Selected quad for the lemma: duty_n

Word A	Word B	Word C	Word D	Occurrence	Frequency Band	MI	MI Band	Prominent
duty_n	child_n	mutual_a	parent_n	1,913	5	9.2702	5	true

Text snippets containing the quad

ID	Title	Author	Corrected Date of Publication (TCP Date of Publication)	STC	Words	Pages
A61509	Jus populi vindicatum, or, The peoples right to defend themselves and their covenanted religion vindicated wherein the act of defence and vindication which was interprised anno 1666 is particularly justified ... being a reply to the first part of Survey of Naphtaly &c. / by a friend to true Christian liberty.	Stewart, James, Sir, 1635-1713.	1669 (1669)	Wing S5536; ESTC R37592	393,391	512

the Magistrate abuse his power not in some particulars only but in many and in many maine particulars if not in all Having thus cleared and vindicated the 6. thing The 7. And last is this which followeth also from the former viz. That when the Prince doth violate his compact as to all its conditions or as to it 's cheef maine and most necessary condition the Subjects are de Iure free from subjection to him and at liberty to make choise of another The very nature of a compact doth clear this For it is absurd to say that in a mutual conditional compact one party shall still be bound to performe his conditions though the other performeth none of his conditions or performeth not the maine and principal one It is absurd to say that when one hath given a benefite upon a certaine condition that he is still bound to bestow that benefite though the condition on which he promised it be no way performed Were it the rational act of rational creatures to set up Soveraignes upon these tearmes or to say wee choose thee to be our Soveraigne upon condition thou rule us according to justice and equity and not tyrannize over us and yet we shall always hold thee for our Prince and lawful Soveraigne Though thou should transgresse all lawes of equity humanity and reason and deal with us as so many sheep kill whom thou will for thy sport and lust c. will any body think that rational men would do so The law tells us L. si fund c. de pactis c. That cessante causâ propter quam res est data pignus debet reddi Before we come to draw our arguments from what is said we shall first roll out of our way what this Surveyer speaks further against these Covenants Pag. 88 89 90 91 92 93. He hath five particulars which he toucheth on The first is this It is easily conceded sayes he that there is a mutual obligation betwixt Magistrats and Subjects to mutual dutyes which is indeed essential to the constitution of the politike body but his obligation ariseth not from any tacite or expresse Covenant betwixt them but from the ordinance and will of God enjoyning them these dutyes in these relations in that society wherein they are combined Answ 1. Subordinata non pugnant This mutual obligation may arise both from the Law of God and from the Covenant without any repugnancy 2. If this obligation arise only from the Law of God neither partyes shall be formally obliged unto other but both obliged only unto God and yet we heard himself say Pag. 100. that Where a Covenant is made betwixt a King and a People that the Covenant on the King's part binds him not only unto God in relation to the People as the object of the duty but doth bind him to the People formally Now whence ariseth this formal obligation if not from the Covenant 3. By this meanes the obligations of fidelity in the subjects unto their Princes have no rise from their oath of allegiance which he elsewhere calleth Foedus unilaterum 4. To what purpose then are Covenants and compacts made If by vertue of these each party be not formally obliged unto other For if David's Covenant with the People of Israel laid no obligation upon him he could not be said to have made a Covenant with them more then with the Phalistimes and yet the Scripture tells us he made a Covenant with Israel And King Ioash made a Covenant with the People 5. I do not well understand how an obligation to future dutyes can be called essential to a constitution which neither floweth from the constitution nor giveth a being to the constitution 6. Againe if there be no obligation unto these mutual dutyes until there be a constitution by compact and if then the obligation be essential how is it imaginable that the obligation shall have no subordinat rise from the constitution or compact whereupon the constitution is founded The 2. thing he sayeth is That though this obligation be mutual yet is it not conditional and how proves he this There is sayes he a mutual obligation to mutual dutyes betwixt Parents and Children but it is not conditional that if Parents be undutiful Children shall be loosed from their duty or on the contrary So is it sayes he betwixt King and People and the citeth Calvin Inst. Lib. 4. Cap. 20. § 29. But it is easily answered That there is a vast disparity betwixt the rise of that relation which is betwixt King and People and that which is betwixt Father and Son And this being once discovered the parity disappeareth And 1. Subjects come not out of the loyns of their King as Children do out of the loines of their Fathers 2. The Son createth not the Father as the Subjects create the King 3. Yea Children do not so much as give their consent that such an one shall be their Father before the relation have being yet Royalists will grant this much unto the People in relation to their King 4. The relation betwixt Father and Son hath no dependence less or more upon any act of will in the Son or upon any Covenants Agriements or Compact expresse or tacite betwixt the Father the Son it is not so as to the relation betwixt King and People for before this mutual relation arise there must be a constitution and this constitution includeth at least some act of the will in subjects some previous consent 5. This relation can never cease so long as both are in life but the other may by a Subject's chooseing to live under another Soveraigne 6. Let the Father do what he wil the relation betwixt him and his Son shall never be loosed or weakened But the greatest Royalists will grant that in some cases the King may be made no King and his relation either wholly taken away or much diminished So then the consequence is null that because Children are not bound to their Parents conditionally therefore Subjects are bound conditionally to there Prince For Children have no hand in making up that relation betwixt Parents and them their consent is not so much as required but in making up the relation betwixt King and Subjects there is a previous compact required in which compact the People have their great share Children give not paternity unto their Parents but Subjects give the Kingship at least instrumentally under God and they set up Kings when they might set up Nobles and set up his Man when they might have set up Another can Children do so How then shall the case be alike And the one be no more conditional then the other Next as for Calvin we willingly with him grant that Subjects are to obey evill Magistrates and to do their duty to them though the Magistrates should come short of theirs as Wives Children are bound to love and be Subject unto undutiful Husbands and Fathers But Calvin will not say that in no case a

I may not pray for him except conditionally but against him as an enemy of Christ's so I may also lawfully resist him with violence 6. It is cleare from other perfsons or things against whom or which I may lawfully pray as inward or outward Enemics forraigne or domestick be they inferiour or superiour against these I may use resistence in my ovvne sinlesse defence 7. The lavves of the land make the one treasonable as vvel as the other and that deservedly vvhen the Prince is doing his duty but vvhen he turneth Tyrant neither can justly be condemned 8. We have seen the one practiced in Scripture and other Histories as vvell as the other 24. If it be lavvful for meer privat persons to refuse obedience unto the unjust and iniquous commands of Princes Then it is also lavvfull for them to resist the unjust and illegal Tyranny of such But the former is undengable Therefore so is the latter The connexion is cleare For 1. Subjection is no more expresly pressed in Scripture then is obedience to Superiours Therefore if not withstanding of this command non-obedience be allowed yea and necessary vvhy not also non-subjection or resistence 2. The lavv of God doth not presse this as more absolute and unlimited then the other 3. Non-obedience to the povver commanding just things is a resisting of the ordinance of God as well as non-subjection thereunto if notwithstanding hereof non-obedience to unjust commands be allowed why also shall not non-subjection to tyranny be allowed 4. The one doth no more derogate from the lawful authority of the Soveraigne then the other 5. The one is no more a wronging of the Minister of God as such then the other because he is no more the Minister and vicegerent of God in acts of Tyranny then in commanding unjust things And therefore 6. such as resist unjust violence can no more procure to themselves damnation then the such as disobey unjust commands CAP. XIII The Surveyer's grounds taken from Scripture for absolute Submission to Suffering examined HAving thus proved the lawfulnesse of private persones resisting in cases of necessity the unjust violence of Superiour powers by many arguments and having vindicated the same from what this Surveyer had to say against them We come now to examine his grounds for the contrary assertion Out of Scripture he adduceth Three grounds Pag. 28. c. The first is taken from the duty of Children toward Paents unjustly afflicting them Heb. 12 ver 9 10. where their reverend subjection under unreasonable and unjust dealing is commended and from the duty of Servants to suffer at the hands of unjust and froward Masters 1 Pet. 2 18 19 20. To which we answere 1. That these examples are so far from making against us that they fully comfirme our poynt as we have shewed above For notwithstanding of what is said in these places he cannot deny but Parents may be resisted by their Children in several cases and Masters by their Servants It would be strange if he should presse this subjection so close home that now no Servant might lawfully resist and withstand the fury of his Master nor no Childe might hold his furious Father's hands and defend himself against his unjust acts of cruelty And Althusius Pol. c. 38. n. 88 89. tels us that in several cases the father lòseth the right of his fatherly power over Children masters power from the law Tit. lust quib mod jus Pat. Pot. amit § Domin lust de his qui sunt sui vel alieni juris l. 5. § sivel Par. de agant vel alend. lib. L. necfilium Cap. de Patr. potcst L. 2. L. 3. Cap. de Inf. expos Novel 115. Cap. 3. 2. If these simititudes be hardly pressed it shall not now be lawful for Subjects to resist so much as by flying for the reverence and subjection required of Children unto their parents will not suffer that to evite every smal injurie from their parents they should ran away from under their power and subjection nor might servants in those dayes run away from their Masters who had another dominion over them then Masters now have over their Servants who are free to goe off when they will himself acknowledgeth this Pag. 31. 3. We have shewed above what a vast difference there is betwixt the power of Parents over their Children and the power of Magistrates over their Subjects And he himself doth confesse there is a difference yet sayes he Pag. 29. There is a full parity and agreement in this that in the inflicting of evils upon these who are under them such as are competent to them to inflict within their sphaere a patient reverent subjection is due from their inferiours even when they abuse their power Ans This is the question if the parity hold even here in all poynts for seing these Relations are different one from another even in their nature and ground it is but rational to think that there must also be some difference betwixt them as to the consequent or result that floweth from that relation else it would follow that as Children are so Subject as that they can never but be subject to their Parents so Subjects could never be free of their Superiours and yet himself tells us that they may by going under another government or removing to other dominions 2. Who shall be judge whether the Superior keepeth within his spaere yea or not If the Superiour then there is no remedy at all for when he doth most exceed his bounds he may judge that he keepeth within bounds and so whether he keep within his sphaere or not there must no resistence be used but a stupide subjection 3. Whether may the Superiour be resisted by the inferiour when he doth what is not incumbent to him to do within his sphaere or not If he may not then why is this parenthesis added As a restriction or limitation of the Subjection required If he may be resisted when he really goeth without his sphaere then this makes for us for he must grant that the Magistrate doth nor prescribe the limites of his owne povver but God and nature and the constitution of the Realme Novv God hath never put it in the povver of Princes to presse their subjects to perjury or to a complyance with a sinful abhominable and abjured course so that vvhn he doth thus he goeth beyond his sphaere His sphaere is to rule for God and the good of the land and not to destroy the interest of Christ and the Commongood and if he may be resisted vvhen he goeth beyond this sphaere then vve have all vve aske It vvas never vvithin his sphaere to break his compact vvith his People and vvhen he doth so he is vvithout his sphaere and may be resisted and this is also for us Againe he tells us in the 2 place That though Kings are not fathers by generation yet as Kings and Magistrats should have fatherly hearts to their subjects they being a sort of official fathers