Selected quad for the lemma: duty_n
Text snippets containing the quad
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A61830
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Eight cases of conscience occasionally determined by the late Reverend Father in God, Robert Sanderson, Lord Bishop of Lincoln.
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Sanderson, Robert, 1587-1663.
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1674
(1674)
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Wing S598; ESTC R37202
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62,486
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160
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himself a new Obligation contrary thereunto Obligatio prior praejudicat posteriori As in the case of Marriage a precontract with one party avoideth all after-contracts with any other And if a man convey Lands to several persons by deeds of several date the first convâ—yance standeth good and all the rest are void and so in all cases of like nature The Obligatory power thereof that is in Vows Oaths Promises c. is rightly said by some to be a constructive not a destructive power The meaning is that such acts may create a new Obligation where was none before or confirm an old one but it cannot destroy an old one or substitute another contrary thereunto in the placeâ— thereof 7. And the reason of this reason also is yet farther evident for that Quisquis obligatur alteri obligatur When a man is obliged by any act it is also supposed that the obligation is made to some other party to whom also it is supposed some right to accrue by vertue of the said act obligatory and that that other party is by the said act sufficiently vested in that said right of which right he cannot be again devested and deprived by the meer act of him who instated him therein and is obliged to perform it to him unless himself give consent thereunto without the greatest injustice in the World Now God having a perfect right to our obedience by his own obliging Precept both for the not doing hurt to any man and for the doing good to every man upon all fit opportunities and this right also confirmed and ratified by our own obligatory act in a solemn manner before many witnesses at our Baptism when we vowed to keep all God's Commandments it were unreasonable to think that it should be in our power by any after-act of ours to disoblige our selves from both or either of those obligations For then we might by the same reason free our selves from the obligation of that latter Act also suppose an Oath or Vow by another subsequent Oath or Vow and from that again by another and so play fast and loose make Vows and break them in infinitum Evident it is therefore that every vow requiring any thing to be done which is repugnant to any office of Piety Iustice Charity or Mercy which we owe either to God or man is void and bindeth not because it findeth us under the power of a former contrary obligation and hath not it self power sufficient to free or discharge us from the same 8. The general rule thus cleared it remaineth to examine concerning the particular Vow now in question whether it be void upon this account or no It will befound hard I believe to free this Vow from being repugnant to the rules of Iustice but impossible I am sure to reconcile it with the perfect Evangelical Law of Charity and Mercy First Civil and Political Iustice requireth that every man should obey the wholsome Laws of his Countrey and submit himself to be ordered thereby Now put the case which is possible enough that the Daughters Husband should for lack of support from his Father-in-law or otherwise live and die in great want leaving his Wife and many small Children behind him destitute of all means for their necessary sustenance The Law would as I suppose in that case upon complaint of the Parish and for their case send the Daughter and her Children to the Father and compel him to maintain them out of his Estate Which order he ought to obey nor can refuse so to do without the high contempt of publick Authority and manifest violation of the Civil Justice notwithstanding his Vow to the contrary The Law must be obeyed whatsoever becometh of the Vow in that case therefore it is evident the Vow bindeth not 9. But say that should not happen to be the case which yet is more than any man can positively say before-hand the Parent is nevertheless in Moral Iustice bound to provide due maintenance for his Children and Grand-Children if he be able Saint Paul saith that Fathers ought to lay up for the Children True it is he speaketh it but upon the by and by way of Illustration in the handling of another argument very distant from this business but â—hat doth not at all lessen the importance of it such illustrations being ever taken à notiori and from such common notions as are granted and consented unto by all reasonable men The same Apostle having amongst other sins of the Gentiles mentioned disobedience to Parents in one verse in the very next verse mentioneth also want of natural affection in Parents And the disobedience in the Child can no more discharge the Parent from the obligation of that duty he oweth to the Child of affection and maintenance then the unnaturalness of the Parent can the Child from the duty he oweth to the Parent of Honour and Obedience For the several duties that by Gods ordinance are to be performed by persons that stand in mutual relation either to other are not pactional and conditional as are the Leagues and Agreements made between Princes where the breach in one part dissolveth the obligation on the other but are absolute and independent wherein each person is to look to himself and the performance of the duty that lyeth upon him though the other party should fail in the performance of his 10. Something I foresee may be objected in this point concerning the lawfulness of the Parents withdrawing maintenance from the Child either in whole or at least in part in the case of disobedience Which how far forth it may or may not be done as it would be too long to examine so it would be of little avail to the present business For it is one thing to with-hold maintenance from a disobedient Child for the present and to resolve so to continue till he shall see cause to the contrary And another thing to bind himself by Vow or Oath never to allow him any for the future whatsoever should happen Let be granted whatsoever can be supposed pleadable on the Fathers behalf in the present case yet there will still remain two particulars in this Vow not easily to be cleared from being unjust First let the Daughters disobedience deserve all this uttermost of punishment fâ—om the offended Father yet how can it be just that for the Mothers fault the pour inâ—ocent perhaps yet unborn Children should be utterly and irrecoverably excluded from all possibility of relief from their Grandfather Secondly It is if not unjust yet what differeth very little there-from the extremity of rigid Justice that any offender much less a Son or Daughter should for any offence not deserving Death be by a kind of fatal peremptory decree put into an incapacity of receiving relief from such persons as otherwise ought to have relieved the said offender without any reservation either of the case of extreme necessity or of the case of serious repentance 11. However it be for the point of
up to the present Cases there are yet two things more to be done First To shew what the different constructions the highest I mean and the lowest the words of the Engagement are fairly capablâ— of And Secondly to find as well as we can whether of the two is more probably the meaning intended by the Imposers to be declared by the words The words are these I do promise to be true and faithful to the Common-wealth of England as it is now established without King or Lords Wherein there are sundry ambiguities 1. First In the words true and faiâ—hfâ—l by which may be intended either the promise of that Fidelity and Allegiance which was formerly acknowledged to be due to the King c. to be now performed to those that are presently possessed of the Supream Power as their right and due Or else that promise of such a kind of fidelity as Captives taken in the War promise to their Enemies when they fall under their power viz. to remain true Prisoners of War and so long as they are in their power not to attempt any thing to their destruction 2. Secondly In the word Common-wealth by which may either be meant those persons who are the prevalent party in this Kingdom and now are possessed of and do exercise the Supreme Power therein as if the right of Soveraignty were vested in them Or else the whole entire Body of the English Nation as it is a Civil Society or State within it self distinguished from all other Foreign Estates Taken in the former sense the fidelity promised to the Common-wealth relateth directly to the upholding of that party who are the present Governors de facto and imports subjection to them as de jure But taken in the latter it relateth to the safety of the Nation and importeth no more as to the present Governors but to live peaceably under them de facto and to yield obedience to them in things absolutely necessary for the upholding Civil Society within the Realm such as are the defence of the Nation against Foraigners the furtherance of Publick Justice and the maintenance of Trade 3. In the words as it is now established c. which may be understood either by way of approbation of what hath been done by way of abolishing Kingly Government and the House of Peers and placing all Authority and Power within the Realm in the House of Commons Or else 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 only as a clause simply and barely reciting what manner of Government it is that this Nation de facto is now under viz. a Government by the Commons only without either King or House of Lords Which Ambiguities considered The highest construction that can be reasonably made of the words is to this effect I acknowledge the Sovereign Power of this Nation where unto I owe Allegiance and Subjection to be rightly stated in the House of Commons wherein neither King nor Lords as such have or henceforth ought to have any share And I promise that I will perform all Allegiance and Subjection thereunto and maintain the same with my fortunes and life to the utmost of my power And the lowest construction that can be reasonably made of the same words is to this effect Whereas for the present the Supreme Power in England under which Power I now am is actually possessed and exercised by the House of Commons without either King or Lords I promise that so long as I live under that power and protection I will not contrive or attempt any act of hostility against them but living quietly and peaceably under them will endeavor my self faithfully in my place and calling to do what every good member of a Common-wealth ought to do for the safety of my Country and preservation of Civil Society therein V. Now cometh in to be considered in the last place the great Question whether of the two constructions it is That which bindeth to the Most or This which obligeth to the Least the words can well bear that the formers of the Engagement did rather intend to declare by these words They that think the former want not probability of reason to ground their perswasions upon For they consider that those who are presently possessed of the Supreme Power are not minded to part with it if they can hold it And that the likeliest way to hold it is if they can possibly bring the whole people of England or at least the far greatest part thereof to acknowledge that they are rightly possessed of it and to promise Subjection and Allegiance to them as such And that therefore the Engagement being purposely devised and set on foot as the fittest engine to expedite that work must in all reason intend to oblige so far Which being so contrary to their Judgment and perswasion concerning the duty and Oath of Allegiance I cannot blame those that so understand the words of the Engagement if they abominate the very thought of taking it But there wanteth not great probability of Reason on the other side to induce us to believe that the latter and lower sense is rather to be deemed the immediate and declared intent of the Imposers whatsoever cause of suspition there may be that the former meaning may be more agreeable to their secret reserved and ultimate intent between which two if there be any difference as it is not impossible but there may be the Engager is not concerned in it or not yet the Equivocation if there be any in that must be put upon the Imposers not on the Promisers score For thus believing there are amongst others these Probabilities 1. That many prudent and consciencious men of the Royal Party as well Divines and Lawyers as others have thus understood it who we presume would not for any outward respâ—ct in the world have taken it if they had conceived any more to have been intended in it 2. That it hath often been affirmed both publickly and privately in several parts of the Kingdom if we may believe either common fame or the reports of sundry credible particular persons by those that have perswaded or pressed others to subscribe that the same is the very true intent and meaning of it and no other 3. That if the Imposers had been minded to have declared an intent of binding to more they might easily have framed the words so as not to be capable of a construction binding to Less 4. That as is also credibly reported whilst the form of words was under debate the opinion of those that would have had it set higher was not followed as held unseasonable and the vote carried for the more moderate expression wherein it now standeth 5. That the Imposers intending by the Engagement to secure themselves especially against the designs and attempts of those men who they knew well enough held them for no other than Usurpers must be in reason supposed to require no more assurance of them by the Engagement than such as may and is usually