Selected quad for the lemma: doctrine_n

Word A	Word B	Word C	Word D	Occurrence	Frequency Band	MI	MI Band	Prominent
doctrine_n	church_n	faith_n	tradition_n	5,594	5	9.1222	5	true

Text snippets containing the quad

ID	Title	Author	Corrected Date of Publication (TCP Date of Publication)	STC	Words	Pages
A65786	An exclusion of scepticks from all title to dispute being an answer to The vanity of dogmatizing / by Thomas White.	White, Thomas, 1593-1676.	1665 (1665)	Wing W1824; ESTC R11142	42,212	90

saw painted on its foreside And in my judgment he had said rarely had he stopt here but in his following Questions he shews his deficiency even in this For he asks farther whence the Soul comes and how t is united to the Body He is therefore most manifestly detected to think that the Soul lying hid in the Body is of it self a certain substance which may directly be made come and be joined to another thing whence he terms it subsistence which doubtless denotes a Thing and Substance Now that this is a most important error in Philosophy none can doubt that 's able to discern the opposition of One and Many For t is plain that either a Man is not a Thing or else that his Soul and Body are not two Things if one thing cannot at once be many nor many one Nor am I scar'd with the distinction which the Boys that gabble Philosophy have always ready in their Budget of a perfect and imperfect thing which saies just nothing unless imperfect signifie to which somewhat is wanting to make it a thing which suppos'd an imperfect thing is not a thing and the distinction vanishes Otherwise the same cannot be one thing and more things Wherefore either a Man is not a Thing but a Pair of Things consisting of an Intelligence and a Beast or his Soul and Body are not two things 2. When therefore he asks Whence comes the Soul it must be answered with a question Whether he doubts whence the man comes For if whilst the man lives there be but one only thing which is call'd the Man 't is he alone can have come and he beats the wind that enquires whence the Soul comes Nor am I shaken with the Authority of our Fore-fathers though never so Reverend I mean not of those who profess themselvs unable to grapple with the Question for these deliver the Candle into the hands of Posterity advising them to pursue on the same Race that it may be seen whether any thing purer occur to them than to themselves ready to Patronize whoever shall clear the Truth But their opposition I resist who clamor 't is the Faith of all Churches that Rational Souls are fram'd by God For now I 'm accustom'd to it to distinguish between what 's due to the sincerity of Faith and what to Scholastical subtilty If I attribute the Making of Man as he 's Intellectual to the singular power and operation of God I have submitted my self to the keys of the Churches Doctrine and subscrib'd to the Tradition of the Saints But whether that action which is the Generation of Man consists of two actual parts or be but one alone by more notions equivalent to more really-distinct actions is a purely speculative Question belonging to the Schools And so it must be said that one Thing a Man equivalent to a Beast and an Intelligence is brought into existence by one action equivalent to two the Generation of an Animal and the Creation of an Intelligence 3. By this truth we are led to the evident solution of the two following knots the econd being how the Body and Soul are united Which 't is plain is herein faulty that it supposes two things to be united existing either before the Compound or not destroyd but ty'd together in it which is clearly false not only out of the ' fore-declared Truth but also out the definition of a Part. For Parts are call'd such whereof by a Motion call'd Composition one thing is made or into which what was one is resolv'd by Division or destruction of the Unity Now Unity not Union is the form of what is One And in that which is One to seek for the colligation or cement is to seek by what the same is made the same The same Error runs through the following Difficulty which laments that 't is unknown how the soul moves the Body Which is utterly knock'd on the head by denying the soul moves the Body For true it is that one animated Member moves another but not that any substance which is a pure soul moves immediately any Member in which the soul is not I appeal to other Animals in which there 's frankly denied to be a Soul independent of the Body and I desire to have shewn me what motion there is in man which is not in them I confess freely that one Member the Brain especially moves the rest after another manner in Man than in other Animals and this by reason of the difference in their Souls but first it ought to be made evident by experiments that a Humane Soul without the help of the Body or some Member acting together with it moves another Member before we are to enquire into the manner how this either is or can be done 4. The last darkness which he bemoans in this Chapter lyes in our ignorance of that Motion whereby the spirits are deriv'd out of the brain into the fit Nerves for the Animal's natural Action And if indeed the Objection brandish an Argument common to all Animals I should soon quit the field for I confess my self not so skilful in Anatomy that I can lay before the eyes why from the Motion of Anger boyling in the heart the spirits should start into those Muscles by whose streining the Animal is carry'd towards its Adversaries and from the Motion of Fear spirits flow into the opposite Muscles by which the Animal flies fromwards them whereas they in a manner add strength to and enforce both alike Yet I make no question at all but by force of the Brain 's Motion caus'd by the motion of the heart it comes to pass that the entrance into one sort of Channels are shut others opn'd and that thence comes this admirable and as-yet-not-sufficiently-seen-through direction of the spirits But the Authors seems to make Mans case proper to himself alledging Will and perhaps Election to be as it were the first Author of this direction Still therefore he slips into the same Error For first he should demonstrate some act of the will without some either precedent or concomitant Motion of the Heart which when t is violent we call Passion when we endeavour at any thing Desire or Flight or some other such like we stile it But if there be no such then the cause of this direction is purely Mechanical as he calls it and not any certain inexplicable power Now that there cannot possibly be any such exempt act of the will 't is clear enough to them who allow ther 's no knowledge without a beat of Phansies For Phansies cannot chuse but both be stird themselves and stir others by the usual ways of Nature By Motions therefore deriv'd from the heart whether in Man or in Animals all Motions whether Natural or Free Universally are perform'd and by consequence are subject to the contemplation and scrutiny of Philosophy and acurate Mechanicks 5. The fourth Chapter objects that the Natures of Sensation and Memory are inexplicable As to the former