willed to remedy we may then conclude that the Passions are of the Order of Nature though they cannot be of the Order of Grace It is true if we consider that the Sin of the first Man has deprived us of the assistance of a God that is Omnipresent and always ready to defend us it may then be said that Sin is the Cause of our relation to sensible things because it has separated us from God by whom only we can be delivered from their Slavery But without insisting any longer upon an Enquiry after the full Cause of our Passions let us examine their extention their nature in particular their end their use their defects and whatever relates to ' em CHAP. II. Of the Vnion of the Mind with Sensible Things or of the power or extension of the Passions in General IF all those who read this Work would be at the trouble of reflecting upon what they feel in themselves it would be needless to shew here the dependance we have upon sensible Objects I can say nothing in this matter which all the World does not know as well as my self if they will but think so that I would forbear to say any of it if experience did not teach me that Men are so very forgetful of themselves that they do not so much as think upon what they feel nor enquire into the reasons of what passes in their Mind I thought it necessary to say some things here which may prepare 'em to reflect upon it and I hope that those who know 'em already will not be uneasie at the reading of 'em for although we are not delighted with the bare repetition of what we know already yet we may be pleased with the repetition of what we know and think of at the same time The most honourable Sect of Philosophers and that whose Opinions many Men do now think it their glory to embrace would perswade us that it is in our own power to be happy The Stoics continually tell us of self dependance Jam beatum esse te judica cum tibi in te goudium omne nasc tur cum in his que homines eripiunt optant custediunt nihil inveneris non dâ—co quod malis sed quod velis Sen. Ep. 124. that we must not be afflicted at the loss of our Reputation Goods Friends or Relations That we must be always of an even temper of Mind and easie whatever happens whether Exile Injuries Affronts Distempers and even Death it self for these are not Evils to be feared In fine they tell us of many such like things which we are enough inclined to believe as well because our Pride makes us in love with Independence as because our Reason tells us that indeed the greatest part of these Evils which really afflict us were incapable of doing it if all things were in order But God has given us a Body and by this Body united us to all sensible things Sin has subjected us to our Body and by our Body has made us dependent upon all sensible things This is the order of Nature this is the Will of the Creator that all Beings which he hath made should be united together thus we are united to all things and 't is the Sin of the first Man which has made us dependent upon all Beings to which God has only allied us Thus is there none that is not now united and wholly subjected to his Body and by his Body to his Relations his Friends his City his Prince his Country his Clothes his House his Lands his Horse his Dog to all the Earth the Sun the Stars to all the Heavens 'T is therefore ridiculous to tell Men that it is in their power to be Happy Wise and Free and they only mock those whom they seriously advise not to be afflicted at the loss of their Friends or Goods 't is even as ridiculous to advise Men not to feel pain when they are beaten or not to be pleased when they eat with an appetite Thus the Stoics are either unreasonable or mock us when they preach to us to be easie under the death of a Father the loss of Goods Exile Imprisonment and such like things and not to rejoyce at the good success of our Affairs for we are united to our Country our Goods our Relations c. by a Natural Tye which now depends not upon our Will Indeed I cenfess that Reason teaches us to suffer Exile chearfully but the same Reason tells us we ought to endure the cutting off an Arm without pain The Soul is above the Body and according to the light of Reason a Man's happiness or unhappiness ought not to depend upon it but Experience sufficiently proves to us that things are not as our Reason tells us they should be and it is ridiculous to Philosophize against Experience Christians dont philosophize after this manner they confess that pain is an evil that it is not without uneasiness that they are ravished from those things to which Nature has united them and that it is a difficult thing to be delivered from the slavery into which Sin has reduced us They grant that it is a disorder that the Soul depends upon the Body yet so as that it may be delivered from this dependence by the Grace of Jesus Christ I feel says St. Paul a law in my Body which fights against the law of my Mind and which enslaves it to the Law of Sin which is in my Members unhappy Man that I am Who shall deliver me from this Body of death it will be the Grace of God through our Lord Jesus Christ The Son of God the Apostles and all his true Disciples do recommend patience to us above all things because they knew that he that will live holily must endure affliction In short true Christians or true Philsophers say nothing which is not agreeable to good Sense and Experience but Universal Nature does continually contradict the Opinion or Pride of the Stoics Christians know that to deliver themselves in some manner from the dependance they are in they must labour to deprive themselves of all things which they cannot enjoy without pleasure nor be deprived of without pain that that is the only means to preserve the peace and liberty of Mind which they have received by the Grace of their Saviour The Stoics on the contrary following the false Idea's of their Chimerical Philosophy imagined themselves wise and happy and that there needed no more than to think on Virtue and Independence to become Virtuous and Independant Reason and Experience tells us the best way not to suffer the pain of pricking is to avoid being prick'd But the Stoics say Prick me and by the force of my Mind and help of my Philosophy I will separate my self after such a manner from my Body that I will not feel whatever passes there I can demonstrate that my happiness depends not upon it that pain is not an evil and you shall see by the
is impossible that he should have any inclination so pure as to have no mixture of any passion Thus the love of Truth Justice and of God himself is always accompanied with some Traces of the Brain which renders this knowledge more lively but commonly more confused It is true that very often we do not discover that our Imagination is a little employed at the same time we conceive an Abstracted Truth The reason is because these Truths have no Images or Traces instituted by Nature to represent them and all Traces which stir them up have no other relation to them but that of Mans Will or chance which has so placed them For Arithmeticians and even Algebraists who only consider Abstracted Things often make use of their Imaginations to keep their Minds fixt upon these Idea's Cyphers Alphabetical Letters and other Figures which they see or imagine are always joined to these Ideas although the Traces which are formed by these Characters have no relation to them and so can make them neither false nor confused And thus by a regulated use of Figures and Letters they discover the most difficult Truths which otherwise it would be impossible to find out The Idea's of things which can only be perceived by the pure Understanding may then be connected to the Traces of the Brain and the fight of Objects that we love hate and fear by a Natural Inclination may be accompanied with the motion of the Spirits It is plain that the thought of Eternity the fear of Hell the hopes or an Eternal Happiness although they be Objects that strike not the Senses yet may excite violent Passions in us So that we may say we are united after a sensible manner not only to all things that relate to the preservation of Life but also to Spiritual things to which the Mind is immediately united by it self It even happens very often that Faith Charity and Self-love make this union to Spiritual things stronger than that whereby we are joined to all sensible things The Souls of true Martyrs are more united to God than to their Bodies and those who die to maintain the truth of a false Religion sufficiently shew that the fear of Hell has more power over them than the fear of death has There is often so much heat and prejudice on both sides in Religious Wars and in the defence of Superstitions that we cannot doubt but there is some Passions in them and such a one as is stronger and much more constant than any other because it is built upon an appearance of Reason as well in those that are deceived as in others We are then by our Passions united to what ever appears to us to be a good or evil to the Mind as well as to what ever seems to be so to the Body There is nothing which we can discover to have any relation to us which is not capable of affecting us and amongst all the things that we know there is none that has not some relation to us We have always some interest even in the most abstracted Truths when we know them because at least there is that relation of knowledge between them and our Minds They are ours if I may so say by our knowledge We feel that they hurt us when we dispute them and if they hurt us it is certain that they agitate and disquiet us Thus the Passions have so vast a dominion and extension that it is impossible to conceive any thing in respect to them whereof we could be certain although all Men were exempt from their empire But let us now see what their Nature is and endeavour to discover all things they comprehend CHAP. III. A particular Explanation of all the changes that happen to the Body and Soul by means of the Passions WE may distinguish seven things in each of our Passions except in Admiration which also is but an imperfect Passion The first is the Judgment the Mind makes of an Object or rather the confused and distinct view of the relation this Object has to us The second is a new determination of the motion of the Will towards this Object supposing it be or appears to be a good Before this view the Natural Motion of the Soul either was intermixed viz. carried towards good in general or it was otherwise determined by the knowledge of some other particular Object But in that moment the Mind perceived the relation this new Object had to it this general Motion of the Will is forthwith determined conformably to what the Mind perceives The Soul draws near to this Object by its love that it may taste it and discover its good by the sensation of sweetness which the Author of Nature gives it as a Natural Recompence for its inclining to good It judged that this Object was a good by an abstracted Reason which affected it not but it remains convinced by the efficacy of Sensation and the more lively this Sensation is the stronger it unites to the good it seems to produce But if this particular Object be considered as evil or as capable of depriving us of any good no new determination happens to the Motion of our Will but only an augmentation of Motion towards the good opposite to this Object which appears an evil which augmentation is so much the greater as the appearing Evil is more to be feared For indeed we hate only because we love and an External Evil is judged as such only because it deprives us of some good Thus Evil being considered as the privation of Good to fly Evil is but to fly the privation of Good which is the same thing as to incline towards good There happens no new determination then in the natural motion of the Will at the meeting with an Object which displeases us but only a sensation of pain disgust or bitterness that the Author of Nature has imprinted in the Soul as a natural pain because it is deprived of good Reason alone would not be sufficient to carry us to it there must also be stir it up Before Sin sensation was no pain but only a warning because as I have already said Adam might when he would stop the motion of the Animal Spirits which would cause pain so that if he felt pain 't was because he willed it as a good or rather he felt it not because he would not feel it So that in all the Passions all the motions of the Soul towards good are only motions of love But because we are touched by divers Sensations according to the different circumstances which accompany the prospect of the good and motion of the Soul towards it we confound the Sensations with the emotions of the Soul and we imagine as many different motions in the Passions as there are different Sensations Now we must here observe that Pain is a real and true Evil and that it is no more the privation of Pleasure than Pleasure is the privation of Pain for there is a
Augustine goes farther than St. Gregory his Faithful Disciple Propinquior nobis qui fecit quà m multa quae facta sunt In illo enim vivimus movemur sumus Istorum autem pleraque remota sunt a mente nostra propter dissimilitudinem sui generis For though he grants that we only know God at present after a very imperfect manner he nevertheless assures us in several places that God is more known to us than those things which we fancy we know best He that has made all things sayes he is nearer to us than those things he has made For 't is in him we have Life Motion and Being Most of the things he has made are not proportioned to our Mind because they are Corporeal and of a Species of Being distinct from him And a little lower Those who have known the Secrets of Nature are justly condemned in the Book of Wisdom Rectè culpantur in libro sapientiae inquisitores hujus saeculi for if they have been able to penetrate into these things which are most concealed from Men with how much more ease might they have discovered the Author and Soveraign of the Vniverse The Foundations of the Earth are concealed from our Eyes but he who has laid those Foundations is near to our Mind 'T is for that Reason that holy Doctor believes Si enim tantum inquit potuerunt valere ut possent aestimare saeculum quomodo ejus Dominum non faciliùs invenerunt Ignota enim sunt fundamenta oculis nostris qui fundavit terram propinquat mentibus nostris De Gen. ad litt l. 5. c. 16. De Trinitate l. 8. c. 8. even that he who has Charity knows God better than he knows his Brother Ecce sayes he jam potest notiorem Deum habere quà m fratrem Plane notiorem quia praesentiorem Notiorem quia interiorem Notiorem quia certiorem I bring no other Proofs of Saint Augustines Sentiment If any Man is desirous of them he may find them of all sorts in the Learned Collection Ambrose Victor has made of them in the Second Volume of Christian Philosophy But to return to the passage of St. John Deum nemo vidit unquam I believe the Evangelists design when he affirms that no Man has ever seen God is to make us believe the difference which is between the Old and New Testament between Jesus Christ and the Patriarchs and Prophets of whom it is written that they have seen God For Jacob Moses Isaiah and others have only seen God with their Bodily Eyes and under an unknown Form They have not seen him in himself Deum nemo vidit unquam But the only Son of the Father who is in his Bosom has acquainted us with what he has seen Vnigenitus qui est in sinu Patris ipse enarravit OBJECTION St. Paul Writing to Timothy sayes That God inhabits inaccessible Light that no Man has ever seen him and moreover that none can see him If the Light of God be inaccessible we cannot see all things in it ANSWER St. Paul cannot be contrary to St. John St. Cyril of Alexandria upon these words of St. John Erat Lux vera who assures us that Jesus Christ is the true Light which lightens all Men that come into this World For the Spirit of Man which several Fathers * In accessibilem dixit sed omni homini humana sapienti Scriptura quippe sacra omnes carnalium sectatoris humanitatis nomine notare solet St. Greg. in cap. 28. Job call Illuminated or Inlightned Light St. Aug. Tr. 14. upon St. John Lumen Illuminarum is only inlightened by the Light of Eternal Wisdom St. Greg. ch 27. of Job which the said Fathers for that Reason call the Light which inlightens Lumen Illuminans David exhorts us to draw near unto God to be inlightned by him Accedite ad eum illuminamini But how can we be inlightned by him if we cannot see the Light by which we are to be inlightned Therefore when St. Paul sayes that this Light is inaccessible he means that it is so to Carnal Men who never look within themselves to contemplate it Or if he speaks of all Men it is because they are all diverted from the Contemplation of Truth because our Body continually disturbs the attention of our Mind OBJECTION God answering Moses who was desirous to see him said Thou canst not see my Face for no Man can see me and live Non videbit me homo vivit ANSWER It is evident That the Literal Sense of this Passage is not contrary to what I have said hitherto For I pretend not that we can see God in this Life in the manner Moses desired it I Answer nevertheless that we must Dye to see God For the Soul unites it self to Truth proportionably as it forsakes the Body 'T is a Truth which we do not sufficiently think upon Those who follow the motions of their Passions whose Imagination is sullyed by the injoyment of Pleasures who have augmented the Union and Correspondence of their Mind with their Body in a word those who Live cannot see God For they cannot look within themselves there to consult Truth Sapientia non invenitur in terra suaviter viventium Job 18. Therefore happy are those who have a pure Heart whose Mind is free and whose Imagination is clean who are not tyed to the World and hardly to their Body in a word happy are those who are Dead for they shall see God Wisdom has declared it publickly upon the Mountain and it also sayes it secretly to those who consult it by looking within themselves Those who continually excite Concupiscence and Pride in themselves who perpetually form a thousand ambitious designs who not only unite but subject their Soul not only to their Body but to all things which are about them in a word those who live not only a Bodily Life but also the Life of this World cannot see God For Wisdom inhabits the most secret part of Reason but those perpetually incline towards external things Yet those who continually mortifie the Activity of their Senses who are careful to preserve the purity of their Imagination who couragiously resist the Motions of their Passions in a word those who break all the Tyes which make others Slaves to the Body and sensible Greatness may discover a World of Truths and see that Wisdom which is concealed from the Eyes of all Mortals Abscondita est ab Oculis omnium viventium Job 28.2 They do in some measure cease to live when they look within themselves They quiet the Body when they approach to Truth For the Mind of Man is situate after such a manner between God and Bodies that it cannot leave Bodies without drawing near unto God as it cannot run after them without removing from him But whereas we cannot quit the Body wholly before Death I own we cannot be perfectly united to God before that time We may now
according to Saint Paul see God confusedly as in a Glass but we cannot see him Face to Face Non videbit me homo vivet Nevertheless we may see him ex parte that is confusedly and imperfectly We must nor imagine that Life is equal in all Living Men nor that it consists in an indivisible Point Videmus nunc per speculum in aenigmate tunc autem facie ad faciem Nunc cognosco ex parte 1 Cor. 15. The Dominion of the Body over the Mind which hinders us from uniting our selves to God by the Knowledge of Truth is capable of more and less The Soul is not equally united to the Body it animates by its Sensations in all Men nor to those towards which it inclines by its Passions and there are some who mortifie the Concupiscence of Pleasure and Pride in themselves to that degree that they hardly any longer have any relation to their Bodies or to the World Thus they are as if they were Dead Saint Paul gives us a great Example of this He chastized his Body and reduced it into subjection and he had humbled and lessened himself to that degree that he thought no more on the World nor the World on him For the World was Dead and Crucified to him as he was Dead and Crucified to the World And 't is for that Reason sayes Saint Gregory that he was so sensible of Truth and so well disposed to receive the Divine Lights that are in his Epistles which as bright as they are only strike those who like him mortifie their Senses and Passions For as he sayes himself The carnal and sensible Man cannot apprehend spiritual things Animalis homo non percipit ea quae sunt Spiritus Dei stultitia enim est illi 1 Cor. 2.14 because the Wisdom of the World the Taste of the Age Wit Niceness Vivacity the Beauty of Imagination by which we live to the World and the World lives in us Ad Moysen dicitur non videbit me homo vivet ae si apertè diceretur Nullus unquam Deum spiritualiter videt qui Mundo carnaliter vivit St. Greg. upon the 28th Chapter of Job communicates to our Mind a sad stupidity and insensibility in respect to all Truths which we cannot perfectly understand without silencing our Senses and Passions Therefore we must wish for Death which unites us to God or at least the Image of that Death which is the mysterious Sleep during which all our External Senses being stupified we may listen to the Voice of inward Truth which is only heard in the silence of Night when Darkness conceals sensible Objects from us and the World is as it were Dead in relation to us 'T is thus sayes St. Gregory That the Spouse had hearkened to the Voice of her Beloved in her Sleep at if she had said I sleep but my Heart wakes I sleep outwardly but my Heart wakes within me because having no Life nor Sensation in reference to visible Objects I become extreamly sensible to the Voice of inward Truth which speaks to me in the most secret part of my Reason Hinc est quod sponsa in Canticis Canticorum sponsi vocem quasi per somnium audieret quae dicebat Ego dormio Cor meum vigilat Ac si diceret dum exteriores sensus ab hujus vitae sollicitudinibus sopio vacante mente vivacius interna cognosco Foris dormio sed intus Cor vigilat quia dum exteriora quasi non sentio interiora solerter apprehendo Bene ergo Eliu ait quod per Somnium loquitur Deus Morals of St. Gregory upon the 33th Chapter of Job AN EXPLANATION OF THE Seventh Chapter of the Second Part of the Third Book In which I prove That we have no clear Idea of the Nature or Modifications of our Soul I Have said in some places and also think I have sufficiently proved it in the Third Book of the Search after Truth that we have no clear Idea of our Soul but only a Conscience or Internal Sensation and for that reason we know it far more Imperfectly than Extension That appear'd so evident to me that I did not think there was any necessity to prove it more at large But the Authority of Des Cartes who says positively That the Nature of the Mind is better known than that of all other things Answer to the fifth Objection against the second Meditation towards the end has prejudiced some of his Disciples so far that what I have written about it has had no other effect with them than to make me pass for a weak Man and one that is incapable of reaching and keeping firmly to abstracted Truths which are improper to beget and preserve the attention of those who consider them I own that I am very weak sensible and heavy and that my Mind depends on my Body in so many respects that I cannot express them I know it I feel it and I endeavour continually to increase that knowledge I have of my self For if we cannot prevent our being miserable it is necessary at least to know it and to feel it since we must at least humble our selves at the sight of our inward Miseries and acknowledge the need we have to be delivered from this Body of Death which disperses Trouble and Confusion throughout all the Faculties of the Soul Nevertheless the Question in hand is so much proportioned to the Mind that I see not why a great application is required to resolve it And this is the reason I did not inlarge upon it For I think I may presume to say that the Ignorance of most Men in relation to their Soul its distinction from the Body its Spirituality its Immortality and its other properties sufficiently prove that we have no clear or distinct Idea of it We may say we have a clear Idea of the Body because we need only to consult the Idea which presents it to discover the modifications whereof it is capable We see clearly that it may be round square at rest or in motion We easily conceive that a Square may be divided into two Triangles two Parallelograms two Trapezias When any one asks us whether any thing belongs or belongs not to Extension we never hesitate upon an Answer because the Idea of Extension being clear we easily at first sight see what it contains and what it excludes But I find not that we have any Idea of our Mind by which we may discover in consulting it the modifications whereof it is capable Had we never felt Pleasure or Pain we should not be able to know whether the Soul were or were not capable of feeling them If a Man had never eaten Melon suffered Pain seen Red or Blue he might consult the pretended Idea of his Soul long enough and never have distinctly discovered from thence whether it were capable or not of such sensations and such modifications I say further although he actually felt Pain or saw Colour he
designed either to maintain the Efficacy of Second Causes or the Nature of Aristotle For although they often spoke after such a manner as favoured Prejudices and the Judgments of the Senses Omnia quippe portenta contra Naturam dicimus esse sed non sunt quomodo enim est contra Naturam quod Dei fit voluntate Cum volantes tanti utique conditorio conditae rei cujusque Natura sit Portentum ergo fit non contra Naturam sed contra quam est nota Natura St. Aug. de Civitate Dei l. 21. c. 8. they sometimes so explained themselves as sufficiently discovered the disposition of their Mind and Heart St. Austin for instance believed the Will of God to be the Power or Nature of every thing as he declares when he speaks thus We are wont to say that Prodigies are against Nature but 't is not true For the Will of the Creator being the Nature of all Creatures how can what is performed by the Will of God be contrary to Nature Miracles or Prodigies therefore are not against Nature but only against what we know of Nature 'T is true St. Austin speaks in many places according to Prejudices But I affirm that proves nothing since we ought to explain literally only such passages as are opposite to Prejudices for the Reasons I have already given If St. Austin in all his Works had never said any thing against the Efficacy of Second Causes but had alwayes favoured this Opinion we might perhaps make use of his Authority to establish it Yet if it does not appear that he ever seriously examined this Question we should alwayes have had Reason to think that his Judgment was not determined upon this Subject and that 't was not impossible but he might be drawn by the impression of his Senses without Reflection to have believed a thing which appeared undoubted until it was carefully examined It is certain for instance that St. Austin alwayes spoke of Beasts as if they had a Soul I don't say a Corporeal one for that Holy Father too well knew the distinction between the Soul and Body to believe there were Corporeal Souls I say a Spiritual Soul for Matter is incapable of Sensation Yet I believe it more reasonable to make use of his Authority to prove that Beasts have no Souls than to prove they have any For from the Principles he has carefully examined and strongly establish'd it manifestly follows they have none Some of St. Austins Principles are these That what has not sinned can never suffer evil Now according to him Pain is the greatest evil and Beasts suffer it That the most noble cannot have the least noble for its end But with him the Soul of Beasts is Spiritual and more noble than the Body and yet has no other end than the Body That what is Spiritual is Immortal and the Soul of Beasts that 's Spiritual is subject to Death There are many such like Principles in the Works of St. Austin from whence it may be concluded that Beasts have no such Spiritual Soul as he admits in them See c. 22 23. de Anima ejus origine as is shown by Ambrose Victor in his Sixth Volume of Christian Philosophy But the Sentiment that Beasts have a Soul or feel Pain when they are beaten being agreeable to Prejudices for there 's no Child who does not believe it we have alwayes reason to think that St. Austin speaks upon this matter according to the general Opinion and never seriously examined the Question and that if he had but begun to doubt and make any reflection upon it he would not have said a thing which is so contrary to his Principles Thus although the Fathers should alwayes have favoured the Efficacy of Second Causes perhaps we should not have been obliged to have had any regard to their Opinion if it had appeared that they had not carefully examined the matter And that what they should have said had been only a Consequence of the Language which is formed and established upon Prejudice But 't is certainly the contrary For the Fathers the most Pious Persons and those who have been best instructed in Religion have commonly snown by some places of their Works what was the disposition of theis Mind and Heart in respect to this matter The most Learned and also the greatest number of Divines seeing on one side that the Holy Scripture was contrary to the Efficacy of Second Causes and on the other that the impression of the Causes publick Laws and chiefly the Philosophy of Aristotle established it For Aristotle thought that God did not concern himself in Sublunary Affairs because it was unworthy his grandeur And that Nature which he supposed in all Bodies was sufficient to produce what happened here below The Divines I say have found this Medium to reconcile Faith with the Heathen Philosophy and Reason with the Senses that Second Causes do nothing except God concurs with them But because this immediate concourse whereby God acts with Second Causes includes great difficulties some Philosophers have rejected it pretending that in order to their acting 't was enough if God preserved them with the same vertue he at first created them And because this Opinion is absolutely conformable to Prejudice and because the operation of God in Second Causes is not sensible it is therefore commonly received by the Vulgar and by those who apply themselves more to the Physicks of the Antients than to Divinity and the Meditation of the Truth The generality of the World believe that God at first Created all things and gave them all the necessary qualities or faculties for their preservation That he has for instance given the first Motions to Matter and afterwards left it to it self to produce by the Communication of its Motions this variety of admirable forms We commonly suppose that Bodies can move one another and even attribute this Opinion to Des Cartes although he expresly speaks against it in the 36th and 37th Articles of the Second Part of his Philosophical Principles Though Man cannot hinder himself from acknowledging that the Creatures depend upon God yet he lessens this dependence as much as possible either through a secret aversion to God or a wretched stupidity and insensibility in respect to his operation But as this Sentiment is chiefly received by those who have not much studied Religion and who often rather follow their Senses and the Authority of Aristotle than their Reason and that of the Holy Scriptures we have not so much reason to fear its establishment in the Minds of those who have any love for Truth and Religion For a little Application in the Examination of this Opinion will easily discover its falsity But that Notion of the immediate concourse of God to each action of Second Causes seems to agree with those passages of Scripture which often attribute the same effect both to God and the Creatures We must consider then that there are
the Resolution I have made and which I have declared at the End of the Preface of the Second Volume of the Search after Truth viz. That I would not Answer all those who should Attacque me without understanding me or whose Discourse gave me any reason to believe that something else besides the Love of Truth was the Motive of their Writing as for others I shall endeavour to satisfie them I am unwilling to disturb others or break my own Repose by contentious Books and Treatises that are wholly useless to a Search after Truth and which serve only to violate Charity and scandalize ones Neighbour and if I now write it is because I ought not to suffer my Faith to be made suspected and because I would be clearly understood that no one ought to treat me as an Heretic upon Consequences which he can draw from the Principles I have Established It is not that I think any Heresie nor even any Error may be drawn from the Book of a Search after Truth I am ready to Answer with Charity and respect all those who shall do me the Honour to Criticise upon me without passion and I shall be always ready to follow Truth as soon as it shall be discovered to me I disavow all Principles which may conclude any Error but I pretend that those persons cannot be justly treated as Heretics who even opinionatively maintain such Principles from which Divines may draw impious Consequences provided the Defenders of these Principles disavow these Consequences for if this were true every one might be treated as an Heretic These are my following Proofs which are drawn even from what passes for Reasonable in the Common Opinions of Philosophers and this not to render them odious Or ridiculous but that I may prove what I design from Universally-received Opinions which Peripatetics insist so much upon that they continually insult over their Adversaries The First Proof Peripatetics and almost all Men believe That Beasts have Souls and these Souls are more Noble than the Bodies they Animate 'T is an Opinion Received at all Times and in all Nations That a Dog suffers pain when he is beaten that he is capable of the Motions of the Passions Fear Desire Envy Hatred Joy Sorrow and that he knows and loves his Master yet from this Opinion may be drawn such Consequences as are directly repugnant to what Faith teaches us The First Consequence contrary to Faith That God is unjust Beasts suffer pain and some are more unhappy than others Now they have never made an ill use of their Liberty for they never had any Then God is unjust who punishes them who makes them unhappy and unequally unhappy although they are equally innocent Then is this Principle false That under a Just God nothing can he miserable without having deserved it A Principle which nevertheless St. Augustine makes use of against the Pelagians to prove Original Sin Moreover there is this difference betwixt Men and Beasts That Men after Death may be happy which recompences the pains they endure in this Life But Beasts lose all at Death they have been unhappy and innocent and no Recompense attends them Thus an innocent Man may suffer in order to Merit and yet God be Just But if a Beast suffers God is unjust Perhaps it may be said That God may do whatever he pleases with a Beast provided he observes the Rules of Justice in respect of Man but if an Angel thought that God could not punish him without having deserved it and yet might do what he pleased with Man should we approve of this Thought Certainly God is Just to all his Creatures and is the most vile are capable of being miserable they must needs be capable of becoming criminal Second Consequence repugnant to Faith That God Wills Disorder and that Nature is not Corrupted The Soul of a Dog is a Substance more Noble than the Body it Animates for according to St. * De Quantit Animae ch 31 32 c. lib. 4. de Anima ejus Origine ch 13. and elsewhere Augustine it is a Spiritual Substance more Noble than the most Noble Bodies Besides Reason shows us That Bodies can neither Know nor Love that Pleasure Pain Joy Sadness and other Passions cannot be Modifications of Bodies 'T is believed That Dogs know and love their Masters that they are susceptible of the Passions of Fear Desire Joy Sadness and many others The Soul of Dogs is not then a Body but a Substance more Noble than Bodies Now the Soul of a Dog is made for his Body it has no other End or Felicity than the Enjoyment of Bodies Then the Nature of Man is not Corrupted and Concupiscence is no Disorder God might make Man for the Enjoyment of Bodies he might subject him to the Motions of Cupiscence c. Perhaps it may yet be said That the Soul of Beasts is made for Man but this is a weak Subterfuge For it 's indifferent to me whether my Dog or Horse has or has not a Soul 'T is not the Soul of a Horse which carries or draws me 't is his Body 'T is not the Soul of a Chicken which Nourishes me but its Flesh Now God could and consequently ought to create Horses who should do all Things we have need of without a Soul if it be true That he has made them only for our use Moreover the Soul of a Horse is better than the Noblest Bodies therefore God ought not to create it for the Body of Man Lastly God ought not to have given Souls to Flies which Swallows feed upon Swallows are but of little use to Man they might have fed upon Grain like other Birds Why then must there be an infinite Number of Souls annihilated to preserve the Bodies of these Birds since the Soul of a Fly is worth more than the Body of the most perfect Animals If then we are assured that Beasts have Souls that is Substances that are more Noble than Bodies we take away from God his Wisdom and make him Act irregularly we destroy Original Sin and consequently overthrow Religion by taking away the Necessity of a Mediator The Third Consequence contrary to Faith The Soul of Man is Mortal or at least the Souls of Beasts pass from one Body to another The Soul of a Beast is a Substance distinct from its Body Now it is Annihilated then Substances may naturally be Annihilated Then although the Soul of Man be a Substance distinct from his Body it may be Annihilated when the Body is destroyed Thus one may demonstrate by Reason That the Soul of Man is Immortal But if we grant as a most Certain Truth That no Substance can be naturally Annihilated the Soul of Beasts will Subsist after Death and since they are made for Bodies the least we can infer is That they pass from one Body into another that they may not be useless in Nature This is a Consequence which appears more Reasonable Now we believe That God
is Just and Wise that He loves not Disorder that Nature is Corrupted that the Soul of Man is Immortal and the Soul of Beasts is Mortal Because indeed 't is not a Substance distinct from their Bodies Therefore in the Language of Monsieur de la Ville which condemns Men from Consequences which he draws from their Principles the Cartesians may represent him as criminal and all Mankind besides because they believe that Beasts have Souls What would Monsieur de la Ville say if from his own way of Arguing we should accuse him of Impiety because he maintains Opinions from whence we deduce That God is not Just Wise Powerful Sentiments which overthrow Religion which oppose Original Sin which take away the only Demonstration that Reason furnishes us with to prove the Immortality of the Soul What would he say if we should treat him as unjust and cruel for making innocent Souls suffer and even Annihilating them for the Nourishment of Bodies which they Animate He is a Sinner they are innocent 'T is only to nourish his Body that he kills Bodies and Annihilates their Souls which are of more value than bodies Again If his Body could not subsist but by the Flesh of Animals or if the Annihilation of one Soul could make him immortal this Cruelty however unjust it is might perhaps be pardonable but how many Substances wholly innocent does he Annihilate only to preserve for a few days a Body justly condemned to death for sin Would he be so little a Philosopher as to excuse himself upon the Custom of the places where he lives But if his Zeal had carried him to the Indies where the Inhabitants build * Linsch ch 37. Hospitals for Beasts where the Philosophers and many of the best Sort of Men are so charitable even in respect to Flies that for fear of killing them by breathing or walking they wear a fine Cloath before their Mouths and fan the Ways in which they pass would he then be afraid to make innocent Souls suffer or Annihilate them for the preservation of a Sinners Body Would he not rather choose their Opinion who allow the Soul of a Beast to be no more Noble than their Body nor distinct from it and by publishing this Sentiment acquit himself of the Crimes of Cruelty and Injustice whereof these People would accuse him if having the same Principles he followed not their Custom This Example might be sufficient to show That we ought not to treat Men as Heretics and dangerous persons because we may draw impious Consequences from their Principles even when they disavow these Consequences But be it as it will I think it is infinitely more difficult to Answer these Consequences that I have now drawn than these of Monsieur de la Ville The Cartesians would ve very ridiculous if they treated Monsieur de la Ville and other persons who are not of their Opinion as Impious and Heretical 'T is only the Authority of the Church which may decide in Matters of Faith and the Church has not obliged us and probably whatever Consequences shall be drawn from Common Principles will not oblige us to believe That Dogs have a Soul more Noble than their Bodies that they know not their Masters that they neither Fear Desire nor suffer any thing Because it is not necessary that Christians should be instructed in these Truths The Second Proof Almost all Men are perswaded that sensible Objects are true Causes of the Pleasure and Pain which is felt by their means They believe that Fire disperses that agreeable Heat which rejoyces us That Nourishments act in us and give us the agreeable Sensations of Tasts They doubt not but 't is the Sun which ripens Fruits that are necessary for Life and that all Sensible Objects have a Vertue which is proper to them by which they can do us much Good or Evil. Let us see whether we cannot draw from these Principles such Consequences as are contrary to what Religion obliges us to believe A Consequence impugning the First Principle of Morality by which we are obliged to love God with all our Power and to fear him only 'T is a Common Notion according to which all Men act That we should love or fear whatever has Power to do us good or hurt to make us sensible of Pleasure or Pain to make us Happy or Unhappy This is a supposed Principle we ought therefore to love and fear them This is a Reasoning which all the World Naturally makes and which is yet a general Principle of the Corruption of Manners It is evident by Reason and the first of Gods Commandments that all the Motions of our Soul whether Love or Fear Desire or Joy should tend towards God and that all the Motions of our Body should be regulated and determined by External Objects By the Morion of our Body we may approach to Fruit avoid a Blow fly a Beast that would devour us But we ought to love and fear God only All the Motions of our Soul ought to tend towards him alone We ought to love him with all our Power This is an indispensible Law We can neither love nor fear what is below us without being disordered and corrupted To be afraid of a Beast ready to devour us or to fear the Devil is to do them honour To love Fruit to desire Riches to rejoyce in the Heat of the Sun as if it were the true Cause thereof nay even to love ones Father Protectour Friend as if they were capable of doing as good this is to give them that honour which is due to God only We must not love any one in this sense 'T is permitted and we ought to love our Neighbour by wishing or procuring for him as a Natural or Occasional Cause whatever may conduce to his Happiness but not otherwise We must love our Brethren not as capable of doing us good but as of enjoying with us the true Good These Truths appear evident to me but Men strangely obscure them when they suppose that Bodies which are about us can act in us as true Causes Indeed the greatest part of Christian Philosophers pretend that Creatures can do nothing if God did not concur to their Action and so Sensible Objects cannot act in us without the Efficacy of the First Cause We ought neither to fear nor love them but God only on whom all things depend This Explication shows Men condemn the Consequences which I have drawn from their Principle But if I should say with Monsieur de la Ville that 't is a slight of Philosophers to cover their Impiety if I should charge them with the crime of maintaining at the expence of Religion Aristotles Opinions and the Prejudices of their Senses if by examining their Heart I should impute to them a secret desire of debauching Mens Morals by the defence of a Principle which justifies all sorts of disorders and opposes the first Principle of Christian Morality by the Consequences
enlightened Philosophy 'T is true that Pleasure is good and Pain an evil and that Pleasure and Pain by the Author of Nature have been affixed to the use of certain things to make us capable of judging whether they are good or bad That we must choose the good fly the evil and generally follow the motions of our Passions All this is true but it only relates to the Body to preserve which and long to continue a Life like to that of Beasts we must suffer our selves to be governed by our Passions and Desires The Senses and Passions were only given us for the good of the Body sensible Pleasure is the character which Nature has joined to the use of certain things that without taking the pains to examine them by Reason we might employ 'em for the preservation of the Body but not that we should love them for we ought to love nothing but what Reason most certainly discovers to us to be our good We are Rational Beings and God who is our chief Good requires not of us a blind Love a Love of Instinct or one that is forced but a Love of Choice of Knowledge and such a one as subjects our Mind and Hearts to him He induces us to love him by discovering to us by the light that accompanies the delection of his Grace that he is our Soveraign Good but inclines us to the good of the Body only by instinct and a confused sensation of Pleasure because the good of the Body deserves neither the application of the Mind nor exercise of our Reason But farther our Body is not our selves 't is something that belongs to us without which absolutely speaking we may exist The Good of the Body therefore is not properly our good for Bodies can be only the good of Bodies which we may make use of for the good of our Body but we must not unite our selves to them Our Soul has likewise a Good peculiar to her self viz. that good only that is superiour to her who alone preserves and produces in her the sensations of Pain and Pleasure For in fine all the objects of our Senses are of themselves uncapable of making us perceive them and 't is God alone that can teach us they are present by the sensation he gives us of them which is a Truth the Heathen Philosophers could never comprehend We may and I confess ought to love what is capable of making us feel Pleasure And 't is for that reason we must love none but God because 't is only he who can act in our Souls since sensible objects can only move the Organs of our Senses But perhaps it may be answered by some what matters it from whence these agreeable Sensations come we will enjoy them Ingrateful as they are not to acknowledge the hand that so kindly bestows these Goods They would have a just God give unjust Rewards and recompense them for the Crimes they commit against him at the very time they commit them They would make use of his immutable Will which is the Order and Law of Nature to force undeserved favours from him For by a criminal Artifice they produce such motions in their Bodies which obliges him to make them taste all sorts of Pleasures But Death will corrupt this Body and God whom they have made subservient to their unjust Desires will make them submit to his just Anger and will mock them in his turn 'T is true 't is a very hard thing that the possession of the Goods of the Body should be attended with Pleasure and that that of the Goods of the Soul should often be tied to Pain and Sorrow We may look upon it as a great irregularity because Pleasure being the character of Good as Pain is that of Evil we ought infinitely to take more delight in the love of God than in the use of sensible things since God is the true or rather the only Good of the Mind This will certainly happen one day and 't is very probable 't was so before the Fall at least 't is certain before Sin entered into the World we felt no pain in the exercise of our Duty But God has withdrawn himself from us ever since the Fall of Adam he is no longer our Good by Nature but only by Grace for now we naturally find no satisfaction in loving him and he rather diverts us from then enclines us to love him If we follow him he repulses us if we run after him he smites us if we are constant in our persuit he still treats us ill and makes us suffer very lively and sensible Griefs But when being weary with walking in the hard and painful Paths of Virtue without being incouraged by the relish of Good or assisted by any Nourishment we begin to feed upon sensible things to which he unites us by the taste of Pleasure as if he would reward us for turning aside from him to follow those perishing Goods In short since the first Sin it seems as if God were not pleased that we should love or think upon him or that we should look upon him as our only and chief Good It is only through the Grace of JESVS CHRIST that we are now sensible that God is our Good since 't is by his Grace that we take any pleasure and satisfaction in the love of God Thus the Soul neither discovering her own Good by a clear view or by sensation without the Grace of JESVS CHRIST she takes the Good of the Body for her own She loves it and is more strictly united to it by her Will than she was by the first Institution of Nature For the Good of the Body being the only one left that we are now sensible of it necessarily acts the more powerfully upon Man affects his Brain more livelily and consequently the Soul must feel and imagine it after a more sensible manner And the Animal Spirits being more violently agitated the Will must needs love it with more Ardour and Pleasure Before Sin the Soul was able to efface out of the Brain an over lively image of sensible good and cause the pleasure that attended this image to vanish The Body being thus submitted to the Mind the Soul could in an instant put a stop to the shaking of the Fibres of the Brain and emotion of the Spirits only by the consideration of its Duty But now it remains no longer in its power nor do these traces of the Imagination and motions of the Spirits any longer depend upon it and therefore by a necessary consequence Pleasure which by the order of Nature is affixed to these traces and motions is become the only Master of the Heart Man cannot long resist this Pleasure by his own strength 't is Grace only that can entirely overcome it because none but God as the Author of Grace can overcome himself as the Author of Nature or rather can appease himself as the Revenger of Adam's Disobedience See the Fifth Dialogue of the Christian