any good end VIII Moreover it is opposite to the nature of sin to produce of it self any good effect as an evil tree cannot bring forth good fruit Mat 7. 18. nor darknesse produce light of it self 2 Cor. 4. 6. but the same great and glorious God who out of his omnipotence brought forth light out of darknesse can also out of our sins take an occasion to illustrate his infinite wisdome his righteousnesse and his goodnesse But these are the effects of a divine power as of a cause working properly and of it self to the production whereof there needs no assistance nor strength from our sins which as to those effects are but meerly contingent and but by accident Those words therefore of David Psalm 5. which St. Paul alleageth Rom. 3. 4. I have sinned against thee 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 that thou mayest be justified when thou speakest are not so to be understood that David for that end committed murder and adultery or that it was lawfull for him so to do that God might be justified in his words but the word 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 and some other Greek particles of the same signification in many places of Scripture are to be understood according to the interpretation of St. Chrysostome not 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 but 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 to denote and inferre the event only and not the true cause of the thing For as he who is in a serious argumentation can inferr a true conclusion from the false praemises which before were granted by another and yet the same Disputant would show himself ridiculous if to prove a true conclusion should willingly make use of some salse assumptions for Truth doth not stand in need of the patronage of Falshood so Almighty God and we also in some respect may do the like can dispose of things that are ill done into good but it is neither congruous to the divine Justice and Goodness neither is it any ways lawfull for us to will and to do evil that good may come thereby IX The third argument is taken a naturâ boni Actus from the nature of a good Act to the complement whereof the concurse of all requisite conditions is so necessary that if one be but absent amongst so many of them although all the other be present and subservient yet that Act shall not be morally good Most remarkable is that Axiom Bonum ex causa integra malum ex quolibet defectu Good proceeds from an upright and an entire cause but evil from any defect And it is besides manifest in all kind of things that there are more required to raise up than to throw down or to destroy The defect of a good Intention is enough to prove any Action evil for that the end whereof is evil must of necessity be evil it self but it is not enough it is not sufficient that a good end or a good Intention should prove the Action good unless all the other requisite conditions be conjoyned Now that any Action whether the internall of the will or the externall of the work may approve themselves to be good we are to understand that there are three distinct goodnesses viz. the goodness of the object the goodnesse of the end and the goodness of the circumstances The quality of every Act doth first of all and principally depend on the quality of the object or of the matter about which it is conversant so that from thence every Act may indefinitely and according to the whole species of it be denominated either good or evil in this respect we affirm that Theft and Adultery are evil in the whole Species of them and that Prayer and the giving of Alms are good in all their severall respects and the acceptations of them but with this difference that things which in themselves are simply evil are so evil that neither upon the account of the end although good nor yet on the account of their circumstances although never so promising they can ever be made truly good But things which are good in their own nature may yet be so corrupted by the end or by undue circumstances that they may leave off to be good and become evil The pravity therefore of the object being presupposed we are altogether to abstain from the Acts of Theft or of adultery as being simply evil in themselves But the goodnesse of the object being presupposed it is not safe for any one at the first either to undertake to do it or to approve it being done unless he hath diligently weighed before hand the end to which it is directed and the severall circumstances with which it is attended and cloathed In these things therefore in which it is said that the Goodness of the Act doth depend on the end and that the end doth discriminate and crown the actions they may be said so for to be true if the Acts be good in consideration to the object or the matter or at the last if they be of a middle nature and indifferent but not if they are evil For the goodness of the object being supposed the Act doth chiefly take its goodness or its evilnesse from the end For examples sake the Act of giving a poor man an alms though it be a good Act in respect of the matter or the object yet if it be done for vain-glory it is morally an evil Act because it is not ordinated to a good end The same Act if it be to relieve the necessities of a neighbour is an Act so far good that it hath a lawfull matter and a right Intention and so partaketh of both the goodnesses above mentioned to wit of the object and the end but it cannot yet be affirmed to be simply good unlesse it be moreover duely circumstanced for to this complement of a good work besides that goodness of the object and the end there is required the goodnesse of circumstances And from hence it is that commonly it is spoken that the goodnesse of the Act doth depend upon its circumstances not primarily and principally but ultimately and for the accomplishment of it the goodness of the object and the end being first laid down seeing therefore these three things are required to the goodness of every moral Act and they are all to be conjoyned to wit the matter lawfull the intention right and the circumstances due it is most manifest that a right intention cannot alone suffice by it self and by consequent that nothing can be performed out of a good Conscience whatsoever the Intention be that is either unlawfull in the object or defective in the circumstances X. But some there are who peradventure will object unto this those words of our Saviour Mat. 6. 22. If thy eye be single thy whole body shall be full of light but if thy eye be evil thy whole body shall be full of darkness Where if the intention be undesstood by the eye which is the judgment of almost all the Interpreters upon
it it seemeth that the goodnesse of the Act doth altogether depend on the goodness of the Intention that adaequately so that what power an evil intention hath to corrupt an Act although otherwise good the same power a good intention hath to approve and to render an Act good which otherwise is evil for a good or a single eye is as efficatious to inlighten the whole body as an evil eye is to infuse darkness on it To adde more strength to this opinion much may be alledged from the Fathers and other Divines of this nature is that in the Glosse As much good as you do intend so much you do perform And that verse in the mouth of every Scool-boy Quicquid agunt homines Intentio judicat illud It is th' Intention judgeth true Of whatsoever things we do XI But in the way of answer as to that place in the 6 of St. Mat. I am not ignorant in the first place that some learned men of this age do give an interpretation to it far different from that of the antient Fathers and not consonant to that we have now in hand But in reverence to those antient Doctors be it granted that those words of our Saviour had a proper relation to the Intentions of men I make answer that the intention when it is a motion of the Will tending to some ends by certain mediums is taken into a twofold consideration first whether it be for the intention of that good into which the Will is finally and precisely carryed being taken from all consideration of the mediums to attain it As if a man should say he intends the glory of God or his own profit and pleasure or secondly whether it be for an entire ordination of the whole progresse of the work from the beginning of the work unto the end including also the mediums or the means to attain it As if a man should say that he intends the glory of God by building a Temple or staining an Idolater or that he intends his own profit by getting riches by his honest labour or by theft and plunder And as he may be said that he intends a journey to Rome who only thinks of going thither and hath not yet resolved with himself which way or upon what accounts he will go as well as he who hath resolved with himself when to go which way and upon what occasions We speak in this whole discourse of the Intention taken the first way viz. on the intention which looks altogether upon the end and not on the means which is so taken in the common use of speaking but those words of the Fathers and other Divines which seem by the intention alone to measure the goodness or the badnesse of mens actions and which are grounded on those words of our Saviour in relation to a single eye and to an eye that is evil do receive their intention in the latter signification as they include the means with the end observable is that of St Bernard That the eye saith he be single two things are necessary viz. that truth be in the election and Charity in the intention That is that our intention be absolutely right both are required that so we may not propound unto our selves such an end which is averse unto the love of God and of our neighbour and that we make not choice of any means that are not joyned with honesty righteousness In every work therefore we must not only look to propound unto our selves a good end but we must withall endeavour to the end so propounded by apt lawful honest means for seeing that the election of the means or the mediums do arise from the intention of the end is so necessarily joyned to it that in the respect thereof it hath the place of an accident inseperable or a necessary circumstance Animum laudô Consilium reprehendâ—â— Cic. 9. ad Attic 11. the School-men do almost all of them conclude that an evil election doth corrupt an intention that is otherwise good by rendring that evil which before was good in the very same manner as evil circumstances do corrupt those Actions to which they are retayners XII The fourth argument is taken from the perfection and obligation of the Law of God For there is a Law propounded from God to men a most perfect Law which commandeth things to be done and forbiddeth those things which are not to be done It hath shewed unto thee O man what is good what the Lord requireth of thee Mich. 6. 8. This is the Law which we must obey if we will fulfil our duties by this Law we are commanded as the Scriptures every where do declare to do good and to eschew evil But if we on the contrary without the least regard to the law of God shall measure out unto our selves things to be avoyded or performed according to our own profit and as we shall think good and shall either omit those good things which God commandeth to be done for the fear of some following evil or shall commit those evil things which God forbiddeth for the vain hope of some good to come what is this but worms as we are to preferre our own Counsels above the expresse will of Almighty God and the wisdome of the flesh above the Authority of the most holy Spirit Farre otherwise did that holy man David By thy precepts saith he have I gotten understanding therefore have I hated all unjust wayes Psal 119. 104. As if he should say being instructed by thy Law which both night and day is in my heart my mouth before mine eyes I do plainly understand what I have to do and what I have to eschew wherefore I do not only decline but hate every way which is not consentaneous to thy Law whither soever it may seem to lead me Therefore since every sin is forbidden by the Law of God and that Law of his containeth not the least exception of any good Intention or Event and we ought not to distinguish where the Law maketh no distinction nor to except where the Law maketh no exception it is most manifest that he whosoever he is who for what Intention or what cause soever it be doth knowingly and willingly do that which is evil he doth sin against the Law of God XIII The fifth argument followeth drawn from the examples of those who under the pretence of a good end being so bold as to disobey the express Commandment of God have satisfied his anger by the just punishment of their rashness and disobedience The Prophet Samuel being sent to Saul the King of Israel who saved some of the cattle of the Amalekites which God had commanded should be totally destroyed for no other end as he pretended than by the bulk and fatness of his sacrifice to make it the more acceptable the said Prophet did lay before his eyes the grievousness of his sin and for the punishment of so great a disobedience did prophesy
Churches do willingly acknowledge and to open a door to the Traditions of the Church of Rome and to take away all the force from the arguments drawn negatively from the Scriptures which the antient Fathers of the Church and the most learned of the Divines of these times do very frequently make use of I make answer that the Church of Rome doth derogate from the perfection of the Scripture in this consideration that in the matters of Faith and things necessary to salvation they do thrust in their unwritten Traditions to be received with the same reverence as the written word of God as if it were not enough for the sons of God to be wise unto salvation by having the new Testament conferred on them which is the Inheritance left them by their Father but they must also have the vain books inserted of humane Traditions But as for those who do dispute negatively from the Scriptures concerning things which are necessary to salvation either to be believed or practised let them make use of this argument as indeed they ought to do But there is no question here of the rule of Faith but of the rule of Conscience and not of the chief rule of it but of the Adaequate and not what is necessary for a Christian to believe or practice to attain unto the salvation of the Soul but what is lawfull for a pious and prudent man to do lawfully or to leave undone at such a time or in such a place The sum of all is that the holy Scripture is the Adaequate Rule of Faith and of things supernaturally to be believed as also of all moral actions so far as they are spiritual and ordained to a supernatural end and it is also the the Law of Conscience the Chief and supreme Rule for the putting of moral things in practice so that where the Scripture determineth of any thing universally either by the way of precept or prohibition it is not lawfull for any other Law whatsoever to stand in opposition to it but it is not so to be understood to be the only Law of Conscience that what is not commanded there to be therefore presently unlawfull And thus much of the third Conclusion XX. The fourth followeth The proper and adaequate Rule of Conscience is the will of God in what way soever it is revealed unto Men. Some call this the Law of God others the eternal Law the words differing in the sound but agreeing in the sence Every part of this Conclusion is to be weighed by it self In the first place I do say it is the will of God which by the Schoolemen though by some of them not rightly expounded and by others of them not rightly applyed is distinguished into Voluntatem beneplaciti and Voluntatem signi the will of the good pleasure and the will of the sign The first called the will of the good pleasure of God is that which God from all eternity did with himself resolve what he himself will do the other which is called the will of the sign is that by which God hath given us a Law by signifying what he would have us to do The first is called the will of God properly and univocally the other improperly and analogically The will of the good pleasure if it be lawfull to speak of the majesty of God after the manner of men is in some respect a Law unto God himself whereby he acteth for he always acteth that which is complacent unto him but it is not given to us by God to be a Law or to be a rule unto our Consciences or at the least for the putting of any thing into action In some respect indeed it may be said to pertain unto the Consciences in regard of sufferings but this is a posteriori from an after observation in this sence that in Conscience we are obliged with patience to endure all things whatsoever shall befall us after that by the event it is manifest to us that God would have it so For rectified reason doth dictate this unto us that we ought not to be displeased at the method of the Divine Providence who can will nothing but that which is most righteous It remaineth therefore Optimum est Deum quo Authore omnia proveniunt sine murmuratione concomitari Senec. Epistol 108 Placeat homini quicquid Deo placuit Idem Epist 71. that the will be the rule of our Consciences which is called The will of the sign For when God by prohibiting and by commanding hath signified what we ought to do and what we ought not to do it is our duties absolutely to conform our wills unto his will Many things amongst the School-men are with unprofitable acutenesse disputed on this Subject viz. Whether and how far the will of the reasonable creature in a thing willed is bound to conform it self to the will of the Creator When the whole matter as much as belongs to our business and the use of humane life may briefly in one word be dispatched which is That we are always bound to will that which God willeth that we should will Thus when God commanded Abraham to offer up his Son Isaac Although God in the will of his good pleasure would not have had that done which at the same time he commanded to be done as by and by shall appear by the event yet Abraham was bound to will the very same thing because God by commanding it did signifie that it was his will that Abraham should have a will unto it XXI I say secondly the will of God revealed unto Men because this revealed will is the formal Cause and Reason of the obligation For the will of God doth not oblige those unto whom it is not revealed And hence it is that the Gentiles to whom the Gospel is not preached are not bound to believe it or to have any faith in Christ for there is no man that is bound to that which is impossible And it is impossible for that man to whom the Gospel hath been never preached and who never hath heard any thing of Christ to believe either in Christ or in the Gospel seeing that the light of Reason cannot ascend so high according to that of the Apostle Rom. 10. 15. How shall they believe in him of whom they have not heard and how shall they hear without a Preacher And the same Apostle thinks it not meet that others should be judged by the Law but those only who have sinned in the Law Rom. 11. 12. Neither doth this suffize to bring an obligation upon the Conscience that the will of God is revealed to him unlesse it be revealed to him as the will of God in a peculiar reference to himself Insomuch that if any of the Gentiles who were Aliens should casually have met with the Books of Moses and by reading of them should observe the Commandements which are there given to the people of Israel he had not presently been obliged to the
of the Laws is the good of the Commonalty or the publick peace and tranquillity This is proved first from those very words of the Apostle that we may live a quiet a peaceable life The Apostle doth here exhort that both privately but especially in publick Congregations for so I conceive this place to be understood and the best Interpreters are of the same opinion with me Requests Prayers and Supplications with thanksgivings may be made as first for all men in general out of Charity and in order to a Spiritual end viz. Eternal happiness in the life to come as they are men and either in Act or in Power Members of the mystical Body of Christ so more especially for Kings and others invested with supreme Authority and this out of Prudence and in order to a Temporal end to wit external felicity in this present life as they are the chief Members of the body politicks from whose legislative and executive power accordingly as they have administred it whether rightly or unjustly either the chief happiness or unhappiness of the rest of the Members and by consequence of the whole Body doth depend Therefore the making of Laws being the chief Act of the supreme political Jurisdiction that which is the supreme End of that supreme Jurisdiction is also the supreme End of the making of Laws to wit the good of the Commonalty It is proved secondly from the Nature of the End as by a Demonstration a priori That in its order is the ultimate End of everything to which all the Acts of that thing are reduced 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Arist 8. Ethic. 11. as to their first regulative principle and to which they are referred as to that for whose sake they are ultimately ordained Therefore the Final Cause is commonly called by Aristotle That for which But all the Acts of Laws are regulated by the Common good as by their first Rule and Principle and are referred to the Common good as to that for whose sake they are made as may appear by running over the several Acts Therefore c. For wherefore are good things commanded or evil ones forbidden and things indifferent and of a middle Nature permitted Or wherefore are Rewards decreed to men that have deserved well of the Common-wealth or wherefore are punishments appointed to the Violators of Laws or wherefore are the Laws in the Courts indifferently pleaded unto both of which those are the first Acts of Laws and by the way of Form and the other more remote and by the way of Effect Is it not for that end that the Common-wealth may flourish in peace and safety and that private men according to their measure and degrees may partake rejoyce in the publick happinesse in a word that they may be all inservient to the Common good Thirdly it is proved a posteriori from the posterior by the sence and consent of all men For the Law-makers who do decree just judgements do indeed appear and those who meditate on Evil as a Law do notwithstanding desire to seem to have an Eye to the Common good and profit in the making of their Laws and to preferr the publick interest above their own Whether they sincerely intend or craftily pretend they all professe that in the making of their Laws their chiefest Intention was the publick Good II. This foundation of the present discourse being laid to wit That the End of Laws is the good of the Common-wealth I proceed to the Doubts whereof let this be the first Whether there be any necessary use at least of Humane Laws And indeed we should not have needed to have made any Doubt of it did not the mad errors of the Anabaptists and some others of their faction make this businesse for us from whose Principles seeing they affirm it is not lawful for a man that is a Christian to be a Magistrate or to contend by war or by sutes in Law to swear or to administer an oath to any one it seems to follow that there is no need at all of Humane Laws For take away but Jurisdiction there will be no man to make Laws and take away the Seats and Courts of Justice there will be no man that will fear them What need sad complaints if the offence be not redressed by punishment what will vain Laws profit without the execution of them The Directive power of the Law must of necessity fall unto the ground if the Coactive power doth not assist it The reason of this Doubt is for the Law of Nature may suffice to leave the Gentiles inexcusable which dictates to them to eschew all Sins and trespasses to injure no man and the like But if that be defective the Christian hath at hand a more sublime and a more perfect Law to wit the Law of Faith Justice and Charity made by our Saviour Jesus Christ whom St. James acknowledgeth to be the only Judge and Law-giver James 4. 12. This place in my Judgement doth neerly touch our Innovatours who have derived and drawn most of their opinion from the unclean wells of the Anabaptists whilst they collect from that place of the Apostle that it is lawful for no man besides Christ alone to make Ecclesiastical Laws for it no wayes appeareth either by the force of the words or by the scope and order of the whole perioch that the Apostle hath spoke more there of Ecclesiastical Laws then of Civil And unless they had rather deal unfaithfuly and deceitfuly with us than be ruled by reason they must do one of these two things which they please either turn absolute Anabaptists and take away altogether from mankind all the power of making Laws or grant unto supreme Magistrates as it is fit they should the power of making Ecclesiastical Laws III. But how these our Brethren can disintangle themselves from the snares of the Anabaptists it doth not much concern us let them look unto it themselves We easily do answer that the Law of Nature is written in our hearts and the Law of Christ is revealed in the Gospel and that both of them in their kind are most perfect but so that for all that it is most manifest that the profit of humane Lawes is very great and their use as necessary Because those divine Laws do contain only general Principles of things to be done From which as Conclusions from their Principles more special Rules are to be deduced accommodated to the right Institution of publick Societies of the manners of single persons Neither is it any way to be feared that it may derogate at all from the perfection of the Law of God For the makers of humane Laws do not go about to add any new stock to the most rich Treasure of the divine Law but they rather take from thence what they judge most profitable to themselves and to their people and the good of the Common-wealth Humane Laws therfore if they are just are nothing else but the Relicts of
the Law of God that is particular determinations of the general Rules which the Law of Nature and the word of God have exhibited indeterminatly wisely accommodated to the Condition Utility of certain people according to the consideration of Times and Places For Examples sake The Law of Nature doth teach in general that we are to offer an Injury to no man and he who doth so is bound to make restitution but to descend to the specialty what injury he hath done unto his neighbour who hath broke down the Hedge and let in his Cattel into his Grounds and what is the restitution to be made for such an Injury is not determined by the Law of Nature but by the Civil Law And the Scripture doth openly hold forth that wicked men are to be punished by the Magistrate Rom. 13. 4. and in other places But what kind of wickednesse the Magistrate is to punish what punishment to afflict and after what proportion is no where defined in the Law of God Power being transmitted to Princes Law-makers by God to define of themselves by Laws well constituted what accordting to their wisdome they shall find most safe and profitable to the Common-wealth The Rights therefore and the Laws of God and of a Legislator and a Judge are distinct and proper to themselves and disposed in so excellent an order that the Precepts and Commandments of God which are general and indeterminate are by the Law-maker determined and accommodated to certain Species of persons and actions and being so determined by the Laws the Judge doth effectually apply them to the particular causes of persons actions so that if a Legislator should make a Law which is not complacent to the Law of God he is to be adjudged to have made an unrighteous Law and if a Judge in any particular Cause shall pronounce Sentence which is not congruous to the Law constituted by the Prince he is to be judged himself to have pronounced an unjust Sentence IV The second Doubt is whether a Law-maker be obliged if possibly he can effect it to command all the acts and offices of all Virtues and to forbid all Sins of whatsoever nature they are or if he cannot all whether he be bound to command and forbid as many of both kinds as possibly he can The Reason of the Doubt is because there is nothing more conducing to the proper end of the Law which is the common good than as much as possibly may be that all the Citizens may be good and none of them evil Therefore it is the part of a Law-maker who always is to have before his eys this end which is the common good to take all possible care he can to command the practice of all Acts of all Vertues that so all his Citizens may be good to forbid all Sins whatsoever that there be no unrighteousnesse amongst them and the two chief of the Apostles doe seem to require this of the political Magistrate Rom. 13. 3 4. St. Paul hath these words Do good and thou shalt have Praise but if thou dost evil fear for the Magistrate is a revenger to execute wrath on him that doth evil that is on him who doth any manner of evil And St. Peter in his first Epistle second Chapter and fourteenth verse 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 for the punishment of evil doer◠but the Praise of them that do well that is of all well-doers and of all evil-doers For that which is pronounced indefinitely is equipollent to an universal it is consonant to the Rule of the Logicians in a necessary matter and to the will of God who forbiddeth the Magistrate the acceptation of Persons V. For answer I say first and generally that the Law-maker is bound to use his utmost Indeavour that his Citizens be all of them good men and none of them evil and by consequence to command all Acts of Vertues and to forbid all Vices so far as the Reason of the Beginning from whom and the End for which he worketh doth require but beyond that he hath no obligation at all For the Beginnining and the End in the operations of all work they naturally or work they freely are the adaequate measure of all Intermedial Acts so far as those Acts are proportionate conformable with the Beginning from whence they proceed with the End to which they tend The Acts therefore of Commanding and Forbidding and others in which the Exercise of the legislative Jurisdiction doth consist must be proportionated both to their Beginning in whose Vertue they are done to wit the Higher Powers granted by God and to their End for whose sake they are done to wit the Common Good A Law-maker therefore ought so far to command prohibit permit and to perform all other Dutyes as they are agreeable to the power granted to him by God and is expedient for the Commonalty which God hath committed to his change VI. But these considerations are general and indefinite To satisfie therefore the Doubt propounded we must descend to something which is more particular but which howsoever may rely on this general foundation I say therefore in the second place the acts of Virtues and Vices some of them being internal of which nature are the freer acts of the Will as to will and not to will and the movings of the affections to love to hate to grieve and if there be any other cogitations and intentions of the heart and mind and some of them being external of which sort are all the commanded acts of the will and the indeliberate motions of the affections which are exercised by bodily Organs as to see to speak to strike to plunder and innumerable others the Legislative power is only exercised on the outward acts but not on the inward A Law-maker may therefore command the payment of a debt the restitution of stollen goods and the outward worship of God He also may forbid Theft Adultery Manslaughter Blasphemy and the like But he cannot command the loving of his Neighbour the confidence to be had in God the contempt of the world nor prohibit the coveting of his Neighbours goods unchast cogitations the hate of his Neighbour and the Atheism of the heart The reason is because to determine of internal actions is neither proportionate to the beginning from which nor to the end for which the Legislator worketh For Almighty God hath only permitted to the Magistrate the Government of the external man and hath reserved to himself alone the knowledge and judgment of the inward actions and the inspection into the hearts of men for the Legislator and the Judge is the same as we have already proved by the testimony of St. James and the Legislative power would be altogether ineffectual to obtain its proposed end if it were only directive and coactive First therefore seeing an external Court cannot understand nor judge of inward actions And secondly seeing it were a vain thing to command or prohibit that
by a Law which when it is committed we are not able to punish And thirdly seeing the external operation of good works and the external declination of evil ones doth suffice to the outward felicity of a Republick it followeth that a Legislator or a Law-maker neither wisely can nor rightly ought either to command or to forbid the internal actions of Virtues or Vices In which regard as in many others the Law of God and Christ which requireth Truth Purity Sincerity in the inward parts and restraineth and checketh the highest and first inordinate motions of the Will and punisheth as well Sins thought on as Sins committed doth most infinitely excell the most excellent Laws of men And therefore David in the 19 Psalm saith that the Law of God is perfect and undefiled and the Law of Christ is as the maker of it is described to be in the fourth of Hebrews A word lively and mighty in operation and sharper than a two-edged Sword and entreth through even to the dividing asunder of of the heart and Spirit and of the Joynts and Marrow and is a Discerner of the thoughts and intention of the hearts VII I say in the third place that Humane Laws may de Jure or by Right command all the outward Acts of all Vertues and forbid all the outward works of sin but they cannot do it de facto The Reason of the first member is because there is no external Act of Vertue or of Vice in the whole Nature and in every Species of it so disposed but that the commanding or the forbidding of it according to the Condition of Affairs and Times may be ordinated to the publiek good Therefore not only the Acts of Justice properly so called as some will have it but the acts also of all other Vertues whatsoever may become the due object and matter of the Law And this I remember to be the observation also of Aristotle and if I be not much mistaken he giveth Instances of it in the Acts of Fortitude and Temperance As if by a military Law it were ordained that none of the Souldiers should run from his Colours or from his ingaging with the Enemy or throw away his Arms or as if by another a Law of frugality or moderation the excess in banquetting were prohibited or as if there were a Command that none should exceed in the bravery of his habit or in the greatness of his retinue or in the Ornaments of his House The Reason of the latter member is because there is so great a variety even of the Species themselves much more of the Degrees both of the Offices of Vertues and the Acts of Sin that if the Law-makers should provide a Caution for every one of them the very multitude of the Laws would be a burthen to the Common-wealth not to be endured VIII I say in the fourth place that a Law-maker is not obliged to this viz. To forbid all the evil that he can forbid or to command all the good It will suffice that the greatest and most remarkable of both kinds are to be contained in the Laws and which are so conjoyned with some extraordinary publick profit that unless somthing were determined of them there must necessarily follow some great and grievous Evil which would prove extremely incommodious to the Common-wealth for amongst the lusts of the Flesh the Allurements of the world the temptations of the Devil and the diâ—positions of men so fruitful of all manner of Iniquities may we so much as dream of a Platonick or an Eutopian Commonwealth we are to think we have done well enough if we stick not too deep in the mire For it is necessary that in every Common-wealth some evils should not be prohibited but tolerated and many good things not commanded but left to every mans discretion and that many things of both kinds should be passed by by the Laws lest being too unseasonably active to remove one evil we peradventure make way for more and greater to arise IX The third Doubt is concerning the Intention of the Law-giver whether and how far it is required to the effect of obliging Which is to demand If a Prince out of no foresight or intent to Justice or to the publick good at all being either carryed away by hatred or ambition and the meer lust or ruling or by avarice or any other depraved desire of an impotent mind should give a Law to his Subjects whether they are bound in Conscience to obey it The answer is easy they are obliged to obey it if there be no other impediment that is if he who made the Law hath a lawful Power and the Law it self be otherwise just and according to the Law of the Nations duely debated and sufficiently promulgated I say therefore in the first place that as in Artificials the End of the work and of the person wotking is not always the same as in the building of a House the End of the work that is of the House is that it may be a commodious habitation for the master of it but the End of the Carpenter is that he may get some gain thereby Just so in a Common-wealth it may come to passe that the Law-maker may intend his own advantage and yet the Law it self may tend to the publick Good X. Peradventure you will object that an indirect End or Intention doth always corrupt the work and therefore the evil Intention of the Law-maker doth vitiate the Law which was his work To answer this objection I say in the second place that an evil intention doth always blemish the work as the work speaketh the action of the person working but it doth not always blemish the work as it is the effect of the operation These two therefore the Action it self and the Perfection of it differ not a little amongst themselves although they are commonly called by the same Name In the same manner as the Effecting and the Effect it self The building of the House and the House builded are both of them called the work of the Carpenter although the one of them is but an action transient and the other after the house is finished an action permanent A bad Intention therefore doth corrupt the work of the Lawmaker that is his own Act which makes the Law and which for the defect of a good end is not without fault but it corrupts not the work of the Legislator that is the Law made by him if that which is commanded by the Law is reducible to the Common good So for all the evil intention of the Judge a Sentence pronounced by him either for favour or for hatred is firm and valid if the said sentence in it self considered appeareth not to be unjust For as rightly St. Augustine hath it potest ex libidine imperantis sine libidine obtemperari We may without any lust obey the lust of the Commander XI I say in the third place Suppose that a Law be not only made with an evil
from our own meditations or the Institution of other men II. I affirmed that all these and every one of them do oblige the Consciences of men and only these absolutely and primarily by themselves and by their proper virtue for all these and these alone do exhibite to us the will of God who alone of himself hath an absolute and a direct command over the Consciences of men But I gave you to understand that there were many other things which Secondarily and relatively and by Virtue of the Law or the Divine will in which they are founded do in their manner oblige the Consciences And all of them do agree in this that they owe all the force of obliging which they have to the Divine will for otherwise the Divine Law would not be the Adaequate Rule of Conscience nevertheless they do all differ among themselves both in the Species by reason of the diversity of the matter and also in the degree according to the power of obliging Moreover there are three degrees of those who do thus oblige The first is of those things whose obligation doth arise from the Authority of another having a right or power in which number are Humane Laws The second is of those things whose obligation doth arise from a free act of the proper will such as are Vowes Oathes Promises and Spontaneous Contracts The third degree is of those things whose obligation doth arise from the intuition of brotherly Charity in which classis is ranked the Law or the Consideration of Scandal or offence III. As for the obligation of Humane Laws I have spoken much more than at the first I propounded to my self yet it may be much less than the weight of the thing deserved of which in our dayly Conversations there is a most frequent Use or the Abundance and Variety of those Doubts required which might cast a scruple into the minds of men In the resolution where of I proceeded so far in the former Terms that having gone over those difficulties which I thought could not improperly be reduced to the material efficient and formal Causes of Laws in my last Lecture I came to treat of those which more properly did pertain to their final Cause where at first having laid this foundation for the whole following Discourse That the good of the Commonalty or which is the same that the publick Peace and Happinesse is the End of Humane Laws with what brevity and perspicuity that I could I answered to the six following Questions First Whether there be any Use or at least any necessary Use of Humane Laws in a Common-wealth in order to the Common Good Secondly It belonging to the Common-wealth that Vertue be reverenced and Vices restrained whether a Law-maker could command all the Acts and Offices of all Vertues and prohibit all Vices and Enormities whatsoever Which if he were not able to perform whether he were at least bound to command and prohibit as many as he could of either kind by Laws which might oblige his Subjects in their Consciences Whether and how far it be required to the effect of the obliging of the Subjects that the Intent of the Law-maker be carryed to the publick Good Fourthly If the Laws made already shall appear less profitable to the publick whether and how far the change of them is either to be attempted by the Prince or to be urged by the Subject Fifthly The Common good being the end of Laws and even of Government it self whether it be lawful and how far lawful for the said Common good to change the form it self of the whole Government or to attempt the change thereof Lastly how that common saying The safety of the People is the supreme Law is to be understood IV. These things I thought necessary to repeat more fully to you that after so long an interruption of Academical exercitations my whole proceedings in these Lectures and the order I have observed therein might better appear unto you and that I might recall into your memory the heads of those things which having heard before with so much humanity I justly do believe that in so long an interval of time you have almost forgotten You will expect I conceive and not undeservedly that I should now proceed in my intended course and go directly on to those next Doubts which yet remain to be resolved As of those of Privileges of Dispensations and to others which some ways do belong to the final kind of a Cause I do confess it indeed and I ought to do it But my friends do interrupt me they advise me that the stubborn and intolerable boldnesse of some men do rather efflagitate that seeing so precisely and so impudently they abuse the Aphorism to the publick ruine although I expounded it but in my last Lecture in the former Term yet that I would take it under examination again and open the genuine sense thereof more clearly and fully than before I had done This in my Construction was nothing else but in a new pomp of words to do over that which I had done before and to the loathing of your Stomacks to give you that meat you before were cloyd with This desire was not pleasing to me but they did grow upon me with new importunities to take it in hand again It will be your humanity to resent and excuse that modesty which I granted to my persisting friends especially having used such a prevalent Argument to overcome me to it not doubting but it would be grateful to the most of you if I should again undertake it V. It is therefore my present businesse to declare unto you what is the meaning of that common Axiom The safety of the people is the supreme Law and how it is to be understood Some men within these few years not well imployed have invented and brought at last into the Common-wealth a new state of Government as before they had brought into the Church a new Religion and as they have earnestly endeavoured under the pretence of Conscience or of Christian liberty to overthrow all the force and frame of the Ecclesiastick Government so under the preâ—ence of Civil liberty or the liberty of the Subject they labour in this confusion of times and with incredible heat of spirit and military terrour to shake and from the very foundation of it to pluck up the whole Fabrick of the Government of State These as often as they are accused of the Royal Dignity trod under feet of the despised Authority of all holy Laws of the disturbance of the publick peace of an unbridled and horrible tyranny exercised on their fellow Subjects all barrs of Right and Justice being broken down of an affected parity in the Church and in the Common-wealth all difference of birth and honours and States being taken away and many more such Anabaptistical impieties they presently defend themselves and their manners with this safety of the people as with a Buckler and think this alone to be preferred
than what became me being at that instant forgetfull of his place and person and of my duty I ought not to revile the High Priest although he hath done something unworthy of the honour of it but the exilience of my passion did prepossesse me from giving that respect unto him which by a more attentive deliberation I should have done This is the sence of the Apostle in that place and it is as easie as it is proper and pertinent X. But I proceed as Science so Conscience also is taken in three several wayes or acceptations First Subjectively for the intellective practical power as when we say that the Law of Nature is written in the heart or the Conscience Secondly Formally for the Habit pertaining to that Potentiaâ— and informing it In the same sence making mention of a person notoriously wicked we say he is a man of no conscience that he hath either thrown off or lost all conscience Thirdly Effectively for any actual motion exercise or operation of that Habit as when a man saith that he is conscious of this or that fact In which sense is that of St. Peter the first Book second Chapter and 19 verse If any man for his conscience to God doth suffer troubles XI Again seeing that Conscience is properly 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 or a knowledge Syllogisticall insomuch that all who do treat of the nature and the method of it do conceive that it cannot more openly or more aptly be illustrated than by a practical Syllogism It is to be observed that the word Science in the very same respect doth fall under a fourfold consideration First and most properly for the precise knowledge of the conclusion and thus it is taken by Aristotle in his Analyticks and many other places Secondly for the knowledge of Principles from which conclusions are demonstrated as if a man should say he knoweth that Omne totum est majus qualibet sui parte Every thing that is whole is more and greater than any part thereof Thirdly for the knowledge of the whole syllogism for he who knoweth the premises and the Conclusion doth know the whole argumentation Fourthly for the aggregated knowledge of many conclusions or demonstrations pertaining to one Subject in the same sence we are said to know natural Philosophy Geometry Physick c. The very same is to be affirmed of conscience whose full discourse many Authors do comprehend in one practical Syllogism But Conscience as is already mentioned being a conjoyned Science that all which comes under this name may more fully and as it were at one sight be discerned the whole businesse as I conceive will more commodiously be dispatched if we shall frame the whole discourse of Conscience so to consist of two Syllogisms that the conclusion of the first Syllogisme be the Major proposition of the following Every thing that is unjust is to be eschewed Every Theft is unjust therefore Every Theft is to be eschewed Let this be the first Syllogism the first proposition whereof is known of it self by the light of Nature Reason doth prove the Minor and the Conscience doth bring in the conclusion which conclusion it presently takes up to be the beginning of the following Syllogism and applying it to some particular Fact accordingly as the Will shall propound unto it it argues in this manner All Theft is to be eschewed This which is now propounded to me to be done is a Theft therefore it is to be eschewed And the Name of the Vice being changed it proceedeth in this manner as often as it judgeth of any past particular Fact XII These things being thus stated I say that Conscience as well as Science is taken four wayes First and most properly for the last conclusion in the course of both Syllogisms as that in which the last Judgemâ—nt of the practical understanding is contained As if a Man should say my Conscience doth suggest unto me that this Theft is not to be committed or my Conscience cryeth out unto me that it ought not to be committed And the knowledge of this conclusion is properly 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 or Conscience as it is distinct from 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 or a guiltlesse conservation of ones self Secondly it is taken for the knowledge of that first universal principle known by the light of Nature or Revelation on which the whole thred of this discourse depends As if a Man should say my Conscience dictates to me that no unjust thing is to be done The word Synteresis which is a guiltlesse conversation of ones self is often used for Syneidesis or Conscience but improperly as in this and such like expressions The Conscience is nothing else but a Synteresis or a guiltlesse conservation of the mind from falling into any Vice when indeed between Synteresis and Conscience properly so called there is no little difference for there is as great a diversity betwixt this Synteresis and Conscience properly so called as betwixt Science and the Habit of the Intellect which are two habits of the mind specifically distinct as heretofore we have read in the fifth of Aristotles Ethicks As therefore in Speculatives Intelligence is a habit of the first principles about Truth and Falshood from whence conclusions are deduced out of which proceedeth Science So in practicks Synteresis is the habit of the first principles about Good and Evill from whence conclusions are deduced out of which proceedeth Conscience Thirdly Conscience is taken more largely for that whole practical discourse of the mind from the first beginning to the last conclusion which is contained in two such syllogisms as a little above I have propounded to you and in its circuit comprehendeth Synteresis and Syneidesis also properly so called For a mans Conscience doth easily suggest unto him all these things viz. that no unjust thing ought to be done and that Theft is deservedly ranked amongst those Crimes which do carry on them the face of injustice and that this particular act which is by me now committed or which opportunity doth tempt me to commit is the guilt of Theft Fourthly Conscience is taken for the aggregated knowledge of many particular acts of which the whole account of our life and conversation doth consist In which sense those words of the Apostle do seem to be understood Men and Brethren in all good Conscience 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 I have conversed with God unto this day Acts 23. 1. To the same sence is that of the Author of the Hebrews Cap. 13. ver 18. we do assure our selves we have a good Conscience desiring to converse honestly with all men and that of St. Peter in the first Book third Chapter and fifteenth verse where as a godly and learned man hath observed that which in the beginning of the verse is called a good Conscience the very same thing in the end of the same verse is called 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 a good conversation for as often as we do praise and
it cometh to pass in all other things which are in an order disposed according to the Rules of Sub and Supra Above or Under in which those which possess the middle place have a two-fold relation the one to the thing Superiour under which they are and the other things to the Inferiour which are placed under them Thus a Captain obeys his Lieutenant Colonell but commands the common Souldier I am a man placed under Authority having Souldiers under me Math. 8. 9. And in the praedicamental course and order those things which are placed between the highest Genus and the lowest Species are both the Genera of those Species of which they are predicated and the Species of those Genusses to which they are subjected In the same manner Conscience receiveth a diverse Condition as it hath a relation unto diverse things for it hath the condition of a power regulating or of a thing regulated In the respect of God and the Law of God it hath the condition of a thing regulated but in respect of man and of humane actions the condition of a power regulating And since it is our purpose to expound unto you the use of Conscience of which in our last Lecture we have given you the Definition especially so far as it pertaineth to the performance of things and is commodious for the Institution of our life and manners the course of the Subject and of our studies doth here require that we should now speak of the double obligation of Conscience that shall be usefull to us which is the Active and passive obligation The passive obligation of the Conscience is that by which it is obliged to confirm it self to the Divine Will to which as to a Rule it is subjected The Active obligation is that which obligeth all humane Acts to a conformity thereunto and is as a rule over them There are therefore two parts of this present treatise the first of the subjection of Conscience or the passive obligation The second of the power of Conscience or the active obligation of it III. Of the first of which that this discourse may more legitimately proceed this is first to be premised seeing that the Rectitude of every thing consisteth in its conformity to its next and immediate Rule and so gradually ascendeth to its first and most chief Rule and seeing the immediate Rule or Law of Conscience is right Reason but subject to the Superior Law which God hath praescribed to it the Conscience may there be said to be right when it is conformable to right Reason according to that Law which God the supreme Law-giver hath praescribed to it for the condition of that Act or Work whatsoever it be which at that time we are performing The last Explication or resolution of Conscience is into a certain Law imposed by God on a rational creature as being the Lord of Conscience alone and the Supreme Legislator who indued man with a Conscience and who is the only knower and the Judge of it who alone hath power to save or destroy a Soul accodingly as it hath kept or broken his Commandements James 5 12. There is but one Law-giver who can save and who can destroy Which is so confessed by all men in whatsoever parts of the world they live that there is hardly one to be found who will not of his own accord allow it to be most true in the Thesis or the Position of it but in the Hypothesiis or Supposition when any thing is to be done I know not by what depravedness of the heart it comes to pass that many men and even those men who appear neither to themselves nor unto others to have thrown off all care of Conscience are with such prone affections transported to those things which they desire to be done that they do not only forbear to bring them most faithfully to be examined by that most chief and supreme rule which is onely able to secure the Conscience but they conceive it is enough for the security of their Consciences if either by the pretence of a good Intention or by the Example of some holy man or if by the Authority of some great Divine they can any ways defend themselves and what they have acted And because this Deceipt in the hearts of men hath been too prevalent in all ages and especially in these last times I perswaded my self that it would be a work most profitable and most necessary for the manners in which we live if I could expound those three vulgar suppositions which are so full of the trepanne and so dangerous unto so many Consciences therefore before we do discend to seek and find out the true rule of Conscience we must first remonstrate that there is not any protection enoguh for the security of the Conscience in the performance of any affair if that which is doâ—e be not performed only with a good intention or be supported by the example of a Godly Man or by the Judgement of a Learned one Of the two last God willing we shall treat hereafter our Discourse at this present shall be of that subject which in the first place doth incounter us viz. Of a good Intention IV. Where I shall lay down this Conclusion That the goodnesse of the Intention is not enough to justifie the goodnesse of the Act. That is a good Intention cannot alone and of it self procure that any humane Act should be morally good or which is the same and they are the very words of the Apostle that Evil should be done that Good may come thereby When I say an Act I understand both the inward Act which is in the Will and all the exterior Acts in the executing faculties which are flowing from it it being my meaning that out of a good Intention alone it doth not follow that either the Will it self which is the first principle of acting or any externall Act flowing from it should be said to be good The Intention may be taken two wayes first properly and formally for the Act of Intending that is for the motion of the Will tending to the end by some certain mediums Secondly materially and objectively for the thing it self intended that is for the end to which the Will so tendeth For the Act intending and the end intended are of one and an alike consideration to the goodnesse or the evilnesse of the Act if we look upon the quality of the Act but if we shall reflect upon the quantity of the goodnesse or of the evilnesse of it there will be found some disproportion in the consideration thereof For it being granted that such aâ— Act is good in its own Species and upon the account of its Object and that it may be done for a good end or on the contrary it being granted that the Act is evil and is done to an evil end by how much the stronger the Will is moved whiles it tendeth to that end by so much the Act respectively will either
be the better or the worse As if a man should partake of the Supper of the Lord to that end to put himself in remembrance of the death of Christ the more entirely that he applyes the mind to the remembrance of his death the better he performes the duty of a true Communicant Again if a man should slander his neighbour intending the ruine of him by how much the more violently he intends it by so much the worse is his Act of Calumnation The quantity therefore of a good or an evil Act is correspondent to the quantity of the goodnesse or the evilnesse of the Intention and is commensurate with it if the Intention be understood according to the Act of intending and not as to the thing intended But the intention taken either way doth not suffice to prove this that any Act which otherwise is evil should be made good V. This conclusion is proved by many and most strong arguments first by the words of the sacred Text in the third Chapter of the Romans where the Apostle not without indignation doth detest that grievous slander by which it was said to be taught That evil may be done that good should come thereof That the sence the scope and the force of this place may be the better understood that St. Paul amongst all the Apostles was abundantly the most copious in asserting every where the mercy of God by Grace making a Covenant of grace with sinfull men and faithfully fulfilling the Evangellical promises notwithstanding all that unrighteousnesse and unbelief of men which lyeth within their hearts and openly and abundantly doth declare it self in their dayly lives and conversations which he professeth to be so far from making these promises of God by Grace to be in vain that on the contrary they do render the glory of his grace and truth to be far more illustrious Rom. 5. 2. for where that the offence abounded there it is manifest that Grace superabounded From hence the Sophisters and Imposters took on one side to themselves an advantage to slander and to diminish if they could the authority of the Apostle On the other side the Hypocrites and profane did take an occasion to live more licentiously and to sin more securely For if that be true said they which is preached by Paul that the sins of men do redound to the greater glory of God there is no reason that God should punish sins or be angry with sinners There is no reason that a man or woman should abstain from sinning nay they should sin more abundantly that God might receive the more abundant glory and evil things are altogether to be done that good things may come thereby The other objections the Apostle confuteth but to this let us do evil that good may come of it he doth not vouchsafe any answer at all he only cryeth out that it is a manifest slander and near of kin unto blasphemy and unless they repent the just judgment of God is threatened to such importunate slanderers as if this Sophism was of that kind of arguments which Aristotle adjudged not to deserve an answer but rather a reproof It is hence manifest and all Interpreters do acknowledge it that the Apostle most constantly denyeth that any evil ought to be done for any intention be it never so good It much availeth saith St. Augustine to consider what Aug. contra meudaciam what end what intention such a thing is done but those things which are manifest sins ought not to be done under any pretence of a good cause or a good end or of a good Intention This is the first argument VI. The second it is taken from the nature of evil or of sin which of its own nature is not first to be chosen 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Hiercl pag. 78. neither is it secondly ordinate to a good end neither is it thirdly apt of it self to produce any good first it is not eligible or it is not to be chosen by reason of its own nature qua tale as it is of such a nature for there is nothing eligible which is not also Expitible and all things that are desired are desired under the account of good Neither is evil of its own nature ordinable to any good end for if it were it were also to be desired for the appetite in Philosophy is not only carryed to the end propounded by the Agent but to those things also which seem to conduce for the obtaining of that end If you object God doth dispose of our evils into a good end of his own and therefore it is not against the nature of evil to be ordinated to a good end I answer in the first place that the ways of Almighty God who is the Lord of Nature and according to his good pleasure can produce good out of evil are farre different from ours who have not the same right or the same power neither is it for us either too curiously to enquire or too magisterially to pronounce any thing of the Providence of God concerning evil In the second place I answer that God indeed is able and accustomed to make use of our sins to serve his Glory Grace and Providence and that it is lawfull for us also as opportunity shall serve to follow his example and to make use of the sins of other men for our spirituall or temporall advantage Notwithstanding as God although he maketh use of the evil of others and produceth Good out of it yet he never doth evil himself that from thence he might abstract good so neither is it lawfull for us to do evil that good might proceed from it It is one thing to make use of the evil of others and turn it into good and another thing to do evil with an intent of good Thirdly I answer a thing may be said to be ordinated in a twofold respect either improperly in the same manner as a thing which way soever it is made use of by the Agent doth notwithstanding tend to its end being so done by the wisdome and power of the supremer Agent contrary to the will and intention of him that did it or it is taken more restrictly and properly and so that only is said to be ordinated to its end which antecedently is chosen by the Agent as a medium that by the nature of it is convenient and conducible to such an end In the first sence that is to be understood when we say that God doth ordinate and dispose of evil to a good end that is when God Non coâ—venire homo viro Vitiis uti Quint 6. Instit 1. out of his infinite mercy and power either abstracts good from evil or turneth evil into good But we must above all things take heed that these expressions be not understood in the latter and proper sence as if God antecedently did well approve or make choice of any evil as a medium convenient by the nature of it to the assecution of
unto him that his Kingdom should be taken from him If any man shall think this example not congruous to prove this truth because it doth not appear that Saul did this with any good intention neither was the end which afterwards he pretended fixed and grounded in his resolution when he did it but it is more likely that he looked after his temporal advantage and commodity both because it was objected to him by the Prophet and laid unto his charge that he obeyed not the commandment of God and because which is common with Hypocrits he did make an excuse for his disobedience That this exception may be waved create no more trouble or scruple it is to be observed that where Hypocrisy is joyned to disobedience the crime is not so much increased as it is doubled There is no man doubteth but that Saul was guilty of a double fault of disobedience and dissimulation not to make mention of the third crime which was the root of the two former viz. a mundane affection and a desire of gain and of his own glory The sins of disobedience and of dissimulation were distinct in Saul neither conjoyned by nature or by time not by nature for one of them can be in any man without the other nor by time for disobedience had the precedency to w ch afterwards upon another occasion was added Dssiimulation which not obscurely may be collected from the very words of Samuel himself who making no mention of the dissimulation of the King did only sharply and securely reprehend him for his disobedience obedience saith he is more acceptable than sacrifice as if he should have said What do you tell me of sacrifices which if you did in earnest before intend them or now to excuse your disobedience you do pretend them it is all one in relation to your duty You ought to have obeyed the commandment of God and without the least murmuring or dispute to have fullfilled that which he prescribed But whatsoever this miscarriage of Saul was most certain it is that Uzzah whose History is written 2 Sam. 6. did put forth his hand to the holy Ark not deceitfully but devoutly and with a most pious Intention that the Ark of the Covenant should not fall on the ground which at that time under the â—economy of the old Testament was a dreadfull Symbol of the Divine presence when the Cart in which it was carryed being violently shaken it seemed even ready to slip down out of it By this slight as some have thought but importunate temerity although he had not the least ill intent yet he merited a multitude of people beholding it that he should suffer the punishment of a sudden death w ch God then did inflict upon him Num. 7. 9. Indeed the Lord Jehovah had before declared that the Ark of the Covenant should not be carryed in a Cart but on the shoulders of the Priests neither was it lawful for any who was not of the order of the Priesthood of the Family of the Koathites to carry the Ark or to touch that sacred vessel Numb 4. 15. he that should presume to do it was to perish by an evil death Therefore by this severe punishment on the first violator of that Law God did strike into the hearts of men a reverence to the more strict observation of the Law and preserved its Authority that no man under any pretence whatsoever should boldly presume to do or to attempt against that which he had ordained And the anger of the Lord was kindled against Uzzah and God smote him there for his rashnesse and he dyed by the Ark of God 2. Sam. 6. 7. XIIII The last argument is taken from the inconveniences that do attend the contrary opinion And they are many I shall only urge but one instead of all and it is often mentioned by St. Augustine which is that the restraint of the Law being taken away all things would be carried at random as the barrs being broken when once the waves of the Sea do exceed their banks they will not endure to be contained within any bounds but will grow upon all places by an unruly usurpation that are farre or near them He who hath once transgressed the bounds of modesty will quickly grow into a heighth of impudence saith Petronius But let us rather be attentive to St. Augustine Quod seeleratissimum facinus quod turpissimum flagitium quod impiissimum sacrilegium non dicatur fieri posse recte atque juste si semel concesserimus in omnibus malis operibus hominum ideo non quid fiat sed quare fiat quaerendum ut quaecunque propter bonas causas facta obtendantur nec ipsa mala esse judicentur What abom nable act what most filthy wickednesse what most impious sacriledge Ah do you not guesse that he prophesyed of this our age and of our affairs may not be said to be done justly and uprightly if we shall once grant that in all the evil works of men we are not to demand so much what is done as wherefore it is done that so those things which are pretended to be done for good causes may not at all of themselves be judged to be evil And again Cum concesseris admittendum esse aliquod malum ne aliquid gravius admittatur non ex regula veritatis sedex sua quisque cupiditate aut consuetudine metietur malum et id putabit gravius quod ipse amplius exhorrescit non quod ampliùs revera fugiendum est When you grant that some evil is to be admitted that a greater one may be omitted every one will be ready to measure that evil not by the Rule of truth but by his own desires or by Custome and will think that to be most grievous which he doth most abhorre and not that which indeed is most to be avoyded The strength of the argument is in this If evil things are to be done that good things may come thereby when most sure it is that all things evil are not to be done and not for all things that are good we must put some limitation or rule to both these doubts as first to know what evil is to be done that good may come thereof and what not and Secondly for what good things some things evil are to be done and for what they are not to be done or it must be left to every mans judgment to arbitrate according to the nature of the thing and as himself shall think good what is to be done and what is not to be done and for what it is to be done If any of which be granted there will be nothing safe amongst men nothing sacred nothing free from injuries perjuries deceits rapine slaughter and destruction Those things without which Common-wealths and the societies of men cannot be preserved must all be banished from the earth in which number are Religion Justice Righteousnesse Faith and Peace XV. The conclusion which I undertook to
it like a nose of wax and to inforce it to an interpretation for their own profit according to their own sence And as that Lacedemonian said that all things at Sparta were honest which were profitable these sparks of Sparta think nothing is filthy enough nothing is to be avoided that may be subservieâ—t to their advantages But fie on this mad Divinity let it be fâ—r from our Schools Pulpits and Brests The holy Apostles of our Saviour have far otherwise instructed us who would give no place to that question Is it expedient or not 1 Cor. 10. 23. before they were fully satisfied in that other question is it lawfull or not Nay the more sober sort of the Heathens themselves were of another judgment who as often as Honesty did seem to disagree with profit they so always have made the reconcilement that they have pronounced that the same is not profitable which is not also honest XXIII But to make no long digression St. Paul in this verse doth altogether deny that any evil is to be done that good may come thereby than which words what can be spoken more plainly or effectually to prove our conclusion But not long since I heard with these ears when those words of the Apostle were urged and some then present could not otherwise defend what they so much desired to maintain they made use of this distinction that it was not lawfull indeed for a private man to do evil at his own pleasure that good may come thereby and this was only that which St. Paul in these words did prohibit but it was lawfull notwithstanding for the common-Council of a Nation to whose care it doth belong that the Common-wealth should receive no detriment to do it if the publick necessity and the safety of the people do so require What and how much is to be done for the safety of the people I shall hereafter God willing examine and determine In the mean time it is in the first place to be observed that this is but an extravagant suggestion and that there is nothing in the whole discourse of St. Paul on which that distinction may rely Secondly If we shall mark the force and the scope of St. Pauls argument in this place we shall perceive that all such limitations and ridiculous inventions of deceitfull men for the Apostle here meets with the objection for promoting the glory of God by the sins of men he denyeth that evil is to be done for that end to render the glory of God more illustrious It followeth therefore a fortiori from the stronger that no evill things are to be done for any thing that is inferiour to the glory of God And seeing the glory of God is infinitely to be preferred to all humane good whatsoever whether publick or private and it is not lawfull notwithstanding to do evil for Gods glory certainly it is not lawfull for a private man or for the Representatives of a whole Commonalty for the redresse of any publick or private inconvenience to do evil themselves or to commend it to be done by another XXIV Let us meditate I beseech you my hearers on these things with our selves and that most seriously and the worse that the dayes are and the more that the snares of temptation are and the assaults more violent let us walk the more exactly and look unto our steps with a greater circumspection let us not suffer our selves by any machinations of the Devills or allurements of flesh the world to be led aside though never so little from that right that streight path of the Commandments of God carrying allwayes in our memoryes that the evils which wittingly and willfully we have committed shall find no excuse in that day when God shall be our Iudge and our Consciences our witnesses And thus much concerning the pretence of a good Intention what remaineth to be spoken concerning the examples placits of men so far as it appertaineth to the regiment of conscience I will God willing proceed to give you a full account of it in my following Lecture THE THIRD LECTURE In which is declared that neither in the examples of good men nor the judgment of experienced men there is protection enough to secure the Conscience GAL. 2. 13. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 And the other Jews dissembled likewise with him insomuch that Barnabas was brought into their dissimulation also HAving propounded to my self to examine and discover to you the adaequate rule of Conscience which is to be the certain and safe Law how to lead our lives I conceived it in the first place most necessary to declare unto you in what a grievous dangerous errour they are who think in the things they do they provide well enough for the security of their own Consciences if either by the flattering intention of some good end or the example of some holy man or the authority and judgment of a man famous for learning and piety they can any ways defend themselves and what they have done And truly how little protection there is in a bare good intention either as to the benefit of the Conscience or the confidence of any good work without the other concomitants of it I think hath been sufficiently declared by me in my former Lecture where by many reasons I have convinced that no evil is to be done that good may ensue thereby It remaineth that this day I do represent unto you that neither the example nor the judgment of any man ought to be of so great authority with us that our Consciences may securely rest in either of them and neither from that alone can we duely conclude that all things which are passed are rightly done or those things for the time to come are simply lawfull to be done which another man indued with never so much learning and sanctity hath either done himself or hath judged lawfull to be put into practice by another II. Moreover how unsafe it is to frame our lives and actions to the examples of other men and how unsatisfying it is to the security of the Conscience to defend our selves by alledging that whatsoever we have done or are about to do hath been done already by some pious man before us may by a most cleer argument appear by the words of the proposed Text especially if we shall go a little higher and derive the ground and the occasion of them from the History of the thing performed St. Peter the Apostle living at Antioch amongst the Gentiles converted to the Christian faith who were not bound inconscience to the observation of the Law of Moses did freely eat with them and did partake of whatsoever meats were set before him as well prohibited as permitted to the people of the Jewes without the least scruple according to the liberty which he had in Christ But when some Christians of the nation of the Jewes came to Antioch from Jerusalem whither they were those false brethren 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉
and to every Learned and Godly Man notwithstanding those things which have been here by me represented You are in the first place to be admonished that in the Interpretation of the Scriptures and in judging of Controversies in reference to Faith and Manners much Reverence and Authority is to be given to the Judgement and the Practice of the Universal Church Secondly That much also is to be imputed to the Authority and the Judgement of a Learned Man for the satisfying of ordinary scruples that too often arise in the minds of men as also for the directing of the Conscience in doubtful things concerning which no certainty can otherwise be had But of both these we shall expresse our selves we hope more commodiously hereafter THE FOURTH LECTURE In which it is both Discussed and Stated what is the Adaequate Rule of Conscience JAMES 4. 12. For there is but one Law-giver who can both Save and Destroy I. HOw small is the Benefit and Protection which redoundeth to every one either in the respect of the Fruit of his Conscience to excuse those things which he hath done or of the security of it with confidence to undertake those things which he is about to do if they only do rely upon the Intention of a good End or upon the Authority altogether of another Judgement or Example I have abundantly declared in my two last Lectures in which my purpose was those stops being removed to make the way more plain ready to proceed unto those things which I had determined to speak of the obligation of Conscience which obligation being two fold Active by which it bringeth one obligation on another and Passive by which it is subjected to the obligation of another the method and privilege of order doth require that we should begin with the Passive For then we more securely can pronounce of the thing measured when it is once manifest that the measure it self is just Our businesse therefore now in hand is to inquire what that is which properly doth oblige Conscience or which is the same what is the proper and Adaequate Rule of Conscience to which to be upright it ought to conform it self which inquisition that it may be the more certain and profitable some few things being premised by way of explication I shall endeavour at the last by certain conclusions to give you an account of the thing it self II. In the first place therefore it is to be understood that for the more exact performance of the offices of Conscience it is necessary to lay down some Rules to which it ought to be subjected for wheresoever there is any Virtue active which of its own Nature is not determined unto one thing in its acting but is in a Potentia to another so that it may act either well or evilly whether this Virtue be a Habite of the first Species of Quality or a natural Potentia of the second it is necessary that there should be some Law or Rule which may direct it in the acting For as often as any thing doth offer it self to the Fancy to be done whither represented by the exterior sence or by some internal suggestion of the mind because the Will which is the next principium of acting is as commonly it is spoken in the Schools but Potentia caeca a blind Potentia and of it self cannot discern Good from Evill so as to be a Rule unto it self the Inquisitive Reason doth straight reflect on Conscience and doth listen to her Dictates Now it is the Office of Conscience presently to Examine the thing propounded And the examination being made to Judge whether it ought to be performed or eschewed whether to be admitted or omitted and accordingly as she hath judged so presently to transmit her Judgement to the Will that is to propound it to the Free-will the same thing either to be chosen or disliked To which Office of Examining Judging and Informing least it should rashly be performed lest the Conscience as blind as the Will it self should misguide it it is necessary that there should be a certain Rule according to which it should be examined III. In the second place we are to know that in Rules as well as in Causes there is a kind of subordination And as in Causes that are ordinated to one another the latter if compared with the former carry with them the Relation and the Account of Effects So in Rules and Measures ordinated to one another every one of the posterior in respect of the superior doth seem to be regulated or to be mensurated by it Since therefore the Rule of the Conscience is two fold one next or the immediate and the other the first and more remote that Rule which is next as it is a Rule in respect of the Conscience which it doth direct so it is also as a Rule Regulated in respect of the first Rule by which it is it self to be directed IV. Seeing the Rectitude of every thing whatsoever doth consist in the conformity of it to its Rule we are in the third place to understand that as I have said there is a two fold Rule of Conscience to wit the Rule which is neerest the Rule which is more remote So there is also a twofold Rectitude of Conscience correspondent to that two fold Rule of it For the Conscience may be said to be upright either absolutely and simply or respectively and secundum quid as the Schoolmen do expresse it In this last Acceptation a Conscience may be said to be upright when it is conformable to its nearest and immediate Rule as he is said to have a true and certain knowledge of any proper passion who from the Subject of it can demonstrate it by its next Cause although he can ascend no higher But in the former acceptation the Conscience may then be said to be upright when it is not only conformable it self to its next Rule but when that Rule is conformable also unto the first Rule In the same sence he may be said to have attained to a perfect knowledge of any thing who knoweth all the causes of it from the first to the last so saith Aristotle lib. 1. phisica Tunc enim unam quamque rem scire dicimur quum omnes ejus Causas principia elementa cognoscimus usque ad prima We are then said to understand what any thing is when we can give you an account of all its causes principals even to the first Elements thereof Therefore as the certainty of Science though immediately arising from the knowledge of the next Cause doth not arrive to its ultimate perfection but by the knowledge of the first cause so the Rectitude of Conscience though immediately it reflecteth upon a conformity to its next rule yet it ascendeth higher and ultimately concludeth in that Rule which is the first rule of it and the supreme II. In the fourth place it is to be understood that when we speak of the obligation of
Christ The Scripture therefore as supernaturally it is to be believed is the only and Adaequate Rule of our faith and according to our actions and performances so far as they are spiritual and pertain to a spiritual end it is to be the only and Adaequate Rule of our Manners and by consequent the principal and as I may so speak it the Architectonical Rule of all our actions But seeing it doth belong to Conscience to look back on things that are done not only upon this account as they are spiritual that is to say whether they are done out of Charity and directed to a supernatural end but as they are moral that is whether they be good or evil lawfull or unlawful free or necessary that a right judgment may be passed on these things we are not only to seek unto the holy Scriptures but to make our seasonable addresses unto other helps XVI In the third place this is proved again by the Form the Character and the Temperature of the Scripture which seeing it containeth in it very many precepts but not all of one kind some of them pertayning to Manners some to Rites and some indifferently common unto all and some peculiar only to some Nation and some again to some one order or person Some of them induring only for a time and others of a perpetual obligation some by way of Counsel of things expedient according as the exigence of the affairs requireth and some again in the way of mandate or command of things simply or absolutely necessary in themselves if there were not some other rule besides the Scriptures for the discerning of moral from ritual precepts and of things temporary from perpetual and of things peculiar from common the Conscience would oftentimes labour in a Labyrinth of doubts and know not which way to turn especially when precepts of diverse kinds being delivered as it were in one the same breath in the same Phrase and in continued connexion of words do immediately follow and tread on the heels of one another For examples sake Levit. 19. 18. An example is there given to love thy neigbour as thy self And in the verse immediately following there is a command that two Beasts of a several kind might not be suffered to mingle in generation with one another and that one Field be not sowen with diverse sorts of seeds nor any garment made of Linnen thread interwoven with Woollen The first command herein is moral and universal the other but Ceremonial and judicial and peculiar only to the Nation of the Jews But when these things are read in the Churches it cannot by the Text appear what so great a difference there is betwixt them And in the 30th verse of the same Chapter the Sanctification of the Sabbath the reverence of the Sanctuary are equally commanded and in a continued course of words and even in the very same solemn sanction of the Law given Ego Jehovah I the Jehovah yet I doubt not but that most men are of opinion that in one of the Precepts the Consciences of men are at this day obliged to the performance of it and that in the other they are not Now what the reason is that their opinion is such the precepts in the Text being all alike and no distinction nor the least apparence of so great a difference there can certainly no other reason be given but that it proceedeth from the judgment of reason and prudence which being excluded obligatory precepts cannot so be known from those which are not obligatory but that the Conscience will be oftentimes in a suspence and not able to know or judge what is commanded to be done or what to be left undone XVII It is proved in the fourth place by an argument drawn from the inconvenicies which do arise from the contrary opinion that is from the most grievous calamities which have a long time afflicted the church of Christ by reason of the misunderstanding of the perfection of the holy Scriptures from whence a most dangerous error hath possessed some men of great estimation that they have declared that nothing can be lawfuly done or commanded which is not authorized by God in the Scripture or at least there approved by some laudable example This foundation being once laid not a few men of a hot spirit being transported to judge charitably of them with a zeale to God but not according to knowledge did begin to raise unnecessary strifes and disputation concerning the Ceremonies of the Church they did declare that all Ceremonies not expressly mentioned in the word of God were to be thrust out and for ever to be banished from the Church of Christ that Laws ordained by men concerning things Indifferent were to be cancelled that all the Churches throughout Europe were to be reformed all things to be reduced to the Evangelical purity and Simplicity The unruly rage of these men did hete for a while make a stand but it did not stand here long but as commonly it commeth to passe 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 one absurdity being granted a thousand will insue their boldnesse derived from his fountain did flow at last into an open rage and brake forth into an Anabaptistical fury And although the growing mischief hath gon so far that it can scarce rise higher yet every day it swels and more and more doth inlarge it self by bringing into the world new monsters of opinions that were we not assured by the word of God that the foundation of God doth continue firm and that the Gates of Hell shall never be able to prevail altogether against the Church it were much to be feared lest the universal Church of Christ overwhelmed with a Deluge of Atheism should utterly be swallowed up by it throughout the world XVIII And let no man think that in vain Rhetorick I do complain of this with more enuy than truth for I am most confident that he whosoever he is that is strongly prepossessed and infected with this errour shall never be able in his daily controversies any ways to satisfie the importunate arguments of the Anabaptists Socinians and other Sectaries whose names I am ashamed to mention For to passe by the established form of Ecclesiastical Government which now adays our Political Divines would either referr to the Civil Magistrate or quite take them away upon no other account but this only that they think it is no where expressed in the word of God they must take away with it the observation of the Lords day the Ordination of Ministers of the Gospel the Baptism of Infants the Sprinkling of water in Baptism for the dipping of the whole body the Sacramental reverence and many other things with all Ecclesiastical Rites and Laws or else having reformed their judgements they must confesse they may all of them be retained without or sin or scandal XIX But this you will say is to derogate from the perfection of the Scriptures which all the Divines of the reformed
knowledge whereof hath hitherto shined into our minds whether internally imprinted by the light of Nature or externally revealed by the Word or whether by our own meditation or by the institution of others is now more excellently and more illustriously made manifest unto us The chief Helps or Mediums thereunto are the Discourse of Reason and Authority the last of which is the Judgement and the Practice of the Church of which neither doth the time permit to speak much neither doth it self require that many things should be spoken of it From the Law of Nature many particâ—lar Propositions of things to be done like so many Conclusions from their Principles are deduced by the discourse of Reason to the use of the Conscience In which unless we orderly proceed from the first unto the last we shall be apt to erre as already I have expressed we must therefore be very carefull that in every part of the Discourse the proceeding be legitimate that those things that follow may aptly depend upon those which go before and that the consequence be necessary lest the Conscience being mis-led do not dictate this or that or otherwise to the will than what it ought to do It is again to be feared lest we erre also in applying the holy Scripture unto the use of the Conscience unless a due regard of Reason be had unto Reason and of Authority unto Authority The Papists while they bestow all their studies that nothing be taken away from the Authority of the Church they give but little unto Reason The Socinians on the other side whiles rejecting all Authority they do measure Faith by Reason onely they do onely attain unto this that they grow mad with reason Both have the same errour but it variously deceiveth And both rocks shall not more easily be avoided than if Authority with Reason and Reason with Authority shall handsomely and prudently be conjoyned XXXVI What place either of them ought to have in the right and orderly unfolding and applying the holy Scripture it is not for this time or my present purpose to represent unto you I shall touch upon it in few words There is especially a twofold Use of Reason in relation to the Scriptures Collative and Illative Collative diligently to compare those divers places of Scripture especially those which seem to bear a remarkable correspondence or repugnancy amongst themselves Illative the propriety of the words the context and the scope being found out effectually and artificially to infer Doctrines being in the mean time not forgetfull that we must attribute so much the more to humane Reason in things to be done than in things to be believed as the mysteries of Faith do more exceed the capacity of natural understanding than the Offices of Life XXXVII The chiefest use of Authority is to beat down the boldness of Hereticks and Impostor who indeavour to cast a mist over the clearest testimonies of the Scripture and to elude the force of them with their subtilties and distinctions whose mouths you can no better stop nor more effectually preserve your selves and others from the contagion of them than by opposing unto their Sophisms and Deceits the Judgement and Practice not of one or of a few men not of one Age or of one corner of the Church but of the whole Catholick Church of all places and all times spread over the whole face of the Earth so heretofore those great Advocates of the Christian Faith Irenaeus Tertullian Vicentius and others judged it to be their safest course to deal with their Adversaries by the right of prescription which how advantagious it hath been to Christendome the event hath taught But those things which deserve a larger consideration I am now forced to omit being mindfull of the time of you and of my self and to defer unto another day what remaineth to be spoken concerning the Obligation of Humane Laws THE FIFTH LECTURE In which the Question is thorowly handled concerning the Obligation of Humane Laws in general ROM 13. 5. Wherefore you must be subject not because of anger onely but for conscience sake HAving begun the last Term to treat of the passive obligation of Conscience I proceeded so far that having discovered and disclaimed those subterfuges in which a seduced generation of men do vainly flâ—â—ter themselves that there is some excuse or protection either for the fruit of their Consciences as to things already done or some security for things that remain to be done for the Intention of a good end or by the authority of another mans example or judgment I have proceeded I say so far as to examine and represent unto you that proper and Adaequate Rule of Conscience to which absolutely and simply it ought to conform it self where in the first place I shewed you that God only hath an absolute and direct command over the Consciences of men Secondly that the next and immediate Rule of Conscience is the light with which the mind at that present is endued or to speak after the Schoolmen Ultimum judicium Intellectus practici The last judgment of the practical understanding Thirdly that the written word of God is indeed the supreme and primary 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 but not the Adaequate Rule of Conscience * 4. Fourthly that the proper and Adaequate Rule of Conscience is the will of God which way soever it be revealed or which is the same again the Law imposed by God upon the reasonable Creature Moreover that more fully and more distinctly we may understand what this will of God is I made manifest unto you that Almighty God did lay open his Will unto mankind by a threefold means First by the Law of Nature which consisteth of certain practical Principles known by themselves which is called the Law of God written in our hearts Rom. 2. 15. Which is with an inward light and of the same oâ—iginal as our minds Secondly by the written word of God which is contained in both the volumes of the holy Writ and is an external light supernaturally revealed and infused into our minds Thirdly by a knowledge obtained from both the former either by our own meditation or from the Instruction and Institution of others and this as it were by an acquired light the chief helps and introductions whereunto are the Discourse of Reason and the Authority that is to say the Judgment and the practice of the universal Church II. I also did advertise you to make some way to this following Treatise that besides the Law of God which absolutely by its self and by its own peculiar power doth oblige the Consciences of all men and that in the highest Degree there are also many others which do carry an obligation with them but inferiour to the former and do oblige the Conscience not primarily and by themselves but secondarily and by consequence not absolutely but relatively not by its own power but by the vertue of some divine precept or Institution on which they
sincerely and openly but with all due reverence to present their just grievances to their Prince and faithfully to lay before him with what present remedies they may cure those evils that oppress them and humbly to beseech him that he would be pleased to condescend to the petions of his Subjects as he shall judge it to be most safe and advantagious to the Commonwealth and confirm the grant of them with his Royal hand And if he being thus petitioned to shall refuse they are to desist for that time from their purposes and to be content with their present affairs and Laws and that without all murmuring or the least sign of force until their Prince being throughly perswaded by his Council and Intreaties of some friends or induced by the arguments of Reasons shall renounce that pertinaciousnesse of his Spirit and give an open Ear to the desires of his Subjects XV. The Fifth Doubt Seeing that the Common good is not only the End of the Laws but of the whole politick Government Is it lawful out of any foresight or pretence of the Common good to change the present form of Government or to attempt the change thereof and how far and to whom is it lawful For Examples sake Is it lawful for the people to change a Monarchical Government into an Aristocratical or into a Democratical or on the contrary A Question of great difficulty concernment especially in these times manners in which we live For my part I will faithfully represent unto you what I think of it and will leave unto every man the liberty to think what he pleaseth I suppose only what is already granted by many and what cannot easily be denye dviz that a Monarchy by Inheritance or a successive Kingdom is absolutely the best amongst all the forms of Common-wealth and highly to be preferred above the other two This being granted I think in the first place that the people if they please may change a Democratical into an Aristocratical or into an Monarchical Government First because it seemeth to be a change for the better moreover in Democracy the chief Command is in the Power of the people so that they may determine of themselves as they themselves please provided that no Injury be done to any man Now it is most certain that by this Change no Injury is done by the people unto any one It cannot be to any other for no Injury can be done to any man in any thing to which he hath no Right neither can any Injury be done herein to themselves who of their own accord do make this Change for no Injury can be ever done to a willing Person 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 I think in the second place that for all these reasons the Peers of a Land also may turn their Aristocratical Government Arist 5. into a Monarchical one For it is a change into the better Ethic. 〈◊〉 and by so doing no injury is done to any man But I cannot so easily resolve you this doubt whether it be as lawful for them to convert an Aristocracy into a Democracy for although they have power to do it and it may be done by them without any injury yet it seems not to be a Commutation into a better State Thirdly I believe that the Monarchy of an elective Kingdom may be changed peradventure into any form of Government but especially into an hereditary and a successive Kingdom and that for almost the same Reasons above alleged nevertheless this ought not to be done unlesse the Kingdom by the death of him that last Reigned be vacant for otherwise it would be an injury to the present King And Secondly it ought not to be done unlesse by the joynt consent of the Peers of the Kingdom and People and of those persons who have the right of electing I think fourthly that a Monarchy by inheritance cannot lawfully be changed into an Elective Kingdom or into any other form of Government either by the people alone or by the joynt consent of People Peers and King which is the whole people in their greatest latitude unlesse peradventure there shall be such a defect in the Royal Progeny that there is not one of them remaining to challenge the Kingdom due by inheritance to him The Reasons of this opinion are First Because according to our former supposition it were a change from a better to a worse Secondly Because by reason of that exchange an apparent injury would be done to the lawful Heir Thirdly Because that not only the Exchange but because such a desire and indeavour doth seem to be quite contrary to the words of Salomon Prov. 24. 21. My Son fear God and the King and have nothing to do with them who affect new things What before I said I must in this place again repeat viz. I do not urge this as too confidently to affirm it or to cause a disputation with any man in the proof of this particular if he be of another judgment XVI The sixth doubt How may that be understood which so commonly is spoken Salus pâ—puli est suprema Lex The safety of the People is the supreme Law The reason of the doubt doth proceed from that which we propounded and proved in the beginning viz. That the End of Laws is the publick good From hence on one side it seems to follow that the safety of the Common-wealth doth depend on the strict observance of the Laws and on the other side that all observancy of the Laws ought to give place to the safety of the Commonwealth And from hence some who within these few years have brought a new Divinity and a new policy into the Church and Common-wealth have no lesse confidently than perversely collected and suggested that the Liberty which they call the Right of the Subjects for so they interpret the Safety of the People is to be preferred above the prerogatives of Kings or the enacting or establishing of Laws and therefore all Regal Power and Authority of the Laws is to stoop unto it For the resolution of this doubt you are to know that all the deceit almost on this vulgar Axiom doth arise from the Equivocation which lyeth hid in the Terms especially in that word People For the people being a kind of a Metaphorical Body may be taken two wayes as the word Body may it self Collectively as it signifies the whole Commonalty of the Republick that is both King and Subjects and Discretively as it signifies the Subjects precisely by themselves and severed from the King As when we say the King and the people So in the word Body sometimes the other Members are to be understood with the Head as when we say the Soul and the Body And sometimes the Members only are precisely to be understood the Head to be taken by its self as when we say the Head and the Body XVII First therefore I say that most precisely and by a very evil Counsel that is wrested