Selected quad for the lemma: doctrine_n

Word A	Word B	Word C	Word D	Occurrence	Frequency Band	MI	MI Band	Prominent
doctrine_n	interpretation_n	reason_n	use_v	26,798	5	11.5946	5	true

Text snippets containing the quad

ID	Title	Author	Corrected Date of Publication (TCP Date of Publication)	STC	Words	Pages
A42816	Logou thrēskeia, or, A seasonable recommendation and defence of reason in the affairs of religion against infidelity, scepticism, and fanaticisms of all sorts.	Glanvill, Joseph, 1636-1680.	1670 (1670)	Wing G812; ESTC R23387	21,978	41

strife I say 't is very probable these might be comprehended also But Reason is no otherwise concerned in all this but as condemning and reproving these dangerous follies THUS we see the pretensions from Scripture against Reason are vain But there are other Considerations by which it useth to be impugned as 1. OUR Reason is corrupted and therefore is not fit to meddle in spiritual matters To this I say That Reason as it is taken for the faculty of understanding is very much weakened and impaired It sees but little and that very dully through a glass darkly as the Apostle saith 1 Cor. 13. And It is very liable to be mislead by our senses and affections and interests and imaginations so that we many times mingle errors and false conceits with the genuine dictates of our minds and appeal to them as the Principles of Truth and Reason when they are but the vain Images of our Phancies or the false conclusions of ignorance and mistake If this be meant by the corruption of Reason I grant it and all that can be inferred from it will be That we ought not to be too bold and peremptory in defining speculative and difficult matters especially not those that relate to Religion nor set our Reasonings against the Doctrines of Faith and Revelation But this is nothing to the disreputation of Reason in the object viz. Those Principles of truth which are written upon our Souls or any Conclusions that are deduced from them These are the same that they ever were though we discern them not so clearly as the Innocent state did They may be mistaken but cannot be corrupted And as our understandings by reason of their weakness and liableness to error may take falshoods for some of those or infer falsly from those that are truly such so we know they do the same by the Scriptures themselves viz. they very often misinterpret and very often draw perverse conclusions from them And yet we say not That the Word of God is corrupted nor is the use of Scripture decried because of those abuses But here advantage will be taken to object again 2. That since our natural understandings are so weak and so liable to mistake they ought not to be used in the affairs of Religion and 't will signifie little to us that there are certain Principles of eternal Reason if we either perceive them not or cannot use them To this I answer That if on this account we must renounce the use of our natural understandings Scripture will be useless to us also For how can we know the meaning of the words that express Gods mind unto us How can we compare one Scripture with another How can we draw any Consequence from it How apply General Propositions to our own particular cases How tell what is to be taken in the Letter what in the mystery what plainly what in a Figure What according to strict and rigorous truth What by way of accommodation to our apprehensions I say without the exercise of our understandings using the Principles of Reason none of these can be done and without them Scripture will signifie either nothing at all or very little to us And what can Religion get this way This inference therefore is absurd and impious All that can justly be concluded from the weakness of our understandings will be what I intimated before that we ought to use them with modesty and caution not that we should renounce them He is a mad-man who because his eyes are dim will therefore put them out But it may be objected further 3. That which men call Reason is infinitely various and that is reasonable to one which is very irrational to another Therefore Reason is not to be heard And I say Interpretations of Scripture are infinitely various and one calls that Scriptural which another calls heretical Shall we conclude therefore That Scripture is not to be heard Reason in itself is the same all the world over though mens apprehensions of it are various as the light of the Sun is one though colours Its reflexes are infinite And where this is it ought not to be denied because follies and falshoods pretend relation to it or call themselves by that name If so farewell Religion too But 4. 'T is Socinianism to plead for Reason in the affairs of Faith and Religion And I answer 'T is gross Phanaticism to plead against it This name is properly applicable to the enemies of Reason But the other of Socinianism is groundlesly applied to those that undertake for it and it absurdly supposeth that Socinians are the only rational men when as divers of their Doctrines such as The Sleep and natural mortality of the soul and utter extinction and annihilation of the wicked after the day of judgment are very obnoxious to Philosophy and Reason And the Socinians can never be confuted in their other opinions without using Reason to maintain the sense and interpretation of those Scriptures that are alledged against them 'T is an easie thing we know to give an ugly name to any thing we dislike and by this way the most excellent and sacred things have been made contemptible and vile I wish such hasty Censurers would consider before they call names No truth is the worse because rash ignorance hath thrown dirt upon it I need say no more to these frivolous objections Those that alledge Atheism and tendency to Infidelity against the reverence and use of Reason are disproved by my whole discourse Which shews that the enemies of Reason most usually serve the ends of the Infidel and the Atheist when as a due use of It destroys the pretensions of both I COME now IV. to the Inferences that may be raised from the whole 1. Reason is certain and infallible This follows from the state I gave of the nature and notion of Reason in the beginning It consists in First Principles and the Conclusions that are raised from them and the observations of sense Now first Principles are certain or nothing can be so for every possible Conclusion must be drawn from those or by their help and every Article of Faith supposeth them And for the Propositions that arise from those certain Principles they are certain likewise For nothing can follow from truth but truth in the longest series of deduction If error creep in there is ill consequence in the case And the sort of Conclusions that arise from the observations of sense if the sense be rightly circumstantiated and the inference rightly made are certain also For if our senses in all their due circumstances deceive us All is a delusion and we are sure of nothing But we know that first Principles are certain and that our senses do not deceive us because God that bestowed them upon us is true and good And we are as much assured that whatever we duly conclude from either of them is as certain because whatever is drawn from any principle was vertually contained in it 2. 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