The King onely cites the Writ the Form whereof is ancient whereby they are summoned to counsell the King de quibusdam arduis not in all things but in some things saith the King Is this to say only in such points as the King shall please to propose Did not His Majesty in expresse words at the beginning of this Parliament leave them to their own method Again Doth the King say If they make any transition they are liable to imprisonment at His pleasure Not His pleasure but the Law is the Rule he tyes Himself unto these then are but false Calumnies Pag. 8. 9. 46. he charges the King with this Position The Lords and Commons in Parliament are meerly to councell the King As if without their consent the King might make a Law That they are limitted by the Writ ad consilium onely That if we make the Lords and Commons to be more then Counsellors we make them commanders and controllers and this is not suitable to royalty From hence the Observator takes occasion to argue very sadly That the Lords and Commons are summoned not onely ad câ—nsilium but ad consensum also in the making and altering Laws And in this though in nothing else he brings authority to back his reasons withall citing the close Roll 7. Ed. 1. Quodomnes tangit ab omnibus approbâ—ri dâ—bet or tratâ—ari He did well to corrupt the Record by putting approbari dâ—bet for tractari otherwise it would not have served his turn But surely the Point needed not proof for never did the King nor any body else deny it the King no where sayes They are called ad consilium onely meerly or that to allow them mere then to counsell were to make them Commanders He saith they are called to counsell that 's true not to command that 's true but he doth not deny them power of consenting which the Observator contradicting himself doth afterwards acknowledge Pag. 16. It is lâ—sâ— unqâ—â—sâ—imed saith he That the legislative power is partly in the King partly in the Kingdome and that the King in ordinary cases cannot make a Law or Ordiaâ—nâ—â— without the Parliament Is it left unquestioned why then would you abuse the people as if the King had claimed a legislative power to himself whereto the consent of the Lords and Commons were not requisite Pag. 7. The King saith he deniâ—s the Lords and Commons if hâ— withdraw himselâ— to have any power of any Court Pag. 10. He cites these as the Kings precise words 'T is improbable and impossible that His Cabinet-Councellors or His Bishops or Souldiers who must have so great a share in the misery should take such pains in the procuring thereof Pag. 25. He tells you That the King saith he cannot without renouncing His own conscience and reason preforce the Parliaments counsell before the Courts All which and many more are falsly imposed upon the King to alienate and corrupt the affections of His Majesties Subjects Pag. 25. He saith The King charges the Parliament with these Doctrines as so offensive 1. That the Parliament hath an absolute indisputablâ— power of dâ—â—laring Law 2. That Parliaments are bound to no Presidents And then the Observator justifies these Doctrines as well as he may for they are most true And had the King denied them as the Observator wou'd have it thought he had indeed destroyed the power of Parliaments But the Doctrines the King chargeth them with are That the then major part of the two Houses had indisputable power of declaring Iaw and were not bound to Presidents Had the Observator taken the Charge aright he would not have answered Statutes are not binding to them why then should Presidents For I hope the now major part of the Houses are bound by Statutes and cannot repeal them though the Parliament may What though his Pamphlet be stuffed with such corruptions yet let me speak one word for him He is no more faulty in this kinde then others You see his iâ—genuity I shall now consider the solidity of his Reasons and the goodly Consequences he draws from them Omitting then those loose extravagant Passages which have no connexion with the Body of his Discourse the sum of that part which seemeth rationall is as followeth Quicquid efficit tale est magis tale The efficient cause is ever superiour unto and more excellent then that which it causeth But the people in whom Power is originall and Majestie underived are the efficient cause conveying Regall Power and Majestie unto Princes not God who is no more the author of Regall then Aristocraticall Power The same people being the efficient cause are also the finall cause for whose good and preservation onely that Power is conveyed and their conveyance is fiduciary upon trust and under such Conditions as they please The people being the efficient cause of Kingly Power he hence infâ—rres They are above the King Rex etsi singâ—lis major universis minor est And from thence to bring it on to his purpose it must needs follow as he thinks the people being above the King The Houses being by vertue of representation the same people must likewise be above the King The Houses then being by vertue of representation the efficient cause conveying Regall Power upon Trust and to no other end but to the good and preservation of the people may when they please to say That it is not disposed of by the King to that end and according to that Trust re-assume that Power and make themselves the disposers thereof from all which Grounds he inferres their power of making Ordinances obliging the People in generall The Ordinance of the Militia to be legall and consequently the Commissions of Array illegall The taking and retaining Hull to be justifiable The taking the Magazine and whatsoever else hath been taken from the King That the King hath in nothing appertaining to His Crown an unconditionable Property That whatsoever Acts he hath passed whatsoever he hath done or can do for His subjects is meer Duty That He ought to acknowledge that he can in nothing merit of the whole State That he ought to assent to all Bills that they approve and adjudge fit to passe That His great Officers be such as they shall allow of That without him they may authoritivè declare the Law and consequently make and repeal Laws and Statutes at their pleasure That when they adjudge the Power intrusted with Him for the Kingdoms safety to be turned against them they and all are ipso facto absolved of all Obedience of all Oaths and Tyes of Allegiance whatsoever to His Majesty and bound to seek their preservation by resistance and defence Desperate Conclusions I shall examine his Grounds ordine retrogradâ— beginning with that immediately antecedent to all his Conclusions Whethâ—r the Parliament so he would have you call the major part of the Lords and Commons remaining are above the King by reason of their representing the whole Kingdom How true it is That the
omnia jura in scrinio pecttoâ—s sui And yet as the government of this Kingdome is now setled the King cannot make void or vertulesse the setled Courts of Justice and thereby draw all things to a determination within his owne breast And if any cause shall come before him as a Judge to determine yet he hath a rule to follow and that 's the Law not his will which Law in respect of the King hath somewhat more then a directive force restrayning him and disabling him to goe against it so that he can doe no wrong The Lawes are made by the Kings power with the peoples or Parliaments assent which is a superiour power or rather the same power in a higher degree or extent to the Regall power alone and withâ—â—â—â— their assent And therefore the Regall power out of Parliament cannot change nor alâ—â—â— the Lawes and Ordinances made in Parliament but is bound by them as being made by a superiour power whence it is that Bracton every where affirmes the Law to be above the King solely And by this superiour power that is by the King with the assent of his people or Parliament were the ordinary Courts of Justice founded and established and their jurisdiction assertained and therefere may not be altered by the Regall power alone and by the same reason the King cannot alter the Constitution of the Court of Parliament but is the Constitution of all Courts alike the ordinary Courts are so constituted as that the Kings speciall Concurrence is not neeessary Arts and Judgements by the ordinary Judges alone are compleat and binding their assembling and departing is setled and doth not depend on the speciall pleasure of the Prince But the Court of Parliament hath another kind of Constitution the Kings speciall concurrence is in that a necessary and essential part Rex est capâ—t principium et finis Parliamenti Their assembling expects his speciall call their continuance depends on his will the Judgemements Arts and Ordinances made in Parliiament and concerning the Kingdome in generall are the Kings onely and without him frustrate and null Consider this good observator and then tel me if you did not endeavor grosly to abuse your reader by telling us that by the same reason the Parliament is not a Court compleâ— without the King the Common-pleas and all other Courts are not I confesse I have wondred to see it of late so often aâ—â—iâ—med That as the King cannot nor ought to declare by prâ—claimation or otherwise his disalowance of the acts judgments of the ordinary Courts so not of the Votes Ordinances of the Lords Commons in Parliament being the highest Court Should the ordinary Courts take upon them to dispose of the Militia by vertue of an Ordinance by them made might not the King by his Proclamation declare the Militia of that Ordinance and forewarne his Subjects not to be abused by it if the Observator can prove that the Lawes and Ordinances made by the now major part of the Lords and Commons are without and against the Kings pleasure of any more validitie that they are in themselves Lawes and Ordinances and not onely so called then I shall admit that the King either by Prociamation or otherwise ought not to declare against them meane while let every man judge how well the observatour hath maintained the power of the Lords and Commons mauger their King to make Lawes and Ordinances that shall bind the people in generall By which Ordinances the Militia the taking of Hull the Navy the Magazine the intercepting all mony and other provision that is but suspected to be passing towards the King the imprisoning all such as appeare dutifull towards his Majesties commands and such like Acts must be justified or acknowledged unjust The Observator finding it more then difficult in a plain field to maintaine his cause endeavours to shelter it under famed pretences of extraordinary danger and necessity in this extremity the King neglecting the helme nay purposely stearing towards rocks and shelves It is the duty of his Parliament in this case to oppose and preserve him and his Kingdome from utter wrecke and ruine He will then acknowledge that in ordinary cases without the King they cannot make a binding Law or Ordinance but in danger that is when they please In the miast of our calamities we are sensible of none thankes be to God but what their Ordinances have occasioned the Parliament seeing they must make use of their legislative power and make Ordinances to secure sâ—me Forts and settle the Militia or else two Kingdomes probably will be lost they doe accordingly the King proclaimes to the contrary in this contrariety consider if the Parliament 〈◊〉 vertually the whole Kingdome if it be not the supreame Judicatory as well in maâ—â—â—â—â— of State as Law if their grounds of jealousie be vaine To what purpose shall we consider of their jealousies if we thinke them to be but pretended by the cunning and practise of some few for accomplishing their designes and plots invented by some of their owne partie to be againe by them discovered yet must King and people submit to their judgement Are not the now major part the supreme Judges of danger to whom King and people are bound to submit If they are is it lesse then a mockery to bid us consider when as after consideration will we nill we we must subjugate our understandings and opinions to whatsoever they already have or hereafter shall declare But yet at your bidding I le consider in this contrariety whether the Parliament pray call them the Lords and Commons now assembled may not make use of their legislaiâ—e power yes if they have any such but I would not have them make use of the King legislative power without him and against him had they beene partners in that power some colour you might have had to have called it theirs but it seemes the power is solely the Kings they are onely to give an assent to the use of it Then you will I consider whether they be not the supreme Judicatory I thinke not the Parliamentiâ— supreame and above them both in matters of State and Law but againe I must consisider you say if the Lords and Cammons be not vertually the whole Kingdome why doe you put in the Lords whom at other times you can be content to spare The Lords Vote in respect of their Barronies derived from the Crowne the Commons Vote in right of their electors whom they represent at least nine parts of the Kingdome neither doe nor may Vote in their election the Clergie in respect of their spirituall livingt may not nor the most substantiall Coppy-holders Farmours nor Lessees for yeers not inheritrixes Jointresses nor reversioners Heirs apparrent and men that live upon Interest are excluded and all that have not 40. s. per annum free hold Land which I imagine cannot be above a tenth part of the Kingdome Tell me good Sir you that
Electors throughout the whole Kingdome may according to this doctrine revoke the trust and authority that all the Members have If so how can my obedience be required to their Votes when as it is doubtful whether the major part of the Free-holders do not disavow their proceedings Most certain it is whether the people were the authors of Regall power or not there neither is nor can be any power remayning in the people above that which is in a Monarch or King for if the supream power remayn in the people it must be a popular State such as Rome sometimes was The Lacedemonians had a King in name but their Estate was truly a popular Estate the supream power being in those 5 worthy Members called the Ephori who figuring patronizing the people had power to controll the doings of their King and their custome was as Plutarch relates every ninth yeere upon some cleer night to gaze upon the Firmament and if they observed the Moon to twincle or any Star to sparkle or shoot they thereupon would commit their King to prison who might not thence be delivered untill the Oracle of Apollo had so declared A happy Government I assure you both for King and people But if you will allow of a true King in power as well as in name the sovereigne power next under God must be in him not controllable with the breath of the fickle multitude Princeps Nec ponit aut sumit secures Arbitrio popularis aurae The Roman Emperour was anciently chosen by the Souldiers but did there remayne in them a power over the Emperour so elected T is recorded that the Souldiers having chosen Valentinian the elder would have added ao lleague unto him in the Imperiall government but the Emperour answered them me ad imperium eligere penes vos erat sed cum jam à vobis electus sim consortem imperii quem postulastis non amplius in vectra sed in mea potestate eligere situm est and with this answer were the Souldiers well contented whereby it appeares there remained no superour power in them Did there remaine a superintendent power in the people over the King it would then be lawfull to appeale from the Kâ—ng to the people as to the more supreame power but such appeales were never heard of at least not till of late nor are they consistant with Monarchy or any government but necessarily tend to Anarchy and destruction Omnis honestae rei malus judex est vulgus there is no Common-wealth wherein there are not more evill then good more simple then wise if then the majority of the people shall determine upon the last Appeale what judgement shall we be ruled by You see whereunto the Observators principles do lead and if you desire to know the fountaine from whence he drew these goodly doctrines that little Treatise entituled Puritano-Iesuitismus will point it out unto you I shall forbeare to consider any further by what authority Kings doe reigne And I heartily wish that this Anti-monarchist had spent his time in praising God for giving us that forme of government which experience teacheth and all the learned in the world do acknowledge to be the best and most convenient rather than by presumptuous enquiry after the cause and origen thereof to have endeavoured to shake and unsettle the same As concerning the finall cause of Regall Authority it must be acknowledged the generall end thereof is no other then the conservation and good of the people and true it is that the King is bound not only by his Oath but also by the very end of his Regall Office to protect us and to endeavour our promotion to all kinde of politicall happinesse even as much as he intends his owne honour and right But I cannot swallow that ingratefull inference the Observator makes from thence daring to tell his King That hee cannot merit of the State that whatsoever hee doth for them is meâ—re duty May not the same act be of duty and yet meritorious or deserving Is it not the duty of a Father to take care for his children and yet your selfe acknowledge the Father doth all his offices meritoriously You suppose though falsly Kingly authority commenceth by pact and agreement with the people is not honour and obedience even by that very pact to be paid him as a due reward and doth not reward presuppose desert although after such pact made his care and protection be of duty yet being free to oblige himselfe by that pact to preserve nourish and defend his people was an act meritorious Omnium domos illius vigilia defendit omnium otium illius labor omnium delitias illius industria omnium vacationem illius occupatio For which the Law doth attribute unto him all Honour Dignity and P cheminence and yet you say he deserveth nay he can deserve nothing The word Grace you tell him sounds not well in his mouth yet surely former Kings have used the word without being checkt for it 28. â— 1. cap. 1. The King â—f his speciall grace for redresse of the grievances of his people sustained by his warres and for the amendment of their estate and to the intent that they may be the more ready to doe him service the more willing to assist and â—yde him in time of need grants c. You see that King tearms it of speciall Grace though for amendment of their estate and for those Articles hee granted them hee expected in retribution that his subjects should bee the more willing to assist and ayde him in time of need And so I hope will all good subjects bee at this time the more willing to ayd his Majesty for those many Acts of greater grace he hath pleased to passe unto us You may see sundry other Acts wherein the King himselfe speaking pronounceth them to be of his speciall grace W. 2. cap. 10 cap. 29. 18. E. 1. Stat. de quo warranto c Statutum de gratia regia diâ—itur quando Rex dignatur cedere de jure suo regio pro quiete comodo populi sui Prâ—m Regall the Observator passeth on to consider Parliamentary power pag. 5. Parliaments have the same efficient cause as Monarchies if not higher for in truth the whole Kingdome is not so properly the author as the essence it selfe of Parliaments and Parliaments have also the same shall cause as Monarchies Well 't is agreed that the good of the Kingdome is the end whereto Parliamentary power should direct it selfe but then as concerning the power of Parliaments and the efficient cause of that power it will be requisite to consider the parts distinctly and then the power of all together The Parliament is a Body consisting of three distinct Estates the King the Lords and the Commons Unto the Commons considered alone it most properly appertaines to present the grievances of the people and in humble manner to pray such redresse as the King with