merits of the cause nor comes to dispute that which was most material in the Controversy I wonder why he shoâ—ld lay so much stress upon Children and Foolâ— and debaucht Persons to make their aâ—sent or dissent so availeable one way or other I am no friend to Dogmatizing yet I humbly conceive that no one has any just reason to think the worsâ— of any Opinion merely because such Persons do not assent unto it Neither do they who plead for this general consent make it so universal as to include every particular Pa. 24. § 20. I desire these Men to say whether by Education and Custom these Notions can or cannot be blurr'd and blotted out Since he is so Positive in his demand why may not we be aâ— positive in our answer and say that they can And what then Why then truly he drops that part of the disjunction and only says If they may suffer â—ariation by adventitioâ—â— Notions which is a very gentle way of blotting out but what then follows Why then we must find â—â—em cleâ—rest and most perspicuous nearest the Fountainâ— in Children c. We must he says but he never yet prov'd the necesâ—ity of that consequence And then as for Illiterate Persons if he mean plain honest illiâ—â—â—atâ—â— Heathens such as are less Learned â—â—t less corrupted by â—â—lse Principles and wicked Practises I doubt not but these Notions will appear clearer in such But however we still remain in the full and undisturb'd possession of that side of the disjunction that these notions may by bad Custom and Education be blotted out which ground thus gain'd will be of great disadvaâ—tage to his cause As for what he says Pa. 18. of the wicked Practices and Atheistical Opinions of some Heathen Nations some think that his Authors were not so exact in their observations as they might have been but suppose they were it makes nothing to the advantage of his cause unless he had prov'd before that these Notions cannot be blotted out of the minds of Men. Neither will it follow hence that they are of no use to Mankind if they may be thus defac'd For 1 st It may be in some measure oweing to these that all the Nations of the Heathen World are not sunk lower into wickedness than indeed they are 2 dly 'T is probable these Innate Notions will be instrumental in the Conviction and Conversion of these People when God in the wisdom of his Providence shall think â—it to do it and I doubt not but the Apostles in their Preaching did appeal to these and make use of 'em for this pâ—rpose Rom. 2. 14 15. Pa. 21. § 14. Here speaking of these Moral Rules he is very urgent with us â—o tell which they are if he means that we should give the exact determinate number of 'em I think this is a very unreasonable demand however I shall at present instanâ—e in those whichâ— Mr. Nye mention◠〈…〉 f His naturall Religion 1 st A tenderness for and care of our Children 2 d. A commiseration of the oppressions and wants of such as are distressed and not by their own fault but thro' mishap or the iniquity of others 3 d. A propensity to favour worthy Persons and actions And here I would only give him this caution that in his reply he do not draw his Answer and Arguments from Children and Fools for such Evidence will be excepted against nor from such as by Vicious customes have blotted these notions out of their minds for no one thinks the worse of the Belief of a God because the whole Club of professed Athests denys it Here give me leave to add one thing further tho' out of its proper place as for those that assert these innate notions I know noâ— how they can well otherwise express it than by saying that the Soul upon occasion exerts 'em and as for that other wâ—y of exerting themselves if it wanted any defence I have very good authority for it Mr. Locâ— P. 13. of his Essay § 27. 'T is â— great presumption that these geâ—erall maâ—imes are not innate since they are lâ—ast known to thoâ—â— in whom if they were â—nnate they must neâ—ds 〈◊〉 theâ—selves with most force and vigour That there is a reall and unalterable distinction betwixt good and evill is a very great and important truth and such as ought to be fixt upon the best and surest foundations but I cannoâ— think Mr. Becconsalls Argument pa. 194. so â—ogâ—nt as the nature of the thing requires Moral good he says always inâ—ludes a nâ—turall good and naturall good is evidâ—ntly establish'd in the frame of created naturâ—â— and consequently if the frame of nature be unalterable mâ—ral good must be sâ— too Here if by moral good always including a naturall good he meâ—nes that moral good is always attended with some râ—al advantage naturally accruing from the practice of it this I grant is generally true but then may we not say here as he says of pleasure pa. 188. In respect of Natural good that it seemes to be a consequencâ— â—ather then a measure and constituent principle of morall good so thiâ— naâ—â—râ—l good which he says iâ— always included in morall good seemes to be the consequence rather then the measure and constituent principle of moral good But then if he makes moral good only a part of as indeed he seems to make it the same with naturall good only distinguish'd by the accession of a free choice pa. 186. and so included in the frame of created nature this will only prove that moral good is what God at first Creation made it and so not in the highest Sense eternal and immutâ—ble as depending merely upon Gods free and Arbitrary will and positive determination and thus this Learned Author will fall in with P. Poiretts opinion in this particular vide former discourse of humane nature pa. 95. Whereas I am willing to carry the reasons of good and evill higher founding them in that relation they bear to the essential wisdom purity and holiness of the Divinâ— nature which relation is in some measure made known to us by those native notices and naturall impressions upon the minds of Men. And whereas he tells us pa. 192. That the proper measures of morall good muâ—t be taken from the original frame ends and intrests of our beings I am afraid that all these in respect to each individual and abstracted from all Law to direct us would be found so variable and uncertain that morall good would upon this hypothesis prove a much more unfixt and unsettled thing then God and Nature ever made it vide pa. 72. Of humane Nature So that I humbly conceive it would not be a sufficient asserting the eternall and immutable nature of moral good to say that it is as immutable as the frame of created nature for we know that this has in some particular instances been changed and may be so againe but the reasons of good and evill never were never can be
Candidates for happiness with a mere natural Pagan who never knew any other Religion I think he cannot reasonably expect it because one who has been throughly preswaded of the truth of Christianity cannot possibly be so fully afterwards convinced of the contrary but that in all probability he will live in a state of self condemnation all his life after unless he fall into such a continued course of debauchery as to Sin away all sâ—nse even of naturall Religion it self And the Sin of Apostacy from the Christian Religion will be such a dead weight upon his Conscience as will necessarily sink him below the condition of an honest Heathen for I believe even such an one may dye with better hopes of future happiness than a Renegado Christian. Here I shall further shew the unreasonableness and imprudence of Deisme 1. DEISME gives no tolerable accounâ— of one of the most considerable Phaenomena's in the World Viz. Of that speedy and general reception of the Christian Religion in the World the whole thing according to the Deist's principles being a mere nullity Here I might insist upon that which is urg'd herein 1 st The contrariety that the Doctrine of Christianity bore to the Vicious principles and practisâ—s of the World 2. The great opposition it met withall from all sides and yet its prevailing against and conquering all difficulties without any outward visible assistance 3 ly The first Promulgers of it were wise and honest Men they were too Learned to be impos'd upon themselves and too honest to deceive others 4 th Neither could there be any thing of interest in the case seeing they engaged in a cause wherein they could not have any prospect of advantage to themselves these things I only mention being more fully prosecuted by others 2. Deisme requires more evidence â—or things than they are capable of or more than the nature of things will admit Now we have as great assurance of the truth of Christianity as we can have of any thing of that nature and as much as we possibly could have supposing the thing to be absolutely true If we require more than this we then run into Scepticisme the greatest folly in the World next to Atheisme 3. Deisme is unreasonable because it pretends to be certain of that which no Man can be certain of viz. That Christiaâ—ity is false something that has been either falsly imposed upon the World or what â—he World has foolishly imposed upon it self this the Deist must be certain of otherwise it is the most imprudent thing imaginable because of that foolish choice he makes and the infinite hazard he runs thereby So that let the gâ—niâ—s of Christianity be as milde and charitable as we can suppose it yet I know not that it has any where declared Pardon for Apostates and it is no ways contrary to the Laws either of God or Man to proceed against those who have renounced their allegiance rathâ—r like Rebells and Traitors than fair Enemies I have hitherto examin'd this Answer to the first part of the Objection mentioned pa. 203. I shall now proceed to the Inference as he calls it pa. 204. That tho' a supernatural Religion be dubious yet it is the safest way to embrace it We do not grant Supernatural Religion to be in the least dubious therefore the consequence is good and well grounded that it is more reasonable in it self and more safe for us to embrace it This methinks is no hard matter to prove one might rather wonder how in a Christian state we should be put upon the proof of such a thing as this For first to imbrace or comply with such a Religion as Christianity is no violation of any command or duty of natural Religion it self for the utmost efforts that Deisme hitherto has or perhaps can make are only some little difficulties it urges against the Old or New Testament not any positive arguments to prove the falsâ—ty of either nay I am apt to believe that even natural Religion seriously and impartially considered and followed would by easy steps lead a Man to the imbraceing of the Christian 2. Christianity and natural Religion have the same generall end and designe to promote the honour of God and the good of Men by Temperance Righteousness and Holiness and then as to the additions contained in the revealed Religion they are not any vicious mixtures or adulterations of the natural but rather improvements of it to higher degrees of excellency and perfection Christianity doth not propound any less noble end nor makes use of any less effectual meanes than natural Religion doth but rather advances and improves both So that if it be possible to be safe in the natural it is much more so in the revealed Religion Christianity has all the advantages of natural Religion and many more Then as to the difficulties that are pretended to accompany the practise of the Christian Religion Viz. A more profound mortification of our lusts and passions aâ—d a more exalted degree of holiness and piety this certainly is rather an argument of its excellence than any diminution of it especially considering the great assistances that the reveald Religion affords us to performe that Obedience which it requires of us and the greatness of the reward that attends the practise of it So that if reveal'd Religion be false it can no ways prejudice the designs of the Natural but if it be true as certainly it is then the mere belief of a Natural Religion will be of fatal consequence to those who have enjoy'd the glad tidings of the Gospel But then Pa. 204. he says I cannot imbrace what comes not within the compass of my knowledge But in Order to our embraceing of a thing it is not necessary that it should so come within the compasâ— of our knowledge as that we should fully comprehend all the Modes and circumstances of it thus we may embrace the Misterys of our faith tho' they do not thus come within the compass of our knowledge and if we must bâ—lieve nothing but what we thus comprehend as to the Modes and manner of the thing then we must in obedience to this principle reject the principal Articles even of Natural Religion also But he proceeds And if I cannot believe 't is a sign the Evidence is not strong enough to make me But our not believing is not always a signe that the Evidence is too weak but that our passions and prejudices are too strong Evidences in matters of Religion do not work as Mathematical ones doe not force assent but suppose some previous dispositions of the Subject upon which their efficacy many times depends 'T is sufficient if the evidence be such as may convince a rational and prudent Person if Men will be perverse and and Sceptical I know no remedy but they must remain so still pertinaciae remedium non posuit Deus not in the common and ordinary Methods of his Providence He proceeds next to answer two Arguments
God takes in this particular I shall only take notice further of one period of his upon this Subject wherein he shows a great deal of wavering and uncertainty in his Notion pa. 209. Cum igitur deus possit per se omnia mentibus patefacere volenâ—â— simpliciter ut videant id quod est inter ipâ—os seu in medio ipsorum hoc est id quod in ipso est quod relationem habet ad illas res quodque illas representat versimile non est c. 1. He is not here willing to call these things Ideas but express 'em but by another large Periphrasis 2. He knows not where to place 'em whether in God or in our selves But to proceed The Second Reason he gives is because this Hypothesis places the minds of Men in the greatest dependâ—nce upon God imaginablâ— because thus we can see nothing but what Goâ— wills that we should see and nothing but what God exhibits to us to be seen We ought not indeed to entertain any Opinion that may lessen our just dependanâ—â— upon God but is it any ways inconsistenâ— with our Christian dâ—pendance to be fâ—llow workers togâ—thâ—r with God in the ways of his own Appointmâ—nt May wâ— not make use of second causes by the assistance of his Power and in Obediâ—nce to his Will and after all depend upon God for a Blessing and all this without any violation of ouâ— dependance upon him But â—e saysâ— our Minds cannot suâ—siâ—ienâ—lâ— depend upon God in all their Operations iâ— tâ—ey are supposâ—d to have all things which we distinctly perceive â—o be necessary to Action or iâ— thâ—y hâ—ve the Iâ—eaâ— of all things present to â—hem â—ut must we have all things nâ—câ—ssary for Action if we have the Ideas of all things prâ—sent to us Is there nothing further râ—quir'd for Action but only thesâ— Doâ—s not the Soul depend upon God as to its presâ—rvation in all 〈◊〉 Actions And is there not requir'd in the 〈◊〉 the fâ—ee determination of it self though 〈◊〉 other requisites besides do concur Withâ—â—t this I know not how the liberty of the 〈◊〉 can be secur'd 3. He further argues from the manner of â—â—d Mind perceiving all things for we all 〈◊〉 by certain experience that when we are â—inded to think upon any particular thing 〈◊〉 first cast our Eyes about upon all Beings 〈◊〉 then at last fix upon the Object which we â—â—tended to think upon but perhaps all 〈◊〉 do not â—ind by experience that this is 〈◊〉 way and method they take in their reâ—â—ective Meditations I rather think that when Men intend to fix their thoughts upon such a particular Object that the previous roving oâ— their Minds is confin'd with in a much narrower compass and is not of such an universal extent But he says 't is past all question that we â—annot desire to see any Object but we must see or know it already though in a more confus'd and general way and the ground of this I suppose is Ignoti nulla cupido or something to that purpose but here I would propound it to Consideration whether Mr. Malbranch though he be a severe Enemy to the Scholastick way yet whether he does not sâ—ffer himself to be too much impos'd upon by that Maxim of theirs before it hâ—â— undergone a just and due Examination But he says all Beings cannot be any other ways present to the mind but because God is present to it who in the simplicity of his being comprehends all things Neither will Gods presentialness with our Minds prove that all Objects are so present to us as to be known by us either distinctly or confusedly unless God be willing to display 'em to us Here it may be further enquir'd whether we may not be said to have a geneâ—al or confus'd knowlâ—dge even of the mysteries of our Religion and of things above the reach and comprehension of human Reason and if so why may we not desire to have a further and clearer sight of 'em now if we should desire to see these things and God be not willing to represent 'em to us tâ—en what becomes of that Union betwixt Man's Will and God's representation of Ideas Pa. 21. Ipse est qui unione naturali quam etiam instituit inter voluntatem hominis representationem idearum ipsis notificat omnia c. But I must confess that I did not think that when Monsieur Malbranch first instituted a philosophical disquisition upon this Subject that he design'd it to extend to things of a divine Nature had he not likewise endeavour'd to reconcile his Opinon to Scripture His last Argument he says may pass for a demonstration with those who are us'd to abstracted Ratiocinations t is this Impossibile est Dâ—um in suis aâ—â—ionibus alium habere sinem principalâ—â— Ã sâ—ipâ—o diversum necessâ—â—giâ—ur est ut cognitio lux quam menti impertitur aliquid nobis patefaciat quod in ipso fit It is impossible that God in any of his Actions should have any principal end different from himself It is necessary thâ—refore that that Knowledge and Light which he bestows upon our mind should open and â—xhibit to us something that is in himself Quiequid enim ex deo veâ—it propter alium fieri non potesi quam propter deum for whatsoever comes from God cannot be for any other besides God These are his words so fâ—r as concerns the present Subjâ—ct but now they are so far from having the force of a Demonstration that they seem not to have the face of a tolerable good Argumâ—nt viz. to prove as he there design'd that we see all things in God for if God in all his Actions has not any principal end differâ—nt from himself all that can necessarily follow from hence is that in this particular Action of his bestowing Light and Knowledge upon our Minds he had no other principal end diffâ—rent fâ—om himself this I â—aâ—ily grant may not God make his own Glory the end of his giving us this natural Light though we do not in his Sence thereby see all things in God Or doth not that Light and Knowledge which God imparts to the Mind discover to us those divine Attributes which are in God and therefore not different from God himself But perhaps it is my unacquaintedness with the abstracted ways of reasoning that renders me uncapable of understanding the force of the Demonstration Mr. Norris speaking upon this Subjâ—ct viz. of seeing and knowing all things in God Pa. 206. Of Reason and Religion says this very Notion Aquinas had once plainly hit upon however he came afterwards to loose it But I do not know that he ever lost that Notion he there hit upon that Opinion which he here asserts being the general opinion of the Schools in this pâ—rticular for says he in express terms Pa. 1. Q. 84. 5. It is necessary to say that the human Soul knows all things in their eternal Reasons by the participiation of which