we haue proued her to be of such a nature as can not depend of bodies â—â—here must be in man some other spirituall substance whose accident â—â—he were Which no man will obiect seeing there is no pretence att all for any other spiritâ—â—all substance to be in man besides his soule And that the reason why any person denyeth her to be so is because they would not acknowledge any thing in Man to be immateriall and other then meere body Seeing â—â—hen that the â—â—oule is a spirituall substance and hath an Existence belonging to her selfe of her owne nature and straine that is a spirituall one It is euident that her continuance dependeth not of the body that in this life is her coparâ—â—ener but that her Existence still remaineth with her after the bodies death which in familiar language signifyeth that she is and suruiuâ—â—th after the body is fallen from her and that its death is her birth and the breaking downe of those clay walles is the freeing of her from prison and the setting her att liberty since by that meanes she enjoyeth fully and solely her owne Existence without being clogged and pestered with a grosse yoke fellow that will haue a share of it whiles they are together Neither can it be surmised that any outward agent can by working vpon her after this her birth out of the body make her cease to be since by being a spirituall that is an indiuisible substance she is not lyable to any of those operations or locall motions or diuisions that change and destroy bodies or is in danger of meeting with any other substance that is of a contrary nature to hers Besides which there is no meanes in nature that wee know of to bring any substance to its end Which I conceiue is sufficient for this discourse wherein your lordship will expect no more then that I proue the soule to suruiue the bodies death and to be in condition like that of Intelligences or Angels And therefore I will not troble you here with such Metaphysicall proofes as to make them cleare would require large explication and the laying of Principles a great way off As for example that since Nature repugneth against annihilation there can be no change in a thing that affordeth not matter to be susceptible of a new forme Or that where Existence is once ioyned immediately to a subsistent forme without matter there is nothing can seuer them But peraduenture some may conceiue I haue not giuen full â—â—atisfaction in this poinct vnlesse I answere the famous argument wherewith Pomponatius hath perplexed euen the learnedest men that were of his time and haue bin euer since For their sakes therefore I will samne vp in short what he vrgeth against the soules continuance after the bodies death and in as succinct a manner giue my solution to his difficulty To this effect then he seemeth to say Euery thing that nature maketh is designed by her for some proper and peculiar action or operation For it would argue her that is to say God the author of of Nature of imprudence if she should bring forth into the world an idle and vselesse thing that where to do nothing and consequently were to serue for nothing Now the proper operation of Mans soule is to vnderstand phich action of vnderstanding is werformed by the soules considering the fantasmes that reside in the braine and without such fantasmes she can not acquire knowledge of any thing But after the bodies death there remaine no fantasmes for her to speculate they being materiall impressions from corporeall obiects and consequently following the lotte of the materiall part of man that compriseth and harboureth them Therefore it followeth that if she should â—â—e seuered from the body and suruiue it she would haue no operation but haue a ranke among substances for no purpose and to no end For auoyding of which inconuenience there is no other remedy but to allow her Beeing a cessation aswell as the Bodyes when Nature hath putt â—â—o periode to all that â—â—he is able to do or is fitt for by taking from her the meanes by which onely she was able to worke This is the summe of his obiection For the clearing of which we may consider that an agent may be conceiued to haue two sortes of operations the one transient into the subiect it worketh vpon the other immanent in it selfe The first driueth to the performing of some effect which being compassed the action ceaseth As when an Artificer maketh some thing or a Traueller goeth to any place as soone as the one hath finished his engine or the other is arriued to his iorneys end their working and their motion do cease But an action immanent in the agent continueth working though the cause be taken a way which did sett it on foote As when a burning coale shineth or gloweth though the fire be out and the blowing ceased that kindled it and as a bell hummeth after the clapper or hammer hath done striking it Many such conditions of actions we may obserue in Nature which the latines do expresse by Neuter verbes as Aâ—â—derâ—â— splendere furere aegrotâ—â—re insanire and the like all which do import a kind of exercise or actuall Existence within the subiect of what they signify without relating to any extrinsecall cause The which though they come verry short of the acts of our soule yet of all corporeall expressions they come nearest to them There being in our soule a kind of vitall reflection in its proper acts which being nothing but the very Existence of the soule it selfe doth comprehend and aequalise as much as in nature is performed by an agent and a patient and their working In this manner it is that the soule after her separation from the body continueth to vnderstand obiects though the fantasmes that att the first serued her to acquire her knowledge be taken from her And euen whiles she was in the body the speculating of fantasmes was not all the businesse that belonged to her for though it is true the doing of that was necessary for her to be able to store her selfe with any thing Yet she transferred the notions of thinges from those fantasmes into her owne spirituall store house and did euen her owne very selfe become â—â—he thinges which she vnderstood as we haue already explicated So that she was built vp of the knowledges that she thus acquired by spiritualising of obiects and by conuerting them into her owne very substance And that speculation of fantasmes which is attributed to her in the body is rather a passion then an action for the doing of that worke is the soules receiuing impression from those fantasmes The retaining of which is her knowing And this knowing must necessarily remaine alwayes with her since it is nothing else but she her selfe so moulded and so impressed That is her owne Beinâ—â— which because it is a spirituall one and superior to corporeall ones doth resume in it selfe the two natures of Essence
dependeth of his actions in this life vpon his owne soddaine and slight conceit in a matter whereof he hath no skill As they do who to iustify the strength of their wittes will not onely speake and argue but also liue as though they belieued there where no life for the soule after the bodies death But to be more indulgent to him then so I shall desire him to examine his instance and to consider that as when a square for example or a triangle delineated vpon paper is proposed vnto a Mathematician to looke vpon there by to discusse some Geometricall proposition though that square or triangle there drawne be a particular determinate one so and so formed of such and such precise dimentions in each line and angle and the like yet the figure that is in his head abstracteth from all those particular circumstances that accompanye either of these vpon the paper and agreeth to any square or to any triangle imaginable be their lines neuer so long or short or drawne with red inke or with blacke c. In the same manner that corporeall figure of a man which appeareth to our reflexion and resideth in our fantasy is not the notion of a man that we here meane and speake of But it is euident to any one who shall looke heedefully into his vnderstanding that from the particular picture of some one man which his fantasy representeth to him his vnderstanding hath gathered and framed a large notion of man in generall which is applicable and indifferent to euery particular indiuidualll man As is euident if we looke into our owne meaning and intention and consider what will satisfy vs as when for example I stand in neede of some one of my seruants to do some thing about me and therefore do call or ring a bell for some of them to come to me which soeuer of those that wayte without cometh in my turne is serued and I am satisfyed In like manner if a tenant is to pay me ten pounds It is allone to me whither he bringeth it in halfe crownes or in shillinges or in six pences And therefore it is euident that my intention aymeth no further then att a common notion and that I know so much Now my intention being regulated by my apprehension preceding it it is cleare that my apprehension is also of the like nature that is to say it is indifferent and common to any one in particular It may be further obiected That from the apprehending of a thing which is indifferent to many it can not be deduced that the apprehending nature is not corporeall but spirituall for when we looke vpon an obiect a farre off before we can distinguish enow particulars of it we are irresolute what it is whither for example it be a horse or an Oxe And yet no man will inferre out of such indifferency that the eye in which it is is a spirit and not a body To this I answere that the supposition is a false one there is no such indifferency in the eye as is intimated all that is there is precisely determinate For the whole obiect and euery part of it concurreth to the making of the picture in the eye and consequently there must needes be in the eye a representation of the whole and of euery minute part of it which is a complete determination of it Whence it appeareth that the indetermination we haue of the obiect is seated meerely in the vnderstanding which iudgeth it but imperfectly by reason of the weake though entire picture that the obiect hath imprinted in the eye And accordingly a painter that were to draw that obiect att that distance must comprise it within such lines as the eye receiueth from it But that which in this case is indistinct and indifferent is our knowledge which resideth in our minde For it not being able to determine by the figure that the eye sendeth to the fantasy whither it be of an Oxe or of a horse remaineth suspended with an indifferency to attribute it either to the one or to the other It may be further vrged that such indifferency of our soules thoughts is no argument of her being a spirit for if it were spirituall substances would be accompanyed with such indifferency the contrary whereofâ—â— is euident seeing that no Angell for example can be either Michael or Gabriell but is precisely such a one determinate Angell distinguished from all others To this I answere that I do not vrge such indifferency as a condition propper to spirits For in truth they are more determined then bodies by reason of their indiuisibility The which is seene in these very notions that are more determined then the bodies from whence they are drawne merely because they are in a spirituall subiect But by this indifferency in the vnderstanding springing from a determinate obiect and by such transformation there of corporeall natures to a quite different manner of being then they are in themselues I gather a different nature that is a spiriturll one in the subiect where they are thus transformed For that bodies can be in our minde as they are when we thinke of them notwithstanding such indifferency which accordeth not with their naâ—â—ure is an euident freeing of the minde from corporeall bondes Now that such a nature as this of indifferency to distinct and different thinges can neither be in it selfe corporeall nor be represented by bodies or by subtile and grosse partes variously disposed is so euident that it were a vaine labour to go about to prooue it The meere casting of our eyes vpon materiall thinges conuinceth it without needing further discourse We can not conceiue a chaire a knife a house a metall a plant an animall or any visible thing what soeuer to be in it selfe without an actual termination No Statue no picture no manufacture nor ought in the world excepting intellectuall expressions can be imagined to bee without its being conâ—â—ined in all determination to such other bodies as comprise enuiron besett it Whosoeuer can doubt of this is incapable of any euidence And consequently where we see an abstraction from all determination and such an indifferency as we speake of we may securely conclude that the subiect where it is made and where it resideth and whence it hath it is not of kinne to bodies but is immateriall and spirituall THE IV. CHAPTER The Immateriality of the soule proued out of the Natvre of Vnderstanding THE second proofe of our soule 's immateriality and spirituality I deriue from her manner of operation when she vnderstandeth any thing That which she then doth is to compare the thing by her vnderstood with some other and by the relation or respect that is betweene them she knoweth the nature of that thing which she so considereth or compareth So that we may conclude the particular prerogatiue of a soule is to haue or rather to be a power of comparing one thing to another And in truth if we looke well into
which concerneth the true good And that although the â—â—urâ—â—ent of materiall spirits which was â—â—ont to foment this Iudgement be now gone yet the effect of their stroakes that very same effect which remained in her when soeuer she had truce from their actuall assaultes remaineth after death in the separated soule and if it be the stronger will of it selfe still presse her on to the same materiall good that the spirits which begott it recommended to her For by the stroke of death the soule looseth nothing of what she had purchased in the body But all that she had or rather that she was there is enlarged and heighthened by this second birth of hers And she becometh such a thing as the precedent moulding of her settled her in a capacity to proue like as the seuerall parcels of warme mudde vpon the bankes of Nilus do become such various liuing creatures by the last action of the enliuening sunne working vpon them as by their precedeâ—â—t dispositions and circumstances they were designed to be Adde to this that there is no formall opposition betweene two such Iudgements in a man Lett the one of them be for example that it is good for him to go to a feast to satisfy and please his appetite The other that it is better for him to go to the Church to pray And it is euident that the truth of this latter doth not contradict the truth of the other but both of them are consistent together If then he dyeth with his soule fraught with these two Iudgements death will leaue them both in his soule each of them stretched out â—â—n such sort as belongeth to a separated soule but still in such proportion as it found them in her â—â—hen it came to deliuer her out of her body So that if it found them â—â—n such a proportion that the Iudgement of good in going to a feast did clearely ouerbeare the Iudgement of good in going to the Church the desire of feasting in the next world will likewise ouerbeare in â—â—er the desire of that good for the obtaining whereof she was to go to â—â—he Church to pray And although â—â—ll the circumstances and possibility of going to a feast be taken â—â—way with the taking away of the body yet the desire of feasting which dependeth not of considerations to be made in the next world but onely of those which were made in the body remaineth as fresh and as quicke as it was when the Man settled his last Iudgement and resolution in this world Nor doth it import that a separated soule hath no tast to be pleased with meate or with drinke For as all her desires were framed in the body so are they such as belong to a whole complete man and not to a naked soule And therefore she desireth to be built vp againe an entire man and to wallow againe in such sensuall pleasures as then prouayled with her To which I may adde that although a separated soule haue not a tast to relish meate yet she hath a will to wish for it And this will is now to her of a like nature as to vs in this world the wish of Beaâ—â—iâ—â—de which dependeth of no other consideration nor is referred to any furtheâ—â— End But is of it selfe the last End as being desired for its owne sake and not vnder the reglement or to serue for obtaining of any thing else more desired then it Nor doth it preiâ—â—dice what I haue here determined to consider that a separated soule is a pure spirit deliuered from that impugner of Reason her flesh which vsed to draw her from her greater good For we must not vnderstandâ—â— her being a pure spirit to signify her being aâ—â— vntainted spirit for she is wholy defiled by her habitation in the body But she is called pure by negation of conjunction to any body which hindereth not but that she may haue in her substance the spirituall effects and contaminations of a corrupted body For whiles she and her body were but one thing both of them subsisting by one Existence the agents that wrought vpon her body did build and qualify her according to what she was to be when she was to be seuered from her body and to Exist by her selfe Now if these agents were peruerse ones they hammered out such effects in her as made her become a spirituall monster of many heads which are the reluctant and incompossible Principles that raigne in her each of them drawing and tearing her a different way from the rest as in the next Chapter I shall more amply declare And although she erreth not in prosecuting her iudgements and desires supposing the principles from whence they spring which are now naturall to her yet all her operations flowing out of those principles are strangely defectiue vgly and monstruous And the reason why her Iudgements and affections in this state of separation are naturall to her and vnalterable whereas before they were but accidentall is this Whilest she was in the body there was no thought or Iudgement so deepely settled in her but by reason of her bodies subiection to externe agents might be weakened by the much importunity of other thoughts occurring to her and pressing vpon her and by litle and litle might be worne away and forgotten And therefore her nature that was thus flexible and changeable in her Iudgements and desires resided purely in the common inclination to Good in abstract or in generall the which was common to all kindes of desires and so onely the desire of Good in generall was naturall to her All particular desires being but accidentall to her and such as might be remoued by extrinsecall causes and agents But when all this subiection of her to such agents by meanes of her body shall be remooued by death and that no causes shall afterwardes be able to worke vpon her and that she herselfe shall be nothing else but a Being or a substance left out of these impressions the stamping of which is now att an end Those desires which formerly were but accidentall are now become naturall to her And whatsoeuer she loueth for it selfe remaineth settled and riuetted in her as a supreme principle ouer which none other hath any authority or preualence and against which nothing can be vrged to infeeble it And in the meane time all other iudgements and desires that are lesse preualent then these do keepe their inferior rankes and beings without loosing ought of the clearenesse of euidence that accompanyeth them vntill an other change do come by the reioyning of her bodie to her By all which discourse it appeareth how a separated soule that is badly and vnequally built vp is free from error and falshood in her Iudgements though her misseplaced affections and the improportioned composure of her will do make her neglect her true good for inferior and vnworthy goods THE VIII CHAPTER Of the Misery of a disordered soule after it is separated from the body HAuing cleared as I conceiue
this great difficulty I shall apply my selfe to explicate in the best manner I am able the different states that the different courses and manners of liuing in this world do settle a separated soule in These may be comprised vnder two generall heads For there being in man two principles from which all his operations do spring Reason and sense his soule and his body It is evident that according as either of these swayeth and hath strongest influence into his actions his course of life is to receiue its denomination I will begin with taking a short suruay of a soule torne from the body of a man that spent his life in the pursuite and in the enioying of sensuall obiects It is already concluded that all the Iudgements and desires which a man contracteth in this life do remaine in the sepated soule in the same proportion and excesse ouer one an other as they were here It hath bin also shewed that notwithstanding such a soules desiring a particular and inferior good more strongly then she doth an vniuersall and superior one yet is she not carried by error or mistaking to preferre the inferior good before the superiour but seeth clearely the difference that in truth is betweene them and that the superior good is of its owne nature preferable to the other though by reason of the temper she is in she preferreth for her enioyment the other meaner good Next lett vs consider the great vehemence wherewith the desires of a separated foule are accompanyed Examples dayly occurre to vs of the great earnestnesse wherewith passionate men desire and prosecute the obiects that their hartes are sett vpon In such sort that neither difficulties nor dangers can diuert them from them And yet the greatest and violentest of these is not comparable to the least and weakest desire of a separated soule In her there is nothing that can retard any operation that she is about as in bodies there is vnto whom motion belongeth not but as they are moued by an other thing and therefore all that appertaineth to them in regard of motion is in a manner resistance to it or a repugnant yielding to what is too stong for them and consequently succession of time and conueniency of place and a mastering power in the agent that worketh vpon them are required to all corporeall motions and operations But a separated soule being as we haue formerly shewed an indiuisible substance and not measured by time nor comprehended by place and withall her selfe being the principle of her owne operations which are nothing else but her very being what she is It followeth that whatsoeuer she doth or desireth is with the whole energy of her Nature whoâ—â—e force and actiuity beareth such proportion to the strength of the greatest and most powerfull body that is as all time doth to an instant or as the whole extent of quantity doth to a point seeing that her actiuity were she to worke reacheth to all place and to the whole masse of corporeall magnitude in an indiuisible of time Now lett vs apply these three considerations to such a soule as we haue proposed for our first suruay Her wearing out her time in the body with continuall conuersation among sensuall obiects and through the loue of them her neglect of rationall and intellectuall goods will haue caused that after death her affections to them will preuaile ouer these latter Such affections can not be conceiued to be but of one or but of two or but of a few of those materiall obiects but of many and of different natures For the puddles of flesh and blood hauing this property that full draughtes of them do begett a satiety and loathing in in the persons that feede greedily vpon them their ouerburthened stomakes do seeke to please themselues by variety and do hope to find fresher and quicker delight in some new obiect Thus they trauell and wander as farre as they can in this labirinth of vanity One pleasure still succeeding an other Their thoughtes sometimes bent vpon richesse otherwhiles vpon power as often vpon honor and estimation from others sometimes vpon reuenge and peraduenture continually vpon the meaner obiects that in their seuerall kindes do affect their grosser senses All this variety of affections that requireth succession of time to be contracted and enioyed in the body will reside together all att once in the separated soule or rather she her selfe will be all of them Many of them will be incompatible with one an other yet she mustendure them all endure euery one of their drawing her a different way like those vnhappy monsters that some historians tell vs of which being composed of two or of more different animals vnited together by some part of their bodies common to them all they are att continuall debate among themselues one of them desiring to carry their whole loade one way or to busy themselues about one thing the other contesting against that But the incompossible affections of such a soule are yet more lamentable then can be represented by the sad conflict of such monsters for these latter are not in the same indiuisible place they are but neere one an other and they are not alwayes in opposition and att warres betweene themselues whereas the soules vnhappy desires do constitute and build vp her very substance which being indiuisible they lye alwayes together in the same indiuisible restlesse bed like snarling dogges like angry vipers and poysonous serpents perpetually biting and tearing one an other Nor can any of them be layed a sleepe for one single moment of time They are continually awake continually raging and continually deuouring one an other and consequently continually deuouring thebowels of that wretched soule that harboureth them Who in the middest of this torment and misery seeth clearely that it can neuer haue end as longas she hath being she being now no longer subiect to mutation that therefore she must remaine thus for all aeternity But this tearing her in pieces by incompossible desires is but part of the torment she sustayneth She is so vnhappy as to be incapable of enioying any one of those obiects she so extremely thirsteth after None of them can follow her into that region where she now dwelleth nor hath the meanes or instruments to conuerse with them were it possible as it is not that they could approch her and offer themselues to her Consider now how great an anguish endureth that man who hauing passionatly sett his hart vpon some beloued obiect is hindered from enioying it The proportion of his sorrow will be according to the proportion of his desire and to the actiuity of his nature We see how much the griefe of a quicke and smart person exceedeth the griefe of a dull and heauy one and particularly when it is for the priuation of the obiect that he prised most We haue dayly examples of men that dye for such losses How strangely excessiue then must the sorrow be of a separated
and of Operation that in bodies are separated And so is both her Being an her worke And consequently she knoweth and vnderstandeth which is her proper operation when she is seuered from the body and hath no more fantasmes to worke by But it is a kind of standing or fixed state of knowing if so I may say and immanent in her selfe as the shining or glowing of a fire coale seemeth to vs to be not att all accompanyed kith motion as is her gaining of wnowledge in this life Which will be better vnderstood if we consider how her first obiect is Being and that her first operation or vnderstanding is to be Being as whose essence is nothing else but a capacity of knowlege or of a new manner of being Being and that all the rest of her vnderstandinges are nothing else but to know other things to be or for her to be the Being of other thinges that is to identify them with her selfe by this imbibition of Being that sinketh the obiects into her And therefore when a soule is once completly become all thinges that is that she knoweth all thinges which she becometh it the very instant of her separation and indeede by her separation from the body It is euident she needeth no further action to gaine any thing or to better her selfe For she hath then all that she is capable of hauingâ—â— and is att the periode she was made for And consequently Pomponatius his argument is of no force since after the bodies death the soule may continue that operation of knowing which she is made for And noâ—â— onely continue it but haue it infinitly exalted and refined ouer what it was in the body By my answere to this obiection I am led to obserue how a separated soule must necessarily retaine knowledge of whatsoeuer she knew in the body For since her knowledge of any thing is her very Being the thing she knoweth It followeth that as long as she conserueth her owne Being the knowledge of that thing must remaine with her But doth her knowledge reste here Hath she acquired by this second birth no addition to the stocke she had bin toylesomely traffiking for in this life A child in his mothers wombe hath no other cognition then such a dull and limited one as his sense of touching or feeling could afford him but as soone as he is borne into this worldes light he receiueth impressions by his eyes of the colors figures magnitudes and other qualities of all kindes of bodies that enuiron him And shall a soule borne into that bright day of intellectuall light see then no more then she saw here in her darke prison She shall certainely And not onely see more but see so much more that it euen dazeleth our eyes to looke vpon the excesse of her seing Lett vs proceede by steppes and consider how the ordering of a few notions begetteth new knowledges and conclusions that he who was imbued with those notions neuer dreamed of till he had marshalled and ranked them in such order And by new ordering and weauing those new conclusions among themselues and with his former notions he further acquireth new knowledges Which the more numerous they grow the higher and larger is their multiplication like numbers which by euery addition of a new figure do encrease their valewes tenne folde Thus sciences do grow from a few plaine obuious principles to the vastenesse we admire So the science of Mathematikes by enterweauing a few axiomes and definitions sprooteth out into an vnbelieuable progeny of subtility and variety Likewise the science of Metaphysikes by ordering such notions as occurre to euery man of common sense runneth ouer the whole machine and extent of all that is And not content with the whole world of bodies and of what is measured by time soareth with a bold wing and piercing eye into a new world of Intellectuall inhabitants where finding them settled by their nature in a state of aeternity she perceiueth time that deuoureth all thinges beneath their orbe flide weakely vnder them into an abysse of nothing without being able to giue the least attainte to their sublimed nature All this is done meerely by orderly disposing those notions that by our senses we acquire And if these in a man whose grosse allay of a body so cloggeth and benummeth the vigour of his subtile inhabitant do grow vp to so incredidible a bulke and height what will their extent be in a separated soule that is all actiuity Her nature is to be an orderer or rather to be an order it selfe for whatsoeuer procedeth from her is orderly which it would not be if order were not first in her Order then being in her it must be her nature since all is nature and substance in that thing which is indiuisible It is cleare then that whatsoeuer is ordered by an agent whose nature is order it must needes be ordered to the vtmost aduantage that by ordering it is capable of And consequently seeing that new knowledge springeth out of the well ordering of precedent notions It followeth that whatsoeuer is knowable out of those notions and principles is fully knowne by a separated soule But when we consider the connexion that all thinges haue one with an other seeing that all the thinges in the world are but like linkes of a chaine forged by an all knowing Architect who doth all his workes by the rules of perfect order and wisedome we can not doubt but that a separated soule by ordering those knowledges she hath acquired in the body and by reflecting vpon them with her vnlimited actiuity and energy she being then entirely a pure Act must needes attaine to the knowledge of all that is And if we examine wherein this connexion consistethâ—â— as it is in our soule we shall find that it is placed in this that the thing which hath one notion is the same which hath an other Whereby we find that the first notion we haue of any thing doth by the nature of our vnderstanding comprehend all other notions and that it can not be perfectly vnderstood vnlesse all others be knowne Wherefore we may conclude that a separated soule doth either comprehend no one thing or else that shee must needes comprehend all thinges As for example If she know her selfe she knoweth that she was the forme of a body not onely of a body in generall but of one so composed so rempered so formed and all other particulars belonging to the body that she is separated froÌ„ From hence she gathereth that this compound of soule and body must necessarily haue a father and a mother and by the indiuiduall proprieties of her body she inferreth the indiduall proprieties of her father and of her mother Whose being such requireth further such and such other causes and circumstances whereon they depend And euery one of them require such and such others that haue caused them And so proceeding on from one to an other she discouereth not onely the first but
also all the causes that haue relation to one another Which in effect is the complexe of the whole world since all thinges in it haue one way or an other relation to one an other either neerer or further off As Maister White hath ingeniously and solidely shewed in the first of his dialogues of the world And this is the methode of acquiring all sciences by the vertue of syllogismes And this vast extent of knowledge will be the firmer and the stronger in her out of this regard that euery one of her knowledges will adde a confirmation and a verifying to euery particular that she knoweth For all thinges in nature hauing a perfect connexion with one an other whosoeuer knoweth truly the nature of any thing knoweth also the nature of all that hath reference to it either as cause or as effect or by any other regard that linketh them together And thus euery one of her multitude or rather infinity of knowledges riueteth faster each other of them euery one of them affording her a new reason why that is so like stones in an arch where euery stone is not onely a support to it selfe but also to all and to euery one of the other stones that compose the arch So that euery knowledge of hers hath a superproportion in a manner infinite beyond any thing she knew in the body And according to the strength of her knowledge is the strength of her other actions as of desiring or louing any thing that her knowledge informeth her to be good since they proceede immediatly from knowledge and are more or lesse vehement according as her knowledge decyphereth them more or lesse abounding with the nature of good Nor can she be deceiued by any appearance of truth that may plant an Error in her insteed of a true Iudgement which is euident not onely out of what we haue euen now said that euery one of her knowledges maketh good euery particular one in her but also more immediatly out of this that it is impossible for Contradictory Iudgements to dwell together in the soule since one of them is engrafted in her or rather is identifyed with her by the nature of Beeing and the other must consequently be excluded from her by not being as euen in in this life we can not iudge any thing att the same time to be and not to be And therefore since all that she knew in this world remaineth with her in the next and that out of the perfect ordering of that she deduceth the knowledge of all thinges else and so enioyeth the fulnesse of science in her and that all shee knoweth is alwayes present to her as being in truth her owne indiuisible nature substance and Being it followeth that no falshood which is a contradiction of some truth incorporated as I may say into her substance can haue admittance to her beliefe And if any were mistakingly harboured by her during her abode in the body which hindered her from completely ordering her notions and from deducing true consequences from them this her new condition of abundant light soone discouereth and cancelleth it THE VII CHAPTER The answere to an obiection BVT if error mistaking or falsehood can not harbour in a separated soule And that the fullnesse of knowledge be the periode and perfection of her nature It may att the first sight appeare impossible that any soule should faile of being happy For seeing that a Rationall creatures desiring of any thing dependeth of the Iudgement that he maketh of such a thinges being good for him It â—â—ould seeme that there is great Error in his knowledge and much mistaking in his Iudgement when he setteth his hart vpon desiring and longing after that which is most hurtfull and pernitious to him To answere this obiection I must entreate your lordship to looke into the nature of the will Which though in substanceâ—â—it be the same with the vnderstanding that is the soule her selfe according as she is ready to proceede to action yet as it is the origine of the soules desires and the impellent of her to action It requireth a particular consideration We may then determine the will in a Rationall creature to be a mastering and conquering Iudgement or resolution that fixeth peremptorily vpon what is to be done For it is cleare that it is nothing else but a Mans immediate disposition to worke or to do some thing And he is allwayes ready to proceede to action and doth proceede thereto vnlesse he be hindred as soone as his vnderstanding iudgeth and telleth him what is best to be done Next be pleased to consider how we find oftentimes by experience that after we haue iudged and determined by our reason and vnderstanding what is best and fittest for vs to do there reseth in our brestes a certaine materiall motion or tyde of spirits that beateth vs off from that resolution and disposeth vs an other way If it happen that this inundation of spirits do chance to ebbe backe againe and leaue the channell free for the calmer waters of reason to haue their course in we returne to our former temper and Iudgement But if a new flood of them do breake in vpon it too strong for it to resist then they carry the mans resolution to their side And according to the violence and repetition of their strokes that beate him off from his first Iudgement the resolution that is made by them is strong and vigourous For as ourvery Being and all our knowledges in this world are made by materiall actions So more and stronger knowledges and Iudgements are made by more and by stronger materiall actions And therefore if these currents and tydes of materiall spirits haue the force to make in a man strong impressions and iudgements of the good they propose and by a continued long beating vpon his vnderstanding do in manner confine it to what they propose they will in the end as it were blinde our reason and make vs thinke onely or atâ—â—least chiefly of the good and aduantage that they suggest They will sinke into the bottome of our soule and settle there the apprehensions of what they recommend And in comparison of those Apprehensions they will weakeâ—â— the truth we see making it a appeare to vs like a dreame or a thing in the ayre that concerneth vs notâ—â— Which in this case I may compare not improperly to oyle swimming vpon some heauier liquoâ—â— in a caske For that remaineth att the toppe without motion or actiuity whiles the water beneath runneth precipitously out att the spigot into the vessels that are sett to receiue it In like manner here truth remaineth without all efficacy whiles the contrary iudgements do flow impetuously into action Now when a man thus tempered cometh to dye and that so his compound cometh to be resolued into body and soule It is euident that in his soule there must remaine a great inequality betweene that Iudgement of hers which concerneth the materiall good and â—â—er other