of God as the word is The Rule and supream Law which God hath appointed for things Political is the common good If the Magistrate command any thing in Religion and it be not according to Gods word then Conscience cannot be bound to it as Religious though the outward Man I think therein also is bound if it be not against Gods word It the Magistrate command any thing of moral concern if it be against the Law of nature or common principles of Light in Man that is the moral Law in the heart the Conscience cannot be bound but must refuse it If he command any thing which is civil or Political and it be against the common good then is it not agreeable to Gods will being not consonant to the rule he hath commanded for civils and consequently the Conscience cannot be obleiged by it upon that accompt In the mean while so long as it is not against conscience otherwise that is so long as it is not sin the outward man is bound and if the Magistrate will constrain a person to it rather then suffer he will obey There are several books and Sermons of Ministers about Religion which do bind the Readers and Hearers by vertue of Gods will but the supream Rule is Gods Word unto which consequently if what they have said or writ be not consonant the Conscience is not bound and according as the Conscience of a Man is convinced whether that which the Minister says be agreeable to the word or not so is it bound or not bound by it The case is the same in Laws The Magistrate doth give us such and such particular commands or Laws His authority he hath from God The will of God as the supream Law or Rule in Politicalls is that the common good be attended and advanced They are Gods Ministers a sending continually upon this very thing So far as his Laws or commands then are agreeable to the common good so far is his Authority good and must obleige the Conscience being from God And so long as a man is convinced in Conscience that they are agreeable thereunto he must be in Conscience obleiged but if he be sincerely perswaded that such or such a thing commanded be not for the publick good the case is but the same with what I said in Religion when the Ministers exhortation disagrees with the word The Magistrate is but Gods Minister in Politicals and his commands disagreeing with the supream Law the common good the Conscience cannot be obleiged in this Case Nevertheless so long as the outward Man is in the Magistrates power and the Subject may not resist he can command obedience out of the case of sin when he pleases to exert his Sword Before I pass off I am made a little sensible how apt our question may be wrested into a dispuâ—e about Terms It is hardly proper to say this or that Law binds the Conscience for Conscience is the discerner of my duty and it were more proper to say my conscience binds me to this Law then that this Law binds it It is scarce proper neither to say the Conscience is bound seeing it is the person is bound Conscience is placed in the understanding and when a thing becomes a Mans duty the will is obleiged rather then the understanding It is not easie likewise to apprehend how the outward man is bound with distinction to the Conscience considering that this obligation hath it's rise and vertue from our duty of not resisting unto which we are always bound in Conscience The term Resisting likewise is liable to diversity of acceptation It is convenient therefore for me in my way to give the sense of my Terms if it be not yet done enough to prevent needless contention By human Laws I understand the declaration of the will of the rightful Governor what he would have his Subjects do I will not also put in the end of Laws in order to the common good because that will presently spoyl the question For where the efficient is our rightful Ruler and the Law serves indeed for that end or hath it's right final cause also there is no question of its obligation Yet if I leave out the end the question indeed may be whether such a declaration be a Law rather then whether it binds Nevertheless as I make a case of conscience of it and count all our Acts of Parliament Laws it is all one in effect to me whether you say such a Law binds not or such an Act or Law is no Law and binds not Ex quo intelliges eos qui perniciosa et injusta populis jussa descripserius cum contra feceriut quod polliciti pro fessique slatâ— quoduis potius tulisse quam leges Cicero de legious By Conscience I understand a faculty in Man of descerning Gods Judgement concerning himself and Actions It is more proper to say a faculty is obleiged then an habit or an Act and that faculty which man hath hereunto is charged whilst himself is to judge whether such a thing commanded be his duty in relation to God or not By obligation I understand the constitution of a due Obligare est jus constituere By obligation of the Conscience I understand the constituting a thing to bedue from me so that if I do it not I must account or judge that God will condemn me for the neglect or the making a thing my duty so that if I leave it undone I sin The obligation of the outward man I account the constituting a thing to be due from me so as if I do it not I may not resist though I be punished or I may be punished and ought not to resiâ—t though I could avoid both the thing and punishment by resistance The word lacere says Grotius from one line of whom a man shall have more Instruction sometimes then from anothers book is distinguished in id quod impune fiâ— and in id quod vâ—tio caret So must we say the word obligare is distinguished into that which if we do not the thing makes us liable to punishment in foro humano or according to the law or that which if we do it not makes us liable to sin That is there is an obligation human only which we have had before that tyes us to obedience upon the penalty of the law or an obligation divine also which ties us to the duty upon the pain of Gods displeasure eternal condemnation The one of these we call the obligation of the outward man and the other of the Conscience By resistance lastly I understand the repelling force with force The word resistance may be taken largely or strictly Resistitur contra Imperium agendo aut vim vi reprimâ—ndo I take it in the last and strict sence Let me yet note one thing more when we distinguish in the obligation of human laws between the outward man and the Conscience we do not distinguish the outward man from the will when we distinguish
themselves from what they please no Laws will be observed and all Government come to the ground Unto this as his substance besides my answer I have already given I shall crave leave to offer a few considerations In the first place this is certainly a shalâ—â—w apprehension which must suffer a conviction from the constant experience of the world For how is the world governed there is not one of a hundred that observes the Laws out of Conscience if they did then must they for ought I know be careful to gâ—t the Statutes and read them as their bibles which one of a thousand never do But men understand it they do such or such things they are lâ—able to be sued or to be bound to the Sessions or the like and to avoid the danger of the Law they observe it Now it is a foolish thing to say the Laws will not be observed or the world will not be governed unless by another means then that by which it is governed and the Law are observed Our Nations and Heathen Nations and those Nations which never had the fear of God to believe a judgement to come have been kept under the observation of the Laws of their Country by these means In the second place this is not only against universal experience but it confronts the very institution of God the appointment of the Magistracy God hath made the Magistrate his Minister and put the sword into his hand for the ordering and governing Societies and Common wealths and if this indeed will not serve that purpose then you render his institution insufficient and make his Minister to bear the sword in vain The Law sayes the Apostle is not made for the righteous but the disobedient and unrighteous If all were righteous and would of themselves make Conscience of doing what they should do there would be no need of Magistrate or Law but when the Law and Magistrate is appointed for this end to bring the refractory to order and those that make no Conscience of what they do to be ruled how fond must the imagination be which conceits unless men do first beleive themselves bound in Conscience to obey they will not observe the Laws In the third place if it be for some persons particular interest to break the Laws it will be the concern of others that they be forced to keep them if they be indeed for the common good so shall they joyn with the Magistrate in his causing the execution of them This indeed is that which upholds all Laws that are good The publick interest being greater then the private does uphold them Whereas if a Law be not really for the publick good this is one certain reason at the bottom of its invalidity and decay because it hath not root enough upon the publick utility to maintain it self against particular enchroachments If a Non-conformist come within five miles of a Corporation there is no body hurt by it and no body like to be concerned at it were this a thing truly conducing to the publick good then must the publick be disadvantaged in their breach of that Law and if the publick then must some more eminently and those should be as much concerned that they obey as themselves to avoid the observation By the way when the advantage for the publick does not countervaile and exceed the private loss or dammage that particular persons shall suffer by a Law such a Law I take to be unjust or at least Politically evil and binds not the Conscience However that which I here affirm is that whether men make a Conscience of a Law or not if the Law be good the publick advantage will prevail when the Magistrate is minded or cause it to be observed In the fourth place it is a thing very unpolitick to offer to the world any principle upon which it should be governed which is other then that which does govern it If the world be governed by the Magistrates sword and the Conscience only that we must not rebell and is governed as well as ever it is like to be governed it is but an unhinging the world to pretend they must receive this principle that human laws bind the Conscience or else there will be no need to obey seeing the People may joyn and chuse not to be forced as he speaks It is a saying if a Horse knew his strength what might he not do he would not let man ride him and use him as he does If the world knew their strength that the Magistrate indeed could not punish them whatsoever they did unless they joyned with him one against another when there is just cause for it they might shake off every yoke but as the whole body of the People cannot be made to know this so as at once to agree upon it any more then the Horse can though every particular man does know it so were it an utterly ruinous thing to speak of it if they could It is true if the people did agree together which agreement is their strength and they cannot know one anothers present minds all that they would not be forced they might choose but then when they made no Conscience to resist how should this man think upon his principle that they would make such Conscience to obey In the first place it does seem to me a pernicious thing to the souls of pious and tender Christians to lay any such load upon the Conscience which is more then it can bear I say there is no temptation hardly more dangerous to the undoing of a soul then to press it upon such things as goes beyond it and over sets it If a man does believe he is bound to make Conscience of every command of his superiour and Law of the Realm or else he doth sin it is enough to make him cast off all the Laws and when his duty is made so grevious to him that it seems impossible for him but to live in sin to be ready for resistance next and then all Magistracy is gon The way to have some Laws obeyed out of Conscience is to take off its obligation from others and if a Magistrate indeed might choose whether his Subjects Consciences should be bound by all his Laws or not there is good reason for him to be content that the matter should be as it is They are bound in Conscience not to resist and he knows not his own strength if he desire any more although when a Law is for the common good then is there Gods command also which takes place There is one thing I cannot but add which might make another consideration what if a despotical Prince was so wicked as resolving to be damned himself to seek the damnation of all his people and should thereupon make so many Laws and about such trivial things on purpose that none of his Subjects might regard to keep them but live and die in the wilful breach of them I pray let this Debater tell me
speak he shall give on account for it at the day of judgement The word Idle in the Original as without work says Causabone de verborum usu 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 is contracted of 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 every Idle word is every word without deed and must import thus much whatsoever it does more that when men make strict professions and determine so rigidly in points of duty and do not answer their own dictates and sayings let them take heed lest by their words least ex ore tuo as being Idle words they bring not themselves into a just condemnation I will therefore advise this worthy person and all men in resolving Cases of Conscience that they take heed of setting down any matter for the binding of others then according to which in their own practise they dare be content to be judged by The determining the obligation of human Laws Indefinitely on the Conscience is more then any mortall can bear For my own part I will protest that whilst I allow the Conscience to be bound by the Law of men when those Laws tend to the common good yet do I not hereby cut my self of from the reserve of any liberty that may arise to me from a farther disquisition although I count it but necessary both to give my reason why in sincerity I hold so and to deliver my conception of that obligation It is a saying of the Antients a man is not born for himself only but for his Country which is not writ only in Cicero but in the heart of all men for this is a truth throughout the earth and delivered by God all along his word while he makes our own selves to be the rule of our carriage towards our Neighbours that we mind not our own things only but every one the things of others Though we study and seek the tranquillity and peace of those with whom we live and consequently in all Societies and Communities we should regard the publick concern even above our particular advantage These are general moral precepts which are writ I say in the heart of man and to be proved in Gods word The Magistrate I account now is Gods Minister to consider of and then design and appoint the particular things or instances wherein every one in their several places are serviceable in these duties and ends and upon that designation of the particular things the obligation flows from those general precepts of God upon the Conscience for their observation I say there is the general Institution of God for Societies and that men in society shall mind and endeavour in their place the publick concern and not their own only The Magistrate is his commissiâ—ted Officer to design appoint or set apart and so declare the instances or particular things which are conducive to this good of the community which they all are bound to intend upon the designation appointment or declaration of these things the obligation flows immediately from the general institution of God upon the Conscience for the observing of them when there could flow none else from these particulars themselves The particular laws or things themselves we know are not the precepts of God and the Conscience is obliged only by Gods will but the general institution of society and that we should seek and endeavour in our place the good of the Publick as our own and above our own in such particulars as be conducive truly to that end is of God and the Magistrate I say according to his office designing these particulars we come not ratione consequentis or absoluté only because such things commanded but ratione conseqâ—â—ntiae or ex hypothesi because such things commanded do come under the divine institution to have the Conscience bound to their performance From hence it follows likewise that if these instances or particulars do not indeed come under the service of these general duties or end such a law is to be lookt upon as cut off from Gods institution and so can have no authority derived to it from God for the obliging the Conscience of any when yet the outward man out of the case of sin is still acknowledged to be bound The particular commands of the Magistrate does I say bind the outward man but the general institution or the moral duty in general of seeking the welfare of the Publick and not our own only is that which binds the Conscience which otherwise were not bound As for the fifth Commandement which requires honor and obedience such as is meet to our superiours I do not here distinguish it from but include it in this general institution for that command must be understood as a comprehensive thing containing in it the whole commission the superiour hath from God which granting him his power to command doth also set the bounds and limitations to that power that he command no other things or no otherwise then as he hath appointed and upon supposition that the superior acts only according to his commission that is according to his prescribed duty or rule in civil things this Commandement of God doâ—â— lay an obligation on the subject to obey him out of Conscience If you will say upon this that the Magistrate hath a derived authority from God for this very act of determining the material objâ—ct of our obedience and therefore besides the obligation which flows from his institution when the matter is determined the Conscâ—ence must be obliged from the Magistrats determination it self by vertue of that derived authority from him I have no need to gain say it and whether you will make it a double obligation or an obligation from a double causality or a mixt obligation divine and human it matters nothing to our dispute so long as Gods authority in the things commanded or his allowance that they be commanded be first acknowledged before we look upon the Conscience to be indeed concerned in them This is certain every authority that is derived must be limited and that according to the will of him from whence it is derived The authority God reserves in his own hands is that alone which is unlimimited and infinite Now the limits God hath set the Magistrate as to the determining the particulars of his subjects duty which is his power of making laws comes to this that he choose them only out of that general matter that is conducive to the end of government the publick good that is to observe the rule of things political If he shall therefore appoint any particular things for his own profit pleasure or humour which come not under this general matter to wit quae habet rationem publici commodi as God hath prescribed it is manifest that he acts not according to his commission and so can have no power derived from thence for those acts or laws and consequently however such laws do bind us in his courts they are of no validity in the court of Conscience We will acknowledge in whatsoever he
Gods In morals the case is not thus whatsoever is not according to Gods will is against it But in civil and indifferent things a thing may not be against his will that is against any moral precept as our obedience I speak of to some human Laws and yet have none of his Authority for it Thus prudence the preservation of my self and the Magistrates honour may prevail with me to do a thing which I think otherwise I have no obligation to do in my Conscience I will yet add I distinguish my obediénce and my obedience out of Conscience or my obedience out of other generall rersons and my obedience out of Conscience to this particular command I do not resolve my obedience into a judgement of private discretion whether a Law be for the common good or no for I can apprehend easily that when God hath required the Magistrate to make no Law but according to this rule no unjust or unprofitable Law he hath not yet commanded that I should never obey such a Law I may obey out of a generall implicit apprehension of duty or a singular love to my superiors person for fear of his displeasure to avoid the danger of the Law or out of severall prudentiall considerations regarding the Magistrate my self or others when yet If I come to the point whether I am bound in Conscience to do the particular thing commanded that is whether there lyes a divine obligation on me as well as that from the Law to do it I am on necessity then to examine it by the rule which God hath set me and that being no other but the common good in politicalls I must resolve my obedience out of Conscience into this judgement when I resolve my prudentiall obedience otherwise It may suffice me therein so long as the thing is not sinfull that I am obliged by man It may be but very rare if I question my Rulers commandment which is like to be only perhaps in some grievous pressure If the Law be bad my obedience yet and my example may do good nor does the Magistrates abuse of his office I hope take away my liberty to endure it if I please The true ends moreover hapily of obedience may be obtained when the end of Ruling is neglected Nay the common good may be promoted possibly by my yeilding to a Law when the Law it self does cross it And farther my disobedience may do more hurt to the common good then the obeying that hurtfull command would do So farre am I from discouraging any from obedience to human Laws as a thing generally good and prudentiall when I would keep the Conscience free and not have it burdened with sin for every want of their performance I see indeed by this and other learned persons what an immagination they have got that if I resolve the question whether I am in Conscience obliged to obey such a Law by my private judging of the thing commanded whether it be agreeable or not to the common good I do usurpe the place of the Ruler and make myself only my own Law-giver as they are apt to speak But this is a mistake for besides that when I judge of the thing commanded by its Rule this judgement of mine is not the maker of my duty but the discerner of it and so I do not become any Law-giver to my self in the business I distinguish the obligation of a human Law and the obligation of Conscience formaliter simpliciter by that Law If I resolved the whole obligation of human Laws into this Ruâ—e and my judgement of the Law by it so that I held it must never be obeyed on other reasons or that if I were punished for not obeying I was not bound to submit then did I offer injury indeed to my Ruâ—er and usurped his Government But if I resolve only the obligation of my Conscience by that Law into this rule and my judgement of it accordingly I usurpe no power of the Magistrates which I leave him still over the exterior man but I keep God only as I ought in his own feat of the Conscience And verily if the Conscience of man be concerned in every human law I would fain know how any of our great Clerks can say that human laws bind not in the case of intollerable griveance If God does command me to do the thing it is not any griveance of minde can excuse me but if it be man indeed commands it only and not God the griveance will be reason enough for me to call it in question and to avoid it if I may but the reason of my non-obedience must not have this foundation that it is my grievance or that I cannot endure it but that consideratis considerandis I am not obliged to it in Conscience CAP. VII THus far his exceptions are but words let us pass now to his reasons against my answer His first reason is It is no easy thing to judge what is best for the Peoples good Kings themselves find it necessary to have their Councets to advise about it To judge what is best for the Peoples good is indeed a high matter To judge only whether a thing be for the common good or not is another matter The judgement of every one is free and any body may judge of any thing as he is able and as he will The Cock may pass his judgement on the Pearl he scraped up That which comes to carry any stress upon judging is the consideration of the effect that depends upon that judgement The judging of a thing which a Man himself hath to do hath this effect depending on it the doing his duty every one is to judge of all those things and circumstances which belong to his own acts whether or no they be agreeable to Gods will that he may do as he ought and the rule of this will in politicals I have declared There is the act now of the Magistrate and the act of the Subject There is a great difference of the concern or moment that lies on a judgement of the same thing when the act of the one depends upon it and when there depends upon it the act only of the other The act of the Magistrate is to make the law and see it executed the act of the People is to obey it By this first reason of his against my answer do I see good reason for it and the sufficiency of it The Magistrate judges whether a thing be for the common good or according to our supream rule in reference to his passing it into a law and then to cause it to be executed The People and every particular person does judge whether the thing commanded be for the common good in reference only to the obligation of their Consciences to obedience Upon the judgement of the Magistrate there does depend an effect of universal concernment that is the obligation of a whole Nation to live according to the Law he makes upon the
in Conscience to active obedience In the last place if this be not granted when you allow the subjects to be reasonable agents in things religious or morall that may bring what is superiour command 's of that nature to the rest of Gods will you turn them into bruites in things civil while they may bring what they are commanded to no test in relation to their own actions If you deny me my judgement of private discretion you will not let me act as a man Indeed this person will have the liberty to judge otherwise then the Magistrate does and yet be bound in Conscience to obey which is to be beneath a bruite for the best act spontaneously and follow the dictates of their sense if they be not hindred But this man will have his judgement one way that the thing is not good and his will and actions another way and that not upon constraint from without but upon the principle of Conscience which is a contradiction against all good sence But as for others and this man too otherwhere who makes it a placing our selves in the throne to determine otherwise concerning the publick welfaer then the proper judge of it doth so consistent is he with himself and such need hath he to be angry if one advise him to be more reflective◠on what he writes 〈◊〉 that will not let us have a judgement different from the Lawgiver and so to act only upon theirs they make men to become Horse as the and the Mule upon whom the rider gets up and they must go on the why and the whither as the driver pleases But if this be the Issue which this mans opinion will lead us to and this son of Circe should expect by the conjuration of these few leaves to transforme us presently out of our humanity that we should be content to be governed hence forward without the exercise of our own reason or assent that is not to act out of election but to be moved in civill obedience only as we are driven we shall have little cause to be very forward to hearken to him He may lay down his Penn and take a Whip in his hand and go Whistle But let us hear his exceptions to this answer Who shall be judge whether a Law be for the publick good or no. His answer is ready at his Tongues end for he needs not go deep for it The Magistrate must judge what is for the publick good for the making the Law and we must judge as to our obedience to it Then which it is hard to write any thing more inconsiderate and dangerous I do acknowledge this to be my judgement and for which I have offered here some reasons and it is not his saying this answer is inconsiderate and dangerous ought to prejudice it if it be well adviced and there be no danger indeed in it For neither doth this man know the previous thought on other occasions upon which this hath been set down nor hath he yet understood the state of my opinion right that he should charge it with any of those consequences as are but the Lyons and the Bears the Chariots and the Armies that fly in the Clouds of his own Immagination But let us hear the reason of this wonderful decision which he hath as ready as he had his answer Because saith he every man is made by God the judge of his own actions I cannot for my life see how that follows from this though I have put his reasoning into the plainest form that ever I could It is pitty but this mans life should be saved and therefore I will tell him my reasoning Those Laws I was shewing which be not for the common good are not agreeable to Gods will or have not his Authority and so bind not the Conscience The question upon this was as it is set down and the answer and the reason with the addition of the words following Because God hath made every man judge of his own actions and consequently of all circumstances whether they are agreeable or not to his will for his forbearing or doing of them If God then hath made every man judge of those things which he is to do in all the circumstances whether they be agreeable or not to his will then must he judge whether those things that he is commanded to do in human Laws be for the common good or no because those Laws only are agreeable to his will I had laid down before which are for the common good and those that are not are devoid of his Authority and bind not the Conscience This I deny not to be my very substance and as the reasoning is manifest and will appear so I doubt not to the indifferent so must it not be thought to be inculcated too often either there or here seeing no man can stand safe in dispute but he that knows what is and when he is upon his foundation For the mans disdainful expressions I have I account my satisfaction and he his sufficient reproof that he hath no more cause for them It is not sence to say the Magistrate must judge what is for the publick good in reference to his act of making the Law and we in reference to ours of obedience to it for he doth not only judge but enjoyn when he makes a Law which leaves us no liberty but to judge whether his will and Gods do not clash together And why is not this sense what reason is this that 〈◊〉 is not sense if he could have said the Magistrate does enjoyn and not judge at all before he enjoyns it then he might have pretended to say thus But if the Magistrate must not enjoyn any thing before he hath considered and judges it to be for the common good and if he doth enjoyn any thing that is not for the common good he hath no Authority from God for it then does it appear necessary that we do consider likewise and judge whether it be for the common good and have his Authority or else we cannot be bound in Conscience to it And thus you see very good sense evidence and fulness in this answer to the question and that the Magistrates will declaration of his will or enjoyning a thing does not take away our liberty and duty to consider when he hath enjoyned it whether we be yet in Conscience in obliged or in prudence only and the outward man to obedience The mistake of this person is that he thinks we may not judge of a Law but only whether it be against Conscience when we must no doubt judge also whether it be obliging to Conscience or otherwise how shall we make Conscience of it We are not to judge only whether it claspes with Gods will but whether it agrees with it If the Magistrates will be not against Gods will yet if it hath not his will and authority with it it is not obligatory to the Conscience The Magistrates will binds not asunder from
his making of a law which the people cannot consider and attend unto and then in an idle descant upon this that it is not fit therefore that laws should be suspended till the subjects be agreed they are for their good with the like words as if there were any indeed ever dream'd that a Law-giver who is with us the Parliament could not make a law untill they had consulted the people first whether they all of them judged the matter such that if it were passed into a law they should be bound in Conscience to the performance and before they had an affirmative answer from them who must be made loath too to be satisfied about it they could pass no act or statute of the Realm This is the sense in which this man let his pen run here and then concludes The Prince is in an ill case who hath such subjects and he is not in very good whose Divines begin to instill such doctrine into them If there be any thing in those more words and the same reason that seems of moment it is already answered I count by distinguishing the part of the Law-giver the subject whose judgement of a thing commanded in a law already passed for the satisfiying himself whether he be obliged in Conscience to the doing can by no means prejudice the act of the Law-giver in the passing the law as is manifest nor does it throw it down being passed For this is a mistake in this person very palpable as if a human law could not be of force unless a mans Conscience be obliged by it I observed this in him before where he said Laws while they do oblige tye the Conscience and that the cause of his error was the want of present knowledge to distinguish between Political and morall obligation The obligation which is on the Conscience is morall and can be no other and passes on it I have said from Gods institution of our generall duty but the obligation which is Political belongs to the outward man and may stand good when the morall ceases and for as much as this obligation of the outward man it self does so arise from the commandment of God for subjection and that we should not resist it may appear to the impartial that will consider aright of what is said that the question or single point between this man and I concerning the obligation of human Laws in reference only to the conscience is really and in good earnest very little or not at all material to the Magistrate or the civill Government which way soever it is determined And when there are so many learned men of divers sorts who exercise their liberty in maintaining the opinion of either extream without controle or prejudice to the world it s a thing hardly becomming either a temperate minde or modest Learning or that I should have most expected from this Authour a free Theology to express himself in this manner as if a man could not endeavour the finding out a middle way that is so needfull in such a controversie but he must be adjudged one that is broaching of something against the State and deserved correction His fourth reason is Grant the subjects such a power that is a power only of judgeing of their own civill acts and in a little time no law shall be observed He proceeds Taxes will not be paid He goes on There will be Insurrections and Rebellion Upon this he brings in certain narrations of the Subsidy of Head money in Richard the Seconds time and what followed of the aid granted to Henry the Seventh in his third year and the Northern Rebellion then of a subsidy in his thirteenth year when the Cornish-men took up arms then of the case of Henry the eight about Aliens and of one John Lincoln a Broaker that was hanged See more in a certain dialogue between a Couceellor of state and a Justice he has in his study for this it is for the man to light on a new book he must by all means be teling us of what he was reading last And thus had we at the begining of these Papers from the tenth argument of Bellarmine against Image worship the relation of the Iconomachi and what befell them in the time of Leo Isaurus in the time of Constantinus Copronomus in the time of the horrible cold and freezing of the Pontick Sea the drought after and the death of the Emperour The man hath a strange fruitful application This brings to my remembrance an advice once I received from an ingenious and prudent Woman who seeing me over ingaged in dispute sometimes with an Anabaptist who was a man of much talk and being not willing I should be so much concerned you must not says she argue with these men in the way you do you lay down the subject and speak upon that and then think to hold them to it and are moved when they speak from the point and so are confounded but you should sayes she give them leave to speak so long until you can lay hold on something that they say and whatsoever it is you must speak of that and by this means while you take them up still upon their last words whether it be to the point or not you will never want matter no more then they do and by the use of their own weapon may deal with them I must profess if this man who hath so apt an expression do come to get this knack of it as he appears to have in these continuations and apendix he may continue his continuations while he lives and I know no body able to dispute with him unless I could light on the fellow that would preach with any body but it should be he said in a Negative way And Peter went to Antioch He went not to be drunk here he speaks of drunkenness gluttony and all manner of excess He went not to lye with women there he speaks of fornication and uncleanness and all other deadly sin But he went to preach there he speaks of the Scriptures from Genesis to the Revelation of the Fathers the Schoolemen the Councels and all the books that ever he read to this day For the reason it self without its appurtenance I have I account prevented it in the state of my opinion The state alone of what I have said will wipe off any such mistaken consequence which he would injuriously bring upon it It is one question whether we are to observe a law another whether we are bound in Conscience to observe it The question between us in the bottom of the point is not concerning outward observation but the inward obligation of Consciences And the truth is as I was saying at the close of the other reason that this business does not really concern the Magistrate or the Common-wealth directly at all though indirectly and ex consequenti any thing may concern any body for what is it to the Magistrate or the community so long as he can