can justly say I do him wrong if I neglect it It is therefore no more lawfull for me to disobey the lawfull command of a superiour to prevent thereby the offence of one or a few brethren then it is lawfull for me to do one man wrong to do another man a courtesie withall or then it is lawfull for me to rob the Exchequer to relieve an Hospitall (x) Quis est qui dicat ut habeamus quod demus pauperibus faciamuâ— furta divitibus August â—ont Mendac cap. 7. For answer First if this argument be applied unto our Ceremonies there will be in such application a meer begging of the question for that our Ceremonies were things indifferent the command of them lawfull the practise of them a duty of justice a legall debt is the maine thing in controversy betwixt the conformists and non-conformists and therefore all this should be proved and not barely presupposed as it is But Secondly the fore mentioned rule is to be understood with this limitation caeteris paribus if the termes of the comparison be equall and equall they are not when the minims of justice are put into the ballance with the weightiest duties of charity and so 't is in the present comparison though we suppose our Ceremonies to be indifferent and the practise of them a dutie of justice for of what importance is such practise in comparison of the not scandalizing of our Brother Who that is not extreamly transported with prejudice will think that the commands of the Prelates to weare the surplice to signe children with the signe of the Crosse in Baptisme c. carry any tolerable proportion with those precepts of the Apostle destroy not him with thy meat thy indifferencies for whom Christ died for such things dâ—stroy not the worke of God Rom. 14.15 20. What lawes of any earthly wight whatsoever concerning ceremonies can be more obligatory than the Commands of God touching the externalls of his worship and service and yet it is his will and pleasure that these externals of his worship should be laid aside for the performance of outward works of mercy I will have mercy and nâ—t sacrifice Matth. 12.7 Thus are we to leave our prayers both publique and private to forsake a Sermon for to save the life of our neighbours to quench the firing of his house to helpe his cattle out of the ditch now if the sacred Ordinances of God are to give way unto works of mercy unto the bodies of men surely then much more is the trash of humane inventions to yeild unto a worke of mercy towards the soules of men This answer which I now give was made by Ruthâ—rford in his dispute of scandall unto the Duplies of the Doctors of Aberdeen pa. 50 51 52 53. his discourse there is so satisfactory as that I have thought fit to transcribe what he saies and I hope the reading of it will not be irksome unto the Reader It is true these duties which we owe to others by way of justice are more obligatory then those which we owe only by way of charity caeteris paribus Whâ—n duties of the Law of nature and morall Law are compuned together then indeed the duties which we owe both by the tye of justice and charity are more obligatory then the duties that we owe onely by the tye of charity As for example My Father is in danger before mine eyes to be drowned in one dâ—ep water and before my eyes also my neighbour or friend is in danger of the like kind the two tyes and bands of justice and charity both by the fifth and sixt Commandements are more obligatory hic nunc and do more strictly oblige that I run to succour and preserve the life of my Father than the life of my neighbour fâ—r the obligation to my neighbour is only Charity by the obligation of the sixth Commandement which obligation ceaseth hic nunc at this time when my fathers life is in hazard and thus farre the Doctors argument goeth for strong as School-men Casuists and Divines teach But it is not to a purpose for the Doctors for all offices and duties generally and universally of what ever kind which we owe by may of Justice are not more obligatory than duties which we owe only by way of charity as when duties of a positive commandement of God enjoined by our superiours and duties which we owe by charity only are compared to ether thâ—n the Doctors Major proposition is not cleare of it selfe as they dreame neither do Casuists or Amesius or Divines say with them but truth and all our Divines say against them Let us suppose that the King and Convocation and Assembly of Priests and Prophets of Israel make a Canon according to Gods word That no manner of man presume to eat shew-bread save the Priests only All men owe obedience to this both because it is Gods expresse Law and by the band of Justice the Eldâ—rs and assembly of the Ancients have forbidden it But if our Doctors argument stand strong David at the point and hazard of famishing for hunger sinned in eating shew-bread yet Christ acquitteth him of all sinne and saith Matth. 12.5 he and his followers are 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 blamelesse Now David was under a duty by mercy and love to his own life and the lives of his followers to eat shew bread and he was under the band of Justice by the Law of the Ancients of Israel and Gods law not to eat Therefore in some cases when our superiours commandements are only positive Lawes they are not more obligatory than duties of Charity only commanded in the Law of nature I cleare it further thus I see my â—â—ighbour in danger before my eyes of drowning and my father commandeth me to goe and labour or sow his farme in that time while I am to preserve the life of my neighbour in present danger to loose his life in a great water By the Doctors maxime I am under the higher obligatory tie of Justice to obey my father who commandeth a thing both lawfull and necessary by vertue of the higher commandement to wit the first of the second Table than I am obliged by the sixth Commandement and of charity only to give present succour and helpe to my dying neighbour so I must let my neighbour dye in the waters to give a duty of Justice to my father of farre lesse necessity I would not commit my Conscience to such Casuists as are the Doctors of Aberdeen But if the Doctors would see with some new light of reason it is cleare that not only the tye of justice maketh the precept more obligatory but also the weightinâ—sse of the thing commanded yea and if the positive Commandements of the Lord our God who of Justice and Kingly soveraignty hath right to aske obedience of us above all earthly Superiours do yeild and cede as lesse obligatory then commandements of love only that are commanded in the Law of nature
What do our Doctors clatter and fable to us of a right of Justice that mortall Rulers have to command in things indifferent from which the destruction of soules doth arise for these commandements of Rulers Kneele religiously before bread the Vicegerâ—nt image of Christ crucified keepe humane holy dayes Crosse the ayre with your thumb above a baptized infants face at best are but positive Commandements not warranted by Gods word But shall they be more obligatory by a supposed band of Justice that Prelates have over us to command such toyes than this divine Law of God and Nature Rom. 14. For indifferent dayes meates surplice destroy not him for whom Christ dyed All the Casuists and Schoolemen Navarra Sylvester Sanchez Raphael dela Torre Meratius Duvallius Thomas Scotus Bonaâ—entura Suarez Vasquez Greg de valentia Albertus Richardus Biel Corduba Angelus Adrianus Alphonsus Becanus Yea and all the hâ—st of our Divines cry with Scripture that mercy and the precepts of love and of the Law of nature are more obligatory than sacrifice burnt offerings and Gods owne positive Lawes yea and that positive Lawes loose their obligatory power and cease to be lawes when the lawes of nature and necessary dutyes of mercy and love as not to murther our brother not to scandalize standeth in thâ—ir way I might weary the Reader here with citations and be wilder my selfe also but it is a point of Divinity denyed by none at all 3. What we owe of Justice to our Superiours is indeed both a morall debt of obedience and a debt of Justice and law which Rulers may seeke by their place and ex jure as Aristotle saith but this right is limited Rulers have no right to seeke absolute obedience but onely in the Lord not against charity And though the place of Rulers be authoritative yet their commanding power as touching the matter of what they injoyne is only Ministerial and they cannot but in Gods place exact that which is Gods due and seing God himselfe if he should immediatly in his owne person Command he would not urge a positive commandement farre lesse the commandement of light and vaine Ceremonies against and beyond the precept of love not to destroy a soule for whom Christ dyed Ergò Superiours under God who borrow all their light from God cannot have a higher right than God hath 4. The comparison of a man who oweth moneys to a Creditor and oweth moneyes to the poore is close off the way for he is obliged to pay the Creditour first but the case hâ—re is farre otherwise the debt of practising indifferent feathers and straws such as kneeling crossing wearing Surplice is neither like the dept owen to the poore nor to the Creditor For natures Law and Gods word 1. Cor. 10.18.19 maketh the Non-practise non-murthering obedience to God when the practise of indifferent things is a soule stumbling to the weake and the practising is but at ' its best obedience to a positive Law and ought to stoope and goe off the way and disappeare when natures Law murther not doth come in ' its way When the Doctors put Loyalty above Charity they suppose obedience to Commandements commanding scandalizing of soulès to be loyalty to Superiours which is questioned it being treason to the soveraigne of Heaven and Earth to destroy his Image it is taken as loyaltie by our Doctors but not proven to be loyaltie and so a vaine question here whether Loyalty be above Charity or not This dispute of scandall is annexed unto his divine right of Church Government which was published 1646. since that Dr. Sanderson 1656 as I shewed you but now propounds the argument a new with a great deale of triumph but without any considerable reinforcement and withall he takes no notice of Rutherford his answer from whence I gather that he never read it and indeed it is a thing very incident unto the greatest Schollars of that party to censure but never to reade their adversaries Thirdly to say something unto Dr. Sanderson as well as unto the Duplyers I must needs confesse that I am transported with a just admiration that so great a schollar should so extenuate as he doth the guilt of an active scandall for he makes the care of not giving offence to a brother to be a matter but of courtesy he cannot saith he justly say I do him wrong if I neglect it But first the Apostle Paul speakes another language in his account to make brethren to offend is to sin against them to wound their weake consciences and so to sin against Christ 1 Cor. 8.12 Compared with ver 11.13 and Rom. 14.15.20 he resolves that 't is a destroying of a brother for whom Christ died a destroying of the worke of God in him whereupon Divines generally determine that 't is soule-murther Now in wounding the weake conscience of our brother in murthering his immortall soule there is doubtlesse some wrong committed against him not to destroy him for whom Christ dyed c. is more than a matter of meer courtesy unto him Secondly suppose the care of not giving offence be in respect of our brother but debitum charitatis yet in regard of God 't is debitum justitiae a legall debt he may and doth challenge it as due and we do him wrong if we disobey him Our Saviour thundereth a woe against such disobedience Woe to him through whom offences come Luk. 17.1 and in the second verse this woe is aggravated by comparison with a very grievous punishment it were better for him that a Mill-stone were hanged about his neck and he cast into the sea then that he should offend one of these little ones But to proceed unto the second comparison on which I insisted out of Bishop Morton and Dr Sanderson a Comparison betwixt a scandall given to a Magistrate and a scandall given to one who is only a brother I demand whether or no the offence given to or taken by a Magistrate who is a brother and withall a Magistrate be not greater than that which is given to or taken by one who is only a brother an impartiall Judg will soone determine that the double relation of brother and Magistrate weigheth down the single and naked relation of a brother c. ut suprà For answer unto this distinguish we of a two 〈◊〉 acception of scandall Primary and Secundary First Primary and so t is an occasioning culpably the fall of another into sin Secondly Secundary and so 't is only the angring vexing displeasing of another This distinction premised the comparison may be understood either of the scandall of a Magistrate in a secundary acception with a scandall of one who is onely a brother in a secundary acception of the word too or else of the scandall of a Magistrate in a secundary acception with the scandall of a brother in a primary acception or 3. of the scandall of a Magistrate in a primary acception with the scandall of a brother in a primary acception also
can be omitted but cannot be committed without sinne But now on the contrary to come to a second Conclusion if either the action be in its nature necessary Second Conciusion or the person entertaining this misprision thereof be justly enjoined performance of it by some superiour power that can herein lawfully challenge obedience from him by a law not meâ—rly pâ—nall and so the action too though indifferent for its nature be yet in its use and unto him become necessary Why then this misperswasion of its unlawfullnesse cannot bind to abstaine from it for so it should oblige unto either omission of a necessary duty or else disobedience unto lawfull authority both great sinnes And nâ—lla est obligatio ad illicita There is no obligation unto things unlawfull can lye upon us For first obligation is onely to that which is a morall good now nothing unlawfull can be a morall good and therefore an erroneous Conscience cannot oblige unto it Secondly no command of an inferiour power can oblige if it be contrary to the command of a superiour power But if an erroneous Conscience should bind unto things unlawfull it should oblige against the commandement of God whose Vicerâ—y Conscience is Indeed Conscience is the next rule of voluntary actions But First it is a well informed conscience that ought to be this rule the will is not bound to follow a blind guide for then being of it selfe coeca potentia it must needs fall into the ditch And secondly conscience is but a subordinate rule unto the Law and Word of God and therefore its power to oblige is derived there from it obligeth not therefore but by vertue of some command of Gods Law or word and Gods Law cannot command things unlawfull for then it should clash with it selfe f Diversimodè amen ligat Conscientia recta eâ—ronea rectâ— simpliciter ligat per se erronea auteâ—â— secundum quid peraccidens Dico autem rectam ligare fimpliciter quia ligat absolutè in omnem eventum Sienim aliquis conscientiam habet de vitando adulterio istam conscientiam sine peccato non potest deponere quia in hoc ipso quòd eam deponeret errando graviter peccaret Eâ— autem manente non potest praeteriri in a ctu sine peccato Unde absolute ligat in omnem eventuâ— sed conscientia erronea non ligat nisi secundum qâ—id sub conditione Iâ—le enim cui dictat conscientia quod tenetur fornicari non est obligatus ut fornicationem sine peccato dimitâ—ere non possiâ— nisi sub hac conditione si talis conscientia duret Haec autem conscientia removeri potest absque peccato undè talis conscientia non obligat in omnem eventum Potest enim aliquid contingere scilicet Depositio conscientiae quo contingente aliquis ulteriùs non ligatur Quod autem sub conditione tantum est secundum quid esse dicitur Dico etiam quod conscientia recta per se ligatâ— erronea vero per accidens Quod ex hoc pateâ— qui enim vult vel amat unum propter alterum illud quidem propter quod amat reliquum per se amat quod verò propter aliud quasi per aceidens sicut qui vinum amat propter dulce amat dulce perse vinum autem per accidens Ille autem qui conscientiam erroneam haber credens esse rectam alià s non erraret nisi inhaereret conscientiae erroneae propter rectitudinem quam in ea credit esse inhaeret quidem per se loquendo rectae conscientiae sed erroneae quasi per accidensâ—in quantum hanc conscientiam quam credit esse rectam contingit esse erroneam Et exinde est quod per se loquendo ligatur à conscientiâ rectâ per accidens vero ab erroneâ Capreol Ex Aquinate Lib. 2. sent Dist 39. Quest 1. Ar. 1. Nemo potest obligari ad malum sub rationem mali sed benè ad malum quod invincibiliter judicatur esse bonum quod proponitur sub ratione boni Nec conscientia obligat contra legem Dei per se formaliter sed solum per accidens materialiter Becanus Sum Theol Scholast T. 2. Tract 1. chap. 4 Q. 7. Capreolus Becanus Raynaudus with many others resolve that however a right and well informed Conscience onely binds unto a thing per se formaliter in omnem eventum yet an erroneous conscience denominated such from an invincible and involuntary errour may oblige unto a thing materially per accidens sub conditione and secundum quid It obligeth per accidens as it is apprehended and believed to be right and well informed so that an erroneous Conscience is adhered unto for the rectitude supposed to be in it It obligeth sub conditione upon condition that such errour of Conscience lasteth for it may be removed without sin and when it is removed the obligation ceaseth then that which obligeth conditionally obligeth onely sceundum quid and not absolutely Unto this I have three exceptions First they limit themselves to errour invincible and involuntary which is not imputable or blameworthy This errour may be conceived to be either in matter of fact or in matter of rule Errour in matter of fact as when Jacob mistooke Leah for Rachell as when a poore subject that cannot judge of the titles of primes thinks a usurper to be his lawfull Soveraigne or as when a man takes goods left unto him by his Parents to be truly his own though perhaps a great part of them were gotten by fraud or oppression without any knowledg of his These and the like particulars are all impertinent unto our present purpose and therefore I shall not stay upon the consideration of them Errour in matter of Law right or rule is againe twofold either in regard of law naturall or law positive Now unto all that have actuall use of reason The errour of the law of nature is vincible and voluntary because the law of nature is sufficiently promulgated unto them it is written in their hearts Rom 2.15 And we may say the same of Christians that enjoy the plenary promulgation of the Gospell and are capable of understanding it for the Gospell sufficiently reveales all divine positives so that a rationall man may know them and is bound to know them and Aquinas states it rightly 1.2 dae q. 19. art 6. voluntas concordans rationi erranti circaea quae quis scire tenetur semper est mala If a man erre concerning such things as he may know and is bound to know such an errour is at least indirectè voluntary and sinfull and cannot oblige A Second exception Conscience hath no power to oblige but what it deriveth from God and therefore what it obligeth unto God also obligeth unto and God is the mâ—rall eause and consequently the Authour of whatsoever he obligeth to but he cannot be the morall cause and authour of that which is sinne and
per eas peccata cohibentur Si autem per inflictionem poenarum manifestum sit plura majera peccata sequi tunc poenarum inflictio non continebitur sub justitia Et in hoc casu loquitur (k) August in libâ—o contra epistolam Par menâ—anâ— docet quod ubi schismatis periculum timetut a punitione peccatorum cessandum est August quando scilicet ex excommunicatione aliquorum imminet periculum schismatis tunc enim excommunicationem ferre nâ—n pertinet ad veritatem justitiae The second is concerning brotherly reproofe dicendum quod correptio fraterna ordinatur ad emendationem fratris ideò in tantum computanda est inter spiritualia bona in quantum hoc consequi potest Quod non contingit si ex correptione frater scandalizetur idâ—o si propter scandalum correptio dimittatur nâ—n dimittitur spirituale bonum But to proceed next to the scandall of the wicked by our indifferencies That we are to forbear things indifferent when they scandalize the wicked and malitious Parker in his treatise of the Crosse part 2. pag. 57. proves by many instances when the thing was indifferent doth not our Saviour foregoe his liberty to please the malicious as when he paid tribute lest he should offend them Matth. 17.27 They were malicious at Corinth and seekâ—rs of occasion against Paul that were likely to be offended by his taking of wages there yet the thing being no necessary duty he thinketh it his duty to forbeare his power therein 1 Cor. 9. The Heathens are malicious to take offence when Christians go to Law for their own yet because going to law is not a duty necessary it must be forborne and Christians rather must loose their own then give occasion of scandall to them 1 Cor. 6. v. 6 7. Unto these examples let me adde another quoted by the same authour elsewhere out of Ezra 8.22 I was ashamed saith Ezra to require of the King a band of Souldiers and horsemen to help us against the enemies in the way because we had spok n unto the King saying the hand of our God is upon all them for good that seeke him but his power and his wrath is against all them that forsake him Here for Ezra to have asked of the King of Persia a Heathen a band of souldiers and horsemen for his safe conduct was a thing lawfull and yet he forbore it lest he should scandalize him by begetting in him a suspicion that that was false which he had told him concerning Gods power and justice A second argument is drawn from the relation of an active scandall it is the morall cause of a passive scandall so that he who scandalizeth another partaketh of and is accessary unto the sin of the party scandalized and we are not to partake of or be accessary unto the sins of any 1 Tim. 5.22 We must have no fellowship with unfruitfull works of darknesse in any whomsoever Ephâ—s 5.11 A third argument is fetcht from the effect of an active scandall 't is of a soule destroying nature so a kind of spirituall murther destroy not him with thy meat for whom Christ died Rom. 14.15 for meat destroy not the works of God vers 20. and who should not tremble at the guilt of the murther of any soul whatsoever for there is no soule so wicked but may for ought thou knowest be one of those for whom Christ shed his most divine and precious blood The last argument is taken from the Opposite of scandall Charity and its act beneficence We are to love all even our most malitious and persecuting enemies Matth. 5.44 We are to do good unto all though especially to the houshold of faith Gal. 6.10 We are to exercise patience and meeknesse towards even those that oppose themselves 2 Tim. 2.14 15. And from this it will inevitably follow that we are to scandalize none Here we have usually objected the example of our Saviour who slighted the scandall of the Pharisees Matth. 15.12 13 14. Then came his Disciples and said unto him knowest thou that tho Pharisees were offended after they heard this saying but he answered and said c. let them alone they be blind leaders of the blind c. The objection concernes onely the scandalizing of them in things indifferent and unto it I shall give an answer in the words of Parker part 2. part 57. If this be all the warrant we have not to forbeare in a thing indifferent for the malicious then have we no warrant at all because the scandall there not cared for is when the Pharisees are offended at his abstaining from their washings and his preaching of a true doctrine both of which were necessary duties for him to doe And when he defendeth his healing on sabbaths and his Disciples plucking eares upon this reason they are duties of necessity and charity he plainly insinuateth there is no defence for deeds unnecessary when the malitious are scandalized In a second place I shall alleadge the Objection of the Schoole-men which by Gregory de Valentia is thus urged Tom. 3. disp 3. q. 18. punct 4. Nam qui non ex ignorantiâ aut infirmitate sed ex malitiâ scandalizatur non laborat tali aliquâ necessitate spirituali cui non possit ipse sine ope alterius proximi facile prospicere mutando pravam suam voluntatem Ergo alter non tenetur tunc cum ali quo suo detrimento prospicere Pharisees the wicked that are scandalized out of meere malice and not out of ignorance or weaknesse are not in any such spirituall necessity or danger but that they can easily provide for the safety and indemnity of their soules without the help or assistance of others by changing their depraved will and therefore others are not bound to incurre any detriment for the prevention of their scandall The answer unto this may easily be foreseen for here is nothing but Jesuiticall dictates that are alltogether proofelesse First Pharisees the wicked that are scandalized out of malice are in a greater spirituall necessity and danger then those that are scandalized out of ignorance or weaknesse for they are in the snare of the dâ—vill taken captive by him at his will 2 Tim. 2.16 And therefore Secondly they are more unable to help themselves and prevent their own falling into sin for their hearts are altogether destitute of any gracious habits there is not in them the spirit a renewed principle to make head or resistance against the flesh the sinfull corruption of their natures there is need then of all help possible to keepe them from falling and all will be uneffectuall unlesse God also put in his helping hand Whereas he talkes that 't is an easy matter for a wicked and malitious man to provide against all danger and need of his soule by changing his perverse and naughty will this is a very grosse Pelagian conceite for it ascribes that unto the power of mans corrupt will which can be