which inforceth Cneus to quit his siege to relieve his brother Some skirmishes passed between both armies but Cesar not being able to draw his enemy to battel goeth and besiegeth Ategua and after a bold resistance he taketh it in view of Cneus Afterwards both armies had divers encounters and combats but to little purpose at last they encamp themselves in a champain near Munda both resolving not to refuse battel neverthelesse â—neus took a high anâ— advantageous ground for his field of battel where Cesar making difficultie to assail him was put upon it by the fury of his souldiers The fight was long and doubtfull even by his own confession and with much ado he got the victory which was bloudy Thirtie thousand on Pompey s part died upon the place and a thousand on Cesars they which saved themselves into Munda were constrained to yield themselves Sextus Pompeius abandoneth Cordova Cneus is swiftly pursued overtaken and killed All places yield themselves to the victour This was Cesars last battel and the deadly wound to Pompey's party The military order of the Grecians and particularly of their Phalanx THe order of the Grecians is but obscurely to be found amongst their authours because the most part of the books which they have written thereof are lost and none have come to our hands but fragments so that it is hard to collect it very exactly The Phalanx was formed after this manner Zugos Jugum signifieth two men in front and more joyned together make a rank and so the word is often taken Stichos Versus signifieth two men one behind the other and more behind each other make a file and versus is often taken for a file Lochos Decurio signifieth a file which the Grecians made of severall depths but never exceeded the number of sixteen as being sufficient to sustein the violentest charge conceiving that to give a greater depth to their Phalanx was but to imploy men unprofitably and that it was better to extend the battalia into breadth to prevent overwinging and so to be charged on the flanks or else by this means to overwing the enemie then to give so great a depth to their Phalanx The Phalanx was compounded of hoplitae onely that is heavie-armed with sarissas that is long pikes and their bucklers for the archers slingers and other casting-weapons had their orders apart In a Lochos or file of 16 men there were five which had command namely the first fifth ninth thirteenth and sixteenth as we may see by the figure following and their names The first figure Lochagos o File-leader 1. Enomotarcha o  2. Enomotarcha o Half-file-leader 3. Enomotarcha o  Vragos o Bringer-up They made the most valiant the File-leader and the most prudent the Bringer up Now to begin their order They joyned two files
it had failed It must be observed that here onely one Tribune is mentioned which causeth me to believe that the two Tribunes which had the authority for two moneths time did agree to command every day by turns Concerning the guard it was kept day and night and the foure and twentie houres were divided into eight watches First the Consul was guarded by his ordinary Cohort then every body made their guard round about his lodging and besides there were three guards kept one at the Questors lodging and the two other at the lodgings of the Consuls two Lieutenants The Tergiductours or Rear-commanders ordered the guards which drew by lot which should begin first and they which were to begin were led to the Tribune which then commanded who gave them the order of the guard and besides that a little tablet with a mark and all the guards were set after the same manner The rounds were made by the Cavalrie whereof the chief officer commanded foure for the day and foure for the night the first went and took their orders from the Tribune who gave them in writing what guards they were to visit The relieving and visiting of the guards was done eight times in foure and twentie houres at the sound of the trumpet and the first Centurion of the Triarii had the charge to cause them to march when occasion served When the trumpet gave them warning the foure forementioned souldiers drew lots and he to whom it fell to begin took some of his friends with him and if in going the round he found the guards in good order he onely took from them the mark which the Tribune had given them and carried it him back again next morning But if he found the guard abandoned or any sentinels asleep or any other disorder he made his report thereof to the Tribune with his witnesses and presently a councel was called to prove the offense and to punish the delinquent according to his desert The Velites made the guard round about the retrenchment on the outside and inside of it and at the gates The Allies had the same order We find not in writing the number of their Corps-du-guards how they placed their Sentinels round about the camp and how many a day were free from the Guard CHAP. VI. Of punishments and rewards NOne but the Consul could condemne any to death and he had this authoritie as well over the principall commanders of the army as over the meanest souldiers thereof The Tribunes administred military justice which was rigourously practiced The manner of their ordinary punishing was thus So soon as the Tribune had touched the partie condemned with a staff or a rod every souldier laid on upon him with cudgels or battered him with stones and oftentimes before he could get out of the camp he was killed but yet if he escaped he was not received into his countrey again and none of his kindred durst give him enterteinment He that opposed or neglected the orders given for the guard or for the rounds or other service concerning the securitie of the camp or falsely pretended to have done some signall act or had forsaken the place where he had been placed or had lost his arms in the battel or had stolen any thing in the camp or born false witnesse or else had forsaken his ensigne was punished after this manner as also he which committed smaller faults thrice If it happened that many Legions or one Legion or a grosse troup had run away they were punished two wayes the more rigourous way was to make them all draw lots and to punish every tenth man or more or fewer according to the exigence of the cause by this means all were partakers of the fear and a small number of them were punished The more gentle way was to cause them to lodge without the camp and to give them barley in stead of wheat which was a mark of ignominie which many troups have wiped out by performing valourous and memorable acts Concerning their rewards they excited those souldiers by honourable acknowledgements and publick commendations in presence of all the rest which had performed some valourous and extraordinary act Besides that to him that had wounded an enemy in some light skirmish or that voluntarily had gone and assaulted him they gave a dart To him which had killed and disarmed him if he were one that served on foot they gave a target if he were a horseman a horse-furniture To him that at the assault of a town was first got up upon the wall they gave a crown which they called Muralis to him which had rescued a Romane citizen a crown called Civica which was set upon his head by him which was so rescued whom he respected and honoured all his life after as his father The commanders had also their shares of honour by the severall triumphs which they obteined according to the greatnesse of their actions and the felicitie of their victories CHAP. VII Of their Pay COncerning their pay It began not untill three hundred fourty eight years after the foundation of Rome before that every souldier armed and victualled himself at his own charge which was no hard thing in those times because their warre was then extended no further then Rome But when they began to go out of Italy it was necessary to give them pay which at the beginning was very small afterwards it encreased as the Romane empire grew in greatnesse I will not trouble my self to make the valuation of it according to our money it being a thing of no utility onely I will say that the souldiers pay must be so proportioned as he may maintein himself well thereby I will further observe here that the Romanes charged themselves with the furnishing of bread apparel arms and tents for all their souldiers and besides barley for the horsemens horses abating these things out of their pay which I find to be a good order and above all things necessary to make an army subsist for besides that the greater part of souldiers are bad husbands and such as if a care be not taken will never be well clothed nor well fed it is impossible that a souldier should everywhere find bread to be bought and that he should carry all things with him which he standeth in need of CHAP. VIII Of their order of battalia THere is a diversitie of opinions about the order of battel of the Romanes Some would have it that when the Hastati be not able to sustein the enemies charge in their retreat they should fall into the order of the Principes by files and both they into the order of the Triarii and so to renew the fight three times Others will have it to be done by troups whereof I conceive there is much the greater probability holding the first way not onely impossible to be put in practice but also most dangerous the other exceeding feisible and profitable For to fall one into another in that maner by files
found themselves enclosed on both flanks At the battel of Pharsale Cesar sheltred one of the flanks of his army by a little river and fortified his Cavalry which was on his other flank by a body of Infantery to resist Pompey's horse which exceeded his own by much so that having routed it by this means he assailed the army on the flank and easily defeated it At the battel of Zama Hannibal made a body of all his old companies of Italy which he divided from all his army that so when all the rest as well of the one part as the other should be weary with fighting this body being fresh might carry away the victory So that Scipio after that he had defeated all that were before him found himself astonished to see a second army for him to fight with afresh Here may be an objection made that the armies might be so unequall in number as all these maximes might prove unprofitable whereunto I answer that when an army passeth a certain number of fourty or fifty thousand men the surplussage serveth for no other end but to famish the army for it is an easie thing by retrenching to avoid battel And if you should resolve to give battel if you would observe the forementioned orders there is no plain so smooth but you may find something wherewith to shelter one of the flanks of your army either by a river wood hill or a ditch and the other with waggons nor nothing that shall be able to hinder you from having some body of reserve which shall not fight at the beginning nor from placing those troups on the wings which you esteem to be your best souldiers Which things if they be exactly observed as they ought they may avail very much for the obteining of victory CHAP. XI A comparing of the arms and military orders of the Romanes with those of the Grecians THe arms of the Grecians were the buckler the pike and the sword Their order was of great bodies of battalions of 16 deep of the heavie-armed and then strengthened by eight in depth of the light-armed so that the battalions came to be 24 in depth and fought all at once making all one front The arms of the Romanes were the target and the sword their order was to make small bodies of 150 or 200 souldiers at the most which were onely ten in depth and to make three orders of battalia that so they might fight three times one after another Concerning the arms of the Grecians it seemeth that their long pikes had a great advantage of the Romane targets because they reached farre and even at this day we find no weapon comparable to the pike against the violence of the horse and for their order those great bodies met with nothing that could resist them On the other side those great Romane targets covered the souldiers so well as the pikes could not hurt them and if once they came to joyn they made a great slaughter with their short broad swords for then the pike was unusefull Moreover their small troups gave them this advantage that they brought more hands to fight at once Concerning their disposing of their three orders one behind another to the end they might relieve each other and to be able to begin the fight again by all three they had this advantage by it that all were not wearied nor disordered at once In so much that oftentimes they have carried away the victory after the defeat of their two first orders for that their third order being fresh and having rallied all the rest gave the last charge against an army which was tired and in disorder and so gained the battel There be two discommodities more in those great bodies namely that they must ever have a very smooth field for the battel else they are not able to keep their order and that they cannot agitate on the right or left but onely fight just before them But the small troups weild themselves on all sides and continue their order in all places It is true that the Romanes sometimes joyned all their forces together making but one body of all their army in an Orb but this was but to save themselves in a retreat and not to charge an enemy for as these great bodies are as it were unmoveable and of little use in assaults so when they will onely defend themselves they are hard to be broken And yet they used not this last order buâ— when they were persecuted by the arrows of a great Cavalrie as that of the Parthians for not being able to come to hand-blows with them they were constrained to put themselves into this order and to shelter themselves with their targets So that I conclude that the arms and orders of the Romanes were better then those of the Grecians because small troups accommodate themselves better to all sites then great ones and fighting at severall times they continue the fight with more obstinacie then when all fight at once and that it is more easie of many small troups to make a grosse readily and without disorder then of a grosse to make many small troups A TREATISE OF Modern VVar Written By the late great Generall the Duke of Rohan Englished by J. C. CAMBRIDGE Printed by ROGER DANIEL Printer to the UNIVERSITIE 1640. To the right worshipfull Sir Thomas Glenham Knight one of the Deputie-Lieutenants and Colonel of a Regiment in the countie of Suffolk Right Worshipfull I Make bold incited by your many favours to present you with a short Treatise of Warre How well the Authour hath acquitted himself therein Your worthy self by reason of your known abilities both for Theorie and Practice in that profession are best able to judge And for my translation your studies and travels having made that language naturall to you I might justly fear a severe censure but that I know your candour such as you will excuse Your obliged servant J. C. A Treatise of Warre IVndertake not here to treat of all the functions of warre in particular because so many have written thereof as it would be a thing superfluous I content my self to make generall observations upon all those things which depend thereon and which may in these times be put in practice being loth to touch upon any thing but what experience hath taught me and in all to be so brief as I may not weary the Reader CHAP. I. Of the election of Souldiers THe election of souldiers was by the Ancients and is by Moderns made after divers wayes The Grecians and Romanes contented not themselves to enroll the souldiers which of their own accord were willing to go to the warre but chose out of them such as they judged to be fittest for that service which is the cause they had so good souldiers The Carthaginians for the most part imployed strangers and therefore had no worse souldiers then their own countrey-men The Turks choose their souldiers and train them The Swisses make use of their
be sometimes so infamous actions committed as you are constrained to use great severity to give a terrour to all finding it very good to strike a fear into all those that have escaped by the means of the lot and to put but few to death For you must imprint this belief into your souldiers that by base flight they escape not death but they onely exchange a glorious death which they should have acquired by fighting valiantly for an infamous one After that the souldier be incouraged by the honour of being esteemed valiant and brought to a hatred of being held a coward it must be made a like degree of honour for every one to know how well to obey his superiour from the private souldier to the Lieutenant generall for on this obedience all the functions of an army depend and without it you can keep nothing in rule nor do any thing that is good This must be ingraffed into the hearts of the souldiers as being one of the principallest vertues required in them From hence groweth order by this military exercise is mainteined briefly by this brave designes are executed and without this all goeth to confusion and ruine I will not trouble my self here to speak of the particular military exercises which the souldier is to be exercised in because divers books are ful of them and that custome doth alwaies change something or other in them I will onely say that there is nothing so profitable as to exercise every souldier to carry his arms properly to use them souldier-like to keep his rank well and therein well to execute all the motions and charges which are commanded him So much concerning the souldiers But concerning the recompense of Generals of armies I will say the same which I said for the souldiers namely that according to the time or the constitution of kingdomes or common-wealths such courses ought to be taken as the honour of such as have done brave actions and great services be not diminished nor blemished For that the most generous spirits which will easily excuse all want of other recompense for their services will never endure to be robbed of the honour due to their brave actions and will sooner stomach such a want of due honour then any other thing whatsoever whereupon very often great mischiefs have followed CHAP. IV. Of the obedience of souldiers NOw as the Generall of the armie requireth of the souldiers that obedience which is due to him so he must have a care to give them no just cause to exempt themselves from it to this end he ought to keep them in continuall imployment for that idlenesse engendreth corruption of manners and discipline whence proceed luxury neglecting of exercises and the guards and disobedience to superiours It was the ease and idlenesse of Capua that destroyed Hannibals army and the delicacies of Babylon which corrupted Alexander himself and from whence he drew away his army to prevent the totall ruine of it there being no means of greater efficacy to keep it in due order and to prevent seditions then to imploy it in warre It is therefore a maxime which must be exactly observed never to suffer your souldiers in any place to be idle especially when the army is brought together in a body for if you imploy them not in that which is good they will busie themselves in that which is naught This course must be taken aswell in the time of securest peace as of open warre particularly to exercise them to use their arms well and to observe good order and though there be no need yet to use them to make retrenchments of the camp and to make their huts that so they may be so accustomed to remove the earth that when necessity shall require it may be no trouble to them I would further imploy them to make fortifications and other works of this kind not onely to keep them in exercise but that also they may get besides their pay wherewith the better to maintein themselves and that they accustome themselves to that which in time of warre is as profitable to them as to fight well there being nothing impossible for twenty or thirty thousand men which will work in the earth for in eight dayes they will make fortresses which shall be impregnable And Cesar hath made himself as much redoubted and admired by the great works which he hath caused his souldiers to make as by his great battels Moreover the Generall must take care that they be well clothed and well fed especially that out of their payes they be furnished with clothes and shoes otherwise he will soon find his army to decay and diseases to rage in it for want thereof He must also have a great care of those which are sick and hurt and therein to spare for no cost that so the souldiers may not excuse themselves from going on upon dangerous services or to undergo laborious imployments because they are abandoned when they are sick or wounded The General ought also to take a particular care not to overlabour his souldiers nor to put them to extraordinary hard marches without great necessity but when need requireth it he must be the first to undergo the labour for the example of the commander maketh all things easie to the souldier The examples not onely of the greatest Captains amongst the Ancients but even of the greatest Monarchs and Emperours should shame our delicate Captains of these times which are afraid to spoil their fair complexion in the sunne and their goodly plumes in the rain which would believe themselves to be dishonoured if they should march on foot at the head of their companies and those great men have not scorned to march at the head of their armies and have refused to quench their extraordinary thirst because there was not water enough to make all the army to drink and so making themselves companions of the dangers and labours of their meanest souldiers have made themselves masters of the greatest part of the world and have gained an immortall glory CHAP. V. Of Marching THere are divers considerations to be made upon the marching of an army which may be assaulted in the day-time or at its dislodging or even in the night when it is lodged If it be not encamped but lodge in villages you must to cause it to meet in one body give it a Rendez-vous on the way which it must take which if the enemy learn time enough to be there first or that he meet with it there by chance he will put the army to run a great hazard which cometh to its Rendez-vous at divers times and by divers wayes The best means to guard ones self from such an accident are to keep your Rendez-vous very secret to have good spies amongst the enemies and to send out many discoverers for intelligence When you encamp you are not subject to that danger because the army is alwayes together For the march you must consider the countrey where you are
and the number of souldiers which you have If you march in great plains you may for the most part march in battalia or at least with formed battaillons and squadrons then it is very easie to put your self readily into a good form to fight well because you march not in a long order But when you march through a strait countrey where but few can march in front then you must compute the discommodity of the way and the time you have for your march with the number of souldiers whereof your army consisteth for 10000 foot marching 10 in front and 1000 horse marching 5 in front with the lightest baggage they can possibly have and ten cannons with equipage for every piece to shoot 100 bullets take up about 28000 foot of way in length whereby you may judge how much way in file 30000 foot and 6000 horse will take Therefore when so great armies find themselves in such a troublesome way you must of necessity divide them into severall bodies which may march one after another and lodge severally or rather cause them to march by divers wayes some miles distant from each other or howsoever to make wayes through the fields for your souldiers to march in leaving the great road for your cannon and baggage If there be a river to passe where you can make but one bridge or some passage over a mountain moorish ground or forrest where you cannot make severall wayes then you must march one after another and on severall dayes I trouble not my self to shew how you are to passe through such bad passages in view of the enemy because many have written thereof yet when it cometh to execution few will get off well if they be charged home but I will onely say that the best way is to calculate the time so well as you may avoid such encounters Concerning the march I find it almost impossible that two armies should meet each other if one of the two Generals be desirous to avoid it especially in an inclosed countrey but whatsoever happen the best way is to have the baggage wholly separated from the souldiers leaving onely on the rear some few troups to keep it from disbanding for if in time of alarm every body have their baggage behind them it causeth a great confusion and hindreth the souldiers from rallying themselves and helping each other The time of lodging is also a dangerous time to be assaulted in because the army is then tired and every man desirous to be lodged hastneth to the quarter in disorder which is a thing hard to avoid if before you enter your lodgings you cause not your army to stand in battalia and so cause them to lodge troup after troup without suffering any to lodge but by command mean time sending out on all sides upon discovery There remaineth the assaulting of a quarter which is that which is more frequently attempted especially when the army is not encamped because it being lodged in severall quarters the enemy may attempt to surprise some one quarter without hazarding a generall combat foâ— which I do not find the ordinary guard alone how exactly soever it be performed sufficienâ— to remedy such an accident because it cannoâ— give the alarm but at too near a distance and thaâ— ofttimes you have not leisure to put your self in order to fight therefore you must be carefull to send out discoverers every night by divers small troups which if they do well perform their task will not suffer you to be surprised for an army or a grosse troup capable to assail a quarter of an army cannot march so secretly that it be not perceived And when you have to do with a vigilant enemy and that you fear such assaults in the night there is nothing so good as to prevent him if it be not in earnest at least to give him alarms every night that so he may be more troubled about keeping himself upon his guards then about assailing you If it be in an intrenched camp where all the army is in one body it is a high enterprise to assault it And this one chapter sheweth the security of an intrenched camp which I will end with this conclusion That all the forementioned things to assure the quarters must never be omitted though you believe your self to be far off from any enemy for that besides the profit you draw from hence in accustoming your army to do their duties there may such an occasion befall you as it may be the safety of your army of your life and of your reputation CHAP. VI. Of encamping I Will not here describe the form of entrenched camps but onely the profitablenesse of them not being able to wonder enough that they have been wholly discontinued No people made so exact use of them as the Romanes and in our time Maurice Prince of Orange hath revived the use of them or at least hath given them a great perfection The entrenchment of a camp assureth an army in that it is never dispersed in the villages where some quarter or other is ever in danger to be surprised but lodgeth all in one body and in such fashion as being assailed it may fight with great advantage The entrenchment saveth a great deal of trouble because by it there is need of the fewer guards by many those lesse toilsome especially to the Cavalry which when they are lodged in open villages are constrained to be on horseback almost all night The entrenchment encloseth your army as a walled city from whence you may march privately with such troups as you please to execute all sorts of brave designes leaving your baggage in safety The entrenchment hindreth the enemy from constraining you to fight unlesse when you please The entrenchment causeth you to be without danger at the head of the most dreadfull armies The entrenchment causeth you to take strong cities in the face of more puissant armies then your own Briefly the entrenchment is lesse subject to infection then the villages where you lodge because you choose a wholsome place to sit down in and in villages you must take them as they fall out Also because this is more ayrie the lodgings are here better divided those things which may cause bad air are more easily removed and in effect an army incamped and entrenched wil rather subsist three moneths in health in a camp then a forthnight in the best villages Whence I conclude that one of the most necessary parts of warre is well to know how to incamp and entrench CHAP. VII Of Battels OF all the actions of warre the most glorious and most important is to give battel the gaining of one or two acquireth or subverteth whole Empires Anciently all warres were divided by battels which caused such speedy conquest For the present warres are managed more fox-like then lion-like and are rather founded upon sieges then combats Neverthethelesse there be divers nations at this day which decide the most part of their warres by
roll by their names and surnames and of what company they be You must command them on pain of death to bring back their ladders if you cannot get the town for they seeing the danger and trouble of bringing them back again will rather desire to do their uttermost endeavour to enter the town moreover you must command ten other men to enter after the first ten which must be led by an officer and another to be on their rear to take care to see them mount without losing of time and without making too much hast otherwise the ladders will be so much laden as that they will break after this ten more must follow commanded and divided as the former and every file of ten must know by which ladder they must mount and in what order that so alâ— may be done without confusion The first teâ— which follow their ladder must carry another though they have no order to raise it that so if any piece of the first should break there may another be raised in the stead If it be by petard the petardier shall call him that is to carry the madrier or planchier then he is to call three for the petard two to carry it and the third to assist in time of need and if the planchier be fastned to the petard theÌ„ foure men may carry it interchangeably by two and two and those two which carry not the petard with the planchier shall each of them have a great smiths hammer After these foure the petardier shall call two men each of them carrying a great ax after them one with a crow-lever then another with a dark-lantern then one with three or foure pieces of lighted matches besides these there must be one to command them which shall carry a piercing instrument or a coopers turrell or some good hooks with steeled points and a weighty hammer So that to attend every petard well there must be ten men this file of ten for the first petard shall be led by some brave Sergeant which shall have the name of every man of his file in writing and shall also know what every of them is to carry The men must know the Mule which carrieth their equipage and so soon as they come to the place where they are to unlade they must place themselves about the Mule that so each of them may receive what he is to carry If the second petard must be applied to a gate or barres they which shall carry it must be in the same order as they of the first petard but if it be for a draw-bridge the rolling-bridge or carriage goeth formost with seven or eight men which are imployed as well to carry it as to push it forward after this the planchier and petard must be carried after the same manner as the first then shall they follow in file and in close order which carry the ladders and planks to cast upon the breach which the petard shall have made upon the draw-bridge then shall they follow which carry haÌ„mers hatchets pinsoÌ„s instruments to pull out bolts and to cut chains then some with fire-lances and granadoes and some dark lanterns The officer which shall have the leading of them must take care that not a man lose his rank and shall divide them into files and shall take care to cause the spare men to carry such portions of the equipage as they did carry which shall happen to be hurt or killed which he shall onely cause to be laid out of the way without suffering those which are to be imployed about the service of the petard to trouble themselves about carrying away any man that is killed or hurt At all the gates and bridges the men must be disposed in the same order But when you go against iron-grates or portcullices you must cause those to march first which carry the tresses or iron-hooks then marcheth the planchier and the petard after which follow hammers hatchets crows of iron and other instruments which may be thought fitting you must not forget to carry fire-balls granadoes or fire-lances if you have observed that you may make use of them every man must carry a hatchet at his girdle you must rather have a supernumerary number of instruments then want one Having thus put all into order and officers at the head and on the flanks of every file you must have besides some petards planchiers and other instruments for reserve which must be carried in the same order as the â—ther For you must alwayes have a double equipage When you come near the place where the execution is to be done you must distribute to every man what he is to carry The Sergeant ordereth them in file and commandeth every one duly to follow his leader then he causeth them to march forward to give room to those of the second petard and so consequently of all the rest there being a guide for the first file to shew them the way And that you may not be intangled sometimes you may cause ten cuiraciers to march before one foot to discover whether the enemy be not on the advenues then follow three men bearing good targets to shelter amongst others the petardier then march they which carry the petards and the other train in such order as hath been said which shall be followed by fifty muskets led by a Captain to give fire for their defense if need be with large hailshot He must look that no man stay by the way as they march when the enemy asketh Who goeth there they must hasten their pace and then the petardier taketh the first petard with him and the rest must follow very close that so when the first is fired the second be ready to be put into his hands The ten horsmen which have marched before all the equipage so farre shall not advance further then the distance of pistoll-shot from the first bars then they shall fall back to the Captain which leadeth the fifty musketiers The first petard being fired the officer shall cause his men to be placed on the right and left hand to give room for the second petard then that shall do the same to give passage to the third then that maketh room for the rolling-bridge and they for the petards and other instruments and consequently all the rest And they which are unladen must help the rest without making any noise And if the petardier calleth for any thing he that carrieth it must be ready to give it him and no man upon pain of death must stirre out of the place where he was placed but onely to give to the petardier what he calleth for or to supply some bodies place which in carrying something to the petardier was hurt or killed The officers must take care that the petardier be presently served and all be done without noise or confusion The ouverture being made they which shall be commanded for the first attempts must be ready to enter and to force whatsoever shall resist them they
which are to follow them must do the like and so consequently all the rest which are to act any thing And when they are within they which first entred must not scatter themselves in the town whilest they are yet weak whether it be in pursuing the enemy or though they meet none but they must make two bodies the one to act the other onely to be put into battalia to sustein the rest This done they must march in good order the one to force that whereunto they are appointed the other to go and embattel themselves in the streets and market-places which you had resolved ought to be seised upon by the plat or draught of the town by which the whole enterprise ought to have been designed For howsoever it hath sometimes succeeded well to foâ—low the enemy speedily with such few men as are entred yet is it not the surest way because they may be repulsed by a few men which hath often caused brave enterprises to be frustrated There must also be a third body which must stand in battalia without during the execution to the end that if they which entred should be repulsed they may sustein them or else to remedy such accidents which might befall them by some of the enemies troups which casually might arrive in that place If you be wholly repulsed that troup which is without shall make the retreat and shall remain firm in battalia untill that the repulsed troups be recollected and put in order but if they which entred become masters of the town to hold it they must disarm the townsmen before they disarm themselves And being well assured of all the corps du-guards and commodious places the houses must be shared that so every man may have his proportion of the bootie they being not suffered to take it any other way and they which shall begin to pillage must be severely punished By this means you may appoint the best houses to them which have best deserved and do the rest by lot whereof no man shall have cause to complain but of his own ill fortune If it be needfull in such places as are assailed by scalado you may dispose some troups of musketiers which shall give fire perpetually upon the flanks and if you can you may adde to them some fire-lances and such as give fire at the top of the ladder must cease so soon as their men begin to mount I have been more particular in this chapter then in any other but so many enterprises have failed by the not observing of the least of these things that I rather chose to be somewhat long herein then to omit them CHAP. XI Of assaults by sieges IN the two chapters of surprises I have begun with the means to defend ones self for that we must never undertake to attempt the surprise of any fort but upon the defects which are to be found in them so that he which knoweth not on which part nor after which manner he ought to make his assault must be prepared for all manner of accidents In these two I will begin to treat of the assailing of towns by sieges for that you must observe by what place and after what manner you are assailed to make a good defense against it Sieges are undertaken either by blocking up of towns to famish them or by taking them by force for both the one and the other you must be master of the field and you must have two armies the one to hinder the enemy from undertaking any thing and the other to form your siege Or in any case you must be the first in the field that you may so fortifie your self before the town you besiege as you may be able to maintein your self there in spite of the furious attempts of the enemy To get the town which you mean to besiege at the easier rate you must attempt to surprise it when there is but a small garrison in it to this end you are to use all manner of inventions to keep them from the knowledge of your purpose to besiege it then all on a sudden you must go and block it up But if notwithstanding all your stratagemes you be not able to surprise it at unawares or that you apprehend the charge to be too great it will be better to make some other siege of lesse importance for a town well and obstinately defended is the ruine of an army and if it be not taken it often diminisheth the reputation of the commander which assailed it For this cause before you undertake any such thing it must be well considered on and you must provide your self abundantly of all things necessary to effect it When you form a siege you must appoint your quarters asmuch as may be in healthfull places and be carefull to make them spacious enough and to keep them clean for you must account upon your time of abode there that your army be not wasted by diseases You must make the quarters of your army so near the town besieged as may be yet so as they be not discommodated by their artillerie And if the ground be level and lie open round about the quarters must be out of reach of the cannon You must make as many quarters as the places are which you intend to assault or at least as the bignesse of the town besieged or the situation thereof requireth Neverthelesse I would have the Generals quarters to be so large as in a case of necessity it might receive all the troups of the other quarters If you make a siege with a small army and that the garrison be strong you must fortifie the quarters one after another with the whole body of the army and in this case you must make the fewer quarters and attempt the fewer places But if you find your self strong enough you may abbridge the businesse and make them all at once Besides this you must make a circumvallation wi h forts and redoubts without reach of cannon of the besieged which shall joyn all the quarters one to the other behind which your army may present it self in battalia and this line must be led in such manner as it may possesse all the commanding places And if the garrison of the town besieged be so strong as you may fear to be assailed on both sides you must make another circumvallation about the town the nearest that may be that so it may require the fewer men to guard it for it being made to oppose your self against the town you need not take care to make it out of the reach of the cannon For the opening of the trenches you are to use the more or fewer ceremonies according as the garrison is strong or weak If it be strong you begin by a good fort and continue by good redoubts along the trenches leaving onely sentinels in them For it is an old errour to think to defend trenches If the garrison be weak you need not make so much ado to gain time The batteries
dare say of the most victorious armies It is principally in the time of prosperity that men grow effeminate and give themselves to take their ease and in that time it ought least to be done if after the example of the delicacies of Capua where Hannibals army imbased it self they would not do the same Whilst we are about cutting off unnecessary things from the army I will say a word concerning pioners There be Captains of our time which will have an unbridled number of them and say that it were better to cut off some regiments of souldiers and to take pioners in their stead which are necessary to make the inclosures of the camp the trenches in a siege the accommodation of the wayes briefly to take away all imployment from the souldiers of working in the ground for that they in these times cannot be brought to be subject to such labours as the ancient Romanes were alledging further that the souldier when he arriveth at his quarter is sufficiently tired though he be not imployed a new to cast up earth An opinion whereat I cannot wonder enough and which strengthneth me in that which I hold that we spoil our souldiers by sparing them too much There must be care taken for their livelihood for their clothing for such as are sick and hurt but they must be hardned to labour and their Generall and other Commanders must be examples to them For if you will reduce them to content themselves with a little whilest you burst your self with excesse of meat and to labour whilest you glory it and live in lazinesse I confesse they will murmure But to return to the pioners it is necessary you should have them to accommodate the wayes for the artillery principally for which five hundred may serve for a great equipage Concerning the inclosing of the camp the souldier is bound to make it for that this labour procureth him a means to rest himself and to sleep in safetie I say further that it is a work which must be done in three or foure houres to this end all the army worketh at it or at least half of it when the enemy is near hand So that if we must needs have it done by pioners there had need be as many of them in an army as there are souldiers which would be a means to famish a whole countrey and to encrease the turmoil which we would diminish Concerning the trenches I never saw it succeed well when pioners did it and whilest the danger groweth the most valiant souldiers are not too good for that imployment and further they must be incited to that work by the gain of it which will serve to assure themselves the better in that danger and to give them a means to spare something to cloth themselves and no money is so well imployed as that in an army CHAP. XV. Of spies and guides THere be yet two sorts of people whereof contrary to the pioners there cannot be too many in an army which are spies and guides The first advertise you of the deportments of the enemy upon whose report either you enterprise something upon him or you guard your self from his designes The second give you knowledge of the countrey of the wayes and passages by which you are to passe or else by what way your enemy can come to you Both the one and the other must be faithfull for that in advising you â—alsly or guiding you maliciously they may cause you to fall into great dangers You must have good store of guides for that especially if you march by night every grosse troup or at least every body hath need of their own and before you set forward they must all be agreed on the way which they will take There must be a Captain of the guides a man of spirit and vigilant and that may take care to get guides froÌ„ place to place Concerning spies there must be something more observed in them and you must be alwayes suspicious of them for that as it is a dangerous task for him that undertaketh it so it is also for him that imployeth them To this end it is necessary that no man know them but he which imployeth them and that spies may not know each other that so they may not agree to give false advises for by this means by examining them severally by the agreement or disagreement of their advises you may judge whether they be good and by the verification of those which speak true or false you shall know who betrayeth you or doth you true service And howsoever when you discover traitours yet I say you may make a profitable use of them by feigning that you believe them to be faithfull and giving them commissions which they may discover to the enemy that you have some designe quite contrary to that which you intend to put in execution that so whilest he is preparing himself for one side you may attempt something upon him on the other But this is not all to beware of your own spies you must also take heed of those of the enemy which you must presuppose you have within your camp as the enemy hath of yours For this reason besides the secresie which must be used in all enterprises it is good to give a charge by publishing in a still way that you have a quite contrary designe to that which you purpose to put in execution that so those spies may so report it to the enemy But the most essentiall means to be well served by this kind of men is to be very liberall to them for they are faithfull to them which give them most CHAP. XVI Of victuall BUt seeing it is to no purpose to have an army composed of good commanders and valiant souldiers well disciplined and obedient well furnished with artillery and munition if they have not what to eat I will distinguish this chapter into five parts the first to make provisions of corn the second to provide for the carriage of it the third of the safe conveying of it the fourth of the making of good bread and the fifth of the distribution of it To this end the Commissary generall of the victuall ought to be a man of authority faithfull vigilant and active and this office ought not to be despised as nowadayes it is nor given to men of mean quality for it is of such importance that according as it is either well or ill discharged it causeth an army to subsist or go to ruine And the Romanes alwayes committed it to some eminent person To come to particulars I will say that the provision of corn ought to be made in due time in sufficient quantitie in a commodious place for transportation and that choice be made of very good corn For you must not conceive any hope of finding it either in the champain or towns where you are to go because the enemy may either hoard it up or burn it and so on that hope you shall find in this
enemies You must also be very carefull to use this faction very courteously and to engage them by little and little into actions which may make them irreconcilable to their Prince But when you see they make warre with respect and that they will but by halves offend him from whom they have revolted you must have them in great suspicion and march with them with bridle in hand for whether it be the fear of a ruine without recovery or the hope of a reconciliation that hindreth them from putting themselves upon reall extremities the one and other are equally dangerous and at last you may fear they may accommodate themselves to your prejudice wherefore if they will not engage themselves to do extraordinary and irremissible actions at the beginning you ought not to joyn with them but under good pledges You must also use such as do voluntarily yield themselves to you with all humanitie clemencie and liberalitie and such as resist you with all severitie for beneficence towards the one and severitie towards the other are the two principall means which get you obedience A town taken by force and hardly used or one which yieldeth it self of its own accord and favoured openeth the gates of a dozen others as on the other side a town taken by force and spared or which rendred it self voluntarily and is evil intreated shutteth a great many Whence I conclude that a Conquerour must be as good as his word whatsoever he promiseth be it in clemency or severity CHAP. XIX Of the defense of States according to their forces and situations TO treat of this subject well we must divide it into three parts namely into small States those of a middle rank and those which are puissant The small ones are of that nature as they subsist not but by the jealousies which their neighbours have one of another for that if one of them will assail a weak State the other will defend it neverthelesse it is but a tottering condition and ill assured for if the one findeth himself able enough to assail them the other will not find himself sufficient to defend them The counsels of Princes and States are not alwayes governed so equally but for the most part one prevaileth above the other Besides this inconvenience there is yet another that sometimes they agree to divide the prey so that such kind of pettie States which have not strength within themselves for their own defense are alwayes in perill and they must use very much pliantnesse to remove all pretexts from their neighbours of undertaking something against them The onely means which they have is to have one or two towns exceeding well fortified with arms and money enough to defend them well that so they may give leisure to them which will not suffer the growth of him which shall assail you to aid you for if you have no means at all to resist your countrey will be taken before they shall have time to assist you and besides that the happinesse which they conceive of conquering you giveth them a spur to assail you you shall find many more persons disposed to succour you then to reconquer your countrey for that the one is easie with equall forces and the other without greater strength is very difficult To which I adde that there is ofttimes as great danger that he which regaineth your countrey as your friend keep it not for himself as well as he which had taken it as your enemy or if he restore it to you it will be with so hard conditions as you shall possesse but the shadow of a Sovereigntie And thrice happy are they which meet with so good and so generous Princes which do reestablish them into their lost States with the same authoritie and liberty as they possessed them before for such examples are exceeding rare Concerning those States of a middle condition I propound a Prince or common-wealth which for his defense is able to entertein an army of 20000 foot and 3000 horse with all necessary equipage If his countrey be of a difficult accesse and that there be no entrance into it but by certain passages and mountains guarded and fortified he hath a great advantage but they which too much do trust and rest upon them and have neglected other defenses have deceived themselves and have been lost by those wayes wherein they thought themselves most assured If it be encompassed by the sea it is a fair moat notwithstanding he which is stronger will find means to make his descent into the island If it be environed with moorish grounds and rivers yet an enemy will find wayes to passe them especially when he hath artillery to favourise such passages insomuch that the surest way is to trust to your own forces namely a good army and good fortresses I say both joynned together for that the army without fortresses being weak and not daring to hazard any thing leaveth the victuall of the champain to the enemy and so the means to subsist at your charge and at last to ruine you And fortresses without an army are not able to preserve you longer then the time you have made your magazines of victuall for within them but these things being proportioned with judgement you may make a great resistance In these things you must not suffer your self to be led by the fansies of the people which without considering the situations of their towns or the publick good when they see their neighbours fortifie themselves will all imitate them a thing equally dangerous to have more fortresses then you can guard or to have none at all Yet I should rather like the last then the first for that at least by hazarding a battel you put your enemy to half the fear but by the other way you must surely perish without being able to do any other thing but prolong your ruine for the jealousie which you have to preserve all your fortresses by leaving great garrisons in them hindreth you of the means of keeping an army in the field and then the spoil of two or three harvests compelleth you to yield your neck to the halter I know there are some which ground themselves upon this reason That when all the principall places of a State be fortified all the victuall of the champain may be drawn into them so that an army coming thither if it stayeth there it dieth through famine and if it doth but passe through it doth no great hurt insomuch that it is almost impossible to make any great siege there Whereunto I answer that fortresses are principally invented for the weaker that so a few men may resist a great number and if you have so great a number of fortresses and those requiring great guards as the great fortified towns do you must have a greater number of souldiers then he shall have which cometh to assail you otherwise you were not able to provide them all with sufficient garrisons to preserve them from a siege And if you be
the stronger without any fortified place you shall preserve your countrey in keeping the field There is yet a further inconvenience in the fortifying of great towns that is that you make them so proud as they will not acknowledge their Sovereigne but upon good terms and upon the least discommoditie they receive in any warre the inhabitants desire rather to change their master then to see their goods wasted Insomuch that I conclude that you ought to have so few fortresses that they may not hinder you from keeping the field that those which you have be so well fortified and furnished with munition as they may make a great resistance and to place them so well as they may bridle the great towns and that they may assure the frontiers that so the enemy may make difficultie to leave a place behind him which might discommodate his victuall and that by intelligence or otherwise he may not seise upon some principall town which may serve him for a seat to entertein warre within the countrey These things thus disposed of you must regard what enemy assaileth you If it be a power of confederates united together it is the more easie to disunite then when it dependeth on one alone and in this case it is exceeding good to cause some diffidence to grow betwixt them by feigning of intelligence with some one of the confederates to whom shewing more respect and lesse animositie you may give jealousie to the rest as also by procuring a diversion upon the countrey of one of the rest It being a very difficult thing that many sovereigne powers should long hold a league together without some disgusts to arise amongst them or mistakings envies and even enmities by reason of the diversitie of their humours and interests so that that power which onely dependeth upon one State onely is much more to be feared And because you may be assailed more or lesse fiercely I must say a word for that If it be by forces which are not too much disproportionable to yours you may preserve your countrey without forsaking it and with your army and fortresses tie up the enemy in hindring him from victuall and by entrenching alwayes so near him as you shall hinder him from making any siege of importance For if a Conquerour advanceth not forward he recoileth and it is impossible for him to subsist in a countrey which he would conquer if at first he taketh no footing and doth not strengthen himself by some considerable prise If also you be assailed by a power altogether disproportionable to your forces in this case you must leave the field and burn all the victuall which you cannot contein within your fortresses and also all the towns and villages which you cannot guard for it is better for you to preserve your self in a ruined countrey then to keep it for your enemy And it is in this that a Prince to gain as he thinketh the name of being compassionate towards his people which in such occasions turn their backs upon him becometh cruel towards himself But it is rather a vice of irresolution and of weaknesse of courage which possesseth us then a true compassion which we have of the misfortune of another as that of the Emperour Otho who upon the first ill fortune that befell him his forces being yet entire durst not trie the hazard of a battel any more And he who could not afford any pitie to Galba in his decrepit age being his designed successour to the Empire and which had committed all kinds of villanies to attein it would perswade posterity that compassion to see the Romane bloud shed had made him resolve to estrange himself from it by killing himself Thus it is that we oftentimes desire to cover our vices with the vertue which is nearest thereunto But as it is a maxime that no publick good can be without some prejudice to some particular men so a Prince cannot disintangle himself from a perilous enterprise if he will please every man And the greatest and most usuall faults which we commit in matters of State and war proceed from suffering our selves to be carried away with this complacencie whereof we repent us when there is no remedy left But to avoid such storms you must hold this for a fundamentall law for your own preservation Never to suffer that neighbour of yours to grow up which maketh himself the strongest for it is better to offend him by hindring him from enabling himself to destroy you then to suffer him to grow greater out of fear to offend him It being a thing certain that no man preserveth his libertie against a conquering enemy by complements but onely by force It remaineth that we speak of puissant States which without help of another have arms money and what else is needfull to maintein a continuall warre Of this kind there be but few and they need to care for none but themselves for that one sole enemy is not able to assail them and that it is hard for the leagues of severall Princes all to agree in such a designe or for any long time to subsist together Neverthelesse I will say a word on this subject Great States are either compacted altogether or spread abroad in severall places the first which have all their forces united are able to assail and to defend themselves more powerfully then they which are so separated because they carry all their forces where need requireth with more diligence and facilitie and lesse charge the other put a great part of the world into an alarm and jealousie because they frontier upon the greatest number of States Neverthelesse if the one or the other be assailed they must make use of the defenses we propounded before onely I will say that they ought to have no fortresses but good ones and few in number and onely on the frontiers and none within the heart of the countrey for that having more cause to fear civil warres then forrein and without which no man will ever assail a great Empire it is the way to take away the main root from them which maketh them to undertake the enterprise and to subsist Besides you ought not to perpetuate any governments neither to families nor yet for life But the principall and most able remedy against civil warre is to entertein a forrein warre which chaseth away idlenesse setteth all on work and particularly giveth satisfaction to ambitious and stirring spirits it banisheth luxurie it maketh your people warlike and mainteineth you in such reputation amongst your neighbours as you are the arbitratour of all their differences It is true that this maxime is not good to be observed but by such States as are of this last sort For as it is necessary for them I find it hurtfull for pettie States which must fear all sorts of warre for being too weak to gain by it they run the hazard to be the pray of such as are the stronger CHAP. XX. Of the means how to assure a