Selected quad for the lemma: duty_n

Word A	Word B	Word C	Word D	Occurrence	Frequency Band	MI	MI Band	Prominent
duty_n	child_n	mutual_a	parent_n	1,913	5	9.2702	5	true

Text snippets containing the quad

ID	Title	Author	Corrected Date of Publication (TCP Date of Publication)	STC	Words	Pages
A02848	An ansvver to the first part of a certaine conference, concerning succession, published not long since vnder the name of R. Dolman	Hayward, John, Sir, 1564?-1627.	1603 (1603)	STC 12988; ESTC S103906	98,388	178

representeth his person who gaue commission and not his owne Herevpon Alexander Panormitane Innocentius and Felinus doe affirme that they may cast their commissioners out of power when they please because as Paulus saith a man can iudge no longer when he forbiddeth who gaue authoritie Further all states take denomination from that part wherin the supreme power is setled as if it bee in one prince it is called a monarchie if in many of highest ranck then it is an aristocracie if in the people then a democracie Whervpon it followeth if the people are superiour to the prince if the prince hath no power but by commission from them that then all estates are populare for we are not so much to respect who doth execute this high power of state as from whō immediately it is deriued Hereto let vs ad that which you haue said in another place that in populare gouernments there is nothing but sedition trouble tumults outragies iniustices vpon euery light occasiō thē we shall perceiue first that you want the art of a wise deceiuer not to be entangled in your tale secondly that this is meere poison which the diuell hath dropt out of your pen to infect christian coūtries with disobedience disorder In a word to the contrary of this your impudent vntruth our laws do acknowledge supreme authority in the prince within the realme dominions of england neither can subiects beare thēselues either superior or equall to their soueraigne or attempt violence either against his persō or estate but as well the ciuill law as the particulare lawes customes of all countries do adiudge it high hainous treasō I will speake now without passion what reason haue we to accept your idle talk for a kind of authority against the iudgement lawes of most nations in the world You proceede that the power of a prince is giuen to him by the common wealth with such conditions exceptions as if the same be not kept the people stand free That the prince receiueth his power vnder plain conditiōs you go about to proue afterward now you hold on that in all mutual contracts if one side recede from promise the other remaineth not obliged this you proue by two rules of the law The first is he doth in vaine require promise to be kept of another man to whom he refuseth to performe that which he promised the other is a man is not bound to performe his oath if on the other part that be not performed in respect whereof he did sweare Poore fellow had you ben as conuersant in the light of law and cleere course of iustice as you are in the smoake dust of some corner of a colledge you wold neuer haue concluded so generally so confidētly vpō any of the rules of law which are subiect for the most part vnto many exceptions Alexander Felinus doe assigne fiue fallencies vnto these rules Socinus giueth the cootrarie rule to him that breaketh his faith or oath faith ought to bee kept thē restraineth it with seauē limitations But all affirme that in those offices which are mutuall between any persōs by the law of nature or of God as between the father the child the husband the wife the master the seruant the prince and the subiect although the same be further assured by promise or by oath the breach of duty in the one is no discharge vnto the other And therfore if the father performeth not his duty towards his children they are not thereby acquitted both of the obedience care which God nature exacteth of them howsoeuer Solon in his lawes discharged children from nourishing their parents if they did not traine them in some trade wherby they might acquire their liuing Much lesse are subiects exempted from obedience if the prince either erre or be defectiue in gouernment because the like respect is not due vnto parents as vnto Princes as I haue somewhat touched before insomuch as a sonne that beareth authoritie hath right both to commaūd and compell the father This was declared among the Romanes by that which Plutarch Liuie Valerius and Gellius doe report of Q. Fabius to whome being consull when Fabius Maximus his father who had bene consull the yeare before did approch sitting vpon his horse the sonne commanded him by a sergeant to allight the father not onely obeyed but highly commended both the courage and iudgement of his sonne in maintaining the maiestie which he did beare and in preferring a publicke both dutie and authoritie beefore priuate Vpon those examples Paulus the lawier did wright that publick discipline was in higher estimation among the Romane parents then the loue of children After an impertinēt discourse that vpon diuers cōsiderations an oath ought not to be performed you annex another cause wherefore subiects may withdraw their alleageāce that is when it should turne to the notable dammage of the common wealth and both these you affirme to be touched in the depriuation of Childeric king of France But I regard not what was touched in the depriuation of Childeric I haue answered to that in the chapter next before I require either arguments or authoritie of more tough temper Well then let vs turne back the leafe and there we shall finde a rule of the law because by rules onely you will beat down rule In euill promises it is not expedient to keepe faith Which is also confirmed by a sentence of Isidorus In euill promises break your word in a dishonest oath change your purpose Well fare your vvits good soule doe you accompt the promise of obedience euill not so I suppose you will say but it turneth to be euill vvhen it turneth to the notable detrimēt of the commō wealth It is one of your peculiar guifts the further you goe the more impious you declare your selfe For if you take the word euill in noe higher sence then for detriment and damage it would follow vpon your rule that a man vvere no further tyed to his promise then the performance thereof were aduantageable vnto him You vvould inforce also that if the father doth dissipate his patrimoniall estate and runne a course to ruine his familie the children and the wife may thervpon disauow their duties But if vvee take a true touch of this point we shall finde that the vices of any Prince are not sufficient of themselues to ouerthrow a state except therevpon rebellions be raised vvhich vvill draw all things into confusion For there is no Prince vvhich either hath liued or can almost be imagined to liue in so little sence of humanitie but generally he both fauoureth and maintaineth some order of iustice onely against particuler persons some of them haue violently bene carried by the tempest of their passion vvhereby notwithstanding the inordinate desires of one man can not possibly reach to

he doth not condition or restraine himselfe but maketh an honorable promise of indeuour to discharge his dutie being tyed thereby to no s●anter scope then he was before The reason hereof is Quia expressio eius quod tacitè inest nihil operatur The expressing of that which is secretly vnderstood worketh nothing Againe when the promise is not annexed to the authoritie but voluntarily and freely made by the Prince his estate is not thereby made conditionall For the interpreters of the Ciuill lawe do consent in this rule Pacta conuenta quae contractibus non insunt non formant actionem Couenants which are not inherent in contracts do not forme an action And therefore although by all lawes both of conscience and state a Prince is bound to performe his promise because as the Maister of sentences saith God himself will stand obliged to his word yet is not the authoritie but the person of the Prince hereby affected the person is both tyed and touched in honour the authoritie ceasseth not if performances do faile Of this sort was that which you report of Traian who in deliuering the sword to his gouernors would say If I raigne iustly then vse it for me if otherwise then vse it against me but where you adde that these are the very same words in effect which Princes do vse at their coronations pardon me for it is fit I should be mooued you will find it to bee a very base 〈◊〉 lye Of this nature was that also which the same Traian did to encourage his subiects to do the like in taking an oath to obserue the lawes which Pliny the younger did account so strange as the like before had not bene seene But afterward Theodoric did follow that fact whereupon Cassiodorus saith Ecce Traiani nostri clarum seculis reparamus exemplum iurat vobis per quem iuratis We repaire the famous example of Traian he sweareth to you by whome you sweare So when king Henry the fifth was accepted for successour to the crowne of Fraunce he made promise to maintaine the Parliament in the liberties thereof And likewise diuers Princes do giue their faith to mainetaine the priuiledges of the Church and not to change the lawes of the Realme which oath is interpreted by Baldus Panormitane and Alexander to extend no further then when the lawes shall be both profitable and iust because Iustice and the common benefit of subiects is the principal point both of the oath and dutie of a Prince whereto all other clauses must be referred And now to your examples First because in all the ranke of the Hebrew kings you cannot find either condition or oath not in the auncient Empires and kingdomes of the world not vsually in the ●lourishing time of the Romaine state both vnder heathen and christian Emperors because these times are too pure for your purpose you fumble foorth a dull coniecture That forsomuch as the first kings were elected by the people it is like that they did it vpon conditions and assurances for themselues That the first kings receiued not their authoritie from the people I haue manifested before and yet your inference hereupon is no other then if you should sue in some Court for a legacie alleadging nothing for your intent but that it is like the Testator shold leaue you something in which case it is like I suppose that your plea wold be answered with a silent scorne After a few loose speeches which no man would stoupe to gather together you bring in the example of Anastasius the first Emperour of Constantinople of whom the Patriarch Euphemius required before his coronation a confessiō of the faith in writing wherin he should promise to innouate nothing And further he promised to take away certaine oppressions and to giue offices without mony Let vs take things as they are and not speake vpon idle imagination but agreeable to sence what either condition or restraint do you find in these words Condition they do not forme because in case of failance they do not make the authoritie void neither do they make restraint because they containe no point whereunto the lawe of God did not restraine him All this he was bound to performe without an oath and if he were a thousand times sworne he was no more but bound to perform it euē as if a father should giue his word to cloath and feede his child or the husband to loue his wife or any man to discharge that dutie which God and Nature doth require It is true that Anastasius was both a wicked man and iustly punished by God for the breach of his faith but his subiects did neuer challenge to be free therefore from their alleageance The same aunswere may be giuen to the promise which Michael the first gaue to Nicephorus the Patriarch That he would not violate the Ordinances of the Church nor embrue his hands with innocent bloud especially if you take the word Ordinances for matters necessarie to be beleeued but if you take it in a larger sence then haue I also declared in the beginning of this chapter how farre the promise doth extend Your next example is of the Empire of Almaine from whence all that you obiect doth fall within this circle After the death of Charles the Great the empire was held by right of succession vntill his line was determined in Conrade the first After whose death it became came electiue first in Henry duke of Saxony then in Otho his son and afterwards in the rest from whom notwithstanding no other promise was wrested but the discharge of that dutie which they were enformed or rather threatned that God wold seuerely exact at their hands But as in all electiue States it vsually hapneth at euery new change and choise the Emperor was deplumed of some of his feathers vntill in the end he was made naked of authoritie the Princes hauing drawne all power to themselues So by degrees the Empire was changed from a Monarchie to a pure aristocracie the Emperour bearing the title thereof but the maiestie and puissance remaining in the States During which weaknesse of the Emperour some points were added to his oath which seemed to derogate from the soueraigntie of his estate But what is this to those Princes who haue retained their dignitie without any diminution either of authoritie or of honour The like may be said of Polonia which not many hundred yeares since was erected into a kingdome and although the States did challenge therein a right of election yet did it alwaies passe according to propinquitie of bloud and was esteemed a soueraigne Monarchie vntill after the death of Casimire the Great when Lodonicus his Nephew King of Hungarie rather greedie then desirous to be king also of Polonia did much abase the Maiestie thereof Yet falling a●terward into the line of Iagello who maried one of the daughters of Lodowicke it recouered the auncient both dignitie and strength But when