Selected quad for the lemma: duty_n

Word A	Word B	Word C	Word D	Occurrence	Frequency Band	MI	MI Band	Prominent
duty_n	action_n	law_n	rule_n	1,234	5	7.2505	4	true

Text snippets containing the quad

ID	Title	Author	Corrected Date of Publication (TCP Date of Publication)	STC	Words	Pages
A39389	To en archy: or, An exercitation upon a momentous question in divinity, and case of conscience viz. whether it be lawfull for any person to act contrary to the opinion of his own consicence, formed from arguments that to him appear very probable, though not necessary or demonstrative. Where the opinions of the papists, Vasquez, Sanches, Azonius, &c. are shewed, as also the opinions of some Protestants, viz. Mr. Hooker, Bp Sanderson, Dr. Fulwood, &c. and compared with the opinions of others; the negative part of the question maintained; the unreasonableness of the popish opinions, and some Protestants, for blind obedience, detected; and many other things discoursed. By a Protestant.	Protestant.; Collinges, John, 1623-1690, attributed name.	1675 (1675)	Wing E718; Wing C5314_CANCELLED; ESTC R214929	62,722	96

thing be a necessary Duty he sinneth in not doing it Vasquez saith it is against the very Law of Nature Sanchez saith that although the Law of God be the primary Rule yet every mans Conscience is the proximate Rule of his Actions and therefore be cannot Act against it Dr. Ames saith That he who doth it Interpretatively sins against God For he must needs do contrary to what he believeth to be the will of God Eiliacius tract 21. M. Qu. c. 4. saith That he which doth it doth that which he thinketh to be sin And saith he hoc ipso amat peccatum by this thing he sheweth he loveth to sin and chuseth sin But this is not our Question We suppose a Man not to be fully and demonstrably perswaded that this or that Action is unlawful but onely upon Arguments which seem to him very probable verily to believe it is unlawful and Quaery whether while he so believeth he can do that thing And this Question divideth it self according to the different Notion of an Opinion which we before hinted viz. Whether a Man thus perswaded of the unlawfulness of an Action by Arguments indeed not demonstrative but such as he judgeth very probable and which he himself cannot Answer so neither doth he think others can may yet because his Principles are not Supernaturally or Mathematically made certain to him act against the Opinion of his own Conscience in Obedience to the will of any Creature 2. Whether a Man thus perswaded of the unlawfulness of any thing by Arguments not demonstrative but probable as before said though at present he can neither himself answer them nor see them answered by any other yet suspecting they may be answered may while this is the Condition of his Conscience act against the present judgment of it though it be incumbred with such a Jealousie or Suspition Now as to the first of these Questions we find little or nothing spoken in the Affirmative by any Popish Casuists or School-men They generally making some fear of the contrary part of the Practical Proposition to which the Person inclineth and Jealousie that this part of the proposition is false and his Arguments Answerable essential to an Opinion conclude that a Soul perswaded though but upon probable Arguments if it hath no such fear suspition or Jealousie to have a fixed Conscience and though fixed in an Error yet conclude it utterly unlawful for a Man to Act against it But if there be in any Soul any fear suspition or Jealousie that its Arguments may be Answered then they conclude the Soul but Opining and do indeed d●spute for a Lawfulness to Act against it though under several Cautions and limitations At this rebound therefore we will take the Question and state it thus Quest Whether supposing a Man or Woman not Demonstrably perswaded that this or that Action is unlawful but from arguments which to him or her appear very probable verily believing so yet not without some Jealousie Fear or Suspition that he may be mistaken and his arguments may be answered may whiles he thus believes do that thing in Obedience to Men which in this manner he judgeth sinful and unlawful to be done For the clearer handling of this momentous and important Question we shall with all Candor Examine 1. What Divines of all sorts whether Popish or Protestant have determined in the case and upon what grounds 2. We shall endeavour to defend the Negative part of the Question proving it wickedness for any to act contrary to the judgment of their own Consciences though that Judgment be onely made up from intrinsick probable arguments 3. We shall answer the Objections of those who have spoke any thing for the affirmative with any colour of Reason CHAP. II. The Opinions of Popish School-men and Casuists in the Case particularly of Vasquez Sanchez Medina Filiucius Azorius Their Monstrous Assertions what they make necessary to make an Opinion probable The Opinion of one Doctor according to them sufficient to warrant Men to Act contrary to their own Opinions Their Opinions what a Man ought to do when Superiours Command Inferiours what the Inferiours judge unlawful The summe of their detestable Doctrine § 1. WE will begin with the Popish Authors Vasquez tells us that the Question is not Whether a Man ought not to follow the Judgment of his own Conscience or could act against it but when it happeneth that there are two opposite Opinions about a thing to be done One saying it is a sin to do it another saith it is not The difficulty is saith he how a Man should carry himself betwixt them so as to form up a singular Judgment of Conscience which without sin he may embrace Vasquez in 12. disp 72. cap. 2. So then the Jesuite it seemeth doth yield the case viz. That if once a Man hath formed a particular Judgment of Conscience that the thing is unlawful though it be but from probable Arguments he cannot do it he onely prescribes in a variety of Opinions in the World as to a singular Matter how Men should well form that Judgment But not to wrong him in the 4. cap. of that Disputation n. 15. he seems to be of another mind and asserteth That a Man in some Cases may act contrary to his own Opinion yea that a Learned Man may Lawfully act contrary to his own Opinion according to the Opinion of others though it be less safe and less probable than his own provided there be any Reason and probability for the Opinion of those others Yet still retaining his Opinion as more probable looking upon that Opinion of others as probable by extrinsecal Arguments that is the Authority Judgments and Testimony of others though he judgeth his own Opinion more probable by intrinsick Arguments The Reasons he gives for this are these 1. Because we may act according to any Opinion which seemeth probable to us We will anon Argue that Case whether it be possible that any thing from meer extrinsick Arguments can seem probable to a reasonable Soul The contrary to which at the same time seems probable from intrinsick Arguments But we know how far the Doctrine of Probabilities serves the woful Interest of that Apostate Synagogue of Rome Largo Proventu est gnavum non deceptura colonum 2. Because it seems incredible to be true that a Man may not do what all the World judgeth Lawful if he alone judgeth it unlawful All the World we confess is a large term and puts the Case to the highest pinch but yet it seems not at all incredible if that be true which the School-men Universally agree That the particular Conscience must be the proximate Rule of action For what shall it profit a Man more to follow all the World than to gain all the World if be loseth his own Soul A Man is certainly bound to follow his own Rules not anothers These are that Jesuites best Reasons He confesseth that in this he followeth Medina some of

an Action appear probably Lawful though at the same time from intrinsick Arguments we Judge it probably unlawful A Pill so nauseous so brutish as it is impossible we should swallow it till we have vomited up our rational Souls And 't is the more odious to us because it is of such affinity to the detestable Blind Obedience of the Church of Rome But to defeat these men of any hopes of prevailing by such Mediums we will shortly enquire into another Question though not the same yet of great Cognation with this which we have now so largely discussed CHAP. VI. Second Quest Whether it be Naturally possible for any Person in a Practical Proposition to judge that part probably Lawful from extrinsick Arguments the contrary to which he at the same time Judgeth probably unlawful from intrinsick Arguments The Question opened The Opinions of Vasquez Sanchez The Negative part of the Question maintained because this is contrary to the Principles of a Rational Soul The Conclusion § 1. WE have had Occasions once and again to hint the known distinction between Speculative and Practical Propositions Divines call those Propositions Speculative whose use and advantage is onely terminated in Speculation and Knowledge and from whence nothing in Practice is Directed They call those Practical whose end is the guidance and direction of the Practice But Speculative Propositions must be again distinguished into such 1. From which no Obligation ariseth to the Exercise of any rational Act of ours Such as these That there was such a City as Troy such a King of France as Pipin c. with a thousand such like 2. Such the Truth of which inferreth the performance of some Rational Action of ours and such as is our Duty towards God as these That the Scriptures are the Word of God That Christ is the Eternally existent Son of God But our Question relates to none of these but to such Propositions onely where the Question is Whether it be Lawful for me to do this or that or no This is that we mean by a Practical Proposition § 2. In our Discourse upon the former Question we have also often hinted what we mean by Extrinsecal and Intrinscal Arguments The singular Judgment of every intelligent Person 's Conscience is formed from some Arguments drawn either from Principles of Reason or Propositions of Scripture These Arguments are either from plain letter of Scripture or Principles of Reason accounted Infallible which fix the Conscience Or else they are drawn from Logical Topicks and called Dialectick Arguments or Probable For Optimus Philosophus nondum nascitur We say These probable Arguments are again either Intrinsecal called Artificial Arguments by the Logicians fetched from the Causes Effects Consequents Adjuncts or other Affections of the Subject or predicate in the Question 2. Such as are meerly Extrinsick Logicians call them In-artificial because every Dunce may bring them they have no Art at all in them Divines call them Extrinsecal because they are Forreign to the in ward parts of the Question and the Soul that brings them These are such as are fetched from Authority and Testimony of others Testimonies of Fathers School-men former or Modern Divines c. Now it is demonstratively Truth That it is possible that a soul should have a great many Arguments appearing to it very probable and such as it cannot Answer and scarcely believes that any other can to prove a thing unlawful and at the same time meet with many Testimonies and sayings of Fathers Councils School-men Casuists Ancienter or more Modern Divines speaking the thing Lawful It is the Case of the Non-Conformists this day Though they meet not with any Fathers Councils c. who judge the things Lawful which they do judge unlawful yet many present Divines they do meet with yet they cannot but from Intrinsick Dialectick Arguments think the things utterly unlawful § 3. Now the Question is in this Case what they shall do They do not deny but it is their Duty upon the Testimonies of Superiours and their Commands or hearing the Judgment of so many Learned Men of another Mind to examine again their own Arguments and to try them to the utmost But supposing at last which is the Case the things yet seem to them from very probable Arguments unlawful what shall they do They may say the Jesuites do such things or not do them For this is the Jesuites help against the abominable absurdity of Acting contrary to an Opining Conscience They say While it it but an Opinion a Man may Opine both contradictory parts of the same Question the one upon Intrinsick the other upon Extrinsick Arguments and although as we shewed before the Opinion which is formed upon Artificial proper intrinsick Arguments must needs be more probable Yet they say a man is not tyed up to magis and minus in the Case It is ground enough say they for any man to act Conscientiously if the thing appear any way probable he is not bound to act according to that which he judgeth more probable So that say they if a thing appear probably Lawful by Extrinsick Arguments the Opinion of some Doctors c. we may do it though at the same time we judge it never so unlawful from Intrinsick Artificial Arguments fetched from all the Topicks in Logick and affections of the subject and Praedictate of the Question § 9. The Case is so weighty and this Opinion so unmanly and Brutish that it is reasonable we should bring forth one or two who shall vouch for themselves and their Brethren that this is what they say and hold Let Vasquez a Man of no small repute amongst them speak first out of his Disput in 12 ae disput 62. Cap. 3. n. 11. Tertio Observandum est eum qui habet assensum unius partis propositionis per propria intrinseca principia etiamsi assensus ille tantum sit probabilis non posse habere assensum alterius pactis per intrinseca propria principia bene tamen posse per externa principia existimari oppositam partem esse probabilem v. plura ibid. cap. 40. n. 15. Sanchez sings the same Song Op. Moral l. 1. cap. 9. n. 12. Vltimum fundamentum est ut duas Opiniones ediametro sibi contradicentes idem intellectus judicet probabiles aut aequè aut alteram probabiliorem he shews this is according to the Opinion of Azorius and Vasquez before quoted And then goeth on telling us that he seeth no Reason but the same Understanding may judge the contradictory parts of the same Proposition both probably true or false lawful or unlawful and that Experience proves it But this is surely a Note above Ela and a Riddle in Philosophy The Jesuites being pinched with that obvious Argument That then the same Soul and at the same time and the same thing may assent to contradictions and blow hot and cold bless and curse with the same breath They think to avoid it by telling us that the