speak he shall give on account for it at the day of judgement The word Idle in the Original as without work says Causabone de verborum usu 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 is contracted of 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 every Idle word is every word without deed and must import thus much whatsoever it does more that when men make strict professions and determine so rigidly in points of duty and do not answer their own dictates and sayings let them take heed lest by their words least ex ore tuo as being Idle words they bring not themselves into a just condemnation I will therefore advise this worthy person and all men in resolving Cases of Conscience that they take heed of setting down any matter for the binding of others then according to which in their own practise they dare be content to be judged by The determining the obligation of human Laws Indefinitely on the Conscience is more then any mortall can bear For my own part I will protest that whilst I allow the Conscience to be bound by the Law of men when those Laws tend to the common good yet do I not hereby cut my self of from the reserve of any liberty that may arise to me from a farther disquisition although I count it but necessary both to give my reason why in sincerity I hold so and to deliver my conception of that obligation It is a saying of the Antients a man is not born for himself only but for his Country which is not writ only in Cicero but in the heart of all men for this is a truth throughout the earth and delivered by God all along his word while he makes our own selves to be the rule of our carriage towards our Neighbours that we mind not our own things only but every one the things of others Though we study and seek the tranquillity and peace of those with whom we live and consequently in all Societies and Communities we should regard the publick concern even above our particular advantage These are general moral precepts which are writ I say in the heart of man and to be proved in Gods word The Magistrate I account now is Gods Minister to consider of and then design and appoint the particular things or instances wherein every one in their several places are serviceable in these duties and ends and upon that designation of the particular things the obligation flows from those general precepts of God upon the Conscience for their observation I say there is the general Institution of God for Societies and that men in society shall mind and endeavour in their place the publick concern and not their own only The Magistrate is his commissiâ—ted Officer to design appoint or set apart and so declare the instances or particular things which are conducive to this good of the community which they all are bound to intend upon the designation appointment or declaration of these things the obligation flows immediately from the general institution of God upon the Conscience for the observing of them when there could flow none else from these particulars themselves The particular laws or things themselves we know are not the precepts of God and the Conscience is obliged only by Gods will but the general institution of society and that we should seek and endeavour in our place the good of the Publick as our own and above our own in such particulars as be conducive truly to that end is of God and the Magistrate I say according to his office designing these particulars we come not ratione consequentis or absoluté only because such things commanded but ratione conseqâ—â—ntiae or ex hypothesi because such things commanded do come under the divine institution to have the Conscience bound to their performance From hence it follows likewise that if these instances or particulars do not indeed come under the service of these general duties or end such a law is to be lookt upon as cut off from Gods institution and so can have no authority derived to it from God for the obliging the Conscience of any when yet the outward man out of the case of sin is still acknowledged to be bound The particular commands of the Magistrate does I say bind the outward man but the general institution or the moral duty in general of seeking the welfare of the Publick and not our own only is that which binds the Conscience which otherwise were not bound As for the fifth Commandement which requires honor and obedience such as is meet to our superiours I do not here distinguish it from but include it in this general institution for that command must be understood as a comprehensive thing containing in it the whole commission the superiour hath from God which granting him his power to command doth also set the bounds and limitations to that power that he command no other things or no otherwise then as he hath appointed and upon supposition that the superior acts only according to his commission that is according to his prescribed duty or rule in civil things this Commandement of God doâ—â— lay an obligation on the subject to obey him out of Conscience If you will say upon this that the Magistrate hath a derived authority from God for this very act of determining the material objâ—ct of our obedience and therefore besides the obligation which flows from his institution when the matter is determined the Conscâ—ence must be obliged from the Magistrats determination it self by vertue of that derived authority from him I have no need to gain say it and whether you will make it a double obligation or an obligation from a double causality or a mixt obligation divine and human it matters nothing to our dispute so long as Gods authority in the things commanded or his allowance that they be commanded be first acknowledged before we look upon the Conscience to be indeed concerned in them This is certain every authority that is derived must be limited and that according to the will of him from whence it is derived The authority God reserves in his own hands is that alone which is unlimimited and infinite Now the limits God hath set the Magistrate as to the determining the particulars of his subjects duty which is his power of making laws comes to this that he choose them only out of that general matter that is conducive to the end of government the publick good that is to observe the rule of things political If he shall therefore appoint any particular things for his own profit pleasure or humour which come not under this general matter to wit quae habet rationem publici commodi as God hath prescribed it is manifest that he acts not according to his commission and so can have no power derived from thence for those acts or laws and consequently however such laws do bind us in his courts they are of no validity in the court of Conscience We will acknowledge in whatsoever he
judgdement of each particular when the law is made there depends no concern but a mans own and that respecting his inward man only Now its certain that the Magistrate in regard of such an effect as depends upon his judgement hath need indeed of the greatest wisdome and the ablest Councel and he cannot be too cautions in his proceeding seeing if he be mistaken and the Consciences of the Subjects be not obliged by such a law yet are their persons liable to be compelled and they must not resist which may prove a vast inconvenience and to be avoided only by a right information at first about the matter But as for a private person who judges not what is best for the peoples good as he speaks right in regard to the Magistrate but onely judges of the thing commanded whether it be agreeable or not to the will of God or the rule of his which he hath given to the world about Politicals if they forget not to minde it to wit that it be in â—eneral for their good the effect which I have said does attend such a judgement is of that nature onely as requires no greater understanding or discretion then every man hath for himself to act by in all the rest of his life and conversation He judges here according to his Rule in these things as he doth in other of his actions according to the word whether he be bound or not bound in Conscience to them And God requires of him to judge and act but according to his talent in all business whatsoever He will acknowledge the outward man to be bound and in a matter of his soul which concerns no body but him or the inward obligation of his Conscience you must leave him to God and his own Judgement His next reason is That when Men know what is conducing to their good they are not apt to do it without a Law And what does this prove or contradict It proves it good therefore that the people have a Law-giver or Governor and that he should be wiser and better then they as Plato may urge it But does it follow they may not therefore judge whether the thing commanded be for their good Surely this will be a good reason why the people should judge of it For if the good they conceive in it is the reason they admit to have any Law and the argument to press them to obey it then must they judge of that good and whether it be conducive to that good or not In the mean while the difference of the reason and ends which is distinguished in the Magistrates judging of a thing to be for the common good or not and the peoples does sufficiently declare the weakness and vanity of such speeches as this Man hath several of He that makes every Man judge of what is for the peoples good takes away the principal power of the Magistrate And why so as if it were an act of power and that usurped for any but the Prince to have a judgement of discretion over his civil actions Again if the people be able to judge of that there is no need of any Law or Law-giver As if when men knew their duty they needed no Magistrate to make them do it and that while himself too is telling us the need of Laws because men aâ—e not like to prefer the publick good though they comprehend it before that of their own particular persons I cannot I perceive be throughly intent to answer what is insignificant but the substance in the main of these two reasons comes to this that every man is not able to bring the thing commanded by the Magistrate to the rule so as to judge whether it be for the common good or not and therefore they must act only upon the judgement of the Law-giver and consequently be no reasonable agents in their Political obedience For satisfaction therefore to this Let us conceive the Magistrate commanding something moral or Religious there are no Protestants but do hold that every man for himself must bring here what is commanded to the rule of the moral Law and Scripture and according as himself believes it consonant or not to the rule he judges it so is he bound to obey it or not to to obey it Now let any man who hath but the heart to think and speak with integrity consider whether a rude and illiterate man that never could read a word in the Bible be more able to judge whether a thing commanded by the Magistrate be agreeable or not to the word of God or whether it be conducive or not to the common good suppose the Waggoner as unlearned as any man I will ask whether such a man be not more able to judge of the Law concerning Waggons that is whether it be good for the high wayes and consequently whether he had best or not observe the act then to judge whether the Doctrine and Discipline of the Church of England or whether whatsoever is contained in the whole Book of Common Prayer with the Rites and Ceremonies be agreeable or not to the Scriptures of the old and New Testament I suppose there is no man will have the hardiâ—sse to oppose such a manifest conviction And if in regard to his practice this man and every other that uses the Common-prayer must judge as well as he can of the lawfulness of it or else he cannot act in faith and so likewise of all those doctrines or practises he yields unto them then will there I hope be no stumbling block left here upon this account I do advance therefore and rest upon this one argument if the incapacity unfitness or little ability that some men have to judge of what is required by the Magistrate whether it be agreeable or no to the common good be a reason sufficient for the denying to the subject such a judgement then must the lesser ability of such to judge whether that which is required be agreeable to the word of God be a reason sufficient to discharge them from judging of it by the word But the consequent is false and therefore the antecedent By the way observe if any man distinguish between judging of a Law whether it be for a common good and judging of the thing commanded by a law or rather of a mans own doing the thing commanded whether it be for the publick good or not I am to be understood of the last when I say the Magistrate judges of the thing in reference to his passing it into a law and we judge of it so passed in reference to our obedience or obligation by it His third reason is the same with the first The people are so far from being able to judge that the wisest Princes find it difficult only we have more words for the enlargement which consist partly in a grave kind of discourse from a passage of a Bishop Bramhall of the severall things and circumstances that the Law-giver is to weigh in
of God as the word is The Rule and supream Law which God hath appointed for things Political is the common good If the Magistrate command any thing in Religion and it be not according to Gods word then Conscience cannot be bound to it as Religious though the outward Man I think therein also is bound if it be not against Gods word It the Magistrate command any thing of moral concern if it be against the Law of nature or common principles of Light in Man that is the moral Law in the heart the Conscience cannot be bound but must refuse it If he command any thing which is civil or Political and it be against the common good then is it not agreeable to Gods will being not consonant to the rule he hath commanded for civils and consequently the Conscience cannot be obleiged by it upon that accompt In the mean while so long as it is not against conscience otherwise that is so long as it is not sin the outward man is bound and if the Magistrate will constrain a person to it rather then suffer he will obey There are several books and Sermons of Ministers about Religion which do bind the Readers and Hearers by vertue of Gods will but the supream Rule is Gods Word unto which consequently if what they have said or writ be not consonant the Conscience is not bound and according as the Conscience of a Man is convinced whether that which the Minister says be agreeable to the word or not so is it bound or not bound by it The case is the same in Laws The Magistrate doth give us such and such particular commands or Laws His authority he hath from God The will of God as the supream Law or Rule in Politicalls is that the common good be attended and advanced They are Gods Ministers a sending continually upon this very thing So far as his Laws or commands then are agreeable to the common good so far is his Authority good and must obleige the Conscience being from God And so long as a man is convinced in Conscience that they are agreeable thereunto he must be in Conscience obleiged but if he be sincerely perswaded that such or such a thing commanded be not for the publick good the case is but the same with what I said in Religion when the Ministers exhortation disagrees with the word The Magistrate is but Gods Minister in Politicals and his commands disagreeing with the supream Law the common good the Conscience cannot be obleiged in this Case Nevertheless so long as the outward Man is in the Magistrates power and the Subject may not resist he can command obedience out of the case of sin when he pleases to exert his Sword Before I pass off I am made a little sensible how apt our question may be wrested into a dispuâ—e about Terms It is hardly proper to say this or that Law binds the Conscience for Conscience is the discerner of my duty and it were more proper to say my conscience binds me to this Law then that this Law binds it It is scarce proper neither to say the Conscience is bound seeing it is the person is bound Conscience is placed in the understanding and when a thing becomes a Mans duty the will is obleiged rather then the understanding It is not easie likewise to apprehend how the outward man is bound with distinction to the Conscience considering that this obligation hath it's rise and vertue from our duty of not resisting unto which we are always bound in Conscience The term Resisting likewise is liable to diversity of acceptation It is convenient therefore for me in my way to give the sense of my Terms if it be not yet done enough to prevent needless contention By human Laws I understand the declaration of the will of the rightful Governor what he would have his Subjects do I will not also put in the end of Laws in order to the common good because that will presently spoyl the question For where the efficient is our rightful Ruler and the Law serves indeed for that end or hath it's right final cause also there is no question of its obligation Yet if I leave out the end the question indeed may be whether such a declaration be a Law rather then whether it binds Nevertheless as I make a case of conscience of it and count all our Acts of Parliament Laws it is all one in effect to me whether you say such a Law binds not or such an Act or Law is no Law and binds not Ex quo intelliges eos qui perniciosa et injusta populis jussa descripserius cum contra feceriut quod polliciti pro fessique slatâ— quoduis potius tulisse quam leges Cicero de legious By Conscience I understand a faculty in Man of descerning Gods Judgement concerning himself and Actions It is more proper to say a faculty is obleiged then an habit or an Act and that faculty which man hath hereunto is charged whilst himself is to judge whether such a thing commanded be his duty in relation to God or not By obligation I understand the constitution of a due Obligare est jus constituere By obligation of the Conscience I understand the constituting a thing to bedue from me so that if I do it not I must account or judge that God will condemn me for the neglect or the making a thing my duty so that if I leave it undone I sin The obligation of the outward man I account the constituting a thing to be due from me so as if I do it not I may not resist though I be punished or I may be punished and ought not to resiâ—t though I could avoid both the thing and punishment by resistance The word lacere says Grotius from one line of whom a man shall have more Instruction sometimes then from anothers book is distinguished in id quod impune fiâ— and in id quod vâ—tio caret So must we say the word obligare is distinguished into that which if we do not the thing makes us liable to punishment in foro humano or according to the law or that which if we do it not makes us liable to sin That is there is an obligation human only which we have had before that tyes us to obedience upon the penalty of the law or an obligation divine also which ties us to the duty upon the pain of Gods displeasure eternal condemnation The one of these we call the obligation of the outward man and the other of the Conscience By resistance lastly I understand the repelling force with force The word resistance may be taken largely or strictly Resistitur contra Imperium agendo aut vim vi reprimâ—ndo I take it in the last and strict sence Let me yet note one thing more when we distinguish in the obligation of human laws between the outward man and the Conscience we do not distinguish the outward man from the will when we distinguish
Gods In morals the case is not thus whatsoever is not according to Gods will is against it But in civil and indifferent things a thing may not be against his will that is against any moral precept as our obedience I speak of to some human Laws and yet have none of his Authority for it Thus prudence the preservation of my self and the Magistrates honour may prevail with me to do a thing which I think otherwise I have no obligation to do in my Conscience I will yet add I distinguish my obediénce and my obedience out of Conscience or my obedience out of other generall rersons and my obedience out of Conscience to this particular command I do not resolve my obedience into a judgement of private discretion whether a Law be for the common good or no for I can apprehend easily that when God hath required the Magistrate to make no Law but according to this rule no unjust or unprofitable Law he hath not yet commanded that I should never obey such a Law I may obey out of a generall implicit apprehension of duty or a singular love to my superiors person for fear of his displeasure to avoid the danger of the Law or out of severall prudentiall considerations regarding the Magistrate my self or others when yet If I come to the point whether I am bound in Conscience to do the particular thing commanded that is whether there lyes a divine obligation on me as well as that from the Law to do it I am on necessity then to examine it by the rule which God hath set me and that being no other but the common good in politicalls I must resolve my obedience out of Conscience into this judgement when I resolve my prudentiall obedience otherwise It may suffice me therein so long as the thing is not sinfull that I am obliged by man It may be but very rare if I question my Rulers commandment which is like to be only perhaps in some grievous pressure If the Law be bad my obedience yet and my example may do good nor does the Magistrates abuse of his office I hope take away my liberty to endure it if I please The true ends moreover hapily of obedience may be obtained when the end of Ruling is neglected Nay the common good may be promoted possibly by my yeilding to a Law when the Law it self does cross it And farther my disobedience may do more hurt to the common good then the obeying that hurtfull command would do So farre am I from discouraging any from obedience to human Laws as a thing generally good and prudentiall when I would keep the Conscience free and not have it burdened with sin for every want of their performance I see indeed by this and other learned persons what an immagination they have got that if I resolve the question whether I am in Conscience obliged to obey such a Law by my private judging of the thing commanded whether it be agreeable or not to the common good I do usurpe the place of the Ruler and make myself only my own Law-giver as they are apt to speak But this is a mistake for besides that when I judge of the thing commanded by its Rule this judgement of mine is not the maker of my duty but the discerner of it and so I do not become any Law-giver to my self in the business I distinguish the obligation of a human Law and the obligation of Conscience formaliter simpliciter by that Law If I resolved the whole obligation of human Laws into this Ruâ—e and my judgement of the Law by it so that I held it must never be obeyed on other reasons or that if I were punished for not obeying I was not bound to submit then did I offer injury indeed to my Ruâ—er and usurped his Government But if I resolve only the obligation of my Conscience by that Law into this rule and my judgement of it accordingly I usurpe no power of the Magistrates which I leave him still over the exterior man but I keep God only as I ought in his own feat of the Conscience And verily if the Conscience of man be concerned in every human law I would fain know how any of our great Clerks can say that human laws bind not in the case of intollerable griveance If God does command me to do the thing it is not any griveance of minde can excuse me but if it be man indeed commands it only and not God the griveance will be reason enough for me to call it in question and to avoid it if I may but the reason of my non-obedience must not have this foundation that it is my grievance or that I cannot endure it but that consideratis considerandis I am not obliged to it in Conscience CAP. VII THus far his exceptions are but words let us pass now to his reasons against my answer His first reason is It is no easy thing to judge what is best for the Peoples good Kings themselves find it necessary to have their Councets to advise about it To judge what is best for the Peoples good is indeed a high matter To judge only whether a thing be for the common good or not is another matter The judgement of every one is free and any body may judge of any thing as he is able and as he will The Cock may pass his judgement on the Pearl he scraped up That which comes to carry any stress upon judging is the consideration of the effect that depends upon that judgement The judging of a thing which a Man himself hath to do hath this effect depending on it the doing his duty every one is to judge of all those things and circumstances which belong to his own acts whether or no they be agreeable to Gods will that he may do as he ought and the rule of this will in politicals I have declared There is the act now of the Magistrate and the act of the Subject There is a great difference of the concern or moment that lies on a judgement of the same thing when the act of the one depends upon it and when there depends upon it the act only of the other The act of the Magistrate is to make the law and see it executed the act of the People is to obey it By this first reason of his against my answer do I see good reason for it and the sufficiency of it The Magistrate judges whether a thing be for the common good or according to our supream rule in reference to his passing it into a law and then to cause it to be executed The People and every particular person does judge whether the thing commanded be for the common good in reference only to the obligation of their Consciences to obedience Upon the judgement of the Magistrate there does depend an effect of universal concernment that is the obligation of a whole Nation to live according to the Law he makes upon the