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ID Title Author Corrected Date of Publication (TCP Date of Publication) STC Words Pages
A94192 Two cases of conscience: resolved by the Right Reverend Father in God Robert Sanderson Late Lord Bishop of Lincoln. Sanderson, Robert, 1587-1663. 1668 (1668) Wing S643A; ESTC R201215 19,017 99

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Imprimatur Tho. Grigg R. in Christo P. ac Domino Domino Humfr. Episc Lond. à Sacris TWO CASES OF Conscience RESOLVED By the Right Reverend Father in GOD Robert Sanderson Late Lord Bishop of LINCOLN LONDON Printed by E. C. for C. Wilkinson at the Black-Boy over against St. Dunstans Church in Fleetstreet 1668. The Case of the ENGAGEMENT SIR I Have hitherto been very sparing in delivering my opinion concerning the point now most in agitation viz. Of the lawfulness or unlawfulness of Subscribing the Engagement considering the mischiefs that must needs have followed if it should be once noised abroad that I had given forth any determination in so tickle a point I could not but foresee on the one side if I should condemn it as utterly unlawful how I should be looked upon by those that have all power in their hands not as a refuser only but a disswader also of what they have thought fit to require And on the other side if I should allow it in any case Lawful what ill use would certainly be made thereof by multitudes of people apt to be so far scandalized thereby as either to swallow it whole without chewing that is resting themselves upon the general determination of the Lawfulness to take it hand over head without due consideration either of the true meaning of it or of other requisite cautions and circumstances or else to conceive themselves by so engaging to be for ever discharged from the bond of their former Allegiance Yet since by your Letter and by sending your Servant therewith on purpose so many dayes journey through unknown wayes and at this season of the year especially as the weather hath proved since his coming forth scarce passable you have shewn your earnest desire to understand what my opinion is in this point so great both for difficulty and concernment I could not think it fit nor consistent with that civility which is to be used especially towards Strangers to send back your messenger without the return of some kinde of answer Wherein albeit I shall not come up to the sull of what your Letter declareth to be your desire viz. In giving a particular Judgment and estimate of the Eight several Arguments therein proposed and the additional Quaere in the Postscript yet you shall find something tending towards your satisfaction therein by touching upon those points so farr as the straits of time would suffer wherein the difficulty of the whole business seemeth chiefly to consist First then it is to be considered that Allegiance is a duty that Every Subject under what form of Government soever by the Law of Nature oweth to his Countrey and consequently to the Soveraign Power thereof For the very same Law which we may call the Law of Nature at least in a large acceptation which inclineth particular men to grow into one civil body of a Common-wealth must necessarily withall imprint a sense and tacite acknowledgement of such a duty of Allegiance in every inferior member of the body unto the Caput Communitatis or Soveraign Power by which that Common-wealth is governed as is necessary for the preservation of the whole body So that the bond of Allegiance doth not arise originally from the Oath of Allegiance as if those that had not taken the Oath had a greater liberty to act contrary to the Allegiance ●●●cified in the Oath then those that have taken it have or as if in case the Oath should be quite laid aside there should be no Allegiance due But it is so intrinsecal proper and essential a duty and as it were fundamental to the relation of a Subject quâ talis as that the very name of a Subject doth after a sort import it In so much that it hath thereupon gained in common usage of speech the style of Natural Allegiance Whence all these inferences will follow 1. That the bond of Allegiance whether sworn or not sworn is in the nature of it perpetual and indispensable 2. That it is so inseparable from the relation of a subje●● that although the exercise of it may be suspended by reason of a prevailing force whilest the Subject is under such force viz. where it cannot be imagined how the endeavor of exercising it can be effectually serviceable to restore the Soveraign Power to the right owner for the establishment of that Publick Justice and Peace wherein the happiness of Common-wealths consisteth yet no outward force can so absolutely take it away or remove it but that still it remaineth vertually in the Subject and obligeth to an endeavour so soon as the force that hindered it is over of actually exercising of it for the advantage of the party to whom of right it is due and the advancement of the common good thereby upon all fit occasions 3. That no Subject of England that either hath by taking the Oathes of Supremacy or Allegiance acknowledged or that not having taken either Oath yet otherwise knoweth or believeth that the Soveraign Power in England to whom his Natural Allegiance is due is the King his Heirs and lawful Successors can without sinning against his Conscience enter into any Covenant Promise or Engagement or do any other Act or Acts whatsoever whereby either to transferr his Allegiance to any other party to whom it is not of right due or to put himself into an incapacity of performing the duties of his bounden Allegiance to his lawful Soveraign when it may appear to be useful and serviceable to him 4. That therefore the taking of the late Solemn League and Covenant by any Subject of England notwithstanding the Protestation in the Preface that therein he had the Honour of the King before his eyes and that express clause in one of the Articles of it wherein he swore The Preservation of the Kings Person and Honour was an act as clear contrary to the Oath of Allegiance and the Natural Duty of every Subject of England as the Assisting of the King to the utmost of ones power which is a branch of the Oaths and the assisting against any person whatsoever with his utmost power those that were actually in Armes against the King which was the very end for which that Covenant was set on foot are contrary the one unto the other 5. And that also for the same reason no Subject of England that hath taken the Oaths and understandeth them or is perswaded that the Soveraignty of this Realm doth of right belong to the King his Heirs and lawful Successors can without sinning in like manner against his Conscience take the Engagement now offered if he so understand the words wherein it is expressed as if they did contain in them and require of the Promiser an acknowledgment that the Supream Power of this Realm whereunto the Subjects ow their bounden Allegiance is rightly rested in those persons that now exercise it or as if they did import an utter abjuration or renouncing of that Allegiance which was formerly held due to the
King II. This being cleared the next enquiry must be Whether or no the words of the Engagement will reasonably bear such a construction as to the understanding of a rational and conscientious Man may seem consistent with his bounden duty and Allegiance to his lawful Soveraign Whereof I think there need be no great question made if it be well considered 1. That all expressions by words are subject to such ambiguities that scarce any thing can be said or expressed in any words how cautelously soever chosen which will not render the whole speech capable of more constructions than one 2. That very many men known to be well affected to the King and his party and reputed otherwayes both learned and conscientious not to mention the Presbyterians most of whom truly for my own part when we speak of learning and conscience I hold to be very little considerable have subscribed the Engagement who in the judgment of Charity we are to presume would not so have done if they had not been perswaded the words might be understood in some such qualified sense as might stand with the duty of Allegiance to the King 3. That as you write it is strongly reported and believed that the King hath given way to the taking of the Engagement rather than that his good Subjects should loose their Estates for refusing the same Which as it is a clear evidence that the King and they who are about him to advise him do not so conceive of the words of this Engagement as if they did necessarily import an abandoning of the Allegiance due to him so 't is if true a matter of great confideration towards the satisfaction of so many as out of that fear only have scrupled the taking of it For the doing of that cannot be reasonably thought to destroy the Subjects Allegiance which the King who expecteth Allegiance from all his Subjects advisedly and upon mature deliberation alloweth them to do III. But all this being granted that the words of the Engagement are capable of such construction yet is not the Conscience thereby fufficiently secured from justly scrupling at the taking thereof unless it may yet further appear that the Subject hath the liberty to make use of such a construction which is in effect the Quaere contained in your Postscript viz. Whether upon supposition that the words of the Engagement will bear more constructions then one the subscriber may take it in his own sense or is bound to take it in the imposers sense or Whether it be necessary or expedient before he subscribe to ask those that require his subscription in what sense they require him to subscribe it Upon the resolution of which Quaere since as I conceive the last resolution of the Judgment wherein the Conscience is to acquiesce doth principally depend I shall endeavor to give you my thoughts therein wherein I acknowledge to have received much light and satisfaction from a discourse written by a very Learned Judicious and Pious friend whereof I lately had the perusal but for some reasons not thought fit to be published as distinctly and clearly as the time I have to do it in will suffer 1. First then for a man that is required of another to give faith by some Oath Promise or other Engagement to take it in a sense of his own manifestly different even in his own apprehension from the others meaning sufficiently expressed by words according to the common custom of speech and the nature of the business which it concerneth is so gross a conceit that had not the impudence of the Jesuits in maintaining the lawfulness of their Equivocations and the sad experience of these late times wherein thousands have cheated themselves in perjury by thinking to avoid it evidenced the contrary it n●ght well have been thought a thing incredible that any man of common understanding should suffer his reason to be so infatuated by his affections as to be deceived thereby For if such latitude of construction should be admitted in Promises and other Obligations of that nature intended for the preservation of faith amongst mankind there would not remain any possible means whereby for men to have assurance of one another meanings Wherefore I take that for a clear truth That all Promises and Assurances wherein Faith is required to be given to another ought to be understood ad mentem imponentis according to the mind and meaning of him to whom the faith is to be given so far forth as the meaning may reasonably appear by the nature of the matter about which it is conversant and such signification of the words whereby it is expressed as according to the ordinary use of speech amongst men agreeth best thereunto The reason whereof is because the faith so required to be given is intended to the behoof and for the interest of him that requireth it namely to the end he may have the better assurance from him that giveth the faith that what is promised shall be accordingly performed which assurance he cannot have if after his meaning sufficiently declared by the words it should yet be at the liberty of the promiser to reserve another secret meaning in his own breast differing therefrom 2. But Secondly what if the intention of the Imposer be not so fully declared by the words and the nature of the business but that the same words may in fair construction be still capable of a double meaning so as taken in one sense they shall bind to More and in another to Less I conceive in such cafe it is not necessary nor alwayes expedient but rather for the most part otherwise for the Promiser before he give faith to demand of the Imposer whether of the two is his meaning But he may by the rule of Prudence and that for ought I see without the violation of any Law of Conscience make his just advantage of that ambiguity and take it in the same sense which shall bind to the Less And this I ground upon the very same reason as before For sith the Faith to be given is intended to the behoof of him to whom it is given it concerneth him to take care that his meaning be expressed in such words as will sufficiently manifest the same to the understanding of a reasonable man Which if he neglect to do no Law of Equity or Prudence bindeth the Promiser by an overscrupulous diligence to make it out whereby to lay a greater obligation upon himself than he needed to doe 3. But then Thirdly if it shall happen as often it cometh to pass when we have to deal with cunning men and may possible be the Case now and undoubtedly was so in the business of the Protestation when the time was That he that requireth the faith to be given do of purpose so contrive the words that there may be left an ambiguity and latitude of sense therein yea and that it be very probable and in a manner apparent upon the consideration of the
least the far greatest part thereof to acknowledge that they are rightly possessed of it and to promise Subjection and Allegiance to them as such And that therefore the Engagement being purposely devised and set on foot as the fittest engine to expedite that work must in all reason intend to oblige so farr Which being so contrary to their Judgment and perswasion concerning the duty and Oath of Allegiance I cannot blame those that so understand the words of the Engagement if they abominate the very thought of taking it But there wanteth not great probability of Reason on the other side to induce us to believe that the latter and lower sense is rather to be deemed the immediate and declared intent of the Imposers whatsoever cause of suspition there may be that the former meaning may be more agreeable to their secret reserved and ultimate intent between which two if there be any difference as it is not impossible but there may be the Engager is not concerned in it or not yet the Equivocation if there be any in that must be put upon the Imposers not on the Promisers score For thus believing there are amongst others these Probabilities 1. That many prudent and conscientious men of the Royal Party as well Divines and Lawyers as others have thus understood it who we presume would not for any outward respect in the world have taken it if they had conceived any more to have been intended in it 2. That it hath often been affirmed both publickly and privately in several parts of the Kingdom if we may believe either common fame or the reports of sundry credible particular persons by those that have perswaded or pressed others to subscribe that the same is the very true intent and meaning of it and no other 3. That if the Imposers had been minded to have declared an intent of binding to More they might easily have framed the words so as not to be capable of a construction binding to Less 4. That as is also credibly reported whilst the form of words was under debate the opinion of those that would have had it set higher was not followed as held unseasonable and the vote carryed for the more moderate expression wherein it now standeth 5. That the Imposers intending by the Engagement to secure themselves especially against the designs and attempts of those men who they knew well enough held them for no other then Usurpers must be in reason supposed to require no more assurance of them by the Engagement then such as may and is usually given to Usurpers which is not an acknowledgment of their title and a promise of Allegiance but meerly a promise of living quietly so long as they are under their power and enjoy their protection 6. That it is a received Maxim of Political prudence for all new Governors especially those that either introduce a new form of Government or come in upon a questionable title to abstain from all harsh procedings even against those whom they know to be evil affected to their Power and not so much as to exasperate them though it be in the power of their hands to destroy them especially in the beginning of their Government but rather to sweeten them into a better opinion of their persons and to win upon them by Acts of Grace and Oblivion for Remissiùs imperanti meliùs paretur So as they may have but any tolerable kind of assurance from them in the mean time of living quietly and peaceably under them We have no reason therefore to believe that the Imposers of this Engagement who have acted the parts of the greatest Politicians so perfectly and succesfully hitherto as to possess themselves so fully os the Supreme Power of so great and flourishing a Kingdom in so few years would be so impolitick as not to proceed by the same rules that all wise and succesful persons have ever practised in the managing and for the establishing of an acquired power VI. Out of all these premises together waying my Positive conclusion either Affirmative or Negative touching the Lawfulness or Unlawfulness of subscribing in universali I shall declare my opinion only in these few following particulars 1. That it is not lawful for any man to take the Engagement with a resolution to break it 2. That therefore whosoever thinketh the words of the Engagement do contain a promise of any thing which it is not lawful for him to perform cannot take it with a good conscience 3. That whosoever so understandeth the words of the Engagement as if they did oblige him to any thing contrary to his Allegiance or render him unable to act according thereunto upon any seasonable emerging occasion cannot with a good conscience take it 4. That if any man for any temporal benefit or avoiding any temporal dammage shall take the Engagement with a doubting conscience that is before he be perswaded in his Judgment upon some probable ground of reason that it is lawful for him so to do he sinneth therein 5. That if any man after a serious desire of informing himself as rightly as he can what are the duties of his Allegiance on the one side and what is most probably the meaning intended by the words of the Engagement on the other side shall find himself well satisfied in this perswasion that the performance in the mean time of what is required by the Engagement so understood is no way contrary for any thing he can discern for the present to his bounden Allegiance so long as he is under such a force as that he cannot exercise it and likewise that whensoever that force is so removed from him or he from under it as that he hath power to act according to his Allegiance the Obligation of the Engagement of it self determineth and expireth and out of these considerations rather then suffer extreme prejudice in his person estate or necessary relations shall subscribe the Engagement Since his own heart condemneth him not neither will I. Sir I have now two requests to you which I doubt not but you will think reasonable The one that whatsoever use you shall please to make of these papers or any thing therein contained for your own or any friends satisfaction yet you would not deliver any Copies abroad least they should come to be printed as some other papers of mine written in this manner have been without my knowledge This I desire both in respect of the danger I might incur from the displeasure of the Potent Party if any such thing should come abroad as also least upon the consideration of some things here hinted they might think the words of the Engagement too light and might thence take occasion to lay some heavier Obligation upon us in words that should oblige to More The other request is that since I have not any other perfect copy of what I now send you you would procure it to be transcribed for me and either the copy so transcribed or these very