Selected quad for the lemma: duty_n

Word A	Word B	Word C	Word D	Occurrence	Frequency Band	MI	MI Band	Prominent
duty_n	action_n	conscience_n	law_n	1,213	5	5.9851	4	true

Text snippets containing the quad

ID	Title	Author	Corrected Date of Publication (TCP Date of Publication)	STC	Words	Pages
A39389	To en archy: or, An exercitation upon a momentous question in divinity, and case of conscience viz. whether it be lawfull for any person to act contrary to the opinion of his own consicence, formed from arguments that to him appear very probable, though not necessary or demonstrative. Where the opinions of the papists, Vasquez, Sanches, Azonius, &c. are shewed, as also the opinions of some Protestants, viz. Mr. Hooker, Bp Sanderson, Dr. Fulwood, &c. and compared with the opinions of others; the negative part of the question maintained; the unreasonableness of the popish opinions, and some Protestants, for blind obedience, detected; and many other things discoursed. By a Protestant.	Protestant.; Collinges, John, 1623-1690, attributed name.	1675 (1675)	Wing E718; Wing C5314_CANCELLED; ESTC R214929	62,722	96

thing be a necessary Duty he sinneth in not doing it Vasquez saith it is against the very Law of Nature Sanchez saith that although the Law of God be the primary Rule yet every mans Conscience is the proximate Rule of his Actions and therefore be cannot Act against it Dr. Ames saith That he who doth it Interpretatively sins against God For he must needs do contrary to what he believeth to be the will of God Eiliacius tract 21. M. Qu. c. 4. saith That he which doth it doth that which he thinketh to be sin And saith he hoc ipso amat peccatum by this thing he sheweth he loveth to sin and chuseth sin But this is not our Question We suppose a Man not to be fully and demonstrably perswaded that this or that Action is unlawful but onely upon Arguments which seem to him very probable verily to believe it is unlawful and Quaery whether while he so believeth he can do that thing And this Question divideth it self according to the different Notion of an Opinion which we before hinted viz. Whether a Man thus perswaded of the unlawfulness of an Action by Arguments indeed not demonstrative but such as he judgeth very probable and which he himself cannot Answer so neither doth he think others can may yet because his Principles are not Supernaturally or Mathematically made certain to him act against the Opinion of his own Conscience in Obedience to the will of any Creature 2. Whether a Man thus perswaded of the unlawfulness of any thing by Arguments not demonstrative but probable as before said though at present he can neither himself answer them nor see them answered by any other yet suspecting they may be answered may while this is the Condition of his Conscience act against the present judgment of it though it be incumbred with such a Jealousie or Suspition Now as to the first of these Questions we find little or nothing spoken in the Affirmative by any Popish Casuists or School-men They generally making some fear of the contrary part of the Practical Proposition to which the Person inclineth and Jealousie that this part of the proposition is false and his Arguments Answerable essential to an Opinion conclude that a Soul perswaded though but upon probable Arguments if it hath no such fear suspition or Jealousie to have a fixed Conscience and though fixed in an Error yet conclude it utterly unlawful for a Man to Act against it But if there be in any Soul any fear suspition or Jealousie that its Arguments may be Answered then they conclude the Soul but Opining and do indeed d●spute for a Lawfulness to Act against it though under several Cautions and limitations At this rebound therefore we will take the Question and state it thus Quest Whether supposing a Man or Woman not Demonstrably perswaded that this or that Action is unlawful but from arguments which to him or her appear very probable verily believing so yet not without some Jealousie Fear or Suspition that he may be mistaken and his arguments may be answered may whiles he thus believes do that thing in Obedience to Men which in this manner he judgeth sinful and unlawful to be done For the clearer handling of this momentous and important Question we shall with all Candor Examine 1. What Divines of all sorts whether Popish or Protestant have determined in the case and upon what grounds 2. We shall endeavour to defend the Negative part of the Question proving it wickedness for any to act contrary to the judgment of their own Consciences though that Judgment be onely made up from intrinsick probable arguments 3. We shall answer the Objections of those who have spoke any thing for the affirmative with any colour of Reason CHAP. II. The Opinions of Popish School-men and Casuists in the Case particularly of Vasquez Sanchez Medina Filiucius Azorius Their Monstrous Assertions what they make necessary to make an Opinion probable The Opinion of one Doctor according to them sufficient to warrant Men to Act contrary to their own Opinions Their Opinions what a Man ought to do when Superiours Command Inferiours what the Inferiours judge unlawful The summe of their detestable Doctrine § 1. WE will begin with the Popish Authors Vasquez tells us that the Question is not Whether a Man ought not to follow the Judgment of his own Conscience or could act against it but when it happeneth that there are two opposite Opinions about a thing to be done One saying it is a sin to do it another saith it is not The difficulty is saith he how a Man should carry himself betwixt them so as to form up a singular Judgment of Conscience which without sin he may embrace Vasquez in 12. disp 72. cap. 2. So then the Jesuite it seemeth doth yield the case viz. That if once a Man hath formed a particular Judgment of Conscience that the thing is unlawful though it be but from probable Arguments he cannot do it he onely prescribes in a variety of Opinions in the World as to a singular Matter how Men should well form that Judgment But not to wrong him in the 4. cap. of that Disputation n. 15. he seems to be of another mind and asserteth That a Man in some Cases may act contrary to his own Opinion yea that a Learned Man may Lawfully act contrary to his own Opinion according to the Opinion of others though it be less safe and less probable than his own provided there be any Reason and probability for the Opinion of those others Yet still retaining his Opinion as more probable looking upon that Opinion of others as probable by extrinsecal Arguments that is the Authority Judgments and Testimony of others though he judgeth his own Opinion more probable by intrinsick Arguments The Reasons he gives for this are these 1. Because we may act according to any Opinion which seemeth probable to us We will anon Argue that Case whether it be possible that any thing from meer extrinsick Arguments can seem probable to a reasonable Soul The contrary to which at the same time seems probable from intrinsick Arguments But we know how far the Doctrine of Probabilities serves the woful Interest of that Apostate Synagogue of Rome Largo Proventu est gnavum non deceptura colonum 2. Because it seems incredible to be true that a Man may not do what all the World judgeth Lawful if he alone judgeth it unlawful All the World we confess is a large term and puts the Case to the highest pinch but yet it seems not at all incredible if that be true which the School-men Universally agree That the particular Conscience must be the proximate Rule of action For what shall it profit a Man more to follow all the World than to gain all the World if be loseth his own Soul A Man is certainly bound to follow his own Rules not anothers These are that Jesuites best Reasons He confesseth that in this he followeth Medina some of

in Case the thing Commanded us be by us Judged Lawful for that he beggs all along we ought not to forbear doing it because some of our Brethren would be grieved and teachy at it provided our doing of it laid no stumbling-block before them to give them Occasion to sin against God We would fain know what Non-Conformist ever said the contrary Thus Men Exercise themselves in Combates with fancied Enemies for really the Doctor hath none in this Case that ever we heard of The Second Part of his Book comes nearer what we last said and notwithstanding all he saith we do think That it is at least a Mute Case as they say in Law Whether the forcing any to Suffer because he cannot or dare not Act contrary to the Opinion of his Conscience guided by Arguments which to him appear probable be not Persecuting To pass by his other impertinencies allowing him to use a very true Method to try the issue in fixing the Notion of Persecution we there joyn Issue with him § 8. In his 44 p. he tells us Persecution is an Inflicting of outward temporal Evils for the Exercise of true Religion The Genus we agree and think he might have shortned the Description by leaving out Outward and Temporal because no Man can Inflict any other Evils upon his Brother The difference he makes to lye in those words For the Exercise of the True Religion But why might not our Saviours terms have been taken for Righteousness sake Yet if Religion be taken in the larger Notion of it for doing any part of our Duty in which we bounden to towards God we cannot fault the Description but this Description makes but the Major Proposition The Minor must be this But the Outward Temporal Evils Imprisonments Deprivation of Ecclesiastical preferments pecuniary mulcts Slanderings Revilings Reproachful speeches Inflicted upon Non-Conformists are not inflicted upon them for doing any part of that Duty wherein they are bounden to God There are very many Non-Conformists will put the Doctor to prove this and tell him It is a piece of Righteousness a part of true Religion and every Mans bounden Duty toward God not to Act contrary to what his Conscience Gods Vice-gerent in him tells him and that upon Arguments which appear very probable to him is Lawful And in Matters of Gods Worship also to do According to what his Conscience tells him is the Will of God he should do And we take Notice too of an Excellent passage in the Doctors Book p. 45. l. ult penult That God hath as much Right to appoint the way of his Worship as to be Worshipped A passage we are so much in Love with that it is one of our greatest Topicks to prove many things Commanded us probably unlawful Prayer is Worship Praying by Forms or by words formed first in our own Hearts is a way of Worship Now say we God hath as much right to prescribe the way as the Worship and hath done it As every Man hath received the gift saith the Apostle so let him Minister 1. Pet. 4.10 Praying and Preaching are Worship The doing these Acts in a peculiar Habit appropriated to these Actions is a way of Worship And God saith the Doctor hath as much right to appoint the way of his Worship as the Worship The like might be said of the other Ceremonies § 9. But suppose we allow the Doctors Description of Persection The next Question is how we shall know what is True Religion Who shall be the Judge Shall the Scriptures But who shall Interpret the Scriptures as to a Christians private Practice Shall the Superiours Then certainly there was never any Persecution in the World For it were very uncharitable to presume that any Superiour should punish another for the Exercise of what himself owned to be the true Religion We have more Charity for Bonner himself Shall the Inferiour be Judge what is true Religion Then I fear the Doctor will be cast many of them will say they are mischievously and violently Prosecuted Imprisoned Punished Reviled for what they Judge the Exercise of the True Religion § 10. The upshot of this Discourse is that who they be who are truly guilty of Persecuting will not be determined till the Day of Judgment when God shall determine which was the True Religion and whether Men truly ran those hazards because they were afraid of sinning against God In the mean time as to us he is Persecuted who can truly say That he suffers for doing any thing which he thinks he should sin against God if he did not do and for forbearing any thing which he truly ●●●n●s he should sin against God if he should do And we believe that those who thus Suffer though another day they shall be adjudged by God to have been in a mistake and so not Persecuted yet as to what they have done will be Judged guilty of no more than an Humane Infirmity §. 11 We have so much Charity as to believe that that Popish Priest who suffers according to the Law for Seducing If he can truly say that he did believe Gods Word Obliged him to do what he did may properly enough say he is Persecuted but we also believe that God will not Judge so another day and that the Magistrate doth but his Duty because by Gods Law none ought to be endured that entice others to Idolatry But whoso makes another to Suffer because he durst not sin against God Acting contrary to what his Conscience judgeth unlawful from probable Arguments we believe far less excusable because there 's no necessity upon him to lay any such Commands and enforce them by any such penalties But there does lye a necessity of suffering in this Case upon the Inferiour to avoid sinning against his Conscience whether his Conscience be in the right or in the wrong will be determined another day In the mean time he should sin if he should not hearken to it to avoid which he suffers which is so far as he can possibly Judge to suffer for Righteousness sake After the saying of which we think little more need be said to the Doctor 's Book § 12. To Conclude our Discourse upon this Question we have observed in all those almost who have wrote for Conformity great insisting upon the Authority of former and present Churches and the Testimonies of many Divines dead or alive some of which they tell us were Old Non-Conformists And this hath been the general Method of all late Writers almost to pass over all our and our Fore-Fathers Arguments and in Order to make us as odious to the World as they would have us to represent us as singular and differing from the Church in all Ages yea from our selves and our Fore-Fathers c. To what better purpose than this these in artificial Arguments are used we cannot tell unless those that bring them have a little tincture of the Jesuites Doctrine we before shewed at large That extrinsick Arguments may make

out the most he can there some or other will dispute the Truth of what he thinks he hath found out and if so it is disputable and if it be disputable his Notion is not indubitable according to this Novel Doctrine and he is bound to do what he is bidden So as his Notion shall be crush'd in the Egg and never be suffered to hatch into a Demonstration or indubitable certainty and all his Reading for the finding out of the truth shall serve for nothing but to torture him with a continual regret and checking of Conscience which will never let a Man be quiet whiles he Acteth in Repugnancy to it Will any say yet he shall do well to Read to perswade himself of the Lawfulness of what he is Commanded Suppose another Superiour should then come and Command him the quite contrary as he may doubtless But it may be some will say so long as he by Reading onely perswades himself it is Lawful not necessary antecedaneously to the Superiours Command he is well enough he may first Obey the one then the other But how shall a Man be able so to govern himself as by Reading to secure himself that he shall not convince himself the thing is necessary Thus according to this absurd position we may part with all the practical part of Scripture and as the Popish Proselytes use to do burn our Bibles onely excepting some few Precepts about Obedience to Superiours in that will lye the whole Duty of Man for whatever else the Scripture saith unless in things unlawful according to the Law and light of Nature must be expounded with a Salvo This you must not do except Superiours Command This you must do unless Superiours Command the contrary If not all Scripture we would willingly know where these Divines will set the Limits Will they say as indeed they do it is onely in things in their own Nature indifferent this looks like something but is indeed nothing Who shall be Judge of those things which are so Shall the Inferiours Conscience as to his practice be Judge Then the Question is granted on our side Shall the Superiour Judge for the Inferiours practice Then the Limitation signifieth nothing How any will get out of this Noose we cannot Divine but enough is said in this case we Conclude it An absurd unreasonable unscriptural Popish Brutish Assertion for any to affirm it Lawful for Christians under any Circumstances in Matters of Worship especially to Act contrary to what in the particular Judgment of his own Conscience formed from Arguments which to him appear very probable he Judgeth to be Lawful from intrinsecal Nature affections and adjuncts of the Action Let us now shortly enquire what inconveniencies our Opinion in this case is incumbred with or are charged upon it CHAP. V. The Grand Objection answered This Principle doth not take away all Power from Magistrates nor at all dissolve the Bonds of any due Obedience The Magistrates Power opened granted limited he hath no power to Judge as to the Inferiours practice what is or is not indifferent The strange variety of conformable Writers in stating and determining the Question The Reasonableness and Necessity of Indulgence Dr. Ashton's late Book examined his Notion of Persecution inquired into the true Notion of it An Introduction to the next Case § 1. THE Common and Grand and we think the onely valuable Objection against this Proposition is That this Principle taketh away all power from Superiours and dissolves all Inferiours Obligations to Obedience and this we hear of often enough and it were Objection enough if it were but half true But let us go down into this Field and see whether the Principle be so guilty according to the Cry against it That which they Offer in Justification of this is That the World is now grown so cunning that there is hardly any thing which can be Commanded by Superiours but the Wit of Man will find out some probable Arguments to prove that it is unlawful which if it be once so proved the Inferiour is discharged from his Obedience Again they say All things are either Necessary Lawful or Vnlawfull for things Necessary and unlawful let Superiours Command what they please the Inferiours must not Omit things necessary nor do things unlawful If the Superiour holds his Peace the Inferiour must do the former and forbear the latter so as the Superiour hath onely a proper power as to things indifferent Take away this and you leave him nothing This is the strength of what we find said here and there in more words § 2. In Answer to both which we say 1. That it is most certain that God hath not set up Superiours for Nothings there is in them a Power and a great Power to Command and Obedience to their Commands is a Duty a great Duty This is not Disputed betwixt us now to open wherein the Power of the Magistrate lyes we say 1. That the Magistrate being as a God to us and God's Vice-gerents his first and great work unquestionably lyeth in seeing that the Commands of God be fulfilled both his Moral Laws and his Positive Laws about Divine Worship and this alone if his Power were no more were not onely a Noble Employment but full and sufficient to employ the Head and Hands of any Mortal Man in any large Jurisdiction 2. Whereas as to the Government of Political Bodies and Matters meerly Circumstantial concerning the Worship of God which are yet necessary to the upholding of Polities and the administration of Justice in them and without which in Matters of Religion the Worship of God either could not at all be performed or at least not so performed but that in the Eye of Common Sense and Reason it would be Judged by the most disorderly and indecently performed In these things Gods Word hath onely generally determined and the Superiour hath a confessed Power in these things which even the highest Non-Conformists will grant to make particular Laws in these things and indeed rightly considered these are but Laws in things necessary though not Originally yet upon supposition of the general Commands of Scripture 'T is one thing to Create Order and Decency another thing to Command that things be done in the Church Decently and in Order The Decency and Order of things in Religion neither must nor can arise but from the Law of Nature the Common sense of Christians and the particular guise and Custom of places Now the Magistrate hath an undoubted Power to Command Circumstantials of Order and Decency that is which are truly so antecedent to his Command Is this no Power and proper to him think we 3. We say that if the Superiour Judgeth a thing thus necessary in pursuit of the general Rules of Gods Word if they indeed be so the Inferiour is bound in Conscience to do or to omit them If the Superiour onely Judgeth them so it is his Duty to Command them If the Inferiour cannot Judge so of

an Action appear probably Lawful though at the same time from intrinsick Arguments we Judge it probably unlawful A Pill so nauseous so brutish as it is impossible we should swallow it till we have vomited up our rational Souls And 't is the more odious to us because it is of such affinity to the detestable Blind Obedience of the Church of Rome But to defeat these men of any hopes of prevailing by such Mediums we will shortly enquire into another Question though not the same yet of great Cognation with this which we have now so largely discussed CHAP. VI. Second Quest Whether it be Naturally possible for any Person in a Practical Proposition to judge that part probably Lawful from extrinsick Arguments the contrary to which he at the same time Judgeth probably unlawful from intrinsick Arguments The Question opened The Opinions of Vasquez Sanchez The Negative part of the Question maintained because this is contrary to the Principles of a Rational Soul The Conclusion § 1. WE have had Occasions once and again to hint the known distinction between Speculative and Practical Propositions Divines call those Propositions Speculative whose use and advantage is onely terminated in Speculation and Knowledge and from whence nothing in Practice is Directed They call those Practical whose end is the guidance and direction of the Practice But Speculative Propositions must be again distinguished into such 1. From which no Obligation ariseth to the Exercise of any rational Act of ours Such as these That there was such a City as Troy such a King of France as Pipin c. with a thousand such like 2. Such the Truth of which inferreth the performance of some Rational Action of ours and such as is our Duty towards God as these That the Scriptures are the Word of God That Christ is the Eternally existent Son of God But our Question relates to none of these but to such Propositions onely where the Question is Whether it be Lawful for me to do this or that or no This is that we mean by a Practical Proposition § 2. In our Discourse upon the former Question we have also often hinted what we mean by Extrinsecal and Intrinscal Arguments The singular Judgment of every intelligent Person 's Conscience is formed from some Arguments drawn either from Principles of Reason or Propositions of Scripture These Arguments are either from plain letter of Scripture or Principles of Reason accounted Infallible which fix the Conscience Or else they are drawn from Logical Topicks and called Dialectick Arguments or Probable For Optimus Philosophus nondum nascitur We say These probable Arguments are again either Intrinsecal called Artificial Arguments by the Logicians fetched from the Causes Effects Consequents Adjuncts or other Affections of the Subject or predicate in the Question 2. Such as are meerly Extrinsick Logicians call them In-artificial because every Dunce may bring them they have no Art at all in them Divines call them Extrinsecal because they are Forreign to the in ward parts of the Question and the Soul that brings them These are such as are fetched from Authority and Testimony of others Testimonies of Fathers School-men former or Modern Divines c. Now it is demonstratively Truth That it is possible that a soul should have a great many Arguments appearing to it very probable and such as it cannot Answer and scarcely believes that any other can to prove a thing unlawful and at the same time meet with many Testimonies and sayings of Fathers Councils School-men Casuists Ancienter or more Modern Divines speaking the thing Lawful It is the Case of the Non-Conformists this day Though they meet not with any Fathers Councils c. who judge the things Lawful which they do judge unlawful yet many present Divines they do meet with yet they cannot but from Intrinsick Dialectick Arguments think the things utterly unlawful § 3. Now the Question is in this Case what they shall do They do not deny but it is their Duty upon the Testimonies of Superiours and their Commands or hearing the Judgment of so many Learned Men of another Mind to examine again their own Arguments and to try them to the utmost But supposing at last which is the Case the things yet seem to them from very probable Arguments unlawful what shall they do They may say the Jesuites do such things or not do them For this is the Jesuites help against the abominable absurdity of Acting contrary to an Opining Conscience They say While it it but an Opinion a Man may Opine both contradictory parts of the same Question the one upon Intrinsick the other upon Extrinsick Arguments and although as we shewed before the Opinion which is formed upon Artificial proper intrinsick Arguments must needs be more probable Yet they say a man is not tyed up to magis and minus in the Case It is ground enough say they for any man to act Conscientiously if the thing appear any way probable he is not bound to act according to that which he judgeth more probable So that say they if a thing appear probably Lawful by Extrinsick Arguments the Opinion of some Doctors c. we may do it though at the same time we judge it never so unlawful from Intrinsick Artificial Arguments fetched from all the Topicks in Logick and affections of the subject and Praedictate of the Question § 9. The Case is so weighty and this Opinion so unmanly and Brutish that it is reasonable we should bring forth one or two who shall vouch for themselves and their Brethren that this is what they say and hold Let Vasquez a Man of no small repute amongst them speak first out of his Disput in 12 ae disput 62. Cap. 3. n. 11. Tertio Observandum est eum qui habet assensum unius partis propositionis per propria intrinseca principia etiamsi assensus ille tantum sit probabilis non posse habere assensum alterius pactis per intrinseca propria principia bene tamen posse per externa principia existimari oppositam partem esse probabilem v. plura ibid. cap. 40. n. 15. Sanchez sings the same Song Op. Moral l. 1. cap. 9. n. 12. Vltimum fundamentum est ut duas Opiniones ediametro sibi contradicentes idem intellectus judicet probabiles aut aequè aut alteram probabiliorem he shews this is according to the Opinion of Azorius and Vasquez before quoted And then goeth on telling us that he seeth no Reason but the same Understanding may judge the contradictory parts of the same Proposition both probably true or false lawful or unlawful and that Experience proves it But this is surely a Note above Ela and a Riddle in Philosophy The Jesuites being pinched with that obvious Argument That then the same Soul and at the same time and the same thing may assent to contradictions and blow hot and cold bless and curse with the same breath They think to avoid it by telling us that the