short time in any whatsoever Estate but the sufficiencie of a Law-maker and the excellencie of Laws is found by the long continuance thereof Therefore those Orders by which the Peoples authority was too much increased cannot be said to be truly Popular but such may be so esteemed whereby the State is long preserved Wherefore many things being ordered in Rome without this temperance in favor of the People they of themselves bereft the State of all solidity Thus Licentiousness of living frequent Meetings Appeals to the Tribunes Freedom in accusing and other such things as seemed to be done in favor of the People served for the building up of Tyranny and wrought Romes final ruine Which was formerly seen in Athens which being constituted by Solon in a too Popular condition soon lost her Liberty and was possest by a Citizen of hers named Pisistratus who followed the same way which the Legislator himself had opened unto him by attributing too much to the People So what is intended for good proves often fatal if not well understood But having discoursed sufficiently of the Form of the Government it will not be amiss to examine some other more general Conditions by which the perfection of every State may be the better known In ordering a City respect is to be had to two things to what belongs to War to what belongs to Peace to the end that she may not be governed by Chance in either of them but by certain Laws and may be equally preserved from forein plots and from home discords and to endeavour that as she cannot always enjoy Peace so she should not be continually molested with War But he who will consider the Actions of the Romans and the Institutions of their City will find them so seriously addrâ—st to Military affairs as he may easily judge that they proposed no other things to themselves then how to increase Empire by making one War beget another wherefore many Armies were instituted and many rewards for military valor to make men bold and valiant against the Enemy but not any thing wereby to accustom them to Justice Temperance and to other civil vertues whereby the City might be maintained in peace and unity 'T is therefore no wonder if that Commonwealth won so much Empire and such Glory in times of War and in times of Peace like rusty Iron lost all her lustre So as troubles from Enemies abroad were no sooner ceased but much greater were excited at home by dissentions amongst the Citizens which did not terminate till things were recalled by occasion of War to the same Warlike order and discipline in which the City was excellently well instituted Which might for a while preserve her but when through the want of occasion of War she could not by that means correct her many disorders nor reduce herself to any setled condition for any space of time being still agitated by storms of Civil sedition she must at last be miserably lost when it was time to begin to enjoy her greatness and prosperity For this cause Scipio Nasica a very wise man would not consent to the destruction of Carthage knowing that that Commonwealth which was ordered onely for war could not last long in idleness How can that Government then be termed good which is so ill disposed towards the attainment of a Cities chief end And who can doubt but that the true end of a City is to have her Citizens live vertuously not the inlarging of her Empire Therefore the Philosopher said well That true civil Felicity was not to be expected from astions which relate to things abroad but from those which are used amongst Citizens It argues not then an excellent Government in that Commonwealth that she overcame the whole world since the perfection of Government lies in making a City vertuous not in making her Mistress of many Countries Nay the increasing of Territories as it is commonly coupled with some injustice so is it remote from the true end of good Laws which never part from what is honest Governments which aim at Empire are usually short lived which denotes their imperfection Which happens not onely because they were not better accommodated in times of Peace but that for the great inlarging of Confines it is necessary to nourish ambitious thoughts in Citizens and such as are too desirous to domineer which are easily turned to the prejudice of the Commonwealth its self For it is not to be affirmed that the same thing can be good in respect of the publick and bad in private Affairs For the general felicity of the whole City and the particular good of every Citizen is one and the same thing they onely differ in some certain respects Then taking ones argument from these things the end of this great Commonwealth might easibly be conjectured which as one said well was overthrown by the wait of its own bulk But grant that the lives of such States may be prolonged it cannot certainly be done without falling upon many other troubles and dangers Let Marius his example serve us to see what advantage Citizens got by the immoderate desire of Glory and Dominion who being alwaies bred up in Arms and having wone Credit and Preferment thereby finding that his antient Reputation began to fail by ensuing Peace raised Mithridates King of Pontus against the Commonwealth to the end that being to make use of his Vallor he might recover his former Repute Thus Athens who once inâ—oyed a peaceful condition under Pericles his good Government when she turned her endeavours of Peace and Quiet to Arms and Dominion and would change her manner of life she reaped the like Fruits of Ambition which by such Orders she had sowed in the minds of her Citizens For Alcibiades out of too immense a desire of Glory was he who of himself did incite the Lacedemonians against his Country by whom she was afterwards robbed of her Liberty and Empire For all this you hear me not say that the study of Arms ought to be neglected which are very necessary in what soever State to defend ones self against the Injuries of Neighbors and to preserve Freedom and Liberty Nay Aristotle reprehends Plato for that he thought Cities had no need of Arms at the first but onely when they began to have Dominion But though they may be useful for some other respects Citizens ought not to fix their studies so much upon Military Exercises as not to know nor value any other praise but that of the Militia and to place their greatest and chiefest Good and the welfare of their City therein But they must know that a man must travel further to find out felicity which is derived onely from vertuous actions reserved in Peace as the true fruits of the labours of War Let us then conclude that this part which was very excellent in Rome lost much of that praise which otherwise it might have deserved for the exquisiteness of its Orders because true use was not made thereof as
closer fight and then whole bodies of fresh and well armed Soldiers succeeded in the Roman Armies For their bodies were covered with their Bucklers which were very large ones and the short but very sharp swords and finely tempered used by the Romans were of great advantage to the Soldiers who might wield them in a long fight as well to defend themselves from their Enemies blows as to let flie upon them which was not practised in other Militia's of those times particularly not amongst the French with whom the Romans had often and dangerous fights for they used very little Bucklers and long heavy swords very sharp at the point so as they were easily wrested and made unuseful Therefore the routs which the Roman Armies received were very few in comparison of those they gave their Enemies and being but seldom worsted and often victorious the state strength and reputation of the Empire did still increase so as when some adverse fortune happened it was not sufficient to extinguish no nor so much as long to weaken the greatness of that Commonwealth Divers particular good rules observed in the administration of War were likewise of great moment for the carrying on of the Roman affairs Amongst which the diligence which was used by publick constitutions in dividing of the prey may be numbred for one for they used to place the prey or booty first in publick and did then so divide it amongst the Soldiers as those who were upon the guard shared as well thereof as those that were forwardest in the action and who had sackt the Enemy Whereby occasion was not given for those notable disorders which have been observed to happen in these latter times wherein upon such an occasion the loss of the whole Army hath ensued The faith also which was so exactly observed and the fair proceedings with such Cities as were subject to that Dominion won the Romans the good affection of the people by whose favor Empires are usually more upheld upon any adverse accident then by any other thing Of these we read of many notable examples it being as far from that good Military Discipline to bear with the insolency of Soldiers as it is introduced in these our last Ages to the great prejudice of people though friends and subjects For such faults as these were severely punish'd the which is observable amongst so many other actions for what the Romans did to those people to whom they did not only restore the goods and liberty which had been by the Soldiers wickedly taken away and so their grievances were redrest but those were severely punish'd who had committed such things To this may be added that the Romans to the end that the power of the Commonwealth might still prevail and might upon any occasion be made use of endeavored as soon as they bent their minds to greater matters to accompany their Land-forces with Maritime-aids so as the one might help the other and the one not only be made more powerful by the other but more secure as it fell out and as it may be observed in many of their actions but chiefly when seeing their affairs succeeded but ill with the Carthaginians who prevailed by reason of their antient Maritime profession and had likewise great advantage in their Land-Militia by their use of Elephanâ—s which the Romans had not as yet well learned how to resist they bent themselves wholly to Naval preparations wherein they did afterwards behave themselves with such valor and prosperity as they overcame these their so fierce and cruel Enemies in a Naval fight and raised their fortune Let us in the next place observe that the greatness and generosity of the Romans was such as not content to secure their neer neighboring dangers and out of a desire of quiet to leave the sparkles of those Wars unquench'd from whence another fire might soon be kindled they always endeavored to see the last sparkle quite put out The Roman Army was overcome and much endamaged by the Galli Gessati after the death of Consul Aâ—ilius where their liberty being exposed to much danger upon this so sad accident the Romans would once more try the fortune of battel wherein they had good success and cutting in pieces above Forty thousand of that Nation they did vindicate their former injuries Nor yet did they then lay down their Arms though they were freed from that their greatest danger but knowing that there remained yet other powerful Armies of the same Gauls is other parts of Italy they would continue war against them and of assailed become assailors which afforded them occasion of those Marcellus his notable victories and of making themselves masters of the chiefest Cities of Lombardy which were possest by the Gauls The Commonwealth of Rome was never in greater danger then when Asdrubal passing over the Alps with a numerous Army entred Italy whilst his brother Hannibal was there likewise with another powerful Army They fought Asdrubal and to their great joy their Consuls were victorious which notwithstanding they forbare not to continue war in Spain though they were free from their greater and neerer dangers but with the Forces they had there went to find out and to fight other Enemy-Armies of the Carthaginians which were in that Province for they knew if those Armies should remain entire the War might easily be renewed and other impediments being removed Hannibal would be the more easily succored with necessaries which he wanted and so might still molest the Romans in Italy Thus not allowing of any Peace then what might be purchased by either having totally quell'd or at least very much weakened the Enemy the Romans never laid down Arms but when they were entire Victors which other Princes not being able to do have deferred their ruine for a short time but have not totally kept it off Many other things might likewise be thought of by which it might be evidently proved that the Romans did always prove victorious at last and did perpetually increase their State and strength But what we have already said may suffice to teach such Princes and Nations as shall aspire to the highest degree of glory whither it is that they ought to bend their thoughts and which are the best means to arrive thereat And when all other necessary accidents shall correspond those who shall imitate the excellent worth and discipline of the Romans will not find themselves any whit deceived The Thirteenth DISCOURSE Whether the City of Rome could have maintain'd herself longer in the glory and majesty of her Command if she had preserved her Liberty and Form of Commonwealth then she did under the Government of Emperors AFter that Caesar had robb'd his Country of her liberty and changing the antient form of Government reduced the Commonwealth of Rome into a Monarchical form she continued therein in a continued series of many Emperors safe and entire or at least without any remarkable alteration or declining for the space of about four hundred years till
Northern Nations which wanted all manner of order and military discipline as well in their Commanders as in the Soldiers of their own Nations whereof the Roman Armies had been for a long time full insomuch as for above twenty years together before the Goths pass'd into Italy they put themselves into the usual pay of some of the Roman Emperors And when Theodosius the Second who was to make head in France against a valiant and numerous Army led on by Attila it was found that the Army which he had then got together retained only the bare name of a Roman Army being totally composed of Barbarians Vizigots Franks Burgonians Alani and others who notwithstanding bore away the victory for the Roman Emperor The like hapned in Gratianus his time who being set upon by Atalaricus King of the Goths was fain for the defence of Italy to make use of Goths Huns and other Soldiers of those Nations But the antient valor of the Romans was no less lost in their Soldiers then in their Commanders For so great an Empire was grown to so great a scarcity of valiant men and such as were fit to command the Armies which were to withstand the raging violence of these fierce and barbarous Nations as Honorius found none to whom he could commit such a charge but one Stilico who was himself a Barbarian a Hun by Nation and very perfidious who moved by his own interest and designs sought to maintain his authority and to the end that he might place his Son in the Empire whilst he commanded over those Forces which were raised to extinguish the Gothish Armies he did not only not beat them when he might have done it but sollicited other Northern people to assault divers Provinces of the Empire and so procured them more Enemies And Theodosius the Second having placed all authority and hope of defending the Provinces of the Empire from the fury of Attila in one Etius when he had lost that Commander he had not any one fitting to undergo that charge but was forced to leave the passage into Italy free unto him That which is reported of Attila doth greatly witness the weakness of the Empire and in what need it stood of valiant and faithfulnes that being fore told by his Southsayers that if he should come to a day of 〈◊〉 with the 〈◊〉 Army in France he should lose the day but that his losâ— would cost the Empirs dear for they should lose one of their best Commanders â—e did put so high 〈◊〉 esteem thereupon as notwithstanding such an 〈◊〉 he râ—fused 〈…〉 battel The Wars made by the Empire many years before the times of this greatest calamity and ruine were made against their own Roman Commanders who commanded over their Armies in several places and who being in far off Provinces rebelled against the Emperors hoping that they might usurp the Empire to the which every one of them did aspire since they saw that all ways even the most indirect lay open to a succession therein so as the Discipline and worth was alike in both the Armies and still the Romans got the victory that is to say those who had the greatest Power and Authorety in the Roman Empire But as soon as occasion was offered of trying the worth of those Soldiers who served the Empire against foreign Forces and that whatsoever the Roman Empire lost proved an addition to their cruel and mortal enemies the weakness thereof was soon seen and what a loss it had suffered by the total corruption of Discipline and good antient orders Which could not have happened if the Commonwealth had still continued for it is not likely that valiant Commanders would be found wanting in that City where by the vertue of good military Institutions Soldiers did so much flourish since those who had betaken themselves to other imployments when once they took upon them the Government of Provinces behaved themselves so in the Militia as they deserved commendations for there was a certain spirit of glory in them all and a desire of propagating the common good as also an aptness for all things which did befit Roman spirits But as soon as the Form of Government being changed the same Romans began to degenerate from their antient worth and that the chief imployments nay the Empire it self fell into the hands of foreigners all things else must likewise suffer alteration and in particular disorders in the Militia and the licentiousness of the Soldiers grew to be such as so great an Empire seemed sometimes to be governed by chance There not being any one therein who took care for the common good nor for the observance of good Orders neither at home nor abroad And the making of the Militia mercinary was cause of the going less in worth and discipline as also of treachery Insomuch as those very Soldiers who served the Emperors favored the Enemy as it happened in Theodosius his time when those who were to guard the Pirentian Mountains were bribed to let the Vandals and Sweeds pass into Italy without making any opposition which was the occasion of other mischiefs And the treachery of his Commander Gallus hindred the Emperor Decius from pursuing a famous victory gotten of the Goths when not being so well flesht as they were afterwards nor yet so powerful they might have been the easilier kept back But in time of the Commonwealth the Roman Commanders and Soldiers fought for their own Grandezza the Nobility grew famous and powerful and the people in whose name and in that of the Senate all Wars were made got honor and advantage by those things which by their Arms they added to that Dominion So as amongst other actions of the Commonwealth it is not without wonder to be considered how she could maintain so many and so numerous Armies as she did meerly out of Roman Soldiers But when these respects began to fail and that the Militia grew mercinary and that the Soldier grew past all measure insolent by reason of their Commanders leudness who permitted them to do all manner of foul things to the end that they might have their assistance in their usurping the Empire The Roman Empire which had formerly wont to be so formidable to their Enemies so obedient to their Commanders began to behave themselves poorly against their Enemies and insolently against their Lord and Master troublesome to their friends whom they were sent to assist and too unable to defend them against foreign Forces which things as they were begotten by the change of Government so is it most apparent that they were the occasion of bringing the Empire to a sooner and more miserable end So many and so heinous disorders could not have risen if the City had continued in a Form of Common-wealth or of Civil Government for though all the Citizens might not have peradventure proved good and valiant yet amongst so many there would still have some one been found of such excellent worth and charity towards his Country as
who were truly wise would be as contented with not ruling over others as most men do what in them â—ies to get prâ—cedencie and command over others Therefore where such a desire is discerned and where there is matter to occasion it as are great riches high places and vain glory a man may with reason suppose that there is there an unsound soul which ought to be taken away lest it infect the whole Commonwealth To take all Nobility all riches all civil preeminencie totally away from a City or Commonwealth as is now done in Turky and as formerly it hath been dâ—â—e by divers Princes that they might rule the more securely relisheth too much of Barbarism and Tyranny though it hath not proved an ill taken advice to them that have known how to use it reputing it just though not in self yet as it hath suited well with such a Form of Government but to rid a City of such things and of such men for a certain prefixt time is such a provision as tends to the preservation of splendor and reputation without either prejudice or danger This is a means whereby vertue and other civil preheminences may be rewarded but not so as the greater part be scorned and opprest for the haughtiness of some few And he who shall well consider it shall find that banishment from a mans Country is not a thing simply and of it self evil or at least not so great an evil but that it may be easily and willingly born withall by him who values the common good so well as he ought But that which makes banishment be thought a mischief is the bad quality which is thereunto annexed when it is inflicted for punishment there being thereby imprinted as it were in indeleble characters that such a one is leudly given and hath committed some fault which is a thing naturally abhorred even by the wickedest sort of men But set this respect aside to live out of a mans Countrie hath no resemblance of evil but is willingly imbraced by many as an advantage and some endeavor it as a badg of honor that they may have occasion to serve their Prince and to deserve well abroad He then who to obey the Laws and Ordinations of 〈◊〉 Commonwealth or State shall live for a certain time from his own home is so far from suffering thereby in his honor as he merits thereby for he may say that by this his obedience he is â—erviceable to his Prince and Country though he do not act any thing So then he receives no injury and may and ought to pass by any particular inconveniency for the publick good Nay it may so happen that that very power and greatâ—â—ss by which a man becomes liable to the Laws is the longer and with less danger preserved unto him though he cannot enjoy it without some parenthesis of 〈◊〉 For we see by experience that these greatnesses and continued prosperities do easily precipitate a man either through the envy of others or by being too immoderately used and sometimes draw along with them the total ruine of the whole Family It may in the last place be alleadged that this exemption from publick imployments and Court service may make him retire to his private studies and enjoy himself which ought to be esteemed one of the chiefest blessings which man can attain unto in this life Insomuch as the Philosopher said that to be kept from preferments is a pleasant breath of wind which sweetly coâ—â—eys the wise man to the Haven of peace of mind and of his lawful studies which many forbear to do of themselves least they may be thought by the world to be vile and abject men and of no abilities By these things it is concluded that Ostracism is a good thing and to be praised and that this custom of the Athenians is fit to be followed and â—â—tated by others But now let us face about What is more necessary for the preservation of a City or State then Justice without which no sort of Government can last long nor merit the name of a Commonwealth or State For take away Justice and you take away the very being thereof and leave nothing but a mis-shapen matter made up of corruption and disorders But in distributive Justice which imports so much towards good and quiet living Reason doth advise it and all good Customs do approve of it that a Geometrical proportion not an Arithmetical ought to be observed insomuch as it is not all men who ought equally and indifferently to share of Hoâ—er and Preheminencies in a City but those who for some good qualities and endowments do deserve them Therefore that Government where the Law of Ostracism is observed must needs be subject to all change and revolts For it cannot but be displeasing to the chiefest and best of the City who seeing themselves whilst they are present threatned with exile and thâ— overthrow of their grandezza and having recourse when they are absent to the favors of other Princes to revenge themselves for the injury they have received may easily disturb the Peace of the City and put the whole Government into a hazardous condition Those who have been driven out of their Country by reason of any Civil faction as it fell out long ago in divers Cities of Italy have always been instrumental to the keeping of those Cities in perpetual troubles and of reducing some of them to slavery which had wont to enjoy liberty And yet what was this banishment but a kind of Ostracism For in these civil seditions none but such as were of greatest power and authority and of whom the rest were most jealous were driven out Nor was this done by the will of one only but by their Decree in whose hands the reformed Government was So as it may be said that these Cities used the Law of Ostracism which hath notwithstanding always proved prejudicial and at long running mortal And to say truth to what purpose could such a Law or Custom serve unless it were the more to exasperate Civil diffention Which the same Athenians having learn'd by experience they did annâ—ll this their Law for the business was come to such a height as they drove ouâ— Citizens out of particular spleen not out of any publick respect as was done by Hyparbâ—lâ— a man of a mean condition and no ways liable so Ostracism who for being an Enemy to Alcibâ—â—les and Niâ—â—as was by their means banished by vertue of that Law But say the Law were kept within its due bounds and used only against such as bore greatest sway and were most eminent to reduce all things to an Equality is â—â—â— only an unjust but a violent action and which doth even contradict Nature herself which did not only make so many different species of things created in the wâ—â—ld but gave various instincts and hidden qualities to those of the same species so as some might prove more generous and of greater worth as is seen not only amongst
easiness wherewith they were done can walk hand in hand with those of the Antients amongst whom we see one only Alexander one Pompey one Caesar to have subjugated many entire Provinces and conquered many Nations And not to go further in search of the like examples since one Age alone very neer this of ours can easily furnish us with them Were not the Emperor Charls the Fifth Francis the First King of France and if will pass by the errors of Religion Sultan Solyman Emperor of the Turks Princes great and valiant in all acceptations in whom so many endowments both of Nature and Fortune did concur as hardly any thing remained to be desired in any of them to make and constitute a potent Prince and an excellent Commander fit to undertake any action how great or difficult soever What was it that Charls with his undaunted and dreadless spirit did not undertake Who was ever known to be more ambitious of praise and military honor then Francis never weary nor satisfied with toiling in Arms and in leading Armies Solyman was so fervently bent upon purchasing glory in the Waâ—s as his age though very great was not able to asswage it for he dyed in the Field amongst Soldiers when he was eighty four years old These great Princes were so puissant and so remarkable for the number to Soldiers which they led to Battel for military Discipline and for all that belonged to War as their Age had no cause to wonder at nor to envy any preceding times which were famousest for such affairs Yet he who shall particularly examine their actions will find they come far short of the famous acts of the Antients and that they correspond not with the fame and opinion of such Princes and of such Forces For if we we shall consider the deeds of those few aforesaid not to mention so many others what and how many were the things done by Alexander the Great who having in so short time vanquish'd the powerful Persian Empire victoriously overran the whole East and made the terror of his wâ—apons known to People almost unknown till then and yet died whilst he was very young How many Cities and Provinces did Pompey and Caesar bring under the Roman Empire The first conquered and subjugated Pontus Armenia Cappadocia Media Hiberia Syria Cylicia Mesopotamia Arabia and Iudaea things which though done seem incredible And the other though he did not overrun so great a space of Land did no less admired things if we will regard the condition of the conquered He quell'd the warlike Switzers French and Dutch and made so many and so fortunate expeditions as by his means only above eight hundred Cities were brought under the Government of Rome What can be alleadged on the behalf of these modern Princes which may compare with these for military glory Charls the Emperor led sundry times puissant Armies upon several undertakings but what was the fruit that he reaped by his most famous Expeditions The greatest and most victorious Army which he ever put together was that wherewith he withstood Solyman when he came to assault â—ustria yet he never departed with it from before the walls of Vienna so as all the Trophy of Victory which he got there for so much expence and labor was only not being overcome for his Army never saw the Enemies face The Wars of Germany were very difficult in this behalf yet therein he contended not with any Prince whose Forces were of themselves equal to his nor were they made out of election or hope of glory by new acquirements but out of necessity and for the defence as well of his own person as of the Empire and all the good he got thereby was only the restoring the affairs of the Crown to the former condition so as the Empires authority might not be lessened The Wars made so long between Charls the Emperor and Francis King of France with no less hatred then force did oftentimes weary both their Armies but though Caesar had several times the better yet at last the power of France was not diminished nor the greatness of Charls his command made any whit the larger so as he was master of so many and so ample States rather by his right of inheritance then by means of War thâ— enterprises of Tunis and Algier in Africa might have some greater appearance of generosity the business being very difficult and attempted with great courage and much danger and wherein the glory appeared to be more then the advantage yet the unhappy success of the one did much lessen the honor and praise won by the other and these undertakings did finally produce no greater effects then the acquisition of one or two Cities and those none of the chiefest of Africa whereas one onely Scipio subdued Carthage the Head of so great an Empire and brought all those Regions under the Roman Eagles The Acts done by Solyman were somewhat greater then these but not to be compared to those of old nor peradventure will they appear to be very famous if we shall consider his power and the long time that he lived Emperor He consumed much time and many men in Hungaria making many expeditions against it and yet got but one part thereof which was none of the greatest Provinces neither He wan the Island of Rhodes but what glory could redound to so mighty a Prince by overcoming a few Knights who were weak of themselves and who were not succoured by others And yet he was therein assisted more by fraud then by force He past with his Army into Persia but though he might say with Caesar venâ— vidi yet could he not add vici for as he with great celerity over ran a great part of the Persian Empire and came to the City of Taâ—ris so not being able to fix in any place or establish any conquest he retreated to within his own Confines having lest the greatest part and the best of his men in the Enemies Country routed and defeated by divers accidents These things then and many other the like give just occasion of wonder and incite curious wits to search out the truest causes of such diversity of successes Amongst which nay in the primary place the different means of warfaring in those times and in these may come into consideration wherein if we come to more particulars we shall meet with the use of Forts and Strong Holds which are become more frequent in these our Ages then they were in former times the art of building being doubtlesly in greater perfection with us then it was with them There is hardly any State or Country now adaies wherein there are not many Towns and Cities either assisted by natural situation or else by art reduced to much safety by many inventions found out by modern Professors of Fortification so as almost every place is so fortified as it is able to hold out with a few men against many and he who will in these times enter into another
a desire of their own greatness the City was reduced oftentimes into eminent dangers Thus the Roman Plebeians thinking almost that they had not a common Country but that it did only belong unto the Nobility forsook it and retired into the Aventine valuing more the increase of their own power by necessitating the Senate to yield to their desires then their putting the City into such a disorder The Nobles likewise more sollicitous to abase the People and to increase their own fortunes then to preserve peace and union in the City did nourish Civil discord by usurpiâ—g the Common goods and by reducing the People to great Poverty through Usury By this discourse it may be comprehended how badly proportioned the Orders were in that mixt Government But it may be more cleerly seen by comparing this Commonwealth with that of Sparta which proved more excellent then any other in that mixt Government and preserved it a long time free from all discord by vertue of her most excellent Laws In Sparta the Princes power ended not but with his life to the end that he being preferred before all others for making the Laws be observed he might the better do it being detained by no self-respect from deposing of Magistrates or from being judged by the People But his Authority was notwithstanding so limited as he was rather a Custos of the Common Liberty then a true Prince in the City The People had as great a share in Government as their condition required For it being they who were to make use of the Magistrates it seemed they might better know their abilities as we see it falls out in other Trades that the excellencie of the work is better known by him that is to use it then by the maker thereof The People had the power given them of choosing and of correcting Magistrates but greater authority was granted to the Senate which was placed as in the midst to defend the Commonwealth from the Princes power and from the peoples insolencie to the end that thereby it might the better temper the one and the other Now let us see how in the joint union of these three Governments certain Conditions were appropriated unto every of them but neither so many nor yet such as made them of clean contrary qualities but so as they might very well be united in one and the same person The Prince had perpetuity of power but this stood so corrected by the Laws as it might easily consist with the other States The Senate which was made up of Forty eight of the prime Citizens represented a true Aristocratical Commonwealth but because they acknowledged their Dignity from the People their power was not such as bereft others of their Liberty But the Peoples authority in ordering rewards and punishments as it was not dangerous so it afforded place for a modest Popular State and rendred that Government more perfect by mixture of all the three best But above all things else there was a miraculous proportion observed in Sparta in sharing out those things which use to cause Civil dissentions amongst Citizens For the Noblemen had the greatest part in Honors but the People were equal to them in Wealth all the Revenues being in common so as the ambition of the one and the necessities of the other were satisfied and all of them being content they enjoyed much Peace and Tranquility so as that Commonwealth may endure longer then any of the antient Reipublicks And if at the first she had been a little more large in communicating her Government by encreasing the number of her Senators so as there had been no occasion in Theopompus his time for the better regulating their too great Authority of introducing the Magistracy of the Ephori whereby the City began to be a little too popular and leaving Licurgus his antient Institutions gave it self over to licentiousness nothing could have been desired in that City to have reduced her to the highest pâ—tch of perfection Therefore as far as the Roman Government differed from this it must be confest it fell so far short of true excellencie The Consuls of Rome had great Authority and it may be more free then became any Magistracy in a Commonwealth but the little durance thereof made it less beneficial to the the Republick For their Power being soon to be given over made them less diligent and less bold in undertaking Publick Affairs For Consulship being laid aside the way was opened of revenging private 〈◊〉 by the Tribunes So Cicerâ— who freed his Country from Catalius Conspiracy when he was out of Place was banished But the Senate because it had not any Ordinary Magistracy from whence no Appeal might be made by which is might curb the Peoples Insolency had not that respect given to it by which the ignorant common people is Governed So as the people not being held back by this Bridle ran into such lâ—centiousness as they dared to commit divers Indignities even against the chief Magistracy of Counsulship as they did when they plucked the Consul Camillus Hestare from the Tribunal that they might by force obâ—aâ—â— admittance to that Supream Magistracy The weakness of the Senate was likewise the occasion of the increase of the power of some Citizens for the peoples resolutions prevailing over the like of the Senate the way of ariving at great power by the favour of the people in despite of the Senate was opened to such as were ambitious Thus did Marius cause himself to be declared Consul contrary to the Laws and Caesar to be confirmed in his Province And to suppress these mens immoderate greatness which tended towards Tyranny it was requisite since the Commonwealth had no usual means to do it to prefer other Citizens of the Nobilities side whose greatness proved afterwards no less pernicâ—ous then that of those whom they thought through their Authority to suppress wherefore the City became wholly divided so that private injuries were with horrid cruelties revenged by Sylla though he professed to vindicate the Common welfare And Pompey to maintain his Greatness put rubs in the Treaty of Agreement with Caesar Wherefore betaking themselves to Arms the Commonwealth could not at last but fall These disorders were occasioned through the weakness of the Senate But the people possessing themselves of other mens Places usurpâ— the best imployments of the Commonwealth and being equall to the Nobility in pâ—â—nt of liberty would without any respect to other things purtake equally of Government So the right disposure of the Honors and Orders of the City were confused which require Geometrical and not Arithmetical proportion in such sort as the same things be not granted to all men but to every one that which is most convenient for him And certainly to constitute a City of that form as all her Citizens should be equal would be no better then to make a Consort of Musick consisting all of the same voyces for as the latter produceth no true Harmony so doth no
underneath the City Gates Nor did these as Consuls or Dictators lead Armies to fight against any save the Aequi Sanniti Toscani and other neighbouring Nations which were but weak Commonalties whose Dominions extended no further then their own Cities and the Territories thereof None of all those Countries being as then reduced under the power of any one Lord. Yet Livies words and the deed it self of having had recourse so often to the Dictator and having had War so many years with the same Nations shews how much so weak Potentates were feared by the Romans who cannot notwithstanding be said to have been much superior to them either for strength and worth of their Militia since it behoved to fight so often with them and hardly could they after so many dangers and a long course of time extinguish them or rather make them their Companions and Friends Who can then justly compare these things to Alexanders great atchievements to his so many Victories won over the greatest and most potent Kings of Asia What though Darius his men may be said to have been rude and base it cannot be denied but that they were Three hundred thousand armed men and of that Nation wherein the Monarchy had long been And Alexanders victorious Forces overran more Countries in little more then ten years then did the Romans in a much longer time when they were at their greatest The before-named Roman Commanders are deservedly praised for divers vertues But what could there be desired more in Alexander to make him be an excellent Commander Who had his share in more Battels then he Who shewed more boldness in undertaking enterprises greater constancie in prosecuting them more hopes in effecting them What other Commander was ever more highly esteemed and dearly beloved by his Soldiers Those vertues which divided amongst many men have made many Captains worthy to be praised met all of them abundantly in him Would Alexander peradventure have been afraid to pass into Italy who shewed his undauntedness in entring into the Desarts of Arabia without any other hope of bringing himself and his Army safe back save what his courage and his happy Genius promis'd him But how easily might he have passed into Italy Greece which was formerly conquered by his Father King Philip being at his devotion and to boot with the abounding commodities which that Country and his own Forces might have afforded him might not he have hoped to be received and assisted by so many people who were express enemies to the Roman Commonwealth who would not have refused to have obeyed so great a Prince as was Alexander so to avoid submitting themselves to the Dominion of a City like to one of theirs and with which they had long and grievous contestations Nay the hatred and envy which they bore to the Romans greatness would have made them all have sided with Alexander against them Was not Pyrrhus invited into Italy for this purpose by the Sâ—mniti and Tarentini and did not many of the Cities which were under the Romans obedience put themselves for the same reason under the power of Hannibal being thereunto moved rather out of their hatred to be commanded by the Romans then their fear of being supprest by the Carthaginian Forces It now remains that we consider some things of Alexanders Militia and of that of the Romans By which it will not be hard for him who will not willingly be deceived to know on which side the advantage and the disadvantage might have been Since if the numher of Combatants be to be valued who can doubt but that the Armies of which he was Lord who was Lord of so many Provinces as was Alexander were much to exceed those which one only City though very populous and very watlike as was that of Rome could put together And if Alexander would do most of his famous Actions with his Macedonians only it was out of his choice and judgment not out of any weakness for he thought an Army of a few valiant and expert Soldiers fitter to undertake a great enterprise then a great multâ—tude which oftentimes bring more confusion then aid So as having when he had overcome Darius made that so memorable Order of his Soldiers of Thirty thousand young men chosen out of the Flower of many subjugated Provinces and made them be instructed in the Macedonian Militia he little regarded his own Macedonians whom as it is written he permitted out of favor and in reward of their former service and at their own requests to follow his Ensigns and to pass with him into India to new undertakings But the so many Battels which he so successfully made may sufficiently witness the excellencie of his Discipline in the Militia as also his taking of so many Cities his long Voyages the perpetual exercise in military works By which things it may be conceived that no more Veteran Army could be found in those times which was more expert in all that belonged to the Militia more obedient to their Captains and more observant of all Military order then then was that of Alexanders The ordering of Soldiers used by Alexander which was called Phalanx is at this day celebrated in which the Ranks of Soldiers standing close being as it were woven together and covered over with great shields they made a solid and safe body of an Army able to sustain whatsoever charge of the Enemy Livy does afterwards consider that the Counsel of a wise Senate as was that of Rome would have prevailed over any one mans Resolves such as was Alexander but he considers not on the contrary side how that in affairs of importancie and chiefly in matters of War the supreme authority and command of one alone is requisite The Romans themselves were of this opinion who in cases of great difficulty had recourse to a Dictator whose Commissions were not limited but he was only charged to take such care as that the Commonwealth might undergo no loss nor prejudice Nor for all this is the authority or reverence due to a Dictator who is Magistrate but for a short time and subject to give an account for what he does in this to be compared with the majesty of a Kings command and of so great and so esteemed a King as was Alexander How often fell it out in Rome that when supplies were to be sent to an Army discords were importunately sollicited by the Tribunes and the Army hindered from being listed Was there any such thing in Alexander in whom supreme Authority and Empire did consist Nor did he yet want some more confiding Friends whose counsels he was accustomed to make use of and those but a few wise and wholly intent upon the good of that Prince upon whom all their greatness did depend as Counsels ought to be in business of great weight to the end that they may be maturely resolved upon and readily executed Which happens not where any command with equal authority and oft-times with much differing thoughts and ends
being invited in by the Mamertini as Pyrrhus was first called ito Italy by the Tarentini And the weakness of Pyrrhus his Forces did not so much occasion the Victories won in the War asdid his inconstancy in prosecuting Enterprises once begun which though it was a natural defect in him yet may it be believed that his sudden departure from Italy might be occasioned by the injury done him by the Carthaginians who unprovoked had taken up Arms against him and were ready to come and find him out in other mens Countries But it may be another greater respect might have moved him to assault the Carthaginian State to wit That he might onely have to do onely with the Carthaginians as he had at first fought onely with the Romans beginning to suspect as having already discovered the Carthaginians good will that if he should tarry longer in Italy and that the Romans danger should encrease that Confederacy might be made between them and the Carthaginians which was first refused So that whatsoever he should afterwards undertake against either of them might afterwards prove more difficult This was then the reason why Pyrrhus whilst the business in Italy was not yet finished nor the danger of the Tarentines not well secured marched to go for Sicily which caused so much trouble and danger to the Carthaginian Affairs as if he had known how to make good use of his Victory the Carthaginians might peradventure have been brought then to those final Extremities which were deferred for another time more for the Romans Glory then for their Welfare and good Fortune Thus what hath been already said may suffice for what concerns the Carthaginians Let us now see what the Romans did and consider whether they did well or no in refusing the help which was voluntarily offered them nay brought home to them by the Carthaginians The War which was made by Pyrrhus against the Romans must be thought to be both great and difficult being made by a Warlike Prince who brought many many men with him well trained up in Arms so as by the very Name and Fame of his Forces he had almost brought many Cities of Italy to his devotion withdrawing them from the obedience of the Romans and though he were a stranger yet having firm footing in Italy whither he was called by the Tarentini he was not likely to undergo those dis-accommodations which Armies use to suffer in another Country but his Forces appeared the more formidable by reason of that terror which things of great Fame and not formerly known use to bring with them And the Elephants were a great cause of fear the Romans not being formerly acquainted with that manner of Militia In so much danger therefore when the whole Rest was at Stake to presume too much upon ones self and upon ones proper Forces and to dream onely of Glory when they were to have been more sollicitous of Safety hath the appearance rather of Rashness then of mature and wise Counsel And why should the Romans promise so much unto themselves against Pyrrhus as to despise the Carthaginians help being as then accustomed to fight with the Tarentini a weak Nation given over to delights of which they were reprehended by Pyrrhus himself and being now to fight with true Souldiers expert in all sort of sufferings and all military Discipline in the recent Wars made by Pyrrhus in Macedonia And when nothing else but even Fortune which in matter of War is so uncertain should have proved averse unto them in any thing to whom could they afterwards have had recourse for succour having despised so great helps readily sent by so great a Power of so great esteem and Authority as was then the Commonwealth of Carthage Yet on the other side it may seem no ways to agree with the Romans Greatness and Generosity to confess themselves so terrified by Pyrrhus his Forces as that they needed Foreign help to defend themselves The Romans might have had Peace from Pyrrhus who when he came into Italy sent his Ambassadors to Rome informing the Senate by them that he was come to compose the Difference between them and the Tarentini with whom if the Romans would have Peace he proffered them the like To which answer was made That the Common-wealth of Rome had not chosen him for their Arbitrator neither did they fear his enmity therefore let him first return to his own Kingdom and then as a Friend to the Commonwealth he might treat of Peace and should be willingly listened unto But the City of Rome did already begin to envy and emulate the Common-wealth of Carthage which she did peradventure more esteem then open enmity with the Kingdom of Epire wherewith she thought she should not so soon have to do neither in matter of Peace nor War though Pyrrhus his ambition had then brought him into Italy Therefore if the Romans would not accept of Peace from Pyrrhus they oughtless to acknowledg their Safety from the Carthaginians They likewise thought they might so much rely upon their own Forces having valiant and well disciplined Souldiers of their own as that there remained no doubt of Victory in that War then what does never part from the uncertainty of Chance in War They considered that the number of Armies or Fleets might be increased by Foreigners and yet the power to resist an Enemy not be made the greater whilst either the differing ends of Princes the little agreement between Commanders or the contrary Custom and Discipline of Souldiers do often occasion many discords in matter of War which are not found where one onely Chieftain commands and disposeth of all things and where better obedience shewn by Souldiers of one and the same Dominion Therefore was it that the Romans did sundry other times refuse foreign aid as particularly in the War against Antiochus when refusing assistance sent unto them by other Kings of Africa they with their own few but valiant Souldiers routed Antiochus his numerous Army made up of many several Nations Such respects as these might have been liable to consideration even when their Faith and Friendship who were to have lent assistance had been for certain to be credited but who could secure the Romans who having already extended their Dominions far into Italy could not grow much greater without injuring Nations further off from being jealous of the Carthaginians who were antient and powerful Lords in Affrica and in Spain and possessed of the greatest part of Sicily and as there were none who could more hinder the increase of their Greatness then the Carthaginians so was it necessary that they being apprehended for such by the Romans should likewise fear them for the preservation of their own quiet and security And what charity is this might those wise and ancient Senators of Rome say which hath moved these Affricans to be so careful of us as without any obligation of Confederacy and not sought unto they should send so prime a Captain as Mago with such a
Mithridates Iugurth and so many others where the then almost lost name of the Carthaginians did not concur But if it had proved true that the Commonwealth of Rome when Carthage should be destroyed should have remained in idleness so harmful to her liberty if Scipio's counsel had proved successful and those evils had been taken away which be feared would befall the Commonwealth Carthage was not only not to have been undone but her power should have been suffered to increase for it is seen by what hath been said that War of it self was not able to keep the Citizens united but was rather that which did divide them But this peradventure might have been done by War wherein their own defence had been only conceined and the keeping of themselves from danger And yet it is an absurd thing to say that an Enemy must be preserved and men must be continually in trouble and danger of War for the conservation of a City But say I beseech you was thâ—re not forty three years between the first and second Carthaginian war And yet though Rome was free from dangers and from being troubled by the Carthaginians nay for some years every where more quiet then she ever was at any other time yet fell she not upon those great mischiefs of civil contentions which she afterwards incurr'd in the greatest heat of her â—orest Wars This was occasioned because the City was not as yet corrupted as it was afterwards because it grew old and because there was not any that knew by correcting her disorders to return her to her first principles What danger can ensue unto or can harm the common liberty or authority of Citizens either in War or in Peace whilst the Laws are observed And when the Laws are trampled under foot what State can be free from the snares of the Enemy The Spartan Kings had not supreme authority in War but War being governed by good Laws could never injure them Power intrusted in Citizens with due measure and temper was never prejudicial And behold an example thereof On the one side Agesilam King of Sparta being Commander in chief of the Army against Farâ—â—bassus and being entred Asia with great hopes of signal victories when he was called home by the Magistracie of the Ephori readily obeyed On the oâ—her side Caesar being already returned into Italy from the French enterprise will contrary to the will of the Senate keep the Army together and despiseth the authority thereof Cato's counsel of destroying Carthage might then have proved good not of it self but when the Romans being safe for these Enemies and setled in a condition of not being to fear any Forein forces could have ordered unto themselves a firm and quiet Civil State It was known by experience that the other agreement made with the Carthaginians had done but little good For they keeping still the same mind though not the same fortune did not let slip any occasion of throwing off the yoke of slavery which the Romans had put upon them So as the only means to rest secure from their Forces since their words were not to be trusted was to put them out of their antient nest and to make them live far from the Sea as they were commanded to do after that their Country was destroyed so to bereave them of the opportunity of the Sea by means whereof that Commonwealth was grown great and powerful But wherein was the quiet of Rome bettered by the ruine of Carthage if they would have to do with more barbarous Nations and Nations further off not moved thereunto through fear nor provoked by any injury thinking their Empire was only to be bounded by the Confines of the Earth What had the Parthians of common with the Commonwealth of Rome what injury had they then done her to make the Romans take up arms against them yet Crassus had a mind to find them out in those far distant parts whereby to draw upon himself and the Roman Armies so many great losses and ruines as they were to undergo in that War The overthrow of Carthage should peradventure have taken from the Citizens of Rome their desire of continual warfaring as it took from them the occasion of being in Arms but it did not so for the cause which produced and nourish'd these thoughts was internal not external So as they were not provoked to Arms but did rather provoke others and when they fought not for the welfare they fought for the glory of the Empire For all the Orders of that City consisted only in the exercise of the Militia But how could a City be long preserved which was wholly bent upon those things which were the means to bring her to her end how could she enjoy true civil felicity if she knew not what it was and did not value it but did abhor that peace and quiet which begers civil felicity Therefore if that Commonwealth had been well instituted in civil Orders and that when Carthage was destroyed she had known which she did not how to lay down Arms this had been the way to bring her to much good nay to the true and chief good of civil felicity not to the ruine and perdition thereof So as if Scipio doubted that the introducing of Idleness into Rome might bring with it such notable disadvantage it was perhaps because knowing the imperfections of that Government he feared not that Idleness which the laying down of Arms is wont to produce but that which is born and doth increase with the corrupt customs of Cities by which contrary but wholly pestiferous effects are begot en as the making of some Citizens love pleasures and hate labor and toil and others strangely proud lovers of brawls and novelty The Athenians endeavoring to banish this sort of Idleness from out their City committed the care thereof to the chief and most severe Magistrate called Areopagus But that true and vertuous Quiet which is opposed unto Toil and which as a thing to be desired ought to be sought for in a City doth not banish but doth nourish true generosity of mind which makes men willingly enter when need requires into the dangers of War for honesty sake and for the defence of their Country not out of ambition and desire of self-greatness And to free the City from the fear of her powerful and bitter enemies the Carthaginians was not contrary to this So as I may conclude That it was not the destruction of Carthage but the ill Government of Rome which wrought her ruine The Eighth DISCOURSE Why Rome could not regain her Liberty after the death of Julius Caesar as she had formerly done by driving the Tarquins first out and then Appius Claudius and the other Decemviri MAny do not without reason wonder why the City of Rome which after having droven the Tarquins out who had reigned for above Two hundred and forty years And which having afterwards made Appâ—us Clandius and the other Decemvirl lay down their Magistracy who usurpâ—d
thought expedient to come to peace with Alaricus King of the Goths leading him and a great number of his men under the Empires pay to make use of them in other undertakings For the Goths being kept in continual pay by some former Emperors amongst other Soldiers which served the Empire and being of themselves conversant in many Wars they were become a valiant People and had learn'd the Roman discipline though not the corruption which overthrew it in the Roman Camp Which though it might be good for the present occasions it did certainly prove very pernicious afterwards For though by this Peace Theodosius was safe from any fear of this Nation whilst he governed together with Gratianus and also afterwards when he held the Empire alone by himself he being a person of singular worth and one who by his industry had somewhat renewed the antient discipline amongst the Soldiers yet after his death the Forces of the Empire beginning again to flag and the Empire falling into the hands of his two sons Arcâ—dius and Honorius who succeeded their Father whilst they were but young and proved not to be of such gallant parts as the condition of those times required many of those who commanded under Theodosius in several parts rebelled who were all of them cryed up Emperors by those Armies wherein they commanded by which occasions being invited the Goths did not only return to rise up in Arms against the Empire but also other Northern Nations who did then inhabit Germany as the Alani Franks and Vandals took up Arms and did at one and the same time assault the States of the Empire in several parts many of them marching more particularly towards Italy and against the very City of Rome which after divers passages remained in prey to these Barbarians the antient Roman worth being so decayed as there was not any one who did so much as provide for the welfare of so stately a City which was the Queen of the World And the Emperor Honorius a thing which is not to be mentioned without much marvel whilst Italy and other Countries were wasted with War and the very City of Rome was reduced to the utmost extremity remained in Ravenna an idle Spectator of his Subjects so great calamity and of the ruine of his State in so base and stupid a manner as being told he might do well to provide for the preservation and safety of so many of the Empires Provinces which being miserably torn in pieces were falling into the power of the Barbarians answered That he could live without them After the ruine of Rome these victorious Barbarians past into France and into Spain where being recruited with other people of their own Nations and the Roman Armies being busied in Civil seditions and in maintaining those Emperors which each of them had chosen they had leisure to fix themselves there and to take possession of those noble Provinces the greatest part of whose antient Inhabitants being extinguished they setled themselves there and did long govern those Dominions and others of them passing into Africa and having won large Territories did with the same Fortune and same thoughts institute their proper Kingdoms But on the other part other People called the Huns fell into Pannonia called now by their names Hungaria and possessing themselves likewise thereof fixt their abode and dominion there So as there was hardly any Western Province of the Empire which was not at this time troubled by this fury of War the Roman Princes and Soldiers not having sufficient worth to withstand them Insomuch that when Attila marched with a furious Army to destroy Italy the Empire not having any Soldiers that they durst confide in to impede his passage the Romans were forced to take King Theodoricus with a good number of his Goths into their pay by whose assistance that cruel Enemy was at that time kept off But the Empires weak Forces being at last tyred and some Commanders being lost in whom there remained yet some worth and discipline the greater and almost fatal ruines of Italy began whereinto when these cruel Barbarians entred they put all to fire and sword bringing total destruction to many noble and populous Cities Which according to the natural order of all things mortal wherein Corruptio unius est generatio alterius gave occasion to the birth of the City of Venice whereunto the remainder of the Italian Nobility had recourse and saved themselves The Twelveth DISCOURSE Why thâ— Commonwealth of Rome though she suffered many Defeats in divers Battels yet did still prove Victorious at last HE who shall narrowly consider the great actions of the Romans will still discover new things therein not onely worthy of praise but of admiration Their prosperity was certainly very great but proceeding as it is to be beleeved from their worth and from certain and ordinary causes The People of Rome made more Wars then ever any Potentate hath been known to do but that which occasioneth the greatest wonder is that their success in all of them was prosperous And that though the Roman Armies were in many Battels overcome yet still in the conclusion of every War the Victories sided with them It will then be worth the while to seek out the truest or at least the most truth-like causes thereof by reasoning thereupon The City of Rome waged continual Wars from the first foundation thereof till Augustus his time which was for above Seven hundred years The gates of that famous Temple of Ianus which were never to be shut but in time of Peace stood always open unless it were once in the Consulship of Titus Manlius nor was there almost any Nation known in those daies with whom the City of Rome hath not at some time made trial of her forces and worth That Commonwealth in so many and so long contentions of War was likewise sometimes favored sometimes frowned upon by fortune so as sometimes she was brought into very great danger yet still she prevailed at last and triumphed over her formerly victorious enemies Long and heavy was the dispute which in her very beginning she had with so many people of Italy and chiefly with those that were nearest who singly by themselves and joyntly with others did conspire against the Romans and did by all their best endeavors seek how to keep the powea of the Empire low which was ordained as was afterwards seen to the height of all greatness Nor was the Commonwealth of Rome secure from the efforts of foreign Nations nay many times she was to withstand the fury of the French who assailed her with great Forces that they might totally subdue her and possess themselves of her Territories as they had done of so many other parts of Italy The Commonwealth made trial of her Forces even in the beginning of her greatness with other Kings till beginning with the first Carthaginian Wars to wage War further from her Confines she proved at last a terror even to the most remote foreign
the care and diligence of one only Prince who was oft-times unfit for Government then it would have done had it been guarded by many Citizens at once as it was in the Commonwealths time But it is very hard to penetrate into the true causes of so great events and so remote from our memory which are reserved to the deeper judgment of him who is the true and Supreme LORD and who governs and doth dispense States and Empires by ways and ends which are unknown to humane reason The Fourteenth DISCOURSE Why the Grecians did not much extend the Confines of their Dominion as did the Romans and how Greece came to lose her Liberty OF all other antient People there are two that have been greatly famous so as their names and the glory of things by them done hath been conveyed over to the memory of Posterity with large acclamations to wit the Romans and Grecians alike for notable examples of all worth and vertue but sufficiently unlike for the greatness and duration of Empire For whereas the Grecians did not extend their Confines beyond the bounds of Greece herself nor did she long flourish in the same splendor of dignity nor greatness of fame and dominion the Romans did command over almost the whole World and their Empire although the Form of Government was changed endured for many Ages for there past above eleven hundred years between the building of Rome and the time wherein she was taken and sackt by the Goths They then who shall consider these things may with reason desire to know why these two Nations did differ so much in fortune since they were equally worthy It was not in any one City alone that choise men for both all civil and military worth did flourish in Greece as in Italy they did in Rome but many Cities did at the same time produce Citizens excellent in all manner of things It would be a tedious thing to number vp the gallant Actions of Miltiades Themistocles Aristides Phocion Alcibiades Ageâ—ilans Cimon Leonida Epaminondas and of so many others whose â—â—me rings loud amongst us And Plutarch when he writes the lives of the most excellent Romans finds as many Grecians almost to parallel to them who are as highly cry'd up for the same vertues Yet did never any of their Cities nor Greâ—â—e herself the Country common to them all ever rise by any of their actions to that high pitch of Fortune and Command as did the City of Rome and whole Italy by the illustrious deeds of the Râ—mans This diversity of success ought not to be attributed to Fortune but their certain and natural causes If Greecâ— should have enlarged the 〈◊〉 of her Empire into the farthest distant Regions as did Italy through the power and gallantry of the 〈◊〉 she must either have been reduced under the power of one only 〈◊〉 or they must all of them have been joined in an uniform 〈…〉 designs But so many difficulties discover themselves in both theâ—e things when they are considered the wonder ceaseth why she could not encrease her Dominions answerable to the Fame Vertue and Glory of things done by that Nation Greece was divided into many several people who were all of them totally or for the most part governed by proper Laws and Civill Institutions in the Form of a Commonwealth though they were of divers States And though they had a general Councel which was called the Aâ—phictyoâ—â—s wherein men met who were sent from all the chief Cities to treat of the most important affairs and such as did concern the common interests of all Greece yet did not this Councel give one onely and certain Government to all Greece but it was such an Assembly as are the Diets which are in these times sometimes call'd in Germany upon some particular Occurrences wherein many Princes and free Cities of that Province meet which do much differ in State Dignity and Form of Government and who have free votes in counselling and in resolving upon such matters as are therein treated But amongst other people of Greece the Spartans and the Athenians antient people of Greece and who for a long time had by their worth purchast much authority were very numerous and eminent when Greece did flourish most both for publick power and for the admirable worth of particular Citizens For though the Corinthians the Argives the Achaeans and some other people were of greater consideration in respect of other lesser Cities yet they for the most part did rather follow the fortune of the Lacedemonians and the Athenians then their own And the Thebans who for a while were in better esteem then the rest by reason of their Soldiers Discipline whom they called by a particular name of the Sacred Cohort yet because of all her Citizens onely two arrived at any celebrated honor to wit Pelopides and Epaminondas and for that her Militia consisted but of Five hundred men their City never arrived at that degree of Dominion and Glory as did Sparta and Athens But as much as these were greater then the others so much did they the more emulate one another both for private worth and glory as for publick Dignity and Reputation To these did the other people of Greece adhere some being by them commanded others by vertue of particular considerations These two Cities were highly esteemed for the orders of the first Founders of such Commonwealths to with Lycurgus in Sparta and in Athens Theseus so as these people who did long before inhabit the same Country began to take name and authority over the rest Those who did inhabit the Terra firma held for the most part with the Spartans and those of the Islands with the Athenians But yet every City was free and hugely intent not to let the power either of the Spartans or Athenians encrease too much but to keep the strength of these two chief Cities so equally ballanced as when the one of them should go about to oppress the other people of Greece the oppressed might have recourse to the other It is therefore to be observed in all the actions of the Grecians that the rest of the people were never firm in their friendships either to the Spartans alone or alone to the Athenians but when the one of them began to exceed the other they sided with the weakest not valuing any tie of friendship or confederacy when they met with any such respect So as for a long time the affairs of Sparta and of Athens marcht hand in hand though each of them both gave and received many routs and partook both of good and bad fortune in War Sparta was strongest by land and Athens by Sea so as they did counterpoise one another and therefore and for that as it hath been said they had each of them many dependants and confederates they kept the forces of whole Greece divided nor was there means afforded to either of them much to exceed the other Wherefore neither of them could busie themselves
power to assault her the War was diversly administred they not agreeing what City should nominate the Commander in chief the Spartans would have reduced the defence to narrow passages by Land and the Athenians would have put the whole fortune of Greece in their Fleet the situations of their Cities and the condition of their Forces would not permit that one and the same thing should be equally useful and commodious for them all Nor was the eminent danger of the Persians so potent Army able to unite the Forces of all Greece but that some of the chief People as the Thessalians Argives and Thebans would be exempted from out the League and the Argives being requested to adhere to the Confederacie of so many other Cities answered that they would rather obey the Persians then give way unto their antient Rivals and Enemies the Spartans Finally the Grecians having obtained a great and unexpected Victory in the Sea-fight at Salamine when they were to have pursued their Fortune after having beaten the â—leet and made the Enemy retire they of themselves gave over all further hopes and came home to their own Havens for that the Spartans envied the glory of the Athenians and fearing by reason of their being stronger at Sea that if they should have proceeded on in their success they would not have spared their own Grecians but have domineered over them and soon after being more moved by envy and their antient home-contentions then by any hatred to the Enemy when they should have driven the remainder of the Persian Army out of Greece the associate Cities fel upon the Thebans because severing themselves in these common dangers from the Grecians they had recourse for friendship to the Persians So as Greece reaped no good by this prosperous success because the Grecians knew not how to value it nor knew they how to use the Victory when they had got it Mardonius was overthrown at the Battel of Platea together with his whole Army which after Xerxes his flight he commanded in chief But what advantage got the Grecians by so great a victory save their dividing of the prey which made them return all of them the sooner to their own houses Nay there arose greater and more cruel civil wars between them afterwards then had ever been before and the business grew to that height as the Spartans who had always profess'd themselves more bitter Enemies to the Barbarians then all the rest joined in league with them and conspired with Tissaphernes who was Governor of Libia for King Darius to ruine Greece Truces made between them were also often broken and out of too great proneness to adhibit faith to the suspitions which they had one of another the publick faith was broken no tye being strong enough to keep those minds fast together which were so divided by perpetual emulation But of all the rest two things are very considerable as touching this present Discourse and the Judgment which is to be given thereupon to wit of what strength the Grecians were in military affairs and with what Princes they had to do in the time when Greece did flourish most and had most reason to aspire to enlarge her Empire Certainly he who shall well consider it will find that warlike Discipline was neither so highly esteemed of nor of that excellencie and perfection amongst the Grecians as it was amongst the Romans for the Romans valued nothing more then military valor and discipline nay for a long time they studied no Sciences nor Liberal Arts wherein those who took any delight made use of Grecians but did wholly give their minds to military exercises and sought for praise from nothing but from War Whence it was that more Soldiers excellently well train'd up in millitary affairs were to be drawn out of the City of Rome then out of other whole Provinces whereas the Grecians did not give their minds to the study of War but to Learning and to the Liberal Sciences which flourish'd a long time amongst them as either born with them or very well cultivated by them There were as many of them that frequented Universities to become Philosophers as of those who studied the Soldiers craft How many Professors were there amongst them of Oratory and Poetry wherein they proved so excellent as all that ever desired to prove good therein since have observed their rules and trodden in their steps How many rare Artificers have there likewise been of Grecians in all the most noble Arts particularly in Sculpture and Picture-drawing The original or at least the perfection whereof knows no other beginning then from Greece In the memory of all Ages the names of Phidias Polyclâ—â—us Alcamenes Aglâ—â—â—hon 〈◊〉 Parrhasius Zeuxis Apelles and of so many others are celebrated Wherefore Greece was more famous for the excellencie of Learning and of the Liberal Arts then for skill in the Militia Yet was the City of Sparta better then the rest at millitary affairs and Athens was sufficiently famous for her Fleets by Sea and her skill in maritime affairs yet the Spartan Militia was bounded within 〈…〉 ere the Athenians did much mind their 〈…〉 mistocles his time And certainly 〈…〉 ordered for the acquirement of Empire For Sparta 〈…〉 tended to Arms yet did they aim more at their own defence and at the presâ—rvation of Libertie then at the acquisition of Empire not onely private Citizens but even the publick weal being constituted in great poverty and restrained to a small number of Citizens they were forbidden all commerce with foreiners least they might corrupt the Laws and Customs of their Country their lives were austeer and they were contented with a little Whence it was that those Citizens were a long time from desiring any further greatness it being therefore propounded to Cleamenus King of Sparta by one Anaxagoras of Miletum who had caused many of the Cities of Ionia to rebel against the King or Persia to make use of that occasion and take up arms shewing him that he might penerate even to the Cities of Susa and possess himself of the wealth of all those Kings The Spartan laught at the proposition and considering onely the length of the voyage said He would none of those riches which were not worth so much labour Yet because the Government of Sparta preserved it self for a long time without any great alteration or change and grew therefore the stronger it was able to get the Dominion of whole Morea and had afterwards the prime place for dignitie and Empire amongst the Grecians On the contrary Athens which by the opportunitie of the Sea and by divers of her institutions aiming at the increasing of the City seemed as if she onght to have inlarged her Dominion beyond the Confines of Greece could not make good use of her Forces nor reap the fruit which became the worth of some of her most excellent Citizens who were highly spirited and were minded to raise their Country to further greatness because she could never
order her self so as to preserve herself long in one and the same Form of Government but was busied in perpetual Civil disorders precipitating herself sometimes into a corrupt Popular State sometimes into the tyrannie of a few But the Grecians seemed as if all their thoughts were usually bounded within themselves insomuch as it is said of some of their most famous Commanders That they did more willingly exercise themselves in Wars made amongst the Grecians themselves then in Wars against the Barbarians since come what would the advantage and honor of the Victory did remain in Greece But as for what belongs to the Militia some may peradventure think that it may be proved by some famous Victories that the Grecians won from the Medes and Persians that they did much study Military Affairs and were very good at Military Discipline insomuch as for that part there was no more to be wished for in them To this it may be answered That it is not to be denied but that the Grecian Militia might be thought to be good and laudable when compared to that of the Barbarians withwhom they had most to do But that it is no waies to be held comparable to that of the Romans who did excellently well understand whatsoever belonged to the true Militia better then did any other Nation in any whatsoever time Insomuch as by reason of their good orders and of the so many Victories which they wan they propounded unto themselves the conquest of the whole world which out of the same reasons they effected But it is observable in the Victories which the Grecians got against the King of Persia's Forces that they were occasioned not so much through the good ordering of their Militia as by reason of a certain obstinate resolution which they had put on to defend Greece from the eminent slavery of the the Barbarians the fear whereof made them bold to encounter whatsoever danger Many of their actions prove this as amongst others that of Leonid as was sufficiently famous who being left with onely Five hundred of his Lacodimonians to guard the Strieght of Thermopla fell boldly with them one night into the Persian Camp where were sundry Hundred thousands of men not being perswaded thereunto out of any hopes of victory of safety but onely out of a desire to revenge the injuries done by Xerxes to Greece by the slaying of so many enemies and by his own voluntary death Who knows not that in the Naval fight at Salamina it was necessity that made the Grecians so couragious Since the Athenians who were of greatest power in that Fleet were already without any Country their City being burnt by the Enemy so that their ultimate hope of any good consisted in that daies good success And to make the necesfity the greater Themistocles who was their Commander in chief chose wisely to joyn Battel in a place which was far from any friends Territories thereby to bereave every one of any other hopes of safety but by being victorious And the great multitude of the Persians Fleet served rather for confusion to them then for any strength for of above a thousand Vessels which were therein it is said that hardly Two hundred entred the Battel And the Victory which was obtained not long after by land against the Army led on by Mardonius was rendred the less difficult by the reputation which the Grecians had won by their Naval Victory and by King Xerxes his running away whose Soldiers proved no more couragious then did their Master for whose glory it was that they were to fight whereas the Grecians fought for themselves for the safety of their Country their Houses and of all that they had But to boot with all this it may peradventure not without truth be affirmed That the actions of the Grecians have been transferred over to the memory of posterity for greater then what indeed they were For Greece had great store of excellent Writers who according to the custom of the Nation amplifying such deeds as might purchase glory to them have studied very much to set them forth to the best and to make them appear praise-worthy Wherefore Salust in the beginning of his History rendring as it were a reason why he took the pains to write saies That the Actions of the Romans may appear to be the less out of the little care they had of putting them into writing every one being more intent to do praise-worthy actions then to celebrate the actions of other men whereas the Grecians actions were made to appear not what they really were but such as the most excellent wits of good Writers could by their adornments set them stately forth Moreover there met many things in the Romans much differing from what hath been said of the Greeks for their whole study was to make their City powerful by any whatsoever way that they might as they did draw upoâ— any occasion great store of Soldiers from thence This was the original of the sanctuarie wherein wicked men driven out of other Countries were received and afterwards People of many of the neighboring Cities were allowed the priviledges of the City of Rome the more to interess them in what belonged to the honor and greatness of Rome as to that of their Common-countrie yet was not the War administred under divers names or auspices as it was in Greece by reason of the several Leagues had between several People but by the sole authoritie of the Roman Commanders and still in sole respect to what made onely good for the Common-wealth of Rome Now if we will coâ—sider with what forein Potentates the Grecians had to make War we shall find that this also made it the harder for them to acquire other mens Countries for just when the Grecians by reason of their having many gallant men amongst them might have aspired at the aggrandizing of their Empire the Persian Monarchie was grown so powerful as it ruled over all the East And was not onely got near to Grâ—â—a by the possession of Lydia but did also possess Ionia an antient Colony of the Grecians So as it was a very great and difficult undertaking to go about to possess the Territories of so great a Prince who though he should receive a rout might easily recover his loss and put himself in a safe posture of defence by reason of the largeness of his Dominion and the multitude of Soldiers that were at his command So as join this outward impediment to the inward which lay in their home discords and we shall see that the Routs which the Grecians gave to the Persians did no further incommodate the Persians then the loss of those Armies nor did the Grecians receive any further benefit thereby then the defending of themselves and their safety for no long time from further dangers But the Kingdom of Macedon though of much less strength for extent of Empire became very formidable by reason of its good Discipline in War and for the great
Men but amongst bruit Beasts yea even amongst Vegetables Then since this Equality is not to be found amongst Men it is great injustice to distribute things equally in a Government to those whose parts and deserts are unequal For in conferring of honors or pâ—eferments in a City or State a Geometrical not an Arithmetical proportion must be observed It is the vertue and merit of every one that must be weighed He who is richer then another may be serviceable to his Country by great and frequent contributions to the Publick He who hath many Clients and Friends may by his power and authority dispose 〈◊〉 Peoples minds to believe â—ell and act well in the Cities occasions and affairs He who is advanced above others in glory must have deâ—erâ—â—d it well of the Commonwealth by some noble action and 〈◊〉 confirâ—t himself therein by some other like action And he Who is â—â—â—re generally given to any Vertue be it or Warlike or Civil is always 〈◊〉 then others to serve his Country and Prince upon all occasions So as to drive 〈◊〉 men as these out of the City is no better then to cut that member from the body which is loveliest and fitter then the rest to be serviceable thereunto Such an Instiâ—uâ—ion then can have no admittance but in Tyrannical governments And the examples alleadged of Thrasâ—â—alâ—â— and Tarquin are examples of Tyranâ—â— who being resolved to preserve themselves by violence in their usurped dominionr were to be jealous of all the best and most powerful men and endeavor to be quit of thâ—â— for their greater security But a just Prince must not imiteate such examples â—ay even in a Politick Government these Proceedings would be pernicious For he who will thereby preserve himself must change the Form of the whole Government and reduce it to a Despoâ—ical and servile condition with which such Orders holding some proportion and conformity they may for a certain time prove useful for the maintaining of that Tyrannie as it hath done to the Turks in these later times and formerly in some other Nations wherein the whole Government hath related to the sole and peculiar accommodation of the Lord Paramount without any respect to the good of the Subject and more according to will then to Law Nor is it true that the power of Citizens or greatness of Barons in a Kingdom proves alwas harmful it may rather upon many occasions prove the safety of that City or State But this may be ill uâ—ed as many other things are the which notwithstanding whosoever should go about to take totally away from a City would ruine it not bring it to perfection Therefore the Law ought to provide for taking away the abuse of things not the things themselves when they are not simply and in themselves evil And if the Authority which the Roman Commanders held in their Armies had been well regulated and their continuing is their military Commands moderated by a shorter time Caesar could not have made use thereof as he did to the prejudice of the Commonwealth he having continued so many years Commander in chief of the same Army and in the same Province Nor had they needed to have raised Pompey to such a height to oppose Caesars greatness But when when they had let it run on too long to declare him an Enemy to his Country and drive him out of Italy proved a violent remedy and mortal to the Common-wealth Neither can that benefit be expected as is pretended by the banishment of so many Citizens who being become too great are for suspition drives out of their Country of securing themselves from their power rather Injury added to Ambition serves for another incitement to make them endeavor some innovation in the City and makes them the more sollicitous in plotting by the means of such as are their friends and adherents in their own City or State to râ—ise some revolt in it for which they have easie recourse to the favor of other Princes So as the trouble of being offensive to those States from whence such men are expell'd is rather increased then diminished We have infinite examples in all Ages of those who being driven by banishment out of a City or State have been the occasion of notable mischief and ruine thereunto For though it cannot be denied but that the â—o great power of Citizens in a City or of Lords and Barons in a Kingdom begets suspition and is dangerous and doth usually cause no small difficulties to the good and peaceful Government of that State yet some other remedy thâ—◠〈◊〉 may be used to obviate those disorders which such excesses do 〈…〉 For that is only to suffer a â—ore to grow old and to gangrene that they 〈…〉 wards forcâ—d to 〈…〉 or sword to heal it In a well-govern'd State 〈…〉 be had and caâ—â— taken both by the Law it self and by the Prince who rules is chief therein not to suffer any one to grow to too 〈…〉 And if any 〈◊〉 do arrive at such a condition as he begins too far to overtop the reâ—â— the foundation and groundwork of his power must dexterously be taken away and of his ploting thoughts so as he may not thereby be able to work any novelties or disturb the publick peace Which may easily be done by his wisdom who commands in chief the same men ought not to be suffered to continue long in the same imployments and especially not to exercise them too long in the same place such things ought not to be left in their power which may serve for fuel the more to kindle their ambitious thoughâ—â— to the prejudice of the publick good which may be done under a pretence of honor so as the Princes may not be noted for injustice nor can the particular persâ—nages account it as an injury done them If any one do abound in riches let him have expensive imployments that he may lessen that wealth which made him appear more eminent then others If he be of too great authority in the Court or amongst the People as having had the management of important affairs along time send him to some place of Magistracie or other imployment a far off and change him often from place to place If he be great and remarkable for glorious actions done by him give him hard and difficult imployments wherein if he succeed not well his reputation will soon grow less with the people who judge by the events But if such a one appear too much ambitious and be so as many men are seen to be out of a certain vain-glory but without any malice of heart he may be contented and kept quiet by confering honors upon him of glorious appearance but little profit But the remedy will prove peradventure harder in those who boast themselves to be more nobly descended and of better blood then others fâ—r many several respects meet often times in them to make them great and powerful yet even against these remedies may be found without
which they propounded unto themselves in this their new abode so to do nor did the condition of those times permit it And they were so fenced from the Arm sof Enemies as then both by the natural condition of their situation as also by the salt waters as they needed not to arm themselves for their own defence Therefore their Citizens being by long custom inured to these thoughts they had no thought of taking up Arms though the City were already much increased both in Forces and Authority unless when they were provoked and more to keep themselves from being injured by others or to assist their Friends and Confederates then out of ambition of Rule and of enlarging their bounds And he who shall consider what their greatest and and most difficult enterprises were in those first times will see they aimed all at this end The Venetians fought first with the French and afterwards against the Huns in defence of their Country and of their Liberties and long after with the Genoeses enforced thereunto by necessity and provoked by many grievous injuries For this very valiant and generous Nation would not rest quiet out of an emulation of glory in Sea-affairs wherein though they were oftentimes worsted by the Venetians yet they still found occasion of new Contests The Commonwealth of Venice hath oft-times taken up Arms likewise in times neerer this our Age with greater preparation for War and with more courage to defend their State in Terta firmâ— which they had already gotten with much ado and whereof they were justly possessed insomuch as they have sometimes valianâ—ly repulsed the fury of most powerful Leagues of Princes who were resolved upon their ruine But it becomes not the moâ—th of a Venetian to say how oft they have taken up Arms in defence of their Friends and Confederates lest he may seem to upbraid others with the services his Countrymen have done them But divers People and Cities assisted and preserved by their Forces do witness this And to speak only of things of more recent memory how great a desire hath this Commonwealth shewn to the common good and to this purpose how careful hath she been of the liberty and glory of Italy in sustaining long and heavy War to preserve the noble Neapolitan Territories in the Italian Princes and the like of Milan But he who will look further back and see what they have done will find that the Venetians have undertaken and finished famous enterprises out of zeal to Religion as they did in the Wars of the Holy Land against the Saracens and divers other times against other Princes to preserve and increase the glory of the holy Church and the Papal dignity which amongst many other actions is cleerly and nobly witnessed by the famous Naval victory won from the Emperor Frederick Barbâ—rossa for the which Venice doth at this day enjoy many great priviledges in witness of her great worth and singular merit But it is needless now to particularize in those things whereof all Histories are full It will suffice to touch upon some things whereby it may be conceived what the first beginnings of the City were and what were the intentions and end of her Citizens Romes ends were far different from these who from her very beginning aimed only at Empire and greatness being built by Romalus a fierce and ambitious man who not content to have recovered his Kingdom to his Grandfather Numiter and opened the way to the Lordship of Alba longa resolved by the assistance of a great many young men who followed him to purchase a better fortune and condition for himself and to build a new City which must have a warlike institution to keep the minds of those stirring youth busied in military exercises and to defend himself from his neighbors who finding that the new City aimed at greater designs thought to keep is low Romulus might with reason promise himself to purchase more Dominion and to enlarge his Confines for he built his City in a Country which was possest by many people who were weak and at odds within themselves so as he needed not fear any potent Prince who might oppose his designs or suppress his Forces before they were somewhat better established This was the first foundation of Romes greatness for the City beginning soon to habituate herself to military discipline and to turn her thoughts upon War and aggrandising her State she grew so confirm'd therein with time and with continual military orders as the Militia and all things thereunto tending did continually flourâ— sh in her For those that came after following as it falls out for the most part the example of their Predecessors her Citizens were always desirous of warlike glory and of Empire proving to be like Romulus and those other valiant men from whom they had their beginning and increase Thus they always made one War beget another not being able to endure the suspected power of their Neighbors nor yet the injuries done unto them by their Friends and Confederates under which two pretences they made first many notable acquisitions in Italy and afterwards passing over the Sea in Africa in Spain and in many other Provinces But to pass on now to another Consideration let us affirm that the situation is of great moment for the Rule and Dominion which one City is to have over another as that which affords security for self defence and opportunity to subjugate others this helps likewise to make a City plentiful and wealthy without which States are hardly acquired For where there is scarcity of livelihood povertie is more to be fought withall then Enemies and want of wealth renders a City alwaies weak and easie to be wasted and opprest Hence it was that Sparta though she had excellent Laws and Institutions yet whilst she observed them she could not much inlarge her Dominions for by them the City was bound for what concerned both the private and publick condition to be kept poor and far from any commerce with others and in our time the Cantons of the Switzers though they be a very valiant Generation yet being poor and seated amongst Mountains and for the most part in barren places their Soldiers being fighting under the pay of other Princes they have not been able to do any thing for themselves or to make any acquisitions but have onely preserved their Liberties If we shall then consider the situation of Venice we shall certainly find it very opportune for most things and miraculously well for some things For if we have respect to safety what City can be compared to this which without any Bulwarks of Walls or Garrisons of Soldiers defended by her natural scituation is of her self safe from all injuries and inexpugnable So as she is the onely example after so many Ages of being untoucht by the Barbarians violence If we respect abundance of plenty and wealth the accommodation that the Sea affords her and the so many Rivers which disgorge themselves either into
test the Wars proved very heavy unto them which they were forc'd to 〈…〉 did not joyn against them because they saw that if that Dukes State fell into the power of the Venetian Commonwealth the way would be laid open to her for much greateâ— matters in Italy whereupon a noble Victorie which was already almost gotten was impeded Hereby it may be then conceived how much the condition of the times was averse to the Commonwealths inlarging her Precincts by Land partly by reason of her self and partly through other various accidents which though they were somewhat more favorable unto her in what concerned the Sea yet met she not with small interruptions therein to her enterprises For the Eastern Emperors being Masters of Greece and of other States and Countries wherein the Commonwealth was to have inlarged the Confines of her command by Sea she could not make any great acquisitions whilst they preserved themselves in such reputation and strength as became their State But afterwards when that Empire began to decline she began to increase and flourish gloriously and her worth was waited upon by much prosperitie as was seen when the Venetians went in companie of the French to the business of the Levant and after many noble warlike actions they took the City and Empire of Constantinople of which acquisition the Commonwealth had so great a share as that their Dukes did then assume the title of Signoridella quarta parte é Mezza di tutto L' Imperio della Romania And soon after with the like prosperous success they did by sundry means reduce many Islands and chief Maritime Towns under their obedience and the Commonwealth marched on apace to greater power and command But this course of glorie and victorie by War was much slackened by the original Customs and Orders of the City as has been said which related more to Peace and Merchant affairs then to War Insomuch as the Venetians seemed for a while to make use of these new acquisitions rather for the better accomodation of their Navigation and Traffick then for any occasion of other enterprises Their business did therefore infinitely increase at this time insomuch as there was not any City famous for merchandizing in the Levant whither the Venetian Ships and Merchants did not flock Nay a great number of men of that Nation did usually remain in those Cities through whose hands the most precious Merchandise of those Countries past to the great advantage of the City and of her private Citizens So as the Genoeses plying the same places at first a certain rivalship and emulation arose amongst them as well for the profit of merchandizing as for the expertness and glory of Sea affairs till at last they came to open and cruel War which kept the Commonwealth so busied and perplexed by disturbing Navigation and even private affairs as for a long while they had no leasure to undertake other enterprises though they had met with opportuity for it and that they had been thereunto disposed For the Venetians having sundry times hazarded their Fleets upon the doubtful event of Battel they tasted both prosperous and adverse fortune insomuch as they were to fight in their own Gulf not more for Empire then for the safety of the City Thus whilst the Commonwealth spent her best years partly in these private affairs and merchandizing business partly in the so long and troublesome Wars against the Genoeses another Power arose in the Levant much greater and more formidable then was the Grecian Empire For the Ottaman Lords beginning by divers accidents but chiefly by reason of the discords among Christians to make notable and successful progress in their rising Empire grew quickly very great and powerful not onely by Land but also by Sea having reduced the City of Constantinople into their hands a very fit place for Sea enterprises whereby the Commonwealth of Venice was not onely bereft of all hopes of further increasing their Dominion by Sea having so great and powerful an â—nemy to near at hand but even what they had already got was exposed to hazard so as being to maintain a bitter and difficult War and to manage it with unequal Forces against this their sore and perpetual adversarie she had more reason to think upon her own defence then by force of Arms to win what belonged to others Let us in the next place consider the conditions of the nearest neighboring people amongst which she was to inlarge her Confines whereby we may also know what difficulties the Commonwealth met with for at the very first she was to overcome the Dalmatians a Nation not onely very valiant but of a quick wit given to sedition and desirous of novelties Whence how great her difficulties were in quelling these may be conceived by this that the Commonwealth of Rome having so many and so far distant Nations yet could she never handsomely put the yoke upon Dalmatia which never was under the Roman Empire until the time of Qctavius Augustus but had still before notably indamaged the Roman Armies It is then no wonder that the state of a Commonwealth should be less which had to contend with such Enemies and who may not know by the actions of this Commonwealth that she rather wanted occasion then worth for the further encreasing her State and fortune Let us now likewise consider the condition of the times wherein the Common-wealth of Rome had her happy beginnings and made the first progress to her Empire Which we shall find to differ much and to be free of the so many difficulties which the Venetians met with Rome had not at her first rise any powerful neighboring Prince for the Assyrians had then the Monarchie whose confines did not extend beyond Asia and after the concourse of many years it was carried by Cyrus amongst the Persians with whom it remained for about Two hundred years till it was destroyed by Alexander of Macedon who though he made greater conquests and made his Forces be felt and dreaded much further off yet dying young in the height of his Victories he could not get into Europe nor afford the Romans occasion of making trial of their Forces with a powerful and valiant Prince And by his death he having left no issue either legitimate or illegitimate behind him that Monarchie was soon destroyed and his Empire was divided between his chief Commanders so as several Kingdoms were thereout framed with which severally the Romans did afterwards much to their advantage make War So as Asia having then been the chiefest Seat of the Empire the Provinces of Europe were not at that time any waies annoied by the power thereof and those that were further from thence as was Italy less then the rest But Greece which was then in high esteem for the excellencie of her Inhabitants genius for what concerned both Civil and Military vertues was divided into many several Peopledoms who contending within themselves for the dignitie both of the soveraigntie of that very
friendship with Caesar which was offer'd them with so much advantage to themselvs but had taken up Arms to defend and preserve for that King their Friend and Confederate the State of Milan little mindful of such a service as the usual affections of other men are seldom found amongst Princes conspires her ruine and tuâ—ns those Arms against her which through their friendship were grown so powerful in Italy What should move him thereunto Not desire of revenge for there appeared no injury Not any fear of his own affairs for he had found them already very constant unto them No self-interest for he ought to have been jealous of Caesars greatness who had been his perpetual Enemy and to have wished well unto the Venetians who had been his antient Friends But what shall I say of the rest Had not Caesar the like obligations to the Venetians as the King of France had which should have kept him from such a confederacie Nay had he not peculiar respects which counsell'd him to the contrary The injuries which the French had done to the Empire the King of France his particular hatred to him the high aspiring thoughts of that King pernicious to the dignity of the Empire and to the German liberty Wherefore as he could never promise himself safe and firm friendship from the French so be ought rather to have obviated their power then have help'd to advance it But who could have expected that such an action should have proceeded from the admired wisdom of Ferdinand King of Spain so unusual and so harmful to himself by reason of the prejudice and danger which he was to receive in not preserving the State which he had won in the Kingdom of Naples in peace and quiet For which cause the greatness of the French their fidelity and natural desire of novelty ought to have been â—â—spected by him yet he assented to the increase of their power and of his own danger But how did those generous thoughts which Pope Iulius the Second seemed to bear to the greatness and liberty of Italy correspond with his joining in confederacie with the Transaâ—pine Princes who went about to oppress her by the ruine of that Commonwealth which was confest by all men to be at that time the Maintainer of the Glory of Italy and the hope that she might again rise to her antient greatness and reputation What safety could the Apostolick Sea expect by increasing the power of those Princes in Italy who were great of themselves whom he feared and upon whose authority he foresaw the Popes of Rome must depend These certainly were such things as did transcend whatsoever could have faln into the imagination of the Venetian Senators or of any other men how wise soever Nor was the immensity of the danger less nor less able to molest and confound the minds of those who were to prepare for resistance against so great a War The King of France his Forces were of themselves very powerful that Kingdom being then more flourishing then it had been for many years before and become more formidable by the possession which the French had got of the Dukedom of Milan which afforded them mighty conveniencies to assault the Coâ—fines of the Common-wealth And though Caesars Forces were not of themselves greatly considerable yet were they increased by the fame he gave out that he led his Army into Italy to make a certain and noble prey thereof and with a mind to restore the Empire to its almost lost greatness whereby he reconciled the mindes of the German Princes and people and got them to joyn their Forces with his Moreover the King of Spains Naval preparation was in particular to be feared to prevent the which those Sea-Forces of the Commonwealth were to be imployed which should all of them have been imployed in defending the State by Land from so fierce an assault The Pope added no small reputation to the League by his authority and his Spiritual arms being accompanied with Temporal forces became the more dreadful And though the other petty Princes forces were but small yet was their will to offend the Commonwealth great and the Kings of England Poland and Hungary were sought unto and sollicited by all these together to join with them and to declare enmity to the Venetians If then the Venetians had yielded to this so new and great preparation for War which like Thunder made both its noise and harm be heard and felt at once what could have been said unto them Ought not they to have been judged worthy of excuse and their Commonwealth free from the imputation that their Orders were no ways good For as an object of immensurable force does not move but corrupt the sense so the encountring with so weighty a conspiracie was a thing not likely to incite the Commonwealth to shew her vertue but rather to disorder and to confound her Yet it is seen how she behaved herself upon such an occasion and whether it may be inferred from these her first counsels as from a thing that was in her own power that she was not worth much or that she did any thing unworthy of herself of her fame or of the reputation which she held amongst other potent Princes of that Age. What appearance was there in her of any fear or rather what greater sign could be desired in her of generous confidence and most noble daring What did she resolve to yield up of free-will What noise what complaints were heard which shewed that she would terminate that contention with vain words which could not be ended but with Arms The Answer which was given to the French Herald who came to denounce unto them that the King was upon his march in Arms against the Commonwealth was onely that that War was intimated them from the King when they had more reason to expect Amity and Peace from him but that they would not be wanting to their own defence being confident that they should be able to defend themselves by their own Forces and through the right of their cause The effects were answerable to their words for they betook themselves forthwith to provide for so great a War The most expert Commanders were sent for from all parts veteran Soldiers mustered in all places in so great numbers and so qualified as it was agreed upon by the common consent of all that neither that Age nor any other for many years before had seen such an Army of meer Italians in Italy Great and very miraculous was the union and concord both in the Senate and City wherewith men of all conditions and ages to lend their helping hand to assist their Country at so great a need There appeared so great a zeal in every one to the common good such resolution to maintain the state and liberty of the Commonwealth even to the last gasp as those who have appeared to be no very good friends to the Venetians in other things do praise these proceedings being forced so
and facilitate their undertakings then did the reputation of their victory Amidst so great amazement and astonishment nothing was left unattempted by Luigi Gritti and Christofero Moro who were the Provedatori del Campo to uphold the Commonwealths fading fortune They betook themselves to rally the remainder of the Army they comforted the Captains and Soldiers with hope of better success they intreated the Nobility and people of Brescia and of other Cities that being mindful of their Loyalties and of other things done in service to the Commonwealth in former Wars had with Philip Maria Visconte they would be like themselves and with like constancy keep themselves under the moderate command of the Venetians and abhorring the severe Transalpine Dominion they would with one onely inconvenience free themselves from many grievous mischiefs But they were all so possest with a Panick fear as no entreaties nor reason could be listned unto those who had escaped the Battel were unfit either for strength or valor to attempt any thing against the Enemy no disposition to defence was found in the City no not so much as to keep themselves from plunder there were but few Forts at that time in the State and those few of no condition of holding out long What was then to be done to whom was any recourse to be had If all Princes and Countries were become Enemies who were to be trusted If all memory of former benefits were laid aside so as least gratitude was found in those who had been most obliged how could new men be raised and provisions made for a new War The armed Enemy was already at the gates nay even within their houses threatning assured ruine What was to be done in such a general dispait but to give way and suffer the cloud to pass which they saw there was neither wit nor counsel sufficient to withstand And as sometimes it falls out in greatest Tempests that the skill and labor of the Marriners being overcome by the malignity of the weather they take down their sails and suffer the ship to drive up and down whithersoever the Sea carries it So in cases of greatest danger into which States do sometimes fall he that sits at the helm must comply with his fortune be it never so bad till the fury of those tempests being past over the Commonwealth though born down yet not quite sunk may rise again and make way for her pristine greatness The Army being then to retreat and the loss of the City drawing other losses after it as one stone that gives against another it was thought the best course to free the people from their former oathes so to preserve them from sacking and plunder which they must have undergone if they should maintain their loyalties and to free themselves from the tax of rebellion if they should submit to the Enemy Such a resolution might appear willing and therefore less generous but it was really necessary prejudicial to him who doth consider meerly the present condition of things but which might prove useful in the future At first sight it appeared to proceed from rashness and fear and yet it proceeded from wisdom from charity and in respect to the good of the State and of the Subjects The piety nor prudence of the Senate could not admit of the onely hope which was offered in this sad condition of times to be used for withstanding so many enemies wherefore the Venetians did magnanimously refuse those helps and assistances which were offered them by the Turks though but little before as some writers affirm they had been very much sought unto by other Christian Princes as by Frederick of Aragon and Lodovicâ—â— Sforza for the defence of their Dominions and not long after by the Emperor Maximilian to be made use of against the Venetians but neither did the justly conceived anger against so many conspiring Princes nor the desire of recovering what was lost prevail with those most wise and religious men but that it was over-born with the zeal of Religion and with a firm resolution of preserving the glory of their other atchievements against the Infidels immaculate neither would the reason of State if well-understood considered in the example of others suffer them so to do and especially in the unfortunate success of the Emperors of Constantinople who having unadvisedly call'd in to their assistance the Ottoman Princes who were much more powerful then they had drawn a greater ruine upon themselves which proved the occasion of the fall of that Empire But being unwilling notwithstanding to give over all hopes of accommodating the afflicted condition of affairs with some ease the Senate resolved to have recourse to the Pope and to Caesar though they had then appeared their bitter Enemies to treat of some Agreement They were moved much hereunto by the respect and reverence due to that holy See and the pious and religious apprehension they had of Ecclesiastical censures to which they were subject and they trusted more in prevailing with Caesar then with the King of France For what hopes were there to do any good by intreaties with him who being first bound to the Common-wealth by obligation and confederacie had spurn'd at all those respects out of meer desire of novelties To these then they granted all that they pretended unto for being to make them quickly jealous of the King of France his greatness they knew some way would be found out for the Commonwealths better fortune But how is it possible to pass over here in silence another thing not at all differing from this by which such base aspersions have been endeavored to be cast upon the Venetians since by this our present discourse we go about to vindicate them by searching into the truth We read in Guicchiardine a Modern and to give him his due in many things an excellent Historian an Oration published by him in the name of Antonio Iustiniano sent by the Commonwealth to Caesar wherein it is said that the Venetians begging pardon at Caesars hand with much subjection and servility of mind did offer to submit the Commonwealth to be perpetually tributary to the Empire and to acknowledg to hold their liberty lives and livelihood from him with some other base unworthy expressions not only not true but not likely to be so For first it is very certain that Iustinian being sent Ambassador to Maximilian and finding him at Trent was never admitted to have audience peradventure for fear of offending the Confederates and making of them jealous Then it is most certain that the Senate gave no such Commission And let him who will not believe it listen but to reason and then he will be perswaded to the contrary The Commonwealth had then lost all her Territories by Land but at the same time she enjoyed all her State by Sea wherein were not only one or two Cities but divers Provinces and noble Kingdoms their Naval accoutrements were very great and equal if not superior to those of whatsoever
it yet more questionable whether strong Holds be a greater safety or weakening to a State and where there are many and very great ones the doubt is made the greater since so many Soldiers must be imployed in their defence as if the Prince be not very powerful he shall hardly find Forces sufficient to keep several Armies as they may be termed on foot some within the Forts and some in the Campagnia Nor can it be made good that strong Holds are of themselves sufficient to secure the whole State for though they may entertain the Enemy for a while and stop the first brunt of an impetuous assault yet at last unless they be back'd with Forces from without and timely succored and relieved being overcome either by power length of time or necessity they must yield and fall into the power of the Enemy which cannot be denied no not by the very Professors and Favorers of Fortification And yet it cannot be denied but if a Prince have sufficient Forces to keep the Field in his own Country he may thereby keep himself from being injured for men do not easily put things to hazard where they think to meet with stout opposition and the only opinion and reputation of such Forces is able to keep off the greatest dangers For the Enemy who did design to assault such a State becomes jealous and doubtful nor is he bold enough to enter far into such a State as is guarded by a good Army and chiefly in situations such as are almost in all Countries as are naturally fortified by Hills Vallies or Rivers where it is hard to enter and harder to retreat And if any well experienced Captain command over such Forces he will be likely enough to defeat the Enemy without endangering himself by keeping him from victuals and so imployed and busied in sunâ—ry ways as he shall neither be able to keep long in the Country nor much less imploy himself in the taking or sacking of any Cities since he knows he is hourly subject to surprisals and to be ruâ—n'd and strong Holds securing nothing but those quarters where they are situated they do not secure the State if they be but a few and if many they require all the Forces for their own defence and leave the Enemy master of the Field to the Prince his prejudice and the Peoples despair So also if they be but little ones and incapable of such Works and so many men as are requisite to make them hold out long they and the Soldiers which defend them are lost and if they be great and contain large plots of ground as is most in fashion in these days they may be more perfect in themselves but they need so many men to defend them as those Forces which ought to be imployed for the safeguard of the whole Country or a great part thereof are bounded within a little compass in defence of some City or Ciâ—adel And yet these very Soldiers when drawn out into the Field may do much better service for being fashioned into the body of an Army they become as it were a moveable Fort which secures at once many Cities and a great Tract of Country nay by these the Enemy is much â—â—damaged and the troubles and danger of War are kept far from a mans own home For as hath been said diversions and preventions may be made by these Forces they may be carried into another mans State and set another mans hoâ—se on fire before it take head in ones own house but he who placeth his safety in strong Holds puts himself into a condition of being at his Enemies disposal in whose will it lies to choose what shall make most for his advantage with great prejudice to the opposing party For he may either pass by the Forâ—s over-ruâ— the Country enrich his Soldiers by booty impoverish the Subjects of that Country which is assaulted and cannot be releived by reason that the Forces thereof are disperst and imploid in the defence of the strong Holds or if he will make any certain archievement he may sit down before any Fort and without indangering his own men whilst he shall live upon the Enemies Territories he may in time take it by siege and effect his own desires for as hath been said no strong Hold can promise it self long safety where no succour is ready at hand But let us come a little closer to the business and let us suppose that these strong Holds may be brought to such a condition as they may be assuredly able to resist any open force which shall come against them and not be deceived in that their beleef as often times they are How can they secure themselves from treacherie and from such dangers as they may be subject unto by the negligence of Soldiers or falsehood of the Commanders that have the custodie thereof in which case the Princes danger is so much the greater and more irreparable for that his Enemy is in the Dominions in a well munited seat from whence he cannot hope to drive him without much labor and difficultie But in greater Cities wherein are a multitude of people and where these cautions and suspitions are not to be found others no whit inferior to these do arise for such quantities of victuals is requisite to feed the many men that are therein inclosed as no Prince is able to provide for so as may serve them for a long time and if this fail to what end serves Walls Weapons or Soldiers To this may be added that the safety of such strong Holds does in a great part depend upon the pleasure of the people who being of themselves naturally fickle do often favor forein Princes out of very slight reasons and sometimes out of a meer desire of noveltie and plot by sedition and by open force against the present State and deliver themselves and the City into another mans power And though they may afterwards repent themselves of their folly they know not how to mend it when a powerful Army is within the City Walls nor can this be done by him who defends the State because he cannot keep so many Forces together as are able to defend several places at â—nce and because loving his Subjects as a legitimate Prince ought to do he is loath to destroy a City of his own though whole Armies be therein But if the State be open and not pestred with Fortifications though it may the more easily be lost by sudden assaults or by ill affected Subjects it will be the more easily regained and as soon as the Prince who is deprived thereof shall have means to rallie his Forces which by misfortune may have been beaten he soon makes head again and recovers what he had lost the Enemy not having any safe hold wherein to abide And of this there are many apparent examples If the Commonwealth of Venice in the times of her greatest calamitie had had her State in Terra firma so well provided of strong
over-run but not gotten returned to the obedience of its former Lords now by degrees from time to time they have by their Forts so confirmed themselves in the possession of such places as they have once taken as the Persians being a people little verst in the expugning of strong Holds have but small hopes of ever driving them out from such spacious Territories first gotten by force of Arms and afterwards by such means maintained by them by a safe possession secured unto them So as the use of Fortresses are sometime according as place and occasion shall serve of no smal service not only to peâ—tie Princes but even to the greatest But as for the number of these strong Holds for the time form and other accident which ought to be observed in the building of them no such certain rule can be given as can serve all men at all times Only this may be said that a wise Prince ought to consider herein not only what he designs to do but what his Estate and what his Forces are otherwise that which was intended for a cure and sustenance may prove poison and ruin to the State As when a Prince will make such and so many Forresses as that by reason of too great and inconsiderate expence in time of Peace in maintaining them he must of himself consume then that will prove true which hath formerly been considered that a Prince of no great fortune not being able to garrisonise or furnish so many Fortresses with things necessary not to draw forth the body of a well-adjusted Army into the field in greatest danger of War will find he hath not secured but increased his own dangers and hath put the total of his affairs in great disorder and confusion Fortresses then as all other things in a well ordered Government ought to be disposed of with good judgment and a well regulated temper 〈◊〉 as their number and greatness may be proportionable to the condition of the State and of the Prince his Forces They must not be placed idly in all places but only upon the Frontiers and in places fit for that purpose and so as the natural situation of the place may assist Art as much as may be and be also thereby assisted for such Fortresses may be maintained in greater security and with fewer Soldiers But above all things all possible care must be had that in time of greatest need they may be succor'd for no Fort can hold out long against a great force unless it be supplied by new Garrisons Munitions and with all other necessaries It is also very advantagious for Fortresses that there be good store of good Earth or Mould within them whereby they may several ways accommodate themselves for defence according as the approaches to take them are made and also to have ready opportunity to use the benefit of many retrears and to gain time which is the proper and grearest conveniencie for Fortresses So as if fitting provisions and respects be had Fortresses so built will prove advantagious for a Prince or State not only in the opinion of Soldiers but even of Statesmen But when they are made without judgment or art it is not the â—ault of the Work but of him who knows not how to use it if such good effects do not ensue thereupon as are desired Which happens not only in strong Holds but in all other things which being ill used lose their efficacie Thus then those arguments are easily answered by these distinctions and by what hath been alleadged in the behalf of strong Holds which might at first occasion any doubt For the Art of Fortification ought not to be despised because it hath not alwaies been the same rather it ought to be so much the more esteemed because we see it grows every day to greater perfection by new inventions and by experiences Thus it fares also with the Art of building of Ships and Houses with that of Sculpture Physick Painting and of all other excellent Disciplines which Experience being the best Introductress did not arrive at such excellencie and estimation suddenly but in process of time And notwithstanding this Art of Fortification hath in this our Age gotten some more setled Rules and as a man may say more certain Principles since the use of Batteries and of other manner of Attaques introduced by modern men whereby she doth govern herself in the whole and in every one of her particular members in form distance proportion of parts and in other things which are alwaies the same where the seat will permit it Variety of noble Wits have added so much of ornament and of perfection of late to this noble Profession as all doubts which may be put whether there be a true Art thereof or no are evidently cleered And though sometimes she may vary by reason of the diversity of situations or by any other accidents which cannot be comprised within one and the same Rule this ought not to detract from the dignity of the Artificers thereof then it doth from the Polititian who certainly is the chiefest Archiâ—ector in all our Civil operations to proceed by probable arguments and oftentimes alter his advice that he may fit his actions to the circumstances which do accompany them Nor doth it follow that such an Art should be the worse thought of because it doth not alwaies compass its end which is the preservation of such a City or such a Country where such Fortifications are erected since that likewise depends upon various accidents which no humane art or wisdom is able to foresee nor when foreseen to provide alwaies by any industry a due remedy against them It may as well be said men ought to forbear building of Ships and deprive themselves thereby of the Traffick and Commerce which is held with far distant Countries because many Ships perish in the Seas The Physitians care doth not alwaies cure the sick party the Orator doth not alwaies compass his ends by his perswasive oratory Ought men therefore to forbear Navigation Physick or Perswasion If a wicked and persidious man betray a Fort unto the Enemy which was recommended to his trust ought this to be attributed to the evil and imperfection of Forts What thing is there so good as may not be abused by wicked men 't is only Vertue which hath this priviledg all other adorments of Humanitie would be exâ—inct and expell'd the World If a Fort be lost for being badly garrisoned ill defended or by some other sinister accident ought the fault which is committed by the Prince his negligence the Commanders ignorance or by the Soldiers cowardise be laid upon the defect of the Fort which is of it self well made But say I beseech you are such disorders and dangers as may arise in a State by want of care in a Prince by the perâ—idiousness of Commanders or cowardise of Soldiers become so peculiar to Forts and Citadels as the same by the same occasion may not happen in Armies and
that Kingdom as he did being more encouraged thereunto by the weakness and backwardness of the Imperialists who if when they had done their utmost had done nothing at all and the Turks knowing that Charls the Emperor being imploâ—ed in other very considerable Wars would not be alwaies able to afford his Brother so great assistance was not this a great incitement to them quickly to renew the War to the greater prejudice and danger not onely of Hungary which Ferdinand laid claim unto but even to the like of Ferdinands own Territories and not long after the fact it self shewed what might have been foreseen by reason for Solyman could not onely not be perswaded to quit the protection which he had taken of his Pupil King Steven but before he should come to any accord with Ferdinand demanded tribute from Austria and the conditions both of the War and Peace growing daily worse and worse the greatest part of Hungary being lost after the notable discomfitures of the German Armies at Essechlo and Buda and the other part continuing still in great danger the certain loss was known which did redound unto them by not hazarding a Battel at this time when the fears and hopes were at least alike on both sides But say that this had been too rash or too difficult a thing to have been effected what hindred them or disswaded them from passing through their own Countries and marching with their Army to between Dava and Sava a Country which had not at all been prejudiced by the late Wars and therefore fit to furnish their Army with victuals and where there are many mountainous seats which were advantagious for the Imperialists and incommodious for the Turks in respect of their Cavalry whereby they might have preserved two Provinces which were Patrimonâ—al States of the House of Austria and therefore ought to have been the more carefully kept Carinthia and Stiria which being abandoned were left a secure prey unto the â—urks who utterly destroyed them by fire and sword endangering likewise the loss of some of their chief Cities for the way would have been block'd up and kept Solyman from coming thither if it had been first possessed by the Imperialists and Solymans reputation would have been much lessened if he had tarried behind leaving that Country untouched which he was come to assault with so great an Army But to do as the Imperialists did to keep so many men with so great a Train of Artâ—llery and all necessaries for War barely to defend one City which lay not open but was begiâ—t with walls which was held to be a strong Forâ—ress and which being but meanly provided of men had formerly repulsed great Turkish forces what was it but by this new and prejudicial example to confirm the Turks and even our own men in the opinion that the Christian Militia was inferior to that of the Turks and that our Princes being intent upon their own defence and not without some fear to imploy their utmost endeavors therein were for their parts to suffer the Turks to enjoy their large Empire in peace and safety Which the Ottoman Princes have brought to so vast a greatness not by letting their Forces lie idle and by being content to defend that Title which they had gotten at first but by going every where to find out the Enemy fighting him upon all occasions and by making their way by their swords into other mens Countries How oft have the Turks entred into the Consinus of Persia nay wrought themselves in even to her inmost parts chiefly intending to come to a day of fight with the Persians Armies which they have often enected though the Persians were rather to be feared then to be despised for their antient honor in War and for the manner of their Militia and yet at last they have in these last Wars got safe possession of the chiefest part of this most noble Kingdom What then is more to be said but that if this way of proceeding have proved prosperous to those that have walked therein he who takes another way walks on towards destruct on and either through ignorance or too great a thirst after quiet and secuâ—ity involves himself into greater troubles and difficulties And though the loss be made by peece-meal which may peradventure make it appear the less yet at last the whole falls into more certain though a later ruine And to speak of more modern affairs how had not only the Commonwealth of Venice but several other States of Christian Princes been preserved from the Turkish power and insolencie if the Leagues Fleet shunning all occasion of fight had retreated without that famous Victory of Lepaâ—â—â— But it was afterwards more cleerly seen that Charls his intent on in this War was far from joining battel with the Turks either that he would not hazard his glory and honor or manifestly confess himself interior to Solyman in Forces when Hungary and Austria being assaulted at another time by the same Solyman in stead of succoring of assisting his Brother who was in emient danger he went to try new adventures in Africa of a much more inconsiderable nature If a day of Battel be ever to be had what else was there to be done to keep off the ruine which doth threaten Christendom every day more and more He who hazards may lose but he may also win And he who stands idly and does nothing whilst he endeavors security by useless means does by degrees daily fall into new dangers and doth as it were voluntarily but for certain basely submit himself to the yoke of a grievous and unworthy slavery If Germany and Italy had been so forward to furnish men and monies for this enterprise the authority of so great a Prince who was the chief Author and Head thereof being considered as upon other occasions which did happen not long after these assistances might have been sooner hoped for When were the whole Forces of Germany seen so united as they were at this time Nay it was rather to be doubted that many seeds of discord were to grow which were already spread abroad throughout this Province by reason of Religion and State-policie whereby Germany might be weakned and divided From whence then was there any good to be hoped for against this so formidable Enemy if so great a preparation for war proved altogether vain and useless The condition of present Times and of long Custom will not suffer us now to hope that we may see what formerly fell out in that famous Councel of Clerement that at the words of an Hermite at the bare exhortations of a Pope Christian Princes and people should readily take up Arms against the Infidels being content for bond of firm union to be all of them signed with the sign of the Cross. But now when any such thing is treated of such disputes are made upon every point every one looks so much to their own particular ends not measuring things aright nor minding the common
they have endeavored to have taken some of the Towns or Forts which were held by the Turks by assault and carry the perjudice home to him who would have brought it to them in the defence of another man Let us examine all these things by considering the last proposition In what place should the Imperial Army have incamped which would not have been very incommodious for them and far off they were not yet absolutely possest of divers Cities upon the Frontiers of Hungary as they were afterwards But let us argue the business in general if the place were weak which they should assault what honor should they win thereby Or would the advantage of such an acquisition have been answerable to the expence and to the expectation had of such an Army Besides such purchases are to little purpose for such places are soon regained by him who is master of the field and if the Imperialists would have attempted the taking of any strong place and should not have effected it soon and easily to how great danger did their Army expose it self they must either raise their siege with loss of honor and with those other bad consequencies which follow in such like cases or else they must keep their station and be cut in peeces when a powerful Turkish Army should come and find the Imperialists scattered and busied about the taking in of strong Holds as afterwards fell out upon the like occasion of Buda which might teach Commanders with what temper they are to proceed when they fall upon such affairs and when they have to do with a potent Enemy But it may be yet more strongly urged that whilst the Turkish Forces should keep themselves safe and inire the Imperialists had but little hopes of keeping what they should happily have gotten Were not Modonâ— and Corone recovered from the Turks by the Imperial Forces under the Ensigns of the same Charls yet these very Towns were soon after abandoned and forsaken because they knew they were not able to maintain them against the Turkish pussant Forces Have not the Imperialists and Spaniards made oft-times many attempâ—s in Africa and had good success therein Yet in whose possession are these very places now which were gotten with so much charge and danger Did not the Turks soon repossess themselves of those places from whence they were driven The League made against the Turks in the year 1537. wherein the same and forces of the same Emperor Charls were interessed did it not 〈◊〉 Castel 〈◊〉 a Fortress fit for their greatest designs But how long were we able to keep it though it were strongly garrisoned These experiences may serve to shew that the good gotten by such cost and labor hath not at last proved any thing save dishonor in forgoing what was gotten But to fall upon the other head If the Imperial Army should have continued incamped in any strong situation of the Enemy which they might have taken without attempting any thing more how would it have been in any better condition then it was when incamp'd before Vienna rather on the contrary the danger was greater and more evident of falling into mighty disorder especially for want of victuals by their going from the Banks of 〈◊〉 from whence alone they could have been safely and opporâ—â—â—ely furnished therewithal for they were to provide for the victualing of a great many and the Enemy did abound in Horse whereby their succors might have been cut off It may peradventure be alleadged that they might have preserved a great tract of Country from the inrodes plunder and firing made by the Turks But first they were not certain to make this advantage the Country being large and exposed to such accidents as these nor were they able without dividing their Forces to supply all places And the Turks seeing this place well guarded if they should have taken their way above the Danubius as they did beneath it towards the Alps finding the fields more large and open in those parts in Moravia Silesia and Austria they might have made larger inrodes and with less danger whereas having quartered themselves in the mountainous situations of Stiria and Carinthia they might at least revenge the injury and in some sort preserve their honor by killing many of them who being disbanded were gone to pillage the Country It is commonly advantagious to advance towards the Confines of a State where the Passes are narrow and difficult either by the ruggedness of the situations or by reason of â—orts upon their Frontiers so as the Enemy may be by these advantages kept afar off But what was there in King Ferdinands States which could perswade him to take this course the Country being large open and where many Armies would not have been sufficient to have kept out an Army which was resolved to enter as these did But it may be said again that this was not a loss which would counterpoise as might very well have happened by reason of their own inconveniencies the breaking up of that Army whereon the defence of King Ferdinands States did relie and which was of so great a concernment to all Christendom And it may be also added that the further the Imperialists had advanced whereby they might the better have met with the Enemy and have fought him if they should not afterwards have done it their fear would have appeared to have been so much the greater and that they had repented to have proceeded so far whereby they should not only no have increased but have lessened the reputation of the force and worth of that Army But for what concerned their marching forward to encounter the Enemy with a resolution of giving him battel at his own home at which the Considerations made to the contrary do seem chiefly to aim it is business of so weighty and so numerous consequences as it deserves to be well examined It is a general Rule That it is requisite the Assailant should have greater Forces then he who is assailed or at least equal Forces And is there any one so blinded with desire as that he does not see the Imperialists disadvantage in this behalf Solyman brought with him an Army consisting of One hundred and forty thousand fighting men and almost as many men more for other Camp-occasions furnished with Artillery and all other Requisites for War an Army verst in Victories and which was then to fight in the sight of their Lord and Master a fortunate and valiant Prince and who are promised by their Law that whosoever dies fighting for his welfare and glory shall be eternally rewarded in heaven An opinion which hath much advantaged the Turkish affairs in point of War Entire obedience excellent military discipline patient undergoing all wants and great toil and labor are things whereunto the Turkish Armies are accustomed in vertue whereof it is and not by chance that they have had so many victories And it was the opinion of all men that these things did at this time
though in great parties to pillage the Enemâ—es Country the business not being any thing alike the Turks had the disadvantage of the Countries situation of being loaded with prey of being in disorder as commonly befals those who go to plunder not to fight and of other accidents But besides all this he who relates this business mentions not any baseness in the Turks but saies That notwithstanding these disadvantages they defended themselves generously to the utmost of their power But what did the same Solyman who cannot be denied to have been very valiant and greatly experienced in matter of War though he had all the advantages that have been mentioned he did not advance with his Army as near as as he might have done nor did endeavor to enforce others nor to be enforced himself to fight but rather went out of his direct way which he had taken to come to Vienna and kept for the most part in strong and commodious seats as between the two Rivers of Sava and Drava and iâ— a powerful and van glorious Prince who professed that he had undertaken that War meerly out of a desire of glory would make use of haesitatious counsels where the consequences were so great and so heavie how would it have becomed Charls a Prince no less wise then valiant and who was necessituted by many other important affairs of some other States of his to leave Germany suddenly as he did to have put himself upon the dubious events of Battel whereby to indanger almost his whole Fortune When Marius was sent against the Cymbrians who were faln down into Italy which was thought to be as considerable a War as any that the Romans had made the same circumstances concurring thereunto whereby to infuse terror as do now to make the Turkish Forces so formidable as crueltie barbarism the great number of the Enemy and the fame of the victories which they had won the wise Commander would not though many occasions had offered themselves and that he was taxed by the unexperienced of timerousness come to a pitch'd field with such an Enemy till for many moneths space he had kept the Army accustomed to the performance of duties and to Military actions and chiefly till he had acquainted them with the aspect of the Enemy and how to have the bettâ—r of them in light skirmishes which were not notwithstanding attempted but upon great advantage And if Caear used to prevent the Enemy and to be the first that should assault it is to be considered that he commanded a veteran Army of whom he had by long Wars had much experience So as the same example is not to be made use of in a new and tumultuous Army and of so different conditions But let us likewise consider what were the reasons which made these two Princes take up Arms for by the first rise of Wars the reason of their administration and the good means whereby to conduce them to a good end is best known The War was offensive on the Turks behalf undertaken with great surquedrie and with great hopes of victory and glory Solyman having propounded unto himself to revenge the injuries done by Ferdinand then King of Bohemia to Iohn King of Hungary who reigned under his Guardianship and protection But whether this was his true intention or no or but pretended that he might possess himself of the Kingdom of Hungary as afterwards he did it was most certain that he could not compass his end of beating the Forces of these two Austrian Brothers Charls and Ferdinand Caesar on the other side being usually distracted and busied as now in particular in other Wars had betaken himself to this to defend the assaults which were threatned his Brothers Territories as also the honor of his family or rather that of all Germany or to confine ones self to narrower bounds it may be said that this contention of War did paâ—ticularly concern the oppugning and the defence of the City of Vienna Soâ—yman who had formerly little to his honor been driven from before the walls of that City professed to return thither with greater Forces being firmly resolved to reduce it to his power and to challenge the Emperor to a pitch'd Battel Charls on the contrary having brought his Forces about that City had propounded unto himself the keeping of it and to frustrate this so great furie and boasting of Solymans Now then whilst Vienna was preserved and that she was kept free from all dangers and that Solyman was so curbed and frightned by the Imperialists Forces as that he duâ—st not advance or make good his word which he had publickly professed did not the Imperialists effect the business they had taken in hand without the effusion of blood Did they not preserve their own honor and do service to all Christendom If this Army as the success of Bittel is more uncertain and dubious then any whatsoever other humane action had received any noâ—able defeat when would this wound have ever been cured The afflicted body of Christendom must have its wounds long kept open and have still ulâ—â—cerated more and more How would Caesars particular Enemies have been encouraged to fall upon his Territories and to have endangered and molested his own particular affairs whilst he should have shewed courage enough but little good counsel in defending another mans right which did not immediately concern himself Had the Tâ—rks in former times been made retreat to their own Confines as now they were without having made any acquâ—sition they had not been masters of so many Christian Kingdoms as now they are And had their Forces proved still vain their Militia would have been imbased and they would have been discouraged from troubling others without any good to themselves which peradventure would have been the safest and securest way of weakning so great a power as that by temporizing affording them thereby occasion of growing idle and of falling into domestick disorders so as they might the more easily have received a blow and have been overcome both by cuning and force Nor will it avail to affirm the contrary as if the future dangers and troubles had been certainly to have happened or that they might have been made greater by a new commotion of War for it was more answerable to reason that when Solyman should have done his utmost with his whole Forces assisted by his own presence he would have suffered the Estates of Austria and of Germany to have remained quiet if King Ferdinand had rested content with his own Patrimonie and with the Kingdom of Bohemia together with the hopes of succeeding in the Empire without intricating himself in new troubles by obstinately maintaining his pretences to the Kingdom of Hungary drawing thereby the fury of the Turkish Forces upon him as he often did So as King Ferdinando and his Councellors are more to be blamed for those many mischiefs which ensued afterwards and for those which we are still threatned with by the so near neighborhood of