Answer acknowledged the said Debt This Court declared that the said Debt of 400 l. and Costs ought to be paid and Ordered the same accordingly and that the same be paid by Phillip Innelt Esq who purchased the premises liable thereto Hodkin contra Blackman al' 26 Car. 2. fo 773. THe Bill is to discover the Estate of the Intestate Maurice Blackman which came to the Hands of Elizabeth his Relict and to make the same liable to the satisfaction of a Debt of 300 l. lent to the said Intestate for Security whereof the said Intestate gave a Penal Security of 1000 l. The Defendant Elizabeth the Administratrix of the said Intestate insists Agreement to Settle 100 l. in Money Goods or Lands upon Marriage for 500 l. Portion 200 l. of the said 500 l. not paid she hath no Assets to Satisfie the Plaintiffs Demands for that in 1665. the Intestate Blackman her late Husband before Marriage with her and her Father Doctor Argoll came to this Agreement viz. that her said Father should give with her in Marriage to the said Blackman 500 l. and in consideration thereof and of such Marriage the said Blackman should enter into one Obligation to the said Doctor Argoll of 3000 l. Bond of 3000 l. to perform the said Agreement and Judgment thereupon pleaded in Bar of other Debts and Goods penalty Conditioned for the Setling of 1500 l. upon the said Defendant Elizabeth and her Heirs in Monies Lands or otherwise within one Month after the Marriage that accordingly the said Blackman in August 1665. entred into such Bond and the said Marriage was had and the said Blackman received 300 l. of the Portion and the remaining 200 l. was in the Hands of the Defendants Serjant Brampston that the said Blackman never made such Provision for the said Defendant Elizabeth and her Children as by the Condition of the said Bond he was to do and the Defendant Mary after the Death of Doctor Argoll her Father whose Executrrix she is finding the said 3000 l. uncancelled and the Condition thereof not performed did in August before the time of putting the Defendant Elizabeth's Answer commence an Action of Debt against the said Defendant Elizabeth as Admininistratrrix to Blackman her late Husband and recovered a Judgment thereon for 3000 l. Debt upon the Bond. But the Plaintiff insists that the remaining 200 l. in Serjant Brampstons Hands which is part of the said Elizabeth's Portion ought to be applyed to Satisfie the Plaintiffs Debt as far as the same will go and what the same falls short of the rest of the Estate ought to supply This Court declared they saw no colour of Cause to give the said Plaintiff any Relief against the said 3000 l. Bond and Judgment thereon had other than against the Penalty and therefore the said Defendant ought to be first satisfied her said 1500 l. out of the Personal Estate of the said Blackman and Decreed the same accordingly Mosely contra Mosely 27 Car. 2. fo 521. THe Defendant claims several things devised to her in specie by the Will of Sir Edward Mosely Clause in a Will that if any Legatee should hinder or oppose the Execution of the Will then such person should lose the Legacy bequeathed A Suit for the Legacy no forfeiture and the Plaintiff would bar her claim and right for the whole by a particular Clause in the Will viz. That if any Legatee should hinder or oppose the Execution of his Will then such person should lose the Legacy bequeathed This Court as to the Clause of Forfeiture in the Will which the Plaintiff would have the benefit of by reason of the Defendants contesting and opposing of the Execution of it declared its Opinion to be That no advantage ought to be taken thereof but that the Defendant ought to have her specifick Legacies bequeathed by the Will The Court also declared their Opinion of the Rent demanded by the Defendant of 880 l. that notwithstanding the Defendants opposition of the Will the said Rent was not forfeited or suspended nor ought in equity to be so deemed and ordered the Defendants demand thereof to stand good and be allowed as a good demand Plummer contra Stamford 27 Car. 2. fo 74. THat Edward Stamford entred into a Recognizance of 800 l. An Ancient Recognizance not set aside to let in a Mortgage to John Stamford his Brother in 22 Car. the Plaintiff having a Mortgage on Edward Stamfords Estate and in respect of the Antiquity of the said Recognizance would have it set aside presuming the mony to be satisfied that the Plaintiff may come in with his Mortgage This Court would not relive the Plaintiff against the Recognizance Twiford contra Warcup 27 Car. 2. fo 749. THe Plaintiff and Defendant entred into Articles for Purchase of the Lands in question Articles Conveyance by which Articles the Plaintiff Covenanted That the said Lands did fully and compleatly contain the quantities of Acres in a particular to the said Articles annexed and in pursuance of the said Articles and particular a Conveyance was Executed to the Defendant Now the Defendant insists That the Plaintiff hath not performed the Covenant in the said Articles for that the Lands are short of what the particular mentions them to be and insists they ought to be made good by the Plaintiff This Court on reading the Articles particular and Conveyance declared that altho' the Covenant in the Articles were that the Lands did full and compleatly contain the quantities in the Schedule yet in that Schedule and likewise in the Conveyance it is mentioned to contain so many Acres by Estimation and if there were 4 or 5 Acres more the Plaintiff cannot have them back again so on the other side if less the Defendant must take it according to the Conveyance and that the Articles being only a security for a Conveyance and the Defendant having afterwards taken a Conveyance No resorting back to a defect in Articles after a Conveyance thereupon executed the Defendant shall not resort to the Articles or to any particular or to any Averment or Communication after the Conveyances Executed which ought not to be admitted against the Deed and therefore saw no Cause to make any allowance for defect of Acres Newton contra Langham 27 Car. 2. fo 563. THe Plaintiff having an Adventure of 1700 l. Adventure in the East-India Company Mortgaged redeemable in the East-India Company Mortgaged the same 15 years since to Sir William Vincent who died and made the Defendant Executor who hath possessed the said 1700 l. Adventure and refuse to reassign the same to the Plaintiff the mony being paid for which it was a Security The Defendant insists That the said Adventure is not redeemable it being contingent and hazardous and cost much mony to insure and 14 years since it was assigned from Hand to Hand by a Decre for the Assignment to the Defendants Testatrix This Court declared That notwithstanding
Value if so proved is to continue to be paid whether the said premisses rise or fall in Value and decreed accordingly Hethersell contra Hales 31 Car. 2. fo 845. THe Question in the Case is touching 2500 l. 200 l. allowed a Trustee for Charges and Expences in managing a Trust demanded by the Defendant for his Charges and Expences in managing the Trust in question which began in 1668. and continued till this Defendants Answer was put in in which time the Defendant received 20000 l. and paid the same all away to the Creditors and the Plaintiff had not surcharged the Defendant 6 d. This Court took till this day to consider what was fit to be allowed in a matter of this nature and having considered that the Defendant was a Friend to the Family and undertook the Trust at their great Importunity he having a considerable Estate when he undertook the Trust and considering the charges of Surveying the whole Estate setting and letting the same looking after Tenants adjusting their Accounts calling in their Rents returning Monies to Creditors and treating with and stating their Debts and procuring and agreeing with Purchasors and for Law charges and for keeping Servants and Horses and employing others in Journeys to London and elsewhere and his Care there lying from home a long time was of Opinion That the Defendant might well deserve the whole 2500 l. yet doth allow but 2000 l. which the said Defendant is to have Ray Vx ejus contra Stanhope 31 Car. 2. fo 809. THe Bill is That Sir Edward Stanhope Trust the Plaintiff Elizabeths Grandfather by Deed demised Lands to Trustees for ten years after the said Edwards death upon Trust that they should out of the Profits pay to the Plaintiff Elizabeth for her Maintenance 20 l. per annum until her Age of 21. and should further pay to the Plaintiff Elizabeth at her Age of 21. if she so long keep unmarried 1000 Marks for her Portion That the said Sir Edward died leaving Issue Edward Stanhope the Plaintiff Elizabeths Father his Son and Heir she being then 12 years of Age That after Sir Edwards death the Trustees did not intermeddle but left all to the management of the said Plaintiffs Father who received all the Profits and on that Consideration Edward Stanhope the Plaintiffs Father demised to Trustees the said premisses the Reversion of which he was seized in Fee expectant upon the said Term of 10 years and other Lands whereof he was Seized in Fee to hold for 20 years upon Trust to pay the Plaintiff Elizabeth 20 l. per Annum until her Marriage and 500 l. after her Marriage in such manner as in the said Deed for 20 years is expressed and the same was said to be made in consideration of the Preferment the said Sir Edward intended for the Plaintiff Elizabeth his Grandchild that the Plaintiff received the profits of the premisses in the said former Lease during the 10 years and profits of the Premisses in the said latter Lease so long as he lived and maintained the Plaintiff and in 1658. the Plaintiff Elizabeths Father dyed without Issue Male but in his life after the said Lease for 20 years setled the premisses with other Lands of 500 l. per Annum upon the Defendant his Brother without any consideration save natural Affection and the Defendant hath since received the profits that the Plaintiff Elizabeth was unmarryed at her Fathers Death and was his only Child and about nineteen years before the Bill exhibited she Marryed George Stanhope who dyed and about 7 years since she Marryed the Plaintiff Ray so to have Satisfaction of the 20 l. per annum from her Fathers Death to the time of her Marriage with George Stanhope and the 500 l. and Interest from her said Marriage but the Defendant refuseth to pay the same pretending the said several Terms are expired and that the Lands of 60 l. per Annum descended upon the Plaintiff Elizabeth by her Fathers permission in Satisfaction of the said Money but the Plaintiff insists the Lands descended to her from her Father were charged with 500 l. which she hath paid and she had no other provision made for her out of her Fathers Estate and that the Defendant had an Estate of 500 l. per Annum come to him by a voluntary Settlement from the Plaintiffs Father The Defendant insisted that if the Plaintiff Eliz. Father did make such demise for 20 years he had no power so to do being but Tenant for life by a Settlement made by the said Sir Edward and so the Defendant not liable to pay the Moneys and the Defendant claims the Lands and Premisses by vertue of a Fine and Settlement made by the said Edward Stanhope the Plaintiffs Father wherein the Defendant and his Brother George Stanhope joyned and though the said Defendant is the Heir Male of this Family yet he receives little there out of the said Estate the same being charged with 86 l. per An. and the Plaintiff hath not only enjoyed the said 62 l. per ann charged only with 500 l. but also as Administrator to her said Father received out of his Personal Estate 600 l. and if she should have the 500 l. in question also she would have a greater share out of the Estate Arrears of Annuity decreed to be paid and also a portion of 500 l. upon the Defendants owning it in a Letter than the Defendant This Court upon reading a Letter from the Defendant wherein he owns the 500 l. to be due to the Plaintiff Elizabeth on her Marriage and 20 l. per Annum in the mean time or to that effect declared the Defendant ought to pay the Arrears of the said 20 l. per Annum from the death of the Plaintiffs Father to her Marriage with her first Husband and also the 500 l. with the Interest thereof from the time it was raised out of the profits and decreed the same accordingly Dom. Blois al' contra Blois al' 31 Car. 2. fo 723. THe Bill of the Plaintiff Will. Dame Jane Blois and of Jane her Daughter by Sir William Bloys is viz. that the said Sir William Blois Father of the said Jane the Infant being Seized of Lands by his Will gave all his Real and Personal Estate to the Defendant Dame Elizabeth to the Plaintiff Dame Jane and to the Defendant Mary Brook and Abigal Hodges provided that his Son Charles Blois should have 300 l. per Annum thereof and all his Goods should be equally divided amongst his 4 Children as soon as the said Charles should by a Match raise 9000 l. to be paid to his Sisters and made the four Children Executors and dyed whereby the Plaintiff Dame Jane and the rest of the Executors were Intituled to all the Real and Personal Estate to them and their Heirs as joynt Tenants in Trust nevertheless for the said Elizabeth and Mary and the Infant Plaintiff until the Sum of 9000 l. should be raised
from this Defendant all her Lands and personal Estate which the Defendant had given her power to do and she died and for Non-payment of the said 400 l. per Annum the Defendant entred upon the Lands liable to the payment thereof and the Defendant hopes the said Decree shall not be Reversed The Plaintiff insists That the Title in Law in the Ladies Estate was in Trustees before her Marriage with the Defendant and so agreed to be continued without his intermedling therewith he bringing no Additional Estate to the said Lady and that there was no Fine levied to the Trustees or otherwise of her Estate of Inheritance Revocation of Uses and that the Uses upon the Recoveries were with power of Revocation in the Lady alone and that pursuant to such power by Deed 14 Car. 1. she Revoked the same and setled the same in Trust for such persons and their Heirs as she by her Will should appoint and that the said Tripartite Indenture and Decree did not discharge the Trust nor take notice of the Recoveries and that the said Lady in 1659. did appoint that her Trustees upon the said Recoveries shall convey part of her Land to the Plaintiff Solmes's Father and the Plaintiff Terrell and the rest to her Heir at Law and that in 1650. the said Land came first to be charged which was after the Ladies death and presently after there appeared Infancies which was the reason the said Decree was not sooner impeach'd This Court being assisted with the Judges Bill of Review dismist for that its a long time since the Decree was made and the Plaintiffs rested under it without any Complaint taking into Consideration the length of Time since the Decree was made and how long they were resting under it without any Complaint and that the Heirs have a benefit by the Ladies separate power of disposing who disposed accordingly by her Will. This Court with the Judges declared and are of Opinion that the said Decree grounded on the Tripartite Indenture 14 Car. 1. was and is a good Decree and ought to be performed and dismissed the Bill of Review White cont Ewens al' 22 Car. 2. fo 237. THis is upon an Appeal from a Decree Appeal from a Decree the Case being That Dame Ann Brett Relict of Sir Alex. Brett having a Joynture in the Manors and Lands of Whitstanton and Alexander her Son having on the Marriage with Elizabeth the Daughter of Sir William Kirkham agreed to settle 250 l. per Annum Joynture on the said Elizabeth but being disabled to do it by reason of Dame Anns Joynture he being seised only of 120 l. per Annum in Whitland and the Reversion of Yarkcombe the said Alexander agreed with the said Dame Ann That his Heirs Executors or Administrators should pay yearly after his death to Sir Humfry Lind and George Brett 250 l. per Annum during the said Dame Anns life if the said Elizabeth should so long live and thereupon the said Dame Ann Joyned with the said Alexander in a Grant of a Rent-charge of 250 l. per Annum out of Whitstanton for the Joyture of Elizabeth and Alexander 12 Jac. 1. demised Whitland and Tarkcombe to Lind and Brett the said Trustees for an hundred years to commence immediately after such time as the Heirs Executors or Administrators of Alexander should fail to pay the said 250 l. per Annum to the said Trustees during the life of the said Elizabeth That 15 Jac. 1. the said Alexander died and there being a failure of payment of the 250 l. by the Children Executors c. of the said Alexander to the said Elizabeth or to the Trustees for the use of the said Dame Ann the said Dame Ann paid the same out of Whitstanton and thereby the said Lease of 100 years of Whitlands and Yarkcombe did commence and thereupon she entred and received the Profits of Whitlands and the said Dame Ann paid the 250 l. during the life of the said Elizabeth That the said Alexander leaving three Children viz. Robert Mary and Ann wholly unprovided for and by Agreement the said Dame Ann was to pay 80 l. per Annum for the said Childrens Maintenance from the death of the said Elizabeth their Mother and that the said Dame Ann and her Trustees should assign the said Lease of 100 years to the said Children when at Age. That 17 Jac. 1. the said Lease was assigned to the Children to commence from 1636. that the said Dame Ann paid the said 80 l. per Annum maintenance which with 1750 l. she had paid to the said Elizabeth amounting to more than the Value of the said Lease of Whitlands whereof she received the Profits till about 1636. the said Mary one of the Children being dead and that the Defendant Ewens having married Ann the other Daughter they and the said Robert Brett the Son held the said premisses as Joynt-tenants by virtue of the said Lease but the said Robert Brett receiving more of the Profits than his share the Defendant Ewens and his Wife sued out a Writ of Partition in 1654. Partition a Moiety was delivered to the Defendant Ewens and Judgment given that the same should be held in severalty and the Defendant Ewens 12 Car. 2. for 132 l. Fine and 20 l. per Annum demised part thereof to the Defendant Nurse who assigned to the Defendant Rutland That the Plaintiff White insisting That Robert Brett acknowledged a Judgment to Richard White in 1644. extended the Defendants Moiety and brought an Ejectment and got a Verdict by surprize since which the Defendant brought an Action and obtained a Verdict whereupon the Plaintiff exhibited this Bill and hath stayed the Defendants by an Injunction To have an account of the Profits received and a Lease 12 Jac. 1. being 20 years since is contrary to the Limitations and Rules both at Law and Equity The Plaintiff insists He is now in the place of the said Robert but in a better condition his said Judgment under which he claims being long since Extended in the life time of the said Richard White and Robert Brett and before any Action brought and if the said Lease be satisfied the same ought to be set aside And to take off the length of Time insists That by a Decree made in the Court of Wards in 1640. the Defendants were to account with the said Robert Brett and the Plaintiffs Father Richard White really lent the said Mony for which the Judgment was got and in 1646. on Extent had a Moiety of Whitlands delivered and that notwithstanding the Lease to the three Children the Lady Ann had possession of Whitlands till 1637. The Defendants insist That the Lady Ann paid 1750 l. and 80 l. per Annum during the Minority of the Children which is more than the Value so look'd on her self an absolute Owner and disposed of the said Lease whereof the said Robert had a Moiety Lease to commence after failure of payment
430. THe Bill is to have a discovery of the Estate of Bennony Honywood The Custom of London for Orphanage part the Plaintiff Sarahs Father whereby the Plaintiff Annand in right of his Wife might have an equal divident thereof according to the Custom of Lond. on the said Bennony Honywood being a Freeman of the said City who having only two Children the Plaintiff Sarah by his first Wife and the Defendant John by his second Wife he married the Plaintiff Sarah to one Brown in 1657 and gave her but a small matter at present saying That when he died she should come in for a customary part of his Estate and 9 years after the said Marriage made his Will in 1660. and thereby devised all his Personal Estate to be divided into three equal parts according to the Custom of London viz. one to his Wife and another between the Plaintiff Sarah and the Defendant her half Brother and thereby declared that what the Plaintiff Sarah had in Marriage with the said Brown should be accounted as part of her share of that third part and out of the other third part which he had power in himself to dispose of and thereby declared to be only reserved to himself he appointed his Executor which was his Wife and the now Defendant to pay to the Plaintiff Sarah for her support for her life and to be in no part of her Husband Browns Estate and 30 l. per Annum and 300 l. in Money That the Plaintiff Sarahs Husband died in 1670 and she in 1672. with the Testators consent Married the Plaintiff Annand and in 1678. the Testator died and the Testators Wife died before so the Plaintiff became intituled to a full Childs part and share of the Personal Estate being 10000 l. The Defendant insists That the Testator did on the Plaintiff Sarahs first Marriage give her a considerable Marriage portion in present and promised to leave her 200 l. more at his death which was to be her full advancement and did not intend she should come in for her customary share and insists That in 1675. the Testator made his last Will and thereby gave the Plaintiff Sarah a Legacy and Legacies to her Children reciting That he had already advanced her at her first Marriage and that he had then promised to leave her 200 l. more at his death and that the Legacies were given to the Plaintiff Sarah in full of all such share and claim as she might after his death have right to or claim in any of his Estate by virtue of the Custom of London or otherwise and insists That the Plaintiff by the said Advancement on her first Marriage her Father the Testator having not declared his Will or other Writing under his Hand that she was not fully Advanced but declared the contrary by the last Will she is thereby barred and excluded by the Custom of London from any other claim out of his Estate then what is bequeathed by the last Will being 500 l. which the Defendant will pay she giving a general Release which said last Will provides she shall do The Plaintiffs Councel insists That the said Declaration in the Will of 1666. was the Testators first Declaration of his intent upon the marriage of the said Sarah and that it was being still under his Hand in writing as sufficient and vallid as if it had been any other writing and that it was produced not as a Will but as an Evidence and is still a writing under the Testators Hand declaring That his first Wives Daughter the Plaintiff Sarah was by him but partly Advanced and that she was by the Custom of London to have an equal Childs part of his Personal Estate with his second Wives Son and then that he could never by a Subsequent Will oblige her to 500 l. Legacy in full of all that is due to her by the Custom of London without her consent and the words of the last Will by forbidding the Plaintiff Sarah to Sue for the Customary part of his Estate or upon the account of not being fully Advanced do strongly imply the intent at the marriage was that what his said Daughter had in marriage was but part of her Advancement The Defendants insist That by the Custom of London a Declaration to let in a Child for a Customary part ought to be by the Testators last Will or by some other writing under Hand remaining in force and unrevoked and that it ought to be an express Declaration which the Will in 1666. is not and the Testator declared by his last Will that the Plaintiff Sarah was already Advanced upon her first marriage and that the Testator promising to leave her 200 l. more at his death implies that it was agreed that she should have no more and the Will in 1666. is Revoked and Cancelled and the Testators hand remains only to the middle-most sheet thereof This Court declared they would be Certified by the Recorder of London whether a Declaration by a Will Revoked be such a Declaration in writing to let a Child have a Customary part of her Fathers Estate The Lord Mayor and Aldermen By the Custom of London a Declaration made by a Freeman by writing tho' such writing were made for his last Will and Revoked is such a Declaration as will let in his Child to have a Customary part of his Personal Estate by the Recorder Certified this Court That by the Custom of the said City a Declaration made by a Citizen and Freeman of the said City by writing with his Name or Mark Subscribed thereto though such writing were made for his last Will and Testament and the same afterwards by him Revoked is such a Declaration as will let in a Child of such a Freeman to have his or her Customary part of his or her Fathers Personal Estate The Defendant insists That the Lord Mayor c. were Surprized in making the Certificate they conceiving themselves streightned in the words and directions of the Order for that although the Will of 1666. had never been revoked yet the same had never been a sufficient Declaration according to the Custom to let in the Plaintiff to have a Customary part and they by the Order being restrained to certifie whether a revoked Will were a good Declaration they did apprehend they were to take it That the Testator had by his Will of 66. made a sufficient Declaration according to the Custom to let in the Plaintiff which he hath not done for the Custom of London in this case is That the Sum certain that any Child had in part of such Advancement ought to be expressed in such Writing or Declaration or else the same is not of any avail and produced Presidents for that purpose that the same ought to be mentioned to the end that in case such Child should be admitted to such Customary part it may be known what the Sum is to the end it may be brought into Hotch-potch with the rest
Mudghill as well as the other Lands and made other particular provisions further which shews he did not intend that for her for if he had he would not have Revoked the former Trusts as to that by which she would have been intituled as Heir especially when he hath devised all the Surplus of his Estate which involves Mudghill as well as the rest amongst his own three Daughters and her equally nor doth it any where appear that Mudghill is in any sort exempted from Satisfaction of the Creditors nor could it so be by the said deed made by Sir Olando Bridgman who best knew the intention of all Parties in this matter But the Plaintiffs insisted That the said Duke could not intend Mudghill should be conveyed to the uses declared in the Will for that the same is to be conveyed to the said Lord John and the Heirs Males of his Body which is an Estate of Inheritance and he had power by a common Recovery to have bound the remainder and the reversion after the Estate tale is not Assets in Law and therefore cannot be conceived for the payment of his debts and the rather for that he recites deeds in 1652. and April 1654. and directs the Trustees therein to convey all his Lands and Mannours in those deeds to his Dutchess and others as to the Mannour of Mudghill as before he declared by his Will and as to all the rest of the Mannours he declared for the payment of his Debts so that all the rest excludes the Mannours of Mudghill and upon the whole Will it doth appear the Duke intended no Reversion should pass but Reversions after Estates for life or years and therefore this Reversion of Mudghill which is after an Estate Tail doth not pass and if it had been intended to pass he would have limited it to the said Lord John for life without remainder to his first or other Sons in Tail for he had before given him a better Estate in Mudghill to him and the Heirs of his Body and the Trustees were not to settle Mudghill accordingly until the same fell in possession the same being yet for Pleydalls life This Court on reading the several Deeds and Will declared That although the Lord John might possibly have an Estate Tail in him and doct it but he not doing it this Court can take no notice of it though probably he did forbear to do it because Duke William had Signified his desire Reversion after an Estate in Tail subject to Trusts for payment of debts that he should not have an Estate executed to him till it should fall in possession and not before except the Trustees pleased But the case must be taken as it doth appear before the Court that is Mudghill was once liable to the payment of the Debts of Duke William and tho' 't is pretended that the Will hath taken out Mudghill yet the said Will doth only take out an Estate Tail but the Revesion thereof when the same falls in possession is subject to the same Trust and goes in company with the other Reversions and the same is legally conveyed and doth pass in the general words and therefore this Court is of Opinion that the Reversion of Mudghill is part of the unrevoked Estate and that the Lord Bridgman did well when he made the said Conveyance to the Lady Dutchess and that when the 19100. l. and the said other debts are paid to which Mudghill is as well liable as the other Mannours and Lands then the Trustees ought to convey all the premisses in Fourths and decreed accordingly Maddocks contra Wren 32 Car. 2. fo 22. THe question in this Cause is Mortgage Account with what profits the Defendant Wren shall be charged in ease of the Plaintiff who claims the premisses in question by virtue of a second Mortgage and is admitted to a Redemption on payment of what shall appear due to the Defendant Wren who hath the prior Mortgage The Plaintiff insists That the said Mortgage being of a Lease and the Defendant Wren having possession by Attornment of Tenants he ought to have received the profits whereby his Mortgage would have been fully satisfied yet he permitted the other Plaintiff Dorothy Wife of the Plaintiff Maddox the Mortgager to receive the same and therefore the said Wren ought to be charged whereby the Plaintiff may be let in to have Satisfaction of his Debt This Court declared The prior Mortgagee upon Redemption by the second Mortgagee shall be charged with the profits by whom soever Received after the Second Mortgage That the Defendant Wren ought to be charged with the Rent whether received by the Wife or any other Person after the Plaintiffs second Mortgage made but all received by her before the said second Mortgage he ought not to be charged Coles contra Hancock 32 Car. 2. fo 112. THat Benjamin Coles the 11th of June Revocation of a Will 1678. made his Will in writing and thereby gave to and amongst his then Children naming them viz. Benjamin Samuel Mary and Hannah Portions and appointed his Real Estate to be Sold and added to his Personal Estate and made Elizabeth his Wife his Executrix and the Testator being a Melancholy Person and fearing he might forfeit his Estate by making himself away to prevent a forfeiture by deed the 14 of June 1678. made over all his Personal Estate to Trustees first to pay his debts then to pay some Legacies and all the rest of his Estate to be divided amongst the aforesaid four Children That the Testator afterwards died a natural death but before his death had another Child viz. Sarah who is not provided for either by the said Will or Deed. The question is whether the said Will be Revoked by the said Deed of Trust that if it be Revoked then the said Sarah insists to have her share of her Fathers Estate and that he ought to be looked upon as dying Intestate and at least the Personal Estate ought to be distributed by the Act for distributing Intestates Estates and the deed ought not to stand in her way for that great part of the Estate did consist in debts which were made after the said deed and did not pass to or was vested in the said Trustees and that it is against Natural Right and Conscience that her Father leaving a considerable Estate she should have nothing of it This Court on reading the said Deed and Will is of opinion A Deed of Trust no Revocation of a Will that the said deed of Trust is no Revocation of the said Will being not made with intent to revoke the same but only to prevent the forfeiture in a case which never hapned and Decreed the same to be set aside and the Personal Estate to be distributed according to the Will and the remainder to be divided amongst the four Children Benjamin Samuel Mary and Hannah Estate Devised to be sold for increase of his Childrens Portions and a Child
dying of Thomas without Issue whereby the Earldom shall descend this shall go over to Charles that cannot be for it hath no Freehold to support it and so it s a Term in gross further there cannot by the Rules of Law or Equity be a Remainder for years of a Term limited after an Estate Tail neither directly nor upon Contingency as in Burges's Case but the Law will allow a remainder directly upon an Estate for life so likewise upon a Contingency if that were to happen during the Continuance of the particular Estate But this case is a step further and not to be allowed they relied chiefly upon Child and Bayles Case which was put thus by Chief Baron Mountague a Devise by A. of a Term to William his Eldest Son and his Assigns and if he die without Issue then to Thomas his youngest Son It was Judged in the Exchequer Chamber to be a void remainder because thereby a perpetuity would ensue though it was argued in that case that it was given upon a Contingency to the younger Son which would soon be Determined and end in a short time Chief Baron Mountague put this for Law a Term may be limited to one and the Heirs Males of his Body upon a Contingency to happen first with Limitation over if that Contingency do not happen it is a good Limitation as if a Term be limited to the Wife for Life and then to the Eldest Son if he over-live his Mother and the Heirs Males of his Body the remainder over to a younger Son if the Eldest Son dye in the life of the Mother the Limitation to the second Son may be good but if there be an Instant Estate Tail created of a Term tho there be a Contingency as to the expectation of him in remainder yet this is such a Total Disposition of a Term as after which no Limitation of a Term can be and so the Judges were of Opinion that the Plaintiff had no Right to the Term but the decree ought to be for the Defendant The Lord Chancellor Nottingham differed from the Judges and Decreed for the Plaintiff He put some steps or Preliminaries which he agreed with them and which were clear 1. That the Term in question though it were attendant on the Inheritance at first yet upon the hapning of the Contingency it s become a Term in gross 2. That the Trust of a Term in gross can be limited no otherwise in Equity than the Estate of a Term in gross can be limited in Law 3. The legal Estate of a Term for years whether it be a long or a short Term cannot be limited to any Man in Tail with the remainder over to another after his death without Issue this is a direct perpetuity 4. If a Term be limited to a Man and his Issue and if that Issue die without Issue the remainder over the Issue of that Issue takes no Estate and yet because the remainder over cannot take place till the Issue of that Issue fail that remainder is void too Reeves Case 5. If a Term be limited to a Man for his life and after to his First Second and Third Son in Tail Successively and for default of such Issue the remainder over though the Contingency never happen yet the remainder is void though there were never a Son born to him that looks like a perpetuity Sir William Buckhursts Case 6. One Case more and that is Burgesss Case A Term is limited to one for life with Contingent remainders to his Sons in Tail with remainder over to his Daughter though he had no Son yet because it was foreign and distant to expect a remainder after the death of a Son to be born without Issue that having a prospect of a perpetuity was adjudged void 7. If a Term be Devised or Trust of a Term limited to one for life with twenty remainders for life Successively and all the Persons in Esse at the time of such limitation these are all good remainders 8. A Term is Devised to one for 18. years after to C. his Eldest Son for life and then to the Eldest Issue Male of C. for life though C. had not any Issue Male at the time of the Devise or death of the Devisor but before the death of C. it s good being a Contingency that would speedily be worn out Cotton and Heaths Case for there may be a Possibility upon a Possibility and a Contingency upon a Contingency and in truth every Executory devise is so and therefore the contrary Rule given by Lord Popham in the Rector of Chedingtons Case is not Reason These things were agreed by all But the Point is The Trust of a term for 200 years is limited to Henry in Tail provided if Thomas die without Issue in the life of Henry so that the Earldom shall descend upon Henry then to go to Charles in Tail and whether this be a Limitation to Charles in Tail is the Question My Lord Chancellor conceived it a good Limitation as a springing Trust to arise upon a Contingency and which is not of a remote or long Consideration As for the Legal Reasons of this Opinion they were these 1. Many Men have no Estates but what consist in Leases for years Now it would be absurd to say That he who has no other Estate than what consists in Leases for years should be uncapable to provide for the Contingencies of his own Family though they are directly in his immediate prospect he shall not make provisions for Wife and Children upon Marriage 2. It was the Opinion of the Lord Chief Justice Pemberton That had it been thus Penned it had been good If Thomas die without Issue Male living Henry so that the Earldom descend upon Henry then the 200 years limited to him and his Issue shall cease but then a new Term of 200 years shall arise and be limited to the same Trustees for the benefit of Charles in Tail Now what difference is there why a man may not raise a new springing Trust upon the same Term as well as a new springing Term upon the same Trust It is true in 6 Ed. 6. in the time of Lord Chancellor Rich all the Judges delivered their Opinion If a Term of years be devised to one provided if Devisee die living I. S. then to go to I. S. is absolutely void But in 19 Eliz. Dier fo 277 328. it was held by the Judges to be a good Remainder Executory Remainder and that was the first time that an Executory Remainder of a Term was held to be good As for Child and Bayles Case the Case is truly Reported by Crook A Term of 70 years is devised to Dorothy for life then to William and his Assigns all the rest of the Term provided that if William die without Issue living at the time of his death then to Thomas which is in effect the present Case but there was more in it William had the whole Term to him and his
Assigns Dorothy was Executrix and granted the Lease to William And the Record goes further After the death of Thomas without Issue it was to go the Daughter which was a plain affectation of a Perpetuity but however this Case is contradicted by other Resolutions Cotton and Heath before cited and Wood and Sanders in this Court which was this a long Lease is limited and declared thus To the Father for 60 years if he lived so long then to the Mother for 60 years if she lived so long then to John and his Executors if he survived his Father and Mother and if he died in their life time having Issue then to his Issue but if he die without Issue living the Father or Mother then the Remainder to Edward in Tail John died without Issue in the life time of the Father and Mother It was Resolved by Lord Keeper Bridgman assisted by two Judges That the Remainder to Edward was good The whole Term had vested in John if he had survived yet the Contingency never hapning and so wearing out in the compass of two Lives in being the Remainder over to Edward might well be limited upon it Object Where will you stop if not at Child and Bayles Case Resp Every where where there is apparent danger of a Perpetuity but so is not this Case The Equitable Reasons were 1. It was Prudence in the Earl to take care that when the Honour descended upon Henry a little better support should be given to Charles who was the next Man and trod upon the Heels of the Inheritance 2. It was very probable and almost morally certain that Thomas would die without Issue he being not of a good state of Body or Mind and while such they were circumspect that he should not Marry 3. It s an hard thing for a Son to tell his Father That the provision he has made for his younger Brothers is void in Law But it is much harder for him to tell him so in Chancery for there no Conveyance is ever to be set aside where it can be supported by a reasonable Construction The Law doth in many Cases allow of a future Contingent Estate to be Limited where it will not allow a present Remainder to be Limited A man hath an Estate Limited to him his Heirs and Assigns this is a Fee-simple but if he die without Issue living I.S. or in such a short time to I. D. this is good Though it be impossible to limit a Remainder of a Fee upon a Fee yet it s not impossible to limit a Contingent Fee upon a Fee Pell and Brownes Case If a Lease comes to be limited in Tail the Law allows not a present Remainder to be limited thereupon yet it will allow a future Estate arising upon a Contingency only and that to wear out in a short time The Limitation in Wood and Sanders Case is after an express Entail and yet Adjudged good because it was a Remainder upon a Contingency that was to happen during two Lives which was but a short Contingency and the Law might very well expect the hapning of it But our Case is stronger because it is only during one life It was decreed the Plaintiff should enjoy this Barony for the residue of the Term and the Defendants to make him a Conveyance accordingly and to account with the Plaintiff for the Profits received since the death of Duke Thomas and which they or any of them might have received without wilful default The Duke of Norfolk exhibited a Bill of Review in Chancery to which Charles Howard put in a Plea and Demurrer which was Argued before Lord Keeper North and he Over-ruled the said Plea and Demurrer and Reverst the Lord Chancellors Decree But afterwards this Decree was Reverst in Parliament and the first Decree affirmed in behalf of Charles Howard Turner contra Crane 34 Car. 2. fo 668. THat Robert Newell and his Wife Copyhold Mortgage for 220 l. paid by the Plaintiffs Wife Susan then a Widow did Surrender the Copyhold Premisses to the use of the said Susan and her Heirs on condition that the said Robert Newell and his Wife 's paying to the said Susan her Executors and Assigns 230 l. in March next after then the Mortgage to be void and the Mony not being paid the said Susan was admitted to the premisses and afterwards Marryed the Plaintiff and they received the profits of the premisses and afterwards Susan died Intestate no ways indebted leaving Susan her Daughter by the Plaintiff her Heir an Infant and the said Susan the Infant was admitted by the Plaintiff her Guardian Admittance of Guardian as Heir to Susan the Mother who received the profits and died leaving the Defendant Jane Crane her Aunt as Heir and she was admitted and the Plaintiff on Susan the Daughters death took Administration of Susan the Mothers Estate and claims the Mortgaged Lands insisting That though the Defendant Jane was Heir to Susan the Daughter who was Heir to Susan the Mother yet the premisses being a Mortgage belonged to him as Administrator to Susan the Mother This Court would consider of this Case and of Cases of Mortgages in Fee where no Covenant is made for the payment of the Mortgage-Mony to the Executor or Administrator and no debts owing by the Mortgagee whether the Heir or Administrator of the Mortgagee shall have the Lands This Court upon reading Presidents declared The Heir of the Mortgagee in Fee there being no debts owing shall have the Redemption Mony and I not the Administrator That he was fully satisfied that the Plaintiff as Administrator to the said Susan ought not to have the mortgaged premisses from the Defendant Jane Crane the Heir of the Heir of the said Mortgagee but the said Jane ought to enjoy the same and dismist the Plaintiffs Bill Dowse contra Percivall 34 Car. 2. fo 186. THe Plaintiffs Father John Dowse Lessee purchased the Inheritance in Trustees Names and dies Intestate This Lease shall attend the Inheritance took a Lease of the City and afterwards purchased the Inheritance in Trustees Names for him and his Heirs and the said Dowse died Intestate the Defendant his Wife as Administratrix claims this Lease to belong to his personal Estate This Court decreed it to attend the Inheritance Magistr ' c. Vniversit ' Colleg ' in Oxon ' contra Foxcroft 34 Car. 2. fo 522. THe Bill is to Revive a former Decree made against the Defendants Father whereby the said Defendants Father was decreed to pay the Plaintiff 2000 l. and Interest To which the Defendant demurs A Decree and Sequestration against one who dies this shall not be Revived against his Heir or Real Estate though it were for Mony payable on the behalf of a Charity for that the said Defendants Father against whom the said Decree and a Sequestration is had is dead whereupon the Sequestration being granted purely for his Contempt of a Decree which was for a personal duty only
he died about six Weeks after to whom the Lady is Administratrix The Judges Opinion upon both these Cases WE have heard the Case of Massingberd and Ash Remainders of a Term successively in a Deed of Trust being limited and confined to fall within 21 years are good and no Perpetuities referred to us Argued by Council on both sides both upon the Deed of Trust and upon the Will and are all of Opinion That the whole weight of the Case rests upon the Deed of Trust and that the Will though it have some Clauses in it which if they were substantive of themselves would alter the case yet as it is penned and the Clauses all bound up with relation to the Deed of Trust it does not And we are likewise of Opinion That all the Remainders and Contingencies in the Deed of Trust being limited and confined to fall within the compass of 21 years are good and that therefore the remainder of the Term ought to be decreed to the Plaintiff Sir William Massingberd Febr. 17. 1684. Thomas Jones Creswell Levings J. Charlton T. Street The Lord Keeper declared himself of the same Opinion with the Judges That the Remainder of the said Terms after the death of the said Dame Elizabeth were good Remainders in Law and that the Plaintiff Sir William ought to enjoy the premisses for the remainder of the said Terms accordingly and decreed the same Nodes contra Batle 35 Car. 2. fo 106. THe Bill is That the Defendant may redeem or be fore closed and the Defendant being served with a Subpoena refuseth to appear and sits out all process of Contempt to a Serjeant at Arms retorned and cannot be apprehended The Plaintiff prays the Bill may be taken pro Confesso This Court declared In regard the Defendant hath not appeared The Bill not to be taken pro Confesso if the Defendant hath not appear'd but a Sequestration shall issue out against him this Court could not decree the Bill pro Confesso but ordered a Sequestration against his real and personal Estate until he cleared his Contempt Moor contra Hart 35 Car. 2. fo 60. THat a Treaty of Marriage was had between the Plaintiff and Ann his Wife Marriage Agreement the Defendants Daughter who promised to give with her 4000 l. but when the Defendant perceived them to be mutually ingaged began to recede from his Promise which the Plaintiff finding a Letter was wrote to the Defendant by a Friend of the Plaintiffs desiring him to be plain and ascertain what Portion he would give the Plaintiff with his Daughter and then the Defendant agreed to give 1500 l. down and 500 l. more at his death if she should have Issue and both Sums to be charged on his Estate at Creaton and Wapingham which Agreement was in Writing and signed by the Defendant and he did in Answer to the said former Letter express and declare as much under his Hand and thereupon the Marriage took effect But the Defendant pretended he never made any such Agreement and that the Plaintiff married his Daughter without his Consent but confesseth he received a Letter from one Reeve a Friend of the Plaintiffs wherein he desired the Defendant to be clear and say what he would lay down upon the Nail in marriage with his Daughter to the Plaintiff and what he would secure to be paid at his death and that he sent a Letter to Reeve in Answer wherein he acknowledg'd the Plaintiffs deserts exceeded his ability and with all plainness acquainted him he would give her 1500 l. in present out of his Estate at Creaton and 500 l. more at his death if she should have Issue then living but that afterwards Mr. Reeves sent a Letter in Answer to that whereby the Treaty and Proposals are absolutely waved and the Defendant never further Treated but the Marriage was had without his Consent and without any Agreement in Writing or Settlement and therefore he insists upon the Act for prevention of Frauds and Perjuries To which the Plaintiff insists The last Letter sent by Reeve was no manner of the Treaty or Proposal in the former Letters in Jan. 1680. This Court Letters under ones Hand shall amount to a good Agreement within the Statute of Frauds and Perjuries on reading the several Letters sent by Reeve to the Defendant in the behalf of the Plaintiff and the Defendants Answer thereunto This Court is fully satisfied the Plaintiff upon his Marriage became well intituled to the 1500 l. agreed by the Defendant under his own Hand to be paid to the Plaintiff as his Wives Portion out of his Estate at Creaton and decreed accordingly Bradbury contra Ducem Bucks 36 Car. 2. fo 401. THis Court did declare Interest upon Interest decreed That the Plaintiffs ought to have Interest for their Interest Mony from time to time when it is a stated Sum. Dom ' Pawlet contra Dom ' Pawlet 36 Car. 2. fo 516. This is upon a Case stated viz. THat John Trust for payment of Debts Maintenance of younger Children and raising Portions late Lord Pawlet on Marriage with the Plaintiff the Lady Susanna his second Wife and of her Portion setled a Joynture of 1000 l. per Annum on her and afterwards having 3 Children viz. the Defendant the now Lord Pawlet and Susanna and Vere Pawlet by Deed conveyed Lands to Trustees and their Heirs viz. to the use of the said Lord Pawlet for life charged with Portions for his Daughters by the Lady Essex Pawlet his former Wife and after the death of the said Lord Pawlet to the use of Francis Pawlet and others for 500 years on Trust that they should after the commencement of the 500 years out of the Profits or by Leases or other lawful ways out of the premisses allow the now Defendant Maintenance and also sufficient to pay all the late Lord Pawlets debts and maintenance for the younger Children and after that to raise Mony to pay the younger Childrens Portions in such manner and time as the said Lord Pawlet should by any Writing or last Will appoint and in default of such limitation or appointment the Trustees to raise 4000 l. a piece for every younger Son and 4000 l. a piece for every Daughter of the said Lord Pawlet by the Lady Sasanna to be paid at their Ages or day of Marriages if such Portions could conveniently be raised and if not then so soon after as the same could be with this further That every younger Son and Daughter should have Maintenance till Portions paid and after all the said Sums raised the Remainder of the 500 years to be surrendred to whom the immediate Reversion belonged which is now the Defendant That the late Lord Pawlet by Will in 1677. and published at the same time when the said Deed was executed gave to his said two Daughters Susanna and Vere Pawlet 4000 l. for their respective Portions to be paid them as the said Deed directed and made the
said Francis Pawlet and the other Trustees Executors Will pursuant to a Settlement for raising Portion That Vere Pawlet one of the said Daughters died and the Plaintiff her Mother took Administration to her Estate and thereby intitles her self to the said Portions of 4000 l. appointed to be paid to the said Vere at her Age or day of Marriage And the Question now being Whether the Plaintiff by virtue of such Administration is intituled to the Portion of her said Daughter Vere who died before her Age or day of Marriage and the Trustees should be compelled to raise the same out of the Trust of the Term of 500 years which was granted out of the Defendant the now Lord Pawlet the Infants Inheritance This Court upon perusal of Presidents declared Difference between a Legacy and a Trust they did not find any of the Presidents that came up to this Case and conceived there was a great difference between a Legacy and a Trust for that a Trust is expounded according to the intent of the party but a Legacy is governed by the Rules of Common Law and an Executor who is to have the residue in one case is not of so great regard as the Heir who is to have the residue in the other Settlement for the raysing of 4000 l. Portion to two Daughters to be paid at Age or day of Marriage one dye before her Portion shall not go to her Administrator but the Heir shall take profits That this case is of general concern to all Families for it was grown a thing of course to charge the younger Childrens Portions upon the Heirs Estate which would not have been charged but for these occasions of providing for Children And in this case the time of payment never hapning but becoming impossible by the death of the Child before the Portion was payable the Plaintiff has no right to demand it And it were hard for this Court to make a Strain against the Heir where the consideration failes for which the Portion was given viz. the advancement of the Children and altho' there were a Will in the case yet it refers to the Deed and was made at the same time so that it does not at all alter the consideration of the Case and it would be hard to decree the payment presently for that were to wrong the Heir who is to have the proceed of the Mony beyond the maintainance until the time of payment This Court saw no ground to take it from the Heir at Law to give it to an Administrator who might have been a Stranger and so dismist the Plaintiffs Bill The Presidents used in this Cause for the Administrators were Rowley contra Lancaster Brown contra Bruen Clobery contra Lampen The President for the Heir Gold contra Emery This Cause was heard in Parliament and the dismission confirmed Woodhall contra Benson al' 36 Car. 2. fo 314. THat John Wirley deceased Settlement Will. being possessed of divers Mannors and Lands for 320 years that the said Term came to the Defendants Adams and Shagburgh in Trust for payment of Monies and after in Trust for Edward Colley Grandson of John Wirley for his life and after his decease to the Plaintiff Ann late Wife of the said Edward Colley and the said Plaintiff Ann to have 130 l. per Annum for her life which Settlement was made in consideration of Marriage and after the death of Edward Colley the Trustees were directed to permit the Heirs Males of Edward on the Plaintiff Ann to be begotten to receive the residue of the profits and in case of no Issue Male of her there is provision for Daughters and Limitations over to the said Edward Colley's Heirs Males and it was also declared that in case the Plaintiff Ann should Survive the said Edward then she to have the moiety of the Mannor house for her life that the Trust limited to the Heirs Males of Edward and the Remainders thereupon depending are void and the benefit of the whole Trust was in Edward for that the Trust would not be Intailed That by another Deed it was declared by the said Edward Colley and his said Trustees that in case the Plaintiff Ann should have no Issue she should have the whole Mannor house above the 130 l. per Annum and by another Deed the said Edward Colley by consent of his said Trustees declared in case the said Edward should die leaving the Plaintiff Ann no Issue and should not otherwise dispose of the residue of the profits of the premisses over and above the Rents and Charges payable as aforesaid then his said Trustees after his death should by Sale or Leases of the premisses pay all debts and after all debts paid to permit the Plaintiff to receive the residue of the profits for her life and after her death to permit the right Heirs of Edward to receive the same That the Trust for the right Heirs of Edward was void and reverted and the said Edward did afterwards declare that in case he had no Issue he intended to leave his whole Estate to the Plaintiff Ann. That the said Edward 22 Jan. 26 Car. 2. made his Will in writing reciting the Agreement in the last Deed touching payment of his debts and after some small Legacies devised to his said Trustees all the rest of his personal Estate in Trust that they should pay his debts as aforesaid and declared his meaning to be that his Executors after his debts paid should deliver the overplus to the Plaintiff Ann deducting 5 l. a-piece for their pains and all charges That Edward soon after dying the overplus belonged to the Plaintiff and the said Trustees possessed the premisses and the personal Estate and the Plaintiff Ann having since intermarryed the Plaintiff Woodhal whereby the whole belongs and remains unto him in right of his Wife and the said Trustees ought to Assign to the said Plaintiff But the said Trustees pretend the Trust and Term aforesaid doth after the Plaintiff Anns death belong unto the Defendant Gabriel Ciber and Jane his Wife she being the only Sister and Heir at Law of the said Edward Colley That the Defendant Benson knowing of the Will and Settlement aforesaid purchased the premisses of the Defendant Ciber and his Wife and the Trustees Assigned to him The Defendants the Trustees insisted That their names were used in the Marriage Settlement of Edward Colley upon his Marriage with the Plaintiff Ann in which Settlement was recited a Conveyance made by John Wirley whereby he did demise the Trusts therein mentioned and the premisses in Trusts as to Clark's Farm for such persons as he or his Executors should by Will or otherwise direct and several other persons upon several other Trusts and as to several parcels of the said premisses which the said Defendant conceived was the Estate lately enjoyed by Edward Colley in Trust for such persons as the said John Wirley should direct and for want of such appointment to