as we shewed Dr. Sanderson did when he speaketh of Doubting he must either say nothing to the purpose for he knows his Adversaries have given him Arguments which appear to them very probable why they Judge the things required unlawful Or else he must mean that if a Man hath any doubt and be not fully perswaded that the Action is unlawful though he hath never so many Arguments which make it appear to him probably such Notwithstanding them he is bound to do the thing Now if this be his Sence he saith that which is not to be made good by any but Mr. Hooker's Principles before spoken to and that which I will think never any Protestant spake before him For his Rule of Tene certum relinque incertum besides that it must be understood of the two parts of the same Proposition not of two distinct Propositions as he wrings it By his leave that is not uncertain of which we are Morally certain Nor 3. Is it certain or can be to any Soul either by Faith or Mathematically or Morally That the Superiour is in all things to be Obeyed Nay the contrary is certain Nor is it certain that he is to be Obeyed in things which the Inferiour upon Arguments which he judgeth very probable Judgeth unlawful for him to do For his confounding the Notions of Disputable and uncertain it is ridiculous for if all things disputable be therefore uncertain because they are disputed and that by some Learned Men too whether the particular Soul dispute them or no. There 's hardly an Article of our Faith will be left us certain or indeed any thing else but onely this That we must Obey our Superiours In the mean time Reader Observe whither these Modern Casuists are driving 1. There are few Actions he might have added Propositions too that are not Disputable Freeman p. 33. 2. In Disputable Actions we must Obey Superiours Commands ibid. p. 15. 3. Yea we must Obey though we doubt i. e. though upon Arguments which to us appear very probable we think the things unlawful to be done because it is certain saith Freeman That Superiours are to be Obeyed in things Lawful and in disputable things it is uncertain that what is required is unlawful 4. Ergo. There are very few Actions but if we be Commanded this or that part let our Consciences say what they will we must do as we are commanded § 19. These now are Doctrines not fit to be openly and plainly asserted in this Noon-day of Truth Therefore the particular Judgments of Private Persons Founded on Arguments which to them seem very probable and inferr a Moral certainty must be confounded with the Notions of Doubts Scruples Fears Jealousies Let this Doctrine obtain a little and let the World Judge if the exploded brutish odious Doctrine of Blind Obedience the Pillar and Basis of Popery be not by slight of hand established The Consequence of this Doctrine if true would be this That Men need no more look to Scripture to see whether an Action were Lawful or no but look upon it as the Will of God to believe as the Church believeth and do as their Superiours command without any regard to the command of God Of this more anon § 20. The Advantage of this Doctrine pretended is Peace by which they can mean no more than an outward Harmony in Action 2. The stretching the bounds of Morality For if two successive Superiours Command me the two contradictory parts of the same Proposition One Commands me to go to Church Another to tarry at home and I am bound to Obey in things disputable it must follow that all things in the World that are disputable are indifferent Now there being as Mr. Freeman saith few actions not Disputable It must follow that there are few Practical Propositions but a Man as to them may do what he list take what part he pleaseth so all things shall become Lawful But now the woful dis-advantage of it is that he who practiseth according to these Principles 1. Shall be sure to have no Peace in his Conscience but a continual regret within himself 2. He will be at last damned For saith the Apostle he that doubteth is damned if he eateth Rom. 14. Except somebody can prove what hath been impudently enough said That Superiours must another day answer to God for all the sinful actions which their Inferiours have done at their command a Doctrine no Superiour hath cause to thank them for Nor is there any way to avoid the first unless it were possible for Men to perswade themselves as Mr. Hooker would have them That it is the Will of God that in Litigious and controverted cases of such Quality Men should submit to the judgment of final decision though in their private Opinions they Judge it utterly to swerve from that which is right as to which we have said enough We therefore stick to the Protestant Doctrine That it is not Lawful under any circumstance of Command to act against an Opining Conscience CHAP. IV. The Question stated It is proved that it is not Lawful to Act contrary to the Opinion of a Mans particular Conscience by five Arguments because the particular Conscience is the Proximate Rule of Action granted by all Divines Because of that Text Rom. 14.23 Because it Subjects a Man to continual Terrors of Conscience The contrary Principle over-throws the Natural Order of the Souls Operation and plucks up a great Pillar of the Protestant Religion and would make the Scriptures and Argumentative Books of little Vse but to Torment Men. § 1. WE come now to assert our Proposition That it is not Lawful for any Person to act against an Opining Conscience i. e. as we have largely opened That supposing a Person though he hath not demonstrative Arguments to prove this or that unlawful which he is required to do Yet if he hath formed up a particular Judgment of Conscience from Arguments which seem to him very probable so as he cannot Answer them nor rest satisfied in the Answers of others while he so judgeth it is sin and wickedness in him especially in Matters which concern the Worship of God to do that Action however required of him This we shall make good by several Arguments § 2.1 To swerve from what God hath made the Proximate Rule of our actions is sinful But to act contrary to the Opinion of our own Consciences is to swerve from what God bath made the Proximate Rule of our Actions Therefore it is sinful The Major can with no Modesty be denyed for what is sin but a Transgression of or deviation from the Rule of our actions The Minor is as Evident It is granted by all Divines we have met with both Popish and Protestant that the Practical Conscience is the Proximate Rule of our Actions nor did we ever meet with it denyed by any Learned Man And indeed it must be so For That Gods Word and Law is the Remote Rule must be owned
saith that it may be a greater sin to contradict my own Conscience than not to Obey my Superiours supposing my Conscience telleth me the thing required is contrary to the Law of Nature But yet Vasquez himself thinketh that in case the Superiour Commandeth a thing otherwise probably Lawful that is as we before heard which some Doctor or Doctors judge so then it is Lawful for a Man to Obey contrary to the private Opinion of his own Conscience because he might do it in such case though it were not Commanded and this is his Principle That when the Precept of a Superiour may Lawfully be Obeyed he is then bound to do it and it becomes necessary This indeed is a strong Argument if we could yield the premises viz. That a Man may Lawfully contrary to the probable Opinion of his own Conscience follow the Opinion of another Quod adhuc est Demonstrandum We shall anon shew the Cursed Fruit of this Root yet Vasquez limiteth this Doctrine a little by telling us 1. That the Superiour must be unquestionably our Superiour 2. That the Subject must know and believe that the Supirour Commandeth according to a probable Opinion and must not think it probable meerly because he is his Superiour for saith he The Dignity of the Superiour Commanding doth not make an Opinion probable Thus far now we have heard the Judgment of the Popish Casuists and School-men in this Case The Summe is this That it is Lawful for a Man to do what his own Conscience from intrinsick probable Arguments judgeth Vnlawful if one or more Doctors do but Judge it Lawful and in such Cases if the Superiour Commandeth he is bound to do what he in his own Conscience judgeth unlawful if it be not apparently and demonstratively so How near this comes to the Sentiments of some Modern Protestant Doctors we may enquire hereafter but before we come to that let us enquire what the Ancienter Protestants have judged in the Case CHAP. III. The Opinion of former Protestants about the lawfulness or unlawfulness of Mens Acting contrary to the Opinion of their own Consciences Such Acting condemned by all former Protestant Casuists Baldvinus Alstedius Amesius Perkins The difference of some later Divines from their Fore-Fathers particularly Mr. Hooker The Vanity of his Proof from Deut. 17.18 Acts 15. Or from Reason Bishop Sanderson agreeing with Ancient Protestants So Mr. Fulwood in his Cases The differing Expressions of some Divines of this present Age The tender touching of the Question and nibbling at the Opinion of the Popish Doctors in the Case by others The Question again stated and made ready for Debate § 1. WE will begin with Fredericus Baldvinus Professor at Wittenbergh he in his Cases l. 1. cap. 9. Professedly disputeth this great point he takes Notice of the two sorts of pretended probable Arguments and determineth in reference to both 1. That an Opinion onely raised from the multitude of others Testimonies in the Case bindeth no Man 2. That an Opinion taken up upon probable Reasons doth bind and so bind that a man cannot Act against it His words in Latine are these Cùm ergo opinionem aliquam non ob assensum aliorum sed ob causas probabiles pro verâ habes Obligatus es in Conscientiâ ne contra eam agas licet Superiores aliud a te exigant donec rationes veriores audias in contrarium ad quas tamen audiendas semper paratus esse debes Et opinionem tuam auditâ meliore sententiâ deponere That is When thou hast taken up any Opinion for true not for the Testimony of others but for probable Reasons thou art bound in Conscience not to act against it no not though Superiours require thee to act till thou hearest better Reasons to the contrary To hear which thou oughtest to be always ready and lay down thy Opinion hearing a better The Opinion of this Grave and Learned Professor is what we take it will be found to have been the Opinion of all Protestants of former Ages For the Observing Reader will find as to this point the same proportionable difference betwixt Ancient Protestant Divines and a Modern brood as betwixt the Old Fathers and School-men and the later Jesuites who have traded in Scholastical and Moral Divinity The latter professing wholly to differ from the former We shall I say find that all former Protestants have agreed That although he that is possessed of an opinion that the thing which is by his Superiours required is unlawful out of Reverence to his Superiours ought throughly to Examine his Opinion and to hear better Reasons if they can be brought and being by them convinced to lay down his opinion Yet while he can do that he cannot do the thing § 2. Let us in the next place enquire of Alstedius He distinguisheth concerning Opinion as relating to a more External Court or to the Court of Conscience As to the former he saith In Disputations c. the Common Opinion is to be preferred before our own But as to Conscience he saith Whatsoever is done against our Consciences is sinful whether our Conscience be Erring Opining or Rightly informed vid. Theol. casuum cap. 2. n. 2. Dr. Ames cas l. 1. c. 5. determines That it is never Lawful for the Authority of other Men to act against our own Opinion be it certain or onely probable We do not remember more than four Protestant Casuists we had whose Writings are more than forty Years Old These were three the fourth was Judicious Mr. Perkins who seems to reduce this to a doubting Conscience and determines That it is sin to act against it because he cannot act in Faith if his Conscience be doubting or erring or gain-saying These being all our former Divines who wrote Treatises of Cases further Testimony is not to be expected It were easie to produce multitudes collaterally speaking the same things But for them we shall but refer the Reader to any Protestants that have formerly wrote upon Rom. 14.23 and see what they say upon these words Whoso doubteth is damned if he eateth because he eateth not of Faith For whatsoever is not of Faith is sin And v. 5. Let every Man be fully perswaded in his oven mind he will find enough we pass it over intending our selves to make some use of that Text anon § 3. But as we said before look as in this very point there is a very great difference betwixt the Ancient Fathers and School-men and the Modern Jesuites in so much that the latter will not allow the Judgment of any of the Ancients in these Cases and both Vasquez and Sanchez think fit to Caution their Readers against it and both Cellot and Reginaldus expresly determine That in Moral Questions the Modern Casuists are to be preferred before the Ancient Fathers though they lived nearer the times of the Apostles So we shall Observe that some later Protestant Divines have delivered themselves either something odly or expresly contrary
them if he Judgeth them in their Circumstances but such as he may do or Omit he is bound to do them or omit them according to the Nature of the Superiours Precept But if the Inferiour Judgeth them unlawful for him to do though this his Judgment be formed but from probable Arguments that is such as to him so appear not from indubitably certain Arguments he cannot Obey but is bound patiently to submit to the penalty imposed upon him for Disobedience So that these Objections are perfectly vain and no incumbrances at all upon our Proposition § 3. But we say It is one thing for us to allow a Power in Superiours to determine us where both we and they agree the thing in its own Nature and cloathed with such Circumstances of a middle and indifferent Nature And quite another thing for us and that as to the things of God too and such things where for doing or not doing the danger of sin and Eternal Damnation lyeth to make him Our Judge what is and what is not Indifferent It is impossible any intelligent Soul should allow the latter to his Superiour without also making him a Judge both of Good and Evil. For Indifferency being a middle betwixt those two extremes there 's no possibility of his being a Judge of it without also determining concerning the extremes And if we could allow this we should as to private Christians use see little need of the Scriptures for the Superiour must Interpret them too or all will come to nothing § 4. Nay we further say that there may be some stresses of Providence as to which the being of Polities and the Preservation of Justice lyes at stake where some things may be Lawful which in Ordinary Cases God will not allow You know saith our Saviour what David did when he was an hungry how he did eat the Shew-bread which was not Lawful for any in Ordinary Cases to eat but for the Priests onely It was a Case of real Necessity to save his Life It would have been a sin both in David upon a lighter pretence to have done it and for the Priest to have suffered it § 5. We have been the more willing to search this business to the bottom because of that andacious Liberty which some have taken either openly to assert or cunningly to insinuate the contrary a thing undoubtedly of as iâ—l a tendency as can well be imagined leading directly to a Blind Obedience one of the Capital Errors of the Church of Rome and possibly a more sottish and brutish Errour than any other which they have as devesting Man of his Humane Nature and that which is the Mother of most other of their abominable Doctrines any absurdities as Naturally following that first as the Thread follows the Needle If it can be supposed that there may be a Superiour absurd in his Sentiments or Practice which that it may be we need no other Evidence than what the Infallible Choyce it self hath given the wiser part of the World often enough Evidence of § 6. We have been amazed to Observe how tenderly Modern Writers have touched this Question Mr. Hooker indeed as we have before said is peremptory enough against us to that degree as we find none of his Posterity in that thing approving his saying The Author of the Pulpit Conceptions Popular deceptions fairly skips it over telling us what should be done by us if we scruple our Obedience but not a word what we should do if we from probable Arguments judge the thing unlawful Freeman as we shewed before is peremptory enough beyond all Reason or Religion But another writing a Book professedly about Tenderness of Conscience when he comes to Answer the Case of Doubting speaks almost to every thing else but prudently leaves out this Case Others tell us that if the thing Commanded be apparently demonstratively indisputably evil if it tends to debauch us in our Sentiments concerning the God-head c. we must not Obey but if otherwise either they say nothing or else tell us we ought to Obey The Reverend Bishop Sanderson and Mr. Fulwood are the onely two Modern Divines that we have met with daring to state the Case distinctly and speaking to it in the Dialect of Protestants But others in their Writings either shew little of Divines stating the Case falsly and not speaking ad idem Or little of Protestants saying that which no Protestant Divines ever durst say before them § 6. And from hence to every considerate Reader will be inevitably concluded the Reasonableness if not the Necessity of an Indulgence from all Superiours who will think themselves under any Obligation to the Royal Law of Love For as that Law will Oblige them not to suffer sin in their Inferiours Lev. 19.17 So. it will also Oblige them not to lay a stumbling block before them that are weak by which they both sin against Christ 1 Cor. 8.9 10 11 12 13. and do not walk Charitably Rom. 14.15 Nor yet to make them to suffer because they dare not sin For to Act against their Conscience though but Opining is sin For all this Suffering must unquestionably be a Suffering for Righteousness sake for to depart from Iniquity is unquestionably a piece of Righteousness Hence though the Superiour upon the first Account be bound to Oblige his Inferiours by his Civil Sanction to do all that which the Law of God hath made necessary for them to do and to forbear what the same Law hath forbidden otherwise he should suffer sin upon them Yet if he thinks fit to Command other things in Religion which possibly himself and some of his Inferiours Judge not sinful and tendent to some State or Decency but the want of them makes not the Servite indecent or disorderly according to any Light or Law of Nature or the general guise and Custom of the place and many other his Inferiours Judge so far from tendency to Order and Decency that they from Arguments which to them appear very probable judge them sinful and unlawful and so capable of no such Notion how he can possibly exact an Obedience to any such Commands without 1. Either putting his Inferiours upon sin and continual disturbance of their Consciences 2. Or making them Sufferers because they dare not sin against God which is as we said before a species at least of Suffering for Righteousness-sake We must confess our selves which possibly is our weakness not Divines sufficient to understand and should thank any one that could inform us Now betwixt these there lyeth no Medium but a Gracious Indulgence the very Remedy which His Most Excellent Majesty hath suited to this fore Evil. § 7. And here we would have finished our Discourse but for a late Book called The Cases of Scandal and Persecution which yet hath no such depths in it as to ask us long time to sound The Author spends one part of his Book in perswading us to believe what we know none ever doubted viz. That
in Case the thing Commanded us be by us Judged Lawful for that he beggs all along we ought not to forbear doing it because some of our Brethren would be grieved and teachy at it provided our doing of it laid no stumbling-block before them to give them Occasion to sin against God We would fain know what Non-Conformist ever said the contrary Thus Men Exercise themselves in Combates with fancied Enemies for really the Doctor hath none in this Case that ever we heard of The Second Part of his Book comes nearer what we last said and notwithstanding all he saith we do think That it is at least a Mute Case as they say in Law Whether the forcing any to Suffer because he cannot or dare not Act contrary to the Opinion of his Conscience guided by Arguments which to him appear probable be not Persecuting To pass by his other impertinencies allowing him to use a very true Method to try the issue in fixing the Notion of Persecution we there joyn Issue with him § 8. In his 44 p. he tells us Persecution is an Inflicting of outward temporal Evils for the Exercise of true Religion The Genus we agree and think he might have shortned the Description by leaving out Outward and Temporal because no Man can Inflict any other Evils upon his Brother The difference he makes to lye in those words For the Exercise of the True Religion But why might not our Saviours terms have been taken for Righteousness sake Yet if Religion be taken in the larger Notion of it for doing any part of our Duty in which we bounden to towards God we cannot fault the Description but this Description makes but the Major Proposition The Minor must be this But the Outward Temporal Evils Imprisonments Deprivation of Ecclesiastical preferments pecuniary mulcts Slanderings Revilings Reproachful speeches Inflicted upon Non-Conformists are not inflicted upon them for doing any part of that Duty wherein they are bounden to God There are very many Non-Conformists will put the Doctor to prove this and tell him It is a piece of Righteousness a part of true Religion and every Mans bounden Duty toward God not to Act contrary to what his Conscience Gods Vice-gerent in him tells him and that upon Arguments which appear very probable to him is Lawful And in Matters of Gods Worship also to do According to what his Conscience tells him is the Will of God he should do And we take Notice too of an Excellent passage in the Doctors Book p. 45. l. ult penult That God hath as much Right to appoint the way of his Worship as to be Worshipped A passage we are so much in Love with that it is one of our greatest Topicks to prove many things Commanded us probably unlawful Prayer is Worship Praying by Forms or by words formed first in our own Hearts is a way of Worship Now say we God hath as much right to prescribe the way as the Worship and hath done it As every Man hath received the gift saith the Apostle so let him Minister 1. Pet. 4.10 Praying and Preaching are Worship The doing these Acts in a peculiar Habit appropriated to these Actions is a way of Worship And God saith the Doctor hath as much right to appoint the way of his Worship as the Worship The like might be said of the other Ceremonies § 9. But suppose we allow the Doctors Description of Persection The next Question is how we shall know what is True Religion Who shall be the Judge Shall the Scriptures But who shall Interpret the Scriptures as to a Christians private Practice Shall the Superiours Then certainly there was never any Persecution in the World For it were very uncharitable to presume that any Superiour should punish another for the Exercise of what himself owned to be the true Religion We have more Charity for Bonner himself Shall the Inferiour be Judge what is true Religion Then I fear the Doctor will be cast many of them will say they are mischievously and violently Prosecuted Imprisoned Punished Reviled for what they Judge the Exercise of the True Religion § 10. The upshot of this Discourse is that who they be who are truly guilty of Persecuting will not be determined till the Day of Judgment when God shall determine which was the True Religion and whether Men truly ran those hazards because they were afraid of sinning against God In the mean time as to us he is Persecuted who can truly say That he suffers for doing any thing which he thinks he should sin against God if he did not do and for forbearing any thing which he truly â—â—â—nâ—s he should sin against God if he should do And we believe that those who thus Suffer though another day they shall be adjudged by God to have been in a mistake and so not Persecuted yet as to what they have done will be Judged guilty of no more than an Humane Infirmity §. 11 We have so much Charity as to believe that that Popish Priest who suffers according to the Law for Seducing If he can truly say that he did believe Gods Word Obliged him to do what he did may properly enough say he is Persecuted but we also believe that God will not Judge so another day and that the Magistrate doth but his Duty because by Gods Law none ought to be endured that entice others to Idolatry But whoso makes another to Suffer because he durst not sin against God Acting contrary to what his Conscience judgeth unlawful from probable Arguments we believe far less excusable because there 's no necessity upon him to lay any such Commands and enforce them by any such penalties But there does lye a necessity of suffering in this Case upon the Inferiour to avoid sinning against his Conscience whether his Conscience be in the right or in the wrong will be determined another day In the mean time he should sin if he should not hearken to it to avoid which he suffers which is so far as he can possibly Judge to suffer for Righteousness sake After the saying of which we think little more need be said to the Doctor 's Book § 12. To Conclude our Discourse upon this Question we have observed in all those almost who have wrote for Conformity great insisting upon the Authority of former and present Churches and the Testimonies of many Divines dead or alive some of which they tell us were Old Non-Conformists And this hath been the general Method of all late Writers almost to pass over all our and our Fore-Fathers Arguments and in Order to make us as odious to the World as they would have us to represent us as singular and differing from the Church in all Ages yea from our selves and our Fore-Fathers c. To what better purpose than this these in artificial Arguments are used we cannot tell unless those that bring them have a little tincture of the Jesuites Doctrine we before shewed at large That extrinsick Arguments may make
thing be a necessary Duty he sinneth in not doing it Vasquez saith it is against the very Law of Nature Sanchez saith that although the Law of God be the primary Rule yet every mans Conscience is the proximate Rule of his Actions and therefore be cannot Act against it Dr. Ames saith That he who doth it Interpretatively sins against God For he must needs do contrary to what he believeth to be the will of God Eiliacius tract 21. M. Qu. c. 4. saith That he which doth it doth that which he thinketh to be sin And saith he hoc ipso amat peccatum by this thing he sheweth he loveth to sin and chuseth sin But this is not our Question We suppose a Man not to be fully and demonstrably perswaded that this or that Action is unlawful but onely upon Arguments which seem to him very probable verily to believe it is unlawful and Quaery whether while he so believeth he can do that thing And this Question divideth it self according to the different Notion of an Opinion which we before hinted viz. Whether a Man thus perswaded of the unlawfulness of an Action by Arguments indeed not demonstrative but such as he judgeth very probable and which he himself cannot Answer so neither doth he think others can may yet because his Principles are not Supernaturally or Mathematically made certain to him act against the Opinion of his own Conscience in Obedience to the will of any Creature 2. Whether a Man thus perswaded of the unlawfulness of any thing by Arguments not demonstrative but probable as before said though at present he can neither himself answer them nor see them answered by any other yet suspecting they may be answered may while this is the Condition of his Conscience act against the present judgment of it though it be incumbred with such a Jealousie or Suspition Now as to the first of these Questions we find little or nothing spoken in the Affirmative by any Popish Casuists or School-men They generally making some fear of the contrary part of the Practical Proposition to which the Person inclineth and Jealousie that this part of the proposition is false and his Arguments Answerable essential to an Opinion conclude that a Soul perswaded though but upon probable Arguments if it hath no such fear suspition or Jealousie to have a fixed Conscience and though fixed in an Error yet conclude it utterly unlawful for a Man to Act against it But if there be in any Soul any fear suspition or Jealousie that its Arguments may be Answered then they conclude the Soul but Opining and do indeed dâ—spute for a Lawfulness to Act against it though under several Cautions and limitations At this rebound therefore we will take the Question and state it thus Quest Whether supposing a Man or Woman not Demonstrably perswaded that this or that Action is unlawful but from arguments which to him or her appear very probable verily believing so yet not without some Jealousie Fear or Suspition that he may be mistaken and his arguments may be answered may whiles he thus believes do that thing in Obedience to Men which in this manner he judgeth sinful and unlawful to be done For the clearer handling of this momentous and important Question we shall with all Candor Examine 1. What Divines of all sorts whether Popish or Protestant have determined in the case and upon what grounds 2. We shall endeavour to defend the Negative part of the Question proving it wickedness for any to act contrary to the judgment of their own Consciences though that Judgment be onely made up from intrinsick probable arguments 3. We shall answer the Objections of those who have spoke any thing for the affirmative with any colour of Reason CHAP. II. The Opinions of Popish School-men and Casuists in the Case particularly of Vasquez Sanchez Medina Filiucius Azorius Their Monstrous Assertions what they make necessary to make an Opinion probable The Opinion of one Doctor according to them sufficient to warrant Men to Act contrary to their own Opinions Their Opinions what a Man ought to do when Superiours Command Inferiours what the Inferiours judge unlawful The summe of their detestable Doctrine § 1. WE will begin with the Popish Authors Vasquez tells us that the Question is not Whether a Man ought not to follow the Judgment of his own Conscience or could act against it but when it happeneth that there are two opposite Opinions about a thing to be done One saying it is a sin to do it another saith it is not The difficulty is saith he how a Man should carry himself betwixt them so as to form up a singular Judgment of Conscience which without sin he may embrace Vasquez in 12. disp 72. cap. 2. So then the Jesuite it seemeth doth yield the case viz. That if once a Man hath formed a particular Judgment of Conscience that the thing is unlawful though it be but from probable Arguments he cannot do it he onely prescribes in a variety of Opinions in the World as to a singular Matter how Men should well form that Judgment But not to wrong him in the 4. cap. of that Disputation n. 15. he seems to be of another mind and asserteth That a Man in some Cases may act contrary to his own Opinion yea that a Learned Man may Lawfully act contrary to his own Opinion according to the Opinion of others though it be less safe and less probable than his own provided there be any Reason and probability for the Opinion of those others Yet still retaining his Opinion as more probable looking upon that Opinion of others as probable by extrinsecal Arguments that is the Authority Judgments and Testimony of others though he judgeth his own Opinion more probable by intrinsick Arguments The Reasons he gives for this are these 1. Because we may act according to any Opinion which seemeth probable to us We will anon Argue that Case whether it be possible that any thing from meer extrinsick Arguments can seem probable to a reasonable Soul The contrary to which at the same time seems probable from intrinsick Arguments But we know how far the Doctrine of Probabilities serves the woful Interest of that Apostate Synagogue of Rome Largo Proventu est gnavum non deceptura colonum 2. Because it seems incredible to be true that a Man may not do what all the World judgeth Lawful if he alone judgeth it unlawful All the World we confess is a large term and puts the Case to the highest pinch but yet it seems not at all incredible if that be true which the School-men Universally agree That the particular Conscience must be the proximate Rule of action For what shall it profit a Man more to follow all the World than to gain all the World if be loseth his own Soul A Man is certainly bound to follow his own Rules not anothers These are that Jesuites best Reasons He confesseth that in this he followeth Medina some of
was unquestionably a wilful Error but such aâ—one as those Learned Men saw necessary to be maintained or the Doctrine of Blind Obedience could not stand § 5. Azorius Institut Moral lib. 2. cap. 26. In this Case determines That we may follow an Opinion that is less certainly safe if it be more probable or certain from which we might conclude that in regard the Opinion of our own Consciences is always to us more probable and certain than the Opinion of any other is or can be though there be a possibility of our sinning in following our own and no possibility in following of anothers yet we may follow it 2. He concludes That if both Opinions be Equally safe we are not bound to prefer that which is more probable Yet he confesseth that Major Corduba and Medina think otherwise he thinks the probability of an Opinion is enough to guide our Practice and that we are not bound to follow that which is most probably true But besides that some of his own Brethren tell him and that truly that That Opinion which is though not demonstratively yet most probably true hath least danger of sin in it Whether an Opinion can to any be probably true by extrinsick Arguments which at the same time we judge from intrinsick Arguments probably not true as Question not yet resolved We do not at all doubt but the Judgment and Testimony of others may give a Proposition some shew of Probability to be true If we have no Arguments against what they say from some appearances at least of Scripture or some Logical Topicks But when we have such Arguments that yet their Opinions in the contrary should seem probable to us is a great Riddle and seems a great baffling of a Reasonable Soul Especially considering that these Forreign Arguments are but Common and may be brought in most Cases on both sides § 6. And indeed here all the Popish Doctors are at a great loss viz. To determine what those Doctors must be how many must concurr in an Opinion before they may over-rule us in Practice against the Judgment of our own Consciences formed from proper intrinsecal Arguments Sanchez saith one Doctor is enough and quotes on his side Anges Sylv. Navarrus Valentia and Sa yea and he proveth it by this Learned Argument That is a probable Opinion which is not built upon a light Foundation Now saith he the Opinion of one Doctor is not a light Foundation Ay but what if one Doctors Opinion be for us another be against us They will tell you They are both probable Take then the summe of the Jesuites Doctrine 1. A probable Opinion is that which is not built upon a light Foundation So saith Sanchez 2. Any one Doctors Opinion is a considerable and no light Foundation That is Sanchez his medium 3. Let a man have never so many intrinsecal proper Arguments not demonstrative to prove a thing unlawful yet he may do it if he can but find one Doctor who judgeth it Lawful 4. If one Doctor judgeth it Lawful another judgeth it unlawful he may do what he pleaseth in it for both parts are probable Hence Sanchez raiseth these Conclusions 1. That if a Man according to the Judgment of his own Conscience perfectly doubteth from intrinsecal Arguments which in a practical case he can find on the one side or the other Yet if he can from Extrinsecal Arguments perswade himself that either part is Lawful he may do either 2. That he who probably judgeth it unlawful to Act according to a less probable Opinion may yet Act according to that which he judgeth less probable if he judgeth That it is probably Lawful for him to follow that which is less probabâ—e 3. That Learned Men may advise others to act contrary to what themselves the Adviserâ— think Lawful if another Doctor hath judged it Lawful These and many other damnable and absurd Opinions they most impudently conclude from these most wretched premises And now let any Judge whether according to these Principles there be any thing Vnlawful or no and one would think that they do not judge any thing Vnlawful that will but read their Escobar Layman Diaena Filucius Azorius Sanchez Or a breviate of some of their Propositions p. 17. in the Additionals to the Mystery of Jesuitism where he shall be directed also to the Authors § 7. But hitherto they have onely told us what a Man May do Let us hear shortly their Opinion of what Men Must do and particularly where Superiours Command us to act contrary to what we from proper intrinsecal Arguments judge Lawful Adrianus as he is quoted by Vasquez positively affirmeth That none can Lawfully Obey their Superiours against the Opinion of his own Conscience he tells us also That Corduba saith the same in effect though he would save himself from this inconvenience by asserting That what in it self absolutely considered is evil may by some Circumstances be good as when it is necessary for us of two evils to chuse one here the lesser evil is made good comparatively and that saith he is the Case here Vasquez 12. disp 62. cap. 6. It is an evil thing for a man to act contrary to the opinion of his own Conscience And it is an evil thing to disobey our Superiours but one of these we must do in this case saith he It is Lawful for a man to act against his own opinion in obedience to his Superiours thus far the Jesuite A Man might have expected such an unboyled Mess of Divinity from a John of Leiden or a Knipperdolling but is this spoken like Divine Can there then be any necessity of sinning where 's Man's free-will in the mean time doth God ever bring the Soul into such a strait Is it not a known Rule That of two evils of punishment we may indeed chuse the least but of two evils of sin none An Erroneous Conscience indeed is under a necessity of sinning but surely he hath no choice in the case whether he will sin this way or that way but must follow the dictate of his Conscience Whether the distinction of Ligat non obligat be worth any thing or no surely all will say he cannot Act against his fixed erring Conscience Is it not a known Rule That nothing can be made good by a Circumstance though indeed Circumstances may make a thing evil because Bonum esse Causis integris Malum e quolibet defectu Therefore Vasquez who Diana saith is instar omnium explodes this Doctrine of Corduba telling us truly That the Obedience which any Man oweth to his Superiours supposeth the matter of the Superiors Command not to be contrary to the Command of one who is higher than he for in such Cases no Obedience is due nor is it any sin to disobey viz. where the thing required is contrary to the Law of Nature the Law of God or the Law of a Superiour in an higher Order Again it is very possible as Vasquez
us Deut. 17.8 Acts 15. we will Examine both these Texts § 8. The words in Deut. 17.8 9 10 11 12. are these If there arise a Matter too hard for thee in Judgment betwixt Blood and Blood betwixt plea and plea betwixt stroke and stroke being matters of Controversie within thy Gates Then shalt thou arise and get thee up unto the place which the Lord thy God shall chuse And thou shalt come unto the Priests the Levites and unto the Judge who shall be in those days and enquire and they shall shew the Sentence of Judgment And thou shalt do according to the Sentence which they of that place which the Lord shall chuse shall shew thee and thou shalt Observe to do according to all that they shall inform thee According to the Sentence of the Law which they shall teach thee and according to the Judgment which they shall tell thee thou shalt do thou shalt not decline from the Sentence which they shall shew thee to the right hand nor to the left And the Man that will do presumptuously and will not hearken unto the Priest that standeth up to Minister before the Lord thy God or unto the Judge even that Man shall dye and thou shalt put away evil from Israel These words are fully that Text. As to which we desire our Reader to Observe 1. That this is Bellarmines first Text to prove Blind Obedience the Duty of Christians So that we may easily judge which way the Face of these Disputants doth stand It might suffice but to refer our Reader to Chamer or any that have Answered Bellamine for an Answer to this Objection 2. Secondly In case this Text will serve the turn now it will infallibly prove the Lawfulness of Priests and Judges putting to death such as shall not do what they have once determined in any case that is indifferent of it self and once by them made necessary But surely this must be asserted by none that value their words at any rate But to come close to the Text if any Argument in this case can be drawn from it it must be this What the Israelites were bound to do upon any determination by the Priest or Judge in the place where the Lord should chuse In hard Matters between plea and plea blood and blood That Christians under the Gospel are bound to do upon the final decision of the Priest or Judge in hard matters between plea and plea blood and blood trespass and trespass stroke and stroke But the Israelites were bound to do according to the final decision of the Priest or Judge sitting in the place which the Lord should chuse and Judging in hard Matters between Plea and Plea Blood and Blood c. Ergo. If the Argument be thus laid it concludeth nothing like the Question but is transitus degenere in genus Our Question is not about Civil things in Controversie where a Man may take any part and not sin against God and where Submission onely inferreth Sussering in matters of a temporal concern but about Religious Actions where a Practice is required which the Party Commanded Judgeth sinful And hazarding the damnation of his Soul Whence also it may be Observed That no Conclusion can from hence be fetched from any purity of Reason But if Mr. Booker intends from that Text to conclude the Question his Argument must be laid thus What the Israelites were bound to as to hard Case◠in Judgment betwixt plea and plea blood and blood trespass and trespass stroke and stroke That Christians are bound to do in all Litigious Controverted Cases of Religion or at least in such Cases where the Superiours Judge the things by them Commanded to be in themselves of an indifferent Nature But the Israelites in hard Cases in Judgment betwixt plea and plea Blood and Blood trespass and trespass stroke and stroke were Obliged to do according to and not decline from the Sentence of the Law which the Priests the Levites or the Judges should teach them and according to the Judgment which they should shew them though in the Opinion of their own Consciences it swerved utterly from that which was right Ergo. Christians also under the Gospel in all Litigiout controverted Cases especially of such Quality where the Superiour Judgeth the things indifferent are bound to do according to and not to decline from the Sentence of the Law which the Civil or Ecclesiastical Superiours now adays shall teach them though in the Opinion of their own Consciences it utterly swerveth from that which is right To which we Answer 1. The whole concludeth nothing to the purpose for it concludeth not that they ought to do any thing contrary to the Sentence of the Divine Law That was of Old to the Priests a Regula Regulans an Original Rule and must be so to all Superiours and it is impossible any should be Obliged to Act contrary to it But lest any should say they were bound to take the Priests and Levites and Judges Sentence to be the Sentence of the Divine Law we further Answer § 9. By denying the Major which is most notoriously false and before it can be made good those that inherit Mr. Hooker's Spirit must make good these things 1. That there it the same Reason or Equity for Superiours final decision and a Christians submission as to his Practice to a final decision in things of a Religious Nature which the Superiour Judgeth indifferent and the Inferiour from Arguments which in the Judgment of his particular Conscience seem probable judgeth unlawful As there was for a final decision amongst the Jews and their submission to such decision in Matters between Blood and Blood plea and plea trespass and trespass stroke and stroke which apparently there is not a determination in the latter being absolutely necessary for upholding the Beings of Polities the Course and Order of Justice the preservation of Humane Society and not making the World a Den of Thieves and Murtherers But no such things can be pretended for things in Religion by the Superiours owned in their own Nature but indifferent and so left by God Neither is there the same Equity or Reason for the Inferiours Submission For what harm could the Inferiour have by submitting to the final decision of the Priests Levites and Judges in those Civil things He might possibly be inforced to put up a wrong to part with a little Money or with some part of his Inheritance or suffer in case of Blood operatly which was his due by a Divine Law He was in no danger by such submission of damning his Soul or wounding his Conscience by finning against God though he might judge he were severely or unrighteously dealt with He might possibly think the part contrary to the decision more just and right But what was he to do Nothing but part with his own Right in Temporal things for the sake of publick Justice and Order and Peace which is every good Christians Duty and Choice But here
other Circumstance Antecedaneous to the Superiours Precept is with Reverence to Mr. Hooker and his Friends very wide Arguing and shooting at a great distance from the Mark. 3. But Thirdly What saith this Grave and Reverend Synod From which if you keep your selves you shall do well They do not say These things though indifferent in themselves you must do because we have made them necessary by our command though you in your private Opinions judge some of them utterly unlawful But we fore-see some will say That although this Councel used a soft Expression yet it manifestly followeth That if they did not abstain from these things they should do ill We Answer that without Question if they had not abstained they had done ill whether the Synod had so determined or no. The Councel did but declare What was the Will of God i. e. That Men must not use their Liberty in things indifferent when the use of it will prejudice the Glory of God in so high a concern as that of Converting Souls The matter of the Decree here was not a thing in that state of the Church in that place indifferent Antecedaneously to their Decree but what was every Christians Duty precedent to the Councels determination The Councel onely instructed them in what was the will of God not make it necessary by their Canon 2. Again they were things which the Christians could not possibly judge Vnlawful nothing was required but abstaining either from such things as Gods word at that present Obliged them to abstain from or had before Obliged the Jews to abstain from If the Christians judged themselves at Liberty to eat of things strangled and blood it was impossible yet they should judge it sinful not to eat of them Now none of us will deny that in Controversies of such Quality where known necessary Duties are Controverted or things necessary eminently with respect to some Circumstances apparent and inavoidable but it is the Will of God that the Church should consult and declare the Will of God as to them and Christians ought to hearken and do according to such their Declaration 1. Principally because it is the Will of God 2. Because of the Churches Authority Advising or Commanding from God especially if their required Practice too reacheth no further than a restraint of their Liberty in doing some things not doing things which their Consciences judge utterly unlawful This is enough to shew the Vanity of the Proposition or the Consequence rather of the Major Proposition § 12. But neither is the Assumption true No such thing appeareth from Acts 15. That the Christians were bound to do what the Synod required though in their private Opinions the things required swerved utterly from what was right As the things were such concerning which we before said the Conscience of none could so dictate So the Blessed Apostles knew the mind of God too well to engage Christians to Act contrary to the Opinion of their own Consciences Nor do we Read that ever the Authority of this Synod was quoted by the Apostle in his Epistle to the Corinthians where he professedly and largely handles one of these Cases about things Offered to Idols Doth he tell the Corinthians any such thing as It is unlawful for you now to eat such things It is indeed in it self a thing indifferent but your Superiours have decreed you should not eat therefore now it is necessary for you not to eat the Councel of Hierusalem made it necessary No such thing but he useth Arguments proper to Christians Consciences from the Nature of the thing The Scandal The Concern of Gods Glory in their forbearance § 13. Thus far we have dealt with the great Champion for the Blind Obedience of Protestants to whom those unsatisfied as to Conformity are sent upon all Occasions not onely to perswade them that they may but that they are bound to conform and it is Sin and Schism and any thing if they do not and we hope however unanswerable to be proclaimed Yet the Candid Reader will judge that he is not such a Lyon but he may be taken by the beard and that without an Inchanted Hand Multa videntur dicuntur quae non sunt We have taken the more pains to Examine this New Dictate of his about The Will of God and his Arguments for it because so much hangs upon it that it being proved false and absurd and his Arguments for it invalid His Folio is of no further use than to inform Men and when that is done they still stand Obliged to Act according to the abiding Opinion of their own Consciences § 24. There is yet another Father whom they much relie upon but far more sparingly quote in this Case and there is Reason for it it is the Reverend Dr. Sanderson the late Bishop of Lincoln a Man who though we know he differed from us yet we must give him his Character That we have not nor ever had such another Adversary He had praeparatum pectus for an Argument and seldom determines a Question but clearly and distinctly So as though we find him something against us yet we can understand him speaking to the point and clearly expressing what he saith Let us therefore hear him and where can we better hear him than in his Book of Praelections concerning the Obligation of Conscience There he speaketh not by the by and collaterally but purposely to the Question Praelect 6. § 16 He puts this Question What certainty is required in the Mind of the Inferiour to secure him in Conscience that he is not bound by the Law of his Superiour To which he Answereth 1. That if the Law be manifestly and notoriously unjust the Subject may be sure he is not bound by it which is also true if by a Moral certainty he judgeth it simply unjust having used all diligence to find out the Truth This is the Case what needeth any more But he goes on 2. If he doth but think the Command unjust from some rooted Error in Judgment of which he cannot easily quit himself The Obligation of the Command abideth notwithstanding the Error of his Mind so that he sinneth if he doth not Obey but he should sin in an higher degree if he did Obey Errore illo nondum deposito whiles he thinks it unlawful 3. If a Man doth onely from some light Scruple or Objection suspect the Law unjust he ought to contemn that Scruple and Obey Here is now a Man speaks like a Divine clearly and distinctly distinguishing betwixt a demonstrative certainty or a certainty of Faith and a Moral certainty betwixt the assent of a fixed Conscience and of an Opining Conscience and Scruple or Suspition and determining Christians Duty in all Cases and so solidly that we believe there is no valuable Non-conformist in England but will subscribe what he saith He durst not tell us We must believe it the Will of God we should submit to the sinal decision of Superiours though it
Understanding affirmeth neither part we wonder how it should Opine then § 10. This is a great point in Popery Jesuitisme especially and of no small gain to them for by this meaâ—â— they can resolve Cases as they list absolve Mens Consciences as they please and Interpret the Law of God into a very pleasing consiâ—tency with the Lusts and Passions of all Men If it were admitted for true it would open a wide door for Men to do what they listed without any check or controul of Conscience There being but few things in practice which one Doctor or other under one Circumstance or other hath not judged Lawful There are few actions but are disputable saith Mr. Freeman in his Reasonableness of Divine Service p. 33. And if one or more Doctors affirm it lawful say the Popish Casuists the private Christian may assent to it as probably Lawful though at the same time from Artificial Intrinsick Arguments formed in his own Breast he judgeth it probably unlawful And we wish some professing themselves Protestant Divines did not cant after this Tune though it may be they will not as the Papists rest it upon the Opinion of one Doctor but many Learned Men if they did not a little linger after this we cannot tell what means their constant choaking of us with the bare Opinions of others contrary to ours in which surely we are no further concerned than as quickned by them to re-examine our own Intrinsecal Arguments more strictly § 11. We must declare our selves in the Negative of this Question and do affirm That it is Naturally impossible for a Rational Soul in a practical proposition to Judge that part from Extrinsecal in-artificial Arguments Probably Lawful which at the same time from Intrinsecal artificial Arguments formed in its own Breast it judgeth Probably Vnlawful and in this Judgment we are confirmed § 12. Because it is contrary to the innate Principles of a reasonable Soul 1. We suppose every one will without difficulty grant it a Principle of a Reasonble Soul To Conclude nothing but from Rational Foundations Reason is a Power within us Discoursing Conclusions from Principles It acknowledged there is a God and that he hath revealed his will in those Books which we call The Holy Scriptures and must acknowledge it the most reasonable thing imaginable that he should be acknowledged true in his word Hence it concludes many Propositions of Faith upon the bare Authority of God revealing them and exerciseth it self no further than to compare Spiritual things with Spiritual But having not that Evidence for other things it maketh use of inbred Notions and from those Principles raiseth Conclusions Now let us consider from what Principle it is possible that Reason should infer such a Conclusion as this That is probably Lawful for me to do which such or such Divines be they more or fewer more or less Learned think is Lawful or which Superiours require under that Notion notwithstanding any Artificial Intrinsick Arguments which make my own Conscience Judge it very probably unlawful It must be this Those Doctors or those Superiours know better than I. Doth Reason in a man allow any such conclusion Modesty indeed upon such an Account may make a reasonable Soul Jealous and Suspitious and to issue out a Writ for a better enquiry upon its Arguments but it is impossible that it should rest in such a Conclusion to guide its Practice where the hazard of the Eternal Felicity of a Soul is concerned Reason speaketh in the Language of Job to his Friends Job 12.3 I have Vnderstanding as well as you and be it what it will gradually compared with all the Doctors reason it is the Candle of the Lord set up in my Soul according to the Light of which I must walk Or in the words of Elihu Job 32.8 There is a Spirit in Man and the Inspiration of the Almighty gives him Vnderstanding Reason saith Bring forth your strong arguments and I will answer them or hear mine and do you answer me § 13. Besides Reason saith If this were belonging to all Doctors or all Superiours that Wisdom as Job saith must dye with them how is it they are not agreed amongst themselves Such and such are on my side if it doth not agree to all Superiours and all Doctors how shall I be assured that it more agrees to those on the adverse side than to those on my fide to Dr. Vasquez more than to Pope Adrian S. 14 Further saith Reason do not know and see that there are many Doctores who are not Docti and that many Learned men in all Ages have been in Factions doth not Dr. Vasquez himself tell me in 12. disp 62. Cap. 4. That he cannot deny but a whole rout of Doctors may embrace an Opinion without any Reason against whom saith he another Doctor of great Authority may bring into the Schools an Opinion maturely deliberated Vasquez need not be Credited if we did not upon Experience find daily that not one of many Doctors examines things but follows some Leader as diligently as Sheep do one another over an Hedge that many either understand not the true Question about which they will be Writing in this Age or of choice mistake it write far more passion than Divinity or Reason which made Vasquez some others of his Brethren deliver their Opinion That a Learned Man may act according to his own Opinion though contrary to the Opinions of other Doctors §. 15 Reason tells a Man that Reason is not entailed to the Relation of a Superiour or the Degree of a Doctor Animae rationales sunt aequales in perfectione Substantiali and Superiority or Doctorship make no difference Experience teacheth us that improvement by Study makes not a difference as to the Exercise of Reason between all Superiours and Inferiours nor between all those who are Doctors and no Doctors It remaineth therefore that the particular Reason of every Soul must stand up in defence of it self especially in matters of Practice as to which Eternal Salvation or Damnation are concerned so as it is not Naturally possible that a Reasonable Soul should from Forreign Authority conclude a thing probably Lawful which from its own Rational conclusions it judgeth probably Vnlawful § 16 But further yet certainly it is repugnant to the connate Principles of Reasonable Souls to assert contraries both at the same time to be true because it is of the Nature of contraries to destroy one another Now the Understanding which shall thus assert must at the same time speak these two things which are manifest contradictions This is Lawful This is not Lawful I think and Judge it Lawful because A B C D c. say so I think it Vnlawful because my own Reason comparing things Spiritual with Spiritual or concluding from confessed Principles tells me it is so Must not this be a very odd Soul that can Discourse after this rate Vasquez was aware of this and thought to avoid it by
Now we would ask how we shall know what the Will of God in his Word is but by the Judgment of our particular consciences at last be the Will of God in it self what it will The Will of God to us must be Interpreted as to Practise by our own Judgments and apprehensions Hence Dr. Ames saith well that he who acteth against his Conscience Interpretatively acts against the Will of God And Filiucius saith right such Actions declare that Men chuse and love sin For so far as they know what is sinful they do sin and if they miss of sinning in their Actions it is but as the blind Man hits the Crow there 's no thank to them out of choyce they sin It is involuntarily if they do that which is right No Action materially good can possibly be so formally if done contrary to the Judgment of our Conscience because it is impossible it should have the concurrence of the Will whiles the Practical Conscience faith it ought not be done The Will cannot will what it judgeth evil it may indeed be mis-guided by the Understanding but it cannot will evil sub ratione mali and so consequentially cannot will what the Conscience telleth the Man he ought not to do So as indeed it is but a Natural Principle That the Practical Conscience is and must be the Proximate Rule of our actions Filiucius saith right that the Law of God and the Law of Nature respecteth our Actions as they are free which they cannot be unless they proceed a Principio cognoscente from a knowing Principle within our selves We proceed to a second Argument § 3. That Principle which allowed perverteth the whole Order of Nature in the operations of a Reasonable soul must be false But this opinion That it is Lawful for us to act contrary to what appears to us Lawful from probable arguments perverteth the whole Order of Nature in the Operations of a Reasonable Soul Ergo. The Major needeth no proof to any who will believe that it is not the Will of God a Man should be Metamorphosed into a Beast So that all our business must be to prove the Minor To which purpose let us but take a view of the Noblest Empire in the World I mean that of Reason in Man and Observeth the Order which God hath by the Law of Nature prescribed by which Reason sitting as a Queen should Rule there The Will is the great Minister in this State the great wheel which by its imperate Acts moveth the whole Man The Object of it is Good or Evil about these two it is Exercised chusing the former refusing the latter and then Commanding all the Inferiour Faculties of the Soul and Members of the Body to move according to its Judgment and Choice The Philopsoher telleth us The Will is blind and that its work is onely to keep its Seat and Judge and Command The Understanding serves it with the Notion of things that takes cognisance of them discerns and represents them as true or false whether reference to Speculation or Practice The Understanding in its work is served by the Interior and exterior Senses So then this is the Order of the Ceasonable Soul in Man whereas all Objects are either Sensible Rational or Spiritual The exterior Senses the Eye and Ear c. bring Intelligence of sensible Objects The Fancy Memory and Imaginative Power bring Intelligence of Objects proper to their Sphear The Understanding takes notice of all Propositions thus brought in to it discerneth them and judgeth concerning them whether they be true or false according to Principles of Sense Reason and Revelation according to the variety of the Matter upon this the Will maketh its choice Those which the Understanding discerneth true and good it willeth and chuseth what it discerns false and evil it refuseth nillete and rejecteth and accordingly Commandeth the Soul to believe or not believe to love or hate to desire or flâ—e from whatsoever the Understanding discerneth and judgeth evil and noxious Here now is the Government of a Reasonable Soul Now let us Observe how guilty the Principle we oppose is of Treason and Sedition against this Noble Government of the Soul instituted in it by God himself We cannot make a better Judgment than by putting a particular case Suppose this the Proposition It is or it is not Lawful for Persons once Ordained to be re-ordained The Case now is to be Judged in the Court of Reason 〈◊〉 Senses bring in this Proposition as what they have some where seen or heard to be brought into Practice Upon this the Court of the Reasonable Understanding taketh cognisance of it The Understanding discerns it a Proposition relating to Instituted Worship and that the Truth concerning it is to be determined not from Principles of Sense or Principles of Natural Reason but from Scripture and Reason working upon things Revealed and comparing things Spiritual with Spiritual The Eye is therefore employed to Read what can be The Ear to hear on all sides what is spoken about it The Fancy or Imagination is also set on work to find out Mediums to prove the one part or other and so the thing cometh with all these helps to be Discoursed by the soul within it self Then the Vnderstanding discerneth and judgeth which part of the Proposition is true and consequently fit to be Practised which is false and fit to be rejected It either concludes one part Demonstratively and certainly false or probably and in all likelihood false or else it hangs in equilibrio not knowing what to determine In the present Case we suppose the Vnderstanding to bring in its report in this Sense As to this Practical Question Whether it be Lawful for them who by Ministers have been Ordained and made Ministers to be re-ordained and made first Deacons then Priests by Bishops I have done my best to try the Truth or Falshood of either part The Eyes and Ears have given me an account of what they have seen in any Books or heard from any Discourses of Learned Men about it The Fancy hath also been employed to weigh and consider Propositions to consider Arguments brought by others on one side and the other and devise Mediums for one part and for the other Now upon my utmost Judgment of the thing from weighing Arguments on all sides it is not demonstratively certain that this Proposition is false That Persons once Ordained may not be re-ordained and that a Submission to such a re-ordination would be sinful But it doth appear to me very probably so I cannot Answer the Arguments which I have thought on or others have brought to prove it so and though I dare not arrogate infallibility to my self and determine the Arguments I have for the Negative unanswerable yet I can find no Answer I can acquiesce in and so far as I can judge it is sinful and will certainly issue in horror of Conscience or Eternal Damnation or both without pardoning Mercy Now the business is