to that which seems most to choak the Plaintiffs Title to this Term and that is the resolution in Child and Baylie's Case For it is upon that Judgment it seems all Conveyances must stand or be shaken and our Decrees made Now therefore I will take the liberty to see what that Case is and how far the Opinion of it ought to prevail in our Case 1. If Child and Baylie's Case be no more than as it is reported by Rolls part 2. fol. 129. then it is nothing to the purpose A Devise of a Term to Dorothy for life the remainder to William and if he dies without Issue to Thomas without saying in the life of Thomas and so it is within the common Rule of a Limitation of a Term in Tail with Remainder over which cannot be good But if it be as Justice Jones has reported it fol. 15 then it is as far as it can go an Authority For it is there said to be living Thomas But the Case under favour is not altogether as Mr. Justice Jones hath reported it neither for I have seen a Copy of the Record upon this account and by the way no Book of Law is so ill corrected or so ill printed as that The true Case is as it is reported by Mr. Justice Crook and with Mr. Justice Crooks Report of it doth my Lord Rolls agree Cro. Hil. 15. Jac. 459. in his abridgment Title Devise 612. There it is a Term of 76 Years is devised to Dorothy for life then to William and his Assigns all the rest of the Term provided if William die without Issue then living then to Thomas and this is in effect our present Case I agree it But that which I have to say to this Case is First It must be observed that the Resolution there did go upon several Reasons which are not to be found in this Case 1. One Reason was touched upon by my Lord Chief Baron That William having the Term to him and his Assigns there could be no Remainder over to Thomas of which Words there is no notice taken by Mr. Justice Jones 2. Dorothy the Devisee for life was Executrix and did assent and grant the Lease to William both which Reasons my Lord Rolls doth lay hold upon as material to govern the Case 3. William might have assigned his Interest and then no Remainder could take place for the Term was gone 4. He might have had Issue and that Issue might have assigned and then it had put all out of doubt 5. But the main Reason of all which makes me oppose it ariseth out of the Record and is not taken notice of in either of the Reports of Rolls or Jones or in Rolls Abridgment The Record of that Case goes farther for the Record sayes There was a farther Limitation upon the death of Thomas without Issue to go to the Daughter which was a plain affectation of a perpetuity to multiply Contingencies It farther appears by the Record that the Fathers Will was made the 10 of Eliz. Dorothy the Devisee for life held it to the 24 and then she granted and assigned the Term to William he under that Grant held it till the 31 of Eliz. and then regranted it to his Mother and dyed the Mother held it till the 1 of K. James and then she dyed the Assignees of the Mother held it till 14 Jac. and then and not till then did Thomas the younger Son set up a Title to that Estate and before that time it appears by the Record there had been six several Alienations of the Term to Purchasers for a valuable Consideration and the Term renewed for a valuable Fine paid to the Lord. And do we wonder now that after so long an acquiescence as from 10 Eliz. to 14 Jacob and after such successive Assignments and Transactions that the Judges began to lye hard upon Thomas as to his Interest in Law in the Term especially when the Reasons given in the Reports of the Case were legal Inducements to guide their Judgments of which there are none in our Case But then Secondly At last allowing this Case to be as full and direct an Authority as is possible and as they would wish that rely upon it then I say 1. The Resolution in Child and Balie's Case is a Resolution that never had any Resolution like it before nor since 2. It is a Resolution contradicted by some Resolutions and to shew that that Resolution has been contradicted there is 1. The Case of Cotton and Heath which looks very like a contrary Resolution there is a Term limited to A. for eighteen years the Remainder to B. for life the Remainder to the first Issue of B. for life this Contingent upon a Contingent was allowed to be good because it would wear out in a short time But 2. To come up more fully and closely to it and to shew you that I am bound up by the Resolutions of this Court there was a fuller and flatter Case 21 Car. 2. in July 1669 between Wood and Saunders The Trust of a long Lease is limited and declared thus To the Father for sixty years if he lived so long then to the Mother for sixty years if she lived so long then to John and his Executors if he survived his Father and Mother and if he died in their life-time having Issue then to his Issue but if he dye without Issue living the Father or Mother then the Remainder to Edward in Tail. John did die without Issue in the life-time of the Father and Mother and the question was whether Edward should take this Remainder after their death and it was Resolved by my Lord Keeper Bridgeman being assisted by Judge Twisden and Judge Rainsford that the Remainder to Edward was good for the whole Term had vested in John if he had survived Yet the Contingency never hapning and so wearing out in the compass of two Lives in being the Remainder over to Edward might well be limited upon it Thus we see that the same Opinion which Sir Orlando Bridgeman held when he was a Practizer and drew these Conveyances upon which the question now ariseth remained with him when he was the Judge in this Court and kept the Seals and by the way I think it is due to the Memory of so great a Man whenever we speak of him to mention him with great Reverence and Veneration for his Learning and Integrity Object They will perhaps say Where will you stop if not at Child and Balie's Case Ans Where why every where where there is any Inconvenience any danger of a perpetuity and where-ever you stop at the limitation of a Fee upon a Fee there we will stop in the limitation of a Term of years No man ever yet said a Devise to a man and his Heirs and if he die without Issue living B. then to B. is a naughty Remainder that is Pells and Browns Case Now the Ultimum quod sit or the utmost limitation of
a Life viz. the Honour of A. descend to H. H. which must be to him in his lifetime or not at all To which I answer that though a Contingency be remote in it self and not likely to happen within a Life the time within which it ought to happen or not at all doth not alter the case and therefore in Child and Bayly's Case reported in 2d of Coke and by Jones and Palmer the failure of Issue was limited to be within a Life viz. a Term was devised to one and his Assigns and if he die without Issue of his body living at the time of his death then to another this was adjudged no Remainder unto that other and though 't was objected that the Contingency must happen within the compass of life or not at all yet no regard was given to that This Case seems to me in reason to be the same with ours I do observe that no Case can be found whether limitation either by way of Trust or Devise of a Term hath been allowed to take effect upon a failure of Issue or after death of the party to whom the first Estate was limited without Issue And as in Child and Bayly's Case the Judges say as I have often heard them say in other Cases that if Matthew Maning's Case was now to be adjudged it would not be so adjudged and that case is a Term is demised to one for life and after his death to another which is allowed good and that they would not go a step farther so I say in this Case it must go further than Manning's Case or any other Case that adjudged to make it void William Jones The Case is new and without any express President and Serj. M d' s opinion 20 Nov. 1680. therefore not capable of so certain a determination as would be expected in case advice were to be given whether a Purchaser should deal in the buying of a Lease or not Yet though there be no President in point yet such-like Cases have been determined as guide my Judgement and Opinion to be scilicet that as this Case is circumstantiated Charles hath not nor can have a right to the Trust of the Term the Reasons and ground of my Opinion is as followeth First The Trust of the term for years in gross and separate from an Inheritance cannot be intailed in Possession or Remainder but yet where there is a Term for years in being if the Inheritance of the Land be intailed with Remainders over there the Term may be limited to wait upon the Inheritance according to the several Intails and such limitation is good so long as nothing intervenes to interrupt or disturb it But I conceive is not capable of such Priviledges of Intail as Inheritance is for the Intail is confirmed by the Statute of Westm 2d de bonis but the attendance of the Term upon the Inheritance intailed is not within the Statute de bonis c. but is a Creature of the Chancery and in several Cases may be destroyed and barred though no Fine and Recovery or other bar be made of the Inheritance I conceive such case if the Tenant intail Alien without Fine or Recovery for valuable Consideration the Issue Intail shall avoid the Inheritance the Chancery shall never help him to avoid the Lease In this particular Case it is clear that neither Charles nor any in Remainder can recover this Term at Law but onely by suit in Chancery and in Chancery shall never recover where the limitation of such a Term in being is not supportable in Common Law which in this Case it is not as I conceive for take the Case without the Contingency that Henry was Tenant Intail Remainder to Charles Intail c. the Recovery suffered by H. would have bar'd Charles and the rest of the term as well as of the Inheritance But the sole Objection here is that the trust of the term to Henry is expressed that it shall determine quo ad Henry and his Issue in case Tho. Duke of Norfolk dye without Issue living Charles as in this case he did The strength of this Objection lies in this First That the Cessor of the Trust is to be upon the death of a Stranger without Issue scil on Tho. Duke of Norfolk on whom the Lands were not Intailed And secondly The term is not to cease but upon the death of Tho. Duke of Norfolk without Issue in the life of Henry As to the first it will make no difference in Reason and in the pollity of the Law where the Cessor is limited on the death of a Stranger without Issue or of the Tenant Intail without heir of his body For first In both Cases the possibility is remote and not regarded in Law where a term is so limited and so were the resolutions in Childs and Bayly's Case and divers others This would be a way to set up a perpetuity as strongly as that it was limited upon the death of the Tenant in tail without Issue Put the case there be Father and several Sons A. B. and C. and the Father is seized in Fee of the reversion of Lands after a Lease of 200 years he settles the Inheritance upon his eldest Son in tail with Remainders in tail to his other Sons and this Lease being in Trustees for him at the same time causes the Lease to be setled in Trustees in Trust for the Sons to wait on the Inheritance in Trust accordingly provided that the second Son dye without Issue in the life of the Father or Son the Trust of the eldest Son to cease I conceive this would not be maintained in Equity if the second Son should not alien by Fine and Recovery As to the Second Objection that the Cessor is on the Death Mic. 17. Jac. R. B. of Tho. without Issue in the Life of Henry whereby the Contingency is reduced to happen in the Life of one person viz. Henry and not at large viz. of the death of Tho. without Issue I conceive no difference made thereby and it is in effect the point adjudged in Child and Bayly's Case which was thus French a Termer for 76 years demises to his Wife for Life Remainder of the Term to W. his Son and his Assigns Provisee That if his Son W. dyed without Issue of his body then living That T. his Son should have the Term or Interest Adjudged then in B. R. which was three years after affirmed Mic. 20. Jac. in the Exchequer Chamber by Hobart Winch Denham Hutton and Jones that the Demise to Tho. was void In that Case the Contingency did expect during the life of W. onely as here it is on the life of H. and the Reasons of their Judgments both in the Kings Bench and Exchequer-Chamber in effect of all the Judges of England at that time was because it might tend to make a perpetuity and that this new-invented way of Intailing of Terms in no sort to be favoured in Law. In Child's
discerned there was the same reason for after twenty mens lives as after one and so then it was held and agreed that so long as the Limitation exceeded not Lives in being at the creation of the Estate it should extend so far That came to grow upon them then and now if this be admitted no man can foresee what an ill Effect such an ill Allowance might have there might such Limitations come in as would incumber Estates and mightily entangle Lands This is certain such an allowed Limitation would adde a greater check to Estates than ever was made by Limitations of Inheritance For when an Estate of Inheritance was limited to a man and his Heirs Males of his body with Remainders over and a Term was limited accordingly to wait upon the Inheritance In that Case he that had the first Estate-tail had full power over the Term to alienate it if he pleased for it is not an Estate within the Statute De Dominis and I doubt not that had a great Influence upon the Judges when they made the difference between Terms for years in Gross and Terms attendant upon the Inheritance For Terms in Gross they could not be aliened in such a Case but Terms attending upon the Inheritance though under such Limitations the parties could alien them But now if this Limitation in question were good then Henry could not part with it because it is to him and his Heirs Males of his body under a collateral Limitation of his brothers dying without Issue and the Earldom descending to himself and then his Estate was to determine and so it would fetter that which if it had been a Term attendant c. would have been alienable I have seen the time often when they have refused to carry Cases further than the Precedents have been in former times and peradventure it would be dangerous if we should do so here and it seems to me to be an odd kind of Estate as this Limitation makes it and if such a construction as the Plaintiff would have should be made it would bring it under a great uncertainty To take this Estate as it stands in Henry and the Heirs Males of his body it is by this Limitation made and so indeed I think it is a Term that waits upon the Inheritance But if this that is contended for be admitted to be a good Limitation upon the Contingency of Thomas's dying without Issue Male then the Estate in Charles would be a Term in Gross for it hath no Inheritance to attend upon Then suppose Henry had died without Issue Male in Charles's life-time then it is a Term attendant upon the Inheritance again If Charles die in the life of Henry it goeth to the Executors If Henry in the life of Charles it goes to the Heirs Therefore I think that this Estate being limited in another way and being it would endure a strain further than any yet has been attempted and it being to commence upon Thomas's dying without Issue Male and not attendant upon any Inheritance it is such an Estate as the Law cannot allow of but void in Limitation and Creation and so I take it the Plaintiffs Bill ought to be dismissed THE Lord Chancellor NOTTINGHAM'S ARGUMENTS The First Argument THIS is the Case The Plaintiff by his Bill demands the benefit of a Term for two hundred Years in the Barony of Greystocke upon these settlements Henry Fredericke late Earl of Arundel and Surry Father of the Plaintiff and Defendant had Issue Thomas Henry Charles Edward Francis and Bernard and a Daughter the Lady Katharine Thomas Lord Maltravers his eldest Son was Non compos Mentis and care is taken to settle the Estate and Family as well as the present circumstances will admit And thereupon there are two Indentures drawn and they are both of the same date The one is an Indenture between the Earl of Arundel of the one part and the Duke of Richmond the Marquess of Dorchester Edward Lord Howard of Eastcricke and Sir Thomas Hatton of the other part it bears date the Twenty first day of March 1647. Whereby an Estate is conveyed to them and their Heirs To these uses To the use of the Earl for his life After that to the Countess his Wife for her life with power to make a Lease for 21. Years reserving the antient Rents The remainder for 200. Years to those Trustees and that upon such trusts as by another Indenture intended to bear date the same day the Earl should limit and declare and then the remainder of the Lands are to the use of Henry and the Heirs Males of his Body begotten with like remainders in Tail to Charles Edward and the other Brothers successively Then comes the other Indenture which was to declare the Trust of the Term for 200 Years for which all these preparations are made and that declares that it was intended this Term should attend the Inheritance and that the profits of the said Barony c. should be received by the said Henry Howard and the Heirs Males of his Body so long as Thomas and any Issue Male of his Body should live which was consequently only during his own life because he was never likely to Marry and if he dye without Issue in the life-time of Henry not leaving a Wife privement Enseint of a Son or if after his death the Dignity of Earl of Arundel should descend upon Henry Then Henry or his Issue should have no farther benefit or profit of the Term of 200 Years Who then shall But the benefit shall redound to the younger Brothers in manner following How is that To Charles and the Heirs Males of his Body with the like Remainders in Tail to the rest Thus is the matter settled by these Indentures how this Family was to be provided for and the whole Estate govern'd for the time to come These Indentures are both sealed and delivered in the presence of Sir Orlando Bridgman Mr. Edward Alehorn and Mr. John Alehorn both of them my Lord Keeper Bridgman's Clerks I knew them to be so This Attestation of these Deeds is a Demonstration to me they were drawn by Sir Orlando Bridgman After this the Contingency does happen for Thomas Duke of Norfolk dies without Issue and the Earldom of Arundel as well as the Dukedom of Norfolk descended to Henry now Duke of Norfolk by Thomas his death without Issue presently upon this the Marquess of Dorchester the surviving Trustee of this Estate assigns his Estate to Marryot but he doth it upon the same Trusts that he had it himself Mr. Marryot assigns his interest frankly to my Lord Henry the now Duke and so has done what he can to merge and extinguish the Term by the signing it to him who has the Inheritance To excuse the Marquess of Dorchester from cooperating in this matter it is said there was an absolute necessity so to do Because the Tenants in the North would not be brought to renew their Estates while so Aged a
person did continue in the Seigniory for fear if he should dye quickly they should be compelled to pay a new Fine But nothing in the World can excuse Marryot from being guilty of a most wilful and palpable Breach of Trust if Charles have any Right to this Term so that the whole contention in the Case is to make the Estate limited to Charles void void in the Original Creation if not so void by the common Recovery suffered by the now Duke and the Assignment of Marryot If the Estate be Originally void which is limited to Charles there is no harm done but if it only be avoided by the Assignment of Marryot with the concurrence of the Duke of Norfolk he having notice of the Trusts then most certainly they must make it good to Charles in Equity for a palpable Breach of Trust of which they had notice So that the question is reduced to this main single point Whether all this care that was taken to settle this Estate and Family be void and insignificant and all this provision made for Charles and the Younger Children to have no Effect I am in a very great strait in this Case I am assisted by as good advice as I know how to repose my self upon and I have the fairest opportunity if I concur with them and so should mistake to excuse my self that I did errare cum patribus but I dare not at any time deliver any Opinion in this place without I concur with my self and my Conscience too I desire to be heard in this Case with great benignity and with great excuse for what I say for I take this question to be of so universal a Concernment to all Mens Rites and Properties in point of disposing of their Estates as to most conveyances made and settled in the late times and yet on foot that being afraid I might shake more settlements than I am willing to do I am not disposed to keep so closely and strictly to the Rules of Law as the Judges of the Common-Law do as not to look to the Reasons and Consequences that may follow upon the determination of this Case I cannot say in this Case that this Limitation is void and because this is a point that in Courts of Equity which are not favoured by the Judgments of the Courts of Law is seldom debated with any great Industry at the Bar but where they are possessed once of the Cause they press for a Decree according to the usual and known Rules of Law and think we are not to examine things And because it is probable this Cause be it adjudged one way or other may come into the Parliament I will take a little pains to open the Case the Consequences that depend upon it and the Reasons that lye upon me as thus perswaded to suspend my Opinion Whether this Limitation to Charles be void or no is the Question Now first these things are plain and clear and by taking notice of what is plain and clear we shall come to see what is doubtful 1. That the Term in Question tho' it were attendant upon the Inheritance at first yet upon the hapning of the Contingency it is become a Term in gross to Charles 2. That the Trust of a Term in gross can be limited no otherwise in Equity than the Estate of a Term in gross can be limited in Law for I am not setting up a Rule of Property in Chancery other than that which is the Rule of Property at Law. 3. It is clear That the legal Estate of a Term for Years whether it be a long or a short Term cannot be limited to any Man in Tail with the remainder over to another after his death without Issue That is flat and plain for that is a direct perpetuity 4. If a Term be limited to a Man and his Issue and if that Issue dye without Issue the remainder over the Issue of that Issue takes no Estate and yet because the remainder over cannot take place till the Issue of that Issue fail that remainder is void too which was Reeves Case and the reason is because that looks towards a perpetuity 5. If a Term be limited to a Man for life and after to his first second third c. and other Sons in Tail successively and for default of such Issue the remainder over tho' the contingency never happen yet that Remainder is void tho' there were never a Son then born to him for that looks like a perpetuity and this was Sir William Backhurst his Case in the 16. of Modern Reports 115. this King. 6. Yet one step further than this and that is Burgis's Case A Term is limited to one for life with contingent Remainders Modern Reports 115. to his Sons in Tail with remainder over to his Daughter tho' he had no Son yet because it was foreign and distant to expect a Remainder after the Death of a Son to be born without Issue that having a prospect of a perpetuity also was adjudged to be void These things having been settled and by these Rules has this Court always governed it self But one step more there is in this Case 7. If a Term be devised or the Trust of a Term limited to one for Life with twenty Remainders for Life successively and all the persons in esse and alive at the time of the Limitation of their Estates these tho' they look like a possibility upon a possibility are all good because they produce no inconvenience they were out in a little time with an easie interpretation and so was Alford's Case I will yet go farther 8. In the Case cited by Mr. Holt Cotton and Heath's Case a Roll. abr tit devise 612. Term is devised to one for 18. Years after to C. his eldest Son for Life and then to the eldest Issue Male of C. for Life tho' C. had not any Issue Male at the time of the Devise or death of the Devisor but before the death of C. it was resolved by Mr. Justice Jones Mr. Justice Crook and Mr. Justice Berkley to whom it was referred by the Lord Keeper Coventry that it only being a contingency upon a Life that would be speedily worn out it was very good for that there may be a possibility upon a possibility and that there may be a contingency upon a contingency is neither unnatural nor absurd in it self but the contrary Rule given as a Reason by my Lord Popham in the Rector of Chedington's Case looks like a Reason Co. 1. 156. of Art but in truth has no kind of Reason in it and I have known that Rule often denied in Westminster-Hall In truth every Executory Devise is so and you will find that Rule not to be allowed in Blanford and Blanford's Case 13. Jac. 1. part of my Lord Rolls 318. where he says If that Rule take place it will shake several common Assurances And he cites Paramour's and Yardley's Case in the Commentaries where it was
THE Duke of Norfolk's CASE OR THE DOCTRINE OF PERPETUITIES Fully set forth and Explain'd Printed Anno Dom 1688. TO THE READER Courteous Reader THis Case in all its parts hath been Collected with all the Care imaginable by several good Hands and what grand agitation it received is not unknown to any that know Westminster-Hall It may be recommended to the World for Publick use upon that score alone For what can be more reasonably thought to please and take with Men of Judgment in any Profession than to peruse the Skill and Arts that have been curiously and with as great integrity made use of by men of the most Famous Reputation in what they profess Besides too if thou dost but consider the great Deliberations and the mighty Cautions that have been always used by all Persons concern'd in the Conduct Debate and Judgment of this Cause till after many Debates and Hearings at the Bar it came to receive its final Judgment in the highest Court of the Kingdom before the Lords in Parliament assisted by all the Judges of England Thou wilt certainly conclude That no unkind acceptance ought to demur upon this Case Here is variety of Learning manifest in the sundry Conceptions of Great and Learned Men but the Nicety lies chiefly upon the Doctrine and Explication of that abstruse Notion in Law called Perpetuities concerning which the Sage Opinions introductive to this Case of the great Council will better instruct thee that were prudently taken by both Parties before the Cause commenc'd and undoubtedly serve and answer the True Ends of a Preface infinitely beyond what thou canst expect from me Their Opinions in Private are always delivered with as much Candour and Caution as their Arguments at the Bar. And the one may be truly said to be of as great use to the Publick when their Opinions can be had if the Cause be Meritorious and will bear it as the other Reader it will be wholly impertinent to hold thee here and I should run my self upon an absolute necessity if I should detain thee longer from the fruition of those delicacies I present thee of troubling thee with my impertinent Complements for presenting thee with a needless and impertinent Epistle Wherefore enter in see it thy self and peruse it for thy profit and satisfaction Farewell THE Duke of Norfolk's CASE A. Bargains and Sells to L. the Barronies of Gr. and 20 Martii 1647. Br. for 10 Months A. Grants the Reversion of those Baronies to 21 Martii 1647. R. and D. and their Heirs to the use of A. for life Remainder to E. the Wife of A. for life Remainder to R. and D. c. for 200 years upon trusts to be declared by another Deed of the same date Remainder to H. H. his second Son and the Heirs Males of his body Remainder to C. H. his third Son and the Heirs Males of his body Remainder to E. H. his fifth Son and the Heirs Males of his body Remainder to A. H. his sixth Son and the Heirs Males of his body Remainder to B. H. and the Heirs Males of his body Remainder to the right Heirs of A. L. Attornes Tenant to R. and D. c. A. makes another Deed declaring the Trust of the Term 21 Martii 1647. for 200 years reciting it and the uses in the last-mentioned Settlement says in the reciting part That 't is intended that the Term should attend the Inheritance the Profits be received by H. H. and the Heirs Males of his body and for default of such Issue such other persons who according to the limitation of Uses should have had them if no such term had been so long as T. H. Eldest son of A. or any Issue Male of his body shall live But in case T. H. die without Issue of his body in the life of H. H. not leaving his Wife ensient with a Son or that after the death of E. H. by failure of Issue Male of T. H. the honour of A. should descend on H. H. then H. H. and his Heirs to be excluded of the Trust then the Indenture witnesseth that the Term shall be upon the Trusts and under the restrained Limitations and Proviso's after-mentioned viz. If T. H. or any Issue Male of his body be living in trust for H. H. and the Heirs Males of his body until by the death of T. H. without Issue Male and not leaving his Wife ensient with a Son or after his death by failure of Issue Male the honour of A. descends to H. H. and in case the Honour shall not descend to H. H. that after the death of H. H. the Trust shall be for the Heirs Males of H. H. and for default of such Issue in trust to permit such other persons and their Issue Male respectively to whom the Free-hold or Inheritance is limited by the former Deeds to take the profits as if no such Lease were And in case the Honour of A. descend upon H. H. then the Trust for H. H. and his Issue Male to cease And then as to the Barony of Gr. in trust for T. H. and the Heirs Males of his body Remainder to T. H. and the Heirs Males of his body Remainder to F. H. and the Heirs Males of his body Remainder to B. H. and the Heirs Males of his body Remainder to H. H. and the Heirs Males of his body Remainder to the right Heirs of A. the Father And as to the Barony of Br. as to one third part of it in trust for E. H. and the Heirs Males of his body Remainder to F. H. and the Heirs Males of his body Remainder to B. H. and the Heirs Males of his body Remainder to T. H. and the Heirs Males of his body Remainder to H. H. and the Heirs Males of his body Remainder to the right Heirs of A. And as to another third part of the Barony in trust for F. H. and the Heirs Males of his body with like Remainders to the other Brothers ut supra Remainders to the right Heirs of A. And as to the other third part in trust for B. H. and the Heirs Males of his body with the like Remainders to the rest of the Brothers ut supra A. died in 1652. E. the Wife of A. died in 1673. and then the term of 200 years commenced D. the surviving Trustee at the request of H. H. assigned 20 Novemb. 1675. the term to one Marriot Marriot assigned the term to H. H. 1 Dec. 1675 H. H. by Bargain and Sale enrolled sells to M. to make him 24 Octob. 1675. Tenant to the Precipe for suffering a Recovery The use of the Recovery declared to be to H. H. and his 25 Octob. 1675. Heirs T. H. the eldest Son of A. died without Issue or having ever Nov. 1677. been married Query If the Trust to H. H. be good and the other Trusts limited to the other Brothers on the Contingent in case T. H. died whereby
Case 't was limited if William had no Issue at the time of his decease in this Case if Tho. had no Issue at the time of Henry's death Put case it had been limited that Tho. had dyed without Issue in thirty or forty or any number of years or if it had been limited that Tho. had dyed without Issue in the Life of Henry and five or six more persons it might have been so limited as well as to one Life and the Law is the same It is more Contingent when the Cessor is limited to be upon the death of Tho. without Issue in the life of Henry then it had been if Tho. had dyed without Issue generally for he may dye without Issue though he dye not without Issue in the life of Henry First the sum of this is if such limitation of a Term as this is be not good at Law the Trust of a Term cannot be good in Chancery Secondly the general scope of the Settlement of the Term was that the Term shall wait on the Inheritance Intail which now cannot be because it is altered Again if the Law should be otherwise that Charles have the whole Term then those in Remainder shall be utterly defeated of it and shall not go to Charles his Son and Heir but to the Executors which was never intended by the Deed. M d. I conceive that notwithstanding the late Judgments in Opinions and Considerations for the younger Brothers Sir J. C Chancery have been that if a Term of years be limited by way of Trust or otherwise to any person and his Heirs Males with Remainders over or other limitations to any other persons those Remainders and Limitations are void and the whole Term shall be to that person and his Executors and Administrators to whom it was first limited in Tail yet this Case is different from all those Cases by reason this was onely a Temporary Provision as to Mr. Henry Howard until that Contingent of the death of the Duke of Norfolk should happen and then absolutely to cease as to Mr. Henry Howard And then the Trust of the Term is declared to be for the preferment of the younger Sons as is above expressed and albeit that Marriot hath in plain breach of Trust by his Assignment enabled the now Duke to destroy the Term in point of Law yet the Chancery may subject the Lands during the Remainder of the term to the Trustees for the younger Children as agreeable to the intention of the Deed of Trust and to all Honesty and Equity and that Equity I take is in no sort bar'd by the Fine if a Bill be exhibied in time J. C. 8 Jan. 1677. I concur with this Opinion because it is no absolute Trust Sir R. S. not so much as for the life of Henry but a limited Trust upon a Contingent which as in its Creation it might so in Fact it did happen in the life-time of Henry and consequently there is no room for any Construction to be made that the Trust of the whole term vested in Henry against the express limitation thereof R. S. I conceive first that if by Act executed my Lord of Arundel Mr. Offley had created this term to my Lord Dorchester and the rest of the Trustees in trust for Henry Howard in tail and after his death to the Brothers in tail that had been a perpetuity and not good for a term though as to that there is a difference taken in Tatten and Mollenex Case More 809 810. in Chancery by the Lord Chancellour and the Judges assistant which seems to be reasonable that the first party that is the Cestique Trust against his Issue may dispose of it but not against him in Remainder for Equity preserves it as to the Remainder so then if it had been to Henry Howard and the Issues of his body the Remainders to the Brothers Though Henry Howard could as to his Issue dispose of it yet as to his Brothers it stood good if that Resolution holds good and the Books says it was grounded upon presidents in that Court too But this case differs where the course of Equity is against it therefore first there is onely by this Conveyance a reception of the profits in Henry Howard and the Issue Male of his body until the Dignity of Arundel come to him And it is not in trust for him and his Issue Male so as he has not the entire trust in him as the other Sons have by the penning of the Deed. Secondly 't is not absolutely in trust in him and his Issue Male but temporary in them upon the falling of the Dignity of Arundel sooner or later and he is not a Cestique trust within any of the Statutes proceeding in the Statute of Uses but has but a limited pursuance of the profits but the trust vests compleatly in the Brothers after Thirdly then the Marquess of Dorchester assigns the term to Marriot and he assigning to H. H. whereby he has in strictness of Law extinguished it whereby there is a wrong and deceit done to the Brothers he is bound in equity and good Conscience to make them recompence and satisfaction for this wrong and it appearing that H. H. was privy to this with a design to extinguish it and that extinguishment turning to his advantage he is likewise compellable in Equity to answer it out of his Estate either by creating a new Term in this Land or by some other way according to the Resolution of the Judges in my Lord of Ormon's Case Hubbard 350. I have seen the Opinions of Mr. Attorney-General Serj. Sir W. Ellis Maynard and Serj. Pemberton whose Opinions I do much value and have great esteem for Mr. Attorney saith that the Term to H. H. and the Heirs of his body under other limitations than the Inheritance was the whole Term vested in H. H. and the Limitations thereof to the other Brothers are void I conceive the whole trust of the Term is not limited to H. H. but part of the Trust so long as Thomas the deceased Duke shall have Heirs Males of his body and until the Earldom comes unto him so as the Trust is but a qualified and limited Trust in H. H. so as this Trust to H. is now ended by way of limitation to H. H. and then there is a new Trust springs and arises to the younger Brothers not by way of Remainder of a term but the Trust to H. H. being ended and determined I conceive a new one may well arise and spring up to the younger Children admitting it were a trust of a term in Gross it is not a Remainder but a future Contingent grant and a limitation to them as it is in Pell and Browns Case Secondly If it be to attend the Inheritance then he conceives clearly the Recovery having barred all Remainders the Term and the trust of the Term is also barred If this Trust had been to wait upon all the Estate as they came
upon the death of the party to whom the term was so given it shall go to his Executors as a Chattle and not to his Heirs Male. 2. I do conceive it will not be denied by any that if there be a long term for years for a 1000 years more or less in trust and a man purchases or settles the Inheritance to the use of himself for life the Remainder in Tail the Remainder in Fee and declare that the trusts of the term shall wait upon those Estates and fall in with them But that this trust of the term shall go along with all the Estate and shall not be merged in any of them and this trust shall not go to an Executor but shall go along with the Estate and if the tenant in tail dye without Issue it shall go along with the next Remainder man in tail and after his death without Issue it shall go to him in Fee simple and attend all the Estates in Remainders be they never so many And this I conceive is the common course in Chancery to incorporate such trusts to go with all the Estates This is not an absolute Trust for Henry and the Heirs Male of his body but a limited and qualified Trust as long as Duke Thomas's elder Brother lived and hath Heirs Males of his body and until the Earldom of A. doth come unto him so as by the death of Duke Thomas without Issue the Trust to Henry which was but a limited Trust is now determined and vanquished as to Henry As this was a contingent trust in Henry but in Case Tho. was alive and had issue when the term was to begin so the continuance and duration of the trust of the term was but to last until the Earldom came unto him and it is the stronger for that this trust ends in Henry by way of Limitation Query How long shall Henry and his Issue have this Trust Answ Until Thomas die without Issue Male and the Earldom of A. come unto him both which hath happened so as the trust for Henry and his Issue is ended by way of limitation and is now disposed over to others as it may well be so as this is a new Trust that by a contingent subsequent Declaration takes away the Trust from Henry and settles a new Trust in the younger Children and it is to be considered that Henry is to have the Trust of this term not so long as he shall have Issue but so long as the Lord Maltravers shall have Heirs Male so as that makes it a collateral Limitation or Determination of the said Estate 4. The Equity and Justice of this Trust carries much weight with me and that condition the Lord Maltravers was in It was fit to settle the Trust in Henry so long as the Lord Maltravers had Heirs Male of his body and if they failed and that the Earldom of A. and great accession of Estate to come to Henry it was a great reason that the younger Children should be provided for and taken notice of And it will not be easie to blow off and overthrow a Trust in a Court of Equity contrary to the express mind and intention of him that made it for the provision of they younger Children especially it being made with so much Justice and Reason wherein he hath both a respect for his Honours Family and younger Children Obj. There is no Objection against all I have said which seems prima facie to carry weight with it and that is when the legal interest is come to Henry and he is Tenant intail in possession and suffers a common Recovery and bars all the Remainders Intail Query How can this trust which is an Accessary follow Estates Answ To which I answer first If the Trust had been to follow and wait upon the Estate this Objection had been the stronger but this trust is not absolutely to wait upon Henry's Estate but so long as Duke Thomas hath Heirs Male of his body and until the Earldom of A. come to him both which are happened he continues still Tenant Intail and yet this Interest is determined in the trusts Secondly this is a future contingent Interest that now is happened to the younger Brothers which cannot be barred and it may be resembled to Pell and Brown's Case 2 Cro. 590 591. A man demiseth his Land to his second Son Thomas and his Heirs and if he die without Issue leaving William his elder Brother then William should have it in Fee it was adjudged that this was a Fee Simple in Thomas the second And though regularly one Fee cannot descend on another yet this being a future contingent Interest that the Devise of the Fee Simple to William his eldest Son. Another great Question was Thomas the second Son suffered a common Recovery whether this did not bar the future contingent possibility of William And it was adjudged it did not Now here is as much a future contingent possibility of a Trust as there was of an Estate and more and therefore there is much reason that the future contingent possibility of a Trust should not be barred by a common Recovery as in that Case And as to that which is said that an Accessary cannot be without a substance and the Estates of the younger Children is to succeed and yet they have no proper Estate for Henry is now Tenant so as this is a personal trust for the younger Children independent of their Estates and if so then clearly this Recovery cannot bar their Estates Another reason why a Court of Equity should help and interpose in this Case may be because the Estate for years was conveyed by Marriot in breach of the Trust which a Court of Equity ought to maintain and support as much as they can First Because Marriot and the now Duke are not Purchasers for a valuable Consideration Secondly They came in with privity and had notice of the Trust And I conceive may and will notwithstanding these Acts make good these Trusts for the younger Children and if this be a new doubtful Case certainly I conceive it is the surest and safest way for a Court of Equity to make good the intention of him that made it and to preserve the Trust for the younger Children William Ellis 26 Feb. 1677. De Termino S. Hill. Anno Reg. Car. 2d Regis XXXIII XXXIV Anno Dom. 1681. Martis 24 die Jan. in Curia Cancellarii Howard versus Le Duc de Norfolk al. THis day being appointed for Judgement in this Cause the three Judges assisted the Lord Chancellor at the hearing viz. the Lord Chief Justice Pemberton the Lord Chief Justice North and the Lord Chief Baron Montague came into the Court of Chancery and delivered their Opinions Seriatim beginning with the Lord Chief Baron Montague and so upwards after whom the Lord Chancellor also delivered his Opinion The sum of all the Arguments as near as could be taken were as followeth The Argument of the
Lord Chief Baron Montague Charles Howard is Plaintiff and the Duke of Norfolk and others are Defendants The Plaintiff by his Bill seeks to have Execution of a Trust of a term of 200 years of the Barony of Grastock which was made by Henry Frederick Earl of Arundel and upon the Bill Answers Deeds and other Passages in this Cause contained is this Henry Frederick Earl of Arundel by Lease and Release of the 20th and 21th of March 1647. did settle the Barony of Grastock and of Burgh and several other Lands to himself for Life then to the Countess Elizabeth his Wife for life and then there is a term created for 99 years which we need not mention in this Case because it is determined and after the death of the Countess there is a term for years limited to my Lord of Dorchester and other Trustees for 200 years under a Trust to be declared in a Deed of the same date with the Release and the limitation of the Inheritance after this term of 200 years is first to Henry Howard now Duke of Norfolk and the Heirs Males of his Body then to Mr. Charles Howard the now Plaintiff Brother of the said Henry and so to all his Brothers successively intail Male with the last Remainder to the Earl of and his Heirs then by a Deed 21 of March 1647 the Earl declares the Trust of the term of 200 years reciting first the uses of the former Deed and therein says it was intended that the said term should attend the Inheritance and the Profits of the Barony of should be received for 200 years by Henry Howard now Duke of Norfolk and the Heirs Males of his body so long as Lord Thomas eldest son of the said Earl of Arundel or any Issue Male of his body should be living but in case he should die without Issue Male in the life of Henry Howard not leaving his Wife ensient with a Son or in case after the death of Thomas without Issue Male the Honour of the Earldom of Arundel should descend to Henry Howard then he and his Issues to have no benefit of this term of 200 years but it was to descend to the other Brother Charles Howard the now Plaintiff as hereafter is mentioned and then comes Now this Indenture witnesseth and therein the Earl declares that it should be under the Limitations after specified viz. if Thomas Lord Howard had any Issue Male or Heirs Male of his body living Henry Howard then the Trustees should have the commencement of the term in trust for the said Henry Howard and the Heirs Males of his body till such time as the Earldom should come to Henry Howard by the death of Thomas without Heirs Males of his body and after to the other Brothers successively and the Heirs Males of their bodies and then doth divide the other Mannors with cross Remainders to the five Brothers then the Case goes on thus the Earl of Arundel dies in time in 1652 Elizabeth the Countess dies in 1673 then in 1675 my Lord of Dorchester the surviving Trustee assigns the Term to one Marriot he assigns it to the now Duke of Norfolk and the Duke the 24th of Octob. 1675 by Bargain and Sale makes a Tenant to the Precipe and then a Recovery is suffered and the Uses of that Recovery 25th of October are declared to be to the Duke and his Heirs Then Thomas Howard the former Duke died without Issue having never been married and that is in the year 1677 whereby the Honour came to the now Duke and so the Plaintiffs Bill is to have execution of the Trust of the term of the Barony of to the use of himself and the Heirs Males of his body This I conceive was opposed by the Counsel for the Defendant upon these grounds 1. That by the Assignment made by Marriot to my Lord Duke Henry the Term was surrendred and quite gone 2. The second ground was the common Recovery suffered which they say barred the remainders which the other Brothers had and so also would be a bar to the Trust of this term 3. And the other ground was that the Trust of a term to Henry and the Heirs Males of his body until by the death of Thomas without Issue the Earldom should descend upon him and then to Charles is a void Limitation of the Remainder As to the first that by the assignment of Marriot to Henry Howard the whole Term was surrendred and being so surrendred hath no existance at all that I find but was barely mentioned and I think cannot be stood upon for this the term by the surrender is gone indeed and merged in the Inheritance yet the Trust of that term remains in Equity and if this Trust be destroyed by him that had it assigned to him this Court has full power to set it up again and to decree the term to him to whom it did belong or a recompence for it therefore I think that stands not at all as a point in the Case or as an objection in the way As to the next thing the common recovery now suffered by the now Duke that doth bar the remainders to the other Brothers And so also the trust of this term that I conceive to be so in case this can be interpreted to be a term to attend the Inheritance and indeed in the reciting part the Deed doth seem to say that it was intended to attend the Inheritance But by that part of the Deed which followeth after now this Indenture witnesseth there it is limited that the term should be to Henry Howard and the Heirs Males of his body until such time as the Honour of the Earl of Arundel by his elder Brothers death without Issue should come to him then to the Plaintiff which doth convey the Estate of the term in a different Channel from that in which the Inheritance is setled and taking this Deed altogether it doth limit this term in such various Estates that it can no way be construed to be a term attending the Inheritance and then I conceive the recovery doth not bar the trust for the recovery would bar the incident to any Estate as this would do here if it attended the Inheritance but being onely a term in Gross and a collateral thing I conceive the recovery has no operation to bar the trust in the term Then the Case singly depends upon the third point whether the Trust of a term thus limited to Henry Howard and the Heirs Males of his body until his Brother die without Issue whereby the Honour came to him with such contingent Remainders over be a good Limitation this is the Question and so in short the Case is but thus A Term of Two Hundred years is granted in trust that Henry Howard and the Heirs Males of his body shall receive the Profits until Thomas die without Issue Male of his body and then to Charles Howard and the Heirs Male of his body And in this case I am
where no Remainders can be limited no contingent Remainder can be limited which I utterly deny for there can be no Remainder limited after a Fee simple yet there may a contingent Fee simple arise out of the first Fee as hath been shewn Thus it is agreed to be by all sides in the Case of an Inheritance but now say they a Lease for Years which is a Chattel will not bear a contingent Limitation in regard of the poverty and meanness of a Chattel Estate Now as to this point the difference between a Chattel and an Inheritance is a difference only in Words but not in substance nor in Reason or the Nature of the thing for the owner of a Lease has as absolute a power over his Lease as he that hath an Inheritance has over that And therefore where no perpetuity is introduced nor any inconveniency doth appear there no Rule of Law is broken The Reasons that do support the springing Trust of a Term as well as the springing use of an Inheritance are these 1. Because it hath hapned sometimes and doth frequently that Men have no Estates at all but what consist in Leases for Years Now it were not only very severe but under favour very absurd to say that he who has no other Estate but what consists in Leases for Years shall be incapable to provide for the Contingencies of his own Family tho' these are directly within his view and immediate prospect And yet if that be the Rule so it must be for I will put the Case A Man that hath no other Estate but Leases for Years Chattels real treats for the Marriage of his Son and thereupon it comes to this agreement These Leases shall be setled as a Joynture for the Wife and provision for the Children says he I am content but how shall it be done Why thus You shall assign all these Terms to John a Styles in Trust for your self and your Executors if the marriage take no effect But then if it takes effect to your Son while he lives to his Wife after while she lives with Remainders over I would have any one tell me whether this were a void limitation upon a Marriage settlement or if it be what a strange absurdity is it that a Man shall settle it if the Marriage take no effect and shall not settle it if the Marriage happen 2. Suppose the Estate had been limited to Henry Howard and the Heirs Males of his Body till the death of Thomas without Issue then to Charles there it had been a void limitation to Charles if then the addition of those words If Thomas dye without Issue in the life of Henry c. have not mended the matter then all that addition of Words goes for nothing which it is unreasonable and absurd to think it should 3. Another thing these is which I take to be unanswerable and I gather it from what fell from my Lord Chief Justice Pemberton and when I can answer that Case I shall be able to answer my self very much for that which I am doing Suppose the Provisoe had been thus penned And if Thomas die without Issue Male living Henry so that the Earldom of Arundel descend upon Henry then the Term of 200 Years limited to him and his Issue shall utterly cease and determine but then a new Term of 200 Years shall arise and be limited to the same Trustees for the Benefit of Charles in Tail. This he thinks might have been well enough and attained the end and intention of the Family because then this would not be a Remainder in Tail upon a Tail but a new Term created Pray let us so resolve Cases here that they may stand with the reason of Mankind when they are debated abroad Shall that be reason here that is not reason in any part of the World besides I would fain know the difference why I may not raise a new springing Trust upon the same Term as well as a new springing Term upon the same Trust that is such a chicanery of Law as will be laught at all over the Christian World. 4. Another Reason I go on is this That the meanness of the consideration of a Term for years and of a Chattel Interest is not to be regarded for whereas this will be no reason any where else so I shall shew you that this Reason as to the Remainder of a Chattel Interest is a Reason that has been exploded out of Westminster-Hall There was a time indeed that this Reason did so far prevail that all the Judges in the time of my Lord Chancellor Rich did 6 Edvardi 6 deliver their Opinions That if a Term for Years be devised to one provided Dyer fol. 74. that if the Devisee die living J. S. then to go to J. S. that remainder to J. S. is absolutely void because such a Chattel Interest of a Term for Years is less than a Term for Life and the Law will endure no limitation over Now this being a Reason against Sense and Nature the World was not long governed by it but in 10 Eliz. in Dyer they began to hold Dyer f. 277 the Remainder was good by Devisee and so 15 Eliz. seems too and 19 Eliz. it was by the Judges held to be a good Remainder and that was the first time that an executory Remainder Dyer f. 328 Dyer f. 358. of a Term was held to be good When the Chancery did begin to see that the Judges of the Law did govern themselves by the reason of the thing this Court followed their Opinion the better to fix them in it they allowed of Bills by the remainder Man to compel the Devisee of the particular Estate to put in security that he in Remainder should enjoy it according to the Limitation And for a great while so the practice stood as they thought it might well because of the Resolution of the Judges as we have shewn but after this was seen to multiply the Chancery Suits then they began to resolve that there was no need of that way but the executory Remainder Man should enjoy it and the Devisee of the particular Estate should have no power to bar it Men began to presume upon the Judges then and thought if it were good as to Remainders after Estates for Lives it would be good also as to Remainders upon Estates Tail That the Judges would not endure and that is so fixed a Resolution that no Court of Law or Equity ever attempted to break in the World. Now then come we to this Case and if so be where it does not tend to a perpetuity a Chattel Interest will bear a Remainder over upon the same Reason it will bear a Remainder over upon a Contingency where that Contingency doth wear out within the compass of a life otherwise it is only to say it shall not because it shall not For there is no more inconvenience in the one than in the other Come we then at last
may be convinced of but truly at present I see no colour to retract it Mr. Serj. M. We pray then my Lord that we may have this right done for us who are for Mr. Howard the Plaintiff that they on the other side will let us know what particular points we must go upon for if they come at large we may not perhaps be so well provided to answer them Lord Chancellor I suppose they can say nothing to any point but that which is the main point in the Case the limitation of the remainder of a springing Trust after the Entail of a Term that is to determine upon a contingency that expired in the time of a Life a point which was never argued for Mr. Howard at the Bar nor stirred by the Counsel Mr. Serj. M. I hope we for Mr. Howard shall be heard to justify your Lordships Opinion Lord Chancellor What hath been said here at the Bench on both sides has been taken in Short-hand and made publick I know the Counsel on both sides hath seen it or will see and look into it well and if they can give me any reasonable satisfaction that I am in the wrong I shall easily recede from it But upon any thing yet offered I am of the same mind I was As to the Learned Judges that assisted me at the hearing the Decree is mine and the Oath that Decree is made upon is mine theirs is but Learned Advice and Opinion And therefore if they can satisfy my Conscience that they are in the right and I not well and good if not I must abide by that Decree I have made according to my Conscience And I will repeat this to you I go upon these Heads for my Opinion and I would be glad any body would answer them I say it is against natural Justice to say that a Man who hath no Estate but what consists in Terms shall be disabled from settling his Estate so as to provide for the contingencies in his Family that are in immediate prospect I say it is a common Case A Man that is less for Years assigns his Term in Trust for himself until such a Marriage take effect and after to himself for Life to his Wife for Life with remainder in Tail to his Children Is that springing Trust upon the contingency of the Marriage good or not If it be not good then what will become of a great many Marriage settlements If it be good then why not in this Case as well as that And I would fain know what difference there is between the Case as it is at the Bar and if it had been limited thus If my Lord Arundel had said that if Thomas Die without Issue Living Henry then the Term for 200 Years in Tail should cease and a new Term should arise upon the same Trust for Charles that it seems had been well enough is there any sense in the World that can lead a reasonable Man to conclude why there should not be a new springing Term upon the same Trust I cannot see any reason to run this Case down upon the single authority of Child and Baylie's Case which was such a resolution as never had its like before nor since but contradicted by several resolutions as have been cited particularly Wood and Saunders Case in this Court in my Lord Bridgmans time These are the grounds my present apprehensions go upon but I will hear Mr. Keck if it may be in any reasonable time and give the respect to the Duke of Norfolk that he shall not be surprized tho' withall I must do Mr. Howard the Justice that he be not eternally delaid Then the Day sevennight was appointed but upon the continuance of Mr. Kecks illness it was put peremptorily for Judgment on the first Saturday in the next Term. De Termino Trin. Anno Regis Car. II. 34 in Cancell Howard vers le Duc de Norfolk Sabbati 17 Junii Anno Dom. 1652. MY Lord we have nothing to do in that Mr. Serj. M. Cause but to pray your Judgment Mr. S. G. My Lord we were in great hopes to have had other Assistances to day but it seems we are disappointed of them That which I shall humbly offer is but short We are by your Lordships favour permitted now to offer something if we can to answer the objections which your Lordship made and which were the ground of your Opinion We did apprehend them to be these that Child and Baylie's Case was not the same with this Case and that the Case of Wood and Saunders is the last resolution of this Nature and will rule this We do my Lord humbly with submission offer these Reasons why the first Case is the same with this and the other difference from it Child and Baylie's Case my Lord tho' it doth differ in some Circumstances yet it differs in no one that doth immediately concern the Limitation For the Circumstances wherein they Differ was the Length of the Term being almost Expired the Conveyances over to several Purchasers and at the end of the Term the resolution taken But tho' it differs in these Circumstances yet these have no influence upon the Limitation or the Construction of Law upon the Limitation Now the Limitation is the same there as it is here for there it is to one for Life and to his Son during the whole Term and if he die without Issue during the Life of his Father and Mother then the remainder over this remainder was adjudged void This is the same Case with ours for in the Case the first remainder actually vested in William the Son for it was to him and his Assigns during the whole Term and if he die without Issue Living Father and Mother then over This remainder I say was adjudged void he was actually seized of the whole Interest which being vested in him could not be devested upon the contingent Limitations over upon his death without Issue living Father and Mother It is the same in our Case the Duke of Norfolk has the Interest of this Estate by the Limitation in Tail actually vested in him and then it cannot be devested by the rule of Child and Baylie's Case upon the Contingency of Thomas's dying without Issue in the Life of Henry which is during the Life of the now Duke of Norfolk And in this respect the Case of Wood and Saunders is not the same It is a Limitation to the Father and Mother for Life and for 60 years if they so long live then to John the Son if Living at the time of the Death of Father and Mother the whole Term. My Lord this was not a vesting the Estate in John the Son but a Contingent Limitation that he should take or not If he were Living at the time of the Death of Father and Mother then he should take If not he should not take There was no Interest vested in him till the Contingency hapned and so the Limitations will be different And that
the Son but hath but a small Estate to give him The Elder Brother he has a Term for Years and has a mind to provide for the Son of his Younger Brother and his intended Wife and he limits the Trust of his Term thus to the use of himself and his Executors till the Marriage be had but if he die or provided he die before the Marriage had without Issue living his Younger Brother the Father of him that is to be Married then to the use of that Son and so on We do make a great doubt whether the Limitation of the Trust of the Term there would be good or not upon the difference of Child and Baylies Case that has been so often mentioned in this Cause and was so solemnly resolved The resolution of which Case and that also of Wood and Saunders we submit to your Lordships consideration As for the intention of the Parties in this settlement we cannot but say it was intended as a provision that when the Bulk of the Estate and the Honour came to the Duke his Younger Brothers should have an increase of their Portions But it is as plain the intent does fail as to all the other Younger Children because the construction of Law will not support it So that the intent without the Rule of Law to maintain it will signify nothing Mr. H. If your Lordship will please to give me leave I think I may offer something that has not yet been observed We do not trouble your Lordship or our selves out of a presumption that we shall so far prevail as to alter the Opinion your Lordship has delivered but truly my design is to offer some reasons why I hope your Lordship will be pleas'd to take some further consideration of the matter Not but that I know your Lordship did very seriously deliberate upon it before you delivered your Opinion and you have been pleased to tell us the reasons you went upon and they were two First upon the Case of Wood and Saunders in this Court And Secondly upon the natural Reason and Justice that a Man that has no other Estate but Terms for Years should have a power to settle those Terms so as to provide for the Contingencies of his Family That a settlement of a Term upon Trustees to himself till the Marriage take effect and then over shall be good this might be resembled to Pell and Browns Case and so come within the same reason Now my Lord with submission we have this to offer This Trust of this Term in our Case was first to attend the Inheritance and that was an Estate Tail limited but then there is a Contingency added to this Trust to this Trust of the Term that if Thomas die without Issue living Henry then to Charles and as it hath been said already it is very plain this Entail of the Term did actually vest Then the single first Question is whether upon the Contingency hapning the death of Duke Thomas without Issue it shall devest and a springing Trust arise to the now Plaintiff Mr. Charles Howard It is said there was a just care taken for him that was a Younger Son so there was but a like care was taken for the other five Bernard c. as well as for him Now then the Case lies upon this doubt with submission to your Lordship whether this can enure by way of a springing Trust by a new Creation We think that cannot be for here being once an Estate Tail limited in a Term that was to attend an Estate Tail of the Inheritance the Remainder over must be void in the very Creation My Lord I have observed ever since I have had the honor to practise at this Bar and very many particular instances might be given that when the Judges have been upon the Cases called to advise here they would not go beyond nor think fit that the Court would not go beyond nor think fit that this Court should beyond the Resolution in Mannings Case And they have often said if that Case were now to be adjudged it would receive another kind of Resolution The Judges gave that Resolution by way of Executory devise and now I think since that there have been more Suits in this Court of this Nature since the King's Restauration than were in forty Years before For cunning People will be always finding out Perpetuities and are fond of Limitations tending to Perpetuities not only in Inheritance but in Terms for Years After Mannings Case the Conveyancers did contrive these Trusts of Terms for Years to go beyond that Case For they seemed to argue thus That being good by way of Executory devise then we will declare a Trust and that the Law has nothing to do with it is a Creature of Equity and Governably by Equity And I have seen a Conveyance of this Nature made by my Lord of Leicester to Marryot and Western drawn 1658. Where there was the Trust of a Term limited over after an Estate Tail but that was never insisted upon to be good all the Cases being otherwise If then it be not good by way of Executory devise it cannot be good by way of Limitation of the Trust of a Term. Now in this Case certainly it would not be a good Remainder by way of Executory devise For when a Term is devised to end in Tail no Man will say a Remainder of the Term can be limited over As for the Case of Wood and Saunders That My Lord I conceive had been good by way of Executory devise A Man that hath a Term deviseth it to his Wife for life and if John his Son be living at the death of his Wife then to him in Tail but if he die without Issue living Wife then to Edward that might be good For it is a condition precedent as to John and there he must survive his Father and Mother or he takes nothing but he dying before them never vested in him at all and so might well vest in Edward But in our Case it is void in the Creation because in the Case here before your Lordship it did vest and was to attend the Inheritance when the Contingency happens Can it then enure to the Plaintiff by way of springing Trust surely no. In Wood and Saunders Case it never vested in our Case it did vest But I must My Lord crave leave to say one word to another point in the Case and that is the Recovery When Contingent Remainders in Law in Cases of Settlements may be by any act in Law barred this Court I conceive will not set them up agen Now in this Case before the Contingency hapned when the Estate Tail of the Inheritance was in my Lord Duke of Norfolk and the Lease for 200 Years attendant upon that Estate Tail then doth my Lord Duke suffer a common Recovery which we apprehend hath so barred and destroyed this Term that this Court will never interpose to set it up again My Lord that which on
am of opinion it fails in point of Limitation and ought to be decreed for the Defendant The Lord Chief Justice Pemberton's Opinion I Need not trouble your Lordship with opening the Case the truth is it is in short no more than thus My Lord Duke of Norfolk's Father the Earl of Arundel having created an Estate for 200 years and setled the Inheritance by one Deed Intail to himself for life and after to his Lady for life and then to his Son and the Heirs Males of his body and for default of such Issue to the other Son Charles and the Heirs Males of his body with several Remainders over Then by another Deed he does declare the Trusts of this term of 200 years which being to Henry and the Heirs Males of his body till my Lord Maltravers die without Issue Male and the Earldom descend to my now Lord Duke and after the determination of that Estate if he shall die without Issue Male then to come to Charles and the Heirs Males of his body whether this be a good Remainder to Charles is the Question For as to any thing of the Recovery or the Assignment I shall put it quite out of the Case and do not think it will have any influence upon the Case as it lies before us And indeed I do first think that the Earl of Arundel did certainly design that if my Lord Maltravers should die without Issue Male whereby the Honour of the Family should come to my Lord Duke that now is Charles should have this Estate and his intentions are manifest by creating this Term which could be of no other use but to carry over this Estate to Charles a younger Son upon the elder Sons dying without Issue And I do think truly that this was but a reasonable Intention of the Father for there being to come with the Earldom a great Estate that would so well support it it was reason and the younger Sons might expect it that their Fortunes might be somewhat advanced by their Father in case it should so happen It was a reasonable expectation in them and truly I think it was the plain intention of the Earl. And there is no great question but it might have been made good and effectual by the limitation of two Terms For if one Term had been limited to determine upon the death of Thomas without Issue and that to be for the now Duke of Norfolk and another Term then to commence and go over to Charles that would certainly have been good and carried the Estate to Charles upon that Contingency but as this Case now is I do think that this way that is now taken is not a good nor a right way for I take this Limitation to Charles to be void in Law. And as to that I know there is a famous difference of limiting Terms that are in Gross and Terms that attend the Inheritance As to Terms that are in Gross I think it will be granted because it hath been setled so often they are not capable of limitation to one after the death of one without Issue for so are all the Cases that have been cited I think further it is as clear that upon Terms attendant upon an Inheritance there may be such a Limitation to wit that a Term that waits upon an Inheritance after the death of one without Issue may go over to another But then it is capable of such a Limitation in that Case with this restriction that is if the Inheritance be so limited for though it be attendant ever so much upon the Inheritance yet that attendance cannot make it capable of another Limitation than that Inheritance is capable of For if I have an Estate in Fee-simple and have the Trust of a term attendant upon that and I will let the Estate of Inheritance descend to my Son I cannot in this case though the Term be attendant limit it that if my Son die without Issue that Term shall go over it is not capable of any Forreign Limitation whatsoever for as to that it is a Term in Gross it hath not the quality of a Term attendant upon the Inheritance at all for first it would fail of an Inheritance and a Free-hold to support it and further than a Term can be supported with a like Estate of Inheritance It will fail to be a Term attendant upon the Inheritance Now here the Estate of Inheritance is limited to Henry and the Heirs Males of his body with Remainders to Charles and the Heirs Males of his body Now thus the Term is capable of a Limitation to Henry and the Heirs Males of his body And for want of such Issue to Charles and the Heirs Males of his body because it hath an Inheritance on which it depends to go along with it and support it But to take this out of its right Course and Channel and put another Limitation upon it That upon the dying of Thomas without Issue whereby the Earldom shall descend this shall go over to Charles alas it cannot be because it hath no Free-hold or Inheritance to support it And then besides it could not have that reason that the Law intends for its permitting such Limitations to Terms attending the Inheritance for I take it the reason why Terms are admitted to be attendant upon the Inheritance and to be capable of Limitations to go along with the Inheritance is their relation they have to the Inheritance and because it is for the benefit of the Inheritance and that I conceive was the onely reason that at first guided these Judgements of the Court of Chancery that these Terms should be admitted to wait upon the Inheritance to protect it when Mortgages were made in former times by Feoffments upon condition of payment of money we hear of none of these Terms But in the latter part of Queen Elizabeth's time and since the way of limiting Terms in Mortgages came up in use and then upon the buying of Inheritances came in the Trust of these terms and they that purchased were advised to keep those Terms on foot to protect their purchased Inheritance I must look upon this indeed as a new Case of Novel invention for in truth I think in truth it is Prima Impressionis and none of the former Cases have been exactly the same For this Term here does partake somewhat of a Term in Gross and somewhat of a Term attendant upon an Inheritance and if there should be such a Limitation admitted such a forreign Limitation as this is I call it Forreign because it is not that which goes along with the Inheritance If that be allowed we know not what inventions may grow upon this for I know mens Brains are fruitful in inventions as we may see in Matthew Manning's Case It was not foreseen nor thought when that Judgement was given what would be the Consequence when once there was an Allowance of the Limitation of a Term after the death of a person presently it was