say rationalitie is the formall cause of man Now 1. Rationalitie is the intrinsecall part of man all other of his parts are more overt and better knowne 2. Rationalitie hath a force to bestow a being vpon man for when God had drawne together the dust of the earth man had not as then his being but he receiued that when God breathed the breath of life into it at that time I say and not before man became a liuing soule 3. Rationalitie bestowes vpon man a being that is actuall and determined vnto one and actiue whereby he is fit to doe the actions of life 4. There is nothing essentiall vnto man but his rationalitie bestowes it on him The body indeed doth make him a singular man by retaining and contracting the soule vnto one but in what respect he is a man that he receiues wholy from his soule and from hence the forme is truely sayd to be the beginning of difference that is hetweene one and another and not the difference it selfe Thom. 1. dist 25. q. 1. art 1. ad 2m. I say the difference of things doth flow from the forme for as vnitie in substance doth make two things to be the same as Okam doth truely teach 1. dist 19. q. 1. lit B. opinio 1a. and Aristotle meta lib. 5. cap. 15. text 20. so difference in substance makes two things to differ The forme is not the difference it selfe for a forme is a subsistence in an vnitie but a difference is a dissenting betweene the essence of two and thus much for the explication of the formall Cause CHAP. X. Of the finall Cause The end is a cause for which the thing is Ramus End By end is meant the last notion which wee haue of the effect and importeth that whereunto the thing tendeth So Aristotle telleth vs meta lib. 2. cap. 1. text 9. An end is Externall Internall In The intent of the doer The thing it selfe naturally Imposed An externall end is the actuall vse of the thing to which the effect is fitted Thus the beatificall vision is mans end to which he tends An end in the intent of the doer is no more but either the fitnes it selfe of the effect thought vpon and purposed by the efficient this is the condition of every workman that deviseth and resolueth vpon the fashion and forme of the thing to be wrought Or the commoditie of the workman and others sought thereby Wee haue example of an end thus vnderstood in those words of Iohn 3.16 God so loued the world c. Where the giving of Christ is an effect wrought by God wherein he intended the glory of himselfe and his sonne and the salvation of the predestinate Thus the workman that makes an axe intends that himselfe shall get reputation and maintenance thereby An end of a thing imposed vpon it is when the efficient inioyned that vse of it which the thing it selfe doth not yeeld and this end we finde in lawes and mony the one is appointed to be a rule of obedience the other to set a price of wares I say appointed by him that hath power to doe it the things themselues doe not yeeld it as all men doe know by experience But the word end in this place doth not signifie either of these foure things The end as it is in the intent and will of the doer is a cause indeed metaphorically not properly and must be reduced vnto the efficient not the finall for in that sort it doth but moue and induâ—â—â—ice principall efficient vnto working and consequently it is an efficient that workes morally That and vnto which the effect tendeth naturally is here vnderstood and defined I haue receiued all these things from Thomas 2. dist q. 1. art 1 2. 3. 1. p. q. 26. art 3. ad 2m. Suarez de praedest lib. 2. cap. 3. no 2. vega in Concil Trident lib. 7. cap. 2. A cause Therfore the end hath an actiue and an exercised act in the producing of the effect for that is the propertie of every cause as hath beene shewed For which a thing is These words set out the nature of that force and they signifie a tendency aptitude and fitnes which the effect hath naturally vnto something without it selfe It is of the nature of a finall cause sayth Okam actually to intend and whatsoeuer doth not so is not truly and properly a finall cause in Prologo 1. sent q. 11. lit F.G. In the same sort writes Aristotle meta lib. 2. cap. 1. text 8. An end sayth he is that for which a thing is made that is whose essence is not so for another that it followes that other but the essence of another followes that If any inquire how tendency c. can haue an actuall exercise vnto doing First I answer it can because that tendency flowes from the forme in as much as the forme doth determine the effect vnto an end according to its owne proportion as the forme of steele is such as best fitteth with cutting Thomas 1a. 2 e. q. 95 art 3. in cor Secondly the end importeth some good so saith Thomas 1. p. q 19. art 1 ad 1 and all men grant it therfore it hath an exercised force to constitute but herein it differs from the form that doth constitute good no more this doth both constitute and diffuse good It doth constitute in as much as it is the perfection of the effect I say the perfection of it because when the effect hath attained thi her it wanteth nothing requisite to a thing of that kind It is diffusiuely good in as much as it is fit and apt to bestow good vpon others Wee haue many examples that shew vs the nature of this argument Fitnes to rule the day and night is attributed to the Sunne and Moone Genesis 1.14 As a thing that followed their nature by creation thus also fitnes to accompany and help Adam is affirmed of Evah Genesis 2.18.21 as the end of her creation Man is apt and fit to loue the knowne good and that is his end this fitnes floweth from his reasonable soule or formall being whose propertie it is to judge truly and choose freely Now this fitnes hath a maine stroake in the constituting of man not by the way of motion for that belongs to the efficient nor by the way of reception and retention for that belongs to the matter but by the way of setled position as the forme doth from whence it floweth 2. By this fitnes a man is made a perfit and compleat humane creature for when he attaines vnto that he wants nothing requisite vnto his being Vntill he be so fitted we cannot conceiue him a humane creature for he would differ nothing from bruit beasts The vse of this argument is of exceeding worth to informe our vnderstandings in the knowledge of the subiect for by it we know the formall cause and consequently the nature of the thing To conclude the doctrine of all the causes ioyntly
terms of Aristotle and Thomas be more significant and fit I thinke it best to follow them Of the essence By these words are set out such arguments as be essentiall vnto the thing of which they are predicated now all the causes be of this kinde for as much as the effect is constituted by all the causes as Thomas hath taught vs in 2. dist 27. q. 1. art 2. ad 9m. he saith the effect is constituted by all the causes that is each one in its kind and maner of working for all of them doe concur and bestow their force vnto the procuring of the thing to be These arguments be all comprehended in the 9. place of arguments viz. To doe CHAP. V. The Definition of a Cause A Cause is that by force whereof Ramus a thing is THis argument which we call a Cause is sometimes taken for every thing wherevpon another followes and so saith Okam 1. dist 1. q. 3. lit N. wherefore as the same Okam sayth 1. dist 41. lit F. A Cause is taken two wayes Sometimes for every thing that hath another thing as an effect thereof and sometime also for a proposition whereof another doth follow thus farre Okam A Cause in this place is taken not so largely as in Okamâ— first and third senses but in the second A Cause in this notion is also taken for the thing it selfe which doth cause and sometimes also for the nature of Causing or for the thing as it doth exercise Causallitie in act or for the relation of Causing A Cause is taken in the second sense in this definition wherefore A Cause is that of which the effect even by it selfe dependeth Thus farre the Iesuites in their Preface vnto Porphyrte By this it is manifest that Ramus and Aristotle doe fully agree in the defining of a Cause and in the explication of that definition therefore we need not say more for the opening thereof a few examples wil make it easily vnderstood but we may not doe that in this place least we be forced to repeate the same thing againe when we come to the particulars CHAP. VI. The Distribution of a Cause There be foureCauses Ramus the Efficient and Matter Forme and End THere is an vniversall agreement in this precept also Aristotle makes them these foure as wee may finde in the 11. chapter of the second booke of his Postertorums his words be these There be 4. Causes 1. That which sheweth what a thing is 2. That which must be when the thing is 3. That which moueth first 4. That for which a thing is He hath the same thing in the fift booke of his Metaphysicks and 23 chapter Thomas doth follow him and doth teach the same things in 1a. 2 a. q. 72. art 3. in cor and no man thinks otherwise therefore I will descend to vnfold the nature of the particulars CHAP. VII Of the Efficient Cause The Efficient Cause is that Ramus from which the thing is Efficient This word imports no more but to doe or to bring to passe and therefore it signifieth the office of all the Causes and consequently it seemes not fit to be given vnto any one Cause distinctly yet notwithstanding we must know that there is good reason thus to call it else the learned of all ages would not haue giuen it that name yea the very nature of it deserues we should call it so as we shall see in the next passage From which These words doe set out the nature or office of that Cause which is called Efficient and signifie the originall or fountaine from whence the effect doth receiue tts being I say the effect and I meane the whole effect for this Cause doth ioyne together all the other Causes whereof the effect is compounded as namely it bestoweth the forme vpon the matter and doth destinate the matter formed vnto the producing of something that is good and therefore it deserues well to be called Efficient The forme doth make the effect to be of this or that kinde the matter formed doth make the effect to be this or that individuall thing the end makes it fit for this or that good but the motion and efficacy of the efficient Cause onely doth giue being vnto the effect in the event Wee haue many examples of this Cause and the operation thereof we finde one in the second of Genesis the seaventh verse where it is sayd God formed man of the dust of the ground and breathed into him the breath of life and he became a liuing soule In this example the making of man is attributed vnto God therefore God is sayd to be the Efficient Cause of man the office of this efficiency is placed in ioyning the forme vnto the matter he framed him of the dust there is the matter and breathed life into him and thereby the forme is imposed on the matter and then God did destinate him to an end viz. The actions of life thereby he made him a living soule We haue another the like example in the 11. of Genesis the 3. and 4. ver where it is reported that The men of the earth did build a high tower of bricke and slime for a memoriall of their name The men of the earth are made the builders of the tower and thereby they became the efficient cause of the whole worke they take bricke and frame it into a tower therefore they ioyne the matter and forme together they destinate the same vnto an end viz. the continuance of their name on earth And thus much shall suffice to set out the nature of the efficient cause Wee should now divide an efficient cause into the severall kindes but that we cannot for as Ramus truely sayes they are vnknowne vnto vs therefore we will set downe the divers and various manner wherein the efficient cause doth worke for that is well knowne and doth helpe vs much in the vnderstanding of the office of thus Cause The efficient cause doth worke By it selfe By accident A Cause doth then worke by it selfe Ramus when it worketh by force of and according vnto the inbred fitnesse thereof We finde this distinction and the explication thereof in the Schooles of all ages The efficient cause sayth Thomas workes by it selfe or by accident the first is when it moneth by its owne proper vertue The second when something is remoued therefrom or that which remaines is hindred from working 1a. 2â— q. 76. art 1. in cor If wee ioyne Okam vnto Thomas wee shall finde this matter fully opened A Cause by accident sayth Okam 1. dist 2. q. 10. lit B. H. is that which worketh by a thing different from it selfe and a cause which workes by it selfe is that which causeth the effect according to its proper nature and not according to some other thing which outwardly doth befall it The efficient doth worke by it selfe in naturall things when it moues according vnto the instinct and inbred disposition of nature as when the living
it consisteth of things true first immediate better knowne preceding and cause of the conclusion Those are first and true which haue force to argue not from others but of themselues They ought to be true because that which is not cannot be knowne they must be first because they ought to be indemonstrable and consist of their owne proper principles we must not inquire of the principles of Science wherefore they are so but every one of them even by it selfe ought to be worthy of credit The medium must containe the causes of the conclusion seeing we know nothing vnlesse wee vnderstand the causes The medium ought to consist of things preceding the conclusion both in nature and our knowledge therefore the principium of ad monstration is an immediate proposition viz. that hath none before it Poster lib. 1. cap. 4. 6. Top. lib. 1. cap. 1. wherupō demonstrations are made by definitions Poster lib. 1. cap. 33. and they are the principles thereof Poster lib. 2. cap. 3. for a definition can no wayes be proued Poster lib. 2. cap 4.5 6. 7. lib. 1. cap 9. By this whole discourse we haue rules to know what Syllogisine containes a truth simply necessary and we are sent vnto them onely whose third argument comprehends the causes of the conclusion and such causes also as are better knowne vnto vs then the conclusion it selfe Wherefore for further explication hereof Aristotle doth shew vs what causes these be and how they concurre In these words For as much as we doe then know when we vnderstand the causes and these be foure 1. the forme 2. the matter 3. the efficient and 4. the end Then the conclusion hath a necessary truth when one of these causes is taken and placed as a medium in two propositions with that Conclusion And by Causes is meant not onely the causes of those things that are but also of those things that haue beene or shall be hereafter Post lib. 2. cap. 11. 12. Now wee doe fully vnderstand where to finde necessary truth in a Syllogisme Our next labour must be to set out these scientificall Syllogismes by other properties that we may know them the more easily and certainely for that cause Aristotle doth distribute a demonstration after this manner A demonstration is Vniversall Particular Affirmatiue Negatiue Poster lib. 1. cap 24. A demonstration vniversall excells a particular and an affirmatiue is better then a negatiue cap. 24.25 This distribution followes the nature of a Syllogisme for every demonstration is a syllogisme though every syllogisme be not a demonstration Poster lib. 1. cap. 2. and is very vsefull to giue vs knowledge where to finde this necessary truth and the degrees of it To conclude this matter of demonstratiue science he sayth The first figure is fittest for a demonstration yea chiefly proper vnto this science and it is to be sought out onely by that Poster lib. 1. cap. 14. Some perhaps will looke that I should giue instances to open the vse of these precepts and it may seeme the more needfull because some are of opinion that no example can be given answerable to this rule I answer this conceit is very vaine for cannot any of the causes or all of them together serue to proue a sentence that is called into question or cannot the causes be disposed with a question into two propositions Without doubt they may Also it is most certaine that every proposition comprehends a necessary truth wherein the effect is argued by the causes for the effect is no more but a comprehension of all the causes and when the causes doe argue the effect the effect is resolued into the causes therefore when we know the causes we cannot but know the effect And consequently such propositions are necessary and what they are such the conclusion must be that is lawfully inferred from them If there may be premises and conclusion answerable to this rule then no doubt there be examples of it and we may shew them if need were but I will saue that labour for this time for divers reasons 1. Aristotle hath done that alreadie Poster lib. 2. cap. 11. so as he that will may make vse of them 2. This kinde of knowledge cannot easily be discerned seeing it is very hard for vs to vnderstand those principles of a thing that are true first and of the same kinde as Aristotle doth admonish Poster lib. 1. cap. 9. Difficile autem c. 3. By a mans owne practice and obseruation he shall finde them and their vse in naturall things and in them onely for in matters divine and spirituall such arguments can haue no place In them we vnderstand by faith not by sence and faith hath Gods authoritie for the principle thereof not the nature or causes of the things themselues I say a man may finde them by practice because by sence we get memory by the remembring the doing of the same thing often we get experience by our many times remembring our experience is one amongst all these that we doe remember there is one thing wherein mans minde doth rest satisfied aboue many that which is one and the same amongst the rest becomes a principium of science if it belong vnto a thing that is Thus much we learne from Aristotle Poster lib. 2. cap. 19. Exsensu c. The medium of a demonstration whereby wee know that a thing is consists in some of these that follow 1. Of the causes but not the first or immediate 2. Of things mediate and no cause but such as are reciprocated or mutually referred to each other 3. Of a demonstration that shewes what a thing is 4. Of things that are not reciprocated yet it is better knowne and yet no cause 5. Of a superior science as Geometry is to the Opticks and Arithmoticke to musicke 6. Of other sciences whereof one is not placed vnder another as Surgery is vnto Geometry To know that a wound is healed sooner or later belongs to the Surgeon but to know the cause why it is healed sooner or latter belongs to Geometry 7. In a demonstration that sheweth what a thing is sometimes also the medium is placed without the extreames as when we say why doth not the wall breath Wee answer because it is not a living creature and these Syllogismes are alwayes made in the second figure after this sort whatsoeuer doth breath is a living creature But a wall is not a living creature Therefore a wall doth not breath Poster lib. 1. cap. 13. Thus farre goe Aristotles precepts to shew vs what Syllogismes containe necessary truth and the degrees thereof If any expect examples of these last I answer they may be given because we may haue examples of the former as I haue alreadie proved They may be given with more ease then the former because the things contained in them are neerer to our vnderstanding but I will saue that labour least I make my discourse ouer long and the Reader too idle We
beasts doe differ in their proper being and Gods destination for the one is made to perish finally the other to rise againe These Creatures doe differ also in their life or liuelines the life of beasts is no more but as breath that doth vanish at their dissolution Mans life is more for his soule is life being a living continuing and spirituall substance and no doubt but that spirituall substance is informed by a liuelihood differing therefrom though our vnderstandings cannot but ghesse at it 1. because wee finde a secret motion of mans vnderstanding and will in his soule differing from the spirituall substance thereof 2. Because mans soule liues when it is parted from the body It may be some will obiect on this sort If the species containes no more then is in the Genus then the specificall difference is also contained in the Genus but this last is not true therefore the first is vntrue also I answer I grant the assumption vpon Aristotles authoritie and proofe alledged before in the poynt of the Genus But I deny the consequence because it doth suppose that the specificall difference is a reall being constituting the species but that is vtterly vntrue If that were so then it is a cause different from the matter forme and end But the last is not true and this I take as granted therefore the first is vntrue also and consequently the argument is so too that is founded therevpon The specificall difference is a rationall entitie and no more namely our vnderstandings doe apprehend this kinde to differ from another when they are both layd together Now this apprehension is a veritie no fiction for it hath a foundation in the thing namely the specificall forme our vnderstanding doth thus argue This hath one kinde of forme that hath another therefore this doth specifically differ from that And thus the specificall difference doth flow from the forme it is not the specificall forme it selfe Hitherto wee haue shewed what arguments are disposed in this kinde of Distribution and the manner how they are disposed now I will declare that it containes a necessary truth and I may easily doe that for it fully agrees with the rules of necessary truth set downe Chap. 34. as will appeare by laying them herevnto 1. The parts doe belong to the whole even to all of it and at all times there is no animalitie more then is comprehended in the Creatures reasonable and vnreasonable We cannot conceiue a time wherein the Creatures reasonable and vnreasonable are not liuing Creatures and therefore the first Rule agrees with this Distribution 2. The Creatures reasonable and vnreasonable are living Creatures even by themselues and their owne nature there is no third thing that comes betweene their nature and the nature of a living creature that makes the one belong to the other but they are so living creatures by themselues that the one is essentiall to the other therefore this Distribution agrees with the second Rule 3. The Creatures reasonable and vnreasonable even in that thing wherin they are they are living creatures so also even in that nature wherein their being doth consist vniversally they are living Creatures yea and this their nature wherein they are they are the first thing in living creatures we cannot conceiue any thing in the essence of the Creatures reasonable and vnreasonable that exceeds the essence of a living Creature Neither can we imagine in any signe or moment of reason that there is any thing in the essence of a living Creature which hath the prioritie or is before the essence of the creature reasonable and vnreasonable I say before either in nature or time but in the first moment wherein you conceiue a living Creature to be you conceiue a creature either reasonable or vnreasonable Wherevpon animalitie and these creatures are conuertible All living creatures conceived as making one totall summe is no larger in number then the Creatures reasonable and vnreasonable and contrariwise So also we may say If a Creature reasonable or vnreasonable then a living Creature If a living Creature then reasonable or vnreasonable And consequently all the lawes of necessary truth agree vnto this Distribution If any desire to know when a Distribution of this kinde is false let him lay it to these rules and by them he shall know If it agrees not with these rules but comes short in any part then it is false And the more it disagrees from them the lesse truth there is in it Here I will end the distribution of the Genus into the species CHAP. XL. Of the distribution of the whole into the members IN this Chapter we must see what a Distribution of the Integrall into the members is The integrall is distributed into the members when the comprehensiue whole is parted betweene the things comprehended therein I must say of this precept as I did of the last The doctrine and practice of Aristotle and Ramus doth patronize it therefore we may take it for a precept of art though they haue it not in so many words the opening thereof will say it came from them In this Distribution 1. The whole is an individuall 2. That whole is severed into peeces as the timber is by the saw or wedges 3. The parts haue different and individuall natures 4. The whole is made by their meeting together therefore this second kinde of Distribution differs really from the former This one example will make the sence plaine and easie A man hath two parts Soule Bodie This proposition is a simple axiome for one thing is attributed to another I say one because both members viz. soule and body be one in reference to man though they be distinct in themselues 1. Man is the whole divided to wit an individuall man 2. This whole is shared one peice to the bodie another to the soule 3. The body and soule haue distinct individuall natures the one corporeall the other spirituall 4. The meeting of these two parts together doth make man as he is an individuall whole the soule in forming the body and the body being informed by the soule This shall suffice to shew what arguments be in this distribution and the manner how they are framed together This kinde of distribution containes a necessary truth because the lawes of necessary truth agree to it 1. Soule and body are affirmed of all men severally and at all times without exception 2. Bodie and soule are referred vnto a singular man by themselues and their owne essence not by the force of any third 3. The soule and body in what respect they are and in the very essence as they are they are affirmed of a singular man I say affirmed both vniversally according to the totall nature of themselues and according to the essence of a singular man So as the essence of a singular man and the essence of soule and bodie are of equall extent the one is as large and no lesse large then the other so also this
their nature is affirmed of man in the first instant and moment of his being and our apprehension Wherevpon this whole and parts are in their nature convertible Thus wee may say If a man then soule and bodie If soule and bodie then a man These things being so wee may vndoubtedly say this kinde of distribution containes a necessary truth and therewithall put an end vnto this precept in hand To conclude I haue this to say ioyntly of these precepts touching a Definition and Distribution their vse is not knowne to the negligent nor esteemed of the ignorant but he that knowes them and hath found the benefit of them will say they are worth the having for by them a man may know when a Definition and Distribution containe a necessary truth and an artificiall forme and consequently he hath a good guide to lead his reason in the right way vnto true knowledge and the avoyding of error CHAP. XLI Of contingent simple Axiomes THat I may put a finall Conclusion to all the precepts that belong vnto simple Axiomes I must shew what arguments are disposed in them how they are disposed and what truth is contained in such simple Axiomes as are neither definitions nor distributions and touching them we say In a simple axiome every argument may be disposed Ramus except full Comparisons those that consent are disposed affirmatinely and they that dissent negatiuely Full Comparisons are iustly excepted out of simple axiomes because they containe foure termes distinctly layd the one to the other no wayes made one by any Coniunction By arguments is meant single arguments for all the foure causes together and essentiall properties belong not to simple axiomes of this sort they are proper to definitions and distributions We shall finde necessary truth or falshood in all such axiomes as pronounce of a thing either as it is in present being or as it is past I say necessary truth not simply but after a sort because the thing that is or is not that was or was not cannot but be when it is nor but not be when it is not as Aristotle hath truely observed De interpre Cap. 9. Simple axiomes that pronounce of a thing to come containe a certaine truth or falshood in respect of God for he foreknowes all things possible by his simple intelligence and all things that shall be by his intuition or knowledge of vision In respect of mans knowledge none of those Axiomes do containe a certaine truth for vnto man all future things are contingent and consequently mans knowledge of them must needs also be contingent vnto Man I say they are contingent for as much as their next causes whervpon they depend are contingent All humane actions depend vpon mans will as their next cause and mans will is a facultie free and indetermined vnto one and therefore contingent All other things not humane are also contingent because their next cause may be hindered in their execution Man is at Gods dispose and all the other Creatures are at Gods and mans These axiomes may containe a contingent truth in respect of man and that is all he can haue of them And here a finall end for simple axiomes CHAP. XLII Of compound Axiomes in generall COmpound Axiomes come now to be handled their generall nature may be expressed in this proposition A compound axiome is that Ramus the band whereof is a coniunction So Ramus and thus Aristotle A speech compounded of simple Axiomes is made one by a Coniunction de interpre In which words he doth acknowledge 1. Some axiomes are compounded axiomes 2. Such axiomes are compounded of simple Axiomes 3. They are made one by that composition 4. Their parts are tyed together by a Conjunction therefore he delivers the same precept with Ramus and vnfolds the meaning of it Thus farre Aristotle went but never further for any thing that I can finde yet may we not say therefore that his Logick is an imperfect art because it may be all his writings are not come to our hands If that be so then time hath done iniury both to him and vs. I thinke rather he omitted compound axiomes of purpose If he did so he had good reason for it for the precepts of simple axiomes giue light enough to shew vs how to iudge of these for these being compounded of them they must needs be the foundation of these and consequently he that can iudge truely of them cannot be ignorant of these Neither may we accuse Ramus of a superfluitie in art for reason avowes his deed also because these precepts are convenient and make the knowledge and vse of this art more easie 2. Learned men of all ages haue vsed such axiomes as he calls compound therefore he might make the precept of them to be parcell of this art seing vse and experience is the mistris of art The one did well in omitting because he tyed himselfe to exactnes The other did well to bring them in because he regarded precedent custome and future ease We will goe with Ramus alone because we cannot haue Aristotles company Axiome This word doth put vs in minde that these propositions 1. Haue arguments framed in them 2. They are framed in these in a fashion differing from simple axiomes from whence they are called compound 3. They containe truth or falshood for such is the condition of all axiomes whatsoever That This word implyeth that a compound axiome is but one proposition or enuntiation as Aristotle calls it Band This word giues vs to vndestand that in compound axiomes we shall find two distinct things tyed together and in this they ioyne with simple axiomes Coniunction By this word wee know the band of a connext axiome is a coniunction and herein stands a maine and principall difference between simple compound axioms they had a verbe these haue a coniunction to tye their parts together In a simple axiome we found a predicate and subiect in these we finde parts tyed together but no name for them we must seeke for that in the particular axiomes themselues This is another reall difference betweene simple and compound axiomes thus farre for their generall nature This generall is thus divided CHAP. XLIII Of a Copulatiue Axiome A compound Axiome is Congregatiue Copulatine Connexiue Ramus Segregatiue discrete disjunct A Copulatiue is that the coniunction whereof is Copulatiue THis Definition doth send vs to seeke an enuntiatiue sentence whose parts are tyed together by this word And. But a little labour will not finde it yea it seemes vnpossible ever to be found for this word is very vnfit so to tye the parts of a sentence together that thereby one argument should set out another and truth or falshood be pronounced seing it doth neither affirme nor infer nor any wayes serue for those ends It may be his Copulatiue axiomes bee contained in such sentences as these be Christ dyed and rose againe Without shall be dogs and sercerers and murtherers and whoremongers and Idolaters