conclusion of that which went before and of a proposition of that that followeth an imperfect transition consisteth of either of these severally and alone Sic igitur Poeta generalissimum primo loco c. That is this must be our care when we do any thing especially if it be of importance that we miss not this method but that we place every thing in his due order and method according to nature Sic Ovidius in Fastis c. So Ovid in his Kalender first sets down the general definition of his works and then he distributes it into twelve parts according to the twelve months of the year reprehending Romulus for making but ten months but it should seem that the Romans had their time divided as well in the time of Romulus as afterward ergo he did invent all the twelve moneths ergo Ovid was deceived in thinking that Numa Pompilius did make January and June now he cals June Janus because that moneth was dedicated to Janus whom some think was Iavan some Noe and the first day of this moneth was his holy day Oratores in prooemio c. So that here we may see this one method that as it is used in Arts so is it used in Poets and Orators now the exordium is nothing but a commoration the narration a description of that thing whereof he is to speak the confirmation a distribution c. Sic Livius summam c. This example is for History CHAP. XX. De Crypticis methodi Haec igitur in variis axiomatis homogeneis c. RAmus hath shewed us what method is and that it is but one now this exact order thereof is then when we desire to teach any thing plainly At cum delectatione motuve aliquo c. If a man be to deliver an Art he must exactly observe this method in every point but many times it fals out in discourses that disorder must be used not for the doctrines sake but because of the perversity of the hearers for they often go out of their way by reason of their weakness now this way is especially when we reject homogenies as Orators use much to do and draw in heterogenies knowing that variety doth delight Sed praecipue rerum ordo initio invertitur c. So as we shall see a rule come in like a morris-dancer as Aristotle placeth many out of order Itaque ad illam perfectae methodi c. So then as we heard in a syllogism that there was an inversion of the parts a superfluity and a defect so here in method haec imperfectior forma non solum detractis rebus mutila est vel superaditis rebus redundat sed ordinis sui quibusdam gradibus inversis praepostera est Quod Poeta facit c. This crypsis is more often in Poets than in Orators or History though it be used much in History now populum docendum sibi proponit i. belluam multorun capitum but indeed he deceives them yet it is onely for delight This order is very usual in Poetry and very pleasant in a tale or fables because when we read them we cannot rest quiet till we come to an end of them Sic ut Homerus ait Homerus Iliada disposuit Nec gemino bellum Trojanum orditur ab ano c. He doth not begin the Trojan war from twenty Eggs in one of which Eggs Helena was and Castor and Pollux in another Semper ad eventum festinat c. for in the first book of his Iliads one would think that he brought in the history of the ten years but indeed thereby he takes occasion to bring in the history of the years before So Virgil fetcheth Aeneas from Sicily which is a little from Carthage c. Sic commici Poeta c. For there every thing must seem to come by chance not of purpose Oratores vero c. they refer all to victory they are like Lawyers and therefore think they may lye at pleasure therefore they will place their strongest arguments first that their Auditors may chew the cud upon them and then they put out their mean arguments in the middle whilst their Auditors are meditating on the first and then at last by that time the Auditors have well thought of the first they bring out one or two strong ones more to make their Auditors beleive that they in the middle were like to the first and last FINIS GRAMMATICAL NOTES THis we are to know That God made all things for man and at the beginning for one man for there was but one but since the Fall because all things cannot come under one man's eye immediately therefore God hath providded Speech to be an Hobson or Carrier between man and man that thereby he might see all things and that so Gods Ordinance of making all things for one man might still continue Logick doth act and bring the thing to my understanding afterwards Speech is the carrier of it therfore it is necessary that there should be a constant rule of speech that one man might understand another but whereas these things being uttered by Speech are therefore hard to be received because they are inartificial Arguments therefore God hath provided Two arts of Speech one of propriety of Speech and another of the decking and sweetning of it So that the Lord doth here even as Physitians use to do with their Patients to wit when they have a bitter Potion to give they use to sugar the top of the Pot wherein it is So that Grammer may be compared to a plain Garment wtithout welt or gard or it is like a grave Citizen Rhetorick may be compared to the lace or jags on the garment and is like a fine Courtier Poetry may be compared to some fine cut and is a Courtier going on his feet so that according to the double use of Speech it is divided into two parts the first wherof is Grammer The name Grammatica is a Greek word which therefore we see was first named of the Grecians and is derived of 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 a letter of 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 a line of 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 which signifieth 1 to engrave seu insculpo and hence cometh our English word ingrave 2 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 signifieth to write because the first writing was by Hieroglyphicks for at the first they used Hieroglyphicks making the images of Birds or Beasts as an Horse for swiftness a Bear or Lion for strength a Lions head and a Ring in it they use still over mens doors signifying thereby watchfulness For in Philosophy we find that a Lion sleepeth with open eyes and this was the first kind of writing The second was in wax Tables or Tables laid over with wax where they have a stile made of steele and our English word steel cometh of stilus and hence also stilus signifieth a pen Now they wrote in these by lifting up the wax and so was the letter made hence came exarare to signifie
I onely lay things together to remember them Dianoia est cum aliud axioma ex alio deducitur estque syllogismus aut methodus This very definition tels me that dianoia is nothing but syllogismus and they are both one so that here are deductions of axioms out of axioms which surely belong to syllogistical judgement onely for I do not mean that it is ordering of one axiom before another but a drawing of deductions from their first rules true it is that a former axiom gives light to that which follows but that light is by vertue of syllogistical judgement so that method placing axioms doth indeed need axiomatical judgement as that also needs invention before it can place them but it doth not therefore follow that the doctrine of axioms should be in method Syllogismus est dianoia qua questio cum argumento ita disponitur ut posito antecedente necessario concludatur Syllogismus signifies properly the sum of an account in the species of numeration especially in Addition and summa and syllogismus are the same and the Logicians have borrowed it of the Arithmeticians because though Logick be the first Art in order and nature yet Arithmetick was observed by men before Logick ergo Plato set over his Academy 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 for it was taught among them as Grammar is now taught among us for as for Logick Grammar and Rhetorick they had them by nature ergo they studied the Mathematicks first ergo they called them Mathematicks for the word is general to all Arts and indeed that was the reason that Aristotle in his Logick brings demonstrations out of the Mathematicks so that this metaphor syllogismus was a priore to them This syllogismus est dianoia qua questio cum argumento c. it is indeed a contract of larger discourse and here in this rule observe first a question secondly an argument thirdly a disposing of them together fourthly a set or constant position of the arguments and the question Lastly a necessary conclusion from them first if it be a clear truth that ought not to be a question else it should Quâ— quaestio What question shall he go ask any body yes a third argument if he will but quaestio here is a law term signifying a commission so that if he doubted he might see at the Law for the truth so that this judgement is a Courtly kind of seeking out truth with two arguments before the judgement seat of a third argument and it is not quaestio which is made with an interrogation which whilst some Logicians did not consider they fell so in love with quaestio as that they made it the subject of Logick and divided it into simplex which is the same with argumentum and compositum which is the same with axioma Then there must be an argument he doth not call it tertium argumentum here as he doth afteward but onely argumentum though there are alwayes three arguments because here he considers it in respect of the whole question not looking at the parts of the question as they are in Invention and argumentum must be brought indeed as an evidence or witness rather than as a Judge for I my self am the Judge thereof Cum argumento Therefore here saith Kickerman must argumentum come in yea here indeed it must come in but it must ergo be taught before for it must be before it can come in ergo to say it must be here taught because it comes in here is fallacia accidentis so that an argument belongs to judgement as it may be disposed not as it may be in it self But saith Kickerman further here is a question before an argument ergo the doctrine of a question must go before the doctrine of an argument indeed it so fals out here but yet the parts of a question are not before an argument without he will make Pigs fly with their tails forward Disponitur He would have further rules of consecution from the third argument that he might know how to use them but indeed the rule of syllogismus is the rule of consecution ergo those maxims as they call them are consecutions from the rules of invention and are prosyllogisms Now here is a disposition whereof Kickerman was not aware whilst he would distribute Logick into a simple conceit a double conceit and into discursus for if disposition be general both to his double conceit and to his discursus then he leaves out two rules the definition and distribution of disposition ergo let us hold the right Ita disponitur because in a simple syllogism there is the disposition of the part of the question with the third argument consequens in propositione antecedens in assumptione and in a composite syllogism there is the whole question placed with the third argument alone in the proposition ergo the question as the better man must have the third argument for his companion for he is the Gentleman ergo he saith quaestio cum argumento and â—â—t argumentum cum quaestione Again the third argument is for the questions sake ergo it is he that is the more lofty but this is not quaevis quaestio but that quaestio quae ita disponitur ut posito antecedente necessario concludatur He cals it an antecedent ergo a syllogism consisteth of two parts an antecedent and a consequent An antecedent is so called because it goes before and a consequent because it comes after again an antecedent and a consequent are not yoked together as two Oxen as in a copulate axiom but one before another as Horses trace as in a connex hanging upon the former by a necessity of consequence Now this question is so posita cum argumento as that the question doth follow on them two for the third argument never comes into the consequent part Here positum is as it were put case as put case there be an antecedent tum necessarium concludatur Object Doth every syllogism conclude necessary truth Yes not but that it may be contingent but he means necessario that is that this consequent will follow necessarily upon the antecedent for the Art or rule of a syllogism as otiosus est amator is contingent Egistus est otiosus is contingent ergo est amator this consequent doth necessarily follow upon the antecedent so that necessario goes not with the conclusion but with the inference of the conclusion Nam cum axioma dubium sit quaestio efficitur ad ejus fidem tertio argumento opus est cum questione collocato That is when a matter is to be demurred and staid upon quaestio efficitur as before ad ejus fidem c. what is that that is ad ejus fiat dictum that is that you may build upon this truth tertio argumento opus est so that fides properly belongs to the will and to the resolution of the will which is the extremity of reason so that fides is in the will ergo
as if I judge the definition of Logick to be before the distribution here the distribution is an adjunct to the definition and here I make of these two one axiom of a subject and an adjunct and judge them by the rule of axiomaaical judgement The second end memoria comprehenditur is true so then the judgement of all the parts of an Art for their conveniency is nothing but the seeing of their consention for one axiom laid to another is subjectum and adjunctum and so we make but one axiom of them now method makes all things one and we remember all things as one and therefore it is that the world is one namely by method and the reason why we forget any thing is because we make one thing more things for every sense is of one thing indeed The reason why we remember a man whom we have seen before is because we remember the disposition of the parts of his body nose mouth eyes c. and so turning the glass of our understanding unto him again we know him and if we would remember any thing for our own present use let us carry them home to their places and we shall not forget them and here we may see that we do not remember by taking the species of things into our brain and there lay them up as in a chest or let them hang as birds in a lime twig and are received by fancy first as if it did fashion them then cogitation considers of them and memory keeps them Answ There is no reason to shew that these should be true for these outward species that come to my external eye vanish away quickly for the species of the understanding they being made of the animal spirit must also soon vanish but by the rule of method we place the things in their order as God hath done and when our eye hath seen them once in their place she knows where to go to find them again so that as my outward eye being once turned from the thing it beheld before doth not receive any species from it so my eye of reason hath not any species of any thing any longer than it looks at it so that I may fitly compare our inward eye of reason to our outward eye or to a glass Atque ut spectatur in axiomate veritas falsitas in syllogismo consequentia inconsequentia sic in methodo consideratur ut per se clarius praecidat obscurius sequatur omninoque ordo confusio judicatur Ramus doth commorari upon this rule and shews it by comparing it with other rules for as the drift of an axiom is truth and falshood and of a syllogism consequence and inconsequence so that syllogistical judgment is but to clear things to us and we must go to axiomatical judgment to see the truth and falshood so that rules of consequution are here and maxims as they call them rules of consequents as sublata causa tollitur effectum c. these are but uses of the arguments of invention and they follow by syllogistical judgment we making the first rule to be the third argument as here if causa be cujus vires est then sublata causa tollitur effectum At. Ergo. Sic in methodo c. Omninoque ordo confusio judicatur By judgment here we are to understand axiomatical judgment as I said before but order is here which we judge by the application of the rule of method to any thing and so we syllogize Sic disponitur ex homogeniis axiomatis primo loco absoluta notione primum secundo secundum tertio tertium ita deinceps According to this rule of method shall be disposed homogeny axioms first that which is absolute that is that which takes not light from any other then of them that take light from others secundo secundum tertio tertium so that the definitions of things in Arts are absolute prima but in truth there is not any definition of any Art absolutely first but that of Encyclopadia there are also magis and minus nota compared with others which are in the second and third places Ideoque methodus ab universalibus ad singularia perpetuo progreditur So that here we must know that that which was before natura prius is here universalius not genus species or any such thing but he means that method proceeds a natura notioribus ad natura ignotiora and this is the genesis of method Now Kickerman not seeing this well and seeing Aristotle say in his Ethicks that he must proceed a generalioribus ad specialiora did imagine that every Art must have his praecognita but Aristotle means that having spoken de summo bono which was the most general end he was to speak of things more special tending to that end and alas what is absolute primum in an Art but the first rule ergo can there be any thing to be praecognitum Again his praecognita are either the Art it self confusedly taught or the exposition of some special rules thereof and for postcognita why the examples are infimae species ergo lowest ergo we cannot go further than examples for postcognita Hac â—nim sola unica via proceditur ab antecedentibus omnino absolute notioribus ad consequentia ignota declarandum eamque solam methodum Aristoteles docuit So that things are to go before or after by their nature and this Aristotle and every one doth consider for when a man cloatheth himself first he is to cover his head then to put on his doublet hose c. and it is preposterous if a man should first put on his shooes then his stockins or breeches and in making himself unready he must analyse that is first put off his shooes then his stockins c. CHAP. XVIII De prima methodi illustratione per exempla artium Sed methodi unitatem exempla doctrinarum artium praecipue demonstant praecipueque vindicant OUr Author stayes long upon method his reasons are because all Logicians are very silent in the doctrine of method and they that have spoken of it are mistaken therein for they make method to be nothing but genesis and analysis whereas they are the practice of a rule or of as many rules as are in the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 of a thing ergo they are not method though there may be a genesis and an analysis of the rules of method as well as of any other rules of Logick or other Arts. Now whilst other Logicians knew not this they have run into many questions about the multiplicity of method whereas it is but one as may easily be shewed by reason For if all things are made one by the rule of method though there are many things in the world then there cannot be more methods for then there should be more worlds Exempla doctrinarum artium praecipue demonstrant praecipueque vindicant Ramus saith that method as it is true is not better seen to
dispositio is judicum or Methodus judicium est axiomaticâ—m or syllogisticum my reasons are these the arts of reason are performed by the internal senses the best phansie invents best and that is performed by a hot brain cogitation serves judgement axiomatical and syllogistical and that is dry and the best memory is an ayrie moist brain ergo whilst I see from this reason in natural Philosophy that axiomatical and syllogistical judgement are thus combined and the other severed I think this art should be thus divided according to their instruments as nature hath severed them Again our Author distributeth the second part into axioma and discursus and under discursus he placeth syllogismus and Methodus now these two cannot be joyned together for why what hath method to do with syllogismus Method doth not dispose syllogismes but axiomes Again the use of a syllogisme is to make clear that that is obscuâ—e and to manifest truth and the rule of truth belongs to axiomatical judgement if it be clear if not then to syllogistical judgement but we bring our question after again to an axiome to see the truth of it ergo these two work about one thing namely about truth therefore they should be combined together So that syllogistical judgement is to make clear that which axiomatical judgement could not yet the doctrine of axioma is before and syllogistical judgement hath for his subject axioma dubium The exceptions against this rule are these first Kickerman saith There is no invention but there is judgement withal that is confessed to be true in use as in Grammar the use of Etimologie is never without Syntax but the use is one thing and the rule another there is no precept of invention that belongs to judgement aut contra then he saith Who can invent but he must also judge for saith he must not a man judge a cause before he find it this is also a fallace of use we cannot find a rule but we use both invention and judgement but by his argument there should be no judgement but syllogistical then again he saith invention was used for a third argument and not as Ramus taketh it True it is the Schools thought it onely to belong to syllogismes and that there was but the use of an argument not the doctrine of it but thus I argue Is invention of a third argument ergo it is of an argument ergo then it belongs not to judgement for the doctrine of a simple conceit as he calls it is distinct from the doctrine of judgement Again if it be a third Argument there wâ—s two before ergo there are Arguments disposed Again when a third Argument is found out do we not dispose pars consequenâ— quaestionis in propositione and antecedens in assumptione and so make the proposition an axiome and likewise the assumption ergo an argument is placed in an axiom as well as in a syllogisme by their own confession therefore we see evidently here that the use of an Argument is common both to syllogistical and axiomatical judgement And I would ask whether causa est cujus vi res est when it is disposed with the effect be the same and have the same definition in an axiome that it hath in a syllogisme If they say it is the same ergo common to both ergo the doctrine of causa and effectum c. must go before the doctrine of an axiome and a syllogisme and Method and must be distinct from them all for as method is distinct from axâ—omatical and syllogistical judgement and is before them because an axiom may be without them not contra So is the doctrine of arguments before the doctrine of axiomes for the same reason and Kickerman confessâ—th as much whilst he distributes Logick into terminus simplex complexus and discursus he saith Authors of Arts are called Inventors as Hypocrates of Medicina Aristotle of Logick but did they not all judge them yes but doth it therefore follow that invention and judgement are not divers things so that this distribution stands firm and sure and as for his conceit to have invention taught in a syllogisme we shall hear of it when we come there for it is very silly Now for his distribution into three parts it comes to one with ours for his first part terminus simplex so much of it as is Logick belongs to invention so terminus complexus belongs to axiomatical judgement and discursus to syllogismes and he would have it belong to method too But first the absurdities are these he does not follow reasons 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 which Logick delivers for conceptus simplex is properly the judgement of a thing when we see the truth thereof so that this is not so proper as invention Now when I say inventio I say that part that directs my reason to seek out things secretly wrapt up in nature again whilest he makes a distribution of the precepts of Logick by these precepts we must understand the systema of Logick by a Metonimie of the material cause and when he sayes a systema of precepts that is a far fetched trope again we never have more parts than two in a distribution but there is some thing left out for to admit of his distribution but is there not a community betwixt his terminus complexus and discursus namely dispositio ergo here he wants the rulâ— of dispositio and so makes his Art imperfect Now he Pâ—eads for the antiquity of it which we are not to admit of but of truth why his Logick was not in ancient time is it therefore nought now The use of this rule is this as we heard before Logick took my reason and told me the marks to shoot at so here it tels me that I must first invent and so I shall go orderly to work and then dispose for the Brick-layer must first have bricks before he can make a brick-wall and the Grammarian must have words before he can make a sentence and as before arguments are more general than axiomes axiomes than syllogismes c. for the one may be without the other not contra as one is more general than two two than three c. because one may be without two or three c. not contra so first we must invenire and then judicare that we may bene disserere for there is nothing betwixt them but when we have stones then we may build and whilst we find in the creatures of God things considered as they are in themselves and then in respect of others therefore so must reason be distributed into his two acts and now we come to invention which is prima pars Dialecticae de inveniendis argumentis first we have heard the reason of the name inventio betokening actively the reason inventing or finding out and howsoever we may find it taken for the whole act of Logick yet it is a Synecdoche and though we cannot but use judgement in it yet it is
the series they belong to Logick that is as if he should say for their Logical notion they belong thither but when he sayes series he is presently in method for his series is nothing but methods work and if he reason that Arithmetick Geometry Nature c. belong to Logick because methods use is there that is fallacia accidentis now the doctrine is one and the use is another the doctrine is distinct the use confused then again whereas he sayes here you have genus summum and subalternum why we heard of them in the distribution ex effectis but because substantia is corporea or incorporea here is a distribution as a genus into his species therefore saith he this belongs to Logick so let him bring in the daubers Art too for Logicks use is there Thus do they make a confusion not seeing things distinct Again whereas they help to find out a subject and predicate they have shut out some namely incompleta as a mans hand which may be a subject or a predicate and when I say the world is made of the first matter is not the first matter here a predicate so they shut out transcendentia as ens but is not homo ens therefore a predicate Again is not a predicate an argument ergo artificiale aut inartificiale if artificiale then fetched out of some Art therefore let me carry my subject to the Art whereunto it belongs and there will I find any predicate again for the help of a medium is every medium a genus subalternum Suppose we shall fetch a medium that is genus summum or an individuum but let me go to the Art of my subject and if I will take that which is above it or below it there I shall have it done to my hand Again he sayes the doctrine of the predicaments serve for definitions and differences c. Why let me go to the Art and there I shall see every thing taught to my hand so that the doctrine of predicaments quatenus they are adumbrations of the Arts are to be seen in their Arts. But to reason that because Logicks use is there therefore they belong to Logick is very absurd Again if there be this predicament to shew the summum and subalternum genus and species subalterna and infima why is there not a predicament to know causa for by the same reason there should be a predicament to find out causas and let them say what they can of the predicaments we shall find all in the doctrine of distribution and definition as substantia is corporea aut incorporea is a distribution and belongs to natural Philosophy and so the next distribution of substantia corporea c. so if we take quantity we shall see we are in some special Arithmetick or Geometry c. for the predicables genus species differentiae proprium accidens these we know are special arguments the two first belong to distributio ex effectis differentia belongs to forma for it is called forma in respect of the thing formed and differentia as it distinguisheth the thing from all other things If they shall say I but here is distributio per formam that is accidental to forma and belongs to distributio so that forma is the better word taken from the nature of it for proprium is nothing but propriam adjunctum and there it is taught as it hath respect to his subject not as it is an act and accidens is also a special kind of adjunct Now the laws of Art require that every precept deliver the principia thereof and therefore be either definitions distributions or properties which they after a sort seeing made these to be helps to the predicaments now for substantia quoad res it belongs to natural Philosophy quoad serim or ordinem to method for quantity it belongs to Mathematicks quality to moral Philosophy yea and to natural too for relates they belong to Logick but there can be no series or order of them for they are but examples of relates as causa and effectum are relates but onely examples ergo infimae species for actio it is nothing but motus quando is nothing but the adjunct of time passio a subject ubi a special kind of subject also of place situs belongs to Geometry otherwise it is an adjunct and habitus is a special kind of adjunct therefore there can be nothing beneath these but examples so that do but look at his table and you shall see him presently go out as he sayes qualitas is naturalis and moralis this is false for naturalis aut moralis are two examples of that adjunct qualitas and justice is no more a quality because it is a vertue then Socrates est genus because animal is genus so that argumentum is the true subject of Invention and not the predicables and predicaments any further than they are arguments Argumentum est quod ad aliquid arguendum affectum est Now we come to the definition of argumentum we heard that Dialectica is a general Art and is conversant about every thing and about non ens gratia entis now then argumentum must be in every thing therefore it is quod any thing whatsoever and thus it is demonstrated because Logick is a general Art so thus here we see argumentum est quod which is as large as aliquid quod affectum est we know this is a borrowed word affection is a disposition natural as the eye is affected to see but that we may see it the better we will dig deeper there is an efficient working then his working which is effâ—ctio which as it is about it so it is affectum ad effectum as if my hand be wounded with a sword there is first an efficient then there is wounding which is effectio then there is a wound which is effectum then my hand is the affectum to be wounded so that affectus is nothing but a nature in that thing by which nature can perform that action so argumentum is affectum as if he should say that that is made or factus ad or effected to another thing or which hath this 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 in it to work with another thing Why affectum It is a property of an argument as homo est risibilis when he doth not ridere so that he defines argumentum in invention from that power or faculty for as a man may have an affection to that thing he never doth so an argument may have an affection to argue when it acteth not so that he teacheth from that disposition of it to act so that he delivereth it not from his act for that is but the use of it but from its true nature as the common Logicians call it praedicabile that which may predicate and sayes it is not an argument till it be disposed but this is accidental to argumentum then in an axiom they call it praedicatum actu which also
is called Argumentum inartificiale because it never comes into Art to make up a Rule though it may come in as a commoration to prove a rule syllogistically but method is the disposition of axioms not of syllogismes now a testimony of a thing belongs to that Art to which the thing witnessed doth belong as Aristotles authority against the creation of the world belongs to Divinity there to be confuted in the doctrine of the creation Argumentum inartificiale sequitur It is an Argument for it is effected ad arguendum but after a new manner for it is externè but as it is grounded upon the Artificials so it is effected to argue Argumentum inartificiale est quod non sua natura sed assumpta alicujus artificialis argumenti vi arguit It is of power to argue as we heard before but not vi sua For when a man beareth witness of a thing we receive it presuming that he is familiarly acquainted with the thing that he witnesseth so that arguit but not sua natura for alas what harmony is there between the witnesser considered in his own nature and the thing witnessed considered in its own nature None at all so that we must look at either of these for their natures Sed assumpta c. So that by the force of some artificiall Argument taken unto it it doth argue ergo this teacheth us not easily to receive every testimony hand over head but first to look whether the testis be well acquainted with the thing witnessed otherwise as it may be an error in him to give testimony of a thing he knows not so may it be no lesse error in us that receive such a testimony This we see reproved in common matters among men and it teacheth us to receive the testimony of a man not so much because ipse dixit but because we are sure he knowes the thing throughly Vi assumpta Nor that it is ortum argumentum for orta did argue with the same force that the first did from whence they did arise but a testimony doth not argue with the force of an artificiall be it primum or ortum though it be backed with artificiall The cause effect should be in the witnesser but they are not in the witness if the testis have seen any one argument we are so far to receive his testimony and no farther if he have seen more arguments or all of them then are we much more to receive his witnesse Itaque cum exquisita rerum veritas subtilius exquiritur per exiguam vim probationis habet This being the nature of an inartificial it hath little force to argue of it selfe for all his strength is aliunde Veritas Truth belongs to an axiome here he means if we would see it to be ens or the entity of it surely this argument can stand us in no great stead the testimony onely swims in our brain but we doe not see the thing in its subtile parts as if he should say the artificial arguments do argue subtilly the inartificiall more grosly In civilibus autem et humanis rebus plerumque hoc argumentum praecipuam fidem è moribus arguentis efficit si prudentia virtus et benevolentia adfuerint He staies upon the use of an inartificiall argument In the matters of the Common-wealth or in matters concerning private men this argument hath his speciall credit because in this kind they are most received we know all the matters in our Courts pass by writings or testimonies of men and in these civill matters we look more after the men then after the thing there are Artificials here in these matters but we look not at them still we are to understand that the witnesses know the artificials the reason is because they are things done in time long before which therefore cannot be decided but by writings or mens testimonies Praecipuam fidem habet That is it doth urge most in respect of the subject whereto it is used E moribus arguentis efficit si prudentia virtus et benevolentia adfuerint This inartificiall Argument hath not praecipuam fidem from it self but as it proceedeth from him that is prudent vertuous and benevolent Prudentia is that skill a man hath to bring his Rule or any deduct from his Rule to practice that is if he be not simple and silly to tattle and prattle he knows not what then praecipuam fidem habet so that prudentia doth require discretion and judgement to know and deliver a truth That commandement Thou shalt not bear false witness is here taught Again if he have not vertue joyned with his prudentia that is if he make not conscience of witnessing the truth when he knoweth it we ought not to receive it so that as he must be able to judge of the truth so must he have conscience to utter it Lastly because notwithstanding though he may be judicious and vertuous yet it may be that even the best man may be carried with an affection either of love or anger ergo he must have good will to speak the truth howsoever ergo it is left to a malefactor that if any of the Iury seem not to have these things he may except against him Id uno nomine testimonium dicitur Of the second part for testis and testimonium are the arguments arguing it is so called in respect of the thing witnessed because that is neerest Now some Logicians as Kickerman place testimonium in judgement not in invention for saith he it is an axiome but he is decived for the testis and the testimonie are arguments and make but one axiome why one argument may be an axiome as a wise man is worthy respect here a wise man is an axiome but when it is a testimony it is not an axiome True it is that the testis speaks rem testatam axiomatically most commonly and that is the reason our Author speaks so often of veritas here in this chapter but as it is a testimony it is no axiome Est divinum vel humanum Here is a distinction of testimonies I dare not call it a distribution for these parts belong not to a testimony but as divers modi we know that divinum testimonium is given from him from whom nothing is hid but that he sees all things the humane is not so so that testimonium comes to be respected these two wayes Now if question be made that divinum testimonium is beyond all controversie surely if God say it we are to receive it for God is good and knowes all and no evill dwells with him neither doth he wish evill to his Man may say with the Academicks hoc tantum sâ—io me nihil scire ergo if a divine and humane testimony be compared together the humane is to give place to the divine neither is there any divine testimony but if we look after it we shall see it in the thing so that a divine testimony is most absolute not quatenus testimonium
of our understanding as it doth discern and determine truth and falshood for it comes of judex a judge and when an axiom is made our judgement comes to judge it so that the name will in the end hardly be found large enough for this part of Logick I would rather distribute it thus Dialecticae partes duae sunt Inventio Dispositio and then Dispositio est judicium aut methodus and judicium est axiomaticum aut syllogisticum My reasons are these first because in method I see no more judgement than in invention but it is properly of the order of axioms Again judgement is for truth and falshood and that is the drift of axiomatical and syllogistical judgement ergo they two are to be coupled together Again I observe this in nature that there are three internal senses fancie cogitation and memory for the common sense is all one with fancie Now these serve reason as the two affections love and hatred serve will for as there is the affection of love to embrace that which will willeth and the affection of hatred to hate that which will nilleth so there is to serve reason first a fancy that serves invention cogitation and memory that serve disposition Now these three are distinct in nature because their organs and instruments by which they work are distinct for the organ or instrument of fancy is heat the instrument of cogitation is drith and moisture of memory Now the opposite to heat is cold therefore cogitation and memory communicate in cold then cold is a dry or moist cold the dry cold is the instrument of cogitation the moist cold is the organ of memory but this cold must be but in a degree for if it be too cold all is mard Now then cogitation and memory communicating together in cold there must be a genus wherein judgement and method must also communicate and that is dispositio so that as these organs are by nature severed in man so nature must sever our reason into invention and disposition and disposition into judicium and methodus and that these are distinct in nature many reasons do shew for when a man is first born then is his invention best his judgement is best when he is past juvenis he remembers best when he is a child and then best for invention because his head is then hottest afterward best for judgement because then his brain is dryest first of all best for memory because his head then is moystest again man in the morning remembers best because then his brain is moyst by reason of the fumes that ascend to the brain when he sleepeth at noon he is fittest for cogitation because his brain is then dryest at night he invents best because then his brain is cold and as in the Suâ—â— course her heat is moystest in the morning dryest at noon and coldest at night so is it with mans reason so that the internal senses are thus divided yet here do we rather admit of a dicotomie because else we should leave out a genus namely dispositio Again because the ends of invention and judgment are various now it may seem strange that Logick teacheth these parts thus divided for if it be true that a child hath his memory first best then his cogitation and then his fancy why should not method be taught first then judgement and lastly invention The reason is this indeed if a child should have use of his disposition first it would hinder his growth for a child hath least use of his reasonable soul for a long time because it is an hindrance of the acts of the vegetative and sensitive soul by reason hereof if he should be moystest he could not grow to that stature which is fitting or if he should be dry it would not extend his moysture again afterward that his fancie is moystest it is for the bene esse of the body for moisture is most praedominant in him till he come to the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 of his age and then his moysture cannot extend it self by reason of his heat and then he becomes most judicious so that these are contrary to the order of method for the good of man Again a child hath his faculty of memory principal that then he may gather things into a store-house and afterward he must come to judge them ergo it is necessary that he should have the best memory first not so much for the act of his reason as for the growth of his body he is for anima vegetativa a plant for sensitiva an animal and yet there is no one act of any of these faculties above but aâ—l act together yet so as one is predominant ergo we say old age brings wisdom Now wisdom is sapientia that is syllogistical judgement or prudentia that is the application thereof upon every occasion Again syllogistical judgement is for axiomatical judgement for when an axiom is doubtful we use the light of a third argument and so going back to the rule of true and false axioms we judge it to be true or false again axiomatical and syllogistical judgement communicate in the disposition of arguments whereas method disposeth axioms immediately arguments mediately again method hath nothing to do with syllogistical judgement no more than with axiomatical judgment ergo we hear how these should be distributed from the organs of them in natural Philosophy and from the very act of reason Now for Kickerman who makes a tricotomy he desiring to make a perfect Art leaves out a genus Dispositio est secunda pars Logicae de disponendis argumentis ad bene judicandum This term dispositio commendeth to us the whole drift of the second part of Logick that is a disposing severing or putting arguments asunder it is pars Logicae taking it for the doctrine of Logick it contains a portion thereof which hath nothing to do with invention I mean for precept but onely for use for invention and judgement are as opposite as white and black Pars Logicae For indeed it belongs to no other Art no not to Rhetorick for doctrine but onely for use for as for their order of exordium narratio c. it is nothing but method ergo it doth not follow that because the Rhetorician useth disposition ergo it belongs to Rhetorick The Orator the Grammarian c. are general men yet their Arts are distinct Logicae Because Logick is the rule of reasons act and there is also this second act of reason to let us see how God hath disposed all things in nature for so all things but God are composite yet there are simples too yes but not in use subsistent in themselves but ever with others ergo Gods simplicity is a property that cannot be communicated to any other thing Secunda For there cannot be a disposition till there be things to be put together as a Brick-layer cannot lay bricks together except he have bricks Again we know Grammar hath two parts first
is the playing at two-hand ruffe for here are but to sides in an axiome ergo in this respect he saith argumenti cum argumento argumenti in generall because all the kinds of arguments may be disposed in an axiome Qua esse aliquid aut non esse judicatur So that the drift of judicium is to look at an aliquid so doth invention but yet it goes further and judges it esse aut non esse Now aliquid a thing that is ens in genere being an aliquid is judged to be this or that so that here we may see that what the common Logicians teach that in an axiome there is a subject and a predicate and the predicate is so called because it is foretold in the subject contra as when I say homo est animal animal tells me somewhat of homo and homo tells me somewhat of animal and the aliquid which is the subjâ—ct is she ed esse aut non esse hence it is that an axiome shewes aliquid esse aut non esse because every thing that is is composite and the simples are imperfect he doth not say aliquid esse verum aut falsum for if I say homo est lapis I say a thing to be though it be false and when I say homo est animal I say a thing to be and it is true Now divers bring in here quaestio and they say it is simplex which is the same with an Argument or Composite which is the same with an Axiome as if there were no use of an Axiome but by way of question but we know that a question belongs to a Syllogisme and to make it as generall as Axioma will not be either 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 or 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Latinè enunciatum Enunciatio Pronunciatum Pronunciatio effatum dicitur Our Author sâ—ays upon the naming of Axioma because few Logicians besides himself have received this name therefore lest his Schollars should think it strange whereabout he goes and whether he had forgotten himself he tells them that he means by axioma that which others call Enunciatum c. Propositio properly belongs to a Syllogisme and is the thesis and the assumptio is the apothesis Why saith he Latinè because axioma is graecè as if he should say I use this word as best sitting my turn for no Latine term utters this thing so well Again the reason is as if he should say I had rather use this term because the Latines fetching the tongue from the Greeks have not names so fitting the things as they because enunciatum enunciatio c. have an adherencie of words and they doe name Logick by Grammar whereas we know an Axiome may be when it is not uttered Enunciatum enunciatio c Enunciatum signifies the thing concrete and enunciatio signifies the axiomation as we may say of it the disposition of it and so of the rest Axioma est affirmatum aut negatum affirmatum quando vinculum ejus affirmatur negatum quando negatur We have heard that there are but two sides of an axiome and to this end qua judicatur aliquid esse aut non esse Now this axiome is distributed first into his adjuncts therefore affirmatum and negatum attend upon the esse and non esse which the axiome doth deliver Homo est animal here aliquid esse dicitur and it is affirmatum homo non est animal here aliquid non esse dicitur and it is negatum so homo est lapis here aliquid dicitur esse affirmatur homo est lapis here aliquid dicitur non esse negatur so that the affirmation and negation of an axiome is not of the esse and non esse of it If he said affirmatum qua esse aliquid here he doth not mean esse but esse that is affirmatum as when I say homo est lapis Esse and non esse are other things then affirmatum and negatum but when a thing is so it ought to be affirmed and when it is not so it ought to be denied Here I say he distributes an axiome into his proper adjuncts ergo this distribution is not imperfect as we said before because then the species which follow should be left out for some there are which say a distribution is perfect or imperfect even as a definition is perfect or descriptio but that is false for we use not a description when we can have a perfect definition but we use a distribution ex adjunctis when we also have a distribution generis in species Again it is not imperfect because it cannot be a distribution of genus into the species or of integrum into the members imperfectly for then affirmatum would signifie a simple axiome and negatum a composite axiome Again if this distribution were left out there would want a rule of Art which is 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Now before we heard of Arguments that were affirmantia and negantia here he saith axioma est affirmatum aut negatum for the band is it that denies or affiâ—ms the arguments one of another ergo the axiome is denyed aut contra yea when there are Arguments affirmantia and negantia disposed in an axiome it is affirmatum aut negatum as when I say darness is not light the band denies light of darkness Affirmatum quando vinculum ejus affirmatur Why have we not yet heard of vinculum If here be his first place why doth he not describe it Answer Because we heard that Dispositio was pars Logicae de disponendis argumentis and that judicium was dispositio argumenti cum argumento qua esse aliquid aut non esse judicatur and in disposition we have this band for though there be a positio of arguments dis that is a sunder yet there is a composition too so that we have it both in the generall definition of disposition and in the speciall description of Judicium Vinculum Now indeed vinculum is vox aequivoca for it is the band of an axiom of a syllogism and of method the band of method is called transitio which ties two several doctrines together as two banks that have water running between them are tied together by a bridge ergo in this case it cannot be defined Vinculum affirmatur Then we see that the affirmation of the axiom is from the band and not from the arguments and when we say homo est lapis and homo non est lapis we have a vinculum in both though indeed where the arguments agree there should be an est and where they disagree there should be a non est Negatum quando negatur For if it be â—ffiâ—matum quando vinculum ejus affirmatur so negatum contra so that here evermore look to the vinculum now this distribution doth not require that we should alwayes affirm and deny too the same axiom and so look at it neither shall we alwayes find it so though it may be
documentorum artis propriorum prima 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 lex veritas secunda 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 lex justitiae tertia 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 lex â—apientiae dicatur So that these three properties are required in every rule of Art Atque ejusmodi axiomatum ita catholicorum judicium verissima prima scientia est So that the judgement of such catholick axioms is prima verissimaque scientia and all others are but second or third truths as they are deducted from the first second or third and are per se so far forth true as their first rule is true hence whatsoever we read we shall find it if we mark it to be either a rule of Art or some deduct so that the heads of Arts should be the heads of common place books and so might we bring all that we read unto them and try them Now some say that 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 contains 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 and 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 ergo they might be left out Answ It doth not follow for these three are distinct things for as it is reciprocum it is not in the same respect 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 c. Again an axiom may be 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 and yet not 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 c. so also an axiom may break the rule 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 and yet not break the rule 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 c. so that if they were left out we should have no rule to shew such axiomes to be false CHAP. IV. De axiomate simplici Atque haec de communibus axiomatis affectionibus species sequuntur VVE have hitherto heard of whatsoever is 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 to an axiom in general for though 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 and 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 belong onely to the rules of Art yet because they may be simple or composite axioms ergo they are generally to be taught to them both the judgment moreover of such axioms was prima verissimaque scientia Prima because that was first and per se true and most true because all other deducts do so far forth approve themselves true as they agree to the first and these first rules are few therefore they come nearest to God who is but one and are next to his wisdom others which are deducts may be many and they come next to the first rules we have among us a distinction of doctrine and use doctrina is properly the first rule of Art and use is the application thereof or the special deducts gathered from the first Others I find take doctrina for the first part of Divinity and Use for the special practice of a rule of Art but they are deceived and speak improperly and all the rules that Kickerman saith are wanting in Ramus are nothing but the practice of a rule that is 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 and they are infinite As posita causa ponitur effectum this ariseth from the definition of causa and it is onely true where the cause is brought as a third argument in a syllogism and otherwise we have no use of it and having handled all that is general to an axiom now we come to the species Atque haec de communibus c. This is a transition not from one part of an axiom to another for those things that we heard of before touching an axiom are but adjuncts to an axiom therefore must not be severed from their subject but because these have taken up two Chapters and so continued the doctrine of axioma long why we may have forgotten our selves thinking we have heard of the species already no saith Ramus we come but now to the species Axioma est simplex aut compositum Disposition we heard did dispose arguments either firstly or at the second hand in an axiom they are disposed either one with one or one with more or more with more if one be disposed with one so that there be but two sides as it were playing at two hand ruffe then it is a simple axiom and from this simple disposition of the arguments it is called simplex compositum contra so that this double disposition of arguments makes this distribution whereas affirmatum negatum and the other adjuncts before rather looked at the band then at the disposition of the arguments so that axiomatica dispositio is simplex in respect of the simple disposition of the arguments that are disposed therein Simplex quod verbi vinculo continetur Simplex is first because there cannot be a composite axiom but there will be a simple axiom and the composite is as it were a manifold simple Verbi vinculo He defines it from the band not that it ariseth from thence but because a verb fals out to tie an axiom to one Continetur For Invention did handle arguments severally but in axioms they are laid together with a cyment or verb. Object Why doth he call it a verb we have not heard of Grammar yet doth he mean that verb which is taught there Answ No but his meaning is that the parts of this axiom are tied together by that which if it be uttered is a verb so that verbum here is a metonimy of the adjunct from the subject verb being put for that whose name will be a verb. If a man would lay bricks with bricks to have them hold together he must have morter and if he would fasten two peices of wood together he must have a nail or a pin of wood for as the morter is to the bricks and the nail or pin to the wood such is this vinculum here spoken of to the arguments Vinculo He cals it vinculum because the vinculum holdeth the arguments together in a kind of composition imitating God therein who hath tied things in nature with an affection and indeed to speak the truth it springs from the affection that is between the two arguments disposed Itaque affirmato vel negato verbo affirmatur vel negatur Before we heard in an axiom that affirmatum was Quando vinculum ejus affirmatur negatum contra why then a simple axiom having the band affirmed must be affirmed contra so that this is nothing but a special application to this kind of axiom of that which was before taught generally to all axioms and that which is special here is that it is the verbum that is denied or affirmed which was vinculum before and this commendation indeed is chiefly for contradiction for if there be contradiction here the verb must be affirmed and denyed ut ignis urit ignis est antecedâ—ns urit consequens here he cals the argument going before the verb antecedens and the argument following the verb consequens others call them subjectum and praedicatum but he is not pleased with their names because subjectum is properly an argument in invention therefore if it should be used here it would breed confusion and not onely subjects and predicates are disposed here but all other arguments
axioms immediately and of things immediately so that we must lay up nothing by the rule of method but axioms and this must be our care in reading any thing to take the axioms and to carry them to their places in Arts. Object Are not syllogisms to be remembred ergo is there not method of them Answ Yes but we take the parts asunder and make them axioms first for the proposition assumption and conclusion are axioms and belong to some Art therefore look whither the more special argument in the axiom belongeth and thither the axiom belongeth and if we would remember the reason why such a thing is so or not so see where your rule is and look at the former axioms and you shall find arguments for the proof of any thing and may so keep them as for example otiosus est amator Egistus est otiosus ergo Egistus est amator The proposition belongs to moral Philosophy for vitium is a vice love is concupiscence the sin and it is the affection of love disordered ergo this breaks the seventh Commandement ergo this axiom belongs hither for love is the more special Egistus est otiosus this indeed belongs to the history of Egistus but because we have it not therefore we may carry it to otium so the conclusion belongs to moral Philosophy to concupiscence Again syllogisms serve but for the clearing of the truth of axioms and then afterward we return again to the rule of an axiom to judge whether it be true or false and this is all that is required for disposing arguments ergo method is dispositio axiomatum onely Again we never remember any thing but we make an axiom of it Object But we remember words Answ Though it be true that some remember words very strangely yet they remember them as axioms for the word and the thing signified by the word make an axiom Object But I suppose they know not the meaning of the words Answ Yet the sound oreecho of the word in his head which is an adjunct unto the word and the word it self makes an axiom still so that method is onely of axioms and commonly they that so remember words have little judgement and if all the axioms of all things were laid down methodically we should remember all things methodically Variorum For method is not in one axiom therefore here take heed that we be not deceived taking that to break the rule of method which is a breach of 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 as if this term invention be made a part of Rhetorick it is against 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 but if the doctrine of this rule Inventio est prima paus Dialecticae c. be taught in Rhetorick that is a breach of method contra the definition of Logick placed in Grammar or Rhetorick is 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 but a breach of method Again he saith they are various not such as shall be contrary one to another for the difference of the axoms of Art is but in a diversity as it were not in opposition because in respect of the object they all tend to one thing Homogeniorum That is of the same kindred this homogenia is not that in an axiom for that is between the arguments in an axiom this is between the axioms themselves so that let us beware that we put not heterogeny axioms in an Art for they that have done so may be compared to ignorant Painters that paint a horses head upon a mans body Again when we are to make a speech of any thing we must be careful to speak within our compass and not to bring in things that are heterogeny to the subject we speak of Pro naturae suae claritate praepositorum For method is the rule of order ergo there must be a praepositio a postpositio of axioms here ergo if we wil draw any Art out according to his true feature we must set every thing in his own place nature observes this course in every thing as we see whilst the earth would rather ascend then there should be vacuum and whilst the spirit of God his mighty power that governs all things doth place every thing in order we see he doth it by the rule of method continually as he placeth the fire in the highest place above the other elements then the air c. dulcenatale solum c. to every man and to every thing because by the rule of method that is his place and if things be displaced they will sooner perish The reason in nature why the load stone desires to stand North and South is because of the rule of method it being most agreeable to the nature thereof so to stand so that every thing desires by this rule not onely its proper place but its proper situs also in that place Pro naturae suae claritate this proposition must be guided by this rule namely the clearness of their nature and good reason for the former axiom doth disery some light to the following Again he saith pro naturae suae so that clarius natura must go first not that which is simply clarius because that that is by nature clarius is clarius and notius then any other and whereas we have a distinction of notius natura and notias nobis they are the same Notius natura is in Genest notius nobis is in Analysi for howbeit in analysi we begin at the lowest which is notius nobis yet in the end we come to notius natura and then that which is notius natura is notius nobis and we know in genere before we know in specie as we know homo before we know Thomas or William c. Hence it is that many of our great Doctors know the rules of Art but know not how to practise them so that indeed they know them not Again because prius natura commonly containeth something in it that we must know before we can understand the next rule so Arts teach us as Logick first teacheth Invention then Judgment In Invention it first teacheth an argument in general then in specie now if we would know which is natura prius in every thing that we may do thus if one rule give light to another or if one rule may be without the other to clear the truth of it then that is first otherwise it needs the help of another it must come after that other as one is before two for I cannot know two before I know one secondly two cannot be but there must be one whereas one may be without two Vnde omnium inter se convenientia judicantur memoriaque comprehendentur Here he tels us a double fruit or end that ariseth thereof for the first end unde omnium inter se convenientia judic antur true it is thus far if an Art be set in order we do there judge of the parts but this is by axiomatical judgment not by methodical for I make but one axiom of two
one is not where the other may not be neither is it after Grammer for subject or common use but only in a kind of precedency of doctrine even as Logick is before Grammer only because if we use Grammer which is the latter Logick's use must be the former as oratio should not be before Ratio Now because Rhetorick is a general Art hence it followeth that it may be used in any art if so be we have not a word without a trope that is so usually and familiarly known as the tropical word is or if it be not of so great use as the tropical word is for tropes do arise from the arguments in Logick so that they do not only set a lustre or resplendency upon the word used but also shew the argument from whence it is drawn Which thing if Keckerman had well considered he would not have found fault with Ramus for using a trope in that word disserere both because Rhetorick is general and secondly because that word disserere is of a thousand times more use then any other word Object But Rhetorick saith he is an Art only of the Affection and not of the Vnderstanding Answ So I can say of Grammer for only Logick is that which my understanding takes hold of and oratio is to the eare yet also to the understanding as it carrieth the reason with it Now indeed Rhetorick slips down more speedily than Grammer doth to the affections and is more volupe and voluptas as it tendeth to bonum is the object of affection And so these Sophistae of Greece when they would deceive their Auditours did so adorn their speech as that it would move so speedily to the affections that the understanding could not examine it and thence it is that this Art hath been most abused of any art and of least request For it is of the nature of Musick that it steals away the affections from that where about they ought to be occupied Eáque perse plurimum potest This is a rule of propriety for it agreeth only to this part of this art and not any other part whatsoever of any other art so we know invention is not of any force without judgement but is seen only in judgement So for Etymology and Syntax in Grammer but elocutio can do much by it self without pronunciatio Now the true reason of this propriety is this because there may be exornatio orationis which is written as there is pronouncing and scriptio orationis may be without the pronunciatio of it for elocutio is orationis but pronunciatio is oris and there may be oratio where there is not os but not contra Vt in Curione qui. Here he doth commorari upon the commendation of this propriety which he illustrateth à specie of Curio who was a Roman that had very pleasant and eloquent words but his pronunciation was very mean hence his elocutio was commendable but not his pronunciatio for there he was maximè nudus though for eloqution he was orator optimis proximus numeratus CHAP. II. Elocutio est Tropus aut figura HEre Elocutio is not a genus to Tropus and Figura but is used tropically by a metonymy of the subject for the adjunct Therefore I had rather say Ornamentum or exornatio orationis est Tropus aut Figura and by that means give them their genus Here exornatio orationis is a definition it self and therefore cannot be defined for there cannot be a definition of a definition therefore I do not define exornatio orationis but only distribute it into Tropes and Figures Now for the demonstration of this distribution We have already seen that Rhetorick is an Ornament of Speech therefore must run along answerably with it therefore distribute it according to it therefore a Speech is either of one word alone or more together as if he should say Rhetorick must adorn Etymology and Syntax so that as Tropus is to Etymology so is figura to Syntax Tropus est Elocutio I would define it thus Tropus est ornamentum orationis c. Or Tropus est quo verbum c. Tropus of 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 because words that are tropical are turned from that which they naturally signifie to that which they do not naturally signifie It is Ornamentum because besides its lustre it carrieth an argument with it Orationis because it is only in oratione and is in it as a jewel or jem is in a Ring and here the art lieth in the word Quà Verbum He useth verbum rather than nomen because nomen properly signifieth that part of Speech which is declined with gender and case though for notation it cometh of novimen of novimus of novi of nosco because we know things by their names But verbum properly is as general as vox and so it is here taken but by a synechdochy of the genus for the species is put for a verb. Again Dicti hath more ambiguity with it than verbum and vox is peculiar to Grammer Again not only nomina but verba are also tropical Again Verbum in a Sentence is the chief word for it is vinculum so that there can be no Sentence without it therefore used with good reason Verbum immutatur Here is a metonymy of the subject for the adjunct for the word is not changed but only the use or signification of it A native significatione That is à Grammaticâ or propriâ significatione though it be not alwayes so at the first hand for sometimes words are changed from one tropical signification to another tropical signification and there they are firstly from the other tropical signification and à natia â significatione at the second hand In aliam Not quamlibet but such an one as shall be according to Logick as that which properly signifieth a cause may tropically signifie the effect aut contra and so of the rest of the Argumens which argue one another In aliam i. e. into such an one as use hath brought up that it may be put for Tropus verò Aristoteli Here he doth commorari about the commendation of a Trope his Argument is à contrario as if he should say If it be so pleasant when it is abused much more when it is rightly used Ideóque Platonis oratio Plate had two Schollers Aristotle and Zenocrates Aristotle was of a quick wit and therefore Plato said He needed a bridle for him Zenocrates was more dull but of a greater judgment therefore he said He wanted a spur for him Now Plato left his School to Zenocrates which made Aristotle maligne at him and upbraid him with his faults and among the rest he challengeth him with Tropes which is a good fault though truth 't is that proper words are better even in an Oration if they can be so conveniently had though afterwards Aristotle commended Tropes if they were pleasant and not far fetch 't from home Et certè Tropum Here he sets
hath set down much like the tunes of musick and as in Speech there are many kinds of words so are there many kinds of Meeter yet those which are ordinary in Schools and of most use are simple or composite Simple is of two feet and is call'd Adonicum of Adonicus the Authour when Sappho being a fine Woman loved and made sapphick verses which were so called of her and after his death at the end of every third verse she in memorial of Adonicus made Carmen Adonicum this consists of two feet for if it should be of four it would be a foot and not a verse now this Sappho was a very fine Musicioner and she did excel Pindar in it Carmen Compositum is of more feet than two and is either tetrametr or polymetr here he is fain to make shift as he can with such words as he can get for otherwise tetram is polymetr though the schools use to say three is the least number of multitude and say tria sunt omnia Tetram is that which hath four feet and this is the first for there is no verse of note that is of three feet Polymet is pentam or hexamet Asclepiad of Asclepiades is the name of a Poet that found out this kind of verses Pentametra are Phaleucium so called of the Author Sapphicum of Sappho as before or Elegum of Eligo to chuse for these were a choice kind of verses Hexametrum epicum is of 6 feet Verùne pentam ab epico nunque separatur Here by pentam he means elegum by a synecdoche Now here are not all the kinds of Meeter by many yea the common Grammers have â—ambicks which here are not set down though the matter be not great CHAP. XVII VVE have already heard the doctrine of Poetical number now follows Oratorical which did not at the first observe measure The first that used to write were Poets which wrote in verse yet Orators used to speak in prose but not to write prose of a great while after the Poets Numerus oratorius est numerus c. That is 't is not tyed to such a strict number of syllables as Poetry is neither to the same feet in many sentences together dissimilis poëtico for it doth not quite through observe the number of feet as Poetry doth neither doth it use the same feet together dissimilis sibi ipsi because we should not alwayes use it lest the people should think it to be a set Speech neither should the same feet be perpetuo used but in divers clauses divers feet Now this oratorical number at the first did arise from Poetry for the Orators seeing the Poets much to delight the people by their Poetical number they also did endeavour to find out a kind of oratorical number whereby both their matter and speech might be of more grace and comeliness unto the people Now indeed this oratorical number hath a kind of deceipt in it but 't is bonus dolus and not malus dolus even as the Physitians use a kind of deceipt whereas they giving to their Patient a bitter Potion do sugar it at the top that the bitterness of the Potion may not so sensibly be felt Now the deceipt is this namely in that because this dolus doth sweeten the matter therefore they think the matter is deceiptful which is fallâ—cia adjuncti and therefore they did use number in prose but at liberty not Rhythme or Number The inventor of this oratorical number was Thrasymachus but he tyed himself too strictly and came too near unto the Poets next was Gorgias but he was also too sweet and therefore did make the people mark his speech and not the matter and therefore did wrong the matter He was a notable Sophister in Arîstotle's and Plato's time and was Isocrates his Master but this Gorgias by this means did much wrong the matter even as if we see a Gentleman in a very fine suit we shal so much look at the suit that we shall not look to the properness of his person Now Isocrates which was Gorgias his Scholler did excel them both and indeed he is the sweetest of all for figura dictionis for he is very moderate but Demosthenes and Aeschines were sweeter for figura sententiae for Demosthenes was strong and therefore his speech was more violent as it were casting out thunderbolts Now for the grace of oratorical number Hyperbaton transmutatio of 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 is permitted that it may be lawful for the sugaring of speech to transpose their words in a sentence into such places as they will make the best sound for otherwise as Fabius saith a speech will be rugged hard and dissolute and yawning if we shall place the words as they do arise so that in Greek and Latin we may for sweeter sound use by porbaton but yet notwithstanding in our English tongue we must not for use hath placed them Grammatically and therefore they may not be changed Differenda igitur quaedam sunt praesumenda Some words therefore saith he are to be put back and some to be put before and even as in building of Stones every stone must not be laid as they come next to hand but as they will best lye together so nothing will make a more sweet speech than a fit mutation of the order of words This oratorical number hath no rythme in it but only in a certain repetition that is in epizeuxis and epistrophe as we shall hear hereafter but is only in the observation of feet which Tully esteemed of so much worth as that he affirmed the speeches to exclaim when the words fell fitly and so our Sermons do much delight yet in them we must take heed we be not too curious lest we draw the peoples minds from the matter to the words and so rob God for so the speech will so delight the eare and the affections that the matter will not enter into the heart and without question Demosthenes had never laid his thunder-bolts so had they not been cast from him with number and therfore saith Tully as wrestlers and sword-players do shun every thing warily and do not strike vehemently that whatsoever is profitable unto fight the same may be comely unto the sight so an Oration doth not make any deep wound unlesse the stroke be fit neither doth it well enough fly the force except it know what is comely in the flying of it therefore as their motion is who are 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 unskilful at that play of Olympus so is their Oration who do not shut up their sentences with numbers CHAP. XVIII THis is the commendation of Tully of oratorical number in feet which ought to be much more acceptable to us than to the Author himself who being enwraped with the Schools and Comments of Rhetoricians thought this act to be most hard which is in twenty orations observed by Ramus and shewed to be most easie so much more excellent was the Oratours nature and