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A17081 A discourse of ciuill life containing the ethike part of morall philosophie. Fit for the instructing of a gentleman in the course of a vertuous life. By Lod: Br. Bryskett, Lodowick.; Giraldi, Giambattista Cinzio, 1504-1573. Ecatommiti. VIII.5. 1606 (1606) STC 3958; ESTC S116574 181,677 286

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reason knoweth that he is as Trismegistus saith a diuine miracle and therefore not made as bruite beasts are to the belly and to death but to vertue and to eternall life that thereby he may vnite himselfe at the last with his Creator and maker of all things when his soule shall be freed from these mortall bands and fetters of the flesh Towards whom neuerthelesse it is his part of raise himselfe with the wings of his thoughts euen whiles he is here in this world soaring aboue mortall things bending his mind to the contemplation of that diuine nature the most certaine roote of all goodnesse the infallible truth and the assured beginning and foundation of all vertues And therefore said Aristotle that the science of the soule was profitable to the knowledge of all truth Whereunto may be added that which Plato and his followers haue affirmed to wit that the soule knowing her self knoweth also her maker and disposeth her selfe not onely to obey him but also to become like vnto him whereof in another place occasion of further speech will be ministred Moreouer a man by knowing himselfe becommeth in this life sage and prudent and vnderstandeth that he is made not to liue onely as other creatures are but also to liue well For they that haue not this knowledge are like vnto bruite beasts and he seeth likewise that nature though she produceth man not learned yet she hath framed vs to vertue and apt to knowledge And that a man is placed as a meane creature betweene bruite beasts and those diuine spirits aboue in heauen hauing a disposition to decline if he list to the nature of those bruite beasts and also to raise himselfe to a resemblance of God himselfe Which things he weighing and considering he reacheth not onely to the knowledge of himselfe but of other men also And by the guiding of Philosophie to direct himselfe and others to the well gouerning of himselfe of families and Common-wealths to the making of lawes and ordinances for the maintaining of vertue and beating downe of vice and finally to set men in the way to their felicitie by giuing them to vnderstand that they onely are happie which be wise and vertuous and meete to be Lords and rulers ouer other men and ouer all things else created for the vse of mankind Of all which things when they shall consider man onely to be the end maruelling at his excellencie they are driuen to acknowledge how much they are bound to the heauenly bountie and goodnesse for creating him so noble a creature and setting him so direct a course to euerlasting ioy and felicitie Hence groweth a desire in them of what is good beautifull and honest and of iustice and to make themselues like vnto their maker who as the Platonikes say is the centre about which all soules capable of reason turne euen as the line turneth about the mathematicall point to make a circle and so by good and vertuous operations to purchase in this life praise and commendation and in the life to come eternal happinesse These were the men whom the Lacedemonians accounted diuine and the Platonikes called the images of God Then said Captain Carleil this your discourse whereby you haue shewed the importance and right meant of knowing our selues hath bin very wise fruitful and fit to declare how we ought to frame our life in this world But I make a doubt whether all this that you haue layed before vs to be done be in our power or no for it seemeth strange that if it be in our power to giue our selues to a commendable life there be any as we see there are many so peruerse and of so crooked iudgement as to bend themselues to wickednesse and naughtie life who when they might be vertuous would rather chuse to be vicious And this maketh me oftentimes to thinke that the doing of good or euill is not in our power but that either destinie which as Thales was wont to say ruled and mastred all things or the starres with their influences doth draw vs to do what we do To this demaund of yours said I you shal haue an answer such as mine author maketh who as a Philosopher naturally discoursing of the actions of the soule deliuereth his minde according to the sentence of all Philosophers But because some part of your question toucheth a point now in controuersie concerning Religion it is good we haue a safe conduct of my Lord Primate that his sence as a Philosopher may haue free passage without danger of his censure That shall you haue said my Lord Primate with a good will for since we are here to discourse of Morall Philosophie we wil for this time put Diuinitie to silence so farre forth as your author say not any thing so repugnant to the truth as that it may breed any errour in the minds of the hearers Then said I the demaund of Captaine Carleil hath three seuerall points or articles the one is whether vertue and vertuous actions be in our power or no Another that it seemeth strange if vice vertue be in our power that any man should be so senslesse as to apply himselfe to vice and forsake vertue The last is whether the good or euill we do proceed frō the influence of the heauens or from necessitie of destinie and not from our owne free election And my author beginneth with the last which he affirmeth to be most contrary to truth and to the excellencie of mans nature proceeding thence to the second and lastly to the first Therefore he saith that whosoeuer holdeth mans will and election to be subiect to the necessitie of destiny destroyeth vtterly according to Aristotles saying all that appertaineth to humane prudence either in the care of himselfe or of his family or in the ordering of lawes and the vniuersall gouernment of Kingdomes and Common-weales as well in peace as in warre for if it were so what need haue men to do any thing but idly to attend what his destinie is to giue him or to denie him or to prouide for any of those things whereof our humane life hath neede What difference were there betweene the wise man and the foole the carefull and the rechlesse the diligent and the negligent The punishment of malefactors and the rewarding of wel-doers shold be vniust and needlesse For euery thing being done by the order of fatall disposition and not by election no man could either deserue praise or incurre blame Besides nature should in vaine haue giuen vs the vse of reason to discourse or to consult or the abilitie to will or chuse any thing for whatsoeuer were appointed by destinie should of necessitie come to passe and if of necessitie then neither prudence counsell nor election can haue any place And the vse of free-will being so taken from vs we should be in worse state and condition then bruite beasts for they guided by instinct of nature bend themselues to those things whereunto
as our Christian writers doe but tooke the vertue fantastike for the vnderstanding multiplied in particular persons And therefore she being mingled with the bodie faileth also with the same and this is that interiour thing which Aristotle saith is corrupted whereby the vnderstanding loseth his vertue as shall be shewed which happeneth not to the possible vnderstanding because it is an essential part of the Intellectiue soule not mingled with the bodie and free from any passion as a diuine substance Of which bodie she vseth no part for her instrument to vnderstand though she haue neede of the fantasie to receiue the Intelligible formes whiles she is the forme of the bodie And this necessitie which the vnderstanding hath of the fantasie to vnderstand sheweth the contrarie of that which these fellowes inferre who hold the vnderstanding to be mortall in that respect For by this it appeareth that the vnderstanding proceedeth not from the power of the matter for if so it were it should haue no neede of the fantasie but should it selfe be the fantasie and therefore Aristotle right well perceiuing that our vnderstanding was not fantasie nor vsed anie part of the body for an instrument sayd that the vnderstanding came from abroad as shall be declared It is therefore no good consequence to say that because the passible soule dieth therefore the possible soule likewise is mortall Yea but said M. Spencer we haue frō Aristotle that the possible vnderstanding suffreth in the act of vnderstanding and to suffer importeth corruption by which reason it should be mortall as is the passible Neither is that reason quoth I sufficient for although the name of suffering agree with the possible vnderstanding and with the passible leauing the difference betweene Alexander and Aristotle in that point the reason and manner in them is different For the suffering of the passible vnderstanding tendeth to the destruction thereof whereas the suffering of the possible is to the greater perfection of the same And for this cause Aristotle telleth vs that the suffering of the senses and that of the vnderstanding are not both of one nature because the first breedes destruction and the later perfection and that therefore an excellent Intelligible giueth perfection to the vnderstanding whereas an excellent Sensible corrupteth the sense But not hauing any other word meete to expresse this suffering of the vnderstanding whiles it is in that act we vse the same that agreeth to the passible though the reason of them both be verie diuerse The possible vnderstanding as hath bene sayd alreadie being the place of the Intelligible formes standeth in respect of the Agent vnderstanding as the matter in respect of the forme for the first is but in power for which respect Auerroes called it the materiall vnderstanding and this later is in act And this Agent vnderstanding by illumining the formes which are in him as blind euen as colours are in things before they be made apparent to the eye by the illumination of light vnderstandeth the kinds of things and vnderstanding them vnderstandeth it selfe For in spirituall things that which vnderstandeth and that which is vnderstood become all one thing and turning it selfe about the vniuersall kinds vnderstandeth withall things particular And this is that which the possible vnderstanding suffereth from the Agent receiuing thereby that perfection which you haue heard Why said Maister Spenser doth it not seeme that Aristotle when he saith that after death we haue no memorie that he meant that this our vnderstanding was mortall For if it were not so man should not lose the remembrance of things done in this life Nay answered I what a sillie part had it bene of Aristotle rather if he had thought the intellectiue soule to be mortall to say that we remembred nothing after this life when nothing of vs should haue remained And therefore it may serue to proue the immortalitie of the soule and not the corruption as you surmise onely for arguments sake that truth may be sifted out But our not remembring then commeth from the corruptible part which is the vertue of the fantasie which being a power of the sensitiue soule that keepeth in store the remembrance of materiall things that vertue which should represent them failing in vs we cannot remember them after death For the memorie is no part of the vnderstanding but of the sensitiue soule and therefore Aristotle said that memorie came from sense insomuch as creatures wanting reason haue memorie though they haue not rememorating as man hath for thereto is discourse required which according to Aristotle is nothing else but an action of the vnderstanding in the vertue imaginatiue Which thing neither in those creatures deuoid of reason nor yet in separated intelligences can haue place because those want discourse and these are pure acts as Philosophers call them Doth not Aristotle sayd my Lord Primate in his Ethikes say that the contentmēts and the troubles of those which liue appertaine vnto the dead and breede them griefe or delight And how is it then that he should say we haue no memorie after this life Aristotle in that place sayd I spake in reproofe of Solon who had sayd that no man could be accounted happie till after his death and meant there to shew that although it were graunted that man had memorie after his death of things done in this life yet could he not be happie when he was dead by reason of the strange accidents which this life bringeth foorth and therefore he said not simply that we remember but that supposing we did yet could we not be happie when we were dead so making good his opinion against Solon by naturall reason Yet sayd Maister Spenser let me aske you this question if the vnderstanding be immortall and multiplied still to the number of all the men that haue bene are and shall be how can it stand with that which Aristotle telleth vs of multiplication which saith he proceedeth from the matter and things materiall are alwayes corruptible Marrie Sir said I this is to be vnderstood of materiall things and not of Intelligible and spirituall such as is the vnderstanding And that the vnderstanding might remaine after the matter were gone as the forme of the bodie he hath as before is said declared in his Metaphysikes affirming the Intellectiue soule to be perpetuall though it be separated from the bodie whose forme it was But how cometh it to passe replied Maister Spenser that the soule being immortall and impassible yet by experience we see dayly that she is troubled with Lethargies Phrensies Melancholie drunkennesse and such other passions by which we see her ouercome and to be debarred from her office and function These quoth I are passions of the vertue cogitatiue fantastike or imaginatiue called by Aristotle as I haue said alreadie the passible vnderstanding and not of the Intellectiue soule Which passible vnderstanding being an inward sense and therefore tyed to the bodie feeleth the passions of the same
whereby it is offended and cannot performe his office towards the other but runneth into such inconueniences by reason of his infirmity and for want of reasons direction And whereas Hippocrates saith that they that being sicke in minde and touched with anie corporall disease haue little or no feeling of paine it sheweth plainely that it is as I haue said For if you marke it well this word feele explaneth the whole since feeling is a propertie of the Sensitiue soule and the vnderstanding feeleth not And in like manner are the words of Aristotle to be vnderstood where he saith that such whose flesh is soft are apt to learne and they that are melancholy to be wise For that the Sensitiue vertue taketh more easily the formes or kindes of things in such subiects according to their nature and representeth them to the vnderstāding from whence knowledge and vnderstanding proceedeth as yesterday was sayd And this happeneth not onely in these passions but also in all other alterations as of gladnesse of sorow of hope and of feare with such like which appertaine not to the vnderstanding to which sayd Aristotle who would ascribe such affects might as well say that the vnderstanding layed bricke to build or cast a loome to weaue Why say M. Spencer doth your author meane as some haue not sticked euen in our dayes to affirme that there are in vs two seuerall soules the one sensitiue and mortall and the other Intellectiue and Diuine Nothing lesse said I for that I hold were manifest heresie as well in Philosophie as in Christianitie For Aristotle teacheth vs that the Vegetatiue and Sensitiue soule or their powers were in the soule Intellectiue as the triangle is in the square which could not be if the sensitiue were separated from the Intellectiue And speaking of the varietie of soules and of their powers he sayth that the Sensitiue could not be without the Vegetatiue but that this latter might well be without the former and that all the other vertues of all the three soules are in those creatures that haue reason and vnderstanding It cannot therefore be sayd according to Aristotle that the Sensitiue soule in man is seuered from the Intellectiue And because man participateth as hath bene sayd of all the three faculties of the soules I see not why these fellowes that mention two speake not of all three as well seeing that in man are the operations of all three For if they say that it sufficeth to speake of the Sensitiue by which man is a liuing creature and containeth the Vegetatiue why should they not as well say that the Intellectiue alone includeth both the other and then is there no need of seuering at all By which it may appeere that this frantike opinion gathered from the Assirians is not onely contrary to Aristotle but to reason it selfe For Aristotle saith that all things haue their being from their formes and that in naturall things the more perfect containe the lesse perfect when the lesser is ordained for the more and that therefore onely the Intellectiue soule which containeth within it the natures of both the others is the onely and true forme of man malgre all such dolts as would haue man to be by reason of diuers formes both a brute and a reasonable creature who seeke to set men astray from the right way with such fanaticall deuices Let vs therefore conclude with Aristotle that both the passible and the possible vnderstandings are vertues of the Intellectiue soule insomuch as she is the particular and proper forme of euery man and that as a humane soule she is euerlasting impassible not mingled with the bodie but seuered from the same simple and diuine not drawne from any power of matter but infused into vs from abroade not ingendred by seede which being once freed from the bodie because nature admitteth nothing that is idle is altogether bent and intent to contemplation being then as Philosophers call it actus purus a pure vnderstanding not needing the bodie either as an obiect or as a subiect In consideration whereof Aristotle sayd that man through contemplation became diuine and that the true man which both he and his diuine master agreed to be the minde did enioy thereby not as a mortall man liuing in the world but as a diuine creature that high felicitie to which ciuill felicitie was ordained and attained to wisedome science after the exercise of the morall vertues as meanes to guide and conduct him to the same And not impertinently haue the Platonikes following their master in that point sayd that nature had giuen vs sense not because we should stay thereupon but to the end that thereby might grow in vs imagination from imagination discourse from discourse intelligence and from intelligence gladnesse vnspeakable which might raise vs as diuine and freed from the bands of the flesh to the knowledge of God who is the beginning and the end of all goodnesse towards whom we ought with all endeuour to lift vp our minds as to our chiefe and most perfect good for he onely is our summum bonum For to them it seemed that the man whom contemplation had raised to such a degree of felicitie became all wholy vnderstanding by that light which God imparteth to the spirits that are so purged through the exercise of morall vertues which vertues are termed by Plato the purgers of the mind stirring vp therein a most ardent desire to forsake this mortall bodie and to vnite it selfe with him And this is that contemplation of death which the Philosophie of Plato calleth vs vnto For he that is come to this degree of perfection is as dead to the world and worldly pleasures because he considereth that God is the center of al perfections that about him al our thoughts desires are to be turned employed Such doth God draw vnto himselfe and afterwards maketh them partakers of his ioyes euerlasting giuing them in the meane while a most sweet tast euen in this life of that other life most happie and those exceeding delights beyond which no desire can extend nor yet reach vnto the same So as being full of this excellent felicitie they thinke euery minute of an houre to be a long time that debarreth them from issuing out of this mortall prison to returne into their heauenly countrey where with that vertue which is proper to the soule alone they may among the blessed spirits enioy their maker whose Maiestie and power all the parts of the world declare the heauens the earth the sea the day the night whereat the infernall spirits tremble and shake euen as good men on earth bow downe and worship the same with continuall himnes and praises and in heauen no lesse all the orders and blessed companie of Saints and Angels do the like world without end This loe is as much as mine author hath discoursed vpon this subiect which I haue Englished for my exercise in both languages and haue at your intreaties communicated vnto you I will not say being betrayed by M. Spencer but surely cunningly thrust in to take vp this taske whereby he might shift himselfe from that trouble But howsoeuer it be if it haue liked you as it is I shall thinke my time well spent both in the translating of it at the first and in the relating of it vpon this occasion in this manner For as I sayd before I began that I would not tye my selfe to the strict lawes of an interpreter so haue I in some places omitted here and there haply some sentences without which this our Discourse might be complete enough because they are rather points of subtiller inuestigation then our speech required though the Author therein perhaps aymed at the commendation of a great reader or absolute Philosopher and in the descriptions of some of the morall vertues added somewhat out of others And what hath beene sayd concerning ciuill felicitie by him and deliuered in substance by me I thinke you will allow to be sufficient Since therefore my taske is done and that it groweth late with this onely petition that you will be content to beare with the roughnesse of my speech in reporting that vnto you which in his language our Author hath eloquently set downe I end Here all the companie arose and giuing me great thankes seemed to rest very well satisfied as well with the manner as with the matter at the least so of their courtesie they protested And taking their leaues departed towards the Citie FINIS ERRATA PAge 12. line 17. climbing pag. 16. lin 32 auoyde pag. 68. lin 14. speake of pag. 81. lin 4. meere pag. 82. lin 1. Politikes pag. 95. lin 10. men pag. 109. lin 15. Dioxippus pag. 140. lin 15. leaue out to pag. 143. lin 13. supposing that c pag. 145. lin 6. their marching pag. eadē lin 7. they neuer went pag. 163. lin 17. flow pag. 164. lin 4. determine pag. 168. lin 25. hath man pag. 173. lin 9. Platonikes pag. 199. lin 17. leaue out to pag. ib. lin 18. leaue out vvhich pag. 216. lin 5. make shew of pag. ibid. lin 18. that she be Pag. 238. lin 14. himselfe
all the arguments which Plato his followers bring to proue this by our desiring of things by seeking them by finding them and by the discerning of them it may suffice to referre you to what Plato hath left of this matter written vnder the person of Socrates in his dialogs intitled Menon and Phoedon and diuers other places And likewise to that which his expositors haue written among whō Plotinus though he be somewhat obscure deserueth the chiefe place as best expressing Plato his sence and meaning But let our knowledge come how it will either by learning anew or by recording what the soule knew before she hauing need howsoeuer it be of the ministery of the senses and seeing it is almost necessary to passe through the same meanes from not knowing to knowledge we shall euer find the like difficulties whether we rememorate or learne anew For without much study great diligence and long trauel are sciences no way to be attained Which thing Socrates who haply was the author of Plato his opinion shewed vs plainely For when the curtizan Theodota scoffing at him said she was of greater skill then he for she had drawne diuers of Socrates scholers from him to her loue where Socrates could draw none of her louers to follow him he answered that he thereat maruelled nothing at all for said he thou leadest them by a plaine smooth way to lust and wantonnesse and I leade them to vertue by a rough and an vneasie path Here Captaine Norreis said Though this controuersie betweene two so great Philosophers be not for ought I see yet decided and that if we should take vpon vs to discerne whose opinion were the better it might be imputed to presumption yet would I for my part be very glad to know what was the reason that induced Plato to say that our soule had the knowledge of all things before it came into the body and I pray you if your author speake any thing thereof that you will therein satisfie my desire Yes marry doth he sir said I and your desire herein sheweth very well the excellencie of your wit and your attention to that which hath bin said and both may serue for a sufficient argument what hope is to be conceiued of a gentleman so inclined and desirous to learne Thus therefore he saith to your question That whereas we according to truth beleeue that our soules are by the diuine power of God incontinently created and infused into our bodies when we beginne to receiue life and sense in our mothers womb Plato contrarily held that they were long before the bodies created and produced in a number certaine by God and that they were as particles descended from the Gods aboue into our bodies and therfore he thought it nothing absurd that they should haue the knowledge of al things that may be knowne For that they being in heauen busied in the contemplation of the diuine nature free from any impediment of the body and that diuine nature containing in it as he said the essentiall Ideas of all things which Ideas according to his opinion were separate and eternall natures remaining in the diuine minde of God to the patterne of which all things created were made they might said he in an instant haue the knowledge of all that could be knowne If this opinion were true said Captaine Norreis happie had it bin for vs that our soules had continued stil after they were sent into our bodies to be of that sort that they had bin in heauen for then should we not haue needed so much labour and paine in seeking that knowledge which before they had so perfectly And being so perfect to what end did he say they were sent into our bodies to become vnperfect His opinion said I was that the soules were created in a certaine number to the end they might informe so many bodies and therfore if they should not haue come into those bodies they should haue failed of the end for which they were created In which bodies the Platonikes say further that they were to exercise themselues and were giuen to the bodies not onely because they should giue them power to moue to see to feele and to do those other operations which are naturall but to the end that they should in that which appertaineth to the mind not suffer vs to be drowsie and lie as it were asleepe but rather to waken and stirre vs vp to the knowledge of those things that are fit for vs to vnderstand and this was the most accomplished operation sayd they that the soule could giue vnto the bodie whiles it was linked thereunto I cannot see said the Lord Primate how this hangeth together For I haue read that these kind of Philosophers held an opinion that our soules all the while they were tied to our bodies did but sleepe and that all which they do or suffer in this life was but as a dreame It is true said I that the Platonikes said so indeed and that was because they knew that whatsoeuer we do in this life is but a dreame in comparison of that our soules shal do in the other world when they shal be loosed from those bands which tie them to our bodies here through which bands they are hindred from the knowledge of those things perfectly which here they learne In regard whereof Carneades Arcesilas and others the authors of the new Accademie said constantly that in this world there was no certaine knowledge of any thing And Nausifanes affirmed that of all those things which here seeme to vs to be we know nothing so certainly as that they were not Vnto which opinion Protagoras also agreed saying that men might dispute of any thing pro contra as if he should say that nothing could be assuredly knowen to vs whiles we are here as our soules shall know them whensoeuer they shall be freed from our bodies and lie no more inwrapped in these mortall shadowes because then they shall be wholy busied in the contemplation of truth neither shal they be deceiued by the senses as in this life they are oftentimes who offer vnto them the images of things vncertainly not through default of the senses but by reason of the meanes whereby they apprehend the formes of things For the sense by his owne nature if he be not deceiued or hindred in receiuing of things sensible comprehendeth them perfectly nay becometh one selfe same thing with them And this is the cause why it is said that our soules sleepe whiles they remaine in this life and that our knowledge here is but as a dreame According to which conceit the inamoured Poet speaking of his Ladie Laura said very properly vpon her death in this sort Thou hast faire Damsell slept but a short sleepe Now wak'd thou art among the heau'nly spirits Where blessed soules interne within their maker Shewing that our life here is but a slumber and seeming to infer that she was now interned or become inward in the
remaining I wil briefly knit vp the rest that concerneth this matter Young men haue naturall heate so much abounding in them that they cannot rest but be still in motion as well of body as of mind The one with running leaping and other exercises and when all they faile the tongue ceaseth not which by reason of their age is the more bold and ready The other with passing from one discourse to another and from one passion to another now louing now hating now boyling with anger and choler now still and quiet with such like motions of the mind And because the motions of the body and the affections of the minde must haue their measure and their rule and the one and the other conuenient exercise and moderate rest therefore did the auncient wise men deuise two speciall Arts most apt and fit for both these purposes Whereof the one they called Gymnastica which is a skilfull and moderate exercise of the body and the other Musike by which name it is well knowne in all languages And when they had caused their youth to spend part of the day in learning those sciences and disciplines which they thought fit for that age for of all other things they abhorred the training them vp in ignorance because seldome can an ignorant man be good and that men without knowledge and learning are but figures of men and images of death without soule or life then would they draw them to honest exercises of the body by degrees For they held it a thing most necessary for the wel-founding of a Common-wealth to be continually carefull of the framing youth both in body and mind because they knew right well that good education maketh young men good and that such are Common-wealths and States as are the qualities and conditions of the men which they do breed Touching the body therfore they did deuise to strengthen and harden it with conuenient and temperate exercises as the play at ball leaping running dansing riding wrastling throwing the barre the stone or sledge and such like For the minde they thought best to stay and settle it selfe with the harmonie of Musike and from these two they resolued that two great good effects did ensue From the first strength of body and boldnesse of spirit and from the latter modesty and temperance inseparable companions for the most part vnto fortitude For some of them were of opinion that our soules were composed of harmonie and beleeued that Musike was able so to temper our affects and passions as they should not farre or discord among themselues but be so interlaced the one with the other in a sweet consent as wel guided and ordered actiō should proceed from the same euen as sweet and delightfull Musike proceedeth from the wel-tempering of tunable voices or well consorted instruments Neither would they haue the one to be exercised and the other omitted for that they thought if yong men should giue themselues onely to the exercises of the body they wold become too fierce and hardy and so be rather hurtfull to their commonweales then otherwise And if they should follow onely Musike which is proper to rest and quietnes and vsed as a recreation of the mind as Aristotle saith they would become soft minded and effeminate But by ioyning both these faculties together in one they sought to make a noble temper and to induce a most excellent habite as well in the mind as in the body So that if valor were required for the defence of their countrey or vanquishing of their enemies they were made fit and apt thereunto by the exercises of the body but with such measure and temper as should not exceed Which measure and temper they obtained from that harmonie which Musike imprinted in their mindes vnder which they comprehended not onely the ordering of the voice and sounds of instruments but all other orderly and seemely motions of the body which vpon their stages or Scaenes in the acting of Tragedies was chiefly to be discouered And that all orderly motions were comprehended vnder Musicke was held so certaine by Pythagoras Archetas Plato Cicero other famous Philosophers that they were of opinion that the orderly course and motions of the heauens could not be such as it is or continue without harmony though Aristotle do oppose him selfe to their opinion And for this cause did Lycurgus deuise that Musike should be conioyned with the military discipline of the Lacedemonians not onely to temper the heate and furie of their minds in fight but also to cause them to vse a certaine measure in that marching and other occasions of war In which respect they were wont to battell without certaine pipes according to the times whereof they vnderstood how to vse their bodies and weapons from which respect also cometh our vsing of drums and trumpets to giue souldiers knowledge when to march when to stand when to assault and when to retire and consequently how to ioyne order and measure with their valour against the enemy and the Lansknight and the Switzer vse also the fife at this day with the drum And to say truth great is the force of Musike skilfully vsed to stirre vp or to appease the mind For we reade that Pythagoras finding a wanton yong man enraged with lust ready to force the doore of an honest woman he so calmed his mind onely by changing the Phrigian tune and number into the Spondean that he gaue ouer his wicked purpose And Therpander when a great sedition was raised among the Lacedemonians he with his musike so quieted their mindes bent to fury that he reduced them to a perfect peace It is also written of the great Alexander that he was so moued by that tune and nūber of Musikes which the greeks called Orthios nomos which was a kind of haughtie tune to stirre men to battel that he rose from the boord to arme himselfe as if the trumpet had sounded the allarme But what talke we of the auncient opinions concerning the force of Musike to moue mens minds when we find they beleeued that their Gods were forced by the vertue of Musike to appease their wrath For the Lacedemonians being infested with a great pestilence Thales of Candia was said by musike to haue mitigated their anger and so to haue deliuered them frō that mortality The which thing Homer also signified when he said that the yongmen of Greece with their songs did appease Apollo his wrath and caused the plague to cease which had infected their campe And the Romanes likewise being annoied with a great pestilence receiued then first the singing of Satires into the Citie though but rudely tuned then as a remedy for that infectiō The force efficacie of musike then being such as I haue declared it is no maruel that the Aegiptiās after they had once receiued it into their Commonwealth as meet for the instruction of their youth wold neuer after allow that it shold be altered or changed but such as it was
no hope of his amendment should rather kill himselfe then by liuing inuite so many others to the like course of life not vnlike to the opinion alreadie recited that it is better one die for a people then that his life should be the occasion of the death of many For Plato aymed euermore at the purging of all cities frō such caterpillers which appeereth manifestly by the pain he would haue inflicted vpon parricides But that it was abhomination to him for a man to kill himselfe he plainely sheweth in his ninth booke of Lawes by the sentence he setteth downe against such men Neuerthelesse this indeed may be found in Plato that vice was so odious vnto him that he would rather haue a man to die then to vndertake any vile vicious action which might breed him perpetuall infamie And Aristotle in this point agreeth with his master though in many he delight to carpe him that a man ought to chuse rather to die then commit any abhominable or grieuous fact or do that which might be for euer reprochful vnto him And Plato his expresse sence of this matter is to be vnderstood in the same dialogue which you first spake of where Socrates is brought to say that the Lord and Ruler of this whole world hauing sent vs into this life we are not to desire to leaue it without his consent and who so doth the contrary offends nature offendeth God And this is the mystery of that precept of Philolaus which forbiddeth a man to cleaue wood in the high way meaning that a man should not seuer or deuide the soule frō the body whiles he was in his way on this earthly pilgrimage but should be content that as God and nature had vnited and tied the soule to the bodie so by them it might be vnloosed againe therefore the Peripatetikes also thought that they which die a violent death cannot be thought to haue ended their dayes according to the course of time and nature And with this my Lord Primate rested satisfied I turned me to Captaine Carleil and sayd Now sir concerning your doubts proposed you may haue perceiued that whatsoeuer destinie be neither it nor the diuine prouidence of Almightie God imposeth any necessitie vpon vs that vertue and vice are in our power vertue growing in vs by the right vse of our free choice and vice by the abuse of the same when through corruption of the iudgement to do that is in apparance good it chuseth the euill and lastly what kind of ignorance is excusable and which not Concerning my demaunds sayd Captaine Carleil I am resolued But since I see our doings proceed from election I would gladly know of you what maner of thing it is for I cannot perceiue whether it be a desire or an anger or an opinion or what I should call it None of all these said I but rather a voluntary deliberation following a mature and aduised counsel which counsell by Plato was termed a diuine thing For election is not made in a moment but when a thing is proposed either to be accepted or refused there must first be a counsell taken respecting both the end of the action and the meanes by which the same is to be compassed so as there is required a time of consultation and therefore it is said that hast is enemie to counsell and that oftentimes repentance followes them that resolue without discussing or debating of matters Next vnto counsell cometh iudgement and after iudgement followeth election and from election issueth the action or the effects that are resolued vpon and accepted as the best And because fortune though she be a cause rather by accident then of her selfe hath no small part in most of our actions the wisest men haue said that counsel is the eye of the mind by helpe whereof men of prudence see how to defend themselues from the blind strokes of fortune and eschuing that which may hurt them take hold of that which is profitable Why then said my Lord Primate it shold seeme that our counsell were wholy in our power But Xenophon is of a contrary opinion for he sayeth that good counsell cometh from the Gods immortall and that their counsels prosper who haue them to be their friends and theirs not who haue them to be their enemies To haue God fauourable vnto vs said I in all our doings is not onely desirable but that it may please him to grant his grace so to be ought all men to craue by humble prayer at his hands But that God is the author of our counsels otherwise then as an vniuersall cause is to be doubted not that the singular gift of the mind and the power thereof to deliberate and consult commeth not from him for the not acknowledging thereof were not onely a grosse ignorance but also an expresse impietie an vnexcusable ingratitude Howbeit since it hath pleased him to bestow vpon vs so great and liberal a gift as the mind we may well beleeue that he will not take from vs the free vse therof For to say that God were the imediate cause of our counsell were as much as to take from vs the vse of reason without which we are not any more men as of late was sayd And therfore besides Aristotles authoritie grounded in that point vpon good reason we find in the Scripture that after God had made man and giuen him by breathing vpon him the spirit of life which is the soule of vnderstanding he left him in the hand of his owne counsell Whereby it appeereth that counsel commeth from our selues and that election is the office of prudence which is called the soule of the mind and the Platonikes call the knowledge of good and euill whereunto it seemed that Tullie agreed when he said that prudence was the science of things desirable or to be eschued which sentence S. Augustine reporteth And Fabius Maximus said that the Gods through prudence and our vertues did grant vs prosperous successes in our affaires as if he should haue said that though God as an vniuersall cause concurred to accomplish our deliberations yet we were to endeuour our selues and to sharpen our wits to consult on the best meanes to compasse our good purposes if we desire to haue his fauour and not to sit idle expecting what will fall out And to end the discourse hereof the auncient Philosophers of the best sort held that the Gods seeing vs employ our vertues and faculties of the mind which hath a resemblāce vnto them well and wisely become our friends and the rather grant vs their helpe and fauour According to which opinion Euripides sayed that the Gods did helpe them that were wise But because we shall haue occasion to speake more largely hereafter of Prudence we will now returne to that which we left long sithens to speake of by the interposing of the doubts moued and that is the knowledge of our selues as the thing that must guide vs to that best and most
iudgement of whom the wisest men of al ages haue esteemed that to be old with a yong mans mind is all one as to be yong in yeeres For it is not grey haires or furrowes in the face but prudence and wisedome that make men venerable when they are old neither can there be any thing more vnseemly then an old man to liue in such maner as if he begā but then to liue which caused Aristotle to say that it imported little whether a man were young of yeeres or of behauiour Neuerthelesse because dayly experience teacheth vs that yeares commonly bring wisedome by reason of the varietie of affaires that haue passed thorough old mens hands and which they haue seene managed by other men and that commonly youth hath neede of a guide and director to take care of those things which himselfe cannot see or discerne Therefore haue lawes prouided tutors for the ages before mentioned vntill they had attained the yeers by them limited thenceforth left men to their owne direction vnlesse in some particular cases accidentall as when they be distraught of their wits or else through extreme olde age they become children againe as sometimes it falleth out Knowledge then is the thing that maketh a man meete to gouerne himselfe and the same being attained but by long studie and practise wise men haue therefore concluded that youth cannot be prudent For indeed the varietie of humane actions by which from many particular accidents an vniuersall rule must be gathered because as Aristotle sayth the knowledge of vniuersalities springeth from singularities maketh knowledge so hard to be gotten that many yeares are required thereunto And from this reason is it also concluded that humane felicitie cannot be attained in yong yeares since by the definition thereof it is a perfect operation according to vertue in a perfect life which perfection of life is not to be allowed but to many yeers But the way vnto it is made opē by knowledge and specially by the knowledge of a mans selfe To which good education hauing prepared him and made him apt when he is come to riper iudgement by yeares he may the better make choise of that way which shall leade him to the same as the most perfect end and scope of all his actions And this by cōsidering wel of his own nature which hauing annexed vnto it a spark of diuinitie he shal not only as a meere earthly creature but also as partaker of a more diuine excellency raise himself haue perfect light to see the ready way which leadeth to felicitie To this knowledge of himselfe so necessary for the purchasing of humane felicitie is Philosophie a singular helpe as being called the science of truth the mother of sciences and the instructor of all things appertaining to happie life and therefore should yong men apply themselues to the studie thereof with all carefulnesse that thereby they may refine their mindes and their iudgements and find the knowledge of his wel-nigh diuine nature so much the more easily And as this knowledge is of all other things most properly appertaining to humane wisedome so is the neglecting thereof the greatest and most harmefull folly of all others for from the said knowledge as from a fountaine or well head spring all vertues and goodnes euen as from the ignorance thereof slow all vices and euils that are among men But herein is one special regard to be had which is that self loue cary not away the mind from the direct path to the same for which cause Plato affirmed that men ought earnestly to pray to God that in seeking to know themselues they might not be misled by their selfe loue or by the ouer-weening of themselues M. Spenser then said If it be true that you say by Philosophie we must learne to know our selues how happened it that the Brachmani men of so great fame as you know in India would admit none to be their schollers in Philosophy if they had not first learned to know them selues as if they had concluded that such knowledge came not from Philosophie but appertained to some other skill or science Their opinion said I differeth not as my author thinketh from the opinion of the wise men of Greece But that the said Brachmani herein shewed the selfe same thing that Aristotle teacheth which is that a man ought to make some triall of himselfe before he determinate to follow any discipline that he may discerne and iudge whether there be in him any disposition wherby he may be apt to learne the same or no. And to the same effect in another place he affirmeth that there must be a custome of wel-doing in thē that wil learne to be vertuous which may frame in them an aptnesse to learne by making them loue what is honest and commendable and to hate those things that are dishonest and reprochfull For all men are not apt for all things neither is it enough that the teacher be ready to instruct and skilfull but the learner must also be apt of nature to apprehend and conceiue the instructions that shall be giuen vnto him And this knowledge of himselfe is fit for euery man to haue before he vndertake the studie of Philosophie to wit that he enter into himselfe to trie whether he can well frame himself to endure the discipline of this mother of sciences and the patience which is required in al those things besides which appertaine to honestie and vertuous life For he that will learne vertue in the schoole of Philosophie must not bring a mind corrupted with false opinions vices wickednesse disordinate appetites ambitions greedie desires of wealth nor wanton lusts and longings with such like which will stop his eares that he shall not be able to heare the holy voice of Philosophie Therefore Epictetus said very well that they which were willing to study Philosophie ought first to consider well whether their vessel be cleane and sweet lest it should corrupt that which they meant to put into it Declaring thereby withall that learning put into a vicious mind is dangerous But this maner of knowing a mans selfe is not that which I spake of before though it be that which the sayd Indian Philosophers meant and is also very necessary and profitable For to know a mans selfe perfectly according to the former maner is a matter of greater importance then so Which made Thales when he was asked what was the hardest thing for a man to learne answer that it was to know himselfe For this knowledge stayeth not at the consideration of this exteriour masse of our body which represents it selfe vnto our eyes though euen therein also may well be discerned the maruellous and artificiall handy-work of Gods diuine Maiestie but penetrateth to the examination of the true inward man which is the intellectuall soule to which this body is giuen but for an instrument here in this life And this knowledge is of so great importance that man guided by the light of