Selected quad for the lemma: death_n

Word A	Word B	Word C	Word D	Occurrence	Frequency Band	MI	MI Band	Prominent
death_n	adam_n	punishment_n	sin_n	6,862	5	5.5451	4	false

Text snippets containing the quad

ID	Title	Author	Corrected Date of Publication (TCP Date of Publication)	STC	Words	Pages
A86451	The grand prerogative of humane nature namely, the souls naturall or native immortality, and freedome from corruption, shewed by many arguments, and also defended against the rash and rude conceptions of a late presumptuous authour, who hath adventured to impugne it. By G.H. Gent.	Holland, Guy, 1587?-1660.	1653 (1653)	Wing H2417; Thomason E1438_2; ESTC R202443	95,057	144

their materiality namely by conceiving them conformably unto it self that is to say after a manner abstracted and immateriall declaring thereby the spirituality of it's being for it is as great a signe of a spirituall Being to understand a matter immaterially as it is to understand a spirit that hath no matter Thirdly I answer that although our power apprehensive does attire spiritual substances in formes corporeall by reason of the imaginative faculty upon which it borders yet the judging and discursive faculties do not so for these two cast of all figures and resemblances corporeall determining Angels for example to be spirits purely and devoid of all figure and corporeity as also in like sort that privations though apprehended as positive entities yet are not so in so much as the soul by meanes of judgement and discourse goes further then the phantasy and findes out truths which the phantasy could not tell it by thus surmounting forms corporeall shewes her independency upon the body and that some of her acts be inorganicall By this then it appeares that the apprehension of spirituall objects under lineaments corporeall is but the first enterteinment of them which though it do argue some imperfection in the soul concerning her manner of being yet not in the being it self Wherefore as on the one side this imperfect way of apprehension argues the soul to be in a degree inferiour unto Angels or pure Intelligences so on the other side the acts of judgement and of discourse which it doth exercise afterward do sufficiently evict that it is in a degree superiour to corporeall entities I exemplify for declaration sake God when he first arrives in our understanding by the out-portalls of simple apprehensions appeares unto us in the habite of a body an Angel in the likenesse of a man Time drest up in wings in his hands a sithe and houre-glasse Death like a raw-bon'd sire armed with a dart c. but forthwith Judgement and Discourse do waite upon them dismissing Apprehension and being thus stepped in devest this Time for example pull of his strange disguize bid him lay down his sithe clippe his wings and break his houre-glasse and to appeare in no other likenesse but his own that is to say without colours or lineaments corporeall and thus having disrobed him of his borrowed attire the soul judges of him as he is and gathers new verities of him by discurring And as the understanding proceeds in this one example so it does in others of the same nature thus the difficulty which Melinaeus made hath found out a solution A fifth head of probation is from the appetite of man that can be satiated with nothing but eternity the desire of which is universall and infinite This desire being generall must needs be from Nature and therefore right and not a vicious rapacity or greedinesse as Pliny seems to make it and so being right cannot be frustrate This argument is urged earnestly by Alex. Valignanus l. contra Japonios apud Possevinum parte 1. Biblioth l. 10. c. 4. Thomas Carmelita l. 11. de salute omnium Gentium procur c. 12. and by sundry other learned men and it seems to be very efficacious because this same appetite of perpetuity is very vehement restlesse and incessant and besides universall yea Pliny himself acknowledgeth as much Wherefore as from the generall and pressing appetite of meat we do inferre rightly a convenient provision of sustenance ordered by nature so in like sort from this ingrafted longing after a perpetuity we may inferre no lesse rightly a provision of immortality ordeined for us One Pontius a late Scotist in his Philosophia universa secundum mentem Scoti excepteth against this argument and divers others also with whom not being willing to wrangle we returne him no other answer but this viz. that he who is more in love with the determinations of any one Master be he never so eminent then he is with truth especially in doctrines of concernment is not an Eagle of the right breed nor deserves the name of a Philosopher It may be here objected that if an appetite were a good argument to prove a satisfaction it would prove we should never dye because against death man hath a great and naturall aversion I graunt it proves that either we shall not dye or else at least should not have died if we had remained in that state of innocency in which Adam was created for death entred into the world onely by sinne but this punishment of death is not of the soul but of man and againe the death of man is no more but a separation of soul and body out of which the death of the soul does not follow but that of the body onely for although a body cannot live without a soul yet no reason can be given why a soul cannot live without a body nay on the contrary side though we may easily understand how a soul may be annihilated yet it is a thing hardly intelligible how it should dy The soul is a form assistent as well as an informant and therefore may well subsist without an actuall informing It appeares that this appetite is naturall First because it is universall and followes the whole species Secondly because it cannot be supprest from breaking out into actuall and vehement longings after immortality out of which it followes first that immortality is a thing possible because nature does not incline us to impossibilities secondly that the appetite is right and rationall and cannot be erroneous as Scotus did object it might for at least in the generalities the works of nature be the works of a high intelligence thirdly that this immortality is not onely possible to be obteined but also shall be atteined Neither if this argument from naturall appetite be a good one would it follow thence as Abulensis in c. 22. Matth. q. 224. conceiveth it would namely that the Resurrection would be a naturall effect and might be proved by reason this I say doth not follow because as Aquinas teacheth 4. d. 43. q. 1. a. 1. lib. de veritate q. 24. a. 10. ad 1. in supplement q. 75. a. 3. Ferrariensis l. 4. con Gen. c. 79. the inclination of nature and her power be both of one latitude and therefore because no naturall efficient is able to reunite a body once separated nature does not incline unto it and so not unto the resurrection Wherefore that unto which nature does incline us is onely to a continuance of the soul with the body and not to a restitution of it after it is once separated from it in so much that if any longing do remaine still in man to have a body by way of resurrection it is but as hote embers the remnants of an ancient fire It is then in this case as it is in the desiring of having all our limbs perpetually entire for if by chance any be cut off as it is not then in the power of nature

divers have laboured to extinguish by denying with the old Academicks and late Socinians that there is any certainty in it and by becoming so witty as to know nothing His regall sceptte I mean his naturall liberty by the command of which the Empire of his little world was swaied is wrested out of his hands and voiced to be wholly forfeited and not any longer to appertain unto him His crown and life was the immortality of his better part as therein chiefly being superiour to beasts and all other things irrationall but behold here also a privy but a dangerous traitour endeavours to despoil him of it so that in fine if all these treacherous assailants might have their wills he shall be wholly mortall poor feeble blind and miserable dethroned from his wonted dignity and cast down unto the lower classe of Beasts Profectò plurima homini ex homine mala as Pliny justly complaineth even though he himself be one of the Authours of those evils which come from man against himself Was it not enough that all inferiour creatures do rebell against us but we must basely and treacherously conspire against our selves The man that going from Jerusalem to Jericho fell amongst thieves had hard measure offered him for he was despoiled and wounded by them and left onely half alive but those thieves amongst whom we are now fallen be farre more cruell for they would kill us outright that is to say both in soul and body and with lesse then this will not be contented But now it is time we begin to examine what urgent reasons what killing arguments there were that moved this new Authour unto so extravagant a course of rigour against all mankind for if these be not very urgent and invincible we must conclude this man guilty not onely of much folly but also of heinous malice and temerity against the rights and prerogatives of man in defense of which we now come into the field against him CHAP. II. His first Classe of arguments examined and refuted HIs first arguments be drawn from mans creation fall restitution and resurrection the principall is this That what of Adam was immortall through Innocency was to be mortalized by transgression But whole Adam quatenus animal rationale was in Innocency immortall Ergo all and every part even whole man liable to death by sinne Upon this bungling argument or syllogisme the weight of all his cause must lean which as I perceive by the posture should have been a syllogisme if the Authour could have cast it into that form but since that might not be we will be contented to take it in grosse as it lies rather then passe it over without an answer We grant then that indeed all Adam for example by sinning became mortall and all and every part of him that is to say he was after so much of his age exspired to yield up to death and be totally corrupted or which is all one he was to have his two essentiall parts disunited and after that untill the resurrection neither he nor any of his parts thus dissevered and disunited to be Adam or a man any longer All which might be without that either the matter of his body or substance of his soul should perish or be destroyed as Thomas de Argentina expresly teacheth in 2. dist 17. ar 1. ad 1. arg And forasmuch as concerns the matter of his body it is an evident case because matter is a thing both ingenerable and incorruptible and so neither produced by his generation nor destroyed by his corruption and as by generation onely fashioned and united so again by corruption or death onely defaced and disunited or dissolved And as for the soul the other part there is no more necessity death should destroy it then there was it should destroy the matter there being no more reason for the one then for the other Wherefore Saint Paul wishing death that so he might be with Christ did not desire to be destroyed as this silly Authours doctrine would infer but to be dissolved for surely if his soul was to have been destroyed by any naturall deficiency or otherwise he could not think to be with Christ during the time of that destruction or dissolution which he wished and so his words and wishing would have been very vain seeing according to this Authour he should by his being dissolved come never the sooner to be with Christ because according to him neither alive nor dead he was to come unto Christ before the generall resurrection nay further his wish would have made against himself and his own ends because he knowing Christ a little in this life might in some small measure injoy him in it but if by death his soul be killed as well as his body he should have no knowledge at all nor comfort of Christ but be cast further off from him then he was before Now as all agree that matter throughout all mutations remaineth incorrupted so also according to the judgement of sundry knowing men and diligent inquirers into the works of nature and transmutation of naturall compounds naturall and materiall forms themselves also do not perish at their parting from their matters but onely are dissolved and dissipated lying after that separation in their scattered atomes within the bosome of nature from whence they had been before extracted by force of the seed the result of whose union was the form So that the entity of the form remains still unperished after corruption though not in the essence and formality of a form or totally and compleatly Thus teacheth the learned Authour of Religio Medici and exactly declares himself of the same mind is the famous late Physician Daniel Sennertus in his Hypomnemata though sometimes not so fully as for example when he ascribes to forms precedent the full production of the subsequent assigning a genitall power or vis prolifica in every form for multiplying of it self by which doctrine he seems to recede from his former principles of Atomes and not to stick constantly to them yea and besides to deliver a conceit which is hardly understood and which moreover seems to be improbable for who can explicate what one form doth when it multiplies another or what kind of causality it doth then exercise or by what strange influence that effect is wrought and the form made up of nothing This same doctrine of Religio Medici and that also which we deliver here touching the origination of forms was the doctrine of old Democritus expressed by him in his constitution of Atomes or minima naturalia as we find it largely expressed and illustrated by Joan. Magnenus l. de Philosophia Democriti ' Disp 2. c. 2. seqq as also by Petrus Gassendus in his voluminous work de Philosophia Epicuri tomo 1. with whom in substance agreed Leucippus as we may find by that which Laertius and others do deliver of him Not that every Atome did contain a form as Sennertus seems to think but rather

severall pieces for the composition of it according as every simple or ingredient of Diacatholicon for example is not Diacatholicon but contains something in it of which it is to be made up and from which as from differing heterogeneall parcels collected and united by an artificiall mixtion it results and for want of putting this difference or restraint Sennertus his own doctrine and explication of Democritus may seem defective But though we may approve of Physicall Atomes for the composition of naturall bodies yet we do not thereby allow of Atomes Mathematicall or indivisibles with Zeno of which point see Arriaga and our learned countreyman and Philosopher Compton otherwise called Carleton Neither again do we with Epicurus and some other old Philosophers maintain any casual meeting or accidentall confluence of them but contrariwise an assembling of them in generation by the force of seminall or spermatick virtue descending from the forms into the sperme or seeds and by the Creatour infused at the first creation into the forms As for the composition it self abstracting from these particulars it was also taught by Anaxagoras when he affirmed all to be in all or every thing and to have a preexistence in the bosome of nature even before such time as by the operation of seminall causes forms be accomplished and made to appear in their own likenesse upon this theatre This is also the judgement of Athanas Kircherius a late learned writer l. 3. de magnete part 3. c. 1. where he shews how rich compounds earth and water be as Chymick industries for separation have discovered insomuch as he noteth there is contained in them a 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 or generall magazine the common matter being from the first creation not lean and hungry but foeta and praeseminata with forms partiall and incompleat This also is the inchoations of forms and the rationes seminales pre-existent which many learned men have often favoured expresly taught by the great Albertus 1. Phys tract 3. c. 15. 16. 1. part summae tract 3. q. 14. ar 2. memb 2. tract 6. q. 26. ar 2. memb 1. part 2. tract 1. q. 4. ar 1. memb 2. Which doctrine of his being explained in this sense declared lies no way within the danger of the objections of Gandavensis Durandus Dominicus de Flandria or Thomas de Argentina who all proceed against it according to a way of understanding though true in it self yet quite different from this and also as we may justly think from the true meaning of Albertus or of Jacobus de Viterbo related by the afore-nominated Argentina l. 2. sent dist 18. ar 2. and there impugned by him The same doctrine for inchoations of forms in the matter before generation I mean not in materia prima but in secunda praeseminata is largely declared proved and defended by our learned countreyman Jo. Bacon a Carmelite l. 1. Quodlibet q. 6. and also in 2. sentent dist 18. q. unica in which latter place he shews that this doctrine is according to the meaning of S. Augustine These same inchoations are the rationes primordiales concreated with the matter in whose bosome they lie as it were a sleep untill such time as by the genitall power and agency of forms which are in perfection and displaid they be called out and united not accidentally but substantially into one Compositum which Compositum when it is to be dissolved all those unfolded seminall reasons do shrink up again and withdraw themselves into the self same beds from which they came And this is the doctrine of Albertus and Bacon although they do not descend to such particulars as be expressed here but hold themselves aloof according to the custome of the Schools in more generall principles and expressions This lastly is nothing else but in a good sense an eduction of forms ex potentia materiae which is Aristotles and his Disciples Doctrine for it cannot be thought that Aristotle ever intended to presse or squeez any forms out of the dry skeleton of matersa prima which matter is a principle onely receptive and no promptuary out of which to educe a form by virtue of any naturall agent whatsoever for in such a spare entity as that what fecundity is imaginable And so much touching the original of forms which is one of the abstrusest and nicest points in all philosophy and that which by vulgar Authours is meanliest handled and by the wisest is known but by conjecture Thus his main argument is answered after which all the rest will fall down headlong with any light touch though but of a finger Immediately after this he argueth out of Gen. 3.19 where Adam is told that for his disobedience he must turn into that dust of which he was made out of which he concludes that all and every part of Adam must be converted into dust which if it be so as he saith then not onely his earthly particles but his aiery watery and fiery parts must to dust also and not onely his body but his soul if he have any must be turned into the same matter See what fine conclusions follow out of this mortall souls philosophy It sufficed then that so much of his body or of the whole man was to return to dust as had been made up of it And by this alone the commination of God is fulfilled without any more ado After this he comes upon us with his false Latine saying as followeth Death reduceth this productio entis ex non-ente ad Non-entens returns man to what he was before he was that is not to be c. and by and by citing impertinently two or three places of Scripture falls to another argument drawn from the resurrection As for the Latine word Non-entem whether it be right or no we will not examine but apply our selves to the consideration of the sense which is as faulty as the Latine can be know therefore in brief that death did not reduce Adam to non ens but to non Adam it did not cause him absolutely not to be but onely not to be man or Adam any longer And forasmuch as concerns his body it is confest and certain that it was not turned by death or mortality into nothing or non ens but into dust which is an ens or something that is to say his body was not annihilated but corrupted and to die is not wholly to be destroyed but partially onely which act is all one with dissolution Now if to the totall mortalizing of man it be not necessary that his body be destroyed then can it not be needfull that his soul should be so and thus our adversaries stout argument is more then mortalized for it comes to nothing which man by dying doth not We will not deny him but that the soul of man did die and die again as much as it was capable of death for first it died by the being separated from the body although indeed according to a philosophical propriety