judgdement of each particular when the law is made there depends no concern but a mans own and that respecting his inward man only Now its certain that the Magistrate in regard of such an effect as depends upon his judgement hath need indeed of the greatest wisdome and the ablest Councel and he cannot be too cautions in his proceeding seeing if he be mistaken and the Consciences of the Subjects be not obliged by such a law yet are their persons liable to be compelled and they must not resist which may prove a vast inconvenience and to be avoided only by a right information at first about the matter But as for a private person who judges not what is best for the peoples good as he speaks right in regard to the Magistrate but onely judges of the thing commanded whether it be agreeable or not to the will of God or the rule of his which he hath given to the world about Politicals if they forget not to minde it to wit that it be in â—eneral for their good the effect which I have said does attend such a judgement is of that nature onely as requires no greater understanding or discretion then every man hath for himself to act by in all the rest of his life and conversation He judges here according to his Rule in these things as he doth in other of his actions according to the word whether he be bound or not bound in Conscience to them And God requires of him to judge and act but according to his talent in all business whatsoever He will acknowledge the outward man to be bound and in a matter of his soul which concerns no body but him or the inward obligation of his Conscience you must leave him to God and his own Judgement His next reason is That when Men know what is conducing to their good they are not apt to do it without a Law And what does this prove or contradict It proves it good therefore that the people have a Law-giver or Governor and that he should be wiser and better then they as Plato may urge it But does it follow they may not therefore judge whether the thing commanded be for their good Surely this will be a good reason why the people should judge of it For if the good they conceive in it is the reason they admit to have any Law and the argument to press them to obey it then must they judge of that good and whether it be conducive to that good or not In the mean while the difference of the reason and ends which is distinguished in the Magistrates judging of a thing to be for the common good or not and the peoples does sufficiently declare the weakness and vanity of such speeches as this Man hath several of He that makes every Man judge of what is for the peoples good takes away the principal power of the Magistrate And why so as if it were an act of power and that usurped for any but the Prince to have a judgement of discretion over his civil actions Again if the people be able to judge of that there is no need of any Law or Law-giver As if when men knew their duty they needed no Magistrate to make them do it and that while himself too is telling us the need of Laws because men aâ—e not like to prefer the publick good though they comprehend it before that of their own particular persons I cannot I perceive be throughly intent to answer what is insignificant but the substance in the main of these two reasons comes to this that every man is not able to bring the thing commanded by the Magistrate to the rule so as to judge whether it be for the common good or not and therefore they must act only upon the judgement of the Law-giver and consequently be no reasonable agents in their Political obedience For satisfaction therefore to this Let us conceive the Magistrate commanding something moral or Religious there are no Protestants but do hold that every man for himself must bring here what is commanded to the rule of the moral Law and Scripture and according as himself believes it consonant or not to the rule he judges it so is he bound to obey it or not to to obey it Now let any man who hath but the heart to think and speak with integrity consider whether a rude and illiterate man that never could read a word in the Bible be more able to judge whether a thing commanded by the Magistrate be agreeable or not to the word of God or whether it be conducive or not to the common good suppose the Waggoner as unlearned as any man I will ask whether such a man be not more able to judge of the Law concerning Waggons that is whether it be good for the high wayes and consequently whether he had best or not observe the act then to judge whether the Doctrine and Discipline of the Church of England or whether whatsoever is contained in the whole Book of Common Prayer with the Rites and Ceremonies be agreeable or not to the Scriptures of the old and New Testament I suppose there is no man will have the hardiâ—sse to oppose such a manifest conviction And if in regard to his practice this man and every other that uses the Common-prayer must judge as well as he can of the lawfulness of it or else he cannot act in faith and so likewise of all those doctrines or practises he yields unto them then will there I hope be no stumbling block left here upon this account I do advance therefore and rest upon this one argument if the incapacity unfitness or little ability that some men have to judge of what is required by the Magistrate whether it be agreeable or no to the common good be a reason sufficient for the denying to the subject such a judgement then must the lesser ability of such to judge whether that which is required be agreeable to the word of God be a reason sufficient to discharge them from judging of it by the word But the consequent is false and therefore the antecedent By the way observe if any man distinguish between judging of a Law whether it be for a common good and judging of the thing commanded by a law or rather of a mans own doing the thing commanded whether it be for the publick good or not I am to be understood of the last when I say the Magistrate judges of the thing in reference to his passing it into a law and we judge of it so passed in reference to our obedience or obligation by it His third reason is the same with the first The people are so far from being able to judge that the wisest Princes find it difficult only we have more words for the enlargement which consist partly in a grave kind of discourse from a passage of a Bishop Bramhall of the severall things and circumstances that the Law-giver is to weigh in
of God as the word is The Rule and supream Law which God hath appointed for things Political is the common good If the Magistrate command any thing in Religion and it be not according to Gods word then Conscience cannot be bound to it as Religious though the outward Man I think therein also is bound if it be not against Gods word It the Magistrate command any thing of moral concern if it be against the Law of nature or common principles of Light in Man that is the moral Law in the heart the Conscience cannot be bound but must refuse it If he command any thing which is civil or Political and it be against the common good then is it not agreeable to Gods will being not consonant to the rule he hath commanded for civils and consequently the Conscience cannot be obleiged by it upon that accompt In the mean while so long as it is not against conscience otherwise that is so long as it is not sin the outward man is bound and if the Magistrate will constrain a person to it rather then suffer he will obey There are several books and Sermons of Ministers about Religion which do bind the Readers and Hearers by vertue of Gods will but the supream Rule is Gods Word unto which consequently if what they have said or writ be not consonant the Conscience is not bound and according as the Conscience of a Man is convinced whether that which the Minister says be agreeable to the word or not so is it bound or not bound by it The case is the same in Laws The Magistrate doth give us such and such particular commands or Laws His authority he hath from God The will of God as the supream Law or Rule in Politicalls is that the common good be attended and advanced They are Gods Ministers a sending continually upon this very thing So far as his Laws or commands then are agreeable to the common good so far is his Authority good and must obleige the Conscience being from God And so long as a man is convinced in Conscience that they are agreeable thereunto he must be in Conscience obleiged but if he be sincerely perswaded that such or such a thing commanded be not for the publick good the case is but the same with what I said in Religion when the Ministers exhortation disagrees with the word The Magistrate is but Gods Minister in Politicals and his commands disagreeing with the supream Law the common good the Conscience cannot be obleiged in this Case Nevertheless so long as the outward Man is in the Magistrates power and the Subject may not resist he can command obedience out of the case of sin when he pleases to exert his Sword Before I pass off I am made a little sensible how apt our question may be wrested into a dispuâ—e about Terms It is hardly proper to say this or that Law binds the Conscience for Conscience is the discerner of my duty and it were more proper to say my conscience binds me to this Law then that this Law binds it It is scarce proper neither to say the Conscience is bound seeing it is the person is bound Conscience is placed in the understanding and when a thing becomes a Mans duty the will is obleiged rather then the understanding It is not easie likewise to apprehend how the outward man is bound with distinction to the Conscience considering that this obligation hath it's rise and vertue from our duty of not resisting unto which we are always bound in Conscience The term Resisting likewise is liable to diversity of acceptation It is convenient therefore for me in my way to give the sense of my Terms if it be not yet done enough to prevent needless contention By human Laws I understand the declaration of the will of the rightful Governor what he would have his Subjects do I will not also put in the end of Laws in order to the common good because that will presently spoyl the question For where the efficient is our rightful Ruler and the Law serves indeed for that end or hath it's right final cause also there is no question of its obligation Yet if I leave out the end the question indeed may be whether such a declaration be a Law rather then whether it binds Nevertheless as I make a case of conscience of it and count all our Acts of Parliament Laws it is all one in effect to me whether you say such a Law binds not or such an Act or Law is no Law and binds not Ex quo intelliges eos qui perniciosa et injusta populis jussa descripserius cum contra feceriut quod polliciti pro fessique slatâ— quoduis potius tulisse quam leges Cicero de legious By Conscience I understand a faculty in Man of descerning Gods Judgement concerning himself and Actions It is more proper to say a faculty is obleiged then an habit or an Act and that faculty which man hath hereunto is charged whilst himself is to judge whether such a thing commanded be his duty in relation to God or not By obligation I understand the constitution of a due Obligare est jus constituere By obligation of the Conscience I understand the constituting a thing to bedue from me so that if I do it not I must account or judge that God will condemn me for the neglect or the making a thing my duty so that if I leave it undone I sin The obligation of the outward man I account the constituting a thing to be due from me so as if I do it not I may not resist though I be punished or I may be punished and ought not to resiâ—t though I could avoid both the thing and punishment by resistance The word lacere says Grotius from one line of whom a man shall have more Instruction sometimes then from anothers book is distinguished in id quod impune fiâ— and in id quod vâ—tio caret So must we say the word obligare is distinguished into that which if we do not the thing makes us liable to punishment in foro humano or according to the law or that which if we do it not makes us liable to sin That is there is an obligation human only which we have had before that tyes us to obedience upon the penalty of the law or an obligation divine also which ties us to the duty upon the pain of Gods displeasure eternal condemnation The one of these we call the obligation of the outward man and the other of the Conscience By resistance lastly I understand the repelling force with force The word resistance may be taken largely or strictly Resistitur contra Imperium agendo aut vim vi reprimâ—ndo I take it in the last and strict sence Let me yet note one thing more when we distinguish in the obligation of human laws between the outward man and the Conscience we do not distinguish the outward man from the will when we distinguish
speak he shall give on account for it at the day of judgement The word Idle in the Original as without work says Causabone de verborum usu 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 is contracted of 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 every Idle word is every word without deed and must import thus much whatsoever it does more that when men make strict professions and determine so rigidly in points of duty and do not answer their own dictates and sayings let them take heed lest by their words least ex ore tuo as being Idle words they bring not themselves into a just condemnation I will therefore advise this worthy person and all men in resolving Cases of Conscience that they take heed of setting down any matter for the binding of others then according to which in their own practise they dare be content to be judged by The determining the obligation of human Laws Indefinitely on the Conscience is more then any mortall can bear For my own part I will protest that whilst I allow the Conscience to be bound by the Law of men when those Laws tend to the common good yet do I not hereby cut my self of from the reserve of any liberty that may arise to me from a farther disquisition although I count it but necessary both to give my reason why in sincerity I hold so and to deliver my conception of that obligation It is a saying of the Antients a man is not born for himself only but for his Country which is not writ only in Cicero but in the heart of all men for this is a truth throughout the earth and delivered by God all along his word while he makes our own selves to be the rule of our carriage towards our Neighbours that we mind not our own things only but every one the things of others Though we study and seek the tranquillity and peace of those with whom we live and consequently in all Societies and Communities we should regard the publick concern even above our particular advantage These are general moral precepts which are writ I say in the heart of man and to be proved in Gods word The Magistrate I account now is Gods Minister to consider of and then design and appoint the particular things or instances wherein every one in their several places are serviceable in these duties and ends and upon that designation of the particular things the obligation flows from those general precepts of God upon the Conscience for their observation I say there is the general Institution of God for Societies and that men in society shall mind and endeavour in their place the publick concern and not their own only The Magistrate is his commissiâ—ted Officer to design appoint or set apart and so declare the instances or particular things which are conducive to this good of the community which they all are bound to intend upon the designation appointment or declaration of these things the obligation flows immediately from the general institution of God upon the Conscience for the observing of them when there could flow none else from these particulars themselves The particular laws or things themselves we know are not the precepts of God and the Conscience is obliged only by Gods will but the general institution of society and that we should seek and endeavour in our place the good of the Publick as our own and above our own in such particulars as be conducive truly to that end is of God and the Magistrate I say according to his office designing these particulars we come not ratione consequentis or absoluté only because such things commanded but ratione conseqâ—â—ntiae or ex hypothesi because such things commanded do come under the divine institution to have the Conscience bound to their performance From hence it follows likewise that if these instances or particulars do not indeed come under the service of these general duties or end such a law is to be lookt upon as cut off from Gods institution and so can have no authority derived to it from God for the obliging the Conscience of any when yet the outward man out of the case of sin is still acknowledged to be bound The particular commands of the Magistrate does I say bind the outward man but the general institution or the moral duty in general of seeking the welfare of the Publick and not our own only is that which binds the Conscience which otherwise were not bound As for the fifth Commandement which requires honor and obedience such as is meet to our superiours I do not here distinguish it from but include it in this general institution for that command must be understood as a comprehensive thing containing in it the whole commission the superiour hath from God which granting him his power to command doth also set the bounds and limitations to that power that he command no other things or no otherwise then as he hath appointed and upon supposition that the superior acts only according to his commission that is according to his prescribed duty or rule in civil things this Commandement of God doâ—â— lay an obligation on the subject to obey him out of Conscience If you will say upon this that the Magistrate hath a derived authority from God for this very act of determining the material objâ—ct of our obedience and therefore besides the obligation which flows from his institution when the matter is determined the Conscâ—ence must be obliged from the Magistrats determination it self by vertue of that derived authority from him I have no need to gain say it and whether you will make it a double obligation or an obligation from a double causality or a mixt obligation divine and human it matters nothing to our dispute so long as Gods authority in the things commanded or his allowance that they be commanded be first acknowledged before we look upon the Conscience to be indeed concerned in them This is certain every authority that is derived must be limited and that according to the will of him from whence it is derived The authority God reserves in his own hands is that alone which is unlimimited and infinite Now the limits God hath set the Magistrate as to the determining the particulars of his subjects duty which is his power of making laws comes to this that he choose them only out of that general matter that is conducive to the end of government the publick good that is to observe the rule of things political If he shall therefore appoint any particular things for his own profit pleasure or humour which come not under this general matter to wit quae habet rationem publici commodi as God hath prescribed it is manifest that he acts not according to his commission and so can have no power derived from thence for those acts or laws and consequently however such laws do bind us in his courts they are of no validity in the court of Conscience We will acknowledge in whatsoever he
this or that particular man miserable if he keep it he will judge it to be the Law-givers intention that he be dispensed with that those should observe it who are made happy or at least not so distressed as he by it There is something I suppose of solidity in this if we can find out for it a right bottom There is no particular person can say if the Law-giver had foreseen this or the particular mans inconvenience he would no have made the Law because Laws in the nature are confinements and streightninâ— to particular persons for the good of the community But this he must say thâ— notwithstanding the will of the Law-giver is indeed that the generality should keep the Law being for their good yet it is to be understood with exception to such a caâ—â— or cases as his is If he can give a reason now for this that will hold it is well The saying he made not his Law to make anâ— simply miserable is true but in Relation to the publick he passed it though some should be distressed by it He cannot say therefore that he made not this Law to make him miserable but this he may say that he made not this Law to make him or any man miserable but for the advantage of the community seeing for the benefit of the publick 〈◊〉 any one may be made to suffer dammage whereas to make a Law that any might suffer it without advantage to the publick is unjust There is necessity then to come here to my foundation and that is this That the general end of every Law and Law-giver is or ought to be and so is supposed to be the publick advantage VVhen any case then general or particular is such that it is not for the publick benefit that a Law be observed or that it is more for the publick good that it be not observed rather then observed the Law-givers intention is to be supposed from the general end that it should not be obligatory to the Subject His intention is to oblige us to such a thing for the publick good But if such a thing in such a case be not for the publick good the obligation ceases being forsaken of his intention There is much may be said here beside what we insist on before from the will of God At the close he presents us with the testimonies of two or three learned men for obedience to all lawful commands of our superiours He might have taken the harmony of confessions or most Diuines common places and added as many more as he pleased of greater authority He might find expressions too as strict as any from some of our Nonconformist Divines But that which is to be answered to all is this that we are to apprehend such passages to be still spoken upon supposition that the Laws or commands of the superiours be good and wholesome Laws They may put in the word lawfull only but under it this must also be implyed The honest and learned Mr. Perkins therefore when he speaks of our duty to the Magistrate does judiciously use such terms VVe are bound to observe the good and wholesome Laws of the Nation wheâ—ein we live When he and others speaks thus it is plain that in the bottom of their minds they apprehend that if the Laws and commands of men be not good and wholesome Laws or commands they are not accordingly bound to them that is not in Conscience bound though the outward man be at the Magistrates service And this I take it is that Light which does even almost Universally flow into the Souls of men at the first consideration of these matters and as it is of Nature it is from God But who shall judge whether a Law be a good or wholesome Law or no This I know may be again askt It is a good and wholesome Law I account when the thing commanded be for the common good And I reply who shall judge whether that which be commanded be lawful or not It will be a thing most foolish to say that he who hath passed the Law as good already must be judge for then it might be no question You will say that every man must indeed be judge of that I say then that if every man must judge whether the thing commanded him in a Law be according to Gods word or not which is a matter of so much more difficulty and concernment to his Soul and where of the most of men are so much more indeed uncapable to judge with soundness and yet every one must judge for himself according to his ability in reference to his own practice why should any scruple to have the same said in the question whether it be for the common good being what is easier done and a less matter The sum of the whole sheets will come to this The most both of Religious and Learned men are at a loss through their dispute and jangling I suppose when the matter else perhaps were more plain in their conceptions about the obligation of human Laws Two extreams we hear The one that they bind not the Conscience at all the other that they bind indefinitely that is all bind under pain of sin A middle path I have effered in resolving the case We see where it is the opposer does pinch They will not allow the subject to be a reasonable agent in Politicals when they cannot deny him to be so in Morals and things Religious If they will allow us a judgement of discretion in Civils They must be ignorant or consider not that the common good is the supream Law That the supream must over-rule the subservient So long as any know not this they are in darkness and bondage But the Scintillations of this truth and Doctrine that I here have brought are the feeds of Light and Liberty to the World In which liberty the considering Christian will stand fast and the tender will rejoyce in consolation THE END Reader BEfore I sent these Sheets to the Press at first I shewed them a Learned Dr. a person of note as of ability and I received his thoughts of them in the words which you find in the beginning Being returned from the Printer I had opportunity to shew them to another of the like eminency and I received presently a full Sheet from him upon the subject I will make bold to set down thus much of it which follows The Office to wit of the Magistrate and exercise or administration being distinguished you truly say that he that is not bound in a particular case to obey yet may be a Subject still which is the relation of one bound to ordinary obedience and Rebellion which is the casting off this subjection iâ— forbidden notwithstanding a particular Law may be disobeyed A Law made against God or the safety of the Common-wealth is no Law in sensu uni voco but it is in sensu aeâ—â—â—vâ—â—o vel analogico and does not pâ—â—perly bind the Subject All men in their wits that are masters of such discourse are agreed that judicium est vel publicum vel provatum Publicum est vel civile Magistratus per gladium exe quendum Vel ecclesiastum Pastorum per verbum clares exequendum Et privatum discretionis est omnium No Man ever obeyed without it for authoritas imperantis agnita is the objectum formale obedientiae and answereth the question Quare obedis The Magistrate being by Office intrusted with the bonum pubeicum the Subject is not called to try every one of his Laws whether they are suited to the bonum publicum or not much less to be critical and busie out of his place But being not bound to be blind or or careless in a notorious case or such of which he hath full and lawful cognizance he may and must discern what command is against the common good R. B.
it from the Conscience The will is wrought upon under both obligations through fear of mans law and through fear of Gods If you divide the outward man from the will you cannot bind it but Physically by putting it in Bonds and Fetters But the obleiging it by the will is binding it with an human obligation and that I account too is not morally but politicaly as I have intimated to wit as human laws are norma humani judicij the man who breaketh a bad law is according to that law to be adjudged to its penalty and in sensu politico humano is an offendor of the law so that if he be punished by the judge who judgeth by that law he must submit yet seeing the Law is no other then such he is not made a sinner by that breach or to be condemned by God To sum up my opinion then without the terms that those that will may assaile me fairly in my sence I am perswaded as Gods will is not mans so every command of man in indifferent things is not the command of God but that when there is no declaration of the magistrates will but it does make the thing he would have to be due from us so as he may punish us by his law for the not doing if he please and we must bear it without defending our selves by force and consequently he may compell us to any thing not sinful by that means yet does not every declaration of his will make the thing he requires to be our duty so that we are necessarily guilty of sin if it be not done but contraily though many a man lives and dyes in the breach of some laws and statutes of the realm so long as they offer no contempt to the Ruler nor scandal to their brethren nor resist if they be brought to suffer they may be good Christians for all that to come to our first lock which our debater and servants of Christ And here I have no more that I know needfull to be supplyed but onely to do this to produce what I have in my Case it self that the main notion I offer here and there may appear to be the same and to vindicate that authority which alone sufficed me then and shall now for my confirmation The words which I offer in my Case are these Power say I is a right to rule or command This right in the nature of the thing must arise from the grant or will of the supream Lord which is God without whose will or that grant or Charter which is an act of his will no power can be derived to any Now that grant or will of God which constitutes any to rule or to be his Minister being for the Peoples good He is the Minister of God for our good sayes the text it must follow that whatsoever is not indeed for the peoples good the Magistrate is not to command because it is Gods will that he commands only for their good And it he do command any matter that is otherwise that command hath no authority as to the Conscience at all as being without the warrant of Gods will I know I have set down this in a few lines but it hath been the fruit of severall thoughts and years I thought good to confirm it with one testimony of Dr. Taylor and I perceive this debater seems offended and to accuse me of disingenuity for it as if I had done him wrong It is necessary therefore that I turn again to that Dr. and see only I must say that I am glad I must confess that I have here such an authority as this Dr. so full for me nevertheless Dr. Taylor is not as farr as I know in a tittle the author to me but a witness to the light I offer In the third Book of his Cases and the first chapter he comes to treat of human laws and what obligation they pass on the Conscience In his first rule he tells us the Conscience is obleiged directly and actively to obey the Laws of Man Several learned Authors together with Nine Arguments to the contrary are proposed which he having very hardly assayled comes to his next Rule that human Laws bind not when there is any intollerable or grievous evil in the obedience To make out this be proceeds to a third Rule that the Laws of our superiour that are not just and good do not obleige the Conscience and then shewing what Laws are such he tells us that a Law is unjust that contributes not to the publick advantage What can be more orderly and desireable to my purpose Only yet to be more sure it is fit I cite also some few of his expressions This is the limit of a Princes power so far as he relates to conscience for beyond this the conscience is not bound Again If a Prince make a Law that is not for the publick good it hath no sanction but fear and no tye upon the Conscience Again all such things as are against the good of the subjects the Law it self declares it to be no Law that is to be more then the superiour hath right or leave to do Again Laws that are made to purposes beyond those measures do no ways obleige the conscience He is the Minister of God for good saith St. Paul otherwise he is not Gods Minister and hath to other purposes none of Gods authority and therefore cannot obleige the conscience to an active obedience in such where his power is in incompetent to command CAP. III. IT will be time now to come to see what he hath objected against this Determination The proposition I am to maintain and he to oppose is this That the laws of a common wealth and particularly an act or the acts of Parliament in this nation that are nor for the common good do not obleige the Conscience of the subject Though we acknowledge in the mean time our alleadgiance and subjection to his Majesty as the executioner of the laws that our outward man is bound still and spared through his clemency It is true that there is a question fallen in who shall be judge whether that which is commanded in a law be for the common good and I shall be ready to speak with the Debator about it in its order but in the mean while if it were not for that what would this reverend man have had to say against the main determination In the first place he tells us that I am a notable instance of my Lord Bâ—â—â—ns observation that there is a little dry Light in the World I remember Plutarch hath a tract of self praise and among several things he hath against it one thing he sayes for it that there is some cases and particularly in the case of a just defence a man may speak of himself or any thing of his own as of another Vnder Plutarchs Apology I will say I do believe this that in this particular I am indeed an instance that there is
adaeqâ—ate rule of Conscience But for the Magistrate to command any thing that is against the common good is disagreeable to Gods will or such a law carries not with it Gods authority Eâ—go whatsoever is commanded or what law soever is not conducive to the common good can not obleige the Conscience So that it must not be under the pain of sin but under the sence of wrath and necessity that we must not resist that we actively obey in such a case In the last place he quotes Dr. Saunderson and I must confess I shall put the less trust hereafter on this man for any matters of controversie or cases of weight for this presumption he seems to have upon one great name when nothing else for ought appears but Dr. Saunderson having resolved this case hath given him the confidence to write in such an Imperious fashion as he hath done these sheets upon a subject whereof he seems to have had so few thoughts before As for that Dr. I have read his Lectures de obligatione conscientiae and dejuramento and the first body of his Sermons I do believe him an excellent Casuist and to speak freely wherein that excellence lyes a man of a clear head but yet not for all that of so searching a head nor quite so learned as such a one as Rutherford in his way and by no means on the Earth of so large a head so great a wit and incomparable sufficiency as Dr. Taylor Well Dr. Saunderson in his ninth prelection puts this case what if a Magistrate intends only his own profit or ambition in a law does that bind he answers yes Because that though the Law-giver may have an ill intention the Law may tend to the common good This is well resolved In a case or two farther then he puts this other what if a law be unprofitable to the publick and something noxious he answers it doth oblige if the thing may be done without sin This resolution is ill for if the reason of the obligation in the former case was good and the true right reason then when there is not that reason a law obliges not If we must obey out of Conscience when a law does tend to the common good though the Law-givers intention be bad then though the Law-givers intention be good if the thing commanded tend not to the publick advantage the Conscience must not be obliged upon the same account And thus Dr. Taylor resolves them both it is in some transient passages which I will not stand here to find out But let us hear Dr. Saundersons reasons The first is Because every man ought to mind what belongs to his part and duty and not trouble himself about other mens But what reason is this it does belong to every man to mind yea and to consider and determine whether his Conscience be obliged by a law or no. His second is Because our duty is to obey not to command or ordain And what reason is this our duty is to obey if what is commanded be agreeable to Gods will else we cannot be obliged to it in Conscience though we do it These two reasons indeed are twins both Stillborn and say nothing The resolution is ill and nothing is to be said for it But what means he by these reasons The subject is to obey the Law not make the Law and he troubles not himself to judge whether a thing be good in reference to the Magistrates act but his own If the law pass he may obey it in the outward man whether it be civilly good or no and not trouble himself But if he come to the point whether it bind his Conscience or no he must consider whether it hath the authority of God in it and consequently whether both it be Lawfull and conducive to the publick advantage I may add says the Debater himself though the Magistrate ought not to ordain any thing but what is for the peoples good yet when he doth otherwise it will be more for their good to obey him then refuse obedience I answer if the Magistrate ought not to ordain any thing but what is for the peoples good then must the ordaining any thing not such be against Gods will But the Conscience cannot be obliged by any thing against Gods will or the Conscience is obleiged by nothing but by Gods will only Ergo no Law or thing commanded us which is against the common good can obleige the Conscience and so hath he cut his own throat here out of self conviction Nevertheless as to what he sayes else there is one remove yet this Debater sees not and that is we distinguish between non obligation of Conscience and disobedience it may be that prudence and such considerations as he urges or others may prevail with a man in the outward action to oâ—ey when yet he accounts himself free from any obligation on his Conscience There is one thing after this I feel upon my own mind I find it not in these papers but I cannot hardly be faithful if I omit it It is this Suppose a Father or a Master bids me do a thing I conceive it like to prejudice his affaires and eâ—ve it undone If this Father or Master be discreet he will commend me for my care and be so far from charging me with disobedience as that he will account I have done his will better then he declared it Upon this I have been apt to determine that the commands of men and Gods do thus differ The one binds unless I can give a reason which is more considerable for the forbearance then that which appears for obedience the other binds both as the rule and reason it self for my action I think again suppose I tell this reason to this Father or Master and they will not admit it but require the thing to be done notwithstanding the prejudice which shall acrue If it be in heat I may do well yet to forbear upon my belief that they will take it well when their thoughts have cooled and the Wisdom herein of many faithful servants have been proved But if I be perswaded fully that they will be displeased presently and not pleased after it seems to me here I am bound to obedience in things not sinful though they be commanded to my own and their hurt I answer to this In the first place it is sufficient that a Child or a Servant is not indefinitely bound to do every thing they are bid but that when they have such a reason as they judge their Parent or Master will be satisfied and better pleased that they forbear the command they may leave it undone If their reason does not satisfie they may be reckoned in the case of such as have no reason In the second place when they have better reason to forbear it then do it I may hold that they are bound to doing only by vertuâ— of the Authority residing in the Parent or Masters person and that they may not
in Conscience to active obedience In the last place if this be not granted when you allow the subjects to be reasonable agents in things religious or morall that may bring what is superiour command 's of that nature to the rest of Gods will you turn them into bruites in things civil while they may bring what they are commanded to no test in relation to their own actions If you deny me my judgement of private discretion you will not let me act as a man Indeed this person will have the liberty to judge otherwise then the Magistrate does and yet be bound in Conscience to obey which is to be beneath a bruite for the best act spontaneously and follow the dictates of their sense if they be not hindred But this man will have his judgement one way that the thing is not good and his will and actions another way and that not upon constraint from without but upon the principle of Conscience which is a contradiction against all good sence But as for others and this man too otherwhere who makes it a placing our selves in the throne to determine otherwise concerning the publick welfaer then the proper judge of it doth so consistent is he with himself and such need hath he to be angry if one advise him to be more reflective◠on what he writes 〈◊〉 that will not let us have a judgement different from the Lawgiver and so to act only upon theirs they make men to become Horse as the and the Mule upon whom the rider gets up and they must go on the why and the whither as the driver pleases But if this be the Issue which this mans opinion will lead us to and this son of Circe should expect by the conjuration of these few leaves to transforme us presently out of our humanity that we should be content to be governed hence forward without the exercise of our own reason or assent that is not to act out of election but to be moved in civill obedience only as we are driven we shall have little cause to be very forward to hearken to him He may lay down his Penn and take a Whip in his hand and go Whistle But let us hear his exceptions to this answer Who shall be judge whether a Law be for the publick good or no. His answer is ready at his Tongues end for he needs not go deep for it The Magistrate must judge what is for the publick good for the making the Law and we must judge as to our obedience to it Then which it is hard to write any thing more inconsiderate and dangerous I do acknowledge this to be my judgement and for which I have offered here some reasons and it is not his saying this answer is inconsiderate and dangerous ought to prejudice it if it be well adviced and there be no danger indeed in it For neither doth this man know the previous thought on other occasions upon which this hath been set down nor hath he yet understood the state of my opinion right that he should charge it with any of those consequences as are but the Lyons and the Bears the Chariots and the Armies that fly in the Clouds of his own Immagination But let us hear the reason of this wonderful decision which he hath as ready as he had his answer Because saith he every man is made by God the judge of his own actions I cannot for my life see how that follows from this though I have put his reasoning into the plainest form that ever I could It is pitty but this mans life should be saved and therefore I will tell him my reasoning Those Laws I was shewing which be not for the common good are not agreeable to Gods will or have not his Authority and so bind not the Conscience The question upon this was as it is set down and the answer and the reason with the addition of the words following Because God hath made every man judge of his own actions and consequently of all circumstances whether they are agreeable or not to his will for his forbearing or doing of them If God then hath made every man judge of those things which he is to do in all the circumstances whether they be agreeable or not to his will then must he judge whether those things that he is commanded to do in human Laws be for the common good or no because those Laws only are agreeable to his will I had laid down before which are for the common good and those that are not are devoid of his Authority and bind not the Conscience This I deny not to be my very substance and as the reasoning is manifest and will appear so I doubt not to the indifferent so must it not be thought to be inculcated too often either there or here seeing no man can stand safe in dispute but he that knows what is and when he is upon his foundation For the mans disdainful expressions I have I account my satisfaction and he his sufficient reproof that he hath no more cause for them It is not sence to say the Magistrate must judge what is for the publick good in reference to his act of making the Law and we in reference to ours of obedience to it for he doth not only judge but enjoyn when he makes a Law which leaves us no liberty but to judge whether his will and Gods do not clash together And why is not this sense what reason is this that 〈◊〉 is not sense if he could have said the Magistrate does enjoyn and not judge at all before he enjoyns it then he might have pretended to say thus But if the Magistrate must not enjoyn any thing before he hath considered and judges it to be for the common good and if he doth enjoyn any thing that is not for the common good he hath no Authority from God for it then does it appear necessary that we do consider likewise and judge whether it be for the common good and have his Authority or else we cannot be bound in Conscience to it And thus you see very good sense evidence and fulness in this answer to the question and that the Magistrates will declaration of his will or enjoyning a thing does not take away our liberty and duty to consider when he hath enjoyned it whether we be yet in Conscience in obliged or in prudence only and the outward man to obedience The mistake of this person is that he thinks we may not judge of a Law but only whether it be against Conscience when we must no doubt judge also whether it be obliging to Conscience or otherwise how shall we make Conscience of it We are not to judge only whether it claspes with Gods will but whether it agrees with it If the Magistrates will be not against Gods will yet if it hath not his will and authority with it it is not obligatory to the Conscience The Magistrates will binds not asunder from
Gods In morals the case is not thus whatsoever is not according to Gods will is against it But in civil and indifferent things a thing may not be against his will that is against any moral precept as our obedience I speak of to some human Laws and yet have none of his Authority for it Thus prudence the preservation of my self and the Magistrates honour may prevail with me to do a thing which I think otherwise I have no obligation to do in my Conscience I will yet add I distinguish my obediénce and my obedience out of Conscience or my obedience out of other generall rersons and my obedience out of Conscience to this particular command I do not resolve my obedience into a judgement of private discretion whether a Law be for the common good or no for I can apprehend easily that when God hath required the Magistrate to make no Law but according to this rule no unjust or unprofitable Law he hath not yet commanded that I should never obey such a Law I may obey out of a generall implicit apprehension of duty or a singular love to my superiors person for fear of his displeasure to avoid the danger of the Law or out of severall prudentiall considerations regarding the Magistrate my self or others when yet If I come to the point whether I am bound in Conscience to do the particular thing commanded that is whether there lyes a divine obligation on me as well as that from the Law to do it I am on necessity then to examine it by the rule which God hath set me and that being no other but the common good in politicalls I must resolve my obedience out of Conscience into this judgement when I resolve my prudentiall obedience otherwise It may suffice me therein so long as the thing is not sinfull that I am obliged by man It may be but very rare if I question my Rulers commandment which is like to be only perhaps in some grievous pressure If the Law be bad my obedience yet and my example may do good nor does the Magistrates abuse of his office I hope take away my liberty to endure it if I please The true ends moreover hapily of obedience may be obtained when the end of Ruling is neglected Nay the common good may be promoted possibly by my yeilding to a Law when the Law it self does cross it And farther my disobedience may do more hurt to the common good then the obeying that hurtfull command would do So farre am I from discouraging any from obedience to human Laws as a thing generally good and prudentiall when I would keep the Conscience free and not have it burdened with sin for every want of their performance I see indeed by this and other learned persons what an immagination they have got that if I resolve the question whether I am in Conscience obliged to obey such a Law by my private judging of the thing commanded whether it be agreeable or not to the common good I do usurpe the place of the Ruler and make myself only my own Law-giver as they are apt to speak But this is a mistake for besides that when I judge of the thing commanded by its Rule this judgement of mine is not the maker of my duty but the discerner of it and so I do not become any Law-giver to my self in the business I distinguish the obligation of a human Law and the obligation of Conscience formaliter simpliciter by that Law If I resolved the whole obligation of human Laws into this Ruâ—e and my judgement of the Law by it so that I held it must never be obeyed on other reasons or that if I were punished for not obeying I was not bound to submit then did I offer injury indeed to my Ruâ—er and usurped his Government But if I resolve only the obligation of my Conscience by that Law into this rule and my judgement of it accordingly I usurpe no power of the Magistrates which I leave him still over the exterior man but I keep God only as I ought in his own feat of the Conscience And verily if the Conscience of man be concerned in every human law I would fain know how any of our great Clerks can say that human laws bind not in the case of intollerable griveance If God does command me to do the thing it is not any griveance of minde can excuse me but if it be man indeed commands it only and not God the griveance will be reason enough for me to call it in question and to avoid it if I may but the reason of my non-obedience must not have this foundation that it is my grievance or that I cannot endure it but that consideratis considerandis I am not obliged to it in Conscience CAP. VII THus far his exceptions are but words let us pass now to his reasons against my answer His first reason is It is no easy thing to judge what is best for the Peoples good Kings themselves find it necessary to have their Councets to advise about it To judge what is best for the Peoples good is indeed a high matter To judge only whether a thing be for the common good or not is another matter The judgement of every one is free and any body may judge of any thing as he is able and as he will The Cock may pass his judgement on the Pearl he scraped up That which comes to carry any stress upon judging is the consideration of the effect that depends upon that judgement The judging of a thing which a Man himself hath to do hath this effect depending on it the doing his duty every one is to judge of all those things and circumstances which belong to his own acts whether or no they be agreeable to Gods will that he may do as he ought and the rule of this will in politicals I have declared There is the act now of the Magistrate and the act of the Subject There is a great difference of the concern or moment that lies on a judgement of the same thing when the act of the one depends upon it and when there depends upon it the act only of the other The act of the Magistrate is to make the law and see it executed the act of the People is to obey it By this first reason of his against my answer do I see good reason for it and the sufficiency of it The Magistrate judges whether a thing be for the common good or according to our supream rule in reference to his passing it into a law and then to cause it to be executed The People and every particular person does judge whether the thing commanded be for the common good in reference only to the obligation of their Consciences to obedience Upon the judgement of the Magistrate there does depend an effect of universal concernment that is the obligation of a whole Nation to live according to the Law he makes upon the
enforce the thing to be done if he will whether a man does do it out of Conscience or out of discretion only out of fear of God or fear of the law or his sword The Magistrate cannot take any cognizance out of what principle a man acts the judgement is not within his jurisdiction and if a man doth not act out of Conscience he cannot make him It is sufficient so long as a man acknowledges his authority from God that he must therefore be subject and must not resist and consequently if in good earnest he stand upon it and will have obedience from him let it be in any thing but sin there is no help for him that is he may not help himself by resistance but he must yield to it whether he will or no. This is that which secures government and Governors Let every man be held bound in Conscience but thus far and as for the rest it is a matter concerns each ones own soul only and his private peace and it will become those that are prudent to be very tender what they determine in the business It is true this reverend Person thought I believe he had spoken well in his saying that it is hard to write any thing more inconsiderate and dangerous then that I have but if a man should write any word against subjection to Magistracy or his own present Magistrate or that it were lawful to resist if the Magistrate should impose any law against the common good when yet it is not sin I account many times not to obey it and escape if we can without resistance this let me tell him were dangerous I cannot say more dangerous because the other is not dangerous that the man may receive some shame and conviction for his own being so inconsiderate in his censure of what he understood no better This Debater shall not have I will warrant him a breath or Title of this nature from me Nay if a law be good I mean politically good and a law is politically good where it is for the common good I am ready to believe and hold it is obliging obliging to the Conscience not only that we must obey rather then resist which we must do if the thing be politically evil unless we count suffering to be better but if we could escape with man we must yet do it I count least we offend God if a law be not politically good I say we must not resist for all that and upon that account rather then suffer we are lyable to obedience And what is there now or what reason is there that any should desire more Let us here our man of Proverbs A man must not resist sayes our Casuist that is express and rather then resist he must suffer but this is to steal a goose and stick a feather I thank him first for this that he hath not left out this passage wholly in this place least his Reader else might have thought me indeed some dangerous person whereas these words have acquitted me and I answer that this Goose he speaks of my stealing is the thing ought to be stolen or removed and that which he makes so light of is to be brought in the Room of it to wit this man is of opinion that human laws even all laws indefinitely bind the Conscience so that a man must sin if he break any of them This is his Goose that is his foolish opinion an opinion intollerable and instead of this that which I would bring in is that though we conceive there be some laws which if a man sometimes observes not he is not to charge himself with sin yet if he be compelled by the lawful Magistrate rather then resist he must suffer and rather then suffer obey But why must he sayes he when he is already perswaded that he need not unless he be forced this is strange where is this Debaters reason I say he must though he should not sin else by neglect because he is forced and cannot help it but for avoiding of suffering he does it But wrath or suffering is not to be feared when the multitude is agreed not to be injured I answer here is the want of the distinction which this author would not take from me between the authority which is in the Magistrates Person and that of his commands The one is from God immediately the other mediately by vertue of the things commanded being for the common good and so particulars of that generall morall duty which is required of God Some may use other words to express this distinction by the Magistrates authority it self and the exercise of it in his commands or laws but this must be known that distinguish we must here to the same sense I intend and be very careful too of the distinction or we shall be lost If the multitude be agreed not to do a thing that is ill it is well I take it and as they ought it was manifestly Jonathans case But if they agree together not to suffer if the Magistrate will enforce the thing let there be but the least Officer will act in it then they resist and sin against God and it is not justify able upon any terms suppose a whole army and but two men in it will stand by the Prince he may I must affirm to speak strictly on the point of Conscience by these two men alone punish a whole army for any thing they refuse to do and they must bear it and cannot help themselves but with sin which they must not do For he that resisteth the power resisteth the ordinance of God and receiveth to himself damnation We know the case under Maximinian when a whole legion of Christians were commanded to sacrifice and they chose rather to suffer decimation twice over being executed man by man rather then defend themselves while their lives were at stake and the sword was in their hands Such a Conscience ought we to have of our subjection and so much does the concern of government and the whole World lye upon it when of obedience as to some particular commands we need to have none In short there lyes no obligation upon Conscience sometimes to obey but there does alwayes not to resist and that both serves the Magistrate turn and suffices when he pleases to have a civil thing done CAP. VIII I will not yet leave his last reason seeing he layes so much stress on it and his strength of all comes to this I do not take here his very words but matter which he may express as he will otherwise The People must not be allowed to judge of their own actions which are commanded by the Magistrate about civil things because they will be swayed by their own interests and judge those Laws against the publick good which are not for their private profit by which means unless they be taught and hold that all Laws indefinitely do bind their Consciences they will notwithstanding the Magistrates power absolve
themselves from what they please no Laws will be observed and all Government come to the ground Unto this as his substance besides my answer I have already given I shall crave leave to offer a few considerations In the first place this is certainly a shalâ—â—w apprehension which must suffer a conviction from the constant experience of the world For how is the world governed there is not one of a hundred that observes the Laws out of Conscience if they did then must they for ought I know be careful to gâ—t the Statutes and read them as their bibles which one of a thousand never do But men understand it they do such or such things they are lâ—able to be sued or to be bound to the Sessions or the like and to avoid the danger of the Law they observe it Now it is a foolish thing to say the Laws will not be observed or the world will not be governed unless by another means then that by which it is governed and the Law are observed Our Nations and Heathen Nations and those Nations which never had the fear of God to believe a judgement to come have been kept under the observation of the Laws of their Country by these means In the second place this is not only against universal experience but it confronts the very institution of God the appointment of the Magistracy God hath made the Magistrate his Minister and put the sword into his hand for the ordering and governing Societies and Common wealths and if this indeed will not serve that purpose then you render his institution insufficient and make his Minister to bear the sword in vain The Law sayes the Apostle is not made for the righteous but the disobedient and unrighteous If all were righteous and would of themselves make Conscience of doing what they should do there would be no need of Magistrate or Law but when the Law and Magistrate is appointed for this end to bring the refractory to order and those that make no Conscience of what they do to be ruled how fond must the imagination be which conceits unless men do first beleive themselves bound in Conscience to obey they will not observe the Laws In the third place if it be for some persons particular interest to break the Laws it will be the concern of others that they be forced to keep them if they be indeed for the common good so shall they joyn with the Magistrate in his causing the execution of them This indeed is that which upholds all Laws that are good The publick interest being greater then the private does uphold them Whereas if a Law be not really for the publick good this is one certain reason at the bottom of its invalidity and decay because it hath not root enough upon the publick utility to maintain it self against particular enchroachments If a Non-conformist come within five miles of a Corporation there is no body hurt by it and no body like to be concerned at it were this a thing truly conducing to the publick good then must the publick be disadvantaged in their breach of that Law and if the publick then must some more eminently and those should be as much concerned that they obey as themselves to avoid the observation By the way when the advantage for the publick does not countervaile and exceed the private loss or dammage that particular persons shall suffer by a Law such a Law I take to be unjust or at least Politically evil and binds not the Conscience However that which I here affirm is that whether men make a Conscience of a Law or not if the Law be good the publick advantage will prevail when the Magistrate is minded or cause it to be observed In the fourth place it is a thing very unpolitick to offer to the world any principle upon which it should be governed which is other then that which does govern it If the world be governed by the Magistrates sword and the Conscience only that we must not rebell and is governed as well as ever it is like to be governed it is but an unhinging the world to pretend they must receive this principle that human laws bind the Conscience or else there will be no need to obey seeing the People may joyn and chuse not to be forced as he speaks It is a saying if a Horse knew his strength what might he not do he would not let man ride him and use him as he does If the world knew their strength that the Magistrate indeed could not punish them whatsoever they did unless they joyned with him one against another when there is just cause for it they might shake off every yoke but as the whole body of the People cannot be made to know this so as at once to agree upon it any more then the Horse can though every particular man does know it so were it an utterly ruinous thing to speak of it if they could It is true if the people did agree together which agreement is their strength and they cannot know one anothers present minds all that they would not be forced they might choose but then when they made no Conscience to resist how should this man think upon his principle that they would make such Conscience to obey In the first place it does seem to me a pernicious thing to the souls of pious and tender Christians to lay any such load upon the Conscience which is more then it can bear I say there is no temptation hardly more dangerous to the undoing of a soul then to press it upon such things as goes beyond it and over sets it If a man does believe he is bound to make Conscience of every command of his superiour and Law of the Realm or else he doth sin it is enough to make him cast off all the Laws and when his duty is made so grevious to him that it seems impossible for him but to live in sin to be ready for resistance next and then all Magistracy is gon The way to have some Laws obeyed out of Conscience is to take off its obligation from others and if a Magistrate indeed might choose whether his Subjects Consciences should be bound by all his Laws or not there is good reason for him to be content that the matter should be as it is They are bound in Conscience not to resist and he knows not his own strength if he desire any more although when a Law is for the common good then is there Gods command also which takes place There is one thing I cannot but add which might make another consideration what if a despotical Prince was so wicked as resolving to be damned himself to seek the damnation of all his people and should thereupon make so many Laws and about such trivial things on purpose that none of his Subjects might regard to keep them but live and die in the wilful breach of them I pray let this Debater tell me