neither is he that is chosen upon the fail of an ancient Royal line or stock truly reducible to any of these three sorts viz. Either a Father of the people or an heir of such a Father or an Vsurper of the right of such a Father 4. Object The last objection I shall hold up being the remainder of what I meet with is But this way of setling Government by the peoples consent cannot be proved ever to have been held or practised All powers that have reigned have entred by the sword or rule by virtue of such entrance Resp This is a very broad allegation and the prejudice therein câ—st upon all powers seems to proceed from partiality to sâ—me But 1. The way of subjects election of their Government to have been practised and that antiently or from the first I have above brought testimonies unto from Authors of the best note to wit Aristotle Cicero Justin Juvenal Ludovicus Vives Polydore Virgil and Mr. Calvin Viz in this Sect. Subsect 4. To these I shall only here add the witness of one of our English Historians giving a threefold instance of the subjects choice of their Soveraign to wit of three Kings One of the antient British another of the Saxon another of the Norman race Mr. Speed Speed Hystory Book 5. Chap. 6. Sect. 2. Book 6. Chap. 2. Sect. 6. Book 8. Chap. 6. Sect. 1. Book 9. Chap. 2. Sect. 54. Chap. 3. Sect. 1 2. tels us that when Julius Caesar first enterprised the conquâ—st of this land among the many Reguli or petty Kings that then ruled in the several parts thereof Cassibilan was by a universal vote chosen the Chieftain and supreme That upon the death of Hardicanute the third Danish King Edward the Confessor was by a general consent elected King And that William the Conquerour appointing no heir at his death his son William Rufus was by the consent and voices of the States made King 2. When learned Authors tell us of fundamentall laws and constitutions of nations and when the late Parliament so often mentioned â—nd insisted on the fundamental laws and the antient fundamental constitution frame aad government of this Kingdom in opposition to an arbitrary and Tyrannical government in their publique votes declarations and remonstrances particularly in their preamble to the Protestation taken by them and the whole Kingdom of May the 3. 1641. and in the Declaration of the House of Commons of April 17. 1616. ordered to be published set up and fixâ—d in every Parish Chuâ—ch what other thing do they mean thereby but this to wit the oâ—igiâ—al establishment of policy and government by the mutual contention CHAP. V. SECT V. Subsect 6. capitulation and agreement of Governours and people Aristotle Aristotelis Polit lib. 3. num 87. lib. 5. num 112. often in his Politicks delivers it as the difference betwixt a King and a Tyrant a Kingdom and a Tyranny that the one is founded upon the will of the Subjâ—cts the other is against their wils and held over them by force Mr. Gregory of C. C. observes upon those words Act. 11.26 And the Disciples were called Christians first at Antioch that the word 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 were called is borrowed from a Roman custom viz. when the Provinces submitted themselves to the imperial Government the use was to cause a 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 or publique edict to be drawn up and proclaimed upon the place And particularly there was such an one at Antioch when the City yeelded up it self into the subjection of the Roman Empire in the time of Julius Cesar In memory whereof that City fixed their aera or reckoning of time upon the date of that action which they therefore called 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 because the Emperour did then 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 publiquely entitle them to all the priviledges immunities c. Here is a famous instance which the said Author brings out of Johannes Antiochenus of the mutual agreement and close betwixt Prince and People at the first entrance into that relation And I would aske further how it could be otherwayes then by mutuall consent that Government was erected in the several Nations at the confusion of languages when the several parties were in an instant rent asunder from that one community they were of and from under that one head which perhaps had been untill then over them and left to themselves to associate each party into a distinct community and under a new Government as they were severally languaged there being no reason or ground to conclude that to each of them there was still appropriate one natural Grandsire and that he was by natural right to be the Soveraign or that in defect thereof there was one eldest house CHAP. V. SECT IV. Subsect 6. and one Parent thereof that was entitled to the regiment of all the other collateral and younger branches of the same stock The which supposals have been above refuted And again how can it be otherwise at the plantation of a new Colonie at the extinction of a Royall race or at the Cession of Kings or States that is when a people are deserted of their former Supreme Governors as the Britains of this Island sometime were by the Roman State to wit then when their prefect Aetius withdrew himself and his legions from this Countrey upon the decay of the Roman greatness and exposed the rule of it unto who so might get it * See Speeds History Book 7. Chap. 1. Sect. 1 2 3. And thus it was some authors tell us at the translation of the Roman Empire to Germany †Widdringtons Theolog. Disput in Admon to his Reader Sect. 4. 3. The Governments that either now are or heretofore have been 1. Many of them are known to have been established by the peoples consent as was even now shewed 2. Of many of them the original first rise or bottom like the head of Nilus is not known Of these because nothing to the contrary appears we have no just reason to think but they stand upon this basis In all matters of tenure immemorial possesion inculpably held leads men to take the beginning to have been right 3. Many are known to have a violent and unjust beginning Of these 1. Some though the entrance of them was such yet they have after come to be setled upon a better foundation Thus it was saith Fr. Junius Junius Animadv in Bellarminum Controv 3. lib. 5. cap. 8. Sect. 18. ca 9. Sect. 20. Mr. Perkins To. 1. Tract of Callings pa. 762. A. in the Empire of Charles the first as also in that of Julius Caesar Ex post facto jus invaluit cujus non ita fuerunt principia justa Accordingly saith Mr. Perkins A Prince enters into a Kingdom by war and bloudshed Now by the bad entrance be is no lawful King Yet if the people do willingly submit themselves to this usurper and be content to yield subjection and the
or becomes a Father he becomes a Supreme Civil Power begins a new Common-wealth and he and his children are exempt from his Fathers if living and all other Civil superiority and the Fathers power and the Common-wealth he is over shall be dissolved by his having Nephews or by his childrens fatherhood and this will make every family though but of two persons to be a Civil State and that no Common-wealth can consist of more then the children of one Father and for ever prevent or deny the compounding a Common-wealth of many families and the distinction of the Common-wealth from the Family And by this multiplication of the number and abridgement of the extent of civil societies you disappoint mankind of that union strength security and comfortable commerce that nature hath guided men to seek and the experience of all ages and nations have found in large and populous societies Or 2. The political power must be said to be in or to be the right of every Father that is not Pater patratus or that hath no Father and this doth dissolve and divide the Common-wealth at the death of such a Father into so many parts as there are left persons fatherlesse whether they be Wife Sons or Daughters and into so many new Common-wealths as there are left Fathers in it that have not a Father 3. The right or power of the Father can relate only to the children and only to his own Out of the extent then of this dominion and consequently out of the Common-wealth it belongeth unto upon this score you must exclude 1. The Wife and Servants of this supposed Monarch though he be their superiour and they in a subordination to him yet he is not their Father 2. All other persons of any other stock there can be no mixture of races or linages in this Common-wealth 4. If Civil power be the right of the Father then it must necessarily be in him in reference to all his children wherever placed or dispersed So that how far soever Adams progeny must be disseminated or spread upon the face of the earth during his life or Noahs during his life or any of the long lived Patriarchs during their respective lives all the posterity that sprang from such a head must belong to and be shut up within one Common-wealth while that common parent lasted And how will this stand with that distribution of Noahs race into severall Countreys and Nations in his life time as also with that of Shems he being living of which in the 10 and 12 Chapters of Genesis and with Abrahams sending away the sons he had by his Concubines into another Countrey while he yet lived Gen. 25.6 Unless it will be said such a Father hath a faculty or warrant to strip himself of this his paternal Civill Dominion and to transfer it or any part of it to others during his life But 1. Thus you unsettle and change the basis and cause of civil dominion you had laid in the Fathers natural right and make it separable from it by humane choice and will and if you put it once upon arbitrary constitution you make it alienable for ever from that subject and from that bottom 2. This cannot be supposed at the confusion of languages Gen. 11.6 7. when as they were one immediately before it and the end of their building Babel was to prevent their dispersion and upon that confusion they were scattered from thence upon the face of the whole earth by which confusion and dispersion the consent or act of their common head for the divesting of himself and for the investing of those who should succeed him in being the respective Soveraign powers of those several divided Countries and nations was prevented Secondly But the inconveniencies of fixing Civil power in the paternal relation alone they endevour to salve by eeking it out with that of primogeniture Unto this I say 1. Primogeniture can never be supposed to derive any thing to the childe but what was in the Father if the Father be a Supreme power a Monarchy may by it be conveyable to his Son and not otherwise Thus primogeniture is not the rise of civil power but supposeth it to be in being and is only the mean of continuation and transmission of it from person to person 2. The natural right of the first born in succession from the Father as we finde it in Scripture seems only to be a better or double portion of what was his Fathers in copartnership with his Brethren If then you go by that you must upon the death of every royal father that hath a plurality of Sons divide the Common-wealth among them according to that proportion whereby it would come to passe that a Kingdom by many descents probably shall be divided into numberlesse minute principalities and every of them still new to be divided by every new succession The conveying of a Kingdom whole and entire to one of many Sons is not from the law of the first born in Scripture but is doubtless from positive institution And this is to me a stâ—ong argument and unanswerable to them that allow the transferring of Kingdoms undivided from Father to Childe that Supreme power is in a person by arbitrary constitution not by natural right as in a Father or first-born for if it were that right by it self would infer a division of Common-wealths according to the multiplication of the Regal stock and so in time an easie dissolution of them 3. If Primogeniture must carry it then the right of Fatherhood aâ—ore insisted on went on no farther then the first man Adam and was never in any after him and upon his decease you put an end to and destroy for ever your paternal right to Political power For upon his death either the power must descend upon every one of his children distributively as Fathers in reference to their respective children as their subjects and then where is that you call the right of primogeniture and what politicall power is accrewed by it or it must descend upon his first-born only and then what becomes from thenceforth of the right of fatherhood 4. If you set the Civill power upon the first born in succession from Adam and so downward then you must either set it upon every fiâ—st-born of every Father and this will bring the absurdities argued to follow upon setting it upon every father or you must fixe it but on one first-born only at once that is the eldest Son of the eldest house and then you make it necessary that all men be kept within one Common-wealth and that there be but one Monarch for that primogeniture can but be in one race and in one person still and how opposite is this not only to the practise of all ages even from Noahs time when the race of mankinde was divided as into divers regions so into several Nations or politique bodies but to the state of mankind so far diâ—persed over the whole earth as it is
or that hope to prevail with them which I should promise my self in the undertaking Deo laus omnis FINIS The Contents THE entry and partition of the work pag. 1. CHAP. I. Of the subject here spoken of power the powers p. 3. Sect. 1. An enquiry wâ—â—ther power be put for the person invested who power or for the abstract the office seated in him p. 3. Sect. 2. The main enquiry to wit what kind of power it is which the Apostle intends in those words power powers p. 5. Subsection 1. Of the force of the woâ—d 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 p. 5. Subsection 2. Power distinguisht into Naturall and Morall p. 15. Subsection 3. That Moâ—all power oâ—ly is intended in this woâ—d power in this place p. 23. Subsection 4. What is required to the making of a Morall power p. 29. CAHP. II. Of the Tearm of God p. 40. Sect. 1. The diverse Scripture-acceptations of this tearm of God p. 41. Sect. 2. For the clearing of the Question which of these acceptations are proper for this Text divers things discussed p. 46. Subsection 1. The difference betwixt the Narrative and the Legislative word of God and that Scripture predictions are not a warrant for us to act upon in the things predicted p 46. Subsection 2. Certain propositions to explain those severall wayes wherein things are said to be of God p. 49. Subsection 3. Of Gods working in humane actions whether good or evill and the difference betwixt the being of the one of God and of the other p 51. Subsection 4. How the hand of God is clear from the sin of man when it actâ—th in mans sinfull action and from injustice in punish him for that action p. 57. CHAP. III. A Digressive enquiry concerning the voice or declarative use of Divine providence p. 61. Sect. 1. The usefulnesse of the said enquiry p. 62. Sect. 2. In what sense the word providence is taken in this enquiry p. 63. Sect. 3. The question discussed whether Divine providence be and wherein it is regulating or declarative of the will of God to be done by us p. 63. Subsection 1. That providence doth declare something of God p. 64. Subsection 2. That providence doth declare somewhat of Gods counsels p. 65. Subsection 3. That providence doth declare to us that God is and what he is p 67. Subsection 4. Certain distinctions premised for the discovery how far providence is declarative of the wil of God which we are to doe p. 68. Subsection 5. Five propositions explaining wherein providence is and wherein it is not declarative of Gods will to be done by us and how providence where it deâ—ivers not the rule may yet determine its obligation to the particular matter p. 69. Subsection 6. That Dominion is not founded in eventual providence p. 89. Subsection 7. That providence alone or without the Rule of Gods word doth not signifie to us the allowing or disallowing will of God in matters either of human right or positive institutim p. 92. CHAP. IV. The Question how the text saith thâ— power is of God stated and resolved p. 97. CHAP. V. Of the tearm ordained of God p. 101. Sect. 1. Of the severall acceptions of the word ordained being put for an action of God p. 102. Sect. 2. What the speciall and proper acception of the Term ordained of God is in this Text p. 107. Sect. 3. Reasons to prove that Gods ordination of the power is preceptive or warrantive not meerly providential p. 109. Sect. 4. Gods preceptive ordination of the power explained particularly how it is communicated to this or that particular Magistrate p. 120. Subsection 1. Ordination contains institution and constitution and what each of these signifies p. 121. Subsection 2. That institution of the power is of God and whether by the law of nature in man innocency p. 123. Subsection 3. That constitution of the power or putting in of the particular Magistrate is of God and how or by what means he doth it p. 124. Subsection 4 That Gods ordination is conveyd to the particular Magistrate by the consent of the community p. 136. Subsection 5. Three other wayes of conveying into persons a title to Soveraign Magistracy examiâ—ed viz. 1. That of Father-hood and primogeniture 2. That of Conquest 3. That of voluntary benefiâ—iallnesse by protection p. 144. Subsection 6. A solution of some objections made against the passing of Gods ordination unto the person of the Supreme Magistrate by the consent of the people p. 167. Sect. 5. That distinction which some give betwixt the power and the acquisition or assumption of the power and its aptnesse to resolve the question Whether a violent intruder into Dominion be among the powers in this Text that are of God ordained of God considered p. 191. CHAP. VI. Of the universal negative note in the words there is no power but of God p. 204. Sect. 1. The originall is not in those words no power but of God expressely universall p. 205. Sect. 2. The severall qualifications which sentences in terms universall do admit p. 207. Sect. 3. The sutablenesse of some of those qualifications of universalls to this supposed universall in the Text p. 210. CHAP. VII Of the being of the powers in that proposition the powers that be are ordained of God p. 216. Sect. 1. The question moved wherein consists the being of the power or what it is that makes the power to be p. 217. Sect. 2. Reasons to prove that prevalency or actual possession of the seat of Government doth not make or inferre one to be the power p. 218. Subsection 1. Argument 1. Taken from the nature of 〈◊〉 p. 218. Subsection 2. Argument 2. From the absurdity of admitting Satans and the Popes usurped powers upon the ground of actual rule p. 220. Subsection 3. Argument 3. From the custome of hereditary Kingdomes accounting the succeeding to be King in the moment of the death of his predecessor without actual investure p. 225. Subsection 4. Argument 4. From the lawfulnesse and usâ—fulnesse of fundamental Lawes and provisions for the future continuance of Government by succession and against encroachers upon the same p. 226. Subsection 5. Argument 5. From the practice of Nations owning them for their Soveraign powers who have not actually ruled p. 228. Subsection 6. Argument 6. From another practice of Kingdomes their admitting some to the place of Supreme command whom they acknowledge not to be the Supreme power p. 233. Subsection 7. Argument 7. From the approved custome of determining controverted Titles unto Soveraignty by arbitration p. 234. Subsection 8. Argument 8. From the expressions of the holy Ghost in Scripture owning men for Kings in relation to the Kingdomes of which they have been unpossessed p. 236. Subsection 9. Argument 9. Taken from the nature of Magistracy p. 245. Subsection 10. Argument 10. From Gods expresse disallowance of some in actual command p. 249. CHAP. VIII Some Arguments to prove that by the power in the Text is to be
will gain little by this parallel 2. Whereas he saith the Common-wealth is alwayes in pupillage It is but an allusive or comparative speech and is therefore unapt to be argumentative A similitude must not be made run of all four It can only import somethings appertaining to a Pupill may be in way of resemblance attributed to the Common-wealth But it were easie to shew divers things wherein there is also a dissimilitude * Idem lib. 12. cap. 2. Sect. 2. lib. 13. cap. 10. Sect. 1. A Pupil cannot choose his Tutor cannot call him to an account during his pupillage But it s generally confest the Common-wealth may elect its Governours And it 's a publiquely declared principle I assert it not the Supreme Power is accountable to the people And himself breaks the correspondency most of all in saying the Common-wealth pupillage is everlasting whereas the Pupill comes to puberty and out of his pupillage at 14 years old Subsection 6. CHAP. V. SECT IV. Subsect 6. A Solution of some Objections made against the passing of Gods Ordination unto the person of the Supreme Magistrate by the consent of the people HAving examined those other wayes of conveying over unto persons the title unto Magistracy and refuted them It now remains that we take notice of some allegations against the peoples consent being the ordinary medium of Gods ordination of a person unto the soveraign power which some seeing they think them fit to be urged will judge worthy either to be assented to or answered 1. Object The Anarchy c. above cited pag. 8. If no man have power to take away his own life without the guilt of being a murderer of himself how can the people confer such a power as they have not themselves upon any one man without being accessories to their own deaths Answ This Reason seems to ground it self upon that common Axiome Nihil dat quod non habet whence it argues the people cannot give the power of capital punishment over them unto any person because they have it not cannot inflict it each upon himself But it is misgrounded 1. Here is ignoratio clenchi For as we yeeld it true that the people have not a civill authority every one over his own life so we do not say but here deny that they can confer it upon another The concession of a power in the people to nominate or elect their Soveraign doth not infer so much viz. that they in so doing give or confer upon him the Magistratical power They may be subordinate agents and their vote or consent may be the medium or instrument used by God to convey that power to the person but they cannot therefore be said to be the Creators efficients authors or donors of that power for that is the properwork or prerogative of God When the young Prophet came to Jehu and poured the oyle upon his head and said unto him Thus saith the Lord God of Israel I have anointed thee King over the people can we say that Prophet made Jehu King That young man was not the author but the messenger only of that business It is very clear in the conveyance of this and of other powers one may be the vehiculum the hander over of that power to another which he is not the possessor of himself A single woman hath not in her the marital power over her self yet by her consent in marriage she conveyes it to her husband The people of a Christian congregation or Church have not each the power of a Pastor or Minister to Preach administer a Sacrament or the Keyes of Discipline to himself yet by their election they may be instrumentall to convey the same to another When the King in whom the power of life and death is gives commission to a Judge to have and execute it subordinately from and for him and sends his order to the Keeper of his seal required by the Law to make such a Commission authentick to passe and seal the said Commission we cannot say the Keeper gives the Judge the said Commission but it is the King â—hat conferres it by this Officers hand That which the peoples consent doth when they agree that this person shall be their Supreme Governour is to determine the general rule that every Common-wealth shall have a Magistracy with power of capital punishment to the particular person in relation to that people but it makes them not to be conferrers efficients or primary causes of that Magistracy When a power or priviledge is by divine institution annexed to the act of the creature it is not the creatures act properly or efficiently but God by his institution that communicates that power or priviledge 2. This Objection in its proper tendency doth not more argue against he peoples capaciâ—y to câ—nfer the power over life upon any person which is a thing we affirme not then it doth against the peoples giving their consent that such a one shall have the said power over them For upon the same medium it may be argued if no man have power to take away his own life without the guilt of being a self-murderer how can any people consent to such a power in another without being accessories to their own deaths But that the people may very lawfully give their consent to such a power in another I hope the Objector will not deny If he should I would say the people of Israel did lawfully give their consent to such a power in Saul David Solomon and others yea it is the part of every people to consent to the Rulers to have it unless we must say that all Subjects are to be under their Governors against their wils 3. But how then must we avoid the Reason If I may not take away or destroy mine own life I may not agree that another shall have the power to do it I answer This is a very false assertion that power which one hath not and may not himself exercise he may not consent to in another If by power be meant as it must needs be in the Objection a power that is in its own nature lawful Indeed that which is simply or in it self unlawful as for instance Murder because it is so unlawful as I may not do it my self so I may not consent to anothers doing of it But that which is lawful in it self but unlawful to me as many things are because though good in it self yet I am not thereto called or authorized of that I cannot say because I cannot do it my self I may not consent to it in another The Apostle Paul did give his consent to the taking away of his own life conditionally if he deserved death and the objection imports no other consent when he was in question about it before his Judge * Act. 25.11 If I be an offender or have committed any thing worthy of death I refuse not to die 4. From this antecedent no man hath power to take away his own
this objection doth not more lie against this of their agreement of Government then against any other I say therefore a civill society having in it persons lying under all those occasions of absence or non acting and add to them one more viz. that some list not to come 't is not thereby rendred actionlesse to this or other purposes But how are the exceptions removed 3. Thus. 1. They that are absent are either incapable of giving a consent to any thing that concernes them as are infants and such as want the use of reason or they are capable 2. Of these latter some are not personally interested in passing or giving a vote in matters political but are involved as to these in their Husbands Parents Masters or Guardians others have an interest personally to concurre in them 3. Of these some may be necessarily absent as the sick lame decrepit others are away volun arily 1. For the necessarily absent This is the case ordinarily but of a few single persons in a great body upon whom nature it self laying a present impediment must needs be taken to lay a present suspense upon their interest of personal presence and consent in the publique business and rather to will the divolving of it upon the other that can meet then that they and the whole community should be suspended from attaining or effecting the dispatch of their publique necessary affaires As they to whom nature denies the use of reason so they from she withholds the opportunity of bringing it to political exercise for want of bodily integrity may be comprehended by her in the actings of others in those things that appertain to the whole community they are of 2. For the voluntarily absent if some yea many that may and should concur will not come this must not prevent the whole or the priviledge of others but rather by their default they put off their right as to the present act and invest it in the rest * Vide Grot. de Jure lib. 2. cap. 5. Sect. 20. We account and justly that a countrey-meeting aâ— which we choose our Parliament men to which the people therein are called though the twentieth part of them that are called do not appear 2. Suppose all present or the absence of those that are not dispensed with how can mary thous nds or some millions of peoplâ— so mâ—et in one place as to communicate their minds to one another and joyntly deliberate and come to a resolution in any thing R. 1. Common-wealths are usually very small at their beginning which is the time of setling their Government for succession 2. When they are come to growth they have another way of acting besides personal presence and cognisance viz. that of meeting and transacting their concernments in and by their Deputies or representees 3. As it is not very convenient so it is not altogether impossible for the collective body I mean those who make a collective assembly to wit grown men and Masters of families and especially so many of them as are disposed to come to meet and treat in an assembly We have divers instances for it in the nation of Israel and among the rest one that was upon occasion of the Levites Concubine mentioned in the history of the book of Judges Cap. 20 21. for the numerousness of and universal accurrence to which assembly let the Text be observed Cap. 20. v. 1 2 12. Cap. 21. v. 5 8. And the people of Rome when come to a very large and populous Common-wealth had their meetings of this nature often in campo Martio 4. And besides the Roman state found out wayes of accommodating the difficulties of so vest an assemblies treating in one by distributing themselves one way into distinct classes and centuries another way into several tribes and giving their votes in those distinct partitions * Vide Tullium de legibus lib. 3. prope finem 3. Object It 's said In case of a Common-wealths want of a supreme Magistracy Idem qui supra pag. 11 12. as when a King dies without heir the power shall not escheat to the whole people but to the supreme heads and fathers of families not as they are the people but quatenus they are Fathers of people over whom they have a Supreme power divolved unto them after the death of their Soveraign Ancestor and if any have a right to choose a King it must be these Fathers by conferring their distinct Fatherly powers upon one man alone Resp It is well he acknowledgeth thus much and we are so far agreed that in case of a Kingdoms destituteness of a head there is an escheature of the power to some and that it is to the heads and Fathers of families so as the right is in them to choose a King only then upon this he thinks good to cast a thin shadow or mist to make it seem as if this were not the same with our tenent as it were to suborne another different way of introducing of Magistracy which in truth hath no reality in it but what is borrowed from and built upon that our position But 1. What means he by that Epithet Supreme added to the heads and fathers of families as if he meant that all heads and families are not interested in that Escheature and election but some only distinguish by that title And if this be his sense I leave him to clear first how he differenceth those he cals Supreme from other heads and Fathers 2. Why he makes such a distinction and limits the said power to some only of the Fathers under that notion of Supreme 2. When he saith The power escheates to the heads and fathers of families I ask what power the power which was before in the King viz. a politicall Supreme Regall power and how escheates or descends it upon them unitedly or conjunctly as copartners and joint heirs of that whole solid power in relation to the Community or body politick This indeed is the power of which the Question is and which wants a lineal heir or subject to bear it upon the supposed death of the King And if that descend upon them it must either be in that manner specified or else so as each person of them is the adequate possessor of the whole and solid power which I suppose will not be said If that then be his meaning lo here a Democracy yielded and set up by him who elsewhere holds there is no ground for any such or any other polarchical forme of Government and that Monarchy is the only warranted form Or In his observations on Aristotles Polit. doth be mean a private Domestical paternall power of each of those heads and Fathers not over the Common-wealth but over their families severally and respectively But for this 1. This is not the power which was in the King and now by his decease without Lineal heir can be said to Escheat or passe from him to any 2. This cannot be
said to come anew to them then but must be acknowledged to have been in them whilest they had their King to remain in them after they have chosen another in his place 3 Where 's he seems as if he would explain how there comes in this sense a supremeness into those persons viz. They have a Supreme Power divolved unto them after the death of their Soveraign Still it remains that he tell us what was above asked viz. what that power is whether Political or Oeconomical and how the power of either of those sorts can accrue De novo to them by such death Indeed that domestical power which was in each of them before in relation to his particular and private family they being left destitute of a Superior or Political head hath another habitude then it had before being become negatively Supreme that is it hath none actually above it but it is the same power still or if we shall say the power of the Pater familias in this vacancy may be put forth unto some acts in relation to the persons in his house which he might not exercise while the Common-wealth had a Magistrate I shall not dispute that but only say though the Oeconomicall power be somewhat larger in actu exercito when unsubordinate to a Political Soveraign then it is being subordinate yet it is within the compasse of Oeconomical still and the same it was in actu signato And that which he cals a Power divolved upon the head of the family by the Soveraigns death is but the drawing forth into act of that which was in him before but was suspended by the politicall relation and subjection That which then can be said to Escheat to the heads of families by such death of their King is a power to dispose of themselves in subjection to another and of their votes for the election of him to be their Soveraign together if you will with a larger compass for the exercise of their paternal power in their families during their want of Magistracy 3. Whereas he saith This power accrues to the heads and fathers of families not as they are the people but quatenus they are Fathers of people 1. They are not Fathers neither is any one of them a Father of a people that is a Common-wealth or body politique but they are Fathers only of their respective families and of the persons therein respectively what power therefore is in them as in that relation can be but Domestical and that which is in every Father 2. What if those persons where no Fathers but were single and unsociate as to such a relation that is what if they were not over any other or if they had no families or children sprung from or belonging to them would not then the said power in the said case Eschear or belong to them If he say no I demand his reason if he say it would then he must say it doth not Escheate to them as they are Fathers of people but as persons and people of that Common-wealth 3. Men that are Fathers of families cannot as such be in a capacity of choosing a King over them they must besides that relation be moreover united and confederate in one Common-wealth or else they cannot put forth that act of election Persons that are either non cives or extraneae civitatis have nothing to do in it Whereby it is very manifest the reason why men have that power of Election of a Magistracy to this or that Common-wealth is not because they are Fathers but because they are Denisons or freemen of that Common-wealth and not comprehended or represented by any Domestical Superior but immediately concerned to act for themselves in the common interests of the people of that Common-wealth 4. Where he saith The Power shall not escheat to the whole people but to the Supreme heads and Fathers of families I say in that it escheats to them who are every one a part in his own family the Supreme head or Father that is having none in this case above him in the Civil State and to such as being without Domestical head are capable of heading a family whom I think he will not exclude it escheates to the whole people for who are the whole people to this effect but they that are Masters of families with them who are Masters of themselves As was before shewed in answer to the second Objection and the latter branch of it and they choosing the whole people choose their Soveraign they being all the people either personally or representatively 5. In that he sayes These Fathers choose a King by conferring their distinct fatherly power upon one This is quite mistaken for 1. They do not put off or part with their Fatherly powers but retain each their own still when they have chosen their King 2. The power which upon their election passeth into the hands of the Elected King is more then all their Fatherly powers laid together that is a Supreme Political Civil or Common-wealth power which is a power of a higher Sphere and differs not only in measure but toto genere or in kinde from that of the Fathers and unto which the paternall still continuing in the Masters of families is subordinate 6. Lastly As this Author cannot exempt these his words if they must bear any sound sense from a confession of that which he contends against both in this Treatise against Mr. Hunton and in his other of Observations upon Aristotles Politicks viz. the rise of Government from the peoples consent so can he not excuse himself think from down right self-contradiction in some other particulars As 1. How will his arguing against the peoples capacity to choose their Soveraign by this Argument That no man hath power to take away his own life and therefore the people cannot confer this power upon another consist with the right of the Fathers of families to choose their King whereas the power to take away their lives is a part of the power to which they choose him 2. How will this Escheature of the power to the heads of families and their right thereby to choose their King stand with what he saith presently after viz. That all Kings are either Fathers of the people or heirs of such Fathers or usurpers of the right of such Fathers And that when the true heir of a crown is dispossessed by a usurper the subjects obedience of the Fatherly power must go along and wait upon Gods Providence who only hath right to give and take away Kingdoms and thereby to adopt subjects to the obedience of another fatherly power For if the power in defect of a right heir escheat to the Fathers of families then it passeth not to an usurper and if those have a right to choose their King he that is chosen by them hath the right to be their King and not the Usurper neither can the subjects be adopted to the obedience of another fatherly power supposed to be in him
Cap. 1. Lect. 4. p. 111. and Lect. 3. pag. 65. Vindication of Treatise of Monarchy Cap. 3. Sect. 6. 3 That the Sword is peculiar to a Magistrate lawfully called Becanus Instit Theol. loc 49. qu. 16. pag. 854. 4 That to the being of a Magistrate is required a lawfull call See those quoted before in this Treatise Cap. 1. Sect. 2. Subsect 3. 5 That to the making of a supream Magistrate is to go to the vote or consent of the people Take those cited Cap. 5. Sect. 4 Subsect 4. To which I will here put in Mr. John Goodwin as swaying much with some In his Obstruct of Justice Sect. 25. pag. 27. SECT VII CHAP. X. SECT VII Many examples given of persons of good account who have disowned or opposed meer possessory powers in such Recognitions or rights as are due to the powers that are ordained of God 7 IN the next place is asked But can any instances be given of any of the people of God or of such persons whose examples are of any commendable or imitable note who at any time have professedly detrected or denyed to those in actuall dominion any duty or acknowledgement due unto Magistrates or that have practised the contrary to what this or any other Text confessedly delivers to be observed in relation to those who are here entitled to be the powers ordained of God Answ A multitude doubtlesse of such examples there have been as may be evident by the no small number of remarkable instances of this kinde which my short observation and memory hath here recollected 1. Of such as have practised the contrary to what is a plain and confessed duty or rule to be observed towards those who are the powers ordained of God 1 And first examples of such as being under the present predominancy of meer possessory powers and being private persons have either deserted such and gone over to their opposites or remaining under them have acted or assisted against them We finde a large list of Câ—ptains and their men of severall Tribes of Israel who being actually seated under the Dominion of the house of Saul fell from it and turned to David both during the Reign of Ishbosheth and upon his death although there were then many heires left of Sauls line See for this 1 Chron. 12.22 unto v. 39. We read of Hushai the Archite of Zadok and Abiathar the Priests and of their two sons Ahimaaz and Jonathan who after Davids flight out of Jerusalem and the maine of the Kingdome both in respect of places and people seised by Absalom and themselves being fully under the territory and command of Absalom yet acted for David in his state of ejâ—ction and against Absalom 2 Sam. 15.32 to the end 16.16 17 18 19.17.6 to the 23. vers When the men of Israel in distinction from Judah generally had cast off David and followed Sheba the son of Bichri upon that variance which fell out betwixt the Judabites and the Israelites about Davids return to his Kingdom and in his way betwixt Jordan and Jerusalem the wise woman of Abel and after the people in that City by her perswasion though they were of those that had deserted David and set up Sheba and though he then had the supream command there consulted and executed a rendition of themselves and City to David and the destruction of Sheba upon Joabs pacificatory offer to them 2 Sam. 20.1 2.14 16 c. Upon Jeroboams usurpation and the ten Tribes revolt from the Kingdome of the house of David the Priests and Levites that were in all Israel and other people out of all the Tribes of Israel which adhered to the true God and his worship upheld in the Kingdome of Judah forsook Jeroboam and his Dominions and joyned themselves to Rehoboam and so strengthened the Kingdome of Judah and Râ—hoboam in it 2 Chr. 11.13 16 17. In like mâ—nner did multitudes out of Israel fall from Baasha King of Israel unto Asa King of Judah Although Baasha was an enemy to the Kingdome of Judah and to that their revolt and endeavoured by force to prevent it 2 Chron. 15.9 1 King 15.17 To this I shall add that the Prophet Jeremiah exhorts the people of Judah from God to relinquish Zedekiah the present supream Gâ—vernor over them and to yeeld up themselves to Nebuchadnezzar King of Babylon Jer. 27.16 c. 21.8 9. And the ground of that appears to be 1. Zedekiah and his Kingdome had lately beene subject and tributary to the Babylonian Ezek. 27. â— to 16. and Zedekiah's and their present standing up against him by their own force of Armes and the assistance of the Aegyptian was but rebellion Ezâ—k 17.6 2 Kings 24.28 2 The Lord had given unto the Babylonian the command of that Territory and people for 70 years by his express order and declaration Jer. 27.12.28.14 16. And the said seventy yeares were ere this that is in the fourth yeare of Jehoiakim begun according to the computation of our best Chronologers * To wit Archbishop Usher Dr. John Reynolds Hugh Broughton Mr. Mede The Divines Annot. and Mr. Light who all of them begin the 70. years the 4. of Jehoiakim And unto these exhortations it 's probable some hearkned and those might be they who fell to the Chaldeans mentioned Jer. 38.19 To these Scripture-instances I shall adjoyne one or two observable ones out of other Histories Ambrose being Bishop of Millain in Italy at what time Maximus the Tyrant of whom before †Chap. 8. sect 4 had deprived Valentinian of possession of his Empire of the West he contested with Maximus about his said act and that very sharply and twice went Ambassadour to him unto Triers and pleaded the right of young Valentinian in that Empire against him the present possessor And when he could not so prevaile he discommunioned Maximus to his owne mighty perill for Maximus threatned him with death Upon which he was forced to to flie to Aquileia whence he returned not untill the said Maximus was repressed and slain by Theodosius * Proximum ei sc Ambrosio certamen cum Maximo fuit Tyranno apud quem legarum pro Valentiniano juniore quem ex Galliis Maximus expulerat bis egit in Urbe Trovirorum Apud quem cùm acerrimè primum contendisser ne adolescentem cui successionis haereditatis jure deberetur regnuÌ„ impâ—rii justa possessione pelleret deinde communione etiam ei interdixit non sine ingenti sui periculo caedem enim ei Maximus minatus est ob quam Aquileiam Ambros secedere coactus est ex quo loco rediit Mediolanum post cum a Theodosio interfectus Maximus esset Magdebur Câ—nt 4. cap. 10 pag. 1163. It is also observed of the same Ambrose that when that Maximus to ingratiate himselfe by an office so just and good offered to interpose his power in the defence of Ambrose against Justina the Arrian Empresse the mother of Valentinian whom Maximus dispossessed she