distributio generis in species though there may be either of these and likewise a distribution ex adiunctis Et transitionum vinculis si longior inter eas intersit explicatio colligandae sunt c. He giues vs here a note by the way that if the distribution went long before that then we should vse a transition from one part to another so that here wee see the vse of a transition and that it belongs to method and it is as it were a bridge to goe from one thing to another and it serueth auditorem reficere ac recreare Omnes definitiones distributiones regulae Grammaticae repertae sint atque vnaquaeque sigillatim iudicata c. Ramus supposeth euery rule of Art already inuented and iudged how shall we dispose them not by any rules before but onely by method which is behind for we speake of order as first the definition of Grammar then the distribution because partes simul sumptae are equiuolent to the whole and let an Art bee laid downe thus and wee shall see euery thing plainly and euidently CAP. 19. De secunda methodi illustratione per exempla Poetarū Oratorum Historicorum Atqui methodus non solum in materia artium doctrinarum adhibetur sed in omnibus rebus quas facile perspicuè docere volumus c. AS Aristotle saith in the first of his Ethicks 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 c. so euery thing may orderly be layd downe quas facile c. therefore Poets Orators c. obserue this rule howbeit they do not vsquequaque ingredi and insistere as Art requireth Virgilius in Georgicis c. Hactenus auorum cultus sidera coeli Nunc te Bacche canam Poetry is a generall Art ergo a Poet is a generall Author therefore Ramus brings examples out of Poetry to shew this generall Art of Logicke Virgil for example handles Georgickes that is husbandry and diuides it into foure parts in his first booke hee handles that which is 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 with husbandry but his distribution is not so good as it should bee if it were an Art for Virgil doth as Kickerman vseth to doe namely diuides it into its common properties and into its speciall properties common as Astrologia Meteorologia then he comes by a transition to trees then by a more imperfect transition in the beginning of his third booked de bobus c. for a transition is perfect or imperfect a perfect one consists of a conclusion of that which went before and of a proposition of that that followeth an imperfect transition consisteth of either of these seuerally and alone Sic igitur Poeta generalissimum primo loco c. That is this must bee our care when wee doe any thing especially if it be of importance that we misse not this method but that we place euery thing in his due order and method according to nature Sic Ouidius in Fastis c. So Ouid in his Kalender first sets downe the generall definition of his worke and then hee distributes it into twelue parts according to the twelue moneths of the yeare reprehending Romulus for making but ten months but it should seeme that the Romans had their time diuided as well in the time of Romulus as afterward ergo he did inuent all the twelue moneths ergo Ouid was deceiued in thinking that Numa Pompilius did make Ianuarie and Iune now he calls Iune Ianus because that moneth was dedicated to Ianus whom some thinke was Iauan some Noe and the first day of this month was his holie day Oratores in prooemio c. So that here wee may see this one method that as it is vsed in Arts so is it vsed in Poets and Orators now the exordium is nothing but a commoration the narration a description of that thing whereof he is to speake the confirmation a distribution c. Sic Liuius summam c. This example is for Historie CAP. 20. De Crypticis methodi Haec igitur in variis axiomatis homogeneis c. RAmus hath shewed vs what method is and that it is but one now this exact order thereof is then when we desire to teach any thing plainly At cum delectatione motuve aliquo c. If a man be to deliuer an Art hee must exactly obserue this method in euery point but many times it falls out in discourses that disorder must be vsed not for the doctrines sake but because of the peruersity of the hearers for they often goe out of their way by reason of their weaknesse now this way is especially when we reiect homogenies as Orators vse much to doe and draw in heterogenies knowing that variety doth delight Sed praecipue rerum or do initio inuertitur c. So as we shall see a rule come in like a morris-dancer as Aristotle placeth many out of order Itaque ad illam perfectae methodi c. So then as we heard in a syllogisme that there was an inuersion of the parts a superfluity and a defect so here in method haec imperfectior forma non solum detractis rebus mutila est vel superaditis rebus redundat sed ordinis sui quibusdam gradibus inuersis praepostera est Quod Poeta facit c. This crypsis is more often in Poets then in Orators or History though it be vsed much in History now populum docendum sibi proponit i. belluam multorum capitum but indeed he deceiues them yet it is onely for delight This order is very vsuall in Poetry and very pleasant in a tale or fables because when we reade them wee cannot rest quiet till we come to an end of them Sic vt Homerus ait Homerus Iliada disposuit Nec gemino bellum Troianum orditur ab ano c. He doth not begin the Troian warre from 20. egges in one of which egges Helena was and Castor and Pollux in another Semper ad euentum festinat c. for in the first book of his Iliads one would thinke that hee brought in the history of the tenne yeares but indeed thereby he takes occasion to bring in the history of the yeares before So Virgil fetcheth Aeneas from Sicily which is a little from Carthage c. Sic commici Poetae c. For there euery thing must seeme to come by chance not of purpose Oratores vero c. they referre all to victory they are like Lawyers and therefore think they may lye at pleasure therefore they will place their strongest arguments first that their auditors may chew the cud vpon them and then they put out their meane arguments in the middle whilst their auditors are meditating on the first and then at last by that time the auditors haue wel thought of the first they bring out one or two strong ones more to make their auditours beleeue that they in the middle were like to the first and last FINIS
may also see that axioma probabile as they call it and axioma subtile belong hither so that all third arguments are not vsed to make the things more true in themselues but to make the truth more manifest to vs ergo Cardan whilst he argued against Scaliger that he that disputed of subtilty might dispute of all things was in the right but when he would goe about to proue that all things were to bee taught in subtilty there he was out for after wee haue discoursed a point syllogistically wee are faine to goe backe againe to the rule of an axiome to iudge the truth or falshood thereof ergo here we may see that axiomes and syllogismes are confederate and not syllogisme and method Now the same axiome may be manifest to one man but darke to another ergo syllogisticall iudgement waits vpon man and if the truth or falshood bee nice or fine that it cannot bee seene with one act of our eye then we must vse a third argument and subtill if we define it aright is axioma non adeo manifestum Sequitur dianoeticum Dianoia signifies reasons discourse the laying about by our 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 for when at first she doth not see a truth then she commands cogitation to coagitare that is to looke after it so that dianoia is nothing but the running about of our reason for the finding out of truth Some Logicians haue compared axomaticall iudgement to a calme sea for there our reason is quiet being satisfied with the truth and syllogisticall iudgement to a troubled sea that is full of stormes winds and tempests for there our reason beats euery corner to conclude that which is doubtfull and from this act it is called dianoia and the iudgement of reason in such an Art is called dianoeticum it running after this or that but our author diuides it afterward into syllogismus and methodus which how it should bee true I see not namely how method should be dianoia for the three internall senses in nature are distinct ergo these parts ought to be distinct according to them as wee heard before Now method makes all things one and so we remember all things as one and the things be iudged before I come here here I onely lay things together to remember them Dianoia est cum aliud axioma ex alio deducitur estque syllogismus aut methodus This very definition tells me that dianoia is nothing but syllogismus and they are both one so that here are deductions of axiomes out of axiomes which surely belong to syllogisticall iudgement onely for I doe not meane that it is ordering of one axiome before another but a drawing of deductions from their first rules true it is that a former axiome giues light to that which follows but that light is by vertue of syllogisticall iudgement so that method placing axiomes doth indeed need axiomaticall iudgement as that also needs inuention before it can place them but it doth not therefore follow that the doctrine of axiomes should be in method Syllogismus est dianoia qua quaestio cum argumento ita disponitur vt posito antecedente necessario concludatur Syllogismus signifies properly the summe of an account in the species of numeration especially in Addition and summa and syllogismus are the same and the Logicians haue borrowed it of the Arithmeticians because though Logicke be the first Art in order and nature yet Arithmeticke was obserued by men before Logicke ergo Plato set ouer his Academy 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 for it was taught amōg them as Grammar is now taught among vs for as for Logicke Grammar and Rhetoricke they had them by nature ergo they studied the Mathematickes first ergo they called them Mathematickes for the word is generall to all Arts and indeed that was the reason that Aristotle in his Logicke brings demonstrations out of the Mathematicks so that this metaphor syllogismus was à priore to them This syllogismus est dianoia qua quaestio cum argumento c. it is indeed a contract of larger discourse and here in this rule obserue first a question secondly an argument thirdly a disposing of them together fourthly a set or constant position of the arguments and the question Lastly a necessary conclusion from them first if it bee a cleare truth that ought not to be a question else it should Qua quaestio What question shall hee goe aske any body yes a third argument if he will but quaestio here is a law terme signifying a commission so that if he doubted hee might see at the Law for the truth so that this iudgement is a Courtly kinde of seeking out truth with two arguments before the iudgement seat of a third argument and it is not quaestio which is made with an interrogation which whilst some Logicians did not consider they fell so in loue with quaestio as that they made it the subiect of Logicke and diuided it into simplex which is the same with argumentum and compositum which is the same with axioma Then there must be an argument he doth not call it tertium argumentum here as he doth afterward but onely argumentum though there are alwaies three arguments because here he considers it in respect of the whole question not looking at the parts of the question as they are in Inuention and argumentum must be brought indeed as an euidence or witnesse rather then as a Iudge for I my selfe am the iudge thereof Cum argumento Therefore here saith Kickerman must argumentum come in yea here indeed it must come in but it must ergo be taught before for it must be before it can come in ergo to say it must be here taught because it comes in here is fallacia accidentis so that an argument belongs to iudgement as it may be disposed not as it may be in it selfe But saith Kickerman further here is a question before an argument ergo the doctrine of a question must goe before the doctrine of an argument indeed it so falls out here but yet the parts of a question are not before an argument without he will make pigges fly with their tayles forward Disponitur He would haue further rules of consecution from the third argument that he might know how to vse them but indeed the rule of syllogismus is the rule of consecution ergo those maximes as they call them are consecutions from the rules of inuention and are prosyllogismes Now here is a disposition whereof Kickerman was not aware whilst he would distribute Logicke into a simple conceit a double conceit and into discursus for if disposition bee generall both to his double conceit and to his discursus then he leaues out two rules the definition and distribution of disposition ergo let vs hold the right Ita disponitur because in a simple syllogisme there is the disposition of the part of the question with the third argument consequens in propositione antecedens
seeing Aristotle say in his Ethicks that he must proceed à generalioribus ad specialiora did imagine that euery Art must haue his praecognita but Aristotle meanes that hauing spoken de summo bono which was the most generall end hee was to speake of things more speciall tending to that end and alas what is absolute primum in an Art but the first rule ergo can there be any thing to be praecognitum Againe his praecognita are either the Art it selfe confusedly taught or the exposition of some speciall rules thereof and for postcognita why the examples are infimae species ergo lowest ergo we cannot goe further then examples for postcognita Hac enim sola vnica via proceditur ab antecedentibus omnino absolute notioribus ad consequentia ignota declarandum camque solam methodum Aristoteles docuit So that things are to goe before or after by their nature and this Aristotle and euery one doth consider for when a man cloatheth himselfe first he is to couer his head then to put on his doublet hose c. and it is preposterous if a man should first put on his shooes then his stockins or breeches and in making himselfe vnready he must analyse that is first put off his shooes then his stockins c. CAP. 18. De prima methodi illustratione per exempla artium Sed methodi vnitatem exempla doctrinarum artium praecipue demonstrant praecipueque vindicant OVr Author stayes long vpon method his reasons are because all Logicians are very silent in the doctrine of method and they that haue spoken of it are mistaken therein for they make method to be nothing but genesis and analysis whereas they are the practice of a rule or of as many rules as are in the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 of a thing ergo they are not method though there may bee a genesis and an analysis of the rules of method as well as of any other rules of Logicke or other Arts. Now whilst other Logicians knew not this they haue runne into many questions about the multiplicity of method whereas it is but one as may easily bee shewed by reason For if all things are made one by the rule of method though there are many things in the world then there cannot be more methods for then there should be more worlds Exempla doctrinarum artium praecipue demonstrant praecipueque vindicant Ramus saith that method as it is true is not better seene to be one then in the rules of Arts for as 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 and 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 are onely belonging to rules of Art so method is almost and principally of the rules of Arts though their order may be in many other things Quibus quamuis omnes regulae generales sint vniuersales c. In the rules of Art all are vniuersals not that there may not be proper axiomes in an Art but hee meanes such as are 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 and 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 otherwise if hee should not meane thus this generality would bee onely true of the rules of the generall Arts not of the speciall Arts but though all be generall earum tamen gradus distinguntur as they are compared one with another as the definition of Logicke is before the distribution being more generall then it and so the distribution is more generall then the next and so for the rest Againe the most generall rule in disposition is more speciall then the last rule of inuention because inuentions vse is more generall then iudgements though the rule of disposition may containe more in it then the rule of inuention containeth in it Quantoque vnaquaeque genelarior erit tanto magis praecedet That is as it is pro naturae suae claritate praeponendum so must it be placed Generalissima loco ordine prima erit quia lumine notitia prima est This being the course of nature to proceed from the highest to the lowest for so wee must place things the reason followeth now indeed Ramus himselfe tooke no great paine about Art in generall and therefore imagined that euery definition in Art was absolutely first whereas in very truth none of them are absolutely first but onely that rule of Encyclopaedia Subalternae consequentiae sequentur quia claritate sunt proximae atque ex his natura notiores praeponentur minus notae substituentur tandemque specialissimae constituentur Among subalterns some are more generall and some are more speciall Ramus here speaks Allegorically alluding to genus and species subalternae and specialissimae in Inuention and here special rules are all one with others in themselues though not in comparison with them Definitio itaque generalissima prima erit Ramus meanes the definitio and the definitum not definitio the argument now this must be first why one would thinke it should rather be last because a perfect definition intendeth to lay downe the whole essence of a thing and before a man can know a peece of a thing hee must know it in the whole as it is comprised in a briefe from the neerest causes thereof Distributio sequitur quae si multiplex fuerit c. For so we heard that a definition was manifold integri in membra generis in species c. because as the definition layd out the whole in one lumpe at once from the causes which are the vtmost things so in a distribution there is the whole but laid out distributiuely in his parts so that this is the difference of them and the following rules doe prosecute euery part according to their place Praecedit in partes integras partitio c The reason of this is because the membra make vp the whole and are causes thereof as the definition was of the thing defined Againe the distributio of generis in species is from the effects and they are after the causes ergo distributio ex causis must goe before them againe a distribution of the integrum into the members in an Art is common to a distribution of the genus into the species as for example in Grammar vox is diuided as integrum into litera and syllaba and both letters and syllables are generall to vox numeri and sine numero which are the species of vox Sequitur diuisio in species c. But if there be a distribution of the subiect into the adiuncts they must goe before distributio generis in species as affirmatum and negatum axioma must goe before simplex and compositum because the adiuncts are 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 with an axiome in generall Againe if we set a distribution of the genus into the species before a distribution ex adiunctis we must handle the species distinctly ergo there would be no roome for distributio ex adiunctis to come in but wee must know that we seldome haue these distributions of the same Art for where there is distributio integri in membra there is seldome
animal is not that Logicall notion neither Socrates for they belong to naturall Philosophy but genus is no adiunct attributed vnto them so this inuention is onely of simple arguments and of the simple consideration of them and therefore our Art runnes along according to Gods order and though we cannot practice any rule of inuention but by iudgement yet it doth not therefore follow that they are the same for it is as if he should say this homo quae pars orationis Nomen here is the practice of Syntax ergo Etimologie and Syntax are all one Inuentio est prima pars Dialecticae de inueniendis argumentis Wee haue heard of the reason of the name Inuention why it is giuen to the first part and that with great reason for wee must finde by much seeking before wee can see things Againe Logicke being the first helpe to see Gods wisedome in his creatures and this vse of inuention being to be found in the thing it is hard to finde therefore it is fitly called inuention from the act of it so againe in dispute a man is same to seeke a third argument to proue his question Iudgement the second part is properly the act of our vnderstanding when it lookes at arguments disposed therefore here it is a metonimie of the adiunct for the subiect when it is put for dispositio and againe it is properly the disposing of arguments together which is of Axiomes and Syllogismes Method doth not looke at the disposing of arguments but at the placing of axiomes so that if I would distribute Dilectica thus Dalecticae partes duae sunt inuentio dispositio dispositio is iudicium or Methodus iudicium est axiomaticum or syllogisticum my reasons are these the arts of reason are performed by the internall senses the best phansie inuents best and that is performed by a hot braine cogitation serues iudgement axiomaticall and syllogisticall and that is drie and the best memorie is an ayrie moyst brain ergo whilst I see from this reason in naturall Philosophy that axiomaticall and syllogisticall iudgement are thus combined and the other seuered I thinke this art should be thus diuided according to their instruments as nature hath seuered them Againe our Author distributeth the second part into axioma and discursus and vnder discursus he placeth syllogismus and Methodus now these two cannot bee ioyned together for why what hath method to doe with syllogismus Method doth not dispose syllogismes but axiomes Againe the vse of a syllogisme is to make cleare that that is obscure and to manifest truth and the rule of truth belongs to axiomaticall iudgment if it be cleare if not then to syllogsticall iudgement but wee bring our question after againe to an axiome to see the truth of it ergo these two worke about one thing namely about truth therefore they should be combined together So that syllogisticall iudgement is to make cleare that which axiomaticall iudgement could not yet the doctrine of axioma is before and syllogistical iudgment hath for his subiect axioma dubium The exceptions against this rule are these first Kickerman saith There is no inuention but there is iudgement withall that is confessed to be true in vse as in Grammar the vse of Etimologie is neuer without Syntax but the vse is one thing and the rule another there is no precept of inuention that belongs to iudgement aut contra then he saith Who can inuent but hee must also iudge for saith hee must not a man iudge a cause before he finde it this is also a fallace of vse wee cannot finde a rule but wee vse both inuention and iudgment but by his argument there should be no iudgment but syllogisticall then againe he saith inuention was vsed for a third argument and not as Ramus taketh it True it is the Schooles thought it onely to belongs to syllogismes that there was but the vse of an argument not the doctrine of it but thus I argue Is inuention of a third argumēt ergo it is of an argument ergo then it belongs not to iudgement for the doctrine of a simple conceit as he calles it is distinct from the doctrine of iudgement Againe if it bee a third Argument there was two before ergo there are Arguments disposed Againe when a third Argument is found out doe wee not dispose pars consequens quaestionis in propositione and antecedens in assumptione and so make the proposition an axiome and likewise the assumption ergo an argument is placed in an axiom as well as in a syllogisme by their owne confession therefore we see euidently here that the vse of an Argument is common both to syllogisticall and axiomaticall iudgement And I would aske whether causa est cuius vi res est when it is disposed with the effect be the same and haue the same definition in an axiome that it hath in a syllologisme If they say it is the same ergo common to both ergo the doctrine of causa and effectum c. must goe before the doctrine of an axiome and a syllogisme and Method and must be distinct from them all for as method is distinct from axiomaticall and syllogisticall iudgement and is before them because an axiome may bee without them not contra So is the doctrine of Arguments before the doctrine of axiomes for the same reason and Kickerman confesseth as much whilst he distributes Logicke into terminus simplex complexus and discursus he saith Authors of arts are called inuentors as Hypocrates of Medicina Aristotle of Logicke but did they not all iudge them yes but doth it therefore follow that inuention and iudgment are not diuers things so that this distribution stands firme and sure and as for his conceit to haue inuention taught in a syllogisme we shall heare of it when wee come there for it is very seely Now for his distribution into three parts it comes to one with ours for his first part terminus simplex so much of it as is Logicke belongs to inuention so terminus complexus belongs to axiomaticall iudgement and discursus to syllogismes and he would haue it belong to method too But first that absurdities are these he does not follow reasons 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 which Logicke deliuers for conceptus simplex is properly the iudgement of a thing when we see the truth thereof so that this is not so proper as inuention Now when I say inuentio I say that part that directs my reason to seeke out things secretly wrapt vp in nature againe whilest hee makes a distribution of the precepts of Logicke by these precepts we must vnderstand the systema of Logicke by a Metonimie of the materiall cause and when he saies a systema of precepts that is a far fetched trope againe wee neuer haue more parts then two in a distribution but there is some thing left out for to admit of his distribution but is there not a community betwixt his terminus
his Scholler Pythagoras now the reason that brought them in was this that they might bee furnished with matter to worke about Logicke So that they were storehouses for them to lay vp things one way or other either analogicè or à latere Kickerman approues that purpose of them for saith he things doe not belong to Logicke now the Logicke in a predicament is this the order of things being placed one before another and so hee saith the predicaments are of great vse for the finding of simples Secondly they conduce for terminus complexus because we see what may be a subiect and a predicate in a proposition then another vse of them he sayes is for discursus for when we know what is aboue and below we may quickly know what is in the middest and they are also of vse for method For the first Inuention of them they are not storehouses for there is nothing but hath an 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 therefore belongs to some Art so that the Arts are the true store-houses of things so that his table of substantia is nothing but a draught of naturall Philosophie but I must tell you vntowardly and that of quantitie nothing but a draught of the Mathematickes that of qualitie nothing but a draught of naturall and morall Philosophie Other things hee brings in which are not so as he makes vbi to be a genus of intus and foras ad aliquid comes vnder relates Quando belongs to adiunctum c. but because Logickes vse is there they thinke they belongs to Logicke by the same argument let them bring all Arts in Logicke but saith he the things themselues belong to the speciall Arts but for the series they belong to Logicke that is as if he should say for their Logicall notion they belong thither but when hee sayes series hee is presently in method for his series is nothing but methods worke and if hee reason that Arithmeticke Geometry Nature c. belong to Logicke because methods vse is there that is fallacia accidentis now the doctrine is one and the vse is another the doctrine is distinct the vse confused then againe whereas he sayes here you haue genus summum and subalternum why we heard of them in the distribution ex effectis but because substantia is corporea or incorporea here is a distribution as a genus into his species therefore saith he this belongs to Logick so let him bring in the daubers Art too for Logicks vse is there Thus doe they make a confusion not seeing things distinct Againe whereas they helpe to finde out a subiect and predicate they haue shut out some namely incompleta as a mans hand which may be a subiect or a predicate and when I say the world is made of the first matter is not the first matter here a predicate so they shut out transcendentia as ens but is not homo ens therefore a predicate Againe is not a predicate an argument ergo artificiale aut inartificiale if artificiale then fetched out of some Art therfore let me cary my subiect to the Art wherunto it belongs and there will I find any predicate againe for the helpe of a medium is euery medium a genus subalternum Suppose we shall fetch a medium that is genus summum or an indiuiduum but let me goe to the Art of my subiect and if I will take that which is aboue it or below it there I shall haue it done to my hand Againe he sayes the doctrine of the predicaments serue for definitions and differences c. Why let mee goe to the Art and there I shall see euery thing taught to my hand so that the doctrine of predicaments quatenus they are adumbrations of the Arts are to be seene in their Arts. But to reason that because Logickes vse is there therefore they belong to Logicke is very absurd Againe if there be this predicament to shew the summum and subalternum genus and species subalterna and infima why is there not a predicament to know causa for by the same reason there should bee a predicament to find out causas and let them say what they can of the predicaments we shall finde all in the doctrine of distribution and definition as substantia is corporea aut incorporea is a distribution and belongs to naturall Philosophy and so the next distribution of substantia corporea c. so if we take quantity we shall see we are in some speciall Arithmetick or Geometry c. for the predicables genus species differentia proprium accidens these wee know are speciall arguments the two first belong to distributio ex effectis differentia belongs to forma for it is called forma in respect of the thing formed and differentia as it distinguisheth the thing from all other things If they shall say I but here is distributio per formam that is accidentall to forma and belongs to distributio so that forma is the better word taken from the nature of it for proprium is nothing but proprium adiunctum and there it is taught as it hath respect to his subiect not as it is an act and accidens is also a speciall kind of adiunct Now the lawes of Art require that euery precept deliuer the principia thereof and therefore bee either definitions distributions or properties which they after a sort seeing made these to be helpes to the predicaments now for substantia quoad res it belongs to naturall Philosophy quoad seriem or ordinem to method for quantity it belongs to Mathematickes quality to morall Philosophie yea and to naturall too for relates they belong to Logicke but there can be no series or order of them for they are but examples of relates as causa and effectum are relates but onely examples ergo infimae species for actio it is nothing but motus quando is nothing but the adiunct of time passio a subiect vbi a speciall kinde of subiect also of place fitus belongs to Geometry otherwise it is an adiunct and habitus is a speciall kinde of adiunct therefore there can be nothing beneath these but examples so that doe but look at his table and you shall see him presently goe out as hee sayes qualitas is naturalis and moralis this is false for naturalis aut moralis are two examples of that adiunct qualitas and iustice is no more a quality because it is a vertue then Socrates est genus because animal is genus so that argumentum is the true subiect of Inuention and not the predicables and predicaments any further then they are arguments Argumentum est quod ad aliquid arguendum affectum est Now wee come to the definition of argumentum wee heard that Dialectica is a generall Art and is conuersant about euery thing and about non ens gratia entis now then argumentum must be in euery thing therfore it is quod any thing whatsoeuer and thus it is demonstrated because Logicke is
a one will goe apace lumine luscus for when a man thinkes he lookes on him then hee lookes asquint and when one would thinke hee lookes a squint then he lookes on him Sic vestitus comitatus res adiunctae sunt quo circumstantiae genere Dido c. Oecanum interea surgens aurora relinquit c. So that not onely accidents but substances may bee adiuncts a man may be an adiunct as he is a seruant So Dido going a hunting is argued first from the time aurora then the attendance of young men then their hunting instruments c. Est vero adiunctorum ad subiecta quibus occupantur vsus item magnus There is another kind of adiunct which are occupantia as we heard before of subiecta occupata So Plato proues that those Cities are miserable which want Physitians and Iudges quia multa quoque et intemperantiam iniustitiam in ea ciuitate versari necesse est Sed consentaneorum categoria sic est vnde quiduis alteri consentaneum vel idem vel vnum dici possit We haue now seene both what goes to the esse and bene esse of a thing now he calls it categoria the arguing categoria signifies to plead against and they that gaue it that name first to argue did discerne truth by the contrarie which is borrowed from the Lawyers and we know when we would see a thing that if we take the contrary it will make it magis illucescere afterward it came to signifie not not that gaine-saying one of another but one mans pleading alone for his client then it came to signifie the arguments that he vsed in his speech for his client and lastly it came to signifie any argument and thence comes argumentum the praedicaments are called so namely categoria and so Ramus would have vs consider euery argument to be a praedicament Idem vel vnum Moreouer hee doth commorari a while telling vs that idem and vnum as the Aristotelians teach are nothing but these consentanie arguments so idem genere doth arise from idem causa so gemelli are idem tempore that is adiuncto so all modi of theirs arise from hence tanquam à primis simplicibus fontibus We shall heare of idem genere and idem specie and idem indiuiduo as if he should say but all of them huc sunt tanquam ad primos et simplices fontes referendi CHAP. 12. De diuersis Argumentum primum consentaneum expositum est c. WEE haue heard of consentaneum and why she should put in primum rather then simplex I see not for if hee meant to haue repeated them hee should haue put in all ergo primum would be put out now the vse of a transition is to hang things together when the one part is newly gone before as it were halfe forgotten then we must haue an imperfect transition otherwise a perfect one this method obserued for memories sake now it remaines that we consider what the thing is not and thus we goe orderly to worke Before we saw what went to a thing for the making of it vp now we cannot well see what a thing is not till we see what it is for non ens is seene gratia entis now this respect ariseth not by way of argument but by seeing what it was Dissentaneum sequitur This is opposite to consentaneum sentio is generall to them both sentire is taken for intelligere consentire is said of things that haue the same iudgement minde and reason dissentanies are of them that haue not the same iudgment ergo seeme to haue no reason in them in respect of consentanies ergo Aristotle denyed dissentanie arguments and made them follow Sequitur ergo it is by nature after secondly it is next to consentanies because they are simple arguments Quod à re dissentit That differs from the thing it argues à re still generall so that because the creatures of God are discreet and many ergo there is dissention and because reason was made to behold the creatures of God ergo it was necessary that they should be handled in Logicke Sunt autem dissentanea Here he calls them dissentanea in the plurall number for that which was res before is become dissentaneum as it hath a dissentanie to argue it secondly because here dissention agrees to them both as they are compared together Aeque manifesta Here dissentanies are made paria arguing equally for manifestation quasi aequa manifesta ergo this propertie containes thus much that one dissantanie is not before another for the manifesting of it as causa was before effectum c. Is not inuention before iudgement and they are opposite Answ True for doctrine but inuention doth not cleare iudgement more nor contra Alterumque ab altero aequaliter arguitur As there was not a prioritie and posterity so they haue equall force to argue contrary to consentanies so that manifestation is for the clearing of them and arguing because they haue the same doctrine but then what vse of them Tametsi sua dissensione clarius elucescant Here it is why they come principally into Logicke as blacke is not so blacke till it be set by white c. magis carendo quam fruendo wee see things for when we haue a thing and see not the priuation of it we make not much reckoning of it sua dissentione this is a discretion from the other properties so then we see why a contrarie makes a contrary most cleare namely this ergo when wee would shew a thing that is obscure we shew it by a contrary quia sua dissentione clarius elucescant Hitherto of the properties which would not be in consentanies for one was more manifest ergo before another and more strongly arguing Dissentanea in the plurall number because one argument serues for them both ergo one name and because they are equally manifest againe to set one before another is to say it is stronger then the other Againe they would not be aeque manifesta Sunt diuersa vel opposita We are to looke at the dissention of things now there is a more weake and a more strong dissention the one turne but a little aside others turne cleane backe and are foes ergo accordingly doth he diuide these now remember it is ens as ens that Logicke considers and many times it falls out that one thing might be taken for another but for diuersitie and commonly our distinctions are diuersa Diuersa is a more light dissention and opposites containe them so that diuersa will giue great light to opposita but not contra ergo diuersa are before Diuersa à diuertendo of turning aside because they agree one with another commonly in consention onely they diuert a little the one from the other and this is it that the name commends vnto vs they may agree in nature but are made to diuert ratione ratio we know belongs to Logicke and it is the same
vi arguit WEE haue heard of artificial arguments and there can be nothing that shall be in the artificio of any thing but wee haue heard it so that if wee looke at any of the creatures of God to see the root the causes of it and then the whole circumference and limitation thereof wee may by these arguments taught before see it throughly Now whereas one man cannot see all things though at the first all things were made for one man the Lord hath in wisedome ordained that wee should receiue some things by reports from others for as the world was to increase both in men and other creatures it was impossil e that one man should see all things intus in cute so that whereas at the beginning all things being made for one man and he afterwards could not see them yet still it is so farre forth true whilest all men see all things It is called inartificiale for the contrary reason that artificiale was so called namely of being in the thing whereas this is not in the nature of the thing but externè altogether so that we may see his force by this hauing no farther to doe with the thing then onely by witnessing of it Exposito artificiali argumento c. This transition containes the conclusion of all that went before and the proposition of that which followes and here againe wee may see how artificiall arguments goe before inartificialls because inartificiall arguments haue no ground but as they are backt with artificialls And this doctrine we may see to be true by the practise of common people for if a man giue testimony of that hee knowes not others will say he doth he knowes not what for as no man can giue testimony of that he knowes not so no man ought to receiue a testimony but as it is backed with artificialls otherwise he knowes not the thing sufficiently as hee should and if hee first heare a testimony of a thing and afterward come to see the thing hee will then say he knowes it not because one testified so much but because himselfe saw it to be so it is called argumentum inartificiale because it neuer comes into Art to make vp a rule though it may come in as a commoration to proue a rule syllogistically but method is the disposition of axioms not of syllogismes now a testimony of a thing belongs to that Art to which the thing witnessed doth belong as Aristotles authority against the Creation of the world belongs to Diuinity there to bee confuted in the doctrine of the Creation Argumentum inartificiale sequitur It is an argument for it is effected ad arguendum but after a new manner for it is externè but as it is grounded vpon the artificials so is it affected to argue Argumentum inartificiale est quod non sua natura sed assumpta alicuius artificialis argumenti vi arguit It is of power to argue as we heard before but not vi sua For when a man beareth witnesse of a thing we receiue it presuming that hee is familiarly acquainted with the thing that hee witnesseth so that arguit but not sua natura for alas what harmonie is there betweene the witnesser considered in his owne nature and the thing witnessed considered in its owne nature none at all so that we must looke at either of these for their natures Sed assumpta c. So that by the force of some artificiall argument taken vnto it it doth argue ergo this teacheth vs not easily to receiue euery testimony hand ouer head but first to looke whether the testis be well acquainted with the thing witnessed otherwise as it may be an errour in him to giue testimonie of a thing he knowes not so may it bee no lesse errour in vs that receiue such a testimony this wee see reproued in common matters among men and it teacheth vs to receiue the testimonie of a man not so much because ipse dixit but because wee are sure he knowes the thing throughly Vi assumpta Not that it is ortum argumentum for orta did argue with the same force that the first did from whence they did arise but a testimonie doth not argue with the force of an artificiall be it primum or ortum though it be backed with artificiall The cause effect should be in the witnesser but they are not in the witnesse if the testis haue seene any one argument we are so far to receiue his testimony and no farther if hee haue seene more arguments or all of them then are we much more to receiue his witnesse Itaque cum exquisita rerum veritas subtilius exquiritur perexiguam vim probationis habet This being the nature of an inartificiall it hath little force to argue of it selfe for all his strength is aliunde Veritas Truth belongs to an axiome here he meanes if wee would see it to be ens or the entitie of it surely this argument can stand vs in no great stead the testimonie onely swimmes in our braine but we doe not see the thing in its subtle parts as if hee should say the artificiall arguments doe argue subtlely the inartificiall more grosly In ciuilibus autem humanis rebus plerumque hoc argumentum praecipuam fidem è moribus arguentis efficit si prudentia virtus beneuolentia adfuerint He staies vpon the vse of an inartificiall argument In the matters of the common wealth or in matters concerning priuate men this argument hath his speciall credit because in this kinde they are most receiued we know all the matters in our Courts passe by writings or testimonies of men and in these ciuill matters we looke more after the men then after the thing there are artificialls here in these matters but we looke not at them still wee are to vnderstand that the witnesses know the artificialls the reason is because they are things done in time long before which therefore cannot be desided but by writings or mens testimonies Praecipuam fidem habet That is it doth vrge most in respect of the subiect whereto it is vsed E moribus arguentis efficit si prudentia virtus beneuolentia adfuerint This inartificiall argument hath not this praecipuam fidem from it selfe but as it proceedeth from him that is prudent vertuous and beneuolent Prudentia is that skill a man hath to bring his rule or any deduct from his rule to practise that is if he be not simple and silly to tattle and prattle he knowes not what then praecipuam fidem habet so that prudentia doth require discretion and iudgement to know and deliuer a truth That Commandement Thou shalt not beare false witnesse is here taught Againe if he haue not vertue ioyned with his prudentia that is if he make not conscience of witnessing the truth when he knoweth it we ought not to receiue it so that as he must be able to iudge of the truth so must hee haue conscience to vtter it Lastly
euery occasion Againe syllogisticall iudgement is for axiomaticall iudgment for when an axiome is doubtfull wee vse the light of a third argument and so going backe to the rule of true and false axiomes we iudge it to be true or false againe axiomaticall and syllogisticall iudgement communicate in the disposition of arguments whereas method disposeth axiomes immediately arguments mediately againe method hath nothing to doe with syllogisticall iudgement no more then with axiomaticall iudgement ergo wee heare how these should be distributed from the organes of them in naturall Philosophy and from the very act of reason Now for Kickerman who makes a tricotomy he de siring to make a perfect Art leaues out a genus Dispositio est secunda pars Logicae de disponendis argumentis ad bene iudicandum This terme dispositio commendeth to vs the whole drift of the second part of Logicke that is a disposing seuering or putting arguments asunder it is pars Logicae taking it for the doctrine of Logicke it containes a portion thereof which hath nothing to doe with inuention I meane for precept but onely for vse for inuention and iudgement are as opposite as white and blacke Pars Logicae For indeed it belongs to no other Art no not to Rhetoricke for doctrine but onely for vse for as for their order of exordium narratio c. it is nothing but method ergo it doth not follow that because the Rhetorician vseth disposition ergo it belongs to Rhetoricke The Orator the Grammarian c. are generall men yet their Arts are distinct Logicae Because Logicke is the rule of reasons act and there is also this second act of reason to let vs see how God hath disposed all things in nature for so all things but God are composite yet there are simples too yes but not in vse subsistent in themselues but euer with others ergo Gods simplicity is a property that cannot be communicated to any other thing Secunda For there cannot bee a disposition till there bee things to be put together as a Bricklayer cannot lay bricks together except he haue brickes Againe we know Grammar hath two parts first Etymologie of a word alone and Syntax of more words together so here there must be of things first a simple consideration of arguments asunder and then a disposing of them together De disponendis Our author saith de disponendis so that this it is the whole of these rules following is to dispose things with things or seeing God practise first in this rule we imitate him for if man be Gods steward ouer his creatures it is requisite he should know them that he may take them to his comfort Argumentis Surely it doth dispose arguments but mediately not immediately first it disposeth axiomes then arguments vnder axiomes for else I doe not see how method will come vnder this definition ergo wee are to vnderstand it thus de disponendis argumentis that is of disposing axiomes immediately arguments mediately as they make vp the axiomes Ad bene iudicandum This should be left out for it belongs not to method for it is ad memoriam recolendum rather ergo we may leaue this out yet he stayes vpon it and giues the reason thereof certa enim dispositionis regula vnumquodque iudicatur this is true but I deny that euery rule of disposition tendeth ad bene iudicandū therfore Aristotle in his problemes saith that a man of great iudgement hath no great good memory and the reason is this because their instruments are contrarie so that certa but not omni dispositionis regula vnumquodque iudicatur Now from this effect Iudicium dispositio pro eodem dicitur yea but not rightly and as I take it here Ramus was mistaken they that made this distribution of Logicke first as Tully Aristotle Plato they knew not method but shut it out of Logick otherwise they would not haue called this part iudgement And that they knew not method it is plaine because they neuer spake of method CAP. 2. De axiomatis affirmatione negatione Iudicium est axiomaticum vel dianoeticum DIsposition hath two parts iudicium and methodus this is the true disposition these doe communicate in a disposition for why here in iudgement we dispose arguments with arguments in method we dispose axiomes with axiomes ergo both of them dispose Againe their instruments are consenting in cold ergo both of them are contrarie to heat for that will seuer things Drith and moisture cleauing together ergo these are the parts iudicium of disposing arguments to iudge them method of placing axiomes to remember them Iudicium is first because method disposeth onely that which iudgement frames euen as inuention is before disposition and this is wonderfull to consider for there can nothing bee well and soundly remembred but that which is first iudged and nothing soundly iudged but that which is throughly inuented And it is true with me if I vnderstand a thing rightly I neuer forget it else I neuer remember it so that if a man forget any thing he hath not iudged it well because he hath not inuented it well to see a thing in the cause that is the argument for there causa is generall that is our intelligentia to make axiomes is our scientia to discourse is our sapientia to apply euery thing in time and place is our prudentia to worke the like our Art these are the things that make a man a scholler and a wise man ergo a man that shall take this course in his studies shall bee an exquisite man euery way ergo in the study of any Art this must bee the way for him that desireth to be a scholler first to see the rule of his Art then the arguments then the sapientia then the prudentia and so he shall remember it for euer What Disposition is we haue heard and how there are two kinds of it now iudicium est dispositio ad bene iudicandum so that the vse of this second part is of great vse for the perfiting of iudgement for if we read things without iudging them we shall many times swallow that for truth which we shall in the end find to be sophistry Axioma est dispositio argumenti cum argumento qua esse aliquid aut non esse iudicatur Axioma the word in his proper signification is worthinesse or dignity and by a metonimie of the adiunct for the subiect it signifieth such a truth as is worthy the receiuing or beleeuing now axioma dubium is not worthy this worthy name axioma because it is not per se manifestū but we are faine to demurre vpon it so that some axiomes are not so plaine as others others also there are which are so plaine as he that cannot see them or doubteth of them deserueth the whip Now because this first part of disposition is of a cleare truth ergo he calls it axioma as if he should say an honourable truth putting
left out there would want a rule of Art which is 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Now before we heard of arguments that were affirmantia and negantia here he saith axioma est affirmatum aut negatum for the band is it that denyes or affirmes the arguments one of another ergo the axiom is denyed aut contra yea when there are arguments affirmantia and negantia disposed in an axiom it is affirmatum aut negatum as when I say darknesse is not light the band denies light of darknesse Affirmatum quando vinculum eius affirmatur Why haue we not yet heard of vinculum if here be his first place why doth he not here describe it Answ Because we heard that dispositio was pars Logicae de disponendis argumentis and that iudicium was dispositio argumenti cum argumento qua esse aliquid aut non esse iudicatur and in disposition we haue this band for though there be a positio of arguments dis that is assunder yet there is a composition too so that wee haue it both in the generall definition of disposition and in the speciall description of Iudicium Vinculum Now indeed vinculum is vox aequiuoca for it is the band of an axiom of a syllogisme and of method the band of method is called transitio which ties two seuerall doctrines together as two bankes that haue water running between them are tied together by a bridge ergo in this case it cannot be defined Vinculum affirmatur Then we see that the affirmation of the axiom is from the band and not from the arguments and when wee say homo est lapis and homo non est lapis we haue a vinculum in both though indeed where the arguments agree there should be an est and where they disagree there should be a non est Negatum quando negatur For if it be affirmatum quando vinculum eius affirmatur so negatum contra so that here euermore looke to the vinculum now this distribution doth not require that wee should alwayes affirme and deny too the same axiom and so looke at it neither shall we alwayes finde it so though it may be so because these are but adiuncts to an axiom and where the same axiom is affirmed or denyed Hinc nascitur axiomatum contradictio quando idem axioma affirmatur negatur So that in contradiction there is this peculiar that the same axiom must be affirmed and denyed so that the true place of contradiction is here hee saith Hinc nascitur whence from the affirmation and negation of the same axiom Now the reason why the same axiom may bee affirmed and denyed is because these are not essentiall to an axiom and the axiom is the same whether it be affirmed or denied the same it is also for esse and non esse but not for affirmation and negation it is the same man that was in the morning cold and warme at noone Now here in disputation we are carefully to obserue that there bee a contradiction where we make one Idem axioma That is the same arguments must be both affirmed and denied one of another and this wee must carefully looke vnto else may wee contend de lana caprina Againe hee said idem Obiect Homo est doctus and homo non est doctus are these the same arguments yes and the same axiom but differing onely in quality they are subiectum and adiunctum but when I say homo est doctus and vnderstand it of homo which is not doctus as Thirsites it is still the same argument but the arguments are disparates CAP. 3. De vero falso Axioma deinde est verum aut falsum verum quando pronunciat vti res est falsum contra IVdicium was either axiomaticum or syllogisticum the axiomaticum was that which shewed a thing to bee or not to be and it was first distributed into affirmatum and negatum now againe an axiom is distributed secondly into verum and falsum which is by nature after the other because an axiom is not true or false till it be affirmed or denyed as when I say homo and animal I doe not say that any thing is true or false till I affirme that homo est animal or deny him to be animal so that truth and falshood doe arise from affirmation and negation therefore verum and falsum are but adiuncts to an axiome because they arise from adiuncts and therefore secondly they are after affirmatum and negatum because they arise from them Now we are in our rule of iudgement which must guide our reason to what end to see the truth and falshood of things ergo axioma is verum or falsum and after our reason sees a thing to be verum then may our will as bonum embrace it for ens verum and bonum are all one and here we may see whither verum belongs properly sometimes indeed it is taken tropically for a like as when I say this is a true picture but I meane that this picture is like such an one here are similia but the axiom is this that this is the picture of such a one it is true so that in the end it will come to be proper another signification we find of verum as when it is opposed to fictum but this is not proper and the meaning is that ens est is a true axiome so that euery signification at the last will fall out to bee the same with this that is here taught Aut falsum If there be verū it must haue his contrary which is falsum Now though there is not falsum in nature yet because God so created the things so vera as they might bee otherwise ergo there is falsum The same axiom might be true and false as wee shall see in contingents ergo there is both verum and falsum Obiect Why may there not be the doctrine of a false syllogisme as well as of a false axiom Answ The axiom is not a false axiom quatenus an axiom in Logicke but quatenus we look at the matter of it for its truth or falshood in naturall Philosophy so for a syllogisme if it breake the rule of a syllogisme for forme then it breakes the rule of Logicke but if it doe peccare for his matter then it breakes some rule of some other Art so that Kickerman is much deceiued for a false syllogisme is a false syllogisme as it breakes the rule of a syllogisme but the doctrine of a false axiome doth not breake the rule of an axiom ergo this is fallacia accidentis and there is an equiuocation in the word axiom and in the word syllogisme Verum quando pronunciat vti res est Because verum and falsum are but adiuncts why wee handle them together with their subiects and we define them also by their subiects so that truth indeed belongs hither ergo it is not the end of Logicke as some would haue it for then all the parts
Art Id appellatur 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 per se The rule of iustice that wee giue to euery thing that which is per se true and homogeny as longitude is in the superficies but not per se but per aliud for so per se here is not opposed to per accidens but to per aliud Axioma catholicum est quando consequens semper verum est de antecedente non solum omni per se sed etiam reciprocè vt homo est animal rationale A catholicke axiome this name is somewhat improper for it doth not containe all that is in a catholicke axiome as 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 doth 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 is primum 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 de toto so that this is 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 first true of the whole and afterward of the parts Kickerman saith that Aristotle takes 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 and 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 for the same but hee neither saith so nor meanes so Quando consequens semper verum est c. By consequens he meanes an argument now can an argument be true here he takes verum in a more large sense then before he meanes when the parts doe so truly predicate one of another as that they make a true axiom 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Non solum omni per se sed etiam reciprocè That is when one part containes the other so that one would thinke reciprocation might be an affection of subiectum and proprium adiunctum in inuention it is true that one containes as much as the other but the subiect and proper adiunct are not the same thing as the definitio and definitum are For homo and risus are not all one but here reciprocation is between subiectum and adiunctum because notwithstanding they be diuers things yet the one containes as much as the other so that this reciprocation is more generall then that before so that the rules of Art are these three namely definitions distributions and properties and euery rule of Art must be most true most iust and most wise because the axiom must stay vp the thing to guide it to his end Tres hae sunt leges documentorum artis propriorum prima 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 lex veritas secunda 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 lex iustitiae tertia 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 lex sapientiae dicatur So that these three properties are required in euery rule of Art Atque eiusmodi axiomatum ita catholicorum iudicium verissima prima scientia est So that the iudgement of such catholicke axioms is prima verissimaque scientia and all others are but second or third truths as they are deducted from the first second or third and are per se so farre forth true as their first rule is true hence whatsoeuer we read we shall finde it if wee marke it to be either a rule of Art or some deduct so that the heads of Arts should bee the heads of common place bookes and so might we bring all that we read vnto them and try them Now some say that 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 containes 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 and 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 ergo they might be left out Ans It doth not follow for these three are distinct things for as it is reciprocum it is not in the same respect 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 c. againe an axiom may be 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 and yet not 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 c. so also an axiom may breake the rule 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 and yet not breake the rule 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 c. so that if they were left out wee should haue no rule to shew such axiomes to be false CAP. 4. De axiomate simplici Atque haec de communibus axiomatis affectionibus species sequuntur WEE haue hitherto heard of whatsoeuer is 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 to an axiom in generall for though 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 and 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 belong onely to the rules of Art yet because they may be simple or composite axiomes ergo they are generally to be taught to them both the iudgement moreouer of such axiomes was prima verissimaque scientia Prima because that was first and per se true and most true because all other deducts doe so farre forth approue themselues true as they agree to the first and these first rules are few therefore they come nearest to God who is but one and are next to his wisedome others which are deducts may be many and they come next to the first rules we haue among vs a distinction of doctrine and vse doctrina is properly the first rule of Art and vse is the application therof or the speciall deducts gathered frō the first Others I finde take doctrina for the first part of Diuinity and Vse for the speciall practice of a rule of Art but they are deceiued and speake improperly and all the rules that Kickerman saith are wanting in Ramus are nothing but the practice of a rule that is 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 and they are infinite As posita causa ponitur effectum this ariseth from the definition of causa and it is onely true where the cause is brought as a third argument in a syllogisme and otherwise we haue no vse of it and hauing handled all that is generall to an axiom now wee come to the species Atque haec de communibus c. This is a transition not from one part of an axiom to another for those things that wee heard of before touching an axiom are but adiuncts to an axiom therefore must not be seuered from their subiect but because these haue taken vp two Chapters and so continued the doctrine of axioma long why we may haue forgotten our selues thinking wee haue heard of the species already no saith Ramus we come but now to the species Axioma est simplex aut compositum Disposition we heard did dispose arguments either firstly or at the second hand in an axiom they are disposed either one with one or one with more or more with more if one be disposed with one so that there be but two sides as it were playing at two hand ruffe then it is a simple axiome and from this simple disposition of the arguments it is called simplex compositum contra so that this double disposition of arguments makes this distribution whereas affirmatum negatum and the other adiuncts before rather looked at the band then at the disposition of the arguments so that axiomatica dispositio is simplex in respect of the simple disposition of the arguments that are disposed therein Simplex quod verbi vinculo continetur Simplex is first because there cannot be a composite axiome but there will be a simple axiome and the composite is as it were a manifold simple Verbi vinculo Hee defines it from the band not that it ariseth from thence but because a verb fals out to tie one axiom to one
truth more plainly Now I doe not see in method how aliud axioma ex alio deducitur if he meane that one axiome is here more generall and another more speciall there may be a fallace in that for the more generall doth not containe in it the more speciall In a mans bodie of all the members the head is first yet none will say that it containes the rest of the members in it notwithstanding there is some thing in this I must confesse for the former rule in an Art giues some light to the rule following as Dialectica est ars bene disserendi giues light to the second rule of Logicke for I must first know the whole before I can distribute it into its parts but how this is any discourse I doe not see Againe I haue shewed that among ancient Logicians dianoia is onely giuen to syllogismes and not to method and in truth I hold dianoia and syllogismus to be all one Againe method is for memory not for the iudging of things and that argument before concerning the distinct organes of the parts of Logicke is instar omnium to proue it It may be said fitly that it is dispositio axiomatum for in axiomaticall and syllogisticall iudgement there were arguments disposed by which indeed axioms did arise but method doth not dispose any arguments but axiomes ergo this in like sort is a meane argument to shew that axiomaticall and syllogisticall iudgement should goe together disposing arguments immediately and method should be aboue for it meddles not with arguments but with axiomes immediately Axiomatum Axioma signifies properly such a truth as is worthy credit without any discourse ergo it agrees to that which is per se manifestum and therefore axioma dubium is not worthie that name axioma but method is dispositio axiomatum first of them that are cleare without any light of a third argument and doubtfull axiomes are not disposed by method but as they are cleared before the tribunall seat of a third argument and indeed method is principally a disposition of the axioms of Arts. Axiomatum not of things Obiect Is there not order in things Answ True it is that method as the rest of Logicke is an adiunct of the things yet it disposeth them gratia axiomatum for as inuention is immediately of arguments and they are of things and as iudgement is of axiomes and syllogismes and they likewise are of things so method is of axiomes immediately and of things immediately so that we must lay vp nothing by the rule of method but axiomes and this must be our care in reading any thing to take the axiomes and to cary them to their places in Arts. Obiect Are not syllogismes to be remembred ergo is there not method of them Ans Yes but we take the parts asunder and make them axiomes first for the proposition assumption and conclusion are axiomes and belong to some Art therefore look whither the more speciall argument in the axiome belongeth and thither the axiome belongeth and if wee would remember the reason why such a thing is so or not so see where your rule is and looke at the former axiomes and you shall finde arguments for the proofe of any thing and may so keepe them as for example otiosus est amator Egistus est otiosus ergo Egistus est amator The proposition belongs to morall Philosophy for vitium is a vice loue is concupiscence the sinne and it is the affection of loue disordered ergo this breakes the seuenth Commandement ergo this axiome belongs hither for loue is the more speciall Egistus est otiosus this indeed belongs to the history of Egistus but because we haue it not therefore wee may cary it to otium so the conclusion belongs to morall Philosophie to concupiscence Againe syllogismes serue but for the clearing of the truth of axiomes and then afterward we returne againe to the rule of an axiome to iudge whether it be true or false and this is all that is required for disposing arguments ergo method is dispositio axiomatum onely Againe we neuer remember any thing but we make an axiome of it Obiect But we remember words Answ though it be true that some remember words very strangely yet they remember them as axiomes for the word and the thing signified by the word make an axiome Obiect But I suppose they know not the meaning of the words Answ Yet the sound or eccho of the word in his head which is an adiunct vnto the word and the word it selfe makes an axiome still so that method is onely of axiomes and commonly they that so remember words haue little iudgement and if all the axiomes of all things were layd downe methodically wee should remember all things methodically Variorum For method is not in one axiome therefore here take heed that we be not deceiued taking that to breake the rule of method which is a breach of 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 as if this term inuention be made a part of Rhetorick it is against 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 but if the doctrine of this rule Inuentio est prima pars Dialecticae c. be taught in Rhetoricke that is a breach of method contra the definition of Logicke placed in Grammar or Rhetoricke is 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 but a breach of method Againe he saith they are various not such as shall bee contrary one to another for the difference of the axiomes of Art is but in a diuersity as it were not in opposition because in respect of the obiect they all tend to one thing Homogeniorum That is of the same kindred this homogenia is not that in an axiome for that is betweene the arguments in an axiome this is betweene the axiomes themselues so that let vs beware that we put not heterogeny axiomes in an art for they that haue done so may be compared to ignorant painters that paint a horses head vpon a mans body Againe when we are to make a speech of any thing wee must be carefull to speake within our compasse and not to bring in things that are heterogeny to the subiect wee speake of Pro naturae suae claritate praepositorum For method is the rule of order ergo there must be a praepositio and a postpositio of axiomes here ergo if we will draw any Art out according to his true feature we must set euery thing in his owne place nature obserues this course in euery thing as we see whilst the earth would rather ascend then there should be vacuum and whilst the Spirit of God his mighty power that gouernes all things doth place euery thing in order we see he doth it by the rule of method continually as he placeth the fire in the highest place aboue the other elements then the ayre c. dulce natale solum c. to euery man and to euery thing because by the rule of method that is his place and if things bee displaced they will sooner