Accusations and Malitious Suggestions made to the King and His Council especially during the time of King Edward the Third whilst he was absent in the Wars in France insomuch as in His Reign divers Statutes were made That provided none should be put to answer before the King and His Council without due Processe yet it is apparent the necessity of such Proceedings was so great that both before Edward the Third's days and in his time and after his Death several Statutes were made to help and order the Proceedings of the King and his Council As the Parliament in 28. Edw. 1. Cap. 5. did provide That the Chancellour and Justices of the King's Bench should follow the King that so he might have near unto him some that be learned in the Laws which be able to order all such matters as shall come unto the Court at all times when need shall require By the Statute of 37. Edw. 3. Cap. 18. Taliation was ordained in case the Suggestion to the King proved untrue Then 38. Edw. 3. Cap. 9. takes away Taliation and appoints Imprisonment till the King and Party grieved be satisfied In the Statutes of 17. Ric. 2. Cap. 6. and 15. Hen. 6. Cap. 4. Dammages and Expences are awarded in such Cases In all these Statutes it is necessarily implyed that Complaints upon just Causes might be moved before the King and His Council At a Parliament at Glocester 2. Ric. 2. when the Commons made Petition That none might be forced by Writ out of Chancery or by Privy Seal to appear before the King and His Council to answer touching Free-hold The King's Answer was He thought it not reasonable that He should be constrained to send for His Leiges upon Causes reasonable And albeit He did not purpose that such as were sent for should answer Finalment peremptorily touching their Free-hold but should be remanded for Tryal thereof as Law required Provided always saith he that at the Suit of the Party where the King and His Council shall be credibly informed that because of Maintenance Oppression or other Out-rages the Common Law cannot have duly her Course in such case the Council for the Party Also in the 13th year of his Reign when the Commons did pray that upon pain of Forfeiture the Chancellour or Council of the King should not after the end of the Parliament make any Ordinance against the Common Law the King answered Let it le used as it hath been used before this time so as the Regaâ—lity of the King be saved for the King will save His Regalities as His Progeniâ—tors have done Again in the 4th year of Henry the Fourth when the Commons complained against Subpoena's and other Writs grounded upon false Suggestions the King answered That He would give in Charge to His Officers that they should abstain more than before time they had to send for His Subjects in that manner But yet saith He it is not Our Intention that Our Officers shall so abstain that they may not send for Our Subjects in Matters and Causes necessary as it hath been used in the time of Our Good Progenitors Likewise when for the same Cause Complaint was made by the Commons Anno 3. Hen. 5. the King's Answer was Le Roy s'advisera The King will be advised which amounts to a Denyal for the present by a Phrase peculiar for the Kings denying to pass any Bill that hath passed the Lords and Commons These Complaints of the Commons and the Answers of the King discover That such moderation should be used that the course of the common Law be ordinarily maintained lest Subjects be convented before the King and His Council without just cause that the Proceedings of the Council-Table be not upon every slight Suggestion nor to determine finally concerning Free â—old of Inheritance And yet that upon â—ause reasonable upon credible Information in matters of weight the King's â—egallity or Prerogative in sending for â—is Subjects be maintain'd as of Right ought and in former times hath been â—onstantly used King Edward the First finding that â—ogo de Clare was discharged of an Acâ—usation brought against him in Parliament for that some formal Imperfections â—ere found in the Complaint commanded him nevertheless to appear before Him and His Council ad faciendum â—cipiendum quod per Regem ejus Conciâ—â—m fuerit faciendum and so proceeded â—â— an Examination of the whole Cause â—â— Edw. 1. Edward the Third In the Star-Chamâ—â—r which was the Ancient Council-Chamâ—â—r at Westminster upon the Complaint â—â— Elizabeth Audley commanded James â—udley to appear before Him and His â—ouncil and determin'd a Controversie between them touching Lands contain'd the Covenants of her Joynture Rot â—aus de an 41. Ed. 3 Henry the Fifth in a Suit before Him and His Council for the Titles of the Mannors of Seere and S. Laurence in the Isle of Thenet in Kent took order for the Sequestring the Profits till the Right were tryed as well for avoiding the breach of the Peace as for prevention of waste and spoil Rot. Patin Anno 6 Hen. 5. Henry the Sixth commanded the Justices of the Bench to stay the Arraignment of one Verney of London till they had other commandment from Him anâ— His Council because Verney being indebted to the King and others practised tâ— be Indicted of Felony wherein he might have his Clergy and make his Purgation of intent to defraud his Creditors 3. Hen. 6. Rot. 37. in Banco Regis Edward the Fourth and His Council 〈◊〉 the Star-Chamber heard the Cause of the Master and Poor Brethren of S. Leonard in York complaining that Sir Hugh Haâ—ings and others withdrew from them great part of their living which consisted chiefly upon the having of Thrave of Corn of every Pâ—ough-Land within the Counties of York Westmerâ—nd Cumberland and Lancashire Rot. â—aten de Anno 8. Ed. 4. Part 3. Memb. 14. Henry the Seventh and His Council in â—â—e Star-Chamber decreed That Margery â—nd Florence Becket should Sue no further in their Cause against Alice Radley â—idow for Lands in Wolwich and Plumâ—ad in Kent for as much as the Matter â—d been heardfirst before the Council of â—ng Ed. 4. after that before the Presiâ—â—nt of the Requests of that King Hen. and then lastly before the Council of said King 1. Hen. 7. What is hitherto affirmed of the Deâ—dency and Subjection of the Comâ—on Law to the Soveraign Prince the â—e may be said as well of all Statute â—â—ws for the King is the sole immediâ— Author Corrector and Moderator them also so that neither of these â— kinds of Laws are or can be any â—inution of that Natural Power â—â—ch Kings have over their People by â—t of Father-hood but rather are an â—ument to strengthen the truth of it for Evidence whereof we may in some points consider the nature of Parliaments because in them only all Statutes are made 12. Though the Name of Parliament as Mr. Cambden saith be of no great Antiquity but brought in
Errors amongst the Heathen Philosophers Polybius though otherwise a most profound Philosopher and Judicious Historian yet here he stumbles for in searching out the Original of Civil Societies he conceited That Multitudes of Men after a Deluge a Famine or a Pestilence met together like Herds of Cattel without any Dependency untill the strongest Bodies and boldest Minds got the Mastery of their Fellows even as it is saith he among Bulls Bears and Cocks And Aristotle himself forgetting his first Doctrine tells us the first Heroicaâ— Kings were chosen by the People for their deserving well of the Multitude either by teaching them some New Arts or by Warring for them or by Gathering them together or by Dividing Land amongst them also Aristotle had another â—ancy that those Men who prove wise of Mind were by Nature intended to be Lords and Govern and those which were Strong of Body were ordained to obey and to be Servants But this is a dangerous and uncertain Rule and not without some Folly for if a man prove both Wise and Strong what will Aristotle have done with him as he was Wise he could be no â—ervant and as he had Strength he could not be a Master besides to speak like a Philosopher Nature intends all things to be perfect both in Wit and strength The Folly or Imbecillity proceeds from some Errour in Generation â—r Education for Nature aims at Perfection in all her Works 2 Suarez the Jesuite riseth up against the Royal Authority of Adam â—â— defence of the Freedom and Liberty of the people and thus argues By â—ight of Creation saith he Adam had only Oeconomical power but not Political he had a power over his Wife and a Fatherly power over his Sons whilst they were not made Free he might also in process of Time have Servants and a Compleat Family and in that Family he might have compleat Oeconomical Power But after that Families began to be multiplied and Men to be separated and become the Head of several Families they had the same power over their Families But Political Power did not begin until Families began to be gathered together into one perfect Community wherefore aâ— the Community did not begin by the Creation of Adam nor by his Will alone but of all them which did agree in this Community So we cannot say that Adam Naturally had Political Primacy in that Community for that cannot be gathered by any Natural Principles because by the Force of the Law oâ— Nature alone it is not due unto anâ— Progenitor to be also King of his Posterity And if this be not gathered out of the Principles of Nature wâ— cannot say God by a special Gift oâ— Providence gave him this Power Foâ— there is no Revelation of this nor Testimony of Scripture Hitherto Suarez Whereas he makes Adam to have a Fatherly power over his Sons and yet shuts up this power within One Family â—he seems either to imagine that all Adam's Children lived within one House and under one Roof with their Father or else as soon as any of his Children â—ived out of his House they ceased to be Subject and did thereby become Free For my part I cannot believe that Adam although he were sole Monarch of the World had any such spacious Palace as might contain any such Considerable part of his Children It is â—ikelier that some mean Cottage or Tent â—id serve him to keep his Court in It were hard he should lose part of his Authority because his Children lay not within the Walls of his House But if Suarez will allow all Adam's Children to be of his Family howsoever they were separate in Dwellings if their Haâ—itations were either Contiguous or â—t such Distance as might easily receive â—is Fatherly Commands And that all â—hat were under his Commands were â—f his Family although they had many Children or Servants married having temselves also Children Then I see no reason but that we may call Adam's Family a Commonwealth except we will wrangle about Words For Adam living 930 years and seeing 7 or 8 Descents from himself he might live to command of his Children and their Posterity a Multitude far bigger than many Commonwealths and Kingdoms 3. I know the Politicians and Civil Lawyers do not agree well about the Definition of a Family and Bodin doth seem in one place to confine it to a House yet in his Definition he doth enlarge his meaning to all Persons under the Obedience of One and the Same Head of the Family and he approves better of the propriety of the Hebrew Word for a Family which is derived from a Word that signifies a Head a Prince or Lord than the Greek Word for a Family which is derived from 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 which signifies a House Noâ— doth Aristotle confine a Family to One House but esteems it to be made of those that daily converse together whereas before him Charondas called Family Homosypioi those that feed together out of one common Pannier And Epimenides the Cretian terms a Family Homocapnoi those that sit by a Common Fire or Smoak But let Suarez understand what he please by Adam's Family if he will but confess as he needs must that Adam and the Patriarchs had Absolute power of Life and Death of Peace and War and the like within their Houses or Families he must give us leave at least to call them Kings of their Houses or Families and if they be so by the Law of Nature what Liberty will be left to their Children to dispose of Aristotle gives the Lie to Plato and â—hose that say Political and Oeconomical â—ocieties are all one and do not differ â—pecie but only Multitudine Pauciâ—te as if there were no difference betwixt a Great House and a Little City All the Argument I find he brings against them in this The Community of Man and Wise â—iffers from the Community of Master and Servant because they have several Ends. The Intention of Nature by Conjunction of Male and Female is Generation but the Scope of Master and Servant is Preservation so that a Wife and a Servant are by Nature distinguished because Nature does not work like the Cutlers of Delphos for she makes but one thing for one Use If we allow this Argument to be sound nothing doth follow but only this That Conjugal and Despotical communities do differ But it is no consequence That therefore Oeconomical and Political Societies do the like For though it prove a Family to consist of two distinct Communities yet it follows not that a Family and a Commonwealth are distinct because as well in the Commonwealth as in the Families both these Communities are found And as this Argument comes not home to our Point so it is not able to prove that Title which it shews forâ— for if it should be granted which yeâ— is false that Generation and Preservation differ about the Individuum yeâ— they agree in the General and servâ— both for the Conservation
Election of a Prince Is there any Example of it ever found in the Whole World To conceit such a thing is to â—magine little less than an Impossibility And so by Consequence no one Form of Government or King was ever established according to this supposed Law of Nature 6. It may be answered by some That if either the Greatest part of a Kingdom or if a smaller part only by Themselves and all the Rest by Proxy or if the part not concurring in Election do after by a Tacit Assent ratifie the Act of Others That in all thesâ— Cases it may be said to be the World of the whole Multitude As to the Acts of the Major part oâ— a Multitude it is true that by Politicâ— Humane Constitutions it is oft ordained that the Voices of the most shall over-rule the Bâ—est and such Ordinances bind because where Men are Assembled by an Humane Power that power that doth Assemble them can also Limit and Direct the manner of the Execution of that Power and by such Derivative Power made known by Law or Custom either the greater part or two Thirds or Three parts of Five or the like have power to oversway the Liberty of their Opposits But in Assemblies that take their Authority from the Law of Nature it cannot be so for what Freedom or Liberty is due to any Man by the Law of Nature no Inferiour Power can alter limit or diminishâ— no One Man nor a Multitude can give away the Natural Right of another The Law of Nature is unchangeable and howsoever One Man may hinder Another in the Use or Exercise of his Natural Right yet thereby No Man â—oseth the Right of it self for the Right â—nd the Use of the Right may be distinguished as Right and Possession are â—oft distinct Therefore unless it can be proved by the Law of Nature that the Major or some other part have Power â—o over-rule the Rest of the Multitude â—t must follow that the Acts of Multitudes not Entire are not Binding to All but only to such as Consent unto them 7. As to the point of Proxy it cannot be shewed or proved That all those that have been Absent from Popular Elections did ever give their Voices to some of their Fellows I ask but one Example out of the History of the whole World let the Commonweal be but named wherever the Multitude or so much as the Greatest part of it consented either by Voice or by Procuration to the Election of a Prince The Ambition sometimes of One Man sometimes of Many or the Faction of a City or Citizens or the Mutiny of an Army hath set up or put down Princes but they have never tarried for this pretended Order by proceeding of the whole Multitude Lastly if the silent Acceptation oâ— a Governour by part of the People be an Argument of their Concurring iâ— the Election of him by the same Reason the Tacit Assent of the whole Commonwealth may be maintained From whence it follows that every Prince that comes to a Crown either by Succession Conquest or Usurpation may be said to be Elected by the People which Inference is too ridiculous for in such Cases the People are so far from the Liberty of Specification that they want even that of Contradiction 8. But it is in vain to argue against the Liberty of the People in the Election of Kings as long as men are perswaded that Examples of it are to be found in Scripture It is fit therefore to discover the Grounds of this Errour It is plain by an Evident Text that it is one thing to choose a King and another thing to set up a King over the People this latter power the Children of Israel had but not the former This Distinction is found most evidenâ— in Deut. 17. 15. where the Law of God saith Him shalt thou set King over thee whom â—â—e Lord shall choose so God must Eliâ—e and the People only do Constituâ—e Mr. Hooker in his Eighth Book â—f Ecclesiastical Policy clearly expounds â—is Distinction the words are worthy â—â—e citing Heaps of Scripture saith he â—e alledged concerning the Solemn Coroâ—â—tion or Inauguration of Saul David Soâ—mon and others by Nobles Ancients and the people of the Commonwealth of Isrâ—el as if these Solemnities were a kind of Deed whereby the Right of Dominion is given which strange untrue and unnatural conceits are set abroad by â—ed-men of Rebellion only to animate â—nquiet Spirits and to feed them with â—ossibilities of Aspiring unto the Thrones they can win the Hearts of the People whatsoever Hereditary Title any other before them may have I say these â—njust and insolent Positions I would â—ot mention were it not thereby to make the Countenance of â—ruth more Orient For unless we will openly proclaim Defiance unto all â—aw Equity and Reason we must for â—here is no other Remedy acknowledg that in Kingdoms Hereditary Birth-right giveth Right unto Sovereign Dominion and the Death of the Predecessoâ— putteth the Successor by Blood in Sâ—sin Those publick Solemnities before mentioned do either serve for an open Testification of the Inheritor's Right or belong to the Form of induciâ—â— of him into possession of that thing â—â— hath Right unto This is Mr. Hooker Judgment of the Israelites Power tâ— set a King over themselves No doubt but if the people of Israel had had power to choose their King they would never have made Choice of Joas a Child but of Seven years old nor of Manases a Boy of Twelve since as Solomon saith Wo to the Land whose King a Child Nor is it probable they would have elected Josias but a very Child and a Son to so Wicked and Idoâ—trous a Father as that his own Servants murthered him and yet all thâ— people set up this young Josias anâ— slew the Conspirators of the Death oâ— Ammon his Father which Justice of the People God rewarded by making this Josias the most Religious King thaâ— ever that Nation enjoyed 9. Because it is affirmed that â—e People have power to choose as â—ell what Form of Government as â—hat Governours they please of which mind is Bellarmine in those â—aces we cited at first Therefore it necessary to Examine the Strength â— what is said in Defence of popular Commonweals against this Natural Form of Kingdoms which I maintain'd Here I must first put the â—ardinal in mind of what he affirms Cold Blood in other places where saith God when he made all Manâ—d of One Man did seem openly to â—â—nifie that he rather approved the Goâ—â—rnment of One Man than of Many â—â—ain God shewed his Opinion â—â—en he endued not only Men but Creatures with a Natural Propensiâ—â— to Monarchy neither can it be â—â—ubted but a Natural Propensity is be referred to God who is Auâ—â—or of Nature And again in a â—â—ird place What Form of Government God confirmed by his Authoriâ—â— may be gathered by that Commonâ—al which he instituted amongst the Hebrews which was not Aristocratical as
Tragical Slaughter of Citizens at home deserved Commiseration from their vanquished Enemies What though in that Age of her Popularity she bred many admired Captains and Commanders each of which was able to lead an Army â—ough many of them were but ill reâ—â—ited by the People yet all of them â—ere not able to support her in times 〈◊〉 Danger but she was forced in her â—â—eatest Troubles to create a Dictator who was a King for a time thereby giving this Honourable Testimony of Monarchy that the last Refuge in Perils of States is to fly to Regal Authority And though Romes Popular Estate for a while was miraculouâ—â—â—â— upheld in Glory by a greater Prudâ—nce than her own yet in a short time after manifold Alterations she was ruined by her Own Hands Suis ipsa Roma viribus ruit For the Arms she had prepared to conquer other Nations were turned upon her Self and Civil Contentions at last settled the Government again into a Monarchy 13. The Vulgar Opinion is thaâ— the first Cause why the Democratical Government was brought in was to curb the Tyranny of Monarchies But the Falshood of this doth best appear by the first Flourishing Popular Estate of Athens which was founded not because oâ— the Vices of their last King but that his Vertuous Deserts were such as thâ— people thought no man Worthy â—nough to succeed him a pretty waâ—ton Quarrel to Monarchy For wheâ— their King Codrus understood by thâ— Oracle that his Country could not be saved unless the King were slain iâ— the Battel He in Disguise entered hiâ— Enemies Camp and provoked a Common Souldier to make him a Sacrifice for his own Kingdom and with his Death ended the Royal Government for after him was never and more Kings of Athens As Athens thus or Love of her Codrus changed the Government so Rome on the contrary out of Hatred to her Tarquin â—d the like And though these two famous Commonweals did for contrary â—uses abolish Monarchy yet they both agreed in this that neither of them thought it fit to change their State to a Democratie but the one chose â—â—chontes and the other Consuls to â— their Governours both which did â—ost resemble Kings and continued â—â—till the People by lessening the Authority of these their Magistrates did â— degrees and stealth bring in their â—opular Government And I verily beâ—â—â—ve never any Democratical State â—ewed it self at first fairly to the â—orld by any Elective Entrance but â—ey all secretly crept in by the Backâ—â—or of Sedition and Faction 14. If we will listen to the Judgment of those who should best know â—e Nature of Popular Government â— shall find no reason for good men desire or choose it Zenophon that brave Scholar and Souldier disallowed the Athenian Commonweal for that they followed that Form of Government wherein the Wicked are always in greatest Credit and Vertuous men kept under They expelled Aâ—ristides the Just Themistocles died iâ— Banishment Meltiades in Prison Phocion the most virtuous and just man of his Age though he had been chosen forty five times to be their General yet he was put to Death with all his Friends Kindred and Servants by the Fury of the People without Sentence Accusation or any Cause at all Nor were the People of Rome much more favourable to their Worthies they banished Rutilius Metellus Coriolanus the Two Scipio's and Tullyâ— the worst men sped best for as Znophon saith of Athens so Rome was a Sanctuary for all Turbulent Discontented and Seditious Spirits The Impunity of Wicked men was such that upon pain of Death it was forbidden all Magistrates to Condemn to Death or Banish any Citizen oâ— to deprive him of his Liberty or so much as to whip him for what Offence ever he had committed either against â—e Gods or Men. The Athenians sold Justice as they â—d other Merchandise which made â—lato call a Popular Estate a Fair here every thing is to be sold The â—fficers when they entered upon their â—harge would brag they went to a â—olden Harvest The Corruption of â—ome was such that Marius and Pompey durst carry Bushels of Silver to the Assemblies to purchase the â—oices of the People Many Citizens â—der their Grave Gowns came Armâ— into the Publick Meetings as if â—â—ey went to War Often contrary â—ctions fell to Blows sometimes with â—ones and sometimes with Swords â—e Blood hath been suckt up in the â—arket Places with Spunges the Riâ—â—r Tiber hath been filled with the â—ead Bodies of the Citizens and the â—â—mmon Privies stuffed full with them If any man think these Disorders Popular States were but Casual such as might happen under any â—nd of Government he must know that such Mischiefs are Unavoidable and of necessity do follow aâ—â— Democratical Regiments and the Reason is given because the Nature of all People is to desire Liberty without Restraint which cannot bâ— but where the Wicked bear Ruleâ— and if the People should be so indiscreet as to advance Vertuous Men they lose their Power For that Good Men would favour none but the Good which are always the fewer in Number and the Wicked and Vitious which is still the Greateâ— Part of the People should be excluded from all Preferment and iâ— the End by little and little Wise men should seize upon the State and take it from the People I know not how to give a better Character of the People than can be gathered from such Authors as lived Amongst or Near the Popular States Thucydides Zenophon Livâ—â— Tacitus Cicero and Salust have set them out in their Colours I will borrow some of their Sentences There is nothing more uncertain than the People their Opinions are as variable and suddain as Tempests there is neither Truth nor Judgment in them they are not led by Wisdom to judg of any thing but by Violence and Rashness nor put they any Difference between things True and False After the manner of Cattel they follow the Herd that goes before they have a Custom always to favour the Worst and Weakest they are most prone to Suspitions and use to Condemn men for Guilty upon any false Suggestion they are apt to believe all News especially if it be sorrowful and like Fame they make it more in the Believing when there is no Author they fear those Evils which themselves have feigned they are most desirous of New Stirrs and Changes and are Enemies to Quiâ—et and Rest whatsoever is Giddy or Head-strong they account Manlike and Couragious but whatsoever is Modest or provident seems sluggish each man hath a Care of his Particular and thinks basely â—â— the Common Good they look upon Approaching Mischiefs as theâ— do upon Thunder only every maâ— wisheth it may not touch his own Person it is the Nature of theâ— they must Serve basely or Domâ—neer proudly for they know â—â— Mean Thus do they paint to the Life this Beast with many Headâ— Let me give you the Cypher â—â— their Form of Government As it â—â— begot
not Govern yet they may partake and joyn with a King in the Government and so make a State mixed of Popular and Regal power which they take to be the best tempered and equallest Form of Government But the vanity of this Fancy is too evident it is a meer Impossibility or Contradiction for if a King but once admit the People to be his Companions he leaves to be a King and the State becomes a Democracy at least he is but a Titular and no Real King that hath not the Soveraignty to Himself for the having of this alone and nothing but this makes a King to be a King As for that Shew of Popularity which is found in such Kingdoms â—s have General Assemblies for Consultation about making Publick Laws It must be remembred that such Meetings â—o not Share or divide the Soveraignty with the Prince but do only deliberate and advise their Supreme Head who â—ill reserves the Absolute power in â—imself for if in such Assemblies the â—ing the Nobility and People have â—ual Shares in the Soveraignty then â—e King hath but one Voice the Noâ—lity likewise one and the People one â—â—d then any two of these Voices should have Power to over-rule the third thus the Nobility and Commons together should have Power to make a Law to bind the King which was never yet seen in any Kingdom but if it could the State must needs be Popular and not Regal 17 If it be Unnatural for the Multitude to chuse their Governours or to Govern or to partake in the Government what can be thought of that damnable Conclusion which is made by too many that the Multitude may Correct or Depose their Prince if need be Surely the Unnaturalness and Injustice of this Position cannot sufficiently be expressed For admit that a King make a Contract or Paction with his people either Originally in his Ancestors or personally at his Coronation for both these Pactions some dream of but cannot offer any proof for either yet by no Law of any Nation can a Contract be thought broken except that first a Lawful Tryal be had by the Ordinary Judge of the Breakers thereof or else every Man may be both Party and Judge iâ— his own case which is absur'd once to be thought for then it will lye in the hands of the headless Multitude when they please to cast off the Yoke of Government that God hath laid upon them to judge and punish him by whom they should be Judged and punished themselves Aristotle can tell us what Judges the Multitude are in their own case 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 The Judgment of the Multitude in Disposing of the Soveraignty may be seen in the Roman History where we may find many good Emperours Murthered by the People and many bad Elected by them Nero Heliogabalus Otho Vitellius and such other Monsters of Nature were the Minions of the Multitude and set up by them Pertinax Alexander Severus Gordianus Gallus Emilianus Quintilius Aurelianus Tacitus Probus and Numerianus all of them good Emperours in the Judgment of all Historians yet Murthered by the Multitude 18 Whereas many out of an imaginary Fear pretend the power of the people to be necessary for the repressing of the Insolencies of Tyrants wherein they propound a Remedy far worse than the Disease neither is the Disease indeed so frequent as they would have us think Let us be judged by the History even of our own Nation We have enjoyed a Succession of Kings from the Conquest now for above 600 years a time far longer than ever yet any Popular State could continue we reckon to the Number of twenty six of these Princes since the Norman Race and yet not one of these is taxed by our Historians for Tyrannical Government It is true two of these Kings have been Deposed by the people and barbarously Murthered but neither of them for Tyranny For as a learned Historian of our Age saith Edward the Second and Richard the Second were not insupportable either in their Nature or Rule and yet the people more upon Wantonness than for any Want did take an unbridled Course against them Edward the second by many of our Historians is reported to be of a Good and Vertuous Nature and not Unlearned they impute his defects rather to Fortune than either to Council or Carriage of his Affairs the Deposition of him was a violent Fury led by a Wife both Cruel and unchast and can with no better Countenance of Right be justifyed than may his lamentable both Indignities and Death it self Likewise the Deposition of King Richard II was a tempestuous Rage neither Led or Restrained by any Rules of Reason or of State Examin his Actions without a distempered Judgment and you will not Condemne him to be exceeding either Insufficient or Evil weigh the Imputations that were objected against him and you shall find nothing â—â—ither of any Truth or of great moment Hollingshed writeth That he was most Unthankfully used by his Subjects for although through the frailty of his Youth he demeaned himself more dissolutely than was agreeable to the Royalty of his Estate yet in no Kings Days were the Commons in greater Wealth the Nobility more honoured and the Clergy less wronged who notwithstanding in the Evil guided Strength of their will took head against him to their own headlong destruction afterwards partly during the Reign of Henry his next Successor whose greatest Atchievements were against his own People in Executing those who Conspired with him against King Richard But more especially in succeeding times when upon occasion of this Disorder more English Blood was spent than was in all the Foreign Wars together which have been since the Conquest Twice hath this Kingdom been miserably wasted with Civil War but neither of them occasioned by the Tyranny of any Prince The Cause of the Baron's Wars is by good Historians attributed to the stubbornness of the Nobility as the Bloody variance of the Houses of York and Lancaster and the late Rebellion sprung from the Wantonness of the People These three Unnatural Wars have dishonoured our Nation amongst Strangers so that in the Censures of Kingdoms the King of Spain is said to be the King of Men because of his Subjects willing Obedience the King of France King of Asses because of their infinite Taxes and Impositions but the King of England is said to be the King of Devils because of his Subjects often Insurrections against and Depositions of their Princes CHAP. III. Positive Laws do not infringe the Natural and Fatherly Power of Kings 1. REgal Authority not subject to the Positive Laws Kings before Laws the King of Judah and Israel not tyed to Laws 2. Of Samuel 's Description of a King 1 Sam. 8. 3. The Power ascribed unto Kings in the New Testament 4. Whether Laws were invented to bridle Tyrants 5. The Benefit of Laws 6. Kings keep the Laws though not bound by the Laws 7. Of the Oathes of Kings 8. Of the
Cases some-what â—ike have been delivered by former â—udges who all receive Authority from the King in his Right and Name to give sentence according to the Rules and Presidents of Antient Times And where Presidents have failed the Judges have resorted to the General Law of Reason and accordingly given Judgment without any Common Law to direct them Nay many times where â—here have been Presidents to direct â—hey upon better Reason only have Changed the Law both in Causes Crimical and Civil and have not insisted so much on the Examples of former Judges as examined and corrected their â—easons thence it is that some Laws are â—ow obsolete and out of use and the â—ractice quite contrary to what it was in Former Times as the Lord Chancellor Egerton proves by several Instances Nor is this spoken to Derogate from the Common Law for the Case standeth so with the Laws of all Nations although some of them have their Laws and Principles Written and Established for witnesse to this we have Aristotle his Testimony in his Ethiques and in several places in his Politiques I will cite some of them Every Law saith he is in the General but of some things there can be no General Law when therefore the Law sqeaks in General and something falls out after besides the General Rule Then it is fit that what the Law-maker hath omitted or where he hath Erred by speaking Generally it should be corrected or supplyed as if the Law-maker himself were Present to Ordain it The Governour whether hâ— be one Man or more ought to be Lord â—ver all those things whereof it was impossible the Law should exactly speak because it is not easie to comprehend all things under General Rules whatsoever the Law cannot Determine it leaves to the Governours to give Judgment therein and permits them to rectifie whatsoever upon Tryal they find to be better than the Written Laws Besides all Laws are of themselves Dumb and some or other must be trusted with the Application of them to Particulars by examining all Circumstances to pronounce when they are broken or by whom This work of right Application of Laws is not a thing easie or obvious for ordinary capacities but requires profound Abilities of Nature for the beating out of the truth witness the Diversity and sometimes the contrariety of Opinions of the learned Judges in some difficult Points 10 Since this is the common Condition of Laws it is also most reasonable that the Law-maker should be trusted with the Application or Interpretation of the Laws and for this Cause anciently the Kings of this Land have sitten personally in Courts of Judicature and are still Representatively present in all Courts the Judges are but substituted and called the Kings Justices and their Power ceaseth when the King is in place To this purpose Bracton that learned Chief Justice in the Reign of Henry the Third saith in express terms In doubtful and obscure points the Interpretation and Will of our Lord the King is to be expected since it is his part to interpret who made the Law for as he saith in another place Rex non Alius debet Judicare si Solus ad id sufficere possit c. The King and no body else ought to give Judgment if He were able since by vertue of his Oath he is Bound to it therefore the King ought to exercise Power as the Vicar or Minister of God but if our Lord the King be not able to determine every cause to ease part of his Pains by distributing the Burthen to more Persons he ought to chuse Wise men fearing God c and make Justices of them Much to the same purpose are the words of Edward the First in the beginning of his Book of Laws written by his appointment by John Briton Bishop of Hereford We will saith he that our own Jurisdiction be above all the Jurisdictions of our Realm so as in all manner of Felonies Trespasses Contracts and in all other Actions Personal or Real We have power to yield such Judgments as do appertain without other Process wheresoever we know the right truth as Judges Neither may this be taken to be meant of an imaginary Presence of the King's Person in His Courts because he doth immediately after in the same place severally set forth by themselves the Jurisdictions of his Ordinary Courts but must necessarily be understood of a Jurisdiction remaining in the King 's Royal Person And that this then was no New-made Law or first brought in by the Norman Conquests appears by a Saxon Law made by King Edgar in these words as I find them in Mr. Lambert Nemo in lite Regem appellato nisi quidem domi Justitiam consequi aut impetrare non poterit sin summo jure domi urgeatur ad Regem ut is Onus aliqua ex parte Allevet provocato Let no man in Suit appeal to the King unless he may not get Right at home but if the Right be too heavy for him then let him go to the King to have it eased As the Judicial Power of Kings was exercised before the Conquest so in those setled times after the Conquest wherein Parliaments were much in use there was a High-Court following the King which was the place of Soveraign Justice both for matter of Law and Conscience as may appear by a Parliament in Edward the First 's time taking Order That the Chancellour and the Justices of the Bench should follow the King to the end that He might have always at hand able men for His Direction in Suits that came before Him And this was after the time that the Court of Common-Pleas was made Stationary which is an Evidence that the King reserved a Soveraign Power by which he did supply the Want or correct the Rigour of the Common Law because the Positive Law being grounded upon that which happens for the most part cannot foresee every particular which Time and Experience brings forth 12. Therefore though the Common Law be generally Good and Just yet in some special Case it may need Correction by reason of some considerable Circumstance falling out which at the time of the Law-making was not thought of Also sundry things do fall out both in War and Peace that require extraordinary help and cannot wait for the Usual Care of Common Law the which is not performed but altogether after one sort and that not without delay of help and expence of time so that although all Causes are and ought to be referred to the Ordinary Processe of common Law yet rare matters from time to time do grow up meet for just Reasons to be referred to the aid of the absolute Authority of the Prince and the Statute of Magna Charta hath been understood of the Institution then made of the ordinary Jurisdiction in Common Causes and not for restraint of the Absolute Authority serving only in a few rare and singular Cases for though the Subjects were put to great dammage by False