to all those blows and all those absurdities which flow from fatall destiny than the necessity of doing Thirdly as contrary to the sense and meaning of the whole world Fourthly as contrary to the Scriptures Lastly I have demonstrated the unreasonablenesse of his comparison between the intellectuall and sensitive appetite both as it is a comparison Theologia Symbolica non est argumentativa As also as it is an inference from the lesser to the greater negatively Now I add That that glosse is accursed which doth corrupt the text as this glosse of his doth That a man is free to do if he will but not free to will Election is that very thing which he saith is not free that is the appetite and it is thus defined Electio est appetitus rei praeconsileatae Election is an appetite of some thing that hath been predeliberated of But the texts alleadged do demonstrate that to chuse or elect is free and undetermined to one Therefore they do demonstrate that it is not free onely to do but much more to will or to chuse It is in the husbands choice either to establish the vow of his wife or to make it voide Here is a liberty of contradiction or of exercise Again Chuse ye this day whom ye will serve whether the gods of your fathers or the gods of the Amorites and I offer thee three things chuse the which of them I shall do Here is a liberty of contrariety or specification And in all these places here is a liberty of election to will to desire to chuse their own appetite Secondly the same is demonstrated from the definition of free-will to be a free power given of chusing one thing before another or accepting or rejecting the same thing indifferently given to the intellectuall nature for the glory of God in order to some end But all these texts by me alledged and many more do attribute unto the will a power of chusing one thing before another or of accepting or rejecting the same thing indifferently Therefore all these texts do demonstrate that the will of man is free not onely to do if he will but to will that is to chuse or to elect Wheresoever whensoever and howsoever the will acteth it is volition but election is the proper formall act of the will as it is free And it is alltogether impossible there should be any election without a freedom to will The will imployeth the understanding to consider of the most convenient means to attain some desired end The understanding doth return its judgement which is like a bill presented to the King by the two houses The will is free either to suspend its act or deny its approbation with la volonte s'advisera The will will advise better or else to consent with la volonte lâ—… vent the will approveth it which consent to the judgement of the understanding is properly election as it were the conclusion of a practical Syllogisme an intellective appetite or an appetite intelect If a great Prince should offer to his poor subject three distinct gifts bid him take his choice of them having underhand given away two of them before to another from him Were it not an abuse and a meer mockery God offered David in like manner his choice of three things I offer thee three things chuse which of them I shall do Did God openly offer to David the free choice of three things and had secretly determined that two of them should never be Far be this from God Especially to do it so seriously and with such solemn protestations as I call heaven and earth this day to record against you that I have set before you life and death blessing and cursing therefore chuse life that both thou and thy seed may liâ—…e Can any man who hath but so much reverential fear of God as a grain of mustard-seed which is the least of seeds harbour such an unworthy thought in his breast that truth itself should be guilty of such grosse dissimulation It is a decided case in law that he who hath granted to another liberty of election cannot before his election dispose of that which he hath granted away to another He who hath a right to elect if he chuse an unworthy person by the sentence of the law forfeites his right to elect for that turn Why so if he was necessitated without his will to chuse as he did We say truely consent taketh away errour That man is not wronged who consents to his own wrong how so if his consent be against or without his own will If the will be not free â—…ut necessitated then nothing is unlawful That which is not lawful by the law necessity maketh lawful In case not onely of absolute but even of extreme necessity meum and tuum ceaseth and that which otherwise had been plain theâ—… becometh just He who necessitateth all events taketh sin out of the World One of my instances was in the election of the King of the Romans to which he answereth as formerly That thâ—… electors are free to name whom they will but not free to will If they be not free to will then they are not free to elect for election is the proper formal act of the will and then the electors are no electors There is one contradiction Neither are they free to name whom they will indifferently if they be determined necessarily and antecedently to name one Possibility of more than one and a precise determination to one that is may name and must name are likewise contradictories in adjecto This is not all We see by the golden Bull what care there is to bring the electors together to Frankfort and to secure them there Every one of them must take a solemn oath upon the Gospel of St. Iohn that according to his faith which he oweth to God and the Roman Empire to the best of his discretion and understanding he will chuse volo eligere with the help of God a King of the Romans that is fit for it and give his voice and vote without all pact stipend price or promise And if they do not accord actually within thirty dayes they are thenceforth to have nothing but bread and water until they have made their election If it was antecedently determined by extrinsecal causes who should be chosen and no other What needed all this trouble and charge to so many great Princes when they might as well have stayed at home and have set seven ordinary Burgers to have drawn lots for it Do men use to swear to chuse that which it may by is not in their power to chuse and to refuse that which it may be is not in their power to refuse The belly is a vehement oratour but if it be absolutely determined whom they must chuse and when they might as well give them mosel wine and the best meat the Country affords as bread and water Here we have expressely volo eligere I will
have been observed to have lost the benefit of their Cleargy at their deaths because they despised it in their lifes It is no marvel if he receive no help from any distinction now who hath ever been an enemy to distinctions and a friend to confusion If his answer have any sense at all this must be it That an indeliberate act may be in truth and in the judgement of the Agent himself a voluntary act yet in the common or publick judgement of other men it may be esteemed and passe for an involuntary and unpunishable act But first neither the questionn nor his assertion was what is to be judged a voluntary act by men who neither know the heart of man nor are able to judge of his will but what is a voluntary act in it self and what is the essence and definition of a voluntary act I argue thus That which is essentially a voluntary act cannot by any thing that is extrinsecall and subsequent and which perhaps may never be be made no voluntary act But the judgement of other men is extrinsecall and subsequent to the act and may perhaps never be How many thoughts of every man every day passe unknown unjudged whether they were regular or irregular Secondly God Allmighty who is the onely searcher of hearts is the proper and onely Judge of the will If the act be truely voluntary he judgeth it to be truely voluntary whether it be for the Agents advantage or disadvantage man cannot judge what acts are voluntary and what are not because he doth not know the heart If one perform outward obedience to the law against his will man judgeth it to be willing obedience and cannot do otherwise If a man do an evill act man must needs judge it to be a voluntary act And indeed so much more voluntary by how much it was lesse deliberated of because the will is lesse curbed and must have lesse reluctation How much doth he erre who prefers the judgement of man before the judgement of God Thirdly according to T. H. his principles all acts of free Agents whatsoever are voluntary and cannot possibly but be voluntary For so he teacheth That a man is free to do if he will but he is not free to will Would he have men to judge that to be unvoluntary which cannot possibly but be voluntary If he will with him is a necessary supposition Lastly Judges do esteem rash unadvised acts not to be so irregular or so punishable as other acts not because they are lesse voluntary for they are more voluntary but because the carefullest man breathing cannot arme himself sufficlently against all occasions but that he may be surprized by sudden passion But if after the first fit of passion he had time and means to cool his heat and to deliberate of his duty before the fact committed and yet he continued obstinate the law looks upon him without pity not onely as a willing but as a willful offender though there was no malice nor inveterate hatred in the case but perhaps a quarrel upon some punctilio of honour But for persons uncapable of deliberation as naturall fools mad men and children before they have use of reason though there may be hatred and malice as experience hath taught us yet the law doth not punish them in the same nature because it supposeth them uncapable of deliberation and unable to consider seriously and sufficiently either of their duty which they owe to God and man or of the dangers which they incur by that act and because it is not their fault that they are uncapable So the judgement of men is no save-guard to him from his contradiction For Judges go upon our grounds which deny all liberty and power of election to such as have not sufficient use of reason without their own fault But he goeth upon contrary grounds to us and to the law holding fools mad men children yea even bruit beasts to be capable of deliberation and election and thereupon supposing all voluntary acts to be deliberated in vain doth he seek shelter under our practise who is an enemy to those principles whereupon our practise is grounded His second contradiction which he relateth amisse is this All spontaneity is an inconsiderate proceeding This is plainly set down by himself By spontaneity is meant inconsiderate proceeding or else nothing is meant by it To which this is contradictory Some spontaneity is not an inconsiderable proceeding affirmed by him likewise When a man giveth mony voluntarily to another for merchandise c. he is said to do it of his own accord which in Latine is sponte and therefore the action is spontaneous From whence I argue thus All giving of merchandise for mony is a spontaneous act but all giving of merchandise for mony is not an inconsiderate act therefore all spontaneous acts are not inconsiderate act To this he answereth nothing His third contradiction is this That having undertaken to prove that children before they have the use of reason do deliberate and elect yet he saith by and by after That a childe may be so young as to do what he doth without all deliberation I acknowledge this to be no contradiction as it is here proposed The acts of reason as deliberation do not come to a child in an instant but by degrees A child is fit to deliberate of his childish sports or whether he should crie or not before he can deliberate of matters of greater moment Buâ—… if the contradiction be proposed as I proposed it and allwayes intended it of young suckling children soon after their birth I see not how he can excuse his contradiction For they have spontaneity the first houre And yet by his confession they are too young to deliberate But if deliberation were no more than he maketh it a demurring upon what they should do out of sensitive hope to suck the breast and sensitive fear of some strange figure Or as he calleth it elsewhere An alternate appetite to do or to acquire an action they may deliberate well enough Castigations of the Animadversions Num. 9. TO that place by me alleadged Because thou hast asked this thing and hast not asked for thy self long life c. He answereth thus How doth he know understanding power properly taken that Solomon had a reall power to ask long life No doubt Solomon knew nothing to the contrary Yet it was possible that God might have hindred him For though God gave Solomon his choice that is the thing that he should chuse it doth not follow that he did not also give him the act of election It is no new thing with him to confound the act and the object choice and the thing chosen election which is allwayes of more than one and the thing elected which is precisely one I doubt not but Solomon had his power to elect from God I doubt not but the grace of God did excite Solomon and assist him in his election
righteous with the wicked Necessity may justifie the sufferings of innocent persons in some cases But no necessity can warrant the punishment of innocent persons Innocentium lachrimae diluvio periculosiores Whether they did well or ill for the manner of the act who put out their bodily eyes because they supposed them to be an impediment to the eye of the soul is not pertinent to our purpose yet was apt enough to prove my intention that bodily blindnesse may sometimes be a benefit His instance in brute beasts which are afflicted yet cannot sin is extravagant I did not go about to prove that universal necessity doth take away afflictions it rather rendereth them unavoidable But I did demonstrate and he hath not been able to make any shew of an answer to it that it taketh away all just rewards and punishments which is against the universal notion and common belief of the whole World Brute beasts are not capable of punishment They are not knocked down out of vindictive justice for faults committed but for future use and benefit I said there was a vast difference between the light and momentany pangs of brute beasts and the intollerable and endlesse pains of Hell Sure enough Dionysius the Tyrant seeing an oxe knocked down at one blow said to his friends What a folly it is to quit so fair a command for fear of dying which lasts no longer a space He himself when his wits are calmer doth acknowledge as much as I and somewhat more Perhaps saith he if the death of a sinner were an eternall life in extream misery a man might as far as Job hath done expostulate with God Allmighty not accusing him of injustice c. but of litle tenderness love to mankind But now he is pleased to give another judgement of it As if the length or greatnesse of the pain made any difference of the justice or unjustice of inflicting it yes very much According to the measure of the fault ought to be the number of the stripes If the punishment exceed the offence it is unjust On the other side it is not onely an act of justice but of favour and grace to inflict temporary paines for a greater good Otherwise a Master could not justly correct his Scholler Otherwise a Chirurgion might not lance an impostume or put a man to pain to cure him of the stone If God afflict a man with a momentary sicknesse and make this sicknesse a means to fit him for an eternall weight of glory he hath no cause to complain of injustice He is angry that I would make men believe that he holds all things to be just that are done by them who have power enough to avoid punishment He doth me wrong I said no such thing If he be guilty of this imputation either directly or by consequence let him look to it he hath errours enough which are evident I did indeed con44te this tenet of his That irresistible power is the rule of justice of which he is pleased to take no notice in his Animadversions But whereas he doth now restrain this priviledge to that power alone which is absolutely irresistible he forgetteth himself over much having formerly extended it to all Soveraignes and Supreme Councels within their own dominions It is manifest therefore that in every Common-wealth there is some one man or Councel which hath c. a Soveraign and absolute power to be limited by the strength of the Common wealth and by no other thing What neither by the Law of God nor nature nor nations nor the municipall laws of the land nor by any other thing but his power and strength Good doctrine Hunc tu Romane caveto Lastly to make his presumtion compleat he indeavoureth to prove that God is not only the author of the Law which is most true and the cause of the act which is partly true because he is the onely fountain of power but that he is the cause of the irregularity that is in plain English which he delighteth in the sin it self I think saith he there is no man but understands c. That where two things are compared the similitude or dissimilitude regularity or irregularity that is between them is made in and by the things themselves that are compared The Bishop therefore that denies God to be the cause of the irregularity denies him to be the cause both of the law and of the action This is that which he himself calleth blasphemy elsewhere that God is the authour or cause of sin Sin is nothing but the irregularity of the Act. So St. John defineth it in expresse terms 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Sin is an anomy or an irregularity or a transgression of the law For sin is nothing else but a declination from the rule that is an irregularity Another definition of sin is this Sin is that which is thought or said or done against the eternall law Still you see the formall reason of sin doth consist in the contrariety to the law that is the irregularity Othets define sinne to be a want of rectitude or a privation of conformity to the rule that is irregularity An irregular action is sin materially Irregularity is sin formally Others define sinne to be a free transgression of the commandement Every one of these definitions demonstrate that Mr. Hobbes maketh God to be properly the cause of sinne But let us weigh his argument He who is the cause of the law and the cause of the action is the cause of the irregularity but God is the cause of the law and the cause of the action I deny his assumption God indeed is the cause of the law but God is not the total or adaequate cause of the action Nay God is not at all the cause of the action qua talis as it is irregular but the free Agent To use our former instance of an unjust judge The Prince is the authour or cause of the law and the Prince is the cause of the judiciary action of the Judge in generall because the Judge deriveth all his power of judicature from the Prince But the Prince is not the cause of the irregularity or repugnance or non-conformity or contrariety which is between the Judges actions and the law but the Judge himself who by his own fault did abuse and misapply that good generall power which was committed and entrusted to him by the Prince he is the only cause of the anomy or irregularity Or as a Scrivener that teacheth one to write and sets him a copy is both the cause of the rule and of the action or writing and yet not the cause of the irregularity or deviation from the rule Sin is a defect or deviation or irregularity No defect no deviation no irregularity can proceed from God But herein doth consist T. H. his errour that he distinguisheth not between an essential and an accidentall subordination Or between a good generall power and the derermination or
Reader by these few instances which follow to judge what the Hobbain principles are in point of religion Ex ungue leonem First that no man needs to put himself to any hazard for his faith but may safely comply with the times And for their faith it is internal and invisible They have the licence that Naaman had and need not put themselves into danger for it Secondly he alloweth Subjects being commanded by their Soveraign to deny Christ. Profession with the tongue is but an external thing and no more than any other gesture whereby we signifie our obedience And wherein a Christian holding firmly in his heart the faith of Christ hath the same liberty which the Prophet Elisha allowed to Naaman c. Who by bowing before the idol Rimmon denied the true God as much in effect as if he had done it with his lips Alas why did St. Peter weep so bitterly for denying his Master out of fear of his life or members It seemeth he was not acquainted with these Hobbian principles And in the same place he layeth down this general conclusion This we may say that whatsoever a Subject is compelled to in obedience to his Soveraign and doth it not in order to his own mind but in order to the laws of his Country that action is not his but his Soveraigns nor is it he that in this case denieth Christ before men but his Governour and the law of his Country His instance in a mahumetan commanded by a Christian Prince to be present at divine service is a weak mistake springing from his grosse ignorance in case-divinity not knowing to distinguish between an erroneous conscience as the Mahumetans is and a conscience rightly informed Thirdly if this be not enough he giveth license to a Christian to commit idolatry or at least to do an idolatrous act for fear of death or corporal danger To pray unto a King voluntarily for fair weather or for any thing which God onely can do for us is divine worship and idolatry On the other side if a King compel a man to it by the terrour of death or other great corporal punishment it is not idolatry His reason is because it is not a sign that he doth inwardly honour him as a god but that he is desirous to save himself from death or from a miserable life It seemeth T. H. thinketh there is no divine worship but internal And that it is lawful for a man to value his own life or his limbs more than his God How much is he wiser than the three Children or Daniel himself who were thrown the first into a fiery furnace the last into the Lyons denne because they refused to comply with the idolatrous decree of their Soveraign Prince A fourth aphorisme may be this That which is said in the scripture it is better to obey God than men hath place in the Kingdome of God by pact and not by nature Why nature it self doth teach us that it is better to obey God than men Neither can he say that he intended this only of obedience in the use of indifferent actions and gestures in the service of God commanded by the commonwealth for that is to obey both God and man But if divine law and humane law clash one with another without doubt it is evermore better to obey God than man His fifth conclusion may be that the sharpest and most successfull sword in any war whatsoever doth give soveraign power and authority to him that hath it to approve or reject all sorts of Theologicall doctrines concerning the Kingdome of God not according to their truth or falsehood but according to that influence which they have upon political affaires Hear him But because this doctrine will appear to most men a novelty I do but propound it maintaining nothing in this or any other paradox of religion but attending the end of that dispute of the sword concerning the authority not yet amongst my Countrymen decided by which all sorts of doctrine are to be approved or rejected c. For the points of doctrine concerning the Kingdome of God have so great influence upon the Kingdome of man as not to be determined but by them that under God have the soveraign power Careat successibus opto Quisquis ab eventu facta notanda putat Let him evermore want successe who thinketh actions are to be judged by their events This doctrine may be plausible to those who desire to fish in troubled waters But it is justly hated by those which are in Authority and all those who are lovers of peace and tranquillity The last part of this conclusion smelleth ranckly of Jeroboam Now shall the Kingdome return to the house of David if this people go up to do sacrifice in the house of the Lord at Ierusalem whereupon the King took councell and made two calves of gold and said unto them It is too much for you to go up to Ierusalem behold thy Gods O Israel which brought thee out of the land of Egypt But by the just disposition of Almighty God this policy turned to a sin and was the utter destruction of Jeroboam and his family It is not good jesting with edg-tooles nor playing with holy things where men make their greatest fastnesse many times they find most danger His sixth paradox is a rapper The civill lawes are the rules of good and evill just and unjust honest and dishonest and therefore what the lawgiver commands that is to be accounted good what he forbids bad And a little after before empires were just and unjust were not as whose nature is relative to a command every action in its own nature is indifferent That it is just or unjust proceedeth from the right of him that commandeth Therefore lawfull Kings make those things which they command just by commanding them and those things which they forbid unjust by forbidding them To this adde his definition of a sin that which one doth or omitteth saith or willeth contrary to the reason of the commonwealth that is the civil lawes Where by the lawes he doth not understand the written lawes elected and aproved by the whole common-wealth but the verball commands or mandates of him that hath the soveraign power as we find in many places of his writings The civil lawes are nothing else but the commands of him that is endowed with soveraign power in the commonwealth concerning the future actions of his subjects And the civil lawes are fastned to the lips of that man who hath the soveraigne power Where are we in Europe or in Asia Where they ascribed a divinity to their Kings and to use his own phrase made them mortall gods O King live for ever Flatterers are the common moaths of great pallaces where Alexanders friends are more numerous than the Kings friends But such grosse palpable pernicious flattery as this is I did never meet with so derogatory both to piety and policy
in a mean for he himself doth never observe a mean All his bolts fly over or under but at the right mark it is in vain to expect him Sometimes he fancieth an omnipotence in Kings sometimes he strippeth them of their just rights Perhaps he thinketh that it may fall out in politicks as it doth sometimes in physick Bina venena invant Two contrary poysons may become a Cordial to the Common-wealth I will begin with his defects where he attributeth too little to Regal power Fist he teacheth that no man is bound to go to warfare in person except he do voluntarily undertake it A man that is commanded as a Souldier to fight against the enemy may neverthelesse in many cases refuse without injustice Of these many cases he setteth down onely two First when he substituteth a sufficient souldier in his place for in this case he deserteth not the service of the Common-wealth Secondly there is allowance to be made for natural timorousnesse or men of feminine courage This might passe as a municipal law â—…tc exempt some persons at some time in some places But to extend it to all persons places and times is absurd and repugnant to his own grounds who teacheth that justice and injustice do depend upon the command of the Soveraign that whatsoever he commandeth he maketh lawful and just by commanding it His two cases are two great impertinencies and belong to the Soveraign to do or not to do as Graces whoso is timerous or fearful let him depart not to the Subjects as right He forgetteth how often he hath denied all knowledge of good and evill to Subjects and subjected their will absolutely to the will of the Soveraign The Soveraign may use every mans strength and wealth at his pleasure His acknowledgement that the Soveraign hath right enough to punish his refusal with death is to no purpose The question is not whether his refusal be punishable or not but whether it be just or not Upon his principles a Soveraign may justly enough put the most innocent Subject in the World to death as we shall see presently And his exception when the defence of the Common-wealth requireth at once the help of all that are able to bear armes is no answer to the other case and it self a case never like to happen He must be a mortall god indeed that can bring all the hands in a Kingdome to fight at one battle Another of his principles is this Security is the end for which men make themselves subjects to others which if it be not enjoyed no man is understood to have subjected himself to others or to have lost his right to defend himself at his own discretion Neither is any man understood to have bound himself to any thing or to have relinquished his right over all things before his own security be provided for What ugly consequences do flow from this paradox and what a large window it openeth to sedition and rebellion I leave to the readers judgement Either it must be left to the soveraign determination whether the subjects security be sufficiently provided for And then in vain is any mans sentence expected against himself or to the discretion of the subject as the words themselves do seem to import and then there need no other bellowes to kindle the fire of a civill war and put a whole commonwealth into a combustion but this seditious Article We see the present condition of Europe what it is that most soveraignes have subjects of a different communion from themselves and are necessitated to tolerate different rites for fear least whilst they are plucking up the tares they should eradicate the wheat And he that should advise them to do otherwise did advise them to put all into fire and flame Now hear this mercifull and peaceable Author It is manifest that they do against conscience and wish as much as is in them the eternall destruct on of their subjects who do not cause such doctrine and such worship to be taught and exhibited to their subjects as they themselves do believe to conduce to their eternall salvation or tolerate the contrary to be taught and exhibited Did this man write waking or dreaming And howsoever in words he denie all resistance to the soveraign yet indeed he admitteth it No man is bound by his pacts whatsoever they be not to resist him who bringeth upon him death or wounds or other bodily dammage by this learning the Scholler if he be able may take the rod out of his masters hand and whip him It followeth Seeing therefore no man is bound to that which is impossible they who are to suffer death or wounds or rather corporall dammage and are not constant enough to endure them are not obliged to suffer them And more fully In case a great many men together have already resisted the soveraign power unjustly or committed some capitall crime for which every one of them expecteth death whether have they not the liberty to join together and assist and defend one another certainly they have for they do but defend their lives which the guilty man may as well do as the innocent There was indeed unjustice in the first breach of their duty Their bearing of armes subsequent to it though it be to maintain what they have done is no new unjust act Why should we not change the name of Leviathan into the Rebells catechism Observe the difference between the primitive spirit and the Hobbian spirit The Thebaean Legion of known valour in a good cause when they were able to resist did chuse rather to be cut in pieces to a man than defend themselves against their Emperour by armes because they would rather die innocent than live nocent But T. H. alloweth Rebells and conspirators to make good their unlawfull attempts by armes was there ever such a trumpetter of rebellion heard of before perhaps he may say that he alloweth them not to justifie their unlawfull acts but to defend themselves First this is contrary to himself for he alloweth them to maintain what they had unjustly done This is too much and too intolerable but this is not all Secondly If they chance to win the field who must suffer for their faults or who dare thenceforward call their Acts unlawfull Will you hear what a casuist he is And for the other instance of attaining soveraignty by rebellion it is manifest that though the event follow yet because it cannot reasonably be expected but rather the contrary and because by gaining it so others are taught to gain the same in like manner the attempt thereof is against reason And had he no other reasons indeed against horrid Rebellion but these two It seemeth he accounteth conscience or the bird in the breast to be but an Idoll of the brain And the Kingdome of heaven as he hath made it not valuable enough to be ballanced against an earthly Kingdome And as for hell he hath expounded it
without appointing or constituting a subjection without subjection an authorising without authorising What is this He saith that it cannot be said honourably of God that he hath parts or totality which are the attributes of finite things If it cannot be said honourably of God that he hath parts or totality then it cannot be said honourably of God that he is a body for every body hath parts and totality Now hear what he saith Every part of the Universe is body And that which is no body is no part of the Universe And because the Universe is all that which is no part of it is nothing Then if God have no parts and totality God is nothing Let him judge how honourable this is for God He saith We honour not God but dishonour him by any value lesse than infinite And how doth he set an infinite value upon God who every where maketh him to subsist by successive duration Infinite is that to which nothing can be added but to that which subsisteth by successive duration something is added every minute He saith Christ had not a Kingly authority committed to him by his Father in the World but onely consiliary and doctrinal He saith on the contrary That the kingdom of Iudaea was his hereditary right from King David c. And when it pleased him to play the King he required entire obedience Math. 21. 2. Go into the village over against you and streightway ye shall find an assetied and a colt with her loose them and bring them unto me And if any man say ought unto you ye shall say The Lord hath need of them He saith The institution of eternal punishment was before sin And if the command be such as cannot be obeyed without being damned to eternal death then it were madnesse to obey it And what evil hath excommunicatien in it but the consequent eternal punishment At other times he saith there is no eternal punishment It is evident that there shall be a second death of every one that shall be condemned at the day of Iudgement after which he shall die no more He who knoweth no soul nor spirit may well be ignorant of a spiritual death He saith It is a doctrine repugnant to civil society that whatsoever a man does against his conscience is sin Yet he himself saith It is a sin whatsoever one doth against his conscience for they that do that despise the Law He saith That all power secular and spiritual under Christ is united in the Christian Common-wealth that is the Christian Soveraign Yet he himself saith on the contrary It cannot be doubted of that the power of binding and loosing that is of remotting and retaining sins which we call the power of the keyes was given by Christ to future Pastours in the same manner as to the present Apostles And all power of remitting sin which Christ himself had was given to the Apostles All spiritual power is in the Christian Magistrate Some spiritual power that is the power of the keyes is in the successours of the Apostles that is not in the Christian Magistrate is a contradiction He confesseth That it is manifest that from the ascension of Christ until the conversion of Kings the power Ecclesiastical was in the Apostles and so delivered unto their successours by imposition of hands And yet straight forgetting himself he taketh away all power from them even in that time when there were no Christian Kings in the World He alloweth them no power to make any Ecclesiastical laws or constitutions or to impose any manner of commands upon Christians The office of the Apostles was not to command but teach As Schoole-Masters not as Commanders Yet Schoole-Masters have some power to command He suffereth not the Apostles to ordain but those whom the Church appointeth nor to excommunicate or absolve but whom the Church pleaseth He maketh the determination of all controversies to rest in the Church not in the Apostles And resolveth all questions into the authority of the Church The election of Doctours and Prophets did rest upon the authority of the Church of Antioch And if it be inquired by what authority it came to passe that it was received for the command of the Holy Ghost which those Prophets and Doctors said proceeded from the Holy Ghost we must necessarily answer By the authority of the Church of Antioch Thus every where he ascribeth all authority to the Church none at all to the Apostles even in those times before there were Christian Kings He saith not tell it to the Apostles but tell it to the Church that we may know the definitive sentence whether sin or no sin is not left to them but to the Church And it is manifest that all authority in spiritual things doth depend upon the authority of the Church Thus not contented with single contradictions he twisteth them together for according to his definition of a Church there was no Christian Church at Antioch or in those parts of the World either then or long after Hear him A Church is a company of men professing Christian Religion united in the person of one Soveraign at whose command they ought to assemble and without whose authority they ought not to assemble Yet there was no Christian Soveraign in those parts of the World then or for two hundred years after and by consequence according to his definition no Church He teacheth That when the civil Soveraign is an infidel every one of his own subjects that resisteth him sinneth against the Laws of God and rejecteth the counsel of the Apostles that admonisheth all Christians to obey their Princes and all children and servants to obey their Parents and Masters in all things As for not resisting he is in the right but for obeying in all things in his sense it is an abominable errour Upon this ground he alloweth Christians to deny Christ to sacrifice to idols so they preserve faith in their hearts He telleth them They have the license that Naaman had and need not put themselves into danger for their faith That is they have liberty to do any external acts which their infidel Soveraigns shall command them Now hear the contrary from himself When Soveraigns are not Christians in spiritual things that is in those things which pertain to the manner of worshipping God some Church of Christians is to be followed Adding that when we may not obey them yet we may not resist them but eundum est ad Christum per martyrium we ought to suffer for it He confesseth That matter and power are indifferent to contrary forms and contrary acts And yet maintaineth every where that all matter is necessitated by the outward causes to one individual form that is it is not indifferent And all power by his Principles is limitted and determined to one particular act Thus he scoffeth at me for the contrary very learnedly