3. 8. and 2. 2. Matth. 23. 33. 2 Pet. 2. 3. and multitudes of other places But Gods purpose of punishing is no act of Justice Both these Propositions doth Dr. Twisse prove Vind. lib. 1. par 1. digr 10. cap. 1 2 3. 5. That which destroys not a sinners obligation to punishment is not his Justification The reason is because Justification is causa câ—rrumpens obligationis ad poenam a discharge and acquittance from sin and condemnation saith Mr. Eyre see Rom. 8. 1 33 34. and 5. 8 9. But Gods velle non punire destroys not a sinners obligation to punishment which I thus prove The obligation which this Will of God destroys either is that which lies upon them from eternity by some immanent act of God I speak now in Mr. Eyres Dialect for to me 't is very absurd to talke of an actual obligation upon a person not existing but this will never be endured that Gods immanent acts should destroy one another or else it is the temporal obligation which comes upon them by the Law other obligation in time there is none Now the foresaid Will of God destroyes this legal obligation either from eternity or in time How it should do it from eternity I cannot imagine because neither the Law nor the sinner nor the obligation do exist from eternity and what it is to destroy an obligation that is not nor never was upon a person that is not nor never was by a Law that is not nor never was is a mystery beyond humane comprehension If in time I would know when either as soon as the Law is made or as soon as it is broken or in some period of time after Not as soon as the Law is made for a sinner is not obliged to punishment by the Law till he hath broken the Law and where there is no obligation there can be no destruction thereof If as soon as the Law is broken I would know how for if notwithstanding the foresaid Will and Purpose of God the Law have power to oblige the sinner to punishment it hath power also to hold him under the same obligation notwithstanding the same purpose If it can oblige him for a minute then for two then for ten then for an houre then for a yeare then for ever unlesse there be some other act besides the bare purpose of God to abrogate or relaxe the Law Causa eadem semper facit idem Gods purposes make no changes immediately upon his Lawes or any other external objects 6. If there may be a will or purpose not to punish where yet there §. 13. is no Justification or pardon for these two words are of the same importance in this debate then Justification doth not consist essentially in a purpose not to punish But there may be a will not to punish where there is no pardon Ergo. The Assumption is manifest There may be hundreds of men at an Assizes suppose they all resolve not to punish the Malefactors that are then and there to be tried Are the said malefactors therefore pardoned No. Then there may be a will not to punish which is no pardon Ergo. Pardon is not essentially a will not to punish Definitio reciprocatur cum definito If it be said that pardon is not an act of the will as a natural power or faculty but as the will of a man under some other moral condition or qualification namely as having jus ad poenam exequendam a right to inflict punishment which because it is peculiar to the Judge therefore his will not to punish is pardon but not the will of the rest that may be present in the Court this is as much as I expect for hence it follows if the case be applied to God that the name of Justification cannot be given to his eternal Will or Purpose I will not meddle with the Question An Deus possit creaturam immerentem affligere But jus puniendi a right of punishing accrews to none whether God or man but upon supposition of some offence committed But from eternity there was no sin Ergo the will or purpose of not punishing was not voluntas habentis jus ad poenam infligendam Ergo it may not be called by the name of Justification When I speak of a right of punishing which results from an offence committed understand it not de jure potestatis as if the said offence gave any authority to God or man which they had not before but de jure exercitii inasmuch as that authority cannot be justly exercised in the punishment of a person but upon such offence committed by him 7. If notwithstanding this velle non punire God be bound in justice to punish the Elect for their sins unlesse his justice be satisfied some other way then his velle non punire is not their Justification The reason is 1. Because Gods justice doth not binde him to punish those whom he hath justified but rather not to punish them 2. Because his justice doth not binde him to punish another for their sins whom he already hath justified supposing their Justification to be as well in order of nature as of time before the others punishment But Gods justice bindes him to punish the elect for their sin unlesse his justice be satisfied in some other way as namely by the death of Christ This appears because de facto Christ bare that punishment which in justice was due to sinners Ergâ— this velle non punire was not their Justification One thing more I long to know Whether velle non punire do define Justification in general as it containes these two notable species Justification by works and Justification by faith or grace or whether it define Justification by grace only particularly and in specie If the former shew us that special forme by which Justification by works and by grace are immediately differenced and opposed If the latter shew us the genus or common nature wherein they agree If neither of these can be done as it is impossible either should then we have here a definition without genus and forma that is a thing defined without a definition or a definition that defines nothing SECT V. BEsides these Arguments there be found more which Mr. Eyre §. 14. objecteth against himselfe as disproving his position that Justification is the Will or Purpose of God not to punish which though they be not of my making yet because they are all very material for support of the truth I shall here undertake their defence The first objection then which Mr. Eyre proposeth against his owne doctrine of eternal Justification is this viz. That it confounds Justification and Election His answer is That Election includes the end and all the means but Gods Will not to punish precisely and formally only some part of the meanes Reply 1. Then the act of Justification is precisely nothing as we have above demonstrated 2. And the effects of this act are like it selfe just
not have saved him without his reading and much lesse would his reading have saved him without that favourable Law yet his life is a thousand fold more worth then his reading of two or three lines and therefore he owes a thousand times more thanks to his Prince for giving him his life upon such a condition then to himself for reading supposing his reading to have been the purchase of his life If a man sell a farme to his friend for five hundred for which another would have given him a thousand what more common then to say He hath given his friend five hundred in the buying 3. But in sober sadnesse doth Mr. Eyre think the welch man speaks §. 25. properly in his God blesse her father c That were a jest indeed How comes it then to be a ridiculous object if there be not some h pleasing deformity in it that flatters the fancie and surprizeth k See Sie râ—de la Câ—ambre Charact. of the Passions ch 4. of laughter p. 210. the soule so moving laughter And what can that deformity be except the welch idiome but the fallacy of non causa pro causa putting that for the cause which is not the cause as we are wont out of Cicero when we see a little man girt with a great sword to transplace the Subject and the Adjunct and say who tied that man to that sword Had the welch man cried as he was bid God blesse the King and the Judge the propriety of the speech had spoiled the jest and deprived it of that facetiousnesse and lepidity which now causeth us to make merry with it A certain discovery that the speech is not proper nor the condition of reading the cause of his pardon the speech becoming ridiculous upon no other account but because it would insinuate that to be the cause which was no more then a condition But the serious judgement of all offendors who escape death by this means and the wisdome of our statâ— determining it to be an act of royal grace and favour to pardon a man on this condition might one would think be of as much authority as one welch mans word It is true indeed the Law nor the Judge could save him unlesse he read nor will God save us unleâ—â—â— we believe Heb. 3. 19. They could not enter in because of unâ—eliâ—f Not through defect of power or mercy in God which are both inâ—inâ—te but because he hath confined himself in the dispensation of pardon and salvation that he will bestow it upon none but them that believe Is it therefore not of grace because not without faith Whereas the Apostle sayes It is of faith that it might be of grace Rom. 4. 16. In that which followes I finde nothing which is not answered already §. 26. or must not be answered in due place for whereas Mr. Eyre sayes that the performance of the condition makes the conditional grant to become absolute the words are ambiguous If he mean it makes it absolute as that without which it had never been absolute I grant it if he mean it makes it absolute by contributing any direct causality I deny it for upon performance of the condition the conditional grant doth indeed become absolute not by the worth or efficacy of the condition but by the will of the Promiser that upon the existence of such a thing or action will be obliged and not without it We have already given several instances of conditions which have nothing of worth in them to engage the Donour and therefore cannot be the cause of the gift for nothing can produce an effect more noble and excellent then it selfe Nor doth it receive any addition of intrinsecal worth by being made the condition otherwise we might work as rare feats by the influence of our wills as l Magnet cure of wounds Van Helmont thinks may be wrought by the magick of the fancie 'T is but willing a pin to be worth a pound and it shall be done And when he addes in the next place that if faith be the condition of the New Covenant in such a sense as perfect obedience was the condition of the old man must needs be his own Justifier if he mean such in the matter and particular nature of the condition It is true if he mean such in the common nature of a condition it is false for we have shewed before both from Reason and Scripture Divines and Lawyers that some kinde of conditions are so far from being inconsistent with grace as that they advance it rather As suppose some benefit of very great value be bestowed on a worthlesse person upon condition that he acknowledge the rich superlative grace and love of the Donour to be the only cause of it Finally thus he speaks As in the old Covenant it was not Gods threat that brought death upon the world just so in the New if it be a conditional Promise it is not the Promise that justifies a beleever but the beleever himself The answer is ready Death came into the world by sin as the culpable meritorious cause but sin could not have slain us but by the Law 1 Cor. 15. 56. Rom. 5. 13 14. Ergo. It is not warily said that Gods threat did not bring death upon the world 2. And when Mr. Eyre hath proved that our performance of the Gospel-conditions hath the same proportion to our salvation as sin hath to our destruction the Papists shall thank him Rom. 6. last The wages of sin is death but the gift of God is eternal life through Jesus Christ our Lord. Mens not-accepting of the grace of God may make that grace without effect as to themselves 2 Cor. 6. 1. Rom. 3. 3. But that therefore their acceptance is the cause of Gods being gracious to them is wilde reasoning And as to worthy Dr. Kendal out of whom Mr. Eyre quotes these passages he hath publickly enough and in Mr. Eyres hearing for one declared himself to be no enemy against conditions of Justification or salvation That he that is pardoned upon his reading doth not pardon himself §. 27. I proved thus because then he must concurre either to the making of the Law which gives pardon upon such a condition or to the pronouncing of the sentence of absolution upon himself according to that Law This Mr. Eyre saith is an impertinent answer because the question is not whether a man did concur in making the Law and Rule of his Justification but whether he had any causal influxe in producing the effect thereof Rep. My answer if he will call it so was very pertinent as to the case of an offendor saved by his Clergy whose pardon is perfected by a Law which gives the remote right and sentence passed according to that Law which produceth his immunity it selfe If then the said offendor cause his own pardon it must be by concurring some way or other to the production of one of these The case is altogether
hath been transacted between God and Christ And doth not Mr. Eyre see that if he yield it to have the nature and operation of a Law in discharging sinners he contradicts himself in his next answer wherein he denies that Justification is the discharge of a sinner by a declared act that is by a Law Indeed such a Gospel as he here speaks of may declare the sinner to be discharged by some former act but it selfe cannot be his discharge and therefore the answer is nothing to the purpose 2. The atonement made by Christ may be said to be perfect two wayes 1. In respect of it self and so it was most perfect as wanting nothing that was requisite to constitute or make it a compleat cause of our peace 2. In reference to its effects and so it is yet imperfect and shall continue so till the Saints be glorified because till then they shall not have the full effect or perfection of peace purchased in the death of Christ If Mr Eyre mean this latter sense when he sayes the Gospel declares a full and perfect atonement made by Christ he begs the question In the former I grant it 3. And so that the Elect were cleansed from their sins in the death of Christ quoad impetrationem because he obtained eternal redemption and cleansing for them but not quoad applicationem till they do beleeve because the remission purchased in the death of Christ is not applied or given to us till we believe 4. Though the Priest made an atonement for all the sins of Israel upon the day of expiation Lev. 16. 30. yet did God require the concurrence of their afflicting themselves and humbling their soules on that day ver 23. otherwise they should have no benefit by that atonement Lev. 23. 29. Whatsoever soule shall not be afflicted on that same day he shall be cut off from among his people Is not this to teach us that without faith and repentance we shall not have remission by the death of Christ Secondly Mr. Eyre denies the Proposition which stands upon §. 2. this ground That Justification is the discharge of a sinner by a published declared act Where note Reader that by a declared act I mean not an act of God declaring and manifesting to a sinner that he is justified as Mr. Eyre doth willingly mistake me and thereupon patcheth a non-sequitur upon me which I intend not to unstitch but such a declaration of his will as is essential to make it a Law for the very essence of a Law consisteth in this that it is the declared will of the Law-giver Deut. 29. 29. and 30. 11 12 13 14 15 16 c. which is the only rule that determines both de debito officii of what shall be our duty to do and de debito poenae praemii of what rewards or penalties shall become due to us Accordingly the thing I maintain is that our discharge from punishment due by Law must be by the revealed will that is by some contrary Law or Constitution of God And I very well remember that in private conference with Mr. Eyre about nine or ten yeares since I told him my judgement was so then and that our Divines were generally dark in opening the nature of Justification for want of taking notice of it to which he then consented But Tempora mutantur c. the thing it self I thus proved Sin is not imputed where there is no Law Rom. 5. 13. Ergo neither is righteousnesse imputed without Law Mr. Eyre answers 1. Though men will not impute or charge sin upon themselves where there is not a Law to convince them of it yet God may for his hating of a person is his imputing of sin The scope of Rom. 5. 13. is not to shew when God begins to impute sin to a person but that sin in being supposeth a Law and consequently that there was a Law before the Law of Moses Rep. Doth Mr. Eyre indeed think that when it is said Sin is not imputed where there is no Law the meaning should be men will not impute sin to themselves where there is no Law To impute sin hath but two senses in Scripture 1. To punish it 2 Sam. 19. 19. 2 Tim. 4. 16. and then the meaning is that men will not punish themselves where there is no Law and because the punishment which the Apostle doth here instance in is death therefore the full sense will be this that men will not kill themselves where there is no Law a very probable glosse Or 2. To accuse or charge the guilt of sin upon a person But the use of the Word will not allow us to understand it of a mans imputing or charging sin upon himself a Vid Guil. Esthi in loc For it is never used in all the Scriptures to signifie the act of a man upon himself but perpetually the act of another as Paul to Philemon ver 18. If he owe thee any thing impute it to me especially when it is put passively as here it is sin is not imputed See Rom. 4. throughout 3. And I do heartily wish Mr. Eyre would have given us a short paraphrase upon the thirteenth and fourteenth verses that we might have seen what tolerable sense could have been made of them according to his Exposition and whether the Apostle do affirme or deny that men did impute sin to themselves before the Law especially if the Apostles scope be what Mr. Eyre sayes it is namely to shew that sin in being supposeth a Law how can it be conducible to that scope to speak of mens not imputing sin to themselves without a Law 4. The grand designe of the Apostle is plainly to illustrate our salvation by Christ by comparison of contraries and the similitude in its full explication stands thus As by the disobedience of Adam sin and death entred upon all his children so by the obedience of Christ life and righteousnesse betides all his The Proposition is set down ver 12. Wherefore as by one man sin entred into the world and death by sin and so death passed upon all men for that all have sinned This is proved ver 13 14. and the summe of the proof as I take it is this Sin was imputed and that unto death from the beginning of the world Ergo there must be some Law in being according to which sin was imputed for it cannot be imputed where there is no Law ver 13. This Law must be either the Law of Moses or the Law given to Adam The former it cannot be for sin and death were in the world long before that Law was given even as long as from Adam to Moses ver 14. Ergo it must be the Law given to Adam And so hath the Apostle his purpose That it was by the disobedience of one namely Adam that sin entred into the world and death by sin From whence it is manifest that God doth never impute sin without a Law that is doth
in its formal notion includes not the non-imputation of sin or that non-imputation of sin which includes not essentially the imputation of righteousnesse He hath told us long since that both these are immanent and eternal acts of God and as such the death of Christ procures neither the effects of both are one and the same and it is therefore impossible to distinguish them in reference to their effects It is to me a mystery beyond comprehension how that imputation which constitutes a sinner righteous should yet include nothing of the non-imputation of sin or how sin can be non-imputed to a sinner and yet he abide unrighteous unlesse some other act concur to make him righteous His third answer is The non-imputation of sin to us antecedes §. 17. the imputation of righteousnesse to us in order of nature only not of time Rep. That is the righteousnesse of Christ avails nothing to the non-imputing of sin to us The very naming of these hideous doctrines is a sufficient confutation of them Should I have delivered such things the names of all the most loathsome hereticks that ever were would have been accounted too soft to have been thrown at my head Yet Mr. Eyre hath not done objectâ—ng against himself but in the §. 18. end of this third answer brings in some body objecting thus We were not then I suppose he means when Christ died Ergo righteousnesse could not then be imputed to us His answer is They might as well object our sins were not then Erge they could not be imputed unto Christ in the businesse of Justification God calleth things that are not as if they were Rom. 4. 17. Rep. 1. I deny the parity of reason between the one and the other Sin can neither be punished nor pardoned before it be committed in â—r to the person that sinâ—eth Neverthelesse he that hath the absolute dominion of his own life as Christ had may as a Surety suffer all that punishment which by the Law can at any time grow due to sin for even amongst men p L. Sâ—ipulaâ—â—s sum L. potest ss de fide juss §. side â—â—ss instit de fide-juss 〈◊〉 accipi potest in â—uturam obligationem Sureties are admitted upon future obligations If as soon as death by the Law was made the punishment of sin before men had broken the Law the Lord Jesus had given up himself to death that in case we should sin his death should have had the same effect as now it hath in this case our sin though then but possible had been imputed unto him for he had borne the penalty due to it and threatened against it but his righteousnesse had not been imputed to us upon the same supposition that we had not sinned In like manner though the sins of the elect were not in being I mean of all the Elect borne since his death when Christ died yet the full penalty which could at any time grow due to them was then in being and determined by the Law which punishment also in summe and substance he might and did undergo that when we should sin we might yet be washed in his blood from all our sins The future sins of the Elect Christ might make so farre present in himself as to endure all the penalty which they could at any time deserve it being not our desert of punishment which obligeth him to suffer it but his own voluntary submission to it which makes punishment due to him as our Surety before it become due to us as actual sinners But pardon of sin being essentially the destruction of that very obligation which the sinner hath contracted upon himselfe doth therefore essentially suppose the sinner and his sin in being though another may suffer for him yet another cannot be pardoned for him pardon of sin being a personal priviledge that is such as rests in the person of the sinner or nowhere 2. And that God in the matter of Justification calleth things that are not as though they were is no part of the Apostles meaning Rom. 4. 17. but to shew the ground of Abrahams stedfast believing on God for the obtaining of a blessing to sense and reason impossible namely that he should become the father of many nations his own body and Sarahs wombe being dead v. 19. The reason hereof was because God is he that raiseth the dead and is able to give being to things out of nothing for he calleth things that are not as if they were therefore Abraham against hope believed in hope v. 18. This is that faith through which he and all his children in the same faith obtain righteousnesse Having thus at large demonstrated the weaknesse of the argument §. 19. from our Justification in Christ as a common person to prove our Justification before faith I left this censure upon it they are credulous soules that will be drawn by such decayes as these into schisme and faction to the hardening and discomforting of more hearts in one houre then the opinion it self should it obtain will do good to while the world stands which censure is of such ill resentment with Mr. Eyre that he hath used no lesse then two leaves of paper to wipe off the dirt untruth slander and what he pleaseth cast upon himself and his Church thereby As to the Argument his own deserting it in plain ground is evidence enough that it is too weak to bear the weight which is laid upon it and if men will embrace opinions which have no stronger foundations is not their own credulity in fault The charge of schisme and faction was not intended against him or any of his charge in particular I little know whether all under his charge be of his opinion or whether all of his opinion in the place he lives in be under his charge but in general against all who without better ground then the foresaid Argument will afford them shall by jealousies separations envyings backbitings rash censurings c. violate the rules of Christian love and peace whereof if neither Mr. Eyre nor any of his charge are guilty yet some others of his judgement in this point are and that so foully that he would loath to undertake their defence if he will be true to the Profession which here he makes of himself CHAP. XII A Reply to Mr. Eyres Sixteenth Chapter concerning our being in Covenant with God before believing SECT I. THe third and last Argument for proving our Justification §. 1. to be before faith I thus proposed and as I thought according to Mr. Eyres minde If we are in Covenant before we believe then we are justified before we believe But we are in Covenant before we beleeve Ergo This Argument Mr. Eyre disclaims as being none of his at least as not being proposed in that forme in which he dressed it and hereupon expatiates in two leaves of paper upon the discourse which passed between himself and me shewing the orderly progresse in which his
e Epist â—â— the Reader page 1 2. â—â—bi pâ—ssion staturâ— not excepted All which things trouble me the lesse because I have such companions in these reproaches as I do not dare to compare my self with the meanest of them As not only Mr. Cranford Mr. Baxter my brother but all that stand in his way that is the maine body of Protestants who have wrote upon this subject ever since the name of Protestant was known upon the earth But it is somewhat strange to me to observe what measure Mr. Eyre meteth to all that cannot vaile to his judgement If Mr Baxter lay down principles inconsistent with his he must be represented as an Arminian a Papist a Socinian and what not If a faithful Christian and that in Mr. Eyres own judgement though none of the meanest rank of Christians neither do but ask him a question and that with all due respect he must be bid to f Page 9 10. I will not english the words for very shame The Profession there following will never be believed after such premises nor will they be any salve for such a publick putting to shame and spitting in the face of a member of Christ If my brother declare himself against his notions he must be g Page 84. printed as a desertor of his Church in New-England for the love of a better Parsonage in old Durus Sermo I could name many Ministers that since these times have returned from thence hither and have gained ten times more by their return then my brother hath or is ever like to do were they all desertors of their Churches for fatter morsels If a man should print of Mr. Eyre that he is of late grown an enemy to h Epist dedic the Councel of War before his Sermon Tithes that if they be sold he might adde some of them to his former Purchases or if they be put into a publick treasury he might take of them more liberally in the more reformed way of a State maintenance or because he envies bread to every Minister that cannot hold pace with him in the way he goes and would have them all at his mercy If I say a man should print these things of Mr. Eyre I should verily account him a slanderer unlesse he were able to prove it better then I am sure Mr. Eyre can prove his charge against my brother He findes fault with my brothers argument because de occultis non judicat Ecclesia and yet is his own practice faultlesse in judging of that which the Church may not judge of I mean the intentions of a mans heart It concernes not me to praise my brother his own innocency in many yeares Profession of Christ is a sufficient defence to him against a thousand such calumniations nor is he mindful to take so much notice of Mr. Eyres language as to give him an answer but content without envying Mr. Eyre his great yearly revenews to serve God with chearfulnesse in his poverty only for his arguments Mr. Eyre hath taken them up upon trust which was not faire dealing and his informer hath misrepresented them I had them and a Vindication of them under my brothers hand and was intended to have printed them as not fearing what Mr. Eyre or any man else could rationally have excepted against them but finding my book to be of it selfe growen beyond that proportion which I intended I have omitted it In his answer to me to leave these personal matters which can be neither grateful nor profitable to the Reader how often be dasheth himself against himself and in the whole scope of his Discourse opposeth himself against the body of Protestant Divines the Reader may in some measure see in this Reply So little cause hath he to charge the doctrine which my self or others maintain against him with a compliance with Popery If I delighted in recriminations I could tell him that his doctrine of eternal reconciliation is Socinianisme that his denial of the elect to be at any time punished for their sin is i Calv. instr advers Lib â—tiâ— cap â—4 pag. mihi 181. Libertinisme as also that God is well pleased with some men in the midst of all their ungodlinesse That his denying of the k Chap 1 § 1. p. â—10 compared with §. 7. Law any power to hold the transgressors of it under an obligation to the punishment which it threateneth is Antinomianisme l Page 152. §. 6. That the death of Christ tends not to the procuring of our Justification m Page 62. That sins are pardoned in nature and time before Christs satisfaction n Page 122. That sinners have no more right to salvation after their beleeving then before with many other Paradoxes of like complexion are Anti-Gospelism and may for ought I know out-vie the most pernicious doctrines amongst the Romanists As for his other charge of Arminianisme the Lord knowes and my own soul knows to my daily shame and sorrow I have as little reason as any man to expect Justification in a Popish or Arminian way Neverthelesse I am altogether proselyted to renowned Bp. Davenants judgement concerning the extent and effects of the death of Christ if that be Arminianisme especially since I read Daylee's late Vindication of Amyrald against Spanhemius And the chief reason that enclines me to it besides the evidence of truth is the advantage I have thereby to give a clear and smooth answer to all the Scriptures which the Arminians are wont to use in defence of their cause It is true Mr. Eyre alledgeth the testimonies of some Divines as speaking seemingly for him But that the same Divines do elsewhere more plainly speak against him hath been so fully evidenced by Mr. Baxter Mr. Warren and blessed Mr. Graile that I cannot account it worth while to take a particular view of his testimonies Only I intended to take some special notice of two of his Authors viz. Robert Parker my Reverend Grandfather and renowned Dr. Twisse As to that passage which Mr. Eyre hath picked out of my Grandfathers book De descensu Christi ad inferos it hath been already so cleared both by Mr. Warren and Mr. Baxter that I am perswaded if Mr. Eyre were to write his book again he would quit the hold he takes on those words Much lesse would he have declared so tragically against me as if I had no lesse then justified my Grandfathers persecutors in all their injurious and unworthy dealings against him in writing for that truth which he never denied But if I do anything unworthy of the name and memory of that Reverend man who yet was never persecuted for his book De descensu much lesse for being supposed to be an abettor of the Justification of impenitent and unbelieving sinners Mr. Eyre might have thought it no greater fault in me then in his own and only sonne my Reverend and much honoured Uncle Mr. Thomas Parker vir omni exceptione major who hath taught me long
nothing for never man was nor ever shall be the better for this supposed Will of God precisely of not punishing for if it produce us any good it is either from eternity or in time Surely from eternity we are never the better for it if in time what is that good I suppose it will be said freedome from punishment Well But doth it effect this freedome mediately or immediately mediately it can do nothing for it is determined precisely to a non-punition and containes not a preparation of any subordinate cause for the effecting of our deliverance Election indeed may very well concurre to our discharge wrought by the death of Christ because it is a pre-ordination of Christ himself and of all other more immediate causes that work in their several orders and dependances for our dâ—scharge If immediately then the death of Christ interposeth no cauâ—ality for the effecting of the said freedome of which notwithstanding Mr. Eyre asserts it to be the adequate and immediate cause in his next Proposition 3. To give a peculiar name to the volition of one part of the meanes as distinct from the volition of all the rest unlesse there be some special reason of such denomination is but to impose upon our understandings for why may not Gods Will of sending Christ of publishing the Gospel of renewing our natures of raising our bodies of glorifying our whole man each of them deserve a more proper and significant name then Election as well as his Will not to punish for as to the act of this Will eâ—dem mâ—do se habet circa omnia objecta volita it respecteth all the meanes willed equally and in the same manner the persons to whom this impunity is willed lay under no other consideration as the objects of this will then as they are the objects of the will of calling sanctifying glorifying so that neither from the act nor the object is there any reason of such denomination Indeed the objects I mean the media volita of election and reprobation being contraries in the utmost degree and irreconcileable in the same person our weak understandings do therefore conceive of those acts as differing specie and accordingly we diversifie their names But the objects of Election being amongst themselves consentanies and subordinate in their execution one to the other and having no other entity or modality before their own existence in time then precisely ut volita it is altogether beyond the reach of my understanding to imagine any reason why the volition of one meanes should have a name proper to it self incommunicable to the volition of any other means willed by the same act to the same end 4 But the answer yields as much as the objection seeks for it grants Justification to be part of election namely Electio ad impunitatem Whereas 1. Scripture-Justification is a forensical act say all our Protestants against the Papists I spare quotations because the thing is too well known to be denied This cannot be affirmed of Election 2. The object of Election is neither a sinner nor a righteous person precisely but one that is not for we are chosen before the foundation of the world Eph. 1. 4. before we have done good or evil Rom. 9. 11. but the object of Scripture-Justification is a sinner Rom. 4. 5. whether believing or unbelieving we dispute below 3. Election is not properly an act of mercy but of absolute dominion and liberty Scripture-Justification is every where reported as an act of mercy Psal 51. 1. Luke 1. 78 79. Matth. 18. 33. Luke 18. 13 14. Heb. 8. 12. Eph. 2. 4 5. Ergo Justification is not Election nor any part of it If it be said that the name of pardon and Justification in these and other places signifies not the act but the effects I shall refer to my vindication of the next objection which is as followeth SECT VI. THe second objection therefore is this Justification imports a change in a persons state ab injusto ad justum Which cannot be §. 15 attributed to the decrees of God I shall divide Mr. Eyres answer into two parts First saith he if Justification be taken for the thing willed viz. the delivery of a sinner from the curse of the Law then there is a great change made thereby he that was a childe of wrath by nature hath peace and reconciliation with God But if we take it for the Will of God not to punish then we say Justification doth not suppose any such change as if God had first a Will to punish his Elect but afterwards he altered his Will to a Will not to punish them Rep. Plain dealing is best in a good cause If Mr. Eyre had told me roundly that the effects of Justification make a change in a persons state but the act doth not I had then known what I had to do But I know not very well what to make of these lines 1. The objection in forme is this Justification imports a change in a persons state ab injusto ad justum But velle nen punire or any other eternal purpose of God makes no such change of a persons state Ergo To say now that the Will of God not to punish supposeth no such change is to yield the Conclusion that therefore it is not Justification 2. What means he by a sinners delivery from the curse of the Law either it supposeth that a sinner doth actually suffer the curse of the Law or some part of it till Justification deliver him but this he denieth of such persons for whom Christ hath satisfied namely the Elect page 60. 61. § 2. or it supposeth an obligation of such persons by Law unto future punishment till they be justified But this he denieth too of the same persons page 110. 111. § 2 3 5. and what it is to deliver a sâ—nner from the curse which he neither suffers at present nor is obliged to suffer for future I want an Interpreter to tell me 3. Nor can I tell in Mr. Eyres sense what it is to have peace and reconciliation with God If he meane it of peace of conscience through the sense of reconciliation himselfe will deny that that is the immediate effect of our delivery from the curse for faith apprehending reconciliation doth intervene and that as a true proper cause of such a peace If he mean it of a state of peace and reconciliation before God he should not need to ascribe that to the thing willed seeing the erernal Will of God is most sufficient unto that according to him as being a real discharge from condemnation an actual and compleat non-imputation of sin and he layes it down for an undeniable truth That the Elect were in Covenant with God before the foundations of the world page 170 171. 4. The great change which he speaks of made by this delivery from the curse of the Law viz. That he that was a childe of wrath by nature hath peace and reconciliation with
imputation be ab aeterno non-futura then is it ab aeterno undeprivable of its futurity for nothing but that which is future can be deprived of its futurity and if it be future ab aeterno then it cannot be made ab aeterno non-future for to be future and non-future ab aeterno is a contradiction 3. But if Mr. Eyre by his privative non-imputation mean no more then a positive act by which that punishment is kept off which is or will become due to a sinner I answer farther That the very essence of the pardon of sin consists in making that punishment undue which before was due and consequently in freeing the sinner from all actual suffering for sin for the remission of sin is opposed to the retaining of it John 20. 23. or else in preventing that that punishment shall never become due which otherwise would be due If in the former sense sin be pardoned from eternity for non-imputation and pardon are all one both in Mr. Eyres sense and of the Scriptures Rom. 4. 7 8. then cannot punishment become due in time but it is from eternity non futurum debitum even as the pardon of sin present and actually committed makes that punishment remaines no longer due to a person which till then was due And if it be from eternity a non-futurum debitum then neither can it be pardoned from eternity pardon being essentially a discharge from punishment due actually or in futurition nor if it could can that pardon be an act of grace because it is no grace to pardon him who neither is nor never will or can be punishable Yet here Reader distinguish of the duenesse of punishment which may arise either from the nature of sin in it self and in this sense it is impossible that sin should be pardoned either from eternity or in time because it is impossible but that sin should be in it selfe punishable or worthy of punishment even as on the contrary vertue is in it self essentially laudable or rewardable Or it may be the act of God by his Law making punishment due to the sinner or obliging the sinner unto punishment for his sin and in this sense only is it pardonable and if it be actually pardoned from eternity then is punishment made from eternity non debita which as I said before destroys both the substance and grace of pardon let us see if we can clear it by Mr. Eyres comparison This Will of God saith he is like the will of a man not to require that debt that shall or is about to be contracted Come on then Titius knows that Caius will be indebted to him and his purpose is before-hand not to require this debt I ask Is this purpose the pardon of the debt or no if not the cause is yielded if it be we will suppose that Titius makes this purpose within himself in the moment A the debt will be contracted in the moment C. All the space of time that is between A and C the debt is not actually a debt but only future If then this future debt be forgiven in the moment A then from thenceforth it ceaseth to be future and so cannot exist in the moment C because for a debt to be forgiven is to be made no debt if it be forgiven at present it is none at present if it be forgiven for the future it is not in futurition to be a debt 4. I will only adde this That according to Mr. Eyres own principles punishment doth never become due to the Elect so as that they stand obliged before God to suffer for any of their sins for that which in the protasâ—s of the similitude is a debt between man and man is a sinners obligation to punishment in the reddition Now Mr. Eyre denies that an elect sinner is at any time unjust simply and absolutely but only in a diminutive sense that is unjust by nature or of himself but positively just by grace at the same time which is but the carcasse of unrighteousnesse making the sinner unrighteous no otherwise then as it were materially he doing that which on his part is sufficient to oblige him to condemnation but he is never formally unjust because the grace of his Judge prevents his actual obligation Ergâ— he doth never stand actually obliged to the suffering of punishment nor is ever actually and formally indebted And whose debt then it was that Christ paid or what debts they are which we are to pray for forgivenesse of Matth. 6. 12. I must confesse I cannot tell which is all I shall need to speak of that second sense in which some may take the pardon of sin Nor will I adde any more animadversions upon these passages though I had once intended it because some have been mentioned already before and others we must make use of in that which follows SECT IX SO much for Mr. Eyres first Proposition upon which I have been §. 26. necessitated to dwell the longer because his discourse is so perplexed and intricate In that which follows I shall be more brief His next Proposition is this If Justification be taken not for the Will of God but for the thing willed to wit our discharge from the Law and deliverance from Punishment so it hath for its adequate cause and principle the death and satisfaction of Jesus Christ Answ The substance of this Proposition I could gladly close with but something is first necessary to be animadverted 1. Whereas Mr. Eyre here makes the satisfaction of Christ the adequate and as in his Explication he tells us often the immediate cause of our Justification if by adequate and immediate he mean only in genere causae meritoriae I consent because there is no other meritorious cause that comes between the death of Christ and our Justification But if he mean that the death of Christ is simply the adequate and immediate cause then I deny it because the act of God as Justifier comes between the death of Christ and our Justification Rom. 3. 25. 26 Whom God hath set forth to be a propitiation through faith in his blood that he might be just and the Justifier of him that believeth on Jesus And the Lord Jesus himselfe also as Lord of soules and having all judgement committed to him by the Father joynes in putting forth the same act of Justification which was merited in his blood as we before observed 2. Mr. Eyre hath been disputing hitherto that Gods Will not to punish is our Justification That by which we are secured from wrath discharged and acquitted from all sin and wrath yea that it was a real discharge from condemnation an actual and compleat non-imputation of sin But now he tells us that the death of Christ is the adequate and immediate cause of our discharge from the Law and freedome from punishment I think for my part it is beyond mans ability to invent or utter more palpable contradictions To be secured from wrath and not secured acquitted
and not acquitted discharged and not discharged what can be more contradictorious or who can conceive what is that security discharge and acquittance from all sin wrath punishment condemnation which yet leaves a man under the power of a condemning Law and without freedome from punishment till Christ buy it with the price of his blood 3. Our discharge from the Law and freedome from punishment may be understood either de jure in taking off our obligation unto punishment and this cannot be the effect of the death of Christ for Mr. Eyre doth over and over deny that the Elect did ever stand obliged by the judgement of God to the suffering of punishment as the Reader shall largely see below in the debate of John 3. 18. and Eph. 2. 3. or it may be understood de facto in the real and actual removal of all kindes and degrees of punishment but neither can this be the effect of the death of Christ by it self or with the former The Purpose of Gods Will saith Mr. Eyre chap. 10. § 10. pag. 108. secures the person sufficiently and makes the Law of condemnation to be of no force in regard of the real execution of it So that what is left for the death of Christ to do I must professe I cannot imagine seeing the act of our Justification and our disobligation from wrath and our real impunity do all exist by vertue of another cause But for further confirmation of this Proposition Mr. Eyre refers us to chap. 14. where we shall wait upon him and say no more to it till we come thither His third Proposition is this Justification is taken for the declared sentence of absolution and §. 27. forgivenesse and thus God is said to justifie men when he reveales and makes known to them his grace and kindnesse within himselfe Answ Understand Reader that when we say Justification is a declared sentence of absolution it is not meant of a private manifestation made to a particular person that himself is justified or pardoned but of that publike declared Law of faith namely the Gospel it self which is to be preached to every creature under heaven He that believeth shall not perish but shall have everlasting life By which Promise whosoever believeth shall receive remission of sin 2. I wonder Mr. Eyre will not give us throughout his whole book so much as one text wherein Justification must signifie a manifestation or declaration made to a person that he is justified and yet tell us here that Justification is so taken If he mean it is so taken in Gods language let him shew where if in mans I will not dispute with him how men take it And as to that text Gen. 41. 13. me he restored but him he hanged which Mr. Eyre doth here instance in to prove that things in Scripture are said to be when they are only manifested if he had consulted Junius he would have told him that the word He relates not to Joseph but to Pharaoh Me Pharaoh restored but him that is the Baker he hanged The following part of this Chapter is spent in a discourse concerning §. 28. the several times and wayes in which God hath manifested his Will of non-imputing sin to his people In which there is nothing of distinct controversie but what hath its proper place in the following debate some where or other And most of what he sayes may be granted without any advantage to his cause or prejudice to thâ— truth there being no act of grace which God puts forth in time but declares something of his gracious purpose as every effect declares and argues its cause And so our Justiâ—â—cation it selfe declareth that there was a purpose in God to justifie because he acteth nothing but according to his purpose I shall not therefore make any particular examination of this remnant of the chapter though there be many things therein which I can by no meanes consent to but set down in the following Propositions how far I consent to each of his 1. I consent that God hath declared his immutable Will not to impute sin to believers in his Word and particularly in the Promise given to our first Parents The seed of the woman shall break the Sâ—rpents head 2. That Gods giving of Christ to the death for our sins and his raising of him up for our Justification doth manifest yet more of the same purpose 3. That baptisme sealing to a believer in act or habit the remission of sins past and entring him into a state of remission for the future doth also further declare something of the same purpose 4. That the same purpose of God is sometime or other in some measure manifested to most true Christians by the work of the Spirit But whether every true Christian hath a full assurance of this purpose of God towards himselfe or any immediately upon their first believing at least in these dayes I am in doubt 5. And that our Justification in the great day of judgement doth most fully perfectly and finally declare the same purpose as being the most perfect compleat and formal justification of all And so much for a discovery of the genius and issues of Mr. Eyres doctrine I come next to a vindicaiton of my own CHAP. III. My Reply to Mr. Eyres fifth Chapter His exceptions against the beginning and ending of my Sermon answered Rom. 5. 1. vindicated And the Antecedency of faith to Justification proved from Gal. 2. 16. and Rom. 8. 30. and Rom. 4. 24. and other places of Scripture SECT I. FOr proof of our Justification by faith the doctrine §. 1. insisted on in my Sermon I advanced several places of Scripture to which Mr. Eyre shapes some answer in his fifth Chapter which we shall here take a view of that the Reader may yet better understand how unlike Scripture-Justification is to that eternal Justification which Mr. Eyre pleads for But before he gives his answer to particular places he thinks fit to informe the Reader that I began my Sermon and concluded it with a great mistake The mistake in the beginning is that I said the Apostles scope in the Epistle to the Romanes was to prove That we are justified by faith i. e. that we are not justified in the sight of God before we beleeve and that faith is the condition on our part to qualifie us for Justification which is a mistake I intend to live and die in by the grace of God The Apostle tells us himself that his scope is to prove that both Jewes and Gentiles are all under sin Rom. 3. 9. and that by the deeds of the Law neither Jew nor Gentile shall be justified in Gods sight ver 20. that so he may conclude Justification by faith ver 28. and if this be not to prove that men are unjustified but by faith I know not what is And that faith here is to be taken properly we prove at large below If this be not the Apostles scope
sufficient cause of condemnation though he be not actually condemned for want of the concurrence of some other cause but what that actuall condemnation is which is hereby intended to be excluded we must farther enquire Condemnation which we are forced often to observe signifies either the sinners obligation to punishment or the execution of punishment in the former sense he is condemned who by the Law is guilty of death in the latter sense he who is actually damned and suffers the punishment threatned In distinction from one or both of these it is that a man is said to be damnable in himself If from the former the meaning is this That all the world the elect and all have wrought that evill which were most sufficient to work the forfeiture of their right to life and make them lyable to eternal death if there were any Law in force against them If this be the sense Mr. Eyre will have the Apostle speak in when he sayes all the world is become guilty before God marke what follows 1. Then the Law neither doth nor ever did condemn any man living for men are supposed to be damnable and but damnable not actually condemned for want of a Law in sorce to condemn them that is to hold them under an obligation to punishment The Law doth but shew its teeth pardon the expression reader but it neither doth nor ever did bite any man no not the most presumptuous transgressours of it though transgressours be as fit objects as can be for the Law to take hold of if it had power so to do Hence secondly I would ask whether ever God did condemn any man If he did by what Act not by the Law that shews indeed who are damnable in themselves not who are condemned of God I suppose it will be said that some are condemned by the eternall Act of Reprobation â—ut I leave it to Mr. Eyre to prove that the name or nature of condemnation can agree to that Act according to Scripture which if he cannot prove as sure enough he cannot nor all the men on earth it must needs follow that there is no such thing as the condemnation of any man according to Scripture Against this sense of the text I could adde much more if I could perswade my self to think that it were needful for the help of any man But it may be this damnability is opposed to damnation executed §. 19. and then the meaning is That the Law doth not shew whom God damneth that is punisheth with damnation but who are damnable or punishable in themselves if God should try and judge them according to the Law But 1. This is nothing to the purpose It is no part of my undertaking to prove that every one who at present is an unbeliever is damned as that word notes the execution of damnation or wrath actually inflicted but that he is condemned that is under a legal obligation to punishment till some gracious act of God discharge him When therefore Mr. Eyre opposeth that men are not condemned by the Law but damnable he fights with a shadow for he that is damnable executively is condemned legally which is that I am proving for it is the work of judgement to execute Laws and to give to every man according to what is due to him by Law if then upon supposition that men were to be tried and judged by the Law of works they would be found damnable it must be also supposed that they were before obliged by Law to the suffering of damnation 2. Otherwise the Law is but the carcasse of a Law and called a Law equivocally as we call a dead man a man for example There was a Law in Israel that whosoever should not humble himself upon the day of expiation should be cut off Lev. 16. which Law is now abrogated Neverthelesse it may be truly said that if a Jew who now keeps not that day were to be tried and judged by that Law he would be found punishable If it be said that Law is now abrogated and so no man incurres the penalty upon the non-observance of it It is most true yet may he be said to be punishable by it in sensu diviso in the very same sense in which Mr. Eyre allows sinners to be damnable by the Law of works namely upon supposition it were in force to make the penalty due and sinners were to be tried and judged by it 3. And was it not worth the while for the Lord Jesus to come down from heaven to redeem sinners from the curse of the Law and that at no easier a rate then by being made a curse for them when the Law never cursed or condemned any man but only shews who are damnable in themselves if they should be judged by the Law From which way of judgement the Elect are supposed to be secured by an antecedent act of God SECT V. MY second Argument to prove that the condemnation mentioned §. 19. John 3. 18. cannot be meant meerly of condemnation in conscience was this The condemnation of an unbelievers conscience is either true or false If true then it is according to the judgement of God and speaks as the thing is and so God condemns as well as the conscience If false c. Mr. Eyre answers There is a threefold act of conscience about sin 1. When it witnesseth to us about the desart of sin 2. When it witnesseth to us concerning the act of sin 3. When it witnesseth to us concerning our final state and condition before God Now if conscience bear witnesse to a man concerning what he hath done and what is his desart in so doing it doth but its duty But if it tell a man that for the sins which he hath done he is a damned creature and must perish everlastingly such a conscience is both penally and sinfully evil Rep. The Argument is wholly untouched For the question is not whether an unbelievers conscience condemn him truly in reference to his final estate but whether it condemn him truly in reference to his present state If it tell him that at present he is in a state of condemnation doth it speak true or false Herein Mr. Eyre will not answer me but saith only that if it tell him his case is desperate and without hope it speaks false I need not tell Mr. Eyre that his answer is impertinent I am perswaded he knows it well enough conscience may tell an unbeliever that he is condemned and herein it speaketh true though it do not tell him that there is no way of coming out of this state of condemnation which were false 2. The two former answers also are not much to purpose for to witnesse concerning the act and desart of sin is as proper to the conscience of a believer as of an unbeliever whereas our question is only concerning the unbelievers conscience And if this be the whole of what conscience can justly charge upon an unbeliever then is the
metaphorically may be called the payments of debts to the Law the sameness of the person is essential to the sameness of the payment so that si alius sâ—lvat aliud sâ—laitur if another person pay 't is another thing that 's paid 4. If Christ paid the idem then no mans sins are pardoned The Law it self would admit of satisfaction from the sinner if he were able to make it if sinners by suffering of punishment could satisfie for their sins they should be discharged from farther punishment without pardon it would be no grace to free them t Grot. de satisfact Christi c. 6. p. 119. videsis Andr. Essen de satisfact l. 2 sect 3 â— 3. p. 519 520 521 c. Vbi idem solvitur out à debitore aut ab alio nomine debitoris nulla contingit remissio nihil enim circa debitum agit Creditor aut Rector 5. Our obligation was ex delicto Christs ex contractu voluntario It was not any breach of the Law that subjected him to death but his own voluntary act Joh. 10. 17 18. Wherefore though the things which Christ suffered were much of the same kind though not altogether with what sinners were by the Law obliged to suffer yet was not he obliged to suffer by the same Law that they were but by a Law peculiar to himself as a voluntary surety for them in which respect it is that we say his payment was not u Vide Cameron disp dc satisf p. 363 Respons ad obj 1. m. ejusdem but tantidem And these are the common Arguments which are wont to be made use of in this matter which Mr. Eyre might have spared me the paines of transcribing if he had pleased and instead thereof seeing they are so well known have given them some answer In the next place he advanceth foure Arguments to prove that the §. 33. death of Chrst was solutio ejusdem I confesse I wonder at his undertaking but let us see his Arguments 1. Saith he Christ was held in the same obligation which we were under he was made under the same Law Gal. 4. 3 4. Ans Why Is a surety held in the same obligation because he is bound to pay the same summe then is there no difference between the surety and the principal debtour The Apostle in Gal. 4. 3 4. saith that Christ was made of a woman made under the Law As the former expression implies that though he were of a woman quoad corpulentam substantiam yet he came not from her quoad rationem seminalem according to the common rule of nature by which children are wont to be borne into the world so doth the latter imply that though his obedience for substance were the same which the Law required of us yet was it not performed by virtue of that common obligation which lyes upon us but by special oeconomy and appointment x Sâ—e P. Ushers Immanuâ—â— pag. 10. f at the end of his Body of Divinity and Essen ubi sâ—pra lib. 1. sect 4. cap. 9. pag. 288. Joh Dried de capt Redempt tract 3. pag. 242 243 244 c. He that was Lord of the Law might have exempted himself from subjection to it if he had pleased See Philip. 2. 6 7 8. So that Christs obedience though in some respect the same with ours as having the same rule and object yet was it of another kind then ours in regard of the principle and manner of performance in that the Law which bound others did yet bind him no farther then himself pleased to be bound The same answer I give to the second text Gal. 3. 13. Christ was made a curse for us and dyed for us Heb. 2. 9 14. Isaâ— 53. 4 5. for none of these things prove that he was any of those who by the Law were obliged to die yea it is certaine he was not for the Law obligeth none to death but sinners yea and for the very matter of the curse and death which Christ suffered though that do not immediately concerne our question for though he had suffered the idem in regard of the matter of his punishment yet formally as his death was a satisfaction or payment that idem was no more then the tantundem which I plead for yet I say it is certaine that there is some kind of evil in the curse executed upon sinners which was never executed upon Christ as an exclusion from all interest in Gods favour the defacing of his image in his soul rage and despaire of conscience and the like The answer therefore is Christ was indeed made a curse for us not that the Law did curse him or had power so to do but because by special compact between his father and himself he endured that punishment for the maine which the Law threatned against sinners Heb. 10. 5 7. A body hast thou prepared me Loâ— come to do thy will even as it was by a special Law that beasts were slaine and sacrificed unto God of old and not by that general Law which curseth every one that sinneth Hence it follows thirdly that when our sins are said to be laid upon Christ Isa 53. 6. Which is Mr. Eyres third Argument it doth by no means follow that the death of Christ was that which the Law required but that Christ was made to beare that punishment which in weight and value was the same which we should else have borne though it be not arithmetically the same If any man can make more of those words let him His fourth and last Argument is this If God would have dispensed with the idem in the first obligation Christ need not have died Which is a very strange consequence for God did therefore dispence with the idem that there might be way made for the death of Christ That which was in the obligation was our punishment if God did not dispense with this it had been impossible for Christ to have died for us but the Law must be executed upon every sinner in his own person But behold the proofe If the justice of God would be satisfied with lesse then the penalty of the Law he might as well have dispensed with the whole Ans As if that which is not the same must needs be lesse I confesse I account it no better then losse of time to answer these things under the notion of Arguments Hitherto then the matter is safe That the death of Christ was not §. 34. the payment of the same which was in the obligation Ergo it doth not deliver ipso facto for explication of which I added that if the debtour himself do bring unto the creditour that which he ows him it presently dischargeth him but the payment of a surety doth not Why not saith Mr. Eyre Amongst men there is no difference so the debt be paid it matters not whether it be by the principal or his surety the obligation is void in respect of both Ans Which