Selected quad for the lemma: diversity_n

Word A	Word B	Word C	Word D	Occurrence	Frequency Band	MI	MI Band	Prominent
diversity_n	divine_a	nature_n	unity_n	374	5	10.1849	5	true

Text snippets containing the quad

ID	Title	Author	Corrected Date of Publication (TCP Date of Publication)	STC	Words	Pages
A61522	The Bishop of Worcester's answer to Mr. Locke's letter, concerning some passages relating to his Essay of humane understanding, mention'd in the late Discourse in vindication of the Trinity with a postscript in answer to some reflections made on that treatise in a late Socinian pamphlet.	Stillingfleet, Edward, 1635-1699.	1697 (1697)	Wing S5557; ESTC R18564	64,712	157

at the same time have Leisure enough to run into other Matters about which there may be more Colour for Cavilling So that this cannot be the true Reason and I leave the Reader to judge what it is The last thing is the point of Reason and here he finds Leisure enough to expatiate But I shall keep to that point upon which he supposes the whole Controversie to turn which is whether the difference between Nature and Person which we observe in Mankind do so far hold with respect to the Divine Nature that it is a Contradiction to say there are three Persons and not three Gods And there are several things I proposed in order to the clearing of this Matter which I shall endeavour to lay down as distinctly as I can and I shall not be Hector'd or Banter'd out of that which I account the most proper Method although it happen to be too obscure for our Men of Wit to understand without Hazard of their Iaws The Principles or Suppositions I lay down are these I. Nature is One and Indivisible in it self whereever it is II. The more perfect any Nature is the more perfect must its Unity be III. Whatever is affirmed of a most perfect Being must be understood in a way agreeable to its Perfection IV. It is repugnant to the Perfection of the divine Nature to be multiplied into such Individuals as are among Men because it argues such a dependence and separation as is inconsistent with the most perfect Unity V. To suppose three distinct Persons in one and the same Indivisible Divine Nature is not repugnant to the Divine Perfections if they be founded on such relative Properties which cannot be confounded with each other and be in themselves agreeable to the Divine Nature VI. Whether there be three such distinct Persons or not is not to be drawn from our own Imaginations or Similitudes in created Beings but only from the Word of God from whom alone the Knowledge of it can be communicated to Mankind Let us now see how he proves that since there is no Contradiction for three Persons to be in one common human Nature it must be a Contradiction to assert three Persons in the same divine Nature He offers at no less than demonstrative Reason p. 58. c. 2. but I have always had the most cause to fear the Men that pretend to Infallibility and Demonstration I pass over his Mysterious Boxes as Trifles fit only to entertain his Men of Wit and come immediately to his demonstrative Reason is it be to be met with It comes at last to no more than this that Human Nature and Angelical Nature and Camel Nature have no Existence but only in our Conception and are only Notions of our Minds but the Persons in the same rational Being are not mere Metaphysical Persons or Relative Properties but they are such as necessarily suppose distinct Substances as well as distinct Properties But in the Trinity the Nature is a really existing Nature 't is a Spiritual Substance and endued with a great number of Divine Attributes not an abstracted or mere notional imaginary Nature and the Divine Persons are not distinct Substances or real Beings but Properties only in a real Being and in an infinite Substance This is the force of the Demonstration But now if I can make it appear that every Nature is not only One and Indivisible in it self but endued with Essential Attributes and Properties belonging to it as such then it will be evident that Nature is not a mere Abstracted Notion of our Minds but something which really exists somewhere and then the Foundation of this demonstrative Reason is taken away And I appeal to any Persons that consider things whether the Human Angelical and Camel Nature as he calls it do not really differ from each other and have such Essential Properties belonging to them as cannot agree to any other Nature For else it must be a mere Notion and Fiction of the Mind to make any real difference between them But if Human Nature and Camel Nature do essentially differ from each other then every Nature hath its Essential Unity and Properties which cannot belong to any other and that without any act of our Minds And if every Nature is really and essentially different from another it must have an Existence somewhere independent on our Notions and Conceptions It may be said That no such Nature doth really exist by it self but only in the several Individuals But that is not the present Question where or how it exists but whether it depend only on our Imaginations or the acts of our Minds and if it doth so then there can be no real and essential Difference in the Natures of Men and Beast which I think none who have the Understanding of a Man can imagine But really existing Natures he saith are in such Persons as necessarily suppose distinct Substances as well as distinct Properties and if they existed only in a common Nature as the Humanity and had not also distinct Substances they would never make distinct Persons I do allow that in created and dependent Beings there must be distinct Substances to make distinct Persons but he ought to have given an account what that is which makes distinct Persons ' necessarily to suppose distinct Substances For the Nature is One and Indivisible in them all or else every Individual must make a new Species which is an Absurdity I suppose he will not be fond of If there be then one and the same Nature in the Individuals whence comes the difference of Substances to be so necessarily supposed If it be from Diversity Dissimilitude Dependence and separate Existence as I asserted then these Reasons can hold only in created Beings and where they cannot hold as in the Divine Nature why may there not be a distinction of Persons founded on relative Properties without any distinction of Substances which is repugnant to the perfect Unity of the Godhead What demonstrative Reason nay what probable Argument hath he offer'd against this He takes notice p. 60. of what I had said about the distinction of Personality and Person and that Personality is originally only a particular Mode of Subsistence and a Person besides the relative Property takes in the divine Nature together with it And what Demonstration have we against this So far from it that he falls to Tristing again to keep his Men of Wit in good Humour So much for Madam Personality now for Sir Person Is this a decent way of Writing about these Matters to begin with the Talk of demonstrative Reason and to end with Burlesquing and turning them into Ridicule If this be an agreeable Entertainment for his Men of Wit it shews that they deserve that Character as well as he doth that of a Demonstrator But this sportfull Gentleman hath found something else to play with viz. that my Notion of three Subsistences without three Substances is really nothing but Sabellianism But I had already said