Selected quad for the lemma: conscience_n

Word A	Word B	Word C	Word D	Occurrence	Frequency Band	MI	MI Band	Prominent
conscience_n	law_n	sin_n	transgression_n	2,525	5	10.8527	5	true

Text snippets containing the quad

ID	Title	Author	Corrected Date of Publication (TCP Date of Publication)	STC	Words	Pages
A89345	Psychosophia or, Natural & divine contemplations of the passions & faculties of the soul of man. In three books. By Nicholas Mosley, Esq;	Mosley, Nicholas, 1611-1672.	1653 (1653)	Wing M2857; Thomason E1431_2; ESTC R39091	119,585	307

it is not Will longer than its free for that is it whereby it is distinguished from Appetite and whereby Man is disstinguisht from Sensitive and all other agents and made like unto God resembling him in his manner of working God workes not necessarily but freely so we what ever we work as men the same do we wittingly work and freely saith Mr. Hooker else our actions would neither he righteous nor sinful in themselves nor reward or punishment due unto us for the same for these do alwaies presuppose some thing done well or ill and that willingly and freely and because of this freedom of Will in Man onely Mans observation of the Law of his nature is righteousness onely Mans transgression sin righteousness and sin is imputed to none hut voluntary free Agents that might have done better or worse than they do Hence ariseth that conscience which is in every Man and not to be found in other Agents a conscience either accusing or excusing every Man for the good or evill he hath done though never so secretly for as much as he might have chosen whether he would have done it or no Every Mans heart and conscience saith Mr. Hooker doth in good or evill even secretly committed and known to none but it self either like or disalow it self and accordingly either rejoyce very nature exulting as it were in certain hope of reward or else grieve as it were in a Sense of future punishment And this ariseth from an innate freedom that is in all Rational creatures a freedom of willing and nilling those things which Reason judgeth good or evil This light of Reason and Understanding is in all men in all Intellectual creatures the wickedest Man that is wholly governed by the inferior Orbs by unruly passions which flow from Sense not by the dictates of a right Understanding hath so much of this Intellectual power which serves to struggle to combate and to fight with those powers of Sense and Appetite and though it seldom prevail yet it leaves a sting of conscience sticking like a thorn in the flesh because in doing evill he prefers and that wilfully a lesser good before a greater the greatness whereof is by reason investigable and may be known Known by an unregenerate man by the light of Natural Reason much more by a regenerate man enlightned by the Spirit of God which is an argument of the freedom of Will in all men the will is alwaies and in all men free free in it nature and essence though in it operations an accidental servitude is acquired by the Fall Man was created with a posse standi and posse cadendi without any servitude upon his Will and though his choice was evil and so he fell yet to will and to doe that which was good was more natural to him the Moral Law was writ in his heart and made connatural more easie it was for him to have kept than broke it though since the Fall the course of nature is changed from a posse standi or posse non cadendi to a non posse non cadendi from a liberty of standing to a necessity of sinning and all this by nature not in massa pura but in massa corrupta by the vitiosity of Nature an evill servitude and sad accident acquired by the Fall of man is more prone to evill than to doe good we may not say so properly naturaliter as accidentaliter the Will being wounded in its operations having an accidental servitude upon it so that now though to will be present with us yet how to perform we know not there is in the best so much predominancy of Sense and Appetite over Reason through evill habits and customes accrewed or the seeds of Original sin derived to them they many times doe contrary to what their Wills desire and their Reason presents as good according to that of the Apostle The good I would that do I not but the evill I would not that do I. CHAP. IX Of the Affections and Passions of the Soul Chap. 9. Book 1. IT remaineth to treat of the Affections and Passions which are incident to the Soul and are but as it were the sundry fashions and forms of the Appetitive soul which Aristotle sometimes calls Accidents sometimes Affections sometimes Passions of the Soul Affections as they are moderate natural and engendred with the soul and body are actions transient not permanent and so are neither vitious or evill in themselves nor ought nor can be removed from our nature which was the error of some Philosophers of the sect of the Stoicks Passions as they are inordinate and predominant and so are vitious and dangerous to the soul and both may and ought to be expelled such as fall not on a Philosopher that is to say a wise and virtuous man for virtus consistit in moderatione passionum therefore although to be angry is natural to every man and cannot be expelled the soul of any yet to be inordinate and immoderate in anger is the part of a fool and not of a wise man because where any inordinate Passions do bear rule they cloud the understanding and obscure the light of truth as thick clouds the light of the sun and therefore concludes Aristotle in the fourth of his Ethicks Mansuetus vult imperturbatus esse non duci à passione from a wise man all unruly and disordered passions are to be driven away This is the exhortation given by Philosophy it self to Boetius tu quoque si vis Lumine claro cernere verum Tramite recto carpere coelum Gaudia pelle pelle timorem Spemque fugato nec dolor assit Nubila mens est vinctaque fraenis Haec ubi regnant And though there be several other Affections and Passions of the Soul which are not here nominated but are notwithstanding in themselves as vitious as these yet these of Joy Fear Hope and Grief are the four Cardinal and chief Affections unto which all the rest may be reduced for there is no Affection but is in respect of some Good or Evill and that a Good or Evill present or Good and Evill absent Joy is an Affection of the Soul for a Good present Hope an Affection of the Soul for a Good absent and future Grief is for an Evill present Fear for an Evill absent and future which Affections as long as they be but rightly ordinate and subject nor may nor can be expelled being natural and good but when they grow heady sensual fleshy terrene set upon the lusts and pleasures of this stage-play world are vitious and hurtful which a wise man a virtuous will keep under and not suffer to range and rule for these are they which are properly called Passions when they grow exorbitant according to the definition of Aquinas Affectus est vehemens animi passio animum torquens verum judicium rationis impediens otherwise it is of these natural and ordinate Affections for they do neither animum