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A34029 Modern reports, or, Select cases adjudged in the Courts of Kings Bench, Chancery, Common-pleas, and Exchequer since the restauration of His Majesty King Charles II collected by a careful hand. Colquitt, Anthony.; England and Wales. Court of Chancery.; England and Wales. Court of King's Bench.; England and Wales. Court of Common Pleas.; England and Wales. Court of Exchequer. 1682 (1682) Wing C5414; ESTC R11074 235,409 350

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the Lady Ann Countess of Newport all that my House called Newport-house and all other my Lands c. in the County of Middlesex for her life And after her death I give and bequeath the premisses to my Grand-child Ann Knollis viz. the Plaintiff and to the heirs of her body Provided always and upon condition that she marry with the consent of my said Wife and the Earl of Warwick and the Earl of Manchester or of the major part of them And in case she marry without such consent or happen to dye without Issue Then I give and bequeath it to George Porter viz. the Defendant The Earl dyed Ann the Plaintiff married Charles the Plaintiff she being then about fourteen or fifteen years old without the consent of either of the Trustees And thereupon now a Bill was preferred to be relieved against this Condition and Forfeiture because she had no notice of this Condition and Limitation made to her c. To this the Defendant had demurred but that was over-ruled Afterwards there were several Depositions c. made and testified on each side the effect of which was this On the Plaintiffs part it was proved by several that it was always the Earls intention that the Plaintiff should have this Estate and that they never heard of this purpose to put any Condition upon her and believed that he did not intend to give away the Inheritance from her But that this Clause in the Will was only in terrorem and Cautionary to make her the more obsequious to her Grandmother The two Earls swore that they had no notice of this Clause in the Will but if they had they think it possible such reasons might have been offered as might have induced them to give their consents to the Marriage and that now they do consent to and approve of the same Some proof was made that the Countess of Newport had some design that the Plaintiff should not have this Estate but that the Defendant should have it But at last even she viz. the Countess was reconciled and did declare that she forgave the Plaintiffs Marriage and that she shewed great affection to a Child which the Plaintiff had and directed that when she was dead the Plaintiff and her Child should be let into the possession of the premisses and should enjoy them c. It was proved also that when there had been a Treaty concerning the Marriage betweén my Lord Morpeth and the Plaintiff and the Plaintiff would not marry him her Grandmother said she should marry where she would she would take no further care about her the Countess was dead at the time of this Suit It was proved that Mr. Fry was of a good Family and that the Defendant had 5000 l. appointed and provided for him by his Grandfather by the same Will On the Defendants part It was sworn by the said late Countess of Newport viz. In an answer made formerly to a Bill brought against her by the now Defendant for preferring of Testimony which was ordered to be read that the Marriage was private and without her consent and approbation and that she did not conceive it to be a fit and proportionable Marriage he being a younger Brother and having no Estate The like was sworn by the Earl of Portland the said Countesses then Husband and that it appeared she leapt over a Wall by means of a Wheel-Barrow set up against it to go to be married and that as soon as the Trusteés did know of the Marriage they did disavow and dislike it and so declared themselves several times and said That had they had any hint of it they would have prevented it Others swore that the Earl of Portland declared upon the day of her going away That he never consented thereto and that the Countess desired then that he would not do any thing like it and that the Earl of Warwick said He would have lost one of his Arms rather then have consented to the said Marriage On hearing of this Cause before the Master of the Rolls viz. Sir Harbottle Grimstone Baronet the Plaintiff obtained a decretal Order viz. That Anne the Plaintiff and her Heirs should hold the Premisses quietly against the Defendant and his Heirs and that there should be an Injunction perpetual against the Defendant and all claiming under him And now there was an Appeal thereupon and re-hearing before Sir Orlando Bridgman Knight then Lord-Keeper assisted by the two Lord Chief Justices and the Chief Baron before whom it was argued thus Serjeant Maynard The Plaintiff ought not to have relief in this Case The Plaintiffs Mother had a sufficient provision by the Earl of Newport's Care And therefore there is less reason that this Estate should be added to the Daughter The noble Lords the Trusteés when the thing was fresh did disapprove the Marriage however they may consent thereunto now The Devise was to the Plaintiff but in tail and afterwards to the Defendant We disparage not Mr. Fry in blood nor Family But people do not marry for that only but for Recompence and like Fortune There was a publique Fame or Report it is to be presumed of this Will in the house and were there not yet it was against her Duty and against Nature that she should decline asking her Grand-Mothers consent and Mr. Fry in Honour and Conscience ought to have asked it And therefore this practice ought not to receive the least encouragement in Equity 'T is true when there was a Demurrer it was over-ruled because the Bill prayed to be relieved against a Forfeiture for which there might be good cause in Equity But now it does not appear there is any in the Case The Estate is now in the Defendant and that not by any act of his own but by the Devisor and the Plaintiff this is a Limitation not a Condition For my Lord Newport had Sons It is somewhat of the same effect with a Condition though it is not so We have a Title by the Will of the dead and the act of the other party without fraud or other act of us and therefore it ought not to be defeated I take a difference betweén a devise of Land and money For Land is not originally devisable though Money is By the Civil Law and amongst civil Lawyers it has beén made a question Whether there shall be Relief against such a Limitation in a Devise But be that how it will Chattels are small things but a Freéhold setled ought not to be devested thus No man can make a Limitation in his Will better and stronger to disappoint his Devise conditionally than this is made If my Lord Newport had béen alive would he have liked such a practice upon his Grand-daughters as want of Notice In Organ's Case and Sir Julius Caesar's Case there was a Grant to an Infant on condition to pay 10 s. and no Notice given thereof before 't was payable yet because no body was bound to give notice it was adjudged
another Bond in full satisfaction of the former Vpon this issue being joyned it was found for the Defendant It was said for him that one Bond might be taken in satisfaction of another and 1 Inst 212. b. 30 Ed. 1. 23. Dyer 29. were cited North Chief Iustice If the second Bond had been given by the Obligor himself it would not have discharged the former but here being given by the Administrator so that the Plaintiffs security is bettered and the Administrator chargeable de bonis propriis I conceive it may be a sufficient discharge of the first Bond. Wyndham accord ' else the Administrator and Heir might both be charged Scroggs accord Atkyns There are many Authorities in the point and all directly that one Bond cannot be given in satisfaction of another So is Cr. Eliz. 623 697 716. 727. and many others But yet I hold that Iudgment ought to be given for the Defendant for though it be an impertinent issue yet being found for him he ought by the Statute of 23 H. 8. to have Iudgment If no issue at all had been joyned it would have been otherwise 2 Cro. 44. 575. Serjeant Maynard cites 9 H. 6. but that case was before the Statute so I ground my Iudgment upon that point North. I took it that unapt issues are aided by the Statute but not immaterial ones And so said Scroggs Judic ' pro Defendente Nisi c. Southcot Stowell Intrat ' Hill 25 26 Car. 2. Rot. 1303. COvenant for non-payment of money The case was thus viz. Thomas Southcote had issue two Sons Sir Popham and William and in consideration of the marriage of his Son Sir Popham covenanted to stand seized to the use of Sir Popham and the heirs Males of his body and for default of such issue to the use of the heirs Males of his own body the remainder to his own right heirs Sir Popham dies leaving issue Edward his Son and four Daughters then Thomas the Father died and then Edward died without issue and the question was whether Sir Pophams Daughters or William had the better title Two points were made 1. Whether the limitation of the Remainder to the Heirs Males of the body of the Covenantor were good in its creation or not 2. Admitting it to be good originally whether it could take effect after the death of Edward he leaving Sisters which are general heirs to the Covenantor North Wyndham Atkyns upon admission of the first point were of opinion for William and that he should have the Estate not by purchase but by descent from Edward for after the death of the Father both the Estates in tail were vested in him and he was capable of the remainder by purchase and being once well vested in a purchaser the Estate shall afterwards run in course of descent Scroggs doubted But they all doubted of the first point and would advise V. infr ' Pasch 29 Car. 2. It was said by the Iustices in the Countess of Northumberlands case That if a Knight be but returned on a Iury when a Nobleman is concerned it is not material whether he appear and give his Verdict or no. Also that if there be no other Knights in the County a Serjeant at Law that is a Knight may be returned and his priviledge shall not excuse him Gayle Betts DEbt upon a Bond. The Defendant demands Oyer of the Bond and Condition which was to pay forty pounds per annum quarterly so long as the Defendant should continue Register to the Arch deacon of Colchester and says that the Office was granted to A. B. C. for their lives and that he enjoyed the Office so long as they lived and no longer and that so long he paid the said 40 l. quarterly The Plaintiff replies that the Defendant did enjoy the Office longer and had not paid the money The Defendant demurs supposing the replication was double Cur ' The Replication is not double for the Defendant cannot take issue upon the non-payment of the money that would be a departure from his plea in bar so if upon a plea of nullum fecit arbitrium the Plaintiff in his Replication set forth an award and a breach the Defendant cannot take issue upon the breach for that would be an implicite confession of what he had denied before North. If the Defendant plead that he did not exercise the Office beyond such a time till which time he paid the money the Plaintiff may take issue either upon the payment till that time or reply upon the continuance but if he do the latter he must shew a breach for the continuance is in it self no breach Ellis Yarborough ACtion upon the Case against a Sheriff for an Escape The Plaintiff declares that one G. was endebted to him in 200 l. and that the Defendant took him upon a Latitat at the Plaintiffs suit and afterward suffered him to escape The Defendant pleads the Statute of 23 H. 6. cap. 10. and that he let G. out upon Bail according to the said Statute and that he had taken reasonable Sureties A. B. persons having sufficient within the County The Plaintiff replies and traverses absque hoc that the Defendant took Bail of persons having sufficient within the Country the Defendant demurs Skipwith The Sheriff is compellable to take Bail If he take insufficient Bail the course is for the Court to amerce the Sheriff and not for the party to have an Action upon the case Cr. Eliz. 852. Bowles and Lassell's case and Noy 39. if the Sheriff takes no Bail an Action lies against him and all Actions brought upon this Statute are founded upon this suggestion 3 Cro. 460. Moor. 428. 2 Cro. 280. but if he take insufficient bail it is at his own peril and no Action lies the Sheriff is Iudge of the bail and the sum is at his discretion Cr. Jac. 286. Villers Hastings and so are the number of the persons he may take one two or three as he pleaseth He cited Cr. Eliz. 808. Clifton Web's case Besides the traverse is pregnant for it implies that the persons have sufficient out of the County and the Sheriff is not bound to take bail only of persons having sufficient within the County Serjeant Barrell contra The Court not agreeing in their Opinions upon the matter of Law it was put off to the next Term to be argued Baldwin for the Defendant cited 3 Cr. 624. 152. 2 Cr. 286. Noy 39. Rolls tit Escape 807. Moor 428. that the Sheriff is compellable to let him to bail and is Iudge of the sufficiency of the Sureties The Statute was made for the Prisoners benefit for the mischief before was that the Sheriff not being compellable to bail him would extort money from him to be bailed and the word sufficient is added in favour of the Sheriff and so are the words within the County The Sheriff is not compellable to assign the bail Bond and then if the Plaintiff cannot
300 l. is as a penalty imposed upon him if he refuse to make such a Grant And if he shall not c. instead of the word not put the words refuse to c. and the case will be out of doubt Besides the annuity to be granted is but 20 l. per annum for a life and 300 l. in money is more then the value of it so that it cannot be intended a sum to be paid in lieu or recompence of it but must be taken for a penalty But suppose it to be a dis-junctive Condition then we ought to have an Election whether we would do but as this case is the Plaintiff by his negligence has deprived us of our Election For Authorities he cited Gerningham Ewer's case Cr. Eliz. 396. 539. 4 H. 7. fol. 4. 5 Co. 21. b. Laughter's case Warner Whyte's case resolved the day before in the Kings Bench. There is a rule laid down in Morecomb's case in Moors Reports 645. which makes against me but the resolution of that case is Law and there needed no such rule That case goes upon the reason of Lambs case 5 Rep. when a man is obliged to pay such a sum as J. S. shall assess J. S. being a meer stranger the Obligor takes upon him that J. S. shall assess a sum in certain and he must procure him to do it or he forfeits his Obligation But in our case nothing is to be done but by the Obligee himself Pemberton contra He argued that the Obligors Election is not taken away for though no Deed were tendred him he might have got one made and the tender of that would have discharged the Condition of his Bond. Indeed this will put him to charge but he may have an Action of Debt for what he lays out He cited the cases cited by Walmesley in Moor 645. betwixt Milles Wood 41 Eliz. Gowers case 38 39 Eliz. c. North. The case of Warner White adjudged yesterday in the Court of Kings Bench is according to Law the condition there was that J. S. should pay such a sum upon the 25th of December or should appear in Hillary Term after in the Court of Kings Bench. J. S. died after the 25th day of Dec ' and before Hill Term and had paid nothing upon the 25th of December In that case the Condition was not broken by the non-payment and the other part is become impossible by the act of God But I think that if the first part of a Condition be rendred impossible by the act of God that the Obligor is bound to perform the other part But in the case at the bar the Obligors Election is taken away by the act of the Obligee himself And I see no difference betwixt this case and that of Gerningham Ewer in Cr. Eliz. if the Condition of an Obligation be single to make such assurance as shall be advised by the Council of the Obligee there concilium non dedit advisamentum is a good plea and the Obligor is not bound to make an assurance of his own head no more shall he be bound to do it when the Condition is in the dis-junctive to save his Bond. In both cases the Condition refers to the manner of the assurance and it must be made in such manner as the words of the Condition import So he said he was of Opinion against the Plaintiff Wyndham Where the Condition of an Obligation is in the disjunctive the Obligor must have his Election But in this case there is no such thing as a disjunctive till such time as there be a request made to seal a Deed of Annuity and then the Obligor will have an Election either to execute the assurance or to pay the 300 l. but no such request being made it should seem that the Obligor must pay the 300 l. at his peril Atkyns agreed with the Chief Iustice and so did Scroggs wherefore Iudgment was ordered to be entred against the Plaintiff Nisi causa c. within a week Quare impedit The Plaintiff declared upon a grant of the Advowson to his Ancestor and in his Declaration says hic in Cur̄ prolat ' but indéed had not the Deed to shew Serjeant Baldwin brought an Affidavit into Court that the Defendant had gotten the Deéd into his hands and prayed that the Plaintiff may take advantage of a Copy thereof which appear'd in an Inquisition found temp Edw. 6. Cur̄ When an Action of Debt is brought upon a Bond to perform Covenants in a Deed and the Defendant cannot plead Covenants perform'd without the Deed because the Plaintiff has the original deed and perhaps the Defendant took not a Counterpart of it we use to grant imparlances till the Plaintiff bring in the deed And upon Evidence if it be proved that the other party has the deed we admit Copies to be given in Evidence But here the Law requires that the deed be produced you have your remedy for the deed at Law We cannot alter the Law nor ought to grant an emparlance Stead Perryer EJectione firmae A man has a Son called Robert Robert has likewise a Son called Robert The Grandfather deviseth the Land in question to his Son Robert and his heirs Robert the deviseé dies in the devisors life time Afterwards the devisor makes a new publication of the same Will and declares it to be his intention that Robert the Grand-child should take the Land in question per eandem voluntatem instead of his Father and dyed And all this was found by special Verdict upon a Trial betwixt Robert the Grand-child and a Daughter of the elder Brother of Robert the first devisee Pemberton The Land does not pass by this Will the devise to Robert became void by his death and cannot be made good by a republication A publication cannot alter the words of a Will so as to put a new sense upon them Land must pass by Will in writing Robert the Grand-son is not within this Will in writing The Grandfathers intention is not considerable in the case Skipwith contra I agree the case between Brett Rygden in the Commentaries to be Law but there are two great diversities between this case and that 1. There was no new publication 2. In this case Robert the Father and Robert the Son are cognominous He cited Dyer 142 143. Trevilians case Fuller Fuller Cr. Eliz. 422. Moor 353. Cr Eliz. 493. North Atkyns Without question Robert the Grand-child shall take by this Will If he never had had a Son called Robert or if Robert the Son had been dead at the time of making the Will the Grand-child would then without dispute have taken by these words Now a new publication is equivolent to a new writing The Grand-child is not directly within the words of the Will but they are applicable to him He is a Son though he be not begotten by the body of the devisor himself He is a Son with
Maskew which I confess is a full authority for this that they need not joyn The Case was thus The Testator recovers a Iudgment and dies making his Will thus Also I devise the residue of my Estate to my two Daughters and my Wife whom I make my Executrix I confess I cannot tell why but the Spiritual Court did judge them all both the two Daughters as well as the Wife to be Executrices and therefore we the Iudges must take them to be so The Wife alone proves the Will with a reservata potestate to the Daughters when they should come in But this makes nothing at all in this Case I think this is according to their usual form The Wife alone sues a Scire facias upon this Iudgment and therein sets forth this whole matter viz. that there were two other Executrices which were under seventeen c. It was adjudged for the Plaintiff and affirmed in a Writ of Errour in Cam. Scacc̄ that the Scire facias was well brought by her alone But first I cannot see how a Writ of Errour should lie in that Case in Cam. Scacc̄ For it is not a Cause within 27 Eliz. 2. What reason is there for Iudgment a reason may be given that before an Executor comes to seventeen he is no Executor But I say he is quoad esse though not quoad Excecutionem A Wife Administratrix under seventeen shall joyn with her Husband in an Action and why shall not the Infants as well in our Case Yelv. 130. is express that the Infant must joyn and be named It is clear that no Administration durante minore aetate can be committed in this Case For all the Executors make but one person and therefore why may not all joyn 2. Admitting they may joyn whether the Infants may sue by Attorney I hold that in no Case an Infant shall sue or be sued either in his own or auter droit by Attorney There are but four ways by which any man can sue In propria persona per Attornatum per Guardianum and per Prochein amy 1 Ro. 747. aut 340. 400. post 747. An Infant cannot sue in propria persona That was adjudged in Dawkes versus Peyton It was an excellent Case and there were many notable Points in it First It was Resolved That a Writ of Errour might be brought in this Court upon an Errour in Fact in the Petty Bagg 2. That the Entry being general venit such a one it shall he intended to be in propia persona 3. That it was Error for the Infant in that Case to appear otherwise than by a Guardian 4. That the Errour was not helped by the Statute of Jeoffails In a Case between Colt Sherwood Mich. 1649. an Infant Administrator sued and appeared per Guardianum and it appeared upon the Record that he was above seventeen years of age I was of Council in it and we insisted it was Errour but it was adjudged That he appeared as he ought to appear and that he ought not to appear by Attorney And the Reasons given were First Because an Infant cannot make an Attorney by reason of his inability Secondly Because by this means an Infant might be amerced pro falso Clamore For when he appears by Attorney non constat unless it happen to be specially set forth that he is an Infant and so he is amerced at all adventures and to relieve himself against this he has no remedy but by a Writ of Errour For Errour in Fact cannot be assignd ore tenus And it were well worth the Cost to bring a Writ of Errour to take off an amercement But it is said That the Infants may appear by Attorney in this Case because they are coupled and joyned in company with those of full age I think that makes no difference for that reason would make such appearance good in case that they were all Defendants But it is agreed That if an Infant be Defendant with others who are of full age he cannot appear by Attorney The reason is the same in both Cases If an Infant and two men of full age joyn in a Feoffment and make a Letter of Attorney c. this is not good nor can in any sort take away the imbecility which the Law makes in an Infant I conclude I think the Plaintiffs ought to joyn but the Infants ought to appear by Guardian But since my two Brothers are of another mind as to the last Point there must be Iudgment that the Defendant respondeat ouster Nota Coleman argued for the Defendant his Argument which ought to have been inserted above was to this effect First These five cannot joyn had there been but one Executor and he under seventeen years the Administrator durant̄ minor̄ c. ought to have brought the Action 5 Co. 29. a. But since there are several Executors and some of them of full age there can be no Administration durant ' minor̄ Those of full age must Administer for themselves and the Infants to But the course is that Executors of full age prove the Will and the other that is under age shall not come in till his age of seventeen years But now the question is How this Action should have beén brought I say according to the President of Hatton versus Maskew which was in Cam. Scacc̄ Mich. 15 Car. 2. Rot. 703. wherein the Executor who was of full age brougt the Scire fac̄ but set forth that there were other two Executors who were under age and therefore they which were of full age pray Iudgment It was resolved the Scire fac̄ was well brought and they agreed That the Cases in Yelverton 130. was good Law because in that Case it was not set forth specially in the Declaration that there was another Executor under age So that they Resolved That the Executor of full age could not bring the Action without naming the others 2. However the Infants ought to sue by Guardian and where Rolls and other Books say that where some are of age and some under they may all sue by Artorney It is to be understood of such as are indeed under 21 but above 17. Respondeas ouster After this the Suit was Compounded Term. Pasch 22 Car. II. Regis The great Case in Cancellaria between Charles Fry and Ann his Wife against George Porter Resolved That there is no Relief in Equity against the Forfeiture of Land limited over by Devise in Marrying without consent c. Many particulars concerning Equity THe Case was Montjoy Earl of Newport was seized of an house called Newport-house c. in the County of Middlesex and had three Sons who were then living and two Daughters Isabel married to the Earl of Banbury with her Fathers consent who had issue A. the Plaintiff and Ann married to Mr. Porter without her Fathers Consent who had issue D. both these Daughters dyed The Earl of Newport made his Will in this manner I give and bequeath to my dear wife