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A50948 The readie and easie vvay to establish a free commonwealth and the excellence therof compar'd with the inconveniences and dangers of readmitting kingship in this nation / the author J.M. Milton, John, 1608-1674. 1660 (1660) Wing M2174; ESTC R33509 22,275 110

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it be feard that long continuance of power may corrupt sincerest men the known expedient is and by som lately propounded that annually or if the space be longer so much perhaps the better the third part of Senators may go out according to the precedence of thir election and the like number be chosen in thir places to prevent the setling of too absolute a power if it should be perpetual and this they call partial rotation But I could wish that this wheel or partial wheel in State if it be possible might be avoided as having too much affinitie with the wheel of fortune For it appeers not how this can be don without danger and mischance of putting out a great number of the best and ablest in whose stead new elections may bring in as many raw unexperienc'd and otherwise affected to the weakning and much altering for the wors of public transactions Neither do I think a perpetual Senat especially chosen and entrusted by the people much in this land to be feard where the well-affected either in a standing armie or in a setled militia have thir arms in thir own hands Safest therefor to me it seems and of least hazard or interruption to affairs that none of the Grand Councel be mov'd unless by death or just conviction of som crime for what can be expected firm or stedfast from a floating foundation however I forejudge not any probable expedient any temperament that can be found in things of this nature so disputable on either side Yet least this which I affirme be thought my single opinion I shall add sufficient testimonie Kingship it self is therefor counted the more safe and durable because the king and for the most part his councel is not chang'd during life but a Commonwealth is held immortal and therin firmest safest and most above fortune for the death of a king causeth ofttimes many dangerous alterations but the death now and then of a Senator is not felt the main bodie of them still continuing permanent in greatest and noblest Commonwealths and as it were eternal Therefor among the Jews the supreme councel of seaventie call'd the Sanhedrim founded by Moses in Athens that of Areopagus in Sparta that of the Ancients in Rome the Senat consisted of members chosen for term of life and by that means remaind as it were still the same to generations In Venice they change indeed ofter then every year som particular councels of State as that of six or such other but the true Senat which upholds and sustains the government is the whole aristocracie immovable So in the United Provinces the States General which are indeed but a councel of st te deputed by the whole union are not usually the same persons for above three or six years but the States of every citie in whom the sovrantie hath bin plac'd time out of minde are a standing Senat without succession and accounted chiefly in that regard the main prop of thir liberty And why they should be so in every well orderd Common-wealth they who write of policie give these reasons That to make the Senat successive not only impairs the dignitie and lustre of the Senat but weakens the whole Commonwealth and brings it into manifest danger while by this means the secrets of State are frequently divulgd and matters of greatest consequence committed to inexpert and novice counselors utterly to seek in the full and intimate knowledge of affairs past I know not therefor what should be peculiar in England to make successive Parlaments thought safest or convenient here more then in other nations unless it be the fickl'ness which is attributed to us as we are Ilanders but good education and acquisit wisdom ought to correct the fluxible fault if any such be of our watry situation It will be objected that in those places where they had perpetual Senats they had also popular remedies against thir growing too imperious as in Athens besides Areopagus another Senat of four or five hunderd in Sparta the Ephors in Rome the Tribunes of the people But the event tels us that these remedies either little availd the people or brought them to such a licentious and unbridl'd democratie as in fine ruind themselves with thir own excessive power So that the main reason urg'd why popular assemblies are to be trusted with the peoples libertie rather then a Senat of principal men because great men will be still endeavoring to inlarge thir power but the common sort will be contented to maintain thir own libertie is by experience found false none being more immoderat and ambitious to amplifie thir power then such popularities which was seen in the people of Rome who at first contented to have thir Tribunes at length contended with the Senat that one Consul then both soon after that the Censors and Praetors also should be created Plebeian and the whole empire put into their hands adoring lastly those who most were advers to the Senat till Marius by fulfilling thir inordinat desires quite lost them all the power for which they had so long bin striving and left them under the tyrannie of Sylla the ballance therefor must be exactly so set as to preserve and keep up due autoritie on either side as well in the Senat as in the people And this annual rotation of a Senat to consist of three hunderd as is lately propounded requires also another popular assembly upward of a thousand with an answerable rotation Which besides that it will be liable to all those inconveniencies found in the foresaid remedies cannot but be troublesom and chargeable both in thir motion and thir session to the whole land unweildie with thir own bulk unable in so great a number to mature thir consultations as they ought if any be allotted them and that they meet not from so many parts remote to sit a whole year lieger in one place only now and then to hold up a forrest of fingers or to convey each man his bean or ballot into the box without reason shewn or common deliberation incontinent of secrets if any be imparted to them emulous and always jarring with the other Senat. The much better way doubtless will be in this wavering condition of our affairs to deferr the changing or circumscribing of our Senat more then may be done with ease till the Commonwealth be throughly setl'd in peace and safetie and they themselves give us the occasion Militarie men hold it dangerous to change the form of battel in view of an enemie neither did the people of Rome bandie with thir Senat while any of the Tarquins livd the enemies of thir libertie nor sought by creating Tribunes to defend themselves against the fear of thir Patricians till sixteen years after the expulsion of thir kings and in full securitie of thir state they had or thought they had just cause given them by the Senat. Another way will be to welqualifie and refine elections not committing all to the noise and shouting of