Selected quad for the lemma: end_n

Word A	Word B	Word C	Word D	Occurrence	Frequency Band	MI	MI Band	Prominent
end_n	action_n	good_a	holy_a	1,345	5	4.7466	4	false

Text snippets containing the quad

ID	Title	Author	Corrected Date of Publication (TCP Date of Publication)	STC	Words	Pages
A18109	A treatise of vse and custome	Casaubon, Meric, 1599-1671.	1638 (1638)	STC 4753; ESTC S107685	65,850	196

A TREATISE OF VSE AND CVSTOME 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 LONDON Printed by I. L. Anno. Dom. M. D.C.XXXVIII Thy word is a lampe unto my feete and a light unto my path 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Arist Mandetur typis hic liber cui titulus est A Treatise of Vse and Custome modò intra 3. Menses proximè sequentes imprimatur Ex aedibus Londin Apri 26. 1638. Sa. Baker A TREATISE OF VSE AND CVSTOME THat man is not made and brought forth into the World to eat and drinke and to take his ease but for some better thing is acknowledged by all men who have any thing left in them of men that is of rationall creatures and have not wholly degenerated into brutes But whether Action or Contemplation bee the thing wherein mans chiefest happinesse in this world doth consist hath beene a question of old and is yet disputed of on both sides To omit the ancient Fathers because our purpose is not to insist long upon this point whose opinion neverthelesse if any desire to know let him read them upon the words of Christ unto Martha Luke x. 41 42. Aristotle and other Philosophers that are for Contemplation goe upon this ground That the neerer every man comes unto God by way of imitation as farre as by nature he is capable of it the more happy he is that God doth enjoy himselfe in the fruition and contemplation of his owne goodnesse infinitnesse eternitie and the like and not in or by any thing externall that he doth cause or produce without himselfe On the other side it is alledged That man naturally is animal politicum that is borne and brought forth into the World not every man for himselfe only but for the good of others also and that it is one of the fundamentall principles of all publike-weales and societies of men that the publicke is alwayes by every man to bee preferred before his owne private whether profit or happinesse Both which opinions may easily bee reconciled if both be acknowledged as I thinke they must of necessitie in their severall respects to be true For certainely if man bee absolutely and barely by himselfe considered as a rationall creature then Contemplation if as naturally sociable having relation to the World as a Citie then Action is his end Action then his end yet even then not action without all manner of Contemplation For as we commonly say of the Sciences that some are speculative and some practicall so is it of contemplation too Some contemplation is meerely speculative and so it is opposed to Action some may be termed though there may seeme to bee some contradiction in the termes active or practicall because it is the ground and foundation of all actions that tend to happinesse For they are not all actions in generall that make men happy but such onely as are good and vertuous Which are such and which are contrarie cannot bee knowne without the knowledge of good and evill Neither is this knowledge in this state of corruption to bee attained unto without much studie and contemplation And this all Divines and Philosophers assent unto that it is not enough that what wee doe bee laudible of it selfe and as the Schoole men speake materially good except wee know it to bee so and doe it upon that ground Then and not till then is our action as it is ours truely good and commendable Hence it is that in the opinion of Aristotle the great wonder of Nature a learned and well grounded Physician though missing of his end is more praise worthy then an ignorant Empiricke that hath good successe because saith hee in his Metaphysickes The one understands what hee doth and goeth upon warrantable grounds though the ignorance of some particular outward circumstance may hinder the good event The other doth hee knoweth not what nor upon what grounds but altogether ventureth upon former experiments Now experience we know is the mistris as of men so of brutes too which though they be irrationall yet are capable of that knowledge that comes by bare experience and cannot therefore be the proper commendation of those creatures which are naturally rationall So that what once a grave Senator Plin. Sec. in Panegyr ad Traja spake of one particular vertue ambitio jactantia effusio quidvis potiùs quàm liberalitas est dicenda cui ratio non constat that that liberalitie that is not grounded upon reason is rather ambition vaine glory profusenesse or any thing else what you will then true liberalitie is as true of any other particular vertue and appliable to vertue in generall to wit That Vertue is not Vertue properly but as it is the frute and effect of true knowledge and sound reason Which also made Aristotle to maintaine in his Ethicks Lib. v. cap. 9. that justa facere was no very hard thing and incidentall unto all men but justum esse that is to doe just actions upon grounds of reason and no otherwise to bee a matter of very great difficultie For which reason also Socrates before him maintained that Truth and Vertue were but one thing And truely in the Scriptures they are often taken for one thing Hence those phrases To doe the Truth To commit a lye and the like To which if it bee opposed that truth and vertue must needs differ as much as the will and the understanding truth being the proper object of the one and vertue of the other it might easily according to the authoritie of Aristotle and other great Philosophers and Schoole men be replied That although the will and the understanding be not all one essentially yet in matter of action they come all to one since that as they maintaine voluntas necessariò determinatur ab intellectu the will of man is wholly ruled and governed by the motions and prescripts of the understanding Whence is that of Aristotle in the same Ethicks lib. vi that 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 that it is not possible that he that is truely wise and prudent should bee naught or vicious And that 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 that no man is evill but through ignorance of that which is most expedient which is there and elsewhere at large discussed by him and prooved as it is to this day maintained by many accute writers But not to engage my selfe into these deepe mysteries of profoundest Phylosophy which may be thought perchance more abstruse then usefull and admit of variety of opinions all that I shall inferre upon these premises which no man I thinke will deny is but this That Truth and Vertue are of such affinitie that without some more then ordinarie insight by vertue of knowledge and contemplation into the one the other cannot bee practised as it should either to afford that inward content and satisfaction to the conscience which is the best reward of a vertuous life in this World or to deserve that commendation from others though this bee least of all to bee stood upon that

leads them into it and makes them insensible of their impietie One thing I am sure of what ever wee thinke of the busines that Turkes and Pagans what advantages soever wee have over them in other respects may sooner hope to bring us in time to their religion by their outward apparant reverence and devotion in duties of religion then we hope ever by all our knowledge to doe good upon them as long as wee continue so prophane I presse it the more that the power of custome which makes us so unsensibly though otherwise I make no question many of us affectionately desiring the conversion of Iewes and Gentiles to passe over all these considerations and to doe still what we have done bee it right or wrong may the better appeare So much being spoken hitherto of the power of custome in matters of religion and having sufficiently as I conceive shewed it here also to bee great wee are now according to the method that wee have followed in the two former parts to proceed to the consideration of the validitie of it according to right and reason and that both in point of doctrine and in point of practise that is in the agendis and the credendis for there is no Religion but hath these two parts of Religion And herein as of my selfe I am very willing to be but short so when I consider the things themselves I doe not see that I shall need to be very long For Religion though it goe beyond Nature and policie very farre yet it is grounded in part upon the same foundations as both Nature and policie are As for example particulars in things naturall must yeeld and conforme to the generall if need bee though it be against their owne particular nature So water to prevent a vacuum and the like A maine ground of policie Salus populi suprema lex esto So in matter of Christianitie too as it is fully both and very elegantly expressed by Saint Chrysostome in these words 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 This is the rule of perfect Christianitie this the utmost bounds or exact definition this the highest top of it to seeke those things that are profitable to the publicke Many things therefore formerly delivered are here applyable But yet to expresse my selfe somewhat more particularly herein also we thus briefly First In those things that are of the very substance of religion and trench upon the principall end of it whether in matter of practise or doctrine custome is not considerable The end as all men know that are wise is the principall thing in all things And to this purpose is Aristotles doctrine in the first of his Ethicks of difference of ends some principall and absolute which in his phrase wee may call 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 some secondarie and subordinat of very good use and moment In the holy Scriptures though a man meete with many changes varieties and alterations according to varietie of times and places yet hee that shall read and observe them with due care and diligence may observe the great things of the Law as one of the Prophets cals them or as it is in the New Testament 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the weightier matters of the Law to be still the same These to understand truely and carefully to practise is true Religion both and happines Secondly In things externall conducing more or lesse so they conduce though but in a lesse degree and not crosse directly to the maine end superiors may yeeld sometimes if they see occasion and inferiors if wise and rationall must alwayes submit unto custome though otherwise of it selfe perchance not so fit and commendable Superiors cannot propose unto themselves a better example to imitate then God himselfe God did indulge many things unto the Iewes which otherwise hee would not have liked because they had beene long used to the superstitions of the Aegyptians So say divers of the Fathers and rightly I thinke and this in God they call properly his 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 or condescention Of Christ and his Apostles something might bee said and hath beene said by others to this purpose But certaine it is that the ancient Fathers of the Primitive Church men Apostolicall and others as it is acknowledged by all men that know any thing of Antiquitie in instituting rites and ceremonies Ecclesiasticall had great respect unto those rites and customes whether sacred or Civill that the first Christians had beene used unto before their conversion unto Christianisme Now if this course bee warrantable where the change is absolute from one Religion to another it must needs bee more plausible and expedient in point of reformation wherein the more we yeeld unto custome in things not so substantiall the more likely wee are to speed in the redresse of more materiall abuses As for inferiors to them properly belong the words of Saint Augustine In iis rebus de quibus nihil statuit scriptura divina mos populi Dei vel instituta majorum pro lege tenenda sunt In those things that are not apparantly contrary to the word of God for private men though otherwise upon grounds never so plausible to oppose their opinion to either custome or authoritie whereby the peace of the Church may bee in danger though it may goe for zeale in this World yet certainely in the world to come and before an higher Iudge it will be found and for such punished I feare either grosse wilfull Ignorance or extreme arrogancie Thirdly In matters of doctrine and truth though every truth bee precious of itselfe and ever to be preferred before any privat ends yet all truth is not alwayes seasonable to be divulged where the error is generall and cannot bee opposed without much scandall As there be customes in matter of action so in matter of opinion too since as hath beene shewed opinions goe by custome as much as any thing Whence it is that in the Ius Orientale you shall find 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 or customes divided into 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 that is customes in point of doctrine and 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 customes in point of discipline or practice that is rites and ceremonies In matter of opinion then the power of custome is in some degree considerable as well as in other things Civilians tell us that Error aliquando jus facit and our common Lawyers also that a Common error by their Law for publicke quiets sake goeth for a Law Finch of Law p. 40. I will not stand to examine upon what ground they speake it because I doe not meane to ground upon them though I could not but take notice of their words by the way Nolite sanctum canibus and keepe thy faith to thy selfe not generally to be understood wee doe not meane but in some cases onely and some other such passages are more to our purpose by farre then any thing that the Law either common or Civill can tell us But the argument is ticklish I leave the rest