8. c. No nor all those deeds neither which are praised 78 12. It is an easy thing to erre in the application of examples 82 14. c. Some examples of perverse Imitation 85 16. c. An argument from the example examined against the custom of kneeling in the holy Supper 87 23. c. What is the use of examples 95 25. c. It is unsafe to subject the Conscience to the opinions of every man 99 28. The tyranny of the Pope of Rome over the Consciences of men 102 29. c. Not to impute too much to the judgements of other men ibid. 31. Nor yet too little 104 The Summary of the Fourth Lecture 1. c. What is that Rule of Conscience to be enquired after 106 4. c. To which we ought to conform our selves 109 6. c. Diverse Degrees of those things which do oblige the Conscience 111 9. c. The first Conclusion God alone hath a peculiar and a direct command over the Conscience 113 12. c. The second Conclusion The next Rule of Conscience is right reason 116 14. c. The third Conclusion The Scripture is not the Adaequate Rule of Conscience 119 18. c. And nothing hereby derogated from the perfection of it 124 20. c. The fourth The Adaequate Rule of Conscience is the will of God which way soever it be manifested 126 23. Which is also the Fundamental of the Obligation 13 24. c. The three parts of this rule first the light by nature infused into the mind which is the Law of Nature 131 26. Secondly the light conveyed into the mind by the written Word of God 27. c. 32. c. In the old Law or the Law of Moses 137 In the new Law the Law of the Gospel 142 35. Thirdly the â—ight acquired 143 Which consisteth by 36. The discourse of Reason 145 37. And the Authority of the Church ibid. The Summary of the Fifth Lecture 1. c. A rehearsal of what before hath been spoken 147 2. c. What is to be understood by the word LAW 149 5. And what by the word OBLIGATION ibid. 6. Question Whether Humane Laws do oblige the Conscience 154 7. c. The first Conclusion Unjust Laws do not oblige the Conscience 155 Which is unfolded 157 9. And confirmed 158 10. The Second Conclusion The Law of man can superinduce a new Obligation to the former 159 11. The Third Conclusion A Law made by one not invested with lawful doth not oblige 162 14. c. A Discourse concerning the Office of a Subject when de Facto it is manifest that he commandeth who hath no right to command 166 22. The Fourth Conclusion Humane Laws do oblige of themselves in general 175 23. And in particular also by consequence 177 24. c. Which is variously confirmed 178 31. c. An Objection is answered drawn from the liberty of a Christian Man 184 36 As also from the allegation that there is but one Law-giver God and Christ 190 37. And from what else is disputed against this opinion 191 The Summary of the Sixth Lecture 1. A proposal of the most remarkable things here treated of 2. The duty of Obedience and the difference of the either sort of Subjection 197 4. The Conscience is free under that obligation which the Laws induce 20â— 6. c. The first Doubt Of a Law commanding a thing impossible 202 8. Second Doubt Or a thing possible but very burthensome 204 9. Third Or what before was necessary 205 10. c. Fourthly Or a thing filthy and unlawful wherein are Questions and Answers 207 10. 13. 14. 1 Whether an unjust Law ought to be made for the publick profit ibid. 2 Whether the Subject be bound to observe it so made 210 3 Whether it be lawful for him to observe it so made 4 what unjust Law he may obey and what not 213 15. 16. c. What is required to make a Law obligatory 214 What a Subject is to do being not satisfied whether the Law be just or unjust 215 18. c. The Fifth of the Obligation of a Law permiting evil 217 22. c. Sixth Of a Law determining a thing indifferent 222 26. The Seventh Of Ecclesiastical Laws in specie 226 27. Those things are refelled which are alleaged against them by the adverse party 228 The Summary of the Seventh Lecture 1. A Rehearsal of what hath been already spoken 238 2. c. The first Doubt who it is to whom it belongeth to make Laws 237 Where it is stated that That the Power of making Laws is the Power of a Superior 238 4. Having an external Jurisdiction 239 5. And that in the highest Command 241 6. c. Which conclusion is largely unfolded 243 9. c. And diversly confirmed 246 11. c. The late fiction of a Co-ordinate Power confuted 248 13. The second Doubt Whether the Consent of the people be required to the obligation of a Law 250 14. c. The chief Command or Soveraignty is from God 253 19. And is an off-spring of Fatherly Power 255 17. c. What are the Peoples parts in constituting a Prince 259 21. The People having given the supreme Power to the Prince have not any right to re-assume that Power again 261 22. c. How it comes to passe that some consent of the people is thought to be necessary to the obligation of a Law 264 25. c. The third Doubt what And how far the consent of the people is required 266 28. The fourth Doubt Of the Laws of lesse Commonaltyes 268 The Summary of the Eighth Lecture 1. A Proposal of things to be spoken 273 2. Of the PROMULGATION of a LAW 274 The first Doubt Whether it be necessary 275 3. c. The second Doubt When a Law is conceived to be sufficiently published 276 6. The third Doubt When a Law that is promulgated or published beginneth to oblige 279 7. c. The Fourth Doubt Whether and how far that man is obliged to the observance of a Law who is ignorant of the Promulgatian of it 281 10. Of a LAW PENAL 28â— The first Doubt How far the Constitution of the penalty pertaineth to the Essence of a Law ibid. 1. c. The second Doubt Of the Obligation of it And what a penalty is 287 3. c. What manner of Law a Penal Law is and how manifold it is 290 5. c. The first Conclusion A Penal Law doth so far oblige as the Legislator doth intend it 293 7. c. The second Conclusion A Law purely Penal doth of it self and ordinarily oblige only unto the penalty 295 9. c. Diverse Objections are answered 299 4. The third Conclusion A mixt Penal Law doth oblige unto the Fault also 304 5. The third Doubt How far the transgressor of the Law is bound to undergoe the penalty ipso facto The Summary of the Ninth Lecture â— The end of the Law is the good of the
it cometh to pass in all other things which are in an order disposed according to the Rules of Sub and Supra Above or Under in which those which possess the middle place have a two-fold relation the one to the thing Superiour under which they are and the other things to the Inferiour which are placed under them Thus a Captain obeys his Lieutenant Colonell but commands the common Souldier I am a man placed under Authority having Souldiers under me Math. 8. 9. And in the praedicamental course and order those things which are placed between the highest Genus and the lowest Species are both the Genera of those Species of which they are predicated and the Species of those Genusses to which they are subjected In the same manner Conscience receiveth a diverse Condition as it hath a relation unto diverse things for it hath the condition of a power regulating or of a thing regulated In the respect of God and the Law of God it hath the condition of a thing regulated but in respect of man and of humane actions the condition of a power regulating And since it is our purpose to expound unto you the use of Conscience of which in our last Lecture we have given you the Definition especially so far as it pertaineth to the performance of things and is commodious for the Institution of our life and manners the course of the Subject and of our studies doth here require that we should now speak of the double obligation of Conscience that shall be usefull to us which is the Active and passive obligation The passive obligation of the Conscience is that by which it is obliged to confirm it self to the Divine Will to which as to a Rule it is subjected The Active obligation is that which obligeth all humane Acts to a conformity thereunto and is as a rule over them There are therefore two parts of this present treatise the first of the subjection of Conscience or the passive obligation The second of the power of Conscience or the active obligation of it III. Of the first of which that this discourse may more legitimately proceed this is first to be premised seeing that the Rectitude of every thing consisteth in its conformity to its next and immediate Rule and so gradually ascendeth to its first and most chief Rule and seeing the immediate Rule or Law of Conscience is right Reason but subject to the Superior Law which God hath praescribed to it the Conscience may there be said to be right when it is conformable to right Reason according to that Law which God the supreme Law-giver hath praescribed to it for the condition of that Act or Work whatsoever it be which at that time we are performing The last Explication or resolution of Conscience is into a certain Law imposed by God on a rational creature as being the Lord of Conscience alone and the Supreme Legislator who indued man with a Conscience and who is the only knower and the Judge of it who alone hath power to save or destroy a Soul accodingly as it hath kept or broken his Commandements James 5 12. There is but one Law-giver who can save and who can destroy Which is so confessed by all men in whatsoever parts of the world they live that there is hardly one to be found who will not of his own accord allow it to be most true in the Thesis or the Position of it but in the Hypothesiis or Supposition when any thing is to be done I know not by what depravedness of the heart it comes to pass that many men and even those men who appear neither to themselves nor unto others to have thrown off all care of Conscience are with such prone affections transported to those things which they desire to be done that they do not only forbear to bring them most faithfully to be examined by that most chief and supreme rule which is onely able to secure the Conscience but they conceive it is enough for the security of their Consciences if either by the pretence of a good Intention or by the Example of some holy man or if by the Authority of some great Divine they can any ways defend themselves and what they have acted And because this Deceipt in the hearts of men hath been too prevalent in all ages and especially in these last times I perswaded my self that it would be a work most profitable and most necessary for the manners in which we live if I could expound those three vulgar suppositions which are so full of the trepanne and so dangerous unto so many Consciences therefore before we do discend to seek and find out the true rule of Conscience we must first remonstrate that there is not any protection enoguh for the security of the Conscience in the performance of any affair if that which is doâ—e be not performed only with a good intention or be supported by the example of a Godly Man or by the Judgement of a Learned one Of the two last God willing we shall treat hereafter our Discourse at this present shall be of that subject which in the first place doth incounter us viz. Of a good Intention IV. Where I shall lay down this Conclusion That the goodnesse of the Intention is not enough to justifie the goodnesse of the Act. That is a good Intention cannot alone and of it self procure that any humane Act should be morally good or which is the same and they are the very words of the Apostle that Evil should be done that Good may come thereby When I say an Act I understand both the inward Act which is in the Will and all the exterior Acts in the executing faculties which are flowing from it it being my meaning that out of a good Intention alone it doth not follow that either the Will it self which is the first principle of acting or any externall Act flowing from it should be said to be good The Intention may be taken two wayes first properly and formally for the Act of Intending that is for the motion of the Will tending to the end by some certain mediums Secondly materially and objectively for the thing it self intended that is for the end to which the Will so tendeth For the Act intending and the end intended are of one and an alike consideration to the goodnesse or the evilnesse of the Act if we look upon the quality of the Act but if we shall reflect upon the quantity of the goodnesse or of the evilnesse of it there will be found some disproportion in the consideration thereof For it being granted that such aâ— Act is good in its own Species and upon the account of its Object and that it may be done for a good end or on the contrary it being granted that the Act is evil and is done to an evil end by how much the stronger the Will is moved whiles it tendeth to that end by so much the Act respectively will either
knowledge whereof hath hitherto shined into our minds whether internally imprinted by the light of Nature or externally revealed by the Word or whether by our own meditation or by the institution of others is now more excellently and more illustriously made manifest unto us The chief Helps or Mediums thereunto are the Discourse of Reason and Authority the last of which is the Judgement and the Practice of the Church of which neither doth the time permit to speak much neither doth it self require that many things should be spoken of it From the Law of Nature many particâ—lar Propositions of things to be done like so many Conclusions from their Principles are deduced by the discourse of Reason to the use of the Conscience In which unless we orderly proceed from the first unto the last we shall be apt to erre as already I have expressed we must therefore be very carefull that in every part of the Discourse the proceeding be legitimate that those things that follow may aptly depend upon those which go before and that the consequence be necessary lest the Conscience being mis-led do not dictate this or that or otherwise to the will than what it ought to do It is again to be feared lest we erre also in applying the holy Scripture unto the use of the Conscience unless a due regard of Reason be had unto Reason and of Authority unto Authority The Papists while they bestow all their studies that nothing be taken away from the Authority of the Church they give but little unto Reason The Socinians on the other side whiles rejecting all Authority they do measure Faith by Reason onely they do onely attain unto this that they grow mad with reason Both have the same errour but it variously deceiveth And both rocks shall not more easily be avoided than if Authority with Reason and Reason with Authority shall handsomely and prudently be conjoyned XXXVI What place either of them ought to have in the right and orderly unfolding and applying the holy Scripture it is not for this time or my present purpose to represent unto you I shall touch upon it in few words There is especially a twofold Use of Reason in relation to the Scriptures Collative and Illative Collative diligently to compare those divers places of Scripture especially those which seem to bear a remarkable correspondence or repugnancy amongst themselves Illative the propriety of the words the context and the scope being found out effectually and artificially to infer Doctrines being in the mean time not forgetfull that we must attribute so much the more to humane Reason in things to be done than in things to be believed as the mysteries of Faith do more exceed the capacity of natural understanding than the Offices of Life XXXVII The chiefest use of Authority is to beat down the boldness of Hereticks and Impostor who indeavour to cast a mist over the clearest testimonies of the Scripture and to elude the force of them with their subtilties and distinctions whose mouths you can no better stop nor more effectually preserve your selves and others from the contagion of them than by opposing unto their Sophisms and Deceits the Judgement and Practice not of one or of a few men not of one Age or of one corner of the Church but of the whole Catholick Church of all places and all times spread over the whole face of the Earth so heretofore those great Advocates of the Christian Faith Irenaeus Tertullian Vicentius and others judged it to be their safest course to deal with their Adversaries by the right of prescription which how advantagious it hath been to Christendome the event hath taught But those things which deserve a larger consideration I am now forced to omit being mindfull of the time of you and of my self and to defer unto another day what remaineth to be spoken concerning the Obligation of Humane Laws THE FIFTH LECTURE In which the Question is thorowly handled concerning the Obligation of Humane Laws in general ROM 13. 5. Wherefore you must be subject not because of anger onely but for conscience sake HAving begun the last Term to treat of the passive obligation of Conscience I proceeded so far that having discovered and disclaimed those subterfuges in which a seduced generation of men do vainly flâ—â—ter themselves that there is some excuse or protection either for the fruit of their Consciences as to things already done or some security for things that remain to be done for the Intention of a good end or by the authority of another mans example or judgment I have proceeded I say so far as to examine and represent unto you that proper and Adaequate Rule of Conscience to which absolutely and simply it ought to conform it self where in the first place I shewed you that God only hath an absolute and direct command over the Consciences of men Secondly that the next and immediate Rule of Conscience is the light with which the mind at that present is endued or to speak after the Schoolmen Ultimum judicium Intellectus practici The last judgment of the practical understanding Thirdly that the written word of God is indeed the supreme and primary 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 but not the Adaequate Rule of Conscience * 4. Fourthly that the proper and Adaequate Rule of Conscience is the will of God which way soever it be revealed or which is the same again the Law imposed by God upon the reasonable Creature Moreover that more fully and more distinctly we may understand what this will of God is I made manifest unto you that Almighty God did lay open his Will unto mankind by a threefold means First by the Law of Nature which consisteth of certain practical Principles known by themselves which is called the Law of God written in our hearts Rom. 2. 15. Which is with an inward light and of the same oâ—iginal as our minds Secondly by the written word of God which is contained in both the volumes of the holy Writ and is an external light supernaturally revealed and infused into our minds Thirdly by a knowledge obtained from both the former either by our own meditation or from the Instruction and Institution of others and this as it were by an acquired light the chief helps and introductions whereunto are the Discourse of Reason and the Authority that is to say the Judgment and the practice of the universal Church II. I also did advertise you to make some way to this following Treatise that besides the Law of God which absolutely by its self and by its own peculiar power doth oblige the Consciences of all men and that in the highest Degree there are also many others which do carry an obligation with them but inferiour to the former and do oblige the Conscience not primarily and by themselves but secondarily and by consequence not absolutely but relatively not by its own power but by the vertue of some divine precept or Institution on which they
are grounded which although they do all agree in this that whatsoever power of obligation they have they altogether acknowledge it as proceeding from the Law of God For the first in every kind whatsoever it be is the cause of the rest neither would the Law of God as already it is stated be the Adaequate Rule of Conscience if it should oblige any beyond it self which it did not oblige by vertue of it self yet these things as I have said that do so agree in one do notwithstanding every one of them differ amongst themselves not only in the Species by reason of the diversity of the matter but also in the Degree according to the efficacy of the obliging and they chiefly consist in a threefold difference for some of them do oblige constantly of which there are two kinds The one in reference to those things whose obligation doth arise from the power of another as humane Laws the Commandements of Parents Masters and the like The other in reference to those whose obligation doth arise from the free election of the will it self As Vows Oaths Contracts Promises and the like Somthings again do only oblige by accident and as it were cursorily according to Time and Place and the exigence of other circumstances as the Law or Reason of Scandal The privilege and priority of order and method do require that we begin with humane Laws concerning the obligation whereof those things which at this time shall be spoken of may all of them be reduced to these two questions 1. Whether humane Laws do oblige the Consciences and secondly how far they do oblige them The determining of most of the particular cases do pertain chiefly to the latter Question which God willing shall be the Subject of our following Lecture we shall only at this time touch upon the first Delectus vim in lege ponimus Cicero 1. de legibus which is Whether humane Laws do oblige the Consciences The Subject of the question needeth not any large exposition Lex or the Law is first so called in an active construction a legendo id est eligendo from choosing as Cicero will have it because the Lawgivers do make choyce of those things which they conceive to be most profitable to the Common-wealth Or secondly as others will have it Lex or the Law is so called a legendo from reading and that in a passive construction because the Laws after they were Enacted were engraven in Tables of Brasse or otherwise legibly written and fastned unto Pillars to be read in publick by the people Aquin 1. 2. quaest 90. Arti 16. Biel. 3. dist Arti 1. Or lastly according to other mens derivation Lex is so called a ligando that is from binding because it doth bind the Subjects to the observation of it but in the Genus of it it is nothing else than a Rule of acting imposed on the Subject by the Superiour being impowered thereunto They are called humane Laws in opposition to Divine for as those Laws are called Divine which immediately are constituted by the authority of God himself whether they be Laws Natural or Laws Positive so those Laws are said to be Humane which although they have an authority derived to them from God yet they are immediately commanded by men and imposed on their Subjects III. The Law of man is thus defined by Aquinas 3. 1 a. 2. ae quaest 90 arti 4. It is the ordination of Reason to a common good promulgated by him who hath the care of the Commonalty His words are Lex humana est Rationis ordinatio ad Bonum Commune ab eo qui curam Communitatis habet promulgata By others it is defined otherwise they differ in the words but almost all of them doe agree in the sense and well so they may for this Definition is very suitable to the publick Law which is the most known and the most usual acceptation of that word And so we use to speak Analogum per se positum pro famosiore significato praesumitur an Analogick being placed by it self is presumed to stand for that which is the most remarkable in the signification But in this present question and to our present purpose Under the Notion and Name of Humane Laws the publick Lawes of Cummonalties are not only to be understood although most chiefly they are and primarily but even the particular Commands of Parents Masters Magistrates and all other Superiors imposed on their Children Servants or their People for when both of them are a kind of Precept in this one thing especially there is a Difference betwixt a Law properly so called and a Mandate for a Mandate or Command is but the Precept of a private person invested with a private Authority but the Law is a publick precept of a person indued with a publick Authority In all other considerations there is but little diversity Certainly as to the effect and force of obliging since it is apparent by the tenth verse of this Chap. that all Legitimate Power whatsoever it be not only publick which notwithstanding I must confess to be the only meaning of the Apostle in that place but also all private power is constituted of God and the Command of a Father to his Son is no lesse a Rule for acting than the Law of the Prince to his Subject all those things which I shall now discourse of concerning the obligation of humane Lawes are so to be understood and let this one premonition suffice that the mandates of private persons be comprehended in the publick Lawes and oeconomical Commands with Politick Constitutions and others of the like nature as far as the Course and Consideration of the Analogy will permit And thus much be spoken of the Subject of the Question The Praedicate followeth V. The Praedicate of the Question is the obligation of the Conscience Now what Conscience is and what is an Obligation in the generality of it hath largely enough been already unfolded by me neither is there any need of repetition When we say the Law doth oblige we mean nothing else than that the Law doth impose on the Subject a Necessity of observing and obeying it You are to know that the Law of its own Nature and as it is a Law doth cary in it self a double force or necessary effect that is the force of directing from whence it is called a Canon or a Rule as it layes open to the Subject the will of the Superiour and sheweth what it is that he would have to be performed by him and a power of obliging by which it differs from Counsel and Admonishment because it commandeth the Subject to obey his will and doth so oblige him to the performance of it that if he doth not obey him he doth sin or erre for Sin is nothing else but an aberration or a receding from that Rule or Law which we ought to follow 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 so Monsters by receding from the ordinary Law
of Nature are said to be the sins of Nature In the second place you are to know that the effect of this Law that is the obligative power of it is grounded on the Will and the power of the Lawgiver so that to speak properly the Law it self doth not bind so effectually as the Will and Power of the Law-giver by causing and inducing an obligation by the means of the efficient Cause but it may be said and indeed usually so it is that the Law doth oblige terminatively that is as a Term of obligation and by the vertue of an exemplar Cause because it is that to which a man is so obliged that he may work according to the Rule of it as an Artist in working is directed by the Copy that is propounded to him In the third place it is to be observed that to oblige the Conscience is so to bind a man up unto obedience under a mortal fault as the Schoolmen speak it that if he prove disobedient he is not only lyable to a temporal punishment either ordained by the Lawes or to be inflicted according to the sentence of the Magistrate but he is deservedly checked by his own Conscience as guilty of the neglect of his Duty and thereby of the Anger of God contracted on him V. The sense therefore of the Question is Whether Humane Lawes have the power to oblige the Consciences of those men to whom they are exhibited in the same way as I have now explained amongst the Protestants Calvin doth deny it as Bellarmin at least doth object against him it is denyed also by Beza and many others Amongst the Papists it is denyed by Gerson Bellarmin himself confessing it and by Almain Bellarm. 3 de laic 9. And as some affirm by Navarrus Amongst the Protestants again it is affirmed by Musculus Ursine and others And amongst the Papists it is confirmed by the Jesuits and a great number of the Schoolmen Some there are who do distinguish on it Rom. 13. as David Paraeus and others And it must needs indeed be acknowledged if by the heat of too much opposition and the affectation of contradiction they had not on both sides erred this controversy had long ago been cast out of the world In disputations such as these I oftentimes do call that to mind which when I was a young man I did read in Aristotle 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 It is manifest that it is so but not why another doth dispute it so In which place he disputes An principia sunt contraria Whether Principles are contrary An detur infinitum Whether there be an infinitenesse or not and the like And therefore in these doubts for this is the true sense and reading of that place in the third of the Physicks we had more need of an Arbitrator who may reconcile both opinions differing rather in shew than in substance than of a Judge who while he determins one part doth condemn the other And this indeed would prevail much in a great part of the controversies which with such contention of minds and bitternesse of stile are now amongst parties carried on in the Christian world if Divines would not suffer themselves to be swayed rather by faction than affection Indeed in this present question as far as I can judge by the perusal of those few books which the infirmity of my health and the streightnesse of my time doth permit to look over the height of the Spirit of contention being on both sides taken away they neither of them do seem to me to be in any great errour but I conceive that those who affirmatively have defined this question to speak freely what I think have spoken more commodiously to the institution of our lives more carefully safely to avoid the danger of error and more properly to the form of sound Doctrine than those who have defined it negatively But that more distinctly I may propose unto you what I conceive is to be determined in this question I will as briefly and as cleerly as I can with some Conclusions comprehend and terminate the whole Subject I will confim my own opinion with some reasons as need shall require and I will answer the arguments which commonly are alleged by the adverse party VII The first Conclusion is that Humane Laws if injust do not oblige unto obedience The thing is manifest enough if the words be rightly understood and that no man might give a misunderstanding to them we are to be advertised that a Law may be said to be unjust either in respect of the End or the Manner or of some Circumstance extrinsecal to the Law it self or in respect of the Matter and Object of the Law For it differeth if that be commanded which is manifestly unjust or whether that which peradventure is not otherwise unjust be yet unjustly commanded That kind of Injustice which adhereth to the Law it self per se that is of it self in respect of the thing commanded doth take away the obligation but it taketh not away that obligation which commeth unto it extrinsecally and as it were by accident that is to say by the fault of the Commander For suppose that a Prince should by a Law made command something to be done the doing whereof of it self were not unlawfull to be done or should forbid that to be done which were not simply necessay And suppose withall there should be no such just cause why he should command this or forbid that being induced to it either by the desire of filthy Lucre or the meer Lust of exercising his Tyranny or by some other depraved affection of his mind this Law is unjust indeed on the part of the King that did command it but the Subject neverthelesse is obliged to the obedience of it The Reason is because that Injustice doth hold altogether on the part of the party commanding and not of the thing commanded So that although the King could not without sin make such a Law yet the Subject without sin could perform that which by that Law is commanded And whatsoever the Subject can perform without sin he is bound if commanded to perform by the Duty of obedience Let the Prince himself look to it by what Counsel or Intention â—e inacted such a Law It doth not belong to me who am but his Subject to examine it neither shall it be imputed unto me if he hath offended in it but as long as nothing is commandmanded but what Lawfully may be performed it shall be imputed to me if I am wanting in my Duty and shall not obey him VIII Moreover I add this also if the Law it self either in respect of the Object or the Matter be peradventure unjust and grievous to the Subject as for examples sake if he demands the payment of a greater Subsidy than the occasion doth require the Conscience of the Subject is not here freed from the obligation But here again we are to distinguish For a thing may be
said to be unjust either as it is unfit or grievous to be born or unlawful to be done In the first Interpretation if it be unjust what by the Law is commanded that is if it be unequitable and not dishonest yet if it be done it is the fault only of him who doth command it He that obeyeth the Command is so far from fault that he should be a great Transgressor if he did not obey it But in the latter sense if any thing what is commanded be unjust that is not only grievous to be born but also shamefull to be done and notwithstanding it is done the Sin lyes heavy on both First on the Magistrate who commanded an unjust thing Secondly on the Subject who acted an unlawful one The sense of the Conclusion is this Wheresoever the Law by its Command doth forbid any thing to be done which is so necessary that it cannot be omitted by the Subject without Sin or wheresoever the Law doth Command any thing to be done which is so unlawful that iâ— cannot be put in execution without Sin that Law doth not oblige in Conscience IX My first reason is De jura praelec 2. Because as elsewhere I have fully explaned there is no obligation for an unlawful Act. Sect. 13. Secondly because as there also I have expressed the first Obligation doth prejudge the following insomuch that a new obligation contrary to the former cannot be superinduced Now any Law commanding a thing unlawful as homicide Perjury Sacrilege or forbidding a necessary duty as the worship of the true God or the performance of our Dutyes to our Prince or Parents c. doth exact that of us which is contrary to our former obligation by the vertue of which divine Precept we were before obliged therefore that humane Law cannot induce any obligation on us The third Reason is Because that no man can at the same time be obliged to Contradictories but if that Law were obligatory it would oblige to the performance of that thing which the Law of God at the same time doth oblige to the not performance of it Now to do and not to do are Contradictories The fourth Reason is deduced from the examples of godly men who have been always so instructed by the principles of their Faith that with a cheerfull spirit they have undertaken and performed the grievous but not dishonest Commands of the Emperours But if any thing though by the authority of Law was required of them which was against Faith or good manners or any ways repugnant to common honesty they openly and couragiously did deny the Command and for the fear of God despised all humane Laws and institutions The Decree being made at Babylon that the concent of musick being heard they all should worship the great golden Image which the most mighty monarch had set up and a most severe punishment threatned to those who should do otherwise the three young men of the Hebrews would not suffer themselves to be obliged by that Law Dan. 3. Because an unlawful thing the worshiping of an Idol was commanded In the Law again of the Persians it being commanded that no man for certain days should make a Petition to any God or man for any thing but to the King of Persians only Daniel did not obey that Law but as his Custom was at his set houres he prayed unto God Dan. 16. And Peter and John being forbidden to speak any more in the Name of Jesus they not only disobeyed the Command but confidently answered Whether it be right in the sight of God to obey you rather than God judge yee Acts. 4. The Reason indeed was because the things that were forbidden were necessary viz. The worship of the true God and the preaching of the Gospel committed to their Chatge X. The second Conclusion The Law of man prohibiting a thing simply evil as Theft Adultery Sacrilege or commanding a thing good and necessary as the worship of God the discharge of Debts the Honour of Parents doth induce a new obligation in the Conscience My first reason is because the proper Cause being given the necessary effect of it will follow unless it be hindred by some other means But an obligation is so necessary an effect of the Law that some have thought that the very Name of the Law hath received its derivation from it as already I have menâ—ioned And nothing seems to be here assigned which may hinder the consecution of its effect The second reason is a Minori ad majus from the Less to the Greater By the confession of all men a Law prohibiting a thing otherwise Lawful or commanding a thing otherwise free doth oblige therefore much more prohibiting a thing unlawful or commanding a thing free But something there appears that may be objected to both these reasons viz. Non esse multiplicanda Entia sine necessitate Beings are not to be multipled without necessity For every man by the power of the Divine Law being obliged to the performance of what is necessary and the eschewing of what is unlawful the same obligation doth exclude that which we think to obtain by humane Laws as superfluous as water praeexistent in a full vessel doth hinder the infusion of new moysture And it seemes that two obligations to the same thing can no more be admitted in one Conscience than can two Accidents of the same Species in one Subject To this I answer that it is usuâ—ly spoken and indeed truly enough Obligationem priorem praejudicare posteriori The former obligation doth prejudice and take place of the posterior which Argument we our selves have even now made use of for the confirmation of the former Conclusion But this Saying hath place only amongst those obligations which are Destructive to one another and whose effects have so great a Contrariety and Repugnancy amongst themselves that one being admitted the other of necessity must be taken away Notwithstanding this doth not hinder but that another and a new obligation may come unto the former provided it be of the same reference and can be consistent with it Neither in this consideration is that of any moment as is alleged of water in a full vessel for the impediment why the full vessel admits of no more liquor doth not consist in the part of the liquor but proceeds from the incapacity of the vessel and the nature of the place which cannot at once receive more bodies And nothing hindreth but there may be many Accidents of the same Species in one and the same Subject provided they be Relative and not Absolute as suppose that Socrates had ten Sons there must be in Socrates ten Paternities for relations are multiplied according to the multiplication of their Terms And we said but even now that the Law did oblige according to the manner of the Term. Therefore seeing that every Law according to the nature of it and as it is a Law is an Inductive to an obligation there will be so
my Judgment In the first place therefore I say That he who de facto is chief Magistrate in a City or Nation although he hath attained to that power by evil Arts is neverthheless to be esteemed by the Citizen as his lawful Prince and by the obligation of his Conscience he is accordingly bound to obey him provided there be no just cause of any doubt to the contrary And in this case this seems to be the only and just cause of doubt when most certainly it is manifest or at least when it seems very probable to the Citizen that there is some other person to whom the chief power is due by greater right If this be not so the Citizen cannot in a good Conscience refuse the commands of the present Possessor For ordinarily it doth not belong unto a Citizen too curiously to enquire by what right the possessor doth possesse it may suffice him for the security of his Conscience that he doth possesse de facto and there is no other man at least so far as he knows who ought by right to possesse that place And besides that which I have already spoken concerning the Roman Emperors the Government of that Common-wealth being subverted to this the whole History almost of all the Kings of Israel doth pertain many of whom relyiug not so much as on the least shaddow of Right but having obtained the Kingdom by unjust Arms and nefarious wickednesse the Royal off-spring of their Predecessors being utterly extinguished that not one of them might remain to succeed in their Fathers Dignities did ascend the Royal Throne and governed the Kingdom by a full and as it were a proper Power and the people rendred obedience to them no otherwise than if they had been invested in it by the greatest right Neither do we find that the people were ever blamed for it But right reason rather perswaded that it so ought to be done For it concerned the publick safety that there should be one who should sit at the Helm of Government and it could not otherwise be better provided for the affairs of his people and himself than that he should be esteemed to have the greatest right who as a true possessor had no right at all And by the Law of Nations those things which belong to none do passe into the right of the present possessors of them XV. In the second place I say That in an Hereditary Kingdom where the right is doubtful betwixt two or more Competitors it is the part of a good Citizen whiles the contention is yet depending and the right to be descerned by a friendly treaty or by war to obey him as his lawful Prince who is in present possession of the Soveraign command Of this Histories can every where afford us very many examples amongst those which are most remarkable are the many differences which happened amongst the competitors of the Kingdom of Portugall after the death of King Sebastian And the six contestations at least for the Kingdom of Scotland after the death of Alexander the King And the most fierce and lasting contention for the Government of the English Nation between the most noble families of York and Lancaster Most certain it is by the consent of all nations throughout the world that the Law did alwayes favour the Person possessing And in these Cases that remarkable saying of the Civilians always prevailed In rebus dubiis melior est conditio possidentis In doubtful things the condition of the Possessor is always the better XVI But again the lawful Prince and Heir of the Kingdom being forced away by the Power of Arms or being so oppressed that he cannot prosecute his own Right If any person whatsoever the said Prince yet living shall violently take into his own hands the Reigns of Government and deport himself as a King when he is more truly an Usurper so that now it is no longer a doubtful right but an open injury If you demand of me what a good Ciâ—â—zen shall do in this condition who peradventure hath taken the Oath of Allegiance in the bâ—halâ— of his lawfull Prince or if he hath not yet he is no lesse indutyed to him than if he had taken it I say in the third place that a good Citizen may not only lawfuly obey the Laws of him who Governs de facto and not de jure that is by present power and not by right and perform all his commands provided there be nothing in them that is uniust or foul but according to the condition of humane affairs there may be such an exigence of necessity as oftentimes it so comes to passe that he may be adjudged to fail even in his duty if he doth not do it It may be objected that but even now it was said that Laws made by one who hath no lawful power do not oblige in Conscience It was so said indeed and it was truly said so and I believe what I have now proposed is not repugnant to it For suppose that a Subject be obliged to perform what by the Law is forbidden yet he is not bound to the Law but to himself and to his Country The obligation is annexed to that Law which is truly so of it self as it is a Law and it necessarily followeth it as the Effect followeth its Cause We have already said that a Law made by one who hath no right unto the Government is not a Law properly but aequivocally therfore hath no power to oblige Therefore whatsoever obligation doth from hence appear to charge the Conscience of the Subject doth arise from another account and not from the Law it self to whom this obligation comes extrinsecally and only by accident as if a professor of Musick should act the part of a Mason XVII You will demand If not from the Law from whence then proceedeth this obligation of the Subject I answer It being the part of a pious and prudent man not only to attend on that which is lawful but also to observe what becometh himself and is expedient for others A good Citizen may be obliged to do that for the advantage of himself and his fellow-Citizens to the performance whereof he is not upon any account or by any right obliged For this obligation doth arise from that double part of duty by which every man is a debtor to himself and a debtor to his Country In the first place it belongs to a prudent man to provide for himself and for his own affairs and it belongs to an honest man to consider in what present condition he is For no man will deny even by the Dictates of Nature but that all must endeavour by all lawful ways and means to defend their lively-hood and themselves and so to deport themselves that they may live safely and in peace to have and to hold to themselves their own Fields Houses and possessions and be careful not to offend those who at their pleasure can take from them both their lives
much tribute is to be paid What merchandise is lawful and what unlawful to be exported or to be imported in such and such a Country What habits are suitable to such and such degrees in an University What Statutes are dispensable and what not c. I say in the third place that such Lawes doe not oblige by themselves and directly I prove first because that God alone is that Law-maker who hath a most peculiar and direct Command over the Consciences of men There is but one Law-giver who is able to save and destroy James 4. 12. In things of a middle nature which are indifferent which for the most part are the subjects of humane Laws we do suppose that God made no Law in particular but left them all to the arbitration of those who are his Vice-gerents on Earth It is proved thus in the second place because that those things only do oblige directly and by themselves which oblige by reason of the matter as of an internal Cause without any respect to the external Causes the Efficient and the Final which would have obliged of themselves if they had not been commanded by Men But things indifferent and of a middle Nature determined by a particular and positive humane Law when they are so qualified in themselves that before the Determination of them they may freely be made or nor be made by any they doe not oblige in respect of the matter therefore not of themselves I say in the third place that the same Lawes notwithstanding doe oblige in particular by the Consequent and by Vertue of the general Divine Commandement And because in this last position the hindge of the whole controversy is turned I will more plainly propound the Conclusion which by and by I will more fully confirm The Conclusion is this Positive humane Laws being rightly and lawfully constituted which contain particular determinations concerning things of a middle Nature and in themselves indifferent and which before they are determined are free to be made or to be unmade do by the vertue of of the Divine Commandement by which we are bound to obey those who are set over us by God so oblige the Consciences of the Subjects to perform obedience to them that they are bound under the penaâ—ty of moâ—tal Sin and the fear of Gods displeasure to give obedience to the said Laws and if they shall fail in the performance thereof they shall endure the checks and sâ—ings of their accusing CoÌ„sciences XXIV This Conclusion is confirmed by divers Reasons the first whereof is taken from this present Text we must therefore be subjected not only for wrath but for Conscience sake The words in themselves are perspicuous enough In the former verses the Apostle had largely insisted upon the necessity of Christian Subjection which he urged chiefly by two Arguments the one from the Institution and the Ordination of God in the two first verses and the other from the fear of the Punishment of man in the two verses following In the way of recapitulation he briefly recollecteth either Argument and repeateth them in this fifth verse and as it is very usual in the Scripture in an order inverted beginning the repetition from the latter and the next member As if he should have said A great necessity of Obedience doth lye upon you in both respects whether the fear of punishment may deterr you or the Conscience of the Duty may incite you If you despise the Power and Authority of the Lawes and do evil consider with your selves that the Magistrate who is set over you is the Minister of God the Revenger of your neglected Duty and ready to draw the Sword with which God hath intrusted him to inflict a corporal punishment due to the despisers of his Lawes But if these things move you not being deluded by a vain hope to find out one subterfuge or another to escape the force of his Arm yet think on God the just Remembrancer of aâ—l Acts committed whether they be good or evil stand in awe of him as of a just Judge Fear your own Consciences those severe accusers those faithful witnesses and importunate Tormentors you cannot avoid them by any Artifices not elude them by any Inventions From the scope of this place the Argument is thus framed Those things which being violated do leave a Remorse upon the Conscience do oblige the Conscience for so it must necessarily be that all remorse or reproof of Conscience must proceed from the sense of some obligation as all other effects do follow their causes but humane Laws being violated do leave a remorse upon the Conscience for that is the expreâ—â—e sense of those words in the Text Necesse est subjici propter Conscientiam You must of necessity be subject for Conscience sake you cannot keep your Consciences upright and safe unlesse you be subjected Therefore humane Laws do oblige the Conscience XXV But some there are who to un-nerve the force of this Argument do in this place give another Interpretation unto Conscience and chiefly herein they defend themselves by the Authority of Chrysostome as if no other Conscience was to be understood in this place but a Conscience only of benefits which is derived unto Subjects from the Political Government I have made mention of this heretofore and praysed it for the sense I confesse is pious though not so genuine And I have thus much against it For in the first place amongst the Ancients Chysostome is singular in this Interpretation whom hardly one or two amongst so many Interpreters have followed Theophyâ—act only and Oecumenius excepted Who are not to be reputed in the number of witnesses for they so tread in the footsteps of Chrysostome that all three of them do make only but one witnesse Secondly No place can be aleged in the Scripture in which either St. Paul or any other of the Apostles have made use of the word Conscience in that sense as Chrysostome here doth feign unto himself Thirdly the Apostle in this place as it is very manifest would induce something which should be of more moment and more effectual to stir up the minds of men than temporal punishment for which end it was better to affright them with the fear of the Divine anger than to admonish them of any benefits received from men Fourthly and lastly the Apostle here in a short repetition of those reasons before alleged would conclude his discourse of Christian Subjection now in the two first Verses of this Chapter he did bring the reason not from the Conscience of the benefit but of the duty XXVI The second reason followeth from the use and the end of the Laws It being most necessary that they should be made and observed for the preservation of humane societies in peace and publick tranquillity for otherwise there would be no certain rule of Contracts no measure of Faith and Civil Justice which are the firmest bands of Cities and societies for the natural and the
written Law of God although both of them by themselves are most perfect in their own kind and being joyned do contain the particular Principles of supernatural faith and the general Principles of things to be done accommodated to all parts of life yet neither of them doth descend to all those particulars which either may be or for the most part are necessary for the preservation of Peace and Order in Cities and Governments For examples sake the Law of reason which is the same with the Law of Nature doth dictate and the Scripture also in the next verse of this Chapter doth teach that Tribute is to be paid for the maintainence of Princes and of the charges of Wars and other publick uses but unlesse it be by a Lâ—w determined how much is to be payed and by what proportion and by whom and in what space of time and other circumstances either thâ—â— payment will miscarry or not be made timely enough or else it will not be enough for the use of the Common-wealth If you say that by this Argument the necessity of Laws is proved indeed but the obligation of them is not determined for Subjects may be enforced to their duties by the â—â—nunciation of punishments We confesse indeed the truth of this if we should go no higher but it furthermore we shall consider without selves how headlong man is burryed to forbidden sins and how bold to venture through them all how 〈…〉 a Keeper Fear is of Duty unlesse that withall there be some sense of Religion to contain men in their duties it will most easily appear how wisely Almighty God the most prudent Moderator of all things hath provided for the affairs of men who hath endued their Consciences with a certain religious reverence to the Law which doth grow up together with their use of Reason From hence it comes to passe that amongst the Heathâ—â—â— ignorant of the true God there were scarce any one found of the antient Legislators but pretended to the people that the Laws which â—e made were delivered to him by some God to 〈…〉 need not give you the names of 〈…〉 Lycuâ—gus and many others whoâ— the 〈◊〉 make mention of it being a truth so well known to all XXVII The third argument is this What is to be done for the Lord we are bound in Conscience to the performance of it But we are bound to be subject to Humane Laws rightly established that is so constituted by the supreme power or by others receiving their Authority from it for the Lord â— Pet. 2. 13. Be subject to every Ordinance of man for the Lords sake whether it be to the King 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 as the Supreme which sufficiently expounds the meaning of St. Paul 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the Higher Powers in the first verse of 〈◊〉 Chapter or unto Governours as unto them that are sent by him c. And that these words 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 For the Lord or for the Love of God as the French Translation hath it doth imply the obligation of Conscience is manifest in the first place by the use of the same expressions in other places of the Scripture as Eph. 6. 1. where speaking of the Duty of Children towards their Parents the words of the Text are Liberi obedite Parentibus vestris 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 in Domino Children obey your Parents in the Lord And by the Duty of Servants to their Masters in the same Chapter v. 7. With good will 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 serving the Lord and not men which in the third of the Col. v. 23. is 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 as to the Lord and not to Men as if he should say For Conscience and not for Wrath only or for the fear of God rather than the dread of Men. It is manifest Secondly from the following words in that place of St. Peter 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 for so is the will of God And â—o St. Paul in the said sixth chapter of the Ephesians and the sixth verse speaking of the Duty of Servants he exhorts them to obey their Masters in the sincerity of Heart 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 doing the will of God from the Heart Now the will of God is the very same Rule of Conscience which I have said to be the Rule Adaequate XXVIII The fourth Argument What Natural Reason doth so prescribe to be done that both the fault and the guilt of the fault are contracted if it be not done we are without all doubt obliged in Conscience to the doing of it For since the sense of Sin pertaineth to the Conscience as also doth the fear of Punishment which ariseth from it whatsoever it is that the Mind rightly conceiveth doth induce the stain of a fault and a guilt of punishment for that fault it doth directly appertain to the obligation of the Conscience Now Natural Reason whose Judgement cannot be indirect doth so far command us to obey Humane Laws that if that obedience be not performed we are immediately conscious to our selves that it is meerly by our own fault that we fayl in that Duty XXIX The fifth Argument â—he Violation of that which necessarily draweth along with it the Violation of the Laws of God doth oblige the Conscience because no man with a safe Conscience can violâ—te the Law of God which is the Rule of the Conscience but the violation of every particular Law solemnly constituted by Men doth necessarily draw along with it the violation of the Law of God to wit of that General Commandment by which God commandeth obedience to the Magistrate Therefore the said Violation of the particular Law of Men doth oblige the Conscience XXX The sixth Argument We are bound in Conscience not to Act that which if it were acted is in a manner to resist God himself For we are bound to be subject and to submit our selves unto God and therefore not to resist him for Subjection and Resistance are contrary unto one another neither can any Man at the same time be subject unto and resist the same person But not to obey Humane Laws solemnly constituted is interpretatively to resist God For he who obeyeth not the Laws doth disobey the Legislative power of the Magistrate which whosoever he is that doth it the said power being ordained by God he doth oppose himself against Gods Ordinance and by Consequence interpretatively he doth oppose God himself which is the Determination of St. Paul in the second verse of this chapter and from whence he orderly concludes the necessity of Subjection 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 â—ccording to Conscience in this veâ—se XXXI From what hath been already spoken it will be no great difficulty to answer to the Arguments which commonly are objected by the Adversaries to this Truth The first and chiefest whereof is taken from Christian Liberty and to the Confirmation of it many places of Scripture are alleged with much pomp circumstance which seem to adstipulate to that Liberty
God which they call positive and from which they would have us freed by the death of Christ whether they be ritual or judicial were only imposed on the Jews but not on us who are Christians Again where it is manifest what God would have done it doth not belong to us by any collation of Comparatives too saucily to determine what ought to be done Now it is manifest that God would have both he would have that his positive Laws delivered to the Israelits by Moses should not oblige the Christians and that the Laws of men rightly and solemnly constituted by the Magistrates should oblige the people under their Authority Thirdly If this Argument indeed were of any force those that make use of it do not observe that by it they do not only take away the obligation but altogether the use also of all humane Lawes For Christ hath no otherwise freed us from the obligation of the Mosaâ—ck Laws than so by taking away the use of them that by us they are no more to be esteemed as Laws Therefore if in the same manner he would have us to be free from the obligation of humane Laws it must of necessity follow that he would have no humane Laws to be any longer extant amongst us So wild a proposition is this of the Anabaptists and other fanatick persons neither is it admitted by themselves who do propound it XXXVI Again they object that of Saint James Chapter the fourth there is but one Law-giver to wit God and Christ who is only Lord of the Conscience He is an invader thereof of Christs right and thrusts himself into the Throne of God whosoever he is that assumeth unto himself a power of obliging the Consciences of other men I answer There is indeed but one supreme Law-giver who hath a direct and Soveraign command over the Consciences of men as by himself and by his own virtue and authority to oblige them which Law-giver is God and Christ as the Apostle hath it But this hinders not but that there may be other Law-givers of an inferiour order and degree who by a power granted and derived to them from that supreme Lawgiver have of themselves a right of making Laws which may consequently oblige the Conscience Just as a King who solely in his own Kingdom hath a peculiar Legislative power yet notwithstanding by his Charter he may give to some College or Corporation a right of making Laws which may oblige all the members of that body not by their own power but by the force of the royal Donation and the Authority granted to them from the King Our Universities as you all know are happy and rejoice in this privilege that in a Legitimate Convocation they may make Laws which we call Statutes and ordain punishments for Delinquents and if it be expedient they may abrogate again and cancel the same Statutes Now there is no man of a sober understanding who will conceive that the excercise of this power doth any wayes derogate from the Legislative right of the King or can be any deceit or prejudice unto it unless it be extended beyond the limits of the Donation defined in the Charter Nay it is rather an excellent and a singular mark of the royal autocrasy that the King hath not only the Legislative power himself but that he can vouchsafe it unto others to be had and used his own right being notwithstanding safe and entire into himself XXXVII The other objections relying on one the same Foundation may be resolved by one a and the same labour I will briefly run them over In the third place they object that the Civil power is meerly temporal therefore belongeth not unto the Conscience which is spiritual Fourthly the end of Humane Laws is the external peace of the Common-wealth and not the internal peace of the Conscience therefore the Laws themselves do only oblige the outward man and not the Conscience which lyeth within Fifthly the Magistrate cannot judge of Consciences and therefore can make no Laws over them it being the same extent of power to give Laws and to judge according to them Sixtly the Magistrate in making of Laws hath no intention of binding the Consciences of the people but only to oblige them to perform that which the Law commandeth which if it be done it is all one to the profit of the Commonwealth whether it be done out of any Conscience of duty or not and it is enough if the effects of Actions be commensurated to the intention of the Agents and they ought not further to be extended XXXVIII I answer and first universally to them all By all these Arguments this only is obtained that humane Laws do not oblige directly and by themselves or by their proper force which of our own accord we grant for we assert no other obligation but what comes to them ex consequenti by Consequence and by the virtue of the general command of God of rendring obedience to the higher powers And from this ground I answer to the particular objections And as the to third I say that the Civil power being meerly temporal cannot of it self and in respect of the Object in which properly and immediately it verseth have a spiritual effect and therefore of it self cannot induce a spiritual obligation neverthelesse by consequence it may have a spiritual effect by a derivation from the power of some superiour cause in the virtue whereof it worketh Now every Magistrate as long as rightly and dâ—ely he doth exercise the Legislative Power which God hath put into his hands he worketh in the virtue of God himself and by ordination of him who is himself a Spirit and as the Lord and Father of Spirits hath a Command over the Spirits of men XXXIX I answer to the fourth that although peace be an external blessing of a Commonalty yet the internal Conscience is obliged to the uttermost to the procuring and preserving of it by all lawful and honest means because that God the Lord of Conscience hath commanded us to love and follow peace and if private certainly much more publick peace Neither is it any way inconsistent that although Conscience be internal yet it is obliged to a thing external for the obligation of Conscience doth not arise from the Nature or any condition of the thing or Object into which it is carryed but from the will of him who hath the right of obliging that is God himself XL. I answer to the fifth that the Legislative and Judicial power doth originally pertain to the same person that is to him who hath the supreme jurisdiction over the Subjects nevertheless dispensatively and by the will of the supreme Magistrate it may both of them and both ways be administred by other persons as he shall think expedient Therefore although God alone hath in himself a peculiar power over the Consciences of the Creature and maketh as well as judgeth Laws by an original proper and absolute right yet
according to his good pleasure he may either delegate a dispensation of either power to another or he may reserve it to himself Therefore it would not be absurd if any man should grant that God in some measure hath delegated a Legislative power to the Magistrate of obliging Consciences but hath reserved the Judicial power over them entire unto himself But there is no necessity that compelleth us to grant 〈◊〉 or to use any expressions that may be helped although by never so gentle an interpretation For we do not say this that God hath given to the Magistrate a power to oblige by his Laws the Consciences of those that be under him but this rather which is a more wary and a more commodiouâ— kind of speaking that God hath given to the Magistrate a power of making Laws which but by the only Authority of God himself do oblige the Consciences of his Subjects For to speak properly the Magistrate doth not oblige the Conscience to obey the Law but God obligeth the Conscience to obey the Magistrate XL. And by this a way is made for an 〈◊〉 to the last objection I do grant indeed 〈…〉 effects of Actions ought not to be extended 〈…〉 the intention of the Agents nevertheless where there are more Agents subordinate there is 〈◊〉 hindreth but that the effect may be extended beyond the intention of the inferiour Agent provided it doth not exceed the Intention of the principâ—â— Agent As in the generation of a Monster which being but boyes we have learned from Aristotle the effect which is the production of the Monster is besides the intention of the second cause or as they speak it of Nature natured that is to say of the person that begets or brings it forth but it is not besides the intention of the first Cause or of Nature naturing that is Almighty God Therefore although the Magistrate in the making of a Law hath no explicit intention of obliging the Consciences yet by instituting the Law he doth institute that which by the intention ordination of God hath an implicit force of obliging them which necessarily is conjoyned to him And this may suffice to be spoken of the obligation of Humane Laws in general I will shortly proceed to the Questions or particular doubtful Cases if God shall permit and my health be more constant to me THE SIXTH LECTURE Of the Obligation of Humane Laws in reference to their material Cause PROV 8. 15. Per me reges regnant et Legum conditores justa decernunt By me Kings reign and the makers of Laws do decree Justice I Have reduced to two general Questions or to two heads what I have propounded to be spoken concerning the obligation of humane Laws The first is whether humane Laws do oblige the Consciences of Subjects Concerning which in the former Lecture I have expounded to you what was my Judgment of it The other Question is How they oblige To which question I have told you there belongeth the deâ—â—ding of some Cases and Doubts which meeâ— in this â—ubject And because they are 〈◊〉 few noâ— of one kind therefore to avoid Confusion and that we may proceed in some Order and Method to that which is to be spoken I have thought is not impertinent to give you a rough Representative of the whole Treatise now in hand And that Method which most of you do remember I observed in those my former exercitations concerning the obligation of an oath I here conceive it very necessary for me to use again that those things may all of them be reduced to the four kind of Causes which I conceive may commodiously be referred to them But because I do find many things to remain which cannot easily be included in those bounds we will assigne them their several â—lasses And they are chiefly two the first of Persons who are under the obligation of those Laws and the other in the comparing of the obligatory Vertue which is in Humane Laws with that which ariseth from the Judgement of the Conscience by Vowes Oaths Promises Contracts and from the Law of Scandal or if there be any thing else which elsewhere obligatory for these two obligations do seem to be in a contestation and justling for precedency to strive which of them should give place unto 〈…〉 To add the third Classis for some certain species of Laws which seem to contain in themselvs somthing singular to themselvs such as are Ecclesiastical Laws Penal Laws the local statuâ—es of Colleges and lesse societies will not peradventure be very necessary seeing in some manner they may be reduced to somthing in the four kinds of Causes and though not so aptly as to satisfy the curious yet so fully as to serve our present purpose for whilst our hearers understand what it is we speak of we have never taken any great care in what method we have gone We will in the first place therefore if God shall grant life health and opportunity to accomplish what we have propounded speak of the obligation of the Laws as to the four kinds of Causes In the second place of the persons who are obliged to the observation of those Laws And lastly of the comparison of the obligations which quarrel amongst themselves giving you before-hand one or two distinctions which will be of great concernment in the whole management of this discourse II. We must understand therefore in the first place Seeing that to the end of Political Government and order there is a two-fold power in those who are invested with Soveraign Authority A directive power by which the Subjects may understand what they have to do and a Power Coactive or Coercitive for by reason of the Analogy it is better so to call it than Coercive by which the Subjects may be compelled to the performance of those things that are commanded if of their own accords they shall refuse to give obedience to them both which are so contained in the Laws that the one consisteth most in precepts and the other is most to be seen in punishments there ariseth from this double power of the Magistrate a double duty of the Subject which answereth to that double power The duty of Obedience in reference to the Directive power and the duty of Subjection in reference to the power Coercitive I here understand subjection as it is properly so called by an appellation Generical which as elsewhere it often comes to passe is restrained to one certain Species For obedience also is a Species of Subjection largely taken The Apostle comprehends both those duties Heb. 13. 17. and signifies them in those two words 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Obey them that have the oversight of you and submit your selves The first whereof pertaineth to the Duty of obedience or of performing that which is commanded by a lawful Superior the other to the Duty of Subjection or of induring what by him shall be inflicted Furthermore As from a double Power there ariseth a double
Duty so from a double Duty there ariseth a double Obligation for every Duty doth infer an Obligation and every Obligation doth suppose a Duty Therefore one kind of the Obligation of Humane Laws is that by which Subjects are bound to obey the precepts of the Law it self and the other by which they are bound to submit themselves to the power of the Law-giver one of the Obligations belongeth to Active Obedience the other unto that Obedience which is called passive and to which we give the Name of Submission III. If it be here demanded how farr Humane Laws can oblige the Consciences of the Subject It is to be said in the first place that all Laws made by one invested by a lawful Power do oblige to Subjection so that it is not lawful for a Subject to resist the Supreme Power by force of Arms whether things just or unjust be commanded This wâ—â— evermore the mind and practice of the Christians in the first Age of the Church living under the most grievâ—us Tyranny of the greatest Enemies to the name of Christ to make no mention herein of the Conduct and the instinct of Nature and the light of right Reason this is most manifest by the Doctrine of the two chiefest of the Apostles For so Peter the Apostle of Circumcision doth diligently instruct the Jews And so Paul the Doctor of the Gentiles doth as carefully instruct the Gentiles St. Peter in the first book and second chapter commands Servants to be subject to their Masters not only good and gentle Masters but those severer ones who would punish them with Scourges when they had not deserved it Saint Paul Rom. 13. doth urge in many words the necessity of Subjection but granteth unto none the Liberty of Resistance be their case or their pretence never so good In the second place I say That although this Subjection is simply necessary yet it is not satisfactory as to Duty unlesse the command of the Law be obeyed where it can be done without Sin And therefore the Subject is bound to Obedience in Conscience in all things that are lawful and honest Hence it is that this word be Obedient is so often and so expressely inculcated by the Apostle Eph. 6. Col. 3. and in other places In the third place I say Where the precept of the Law cannot be observed without sin if the Subject shall patiently submit himself to the Power of the Law-giver he hath satisfied his Duty and is not obliged in Conscience to perform that which the Law commandeth nay he is obliged not to do it for there can be no Obligation to things unlawful It is alwayes necessary therefore to be subject but not alwayes necessary to obey IV. Furthermore seeing both are certain that the Consciences of Men are free Servitus in totum hominem uon descendit Sen. de Bencf 20. and ought to be so which Liberty no Humane Power can or may infringe And that an Obligation is a kind of a Bond and doth induce a necessity which seemeth to be opposite and to fight with just Liberty for neither is he any wayes free who is bound neither can he be free to both who by some necessity is bound to either that it plainly may appear that this Obligation of Conscience of which we now do treat may consist with the just Liberty of Conscience we must necessarily in this place give you another distinction which is that the Precepts of Humane Law may be taken two wayes either formally for the Act it self of giving the precepts or materially for the thing precepted If the Law-giver therefore should intend an Obligation or impose on the Subject a necessity of obeying from giving the Precept of his Law taken materially that is from the necessity of the thing it self which is precepted which notwithstanding in the truth of the thing was not necessary before that Law was made he in that very fact should lay a force upon the Conscience of the Subject which should be repugnant to the Liberty of it But if he should derive his Obligation from giving the precept of his Law taken formally thâ—â— is from the legitimate Authority with w ch he himself is invested that gives it a moral indifferency of the thing precepted in the mean time remaining and in the same state in which it was before the Law was made although the obligation followeth which imposeth on the Conscience a necessity of obeying yet the inward Liberty of the Conscience remaineth uninjuried and intire V. If this seems obscure to any I will illustrate it unto him by an Example A Civil Law being made that no man should eat flesh during all the time of Lent if the Law-giver either in the preface or in the body of that Law should signify that he laid this Command upon his Subjects because it were ungodly and unlawful for them in that time to eat flesh This were to throw a Snare on the Consciences of his Subjects as much as in him lay to weaken their Liberty But if expressely he should signify that the thing being otherwise free in it self he did so ordain it for the profit of the Commonwealth that his Subjects according to the Example of the antient Church should thereby take an occasion to exercise a more abstemious and severer Discipline or if by the words of the Law it self or elsewhere it might appear that the Law-giver intended not by that Law to fasten any opinion of necessity on the thing so commanded there would on this account no injury be done to the Consciences of the Subjects and the liberty thereof For there is a great difference when one thing is commanded by the Magistrate because it is thought to be necessary oris prohibited because it is conceived to be unlawful And when another thing begins then only to be thought necessary and lawful after that it is commanded by the Magistrate and unlawful because it is forbidden by him The first Necessity which anteceded the Law and is supposed by it to be some cause of it is contrary to the liberty of the Conscience but the other which followeth the Law and proceedeth from it as an essect thereof is not repugnant to it The reason of this difference is because the antecedent necessity which the Law supposeth doth necessarily require some assent of the practical judgement but to the following necessity which proceedeth from the Law the consent of the will is sufficient to the performance of that outward work which by the Law is commanded Now an Act of the Will cannot prejudice the liberty of Conscience as an Act of the judgment doth for the Act of the Will doth follow the dictates of the Conscience as the effect followeth its cause but the Act of the Judgment doth precede those Dictates as the Cause goeth before its effect VI. These distinctions being premised I proceed unto the Doubts where in the first place those which we meet with concerning the material Cause
vitious by reason of the defect of a due rectitude in that circumstance From whence ariseth another difference betwixt an affirmative and a negative Humane Law or a Law commanding or forbidding For a Law affirmative doth not give any goodness to the Act which it commandeth if it be otherwise evil in any part of it But a Law negative doth contribute evilnesse to the Act which it forbiddeth although it be otherwise good in every part of it Or which is the same again a Humane Precept affirmative doth make that necessary which it finds to be good a humane precept negative doth make that unlawful which it found to be good both of them what they found evil do leave it to be evil as they found it Notwithstanding both do oblige in their manner and as to us this to the doing of that which by commanding is now made necessary and that to the not doing of that which by forbidding is now made unlawfull XXVI The seventh Doubt remaineth of Ecclesiastical Lawes in Special By Lawes Ecclesiastical I do not understand those Lawes which are constituted by Ecclesiastical Persons without the Authority of the Civil Magistrate which consideration pertains not to this case but to a Cause of an other kind to wit the Cause efficient but those which being made by any lawful Power doe treat of Ecclesiastical things for at this present we dispute only of the material Cause I have never heard of any besides those two above named who denyed all Indifferency or who would not grant to the political Magistrate some Power in things indifferent meerly political But we meet every where with a great number of Innovators who would take from men all Power of making Rites and Ceremonies in the publick worship of God besides those which are prescribed by Christ and his Disciples in the Gospel But sincerely I professe that to give satisfaction to my self and to others in this particular Having perused many Books written by many Authors but especially of our own Nation concerning this Subject I find not any one that can produce any just or any likely Reason of Difference why there may not be a Power of ordaining and determinating concerning things indifferent as well in Cases Ecclesiastical as Political For the Arguments which are urged from Scandal and Christian Liberty and other common Places of the same Nature doe equally fight against the Lawes and Constitutions of both Kinds and do overthrow them both or neither of them Those which are thought to carry a peculiar force against Ecclesiastical Laws and Rites are four which as the time will permit I will briefly and orderly examine they are derived 1. From Christ the Lawgiver 2. From the perfection of the Scripture 3. From the nature of holy Worship 4. From the example of the antient Church XXVII In the first place they object that of the Apostle James 4. 12. There is one Lawgiver who can save and destroy In the reign of Elizabeth many who were the Coriphaei of that Disciplinary Faction did make very much of this argument as the foundation of their whole Cause They alleged that Christ was the only Prince and Legislator of his Church And the Laws which he made did oblige the Church to a perpetual observation of them and that no other Laws ought to be admitted nor any other Legislator acknowledged whosoever shall presume to make any other Lawes besides those which Christ made shall act the part of Anti-Christ and declare himself a rash Invader into the Office of Christ We have discoursed on this place and expounded it already as occasion did require especialy where it was to be proved that God only and his Christ did exercise an absolute and a direct Command on the Consciences of Men But that this hath no greater a place in Lawes politick than in Ecclesiastick he must needs be blind that doth not observe it For why can the obligation of humane Laws in civil things consist with the legislative Power of Christ alone and why cannot there be the same consistence in Lawes Ecclesiastical Who can discover or produce the least shadow of any difference from that Text. Be Christ the Law-giver of the Christian Church Is he not as well the Law-giver of the Christian Common-wealth But the Apostle in that place made not the least mention of the Church nor instituted the least disputation concerning things Ecclesiastical neither doth he treat there at all of Political Lawes or Rites but of the Censures of Private Men. He would have the faithful admonishâ—d to be mindfâ—â—l of Christian Charity and that they should forbear from passing a rash Judgment on their Brothers for God was only the Judge of Consciences who alone made that Law by which every man in the last Day shall be judged This is the true scope of that place This is the mind of the Apostle What is here I pray you that tendeth to the condemning of Humane Lawes or if to the condemning of them why of Ecclesiastical Lawes more than Civil Neither of which either the one or the other are asserted by us by themselves and of their own Vertue to oblige the Conscience XXVIII In the second place they object the Perfection of the Holy Scripture This they say is the Rule both of Life and Manners and which can make a man of God wise to every good work to which if any man shall adde any thing of his own he shall commit a most remarkable trespasse against God and pull most heavy punishments on himself All this is most certain But if the Scripture in all considerations be the absolute rule of our lives of all things whatsoever to be done and if we may believe these Stoicks it extends to the slightest things insomuch that it is not lawful to take up a straw unlesse it be by the prescribed word of God will it not suffice as well for the regulating of things Civil as Ecclesiastical or how can the Laws of â—he Church derogate more from the perfection of the Scripture than the Laws of the Commonwealth or who is he who rightly can say that he hath added something to the word of God who for Honesty and Orders sake did make the Ecclesiastical Laws seeing he propounded not his Laws unto the people as the word of God and God in his word hath commanded that all things in the Church shall be done honestly and in order XXIX In the third place they object the Nature of worship to wit that the worship of God is a thing sacred in which worship all things are to be done by the Command of God and all Humane inventions are to be driven far away as superstitious nay plainly Idolatrous and traditionary Rites Indeed the worship of God is a sacred thing neither is it lawful for man to institute any other worship besides that which God hath ordained But because there is an Ambiguity in the word we are to distinguish of the worship of God which is taken
that Deliverance which God vouchsafed to the Nation of the Jewes under Ahasuerus King of the Persians Esther 9. Thirdly when Moses commanded but one day only in the year to be observed in the seaventh month for a solemn Fast the Kings and Magistrates of that people for what causes it is not known but likely in the remembrance of some remarkable Judgements of God did by their own Authority institute annual solemn Fasts insomuch that in the dayes of the last of â—he Prophets there were four solemn Fasts kept every year viz three others besides that of the seventh month in the fourth fifth and tenth month of all which mention is made Zach. 8. 19. Fourthly the Feast of the Dedication of the Altar called Encoenia was instituted by the Asamonians without any command of God The History is to be read Maccab. 4. 59. And by the Judgement of the most and best Interpreters Christ himself is thought not only to have approved of it but to have honoured it with his presence Joh. 10. 20. Fifthly we find it no where to be enjoyned by any Commandment of God that in solemn Fasts and penitential mourning they should put on Sack-cloth and strew Ashes on their hair but amongst the Jews for some Ages past the long custom was so received and so obtained the force of a Law that Christ himself did use that manner of Speech as from the custom of that Nation and showed not the least dislike of it Mat. 11. 21. Sixthly it is manifest by the writings of the Rabbins that it was the manner also of the Jews before the supper of the Passeover that the Master of the Family should stoop solow as to wash the feet of those of his own houshold which although commanded by no Law of God we find it to be observed by Christ as it is manifest in the History of the Gospel John 13. Why shall I here number up the Synagogues every where builded in so many Cities and Towns for the Conveniency of sacred Conventions and many other things a long Catalogue whereof the Jewish Commentaries doe afford us From all which this may be concluded If so many things pertaining to the worship of God were lawful for the Jews to alter under that yoak of Severer Discipline there can no probable Argument be derived from their Example to overthrow the force of Ecclesiastical Humane Laws THE SEVENTH LECTURE Concerning the obligation of humane Laws in relation to the Efficient Cause thereof PROV 8. 15. Per me reges regnant et Legum conditores justa decernunt By me Kings reign and the makers of Laws do decree just things IN the last Term we did treat of the obligation of humane Laws both in the Generality of them to wit that Laws rightly constituted do oblige the Consciences of the Subjects to obedience so also in the Species as to those doubts which seemed properly to pertain to the material cause to wit how humane Laws do oblige them First we treated of things impossible Secondly of things possible but very burthensome Thirdly of things necessary Fourthly of things unlawfull and dishonest Fifthly of Evils to be permitted Sixthly of Things of a middle Nature indifferent in general Seventhly of Ecclesiastical Rites in Special of all these things which have been spoken that I may not appear too tedious in repetition the Sum is this That Subjects are obliged to obey just Laws but they are not obliged to obey Laws that are unjust And so Solomon in this Text requireth of the makers of Laws that they do decree nothing but what is just I must now proceed to prosecute those things which are yet remaining to be spoken of In the handling of which I will use as much brevity as the subject will permit that so in its due time I may finish the whole work or at least so much of it as pertaineth to the obligation of Laws II. In the order of Causes according to the method which I have elsewhere observed the Efficient Cause doth follow next to the Material And the Formal next to that the Final Cause is the last of all and doth both head the Rear and shuts it up Concerning the Efficient Cause of Laws I have already sufficiently shewed in the third Conclusion of the fifth Lecture That humane Lawes do not oblige unless they are made by a person invested with a legitimate Authority This in the first place is now remaining to be considered of In whom is the just and lawful power of making of Laws or who are those makers of Laws to whom according to the mind of Solomon The Right of discerning righteous things belongeth To give a full Answer to this first doubt which is the chiefest of all by farr in this kind of Cause two things are to be supposed In the first place I suppose the legislative power to be the power of a Superior as to give a Command in which appellation I do also comprehend a Prohibition which is a proper Act of the Law to be the Act of a Superior You are to observe that in this consideration there is not a little difference betwixt these three A Promise A Petition and a Command Without the least distinction it is common to all Superiors Inferiors and Equals to promise For a Father may promise something to his Son and the Son to the Father and the Brother or a Neighbour to his Brother or to his Neighbour But to Crave or to Petition belongeth properly to Inferiors and sometimes in some respect to Equals As the Son beseecheth his Father or the Neighbour his Neighbour to excuse him or to receive the acknowledgment of his thankfulnesse but this belongeth not unto Superiors unlesse it be very improperly and by discending to a lower degree than their condition is But it is so peculiar to Superiors and of Men placed in a preheminence of Dignity to Command that he would be altogether ridiculous whosoever he is whether an Equal or an Inferior that seriously should command his Superior or Equal to the performance of any thing For every Act doth require a Beginning proportionated to it And an Equal hath no Command on an Equal III. Now as to an obligation concerning these three it is thus to be Stated He who craveth one thing of another man obligeth by that petition neither himself nor the party of whom he craveth it for it is a petition and a petition is an Act of Indigence and not of power whose effect because it depends on another and proceeds not from the Agent it self cannot induce any obligation But he who promiseth something to another man doth by his promise oblige himself but he obligeth not him to whom the promise is made for a promise being the Act of a free will every man as he is a free Agent and hath a power over his own will as the Apostle speaketh 1 Cor. 7. 37. can exercise on himself that Right and Power which he hath over his own will but
obliged to the punishment I mean a temporal punishment for the account is far otherwise of the Spiritual and Eternal punishment For examples sake suppose a man hath committed a fault as he hath told a lye or betrayed the secrets of his friend or hath privately detracted from the good name of his Neighbour for which the Laws of men do appoint no punishment he therefore cannot be punished by man with any temporal punishment neither is it necessary that God should temporally afflict him But that no man may too boldly flatter himself assume unto himself hereby a greater liberty of sinning because he thinks himself free from temporal punishment he ought duly to call to mind that he is nevertheless obliged to a far more grievous punishment which is a Spiritual and an Eternal punishment Both which punishments are so necessarily and so reciprocally conjoyned with every fault that the punishment doth alwayes presuppose a fault going before it for God punisheth no man that deserves it not and at the last the deserved punishment must necessarily follow the fault unless it be prevented by the mercy of God remitting the fauâ—t in Christ by Faith and by Repentance XV. These things thus premised to answer to the propounded Doubt I will inferre some Conclusions And in the first place we must judge How the penal Law doth oblige the Subject in Conscience by the mind and Intention of the Law-maker If it be manifest that there is any certainty of it that is if it be certain that the Law-maker did intend to oblige the Subjects not only to the penalty but to the fault also they are undoubtedly obliged to observe that which is commanded by the Law and do not satisfie their Duty if they are prepared to undergo the Penalty ordained by the Law But if it be manifest that he intended not to oblige them but only to the Penalty it is certain that the Subjects are not bound beyond that Penalty The Reason is because the Foundation or Ground of the Obligation of the Law as elswhere is shewed is the manifested will of the Law-maker invested with a Lawful power Therefore where the Will of the Law-maker which is the adaequate Measure of that Obligation which the Law induceth is manifest we need not to make any further doubt concerning the extent of the Obligation XVI Peradventure you will demand what assurance may suffice that a Subject may be secure in his Conscience that sufficiently he understands the mind and intention of the Law-maker I answer that a mathemat calcertitude which is manifest by Demonstration and impossible to be false is in vaâ—n to be expected in morals by reason of the infinite variety of Circumstances and uncertainty of Humane affairs nevertheless a certain logical certitude may oftentimes be had of the Intention of the Law-maker which is to be collected from the words of the Law it self from which his Intention may so perspicuously appear that there needeth not any further Evidence The mind of the Legislator may be manifested partly by the form and manner of the Precept he enjoyneth and partly by the greatness of the Punishment that is to be inflicted but especially from the Preface of the Law it self in which that it may be more acceptable to the people he useth to declare the causes and reasons that do induce him to the making of that Law as also how just it is and necessary for the taking away of abuses and for the advantage of the Common-wealth From all which being rightly weighed together by comparing of the circumstances it will be no great difficulty for a wise and apprehensive man so to learn the meaning and intention of the Lawgiver and to have such a sufficient moral certitude thereof for in morals a moral certitude is sufficient as to conclude that undoubtedly he intended such a thing in the making of it But if the Subject be not of so great an apprehension and Judgment as duly to examine all the importances of the reasons or if he be afraid since every man is not a Competent Judge in his own Cause left he might interpretate the mind of the Law-giver more favourably on his side than he ought to do it would be his best course if it be a business of so great Importance that it will be very uncommodious or troublesome to him to observe that which by Law is commanded to addresse himself to some man of approved Piety and Prudence and plainly and sincerely to declare his mind unto him and to acquiesce in his opinion and his judgment XVII But because it may be and oftentimes it so comes to passe that after all diligence there can be obtained but little certainty of the mind of the Law-maker from the Law it self or not so much as the Conscience of a good man may safely acquiesce therein We must seek further in so doubtfull a case examine what interpretation we are to follow in so doubtfull a case whether that which is the more large favourable as many will have it or as others the stricter interpretation Martin Navar a man of great authority amongst the Canonists is said to be of an opinion that he thought no penal Law did oblige to the fault by it self but only to the penalty Other Authors have been of another judgment and have taught that every penal Law unless by the mind of the Law-maker it was manifest to the contrary did oblige to the fault also I must confess that the extremes of both opinions have been always suspected by me it may so come to pass that as some have spoken too favourably so others too severely That therefore in a thing So dubious we may have something to follow which is certain let this be the second Conclusion A Law purely penal doth by it self and ordinarily oblige only unto the penalty and not unto the fault I say in the first place a Law purely penal whether it be categorically taken or disjunctively I say in the second place by it self for by accident and by the supposition of a former obligation it may oblige to the fault also for a penal Law is made to that end that Subjects by fear of punishment be compelled to their Duties to which they were bound before by a former Law divine natural or humane so those penal Laws he that killeth a man let him suffer the pains of Death He that transporteth Merchandize beyond the Seas let him either pay the Custom or lose his Merchandize do oblige to the fault so that whosoever shall undergo the punishment shall not clear his Conscience thereby unless he shall obey the precept of the Law but they do not bind so by themselves and by their own virtue but by the force of a precedent obligation that taketh its rise from the command of a former Law For the Subject was obliged before that Law according to our supposition was made both by the Law of God not to commit murder and
Conscience that the said obligation doth not signifie any compulsion for to speak properly the Conscience can no more be compelled than the free-Will but a power rather and authority which she is bound to obey to urge her to the performance of that which belongs unto her duty In the very same manner altogether as a King who hath the Legislative power by enacting lawes doth oblige his subjects to the observation of them As therefore in the external Courts Subjects properly and formally are obliged to obedience not so much by the law it self as by the power of the Law-giver howsoever the Law it self is said to oblige but when it is so spoken it is to be understood improperly and as it were materially and terminatively because the obligation is made by it and to it so the Law is said to judge John 7. 5. Doth our Law judge any one although the Law it self doth not judge but the Magistrate because the Magistrate ought to judge according to the Law so in the internal Court the Rule or the Law imposed on Conscience doth not properly oblige it but the power and authority of the Imposer yet so as by the Consequent truly and not unaptly although not so properly the Rule it self may be said to carry with it an obliging Virtue When therefore it is demanded what is that which obligeth Conscience to the performance of her duty At the same time both these questions are propounded First and principally who is the Lord of Conscience who hath right and power to impose a Rule or Law upon it to which it ought to conforme it self And then secondly and consequently what is that Rule of Conscience or that Law which is imposed on it by the Lord thereof and to which by his dominion and Empire over it it is bound to conform it self VI. In the fifth place it is to be understood when any thing is attributed to another it is attributed either by it self or not by it self that is to say by accident Those things therefore to which the power of obliging the Conscience is any ways to be attributed do fall under a threefold consideration For in the first place they either oblige the Conscience simply by themselves that is they do directly oblige by themselves and by their own power not only as the Term by it self is opposed to the Term by accident but as it opposed also to this Term by another Or in the second place they do oblige by themselves respectively that is as the Term by it self is opposed to the Term by accident and not as it is opposed to the Term per aliud that is by another The meaning is they do not oblige by their own proper power but by the vertue of another having a power to oblige Or thirdly they do oblige by accident only and in neither of the considerations by it self It is besides observable that in those things which do oblige the Conscience in the second consideration there is some difference to be made according to the different account of the cause from whence the obligation doth arise For it is one thing when the obligation is forcibly imposed by the authority of another and another thing when it is willingly contracted and of its own accord By this that hath been spoken it is manifest that there are four degrees of those things which do oblige the Conscience For examples sake to give you a short view of what hath been already spoken and of what as yet remaineth to be spoken you are to understand in the first place that the express Commandment of God doth oblige properly by it self and by its own force In the second place the Laws of men and the mandates and orders of our Superiours do oblige the Conscience but by no power or authority but by the vertue of the Commandement of God Thirdly Vows and promises being made of our own accord when it was wholy in our own choice to do otherwise do in their proper fact and freedom of election oblige our Consciences to the performance of them Fourthly and lastly the Law of consideration of Scandal and offence doth by accident oblige the Conscience VII We are here to understand that only that obligation which consisteth in the first degree is absolute and universal the other three are relative and particular I say it is absolute because it doth directly and alwayes oblige and because it obligeth all persons and the obligation of it is never to be cancell'd The others may be said to be relative both because they do not bind of themselves or by their own power but by a relation to some precept or institution of God as also because they do not always or every where oblige and in every case but when those considerations do require which they do bear a reference and respect unto The obligation therefore of the first degree is predominant over any obligation whatsoever in the other three insomuch that it is able to make them of no effect but it is impossible for them to render it frustrate Nay if we take it universally the obligation in any superiour degree the other being equall is more valid than the obligation in any inferiour degrees whatsoever and doth judge over them either by taking away what was done and contracted as oftentimes or at least by hindring what was to be done as always Therefore as to the power of obligation the Laws of men must give place to the Laws of God private contracts and promises to publick constitutions and the Law or consideration of offence or scandal to them both VIII These things being thus premised that we may be happy in a certain Rule by which we may know how to live I will according to my promise comprehend in some few conclusions those which are most necessary to be understood concerning the Rule of Conscience and the passive obligation of it The first conclusion is That God alone hath a most proper and direct command on the Consciences of all men So that none but God alone hath power to impose a Law upon the Conscience of any man to which it ought to be subjected as obliging by it self I say by it self for we are all bound in our Consciences to observe the just Laws of men to keep our vows and promises made to God or men and to be careful that we become not a scandal or an offence unto others But we are bound unto all these things upon no other tye but as they are reduceable to the will of God commanding them as in its due place we shall give an account unto you of the particulars thereof IX This Conclusion is proved first by the words of the Apostle already mentioned There is but one Law-giver who can both save and destroy In which words two arguments do prefer themselves to our observation In the first place they assert there is but one Legislator not one picked out amongst many not one above many but one
many obligations as there are Lawes being correspondent to them as to their Terms Neither is this Multiplicare entia sine necessitate to multiply Beings without necessity for the causes being multiplied it is necessary that the effects of those causes should be multiplied also And that it may seem incredible to none we may behold it or something very like unto it to come to passe every day both in things natural and moral It is evident to the sense that a man may be tyed to a Pillar with two or three cords as Peter Acts 12. 6. He slept 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 bound with two chains And it is to be doubted by none but that a man having obliged himself to the performance of such a duty which by the Law of God was incumbent on him he notwithstanding that first obligation may again oblige himself by Vow or Oath or Promise to render that obligation the more effectual Thus Jacob the Patriarch vowed that Jehovah should be his only God Gen. 28. 21. And David swore that he would keep the righteous Judgments of God Psal 119. 106. And all of us who are Christians when we were sprinkled at the Fount did by a new Covenant of Baptism bind our selves to Faith in Christ to renounce the Devill the World and the Flesh and to keep the commandements of God to the performance of all which duties most sure it is that we were obliged before XI The third Conclusion Humane Lawes whether things unlawful or necessary or things indifferent be commanded being made by a single Person or by a Commonalty not having a lawful power do not oblige in Conscience As if the Mayor of this City should impose Laws on this University or my next Neighbour should command my servant to yoak my Oxen to bring in his harvest c. Or as if a company of seditious Persons being met in some one County of England as they did heretofore under the conduct of Ket in Norfolk and many times in other places should demand of the inhabitants a certain Sum of money or should publish Edicts to exact a servitude of their persons not due unto them and by force of Armes should compel them to obedience although it peradventure were lawful for them to do as they were commanded it being found they were unable to make resistance yet certainly their commands should oblige no man in Conscience to the observation of them Aquin. 1. 2. quaest 96. art 4. First because the said Laws are Laws only in name and aequivocally But in deed and in earnest they are rather violences than Laws and an aequivocal Cause doth inferr no effect as a sentence spoken by one who is no Judge doth not oblige the Parties And Secondly Because the Power of obliging as already hath been mentioned is not effectively derived from the Law it self but from a will joyning with the power of the Law-maker therefore where Power is wanting the Cause that is properly the efficient of that obligation is wanting also and the proper Cause being defective it is necessary that its Effect should be deficient also And this is easie to be collected by the words of the Apostle in this place who deduceth the Duty of obedience on the part of the Subject from the Power of Jurisdiction in the Magistrate from whence it is no man is bound to obey him who hath not the Right of Commanding XII If you shall object that an unâ—uly multitude of factious persons such as before I have made mention of have the Power of Commanding because they can compel those to the performance of their commands over whom they exercise their Tyranny I answer that the Power of which I speak and on which Obligation doth depend is not that Power which the Greeks call 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 that is Might or Puissance which by most is used in this sense by which a man is potent to give such an effect to his Intention that it finally cannot be hindered but that Power which the Greeks call 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 that is a lawful Power which cometh by some Right of Nature or of Nations or by a Civil Right in respect both of the person who bears it and of those who are any wayes substituted under him This Power in this present Argument the Apostle doth so much presse that in the space almost of three Verses he names it five times and makes not the least mention of the other XIII But you will allege that those who in the time of the Apostles were the supreme Governors did ascend unto the height of the Empire not by any Right of Inheritance nor by the free Suffrages of the people or any lawful Authority but by Force and Treachery or military Tumult and yet the Apostle notwithstanding doth expressly attribute an 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 that is a lawful Authority to them as unto legitimate Magistrates and imposeth on their Subjects a necessity of obeying them and that not for fear of Punishment but for Conscience sake We must confesse indeed that the first Emperors of Rome after the eversion of the Common-wealth did not attain unto the Empire by any great lawfulnesse of Right yet withall we must confess that they were invested with the Right of the Sword and a legitimate Jurisdiction to which all whosoever were under the Roman Power ought to be subject for there was not then any single person that could challenge it as due unto him by more Right and the Senate and People of Rome in whose Power not long before and for many Ages also was the chief Command what by fear and what by obsequiousness did give way to the losse of their Privileges and acknowledged those for their lawful Princes who had obtained the Empire by unlawful Acts. This being granted which certainly in my opinion can no wayes be denyed there can remain no other doubt concerning the necessity of obeying But in a dubious case what is the duty of a Christian whether and how far he is obliged in the Court of Conscience to give way unto the Times and to accommodate himself to the present manners and be obedient to the Lawes the Edicts and the Commands of one who in his Judgment at least hath attained to the Soveraignty de facto that is by Power and by no Right at all it is no easy thing to judge neither is it the part of a wise man to determine any thing on so great and so high a Point XIV I here therefore do conclude on nothing positively but that I may not be censured to be wanting in my duty or at least to your expectation if I should make mention of a Question and give you not the least satisfaction in it I will in a a few words expound unto you what seemeth to me having been very serious hereupon to be most consentaneous to true reason unless peradventure some circumstances as oftentimes it comes about in such deliberations shall grow too much upon
go with him twayn A man therefore may and if occasion so requires he ought to depart from his own right for his own peace but much more for the publick tranquillity and obey him who hath no lawful power to command But above all he must have this Reserve so to depart from his own right that by so doing he taketh not any thing away from the right of another And Abraham in this did justly and wisely Gen. 14. who though he made the King of Sodom partaker of the spoils which by the right of war was his portion from the five Kings that were overthrown yet he cautelously provided that both the Priest should have his Tenths and his three Associates in the War should not want of their full proportions In the like manner obedience is so to be payed to an Usurper that the fidelity due unto the lawful Heir be no ways violated and that his right suffers no prejudice by it XXI But it may be objected How can this be done That which is grateful to an Usurper cannot but be most ungrateful to the lawful Prince No man can serve two Masters that look so contrary all whose Votes Mat. â— Studies and Counsels are violently carryed on to the ruine and destruction of one another I answer the account being well computed there is no reason that we should think that this obsequiousness of the Citizen so ordered and bounded as we before have delivered should be unpleasing to the lawful Prince but altogether to the Uâ—urper nay we may presume that with the consent of the true Prince himself it ought to be so For by this obedience the Citizen is not to be accounted to have assisted so much the unjust Possessor as the whole Commonalty or Republick the safety whereof doth no lesse concen the true Heir than the unjust Possessor Nay peradventure much more because being the true Father of his Country he is to be believed to love it sincerely to wish it more happinesse than the other who having excluded him hath thrust himself into his house and hath excercised a command over his Family and by how much the affections of a Mother to her Children are more pure vehement than a Step-mothers as may appear by that remarkable contestation of the two Harlots before Solomon the true Mother who knew the Child to be her own desiring the safety of it and that it should be given rather to another nay unto her Adversary than that it should perish by the Sword so it is most likely and it is to be presumed that the lawful Heir hath a greater care of the safety of his people whom although for the present under the yoak of a Stranger yet he doth acknowledge them to be his own hopeth well that in time they will prove profitable to him than he who having newly usurped the supreme Magistracy will be more careful it is likely to establish his newly acquired Greatness than to procure the safety of the publick and therefore the lawful Heir had rather that as modestly as they could they should accommodate themselves to the present affairs for their own safety than to run into a certain destruction by making an unseasonable and an unsuccessful opposition against one that overpowers them And thus I have given you my opinion concerning this most difficult and high question determining possitively of nothing but being ready if any man shall render more certain reasons to correct what hath been spoken and to jump in to the same Judgment with him XXII The fourth Conclusion followeth Humane Laws concerning things not unlawful do by themselves and directly in the general oblige the Conscience Which is as much as to say This general precept that Subjects should obey humane Laws being duly made is obligatory directly and by its self And this Calvin himself who doth not use to attribute too much to humane constitutions doth acknowledge who in the 4 Institute 10. § 5. doth advise that such a distinction be made inter Genus et Speciem betwixt the General and the Special that although it be denied that Laws in the Special do oblige the Conscience yet it must be granted that they have an obliging power in the General The reason is perspicuous for this general precept doth pertain to the eternal and Divine Law every part whereof doth directly and by it self and not only by consequence oblige our Consciences It pertains to the Law of God in a double respect First Because natural Reason dictates that Peace and Order which is the Soul of Common-wealths and of all humane Societies cannot be preserved but by an Obedience to the Lawes according to the solemn Constitution of them Secondly Because that God in the Holy Scripture doth command us to be subject unto those who are over us in that Order as God hath appointed and to obey 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 he Higher Powers as may appear in the first and second verses of this Chapter and not to draw back our necks from their yoaks upon a bare pretext that they are meet men 2 Pet. 2. 13. and Creatures such as we are 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the Sons of Adam of the same â—ace of mankind and subject to the same Affections Sufferings Inâ—irmities and Casualties as our selvs but rather being mindful that Almighty God by a delegated Power did set them over us as his Vicegerents on Earth and hath been pleased to vouchsafe them so much honour as to communicate his own Name unto them as to so many visible and mortal Gods Psal 82. 6. I have said you are Gods we should reverence honour and obey them with the greatest Reverence and though not for their own sakes who are but men as we are nor composed of better Clay yet in respect to the Divine Oâ—dination who making them to bâ— Prâ—nces hath preferred them into a higher place abovâ— other men and in some measure made them Partakers of his own Power 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 according to the Lord as the Apostle Sâ— Peter â—n another place and by consequence 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 â—ccording unto Conscience as the Apostle Sâ— Paul hath it in this place XXIII The fifth Conclusion Humane Lawes according to the solemn Constitution of them doe oblige theâ—â—â—science even in particular and although not directly and by themselves yet by Consequent and by 〈◊〉 of the general Divine Commandment I say in the first place Lawes solemnly and rightly constituted that is both by reason of the efficient Cause being made by him who is indued with lawful Power and by reason of the matter commanding nothing unlawful dishonest or filthy or any wayes unworthy the Duty of a Christian For we already have asserted that the Lawes which do offend in either of those two senses are not obligatory I say in the second place In the particular that is to a particular Determination in things of a middle Nature and in others As what and how
the duties of Divine worship but at what hour the people shall meet and in what place what form of words are to be used and what must be the gesture of the body the several parts of the service and other things of the same nature are all of them to be determined by Humane constitutions In the same manner the Law of God forbiddeth Theft to be commited but what kind of Theft is to be animadvertised against with such a punishment and what with another punishment is from the Laws of man From this determination of a general thing and undetermined by the Law of God the Law of man hath this privilege that it can induce a new obligation on the Conscience of the Subject not only different from the first obligation in number and in respect of the Term because it is of another dependency but also diverse in the Species and in respect of the matter because it is exercised on another object for the first obligation which ariseth from the Law of God is to the thing it self as it is a substance but this obligation which the Lawes of men do super-induce is to the manner of the thing or to the circumstance of it X. The fourth Doubt is of a thing that is foul and unlawful which is indeed a Doubt of great moment and containeth many cases for almost all the Conditions which are required to the right Constitution of Lawes a 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Aristot 5. Ethic. 3 are reduced to Justice alone And not only for that reason that universal Justice doth in her Circle comprehend all Vertues but especially for this reason that particular Justice and more specifically that Justice which is called Legal Justice is above all other Vertues the chief and the only Pillar of Common-wealths and all humane Societies Concerning this Doubt In the first place it is questioned Whether an unjust Law ought to be made for the publick profit Of which opinion was Nicho. Machiavel who affirmed that the due matter of Laws whether just or unjust was that which was most commodious for the preserving the encreasing of a politick State for when in his opinion the end of Civil Power is the preservation of it self and the encrease of Soveraignty which Power cannot vigorously be preserved much less the Soveraignty enlarged if all the Lawes and Councils of Princes were examined according to the exact Rule of Justice and Honesty It concerned those who sate at the Helm so to bend as occasion should require the Rule of Honesty as to make it subservient to the publick advantage for the end in all things is to know how best to measure those things that are of a middle nature what so ever was the opinion of Machiavel this was certainly the Judgment of a personage of great account amongst the Lacaedemonians who openly pronounced that was most honest to the Spartans which was most profitable to them To confirm this opinion that of Horace is alleged Ipsa utilitas justi propè mater et aequi Hor. 1 â—aâ—yr 3. Profit almost the very mother of Justice and Equity And how thriving a Principle this is may be proved by the Example and successe of the Turks who relying on this Foundation most happily have far and near extended the bounds of their Empire throughout Asia Africa and Europe And to speak the truth had not some men who above all others do professe themselves to be Christians nay the only Christians and delight to be called the Reformers and the Restorers oâ— the purer Religion made a great use of this most wicked principle the Christian World had not every where groaned under so many Sacrileges Perjuries Seditions Warrs Tumults and Tyrannies XI But on the other side Princes on earth ought not to abuse that power which they have received from God against his will or otherwise than he intended for this power is not given them so much as to Lords as it is intrusted to them by God as his Ministers 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Rom. 13. 4 6. It is intrusted to them upon that account that they should work righteousnesse and not exercise Tyranny and an unjust Domination And this is manifest by the very words of the Text By me Kings Reign and Princes decree just things As if to Reign and truly to be a Prince were nothing else but to decree those things which are just and righteous And the Prophets do every where denounce the most severe anger Esai 10. 1. and vengeance of God against those Kings Princes who had decreed unjust Judgements Psal 94. 20. and had meditated iniquity as a Law Neither is the inlargement of Empire the â—nd of Civil Power as the Politicians of this world do affirm but the preservation of the people in Tranquillity and peace with all Godlinesse and Honesty 1 Tim. 2. 2. For Justice if there be any other is the best preserver of the publick peace And as the Righteousness of Faith doth procure and conserve the inward peace of the Conscience so legal Justice doth preserve the outward peace of the Common-wealth Esai 32. 17. the fruit of Justice saith the Prophet Pindaâ— shall be Peace and the Theban Poet calleth Quietnesse the Daughter of Justice Neither is that the meaning of Horace as if Honesty were meerly to be measured by profit the scope of his sense is far otherwise to wit that men wild at first and wandring by the observation of the publick profit and the common good were brought at the last to draw together into one Body and maintain Societies and by just Laws and Punishments to restrain injuries and wickednesse The Arguments drawn from the Turks whom it appears that God especially had raised up and made them as his Scourge to correct the great perfidiousnesse and other Sins of the Christians or from any others to maintain a bad Cause by the prosperous successe that did attend it do favour rather of the Alcoran of some abhominable miscreant than of the Purity of the Gospel of our Saviour Christ XII The second Question is Whether an unjust Law though it ought not to be made yet being made may oblige the Conscience of the Subject so far as to be bound to observe it For many things there are which ought not to be done yet being done are valid And it may so come to passe that what could not without sin be commanded yet without sin may be performed as abundantly we have confirmed in our fore-going Lectures The reason of this doubt is Because that true obedience is no Disputresse for the practice of obedience doth properly consist in this to subject ones self to the will of another without the least murmur or dispute Nimis delicata est obedientia saith Bernard quae transit in genus causae deliberativum That Obedience is too delicate when it comes once to be so deliberate as to inquire after the Cause thereof But I answer briefly the Conscience of the
certain pay of some Tribute and thus houses of Incontinence are permitted at Rome XIX This distinction being permised In the first place I affirm That privatively many Evils are necessarily tolerated in all Common-wealths for it is impossible that the Laws should extend themselves to all the Species and kinds of vitious Acts or that all kind of Sin should be restrained by humane Laws The Law of God hath this only which is admirable and peculiar to it self that it alone commandeth all things that are to be done and forbiddeth all things that are to be avoyed Now in this permission there is no place for obligation for it is necessary that every obligation should arise from some Act and not by the privation of an Act or a Non-Act I say in the second place That the negative permission of evil may be lawful For if there be some evils that cannot be quite taken away without some great Inconvenience to the publick it pertaineth to the political prudence of Government so to moderate the use of it and circumscribe it within certain bounds as to make it subservient to the Publick profit And this by the Example of God himself who permitted the Divorce of Wives to the people of Israel to that purpose as Christ the most excellent Interpreter of the Law expounds it Mat. 19. â— Lest by the hardnesse of their hearts and the unbridled roughnesse and cruelty of Husbands to their Wives there should arise more grievous inconveniences I say in the third place That by this Law there is no man notwithstanding obliged to perform that which this Law permitteth for the end of permission is not that that be done which by this Law is permitted but that nothing be done beyond that which the said Laws permit Therefore as the permission it self is only negative so it induceth only a negative obligation That is the Subject is obliged to do if he pleaseth what the Law permitteth and not to exceed the bounds which that Law prescribeth I say in the fourth place That the positive permission of Evil is not lawful if there be more or more grievous Evils which follow that permission than those are for the remedy whereof it was pretended especially if to the permission and imposition of a filthy thing there is added a suspition of filthy lucre I say in the fifth place That by such a Law no man is bound to the performance of that which is permitted nay for all the permission of that Law every man is obliged to a non-performance My Reason is as to the former part Because it is against the Nature of a permission to oblige for a permission granteth Liberty and every obligation is a kind of a Bond. As to the latter part Because we suppose that what by the Law of man is so permitted is of it self evil and by the Law of God we are obliged not to do Evil The permission therefore of Evil as it is a bare permission doth oblige no man to the performance but as it is the permission of Evil it doth oblige every man not to do that which is permitted XX. But it hath often heretofore been spoken that every Law hath a power obligative which so individually doth accompany it as but to grant the Law the obligation must necessarily follow and take away the obligation you take away also the Law with it It may therefore be objected that we must hereupon either deny the permissive Law to be a Law or acknowlege it doth oblige To answer to this objection we need not fly so far as to deny the Law permissive to be a Law which we do acknowledge not only to be a Law but a Law properly so called Certainly that Mosaical Law of Divorce mentioned Mat. 19. Though it comes by name of permission 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 in the eighth verse yet in the seventh verse of the same Chapter it is called a command 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 What is not the very name of a Law every where given to it is not the Definition of that name as congruous to it as to a Law either commanding or forbidding something to be done so that it cannot be denyed but that the Law is predicated of them all univocally and as a Genus in reference to its Species it is not then to be granted that the Subject by this Law is obliged I do so conceive it altogether to be granted which that it may more rightly be understood to be not incohaerent with those things which have been already spoken of a permissive Law I say in the sixth place That every Law permissive as it is a Law doth oblige the Subject in his Conscience to the observation of it The reason is manifest for an obligation as often it hath been already spoken is a necessary effect of the Law and not to be severed from it Which that it may not seem to be quite contrary to what now hath been delivered these two things are to be observed which therefore the more remarkably I shall give unto you The first that I said the permissive Law doth oblige to the observation of it Now it is one thing that the Subject is obliged to the observation of the Law which I still affirm and another thing that the Subject is oâ—liged to do that which the Law permitteth which I have before denyed and do deny it still The second that I said the permissive Law as a Law doth oblige which is true but I did not say it did oblige as it was permissive for that is false because we are to know that the force of a permissive Law as it is a Law doth not consist in the permission it self which being differentaa divisiva but a divisive difference of the Law it must needs come in order after it as every difference divisive is by nature in a posterior place to the Genus which doth divide it and presuppose it but is for the most part expressely or at least virtually contained in that praeception which is as it were the constitutive and formal difference of the Law and in the very words of the Law it self For this preception is that from whence the obligation of the Subject doth first arise and to which his obedience is ultimately terminated I will make it manifest unto you by example By reason of the necessity of borrowing of money the maker of the Law permitteth of Usury in a moderate proportion amongst the Citizens a punishment being denounced to those who shall exceed by taking more use than the Law allowes I will not here define whether Usury be simply and in every kind of it unlawful or not neither doth it belong to my present purpose nevertheless this is certain that were it never so lawful no man by that permissiou is obliged to the exercising of it But in this Law besides this permission which obliges no man there are two things which belonging to the Precept of the Law have thereupon
presently as soon as ever they are published according to the manner of the Country oblige all those Subjects to whose notice they are arrived or where it was not in the fault of the Lawmaker but that they might have come to the knowledge of them For seeing the obligation of the Law dependeth on the will of the Law-giver and not on the notice of the Subject it followeth that the obligation of the Law is of force when the Law-giver hath sufficiently expressed his will to his Subjects by some outward sign whether it were made known to all his Subjects or whether it so fell out that some of them peradventure were ignorant of it For grant but the Law and the obligation is granted which hath its dependency on the Law as it is a Law and necessarily followeth it as every necessary Effect doth follow its proper Cause as already we have often mentioned Therefore there being nothing wanting to a Law that is required to the compleating of its essence after that it is made and sufficiently published it altogether followeth that a Law so made and published ought presently to inferre an obligation neither is it any wayes inconvenient that an obligation be made and become ours by the will only Act of another we not knowing it if the said obligation doth carry with it the nature construction of a moral Debt as the Schoolmen speak it Although from obligations and debts w ch arise from contracts the case is otherwise VII The fourth Doubt How the Law doth reach unto those who though after a sufficient publication of it and the elapse of the time prefixed by the Law have not yet actually any knowledge of it Which is to demand whether he to whom the Law is not actually known be so guilty of the fault that he transgresseth if he doth any thing against it and thereupon deserveth that punishment which that Law inflicteth on the transgressors of it The reason of this Doubt is on the one side because that obligation is vain or rather none at all which obligeth neither to the fault nor to the punishment And on the other side both because it is absurd to be bound to that which is impossible but to observe a Law which we know not is certainly impossible as also because from the two Offices of the Law above specified it is necessary that the power of directing as first by Nature must go before the other power of obliging so that the Law cannot oblige any but whom it directeth and it cannot direct any but those to whom it is known This being laid down in the first place which admits of no scruple viz. that the Subject to whom the Law is known is obliged both to the fault and to the punishment As for those that know not the Law I answer to the propounded doubt and say in the first place that he who by his grosse negligence is ignorant of the Law when it proceeds from his own fault that he is ignorant of it is no lesse or at least not much lesse guilty of the fault and deserveth punishment as well as he who doth know the Law and doth it not For the Ignorance of that thing which every man ought to know and may know doth excuse no man And in the interpretation of the Law there is no great difference betwixt a wilful Ignorance and a fault committed VIII I say in the second place That he who is therefore ignorant of the Law because he was a little more carelesse or negligent than in a businesse of that moment he ought to be although the fault be never so light as the Civilians term it yet because it is manifest it was done by a fault and by his own Fault he is not altogether free from the obligation of the Law My Reason is because that Ignorance was vincible as the Schoolmen speak that is which could be overcome for if the Subject had been so diligent as he ought to have been and as the dignity of the cause required and as wise men use to be in their imployments of greater weight he could not be ignorant it is presumed of the promulgation of the Law Now his Ignorance of that Law according to which every man is bound to direct his Actions being in him an ignorance that might have been helped this Ignorance cannot be but culpable and if culpable in whatoever degree it be it cannot but accordingly be inexcusable It may be argued But by how much the lighter the fault is the Ignorance in both Courts is so much the more excusable and amongst the equal Arbitrators of things doth deserve a more easy pardon It is to be answered that he was before obliged by the Law although he was ignorant of it And it is manifest by this because as soon as ever by the Testimony of some man of Reputation he understood that the Law was published he immediately in his own Conscience judged himself to be obliged by that Law now there could arise no obligation from a new report or by the Testimony of this man neither is there any power of obligation either in himself or in his Testimony therfore without doubt he was obliged before by that Law although he had neither notice of the Law nor any Conscience of the Obligation IX I say in the third place He who in earnest and invincibly either by accident or any other impediment and by no neglect of his own is ignorant of the promulgation of a Law as if any man should be visited with madness or labour under some long or grievous disease or being newly returned from forein Countries should never hear of the publication of such a Law nor indeed could hear of it he is not by that Law obliged either unto the fault or any punishment of the fault so properly named Nevertheless by the same Law which he is invincibly ignorant of he may become so far lyable to a punishment improperly so called that is to some losse to be sustained The first part of this position is thus proved No man committeth a fault or deserveth punishment who doth not Sin but he who keeps not a Law of which he is invincibly ignorant doth not Sin for if he should sin he were obliged to that which is impossible therefore he cannot deservedly be blamed nor justly punished But that he may be obliged to some dammage to be sustained by that Law which is the other part of our assertion shall appear to be most clear by this example Suppose there be a Law prohibiting some certain kind of Trassiquings and Contracts by which Law amongst other things it is decreed that all such contracts made one month after the promulgation of the said Law shall be altogether void and of no effect If any man after that month is run out being in good earnest and invincibly ignorant of the promulgation of that Law shall strike such a bargain which is by the said Law forbidden he will be
propounded and he doth not violate the Law unless he doth neglect them both XXIV This which was to be spoken of the obligation of a Law purely penal being as I conceive sufficiently unfolded let us now passe to the consideration of a penal Law mixed Concerning which I make this my third conclusion A penal Law mixed to wit which openly commandeth something to be observed and that it more diligently may be performed which is commanded doth appoint a penalty to the transgressors doth oblige both to the fault and to the punishment insomuch that he neither satisfies the Law nor his Conscience who undergoes the punishment unless he doth perform that also which is commanded by the Law There is none can doubt that such a Law doth oblige to the punishment for otherwise of what use would the punishment be that is added to it And it is manifest that it obligeth to the fault because it containeth a manifest command And every command obligeth to the fault For a Fault or a Sin is nothing else but the transgression of some precept 1 Joh. 3. Neither can that be probably spoken which is said to be the opinion of Navarr that the Law-maker by inserting the punishment doth signify that he hath no intention of obliging but only to that punishment which is annexed Observe I pray you how perverse it is so to interpret the appointing of a punishment which it is certain is for that end annexed to the precept that the said precept by the fear of punishment might more diligently and more accurately be observed as to make weak and take-away the obligation of the said precept Numberlesse are the Laws which throughout the world are made against Thieves Murderers perjured Persons and other wicked and nefarious people God also gave a Law to our first Parents by which he forbad them to eat of the fruit of the Tree which was in the midst of Paradise having annexed to the prohibition the punishment of death if they should eat thereof Gen. 2. Can any man be found so dâ—stitute of reason as to think that Adam was obliged by this Divine Law and that others are obliged by Humane Laws to the punishment only and not unto the fault Who will affirm to omit humane Laws that Adam was not obliged in Conscience by that Divine Law to abstain from the forbidden fruit but to this only that if he did eat thereof he should be ready to undergoe the setence of death The opinion therefore of Navarre being exploded as dangerous and by all men confuted if indeed the opinion was his which I shall hardly believe he being a man of so reverend a fame we are to affirm that a penal Law mixed being both penal and preceptive doth oblige both to the punishment and to the Fault to the punishment as it is penal and to the Fault as it is preceptive XXV The third Doubt remaineth How and how far the transgressor of a penal Law is bound to undergoe the punishment in the fact it self that is appointed by the Law I must make haste I will therefore be as short as I can I say therefore in the first place if the punishment appointed by the Law be such that it imposeth not any thing upon the transgressor to be either done or suffered by him but consisteth rather in an inability to do something which was commodious for him to do or in an incapacity of receiving somthing which would be profitable for him he is guilty of the Law so violated and is bound ipso facto to undergo the punishment There are many Laws which do forbid transgressors to do this or that as the Civil Laws for certain causes do forbid translationem Dominii the alteration of power or free-holds There are also many Laws which for such a certain time do make Delinquents incapable of such a place or dignity As if a Disturber of the peace by a statute of the University be prohibited to have his Grace propounded in the Congregation House for the space of two years after the fault committed In such the like cases where the punishment consisteth only in the Inability or the Inâ—â—pacity because to undergoe this punishment there is no Cooperation required of the person to be punished but rather a certain Cessation of operating He who hath violated the Law is obliged willingly to suffer the punishment although he be not required I say in the second place if the punishment appointed by the Law be such that a cooperation of the person offending be necessarily required to the Execution of the Law that is that he who is to be punished is to act something himself in his own punishment he is not obliged ordinarily to undergoe the said punishment ipso facto before the Judge hath pronounced the sentence or which is the same before the punishment be exacted of him by a person to that purpose invested with lawful Authority The guilty person is bound indeed to suffer the punishment but if he called to it otherwise he is not bound I say in the third place that a guilty man after the sentence pronounced by the Judge or after he is required to it by a person invested with lawful Authority is obliged to a willing undergoing of the punishment yea and with some Cooperation of his own if this Cooperation be not against the Laws of humanity though otherwise very grievous and extremely painful For examples sake If an offendor be commanded to pay a great sum of money under the name of penalty or to depart the Kingdome he is bound by the power of the Law to the performance of it but if the punishment imposed be not only grievous but something also that is inhumane as if a malefactor be commanded to scourge himself to cut off his own hand to drinke poyson or the like in these cases the guilty person is obliged to undergoe the punishment passively but he is not obliged actively to cooperate in it w ch he knows to be ordained by the Law and which by his default he hath deserved And let this suffice to be spoken of the necessity of the Promulgation of Laws and of the Obligation of those penal Laws which may seem to have any reference with the Formal Cause of Laws THE NINTH LECTURE Of the Obligation of Humane Laws in respect of the Final Cause thereof 1 TIM 2. 2. For Kings and for all that are in Authority that we may lead a quiet and peaceable life in all Godlinesse and Honesty IN our former Lectures we have treated of the Obligation of Humane Laws as to their Material Efficient and formal Causes in some places peradventure more largely and in others again peradventure more concisely than was requisite It remaineth that we should proceed to the explication of those things which do pertain to the final Cause of Laws But before we do come to dissolve these doubts we are first to premise and pronounce as an undoubted Truth That the ultimate end
NEMO ME IMPUNE LACESSIT SERO SED SERIO The Most honble William Marquiss of Lothian TEN Lectures ON THE OBLIGATION OF Humane Conscience READ In the Divinity School at OXFORD In the Year 1647 By that most Learned and Reverend Father in God Doctor Robert Sanderson Bishop of Lincoln c. Translated by Robert Codrington Master of Arts. LONDON Printed by Tho. Leach and are to be sold by John Martin James Alâ—stry and Tho. Dicas at the Sâ—gn of the Bell in St. Pâ—uls-Church Yâ—rd 1660. SEVERAL CASES OF CONSCIENCE Discussed In Ten Lectures IN THE DIVINITY SCHOOL AT OXFORD By that most Learned and Reverend Father in God Doctor Robert Sanderson now Lord Bishop of Lincoln LONDON Printed by Tho. Leach and are to be sold by John Martin James Allestry and Tho. Dicas at the Sign of the Bell in St. Pauls-Church-Yard 1660. To the most Noble Robert Boyle Son to the Right Honourable Richard Earl of Cork deceased and Brother to Richard Earl of Cork now living Honourable SIR THis small present whatsoever it is coveteth to preferre it self to your Trust and Patronage and to come abroad into the world under the protection of your name Most willingly therefore I do here make a tender of it unto you who as I understand by Fame and in Subjects of worth Fame is seldom found a Liar are not only Illustrious by the splendor of your Birth but far more Illustrious by the nobility of a generous mind by your love to Learning your Humanity Piety and all manner of Virtue howsoever to me living privately and contentedly in a smal Cottage and not much solicitous what is done abroad especially as the times noware never known by your face nor by your name until within these few Months no nor as yet known unto me but only by your MUNIFICENCE Nevertheless I hope this poor gift will find some acceptance with you because having already obtained my Rod of Liberty you endeavour to enclose me again in my antient circle and to draw me back to my discontinued exercise by proposing to me some honest Salary by the excellently learned Mr. Thomas Barlow chief Keeper of Bodleys Library in the famous University of Oxford It is indeed wellâ—done that in this deplorable state of Civil and Ecclesiastical affairs if we may call 〈…〉 and a hideous confusion of all things there are peradventure found one or two of a more refined clay who either by their encouragment or their bounty are careful to comfort the sad Muses and the Retainers to them of whatsoever condition those especially who being Professors of true and Christian Philosophy are every where neglected and dispised as the refuse of the world Iâ— any thing therefore by the permission of the Almighty shall hereafter be undertaken and published by me in this kind of writing which pertaineth to moral Philosophy that may be either profitable to the Publick or useful to any private man for the better Institution of his life and the framing of his manners by the prescript of the Divine Law and Gospel whether it be in the Latin tongue or in the English which I perceive to be more acceptable of to many of our Nation I do here willingly acknowledge and freely professe that for the greatest part it is due unto you who were both the Author to me to undertake it and an Assistant cheerfully to proceed in it And do you most wâ—râ—hy Sir proceed to do good that is to do that which you do already to adorn Learning to favour learned men to advance Piety to procure you faithful friends at the charges of unfaithful Mammon that so ouâ— of the abundance of good works sowed in this world there may redound unto you a most fruitful Harvest of eternal blessednesse in the world to come Amen From Botheby Pannel◠〈◊〉 Lincolnshirâ— 10 Cal. Decemb. 1659. To the Courteous READER Friendly Reader whosoever you are BEfore you advance into the House it self you are â—ere in the first entrance to be encountred and desired in some few things to suffer your self to be informed of the cause that chiefly compelled us to the publishing of these papers which here we represent unto you I had rather indeed if others had been of the same mind with me that they should never have seen the light for the proof whereof this may be one Argument and of force enough that part of these Lectures written by me some yâ—ars since were never for the space of ten years and more reserved in any Desk but lay in corners up and down amongst my rejected as mâ—ch as neglected papers had I not another Argument of far greater force than the former viz. The Imperfection of the worke which of it self doth betray it self For a Writer that understands himself and makes provision for his Reputation and Dignity mâ—st carefully finish the work he hath begun Lib. 2. de Natur. deorum and not so much as think of sending it abroad before to speak with Cicero it be every where apt and polished and made compleat and perfect in all the parts and numbers of it For in vain from thence you may look for Praise where you may think you come off very handsomely if for Praise you deserve Pardon What â—hâ—â—…fore Were friends the cause of it Who are accustomed to encourage and give more rains to those who of their own accord are running into those hazards and to spur on others who draw back I will not affirm this neither for although I may grant that the exhortations and desires of friends the common refuge of the greatest part of Scriblers may serve oftentimes for an honest excuse yet they could never seem to me to be the just and allowable grounds for such a Cause Nevertheless as most frequently it is seen there were not wanting some ergodioctists some Brain-Exacters who demanded of me and that I may use the words of Fabius with daily and reproaching Importunities did efflagitate that I would present those things to the eys of all men to be read which heretofore in reading were so grateful to their ears but I who was not ignorant how acuter was the judgement of the eye than of the ear did constantly deny it They on the other side were more instant with me and more vehemently did urge me and as oft in like cases it comes to pass they did gently chide me But I who was resolved to be obstinate stood fixed to my self for whatsoever they could object unto me I was ready always to answer them that a work begun and not half of it nor the third part of it peradventure hardly accomplished was not rashly to be communicated to the publick But they again were as ready to reply Why cease you then Why do you not set your self close unto your study and put your last hand unto that work which your first hand hath so happily begun What shall I say for my self in this case I am ashamed to confesse and I may not be
Commonalty 31â— â— c. The first Doubt Whether there be any necessary use of Humane Laws 312 4. c. The second Doubt Whether it belongeth to a Law-giver to command the Acts of all Virtues and to forbid all Vices 315 â— c. The third Doubt Of what importance the intention of the Lawgiver is to the effect of the obligation 320 2. c. The fourth Doubt Of the changing of Laws 322 5. The fifth Of the changing of the form of the whole politick Government 326 6. The sixth Doubt How that Axiom The safety of the People is the supreme Law is to be understood 329 The Summary of the tenth Lecture â— c. A rehearsal of some things already spoken 334 4. The genuine sense of this Aphorism viz. The Safety of the People is the supreme Law is again debated and resolved 146 7. What is to be understood by this word Safety 340 8. c. And what by the word People 342 11. c. When words collâ—ctive are to be taken collectively and when to be taken Discretively 345 13. The Safety of the People doth include also the safety of the King 348 14. c. And his safety especially 349 16. In every Common-wealth there must be necessarily some Authority which is to be above all Law 351 17. c. Which cannot belong to any other but to the Prince only 353 19. The original of this Aphorism is examined 355 20. What Subjects may do in this case and how far they may act 357 22. An Illustrious example of it 359 THE END THE FIRST LECTURE In which the Definition of Conscience is propounded and unfolded 1 COR. 2. 11. What Man knoweth the things of a Man but the Spirit of Man which is in him I. THat the power of Conscience is very great a Cicero pro Milone either in the respect of Fear or Confidence hath been of old declared by wise and learned Men and more neerly and abundantly attested by the sence and the experience of all Men. It is therefore the more to be lamented that many while greedily they imploy all their studies in the knowledge of things indifferent are in so dark an ignorance in the knowledge of their own Consciences notwithstanding there is no where to be found a more faithful Admonisher or a more diligent Accuser or a Severer Witnesse or an uncorrupter Judge or a sweeter Comforter or a more importunate Enemy That therefore I may instill into the Minds and Ears of the ingenious that old and so often repeated instruction 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 that is Know thy self and divert them a little from the too immoderate desire of a more unprofitable knowledge gradually by inviting them to a greater care and study of their Consciences I thought it would be a work worth the labour if I should a little more diligently inquire into the use Nature of Conscience and in this place according to my obligations communicate to you my Auditors those Meditations which I shall find most observable on this Subject I have determined therefore in this first Lecture to lay open the Nature of Conscience by defining it and in my following Lectures by the Almighties permission I will expound unto you the use and office of the Conscience especially as it reflecteth on things to be done and that in a double respect the first to the rule of the Law to which it ought to be Subject and the other in respect to former actions over which it is ordained to govern II. But the method of defining being twofold the one Synthetical or by the way of Composition when by due weighing of every part of the premises the definition at last is perfectly collected the other Analytical and by way of resolution which doth take asunder every peice of the definition and open and unfold that which at first was propounded entire Although the former may peradventure seem more convenient to the order of Nature yet I have made choice of the latter which I conceive more fit for instruction Thus therefore I do briefly define Conscience Conscience is a faculty or a habit of the practical understanding by which the mind of Man doth by the discourse of reason apply that light with which he is indued to his particular moral Actions In this definition two things do preferre themselves to observation First the name of the thing defined which is the voyce of the Conscience it self Secondly the particular members of the definition which are all those that are ordinary in the definition of the qualities of the first and second Species that is to say the Genus the Subject the Object and the proper Act. III. As to the Name of the thing defined it is observed by learned men that in all the old Testament there is not found a Hebrew word which precisely and peculiarly doth signifie the Conscience But the Hebrews according to their custom of speaking as often as mention is made of Conscience they make use of one of those two words to expresse it 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 or 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 and 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the first whereof is known by all to signifie the Heart and the other the Spirit of Man According to this is that of Solomon in the fourth of Proverbs Prov. 4. 23. Keep thy Heart with all diligence as if he should have said Le every one have a diligent care of his own Conscience And in the seventh of Ecclesiastes where according to the old interpretation the words are â—ccle â— 23. Thy Conscience knoweth that thou thy self hath often cursed others And according unto the Translation of Tremellius thy Mind is Conscious It is in the Hebrew Text 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 that is Thy Heart knoweth And in the new Testament especially in St. John in whose writings there are many Hebraisms the word 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the Heart is often put for the Conscience as John 1 3. 1 John 3 21. If our heart condemneth us not that is if our Conscience doth condemn us not it being the proper office of the conscience to condemn or not to condemn the guilty person standing before the tribunal of Justice From this proceeds that common allusion of St. Bernard and others Conscientia quasi cordis scientia The Conscience is the hearts consciousness The conscience also in the holy Scripture oftentimes by the Hebrews and the Gâ—ecians is called and expressed by the name of Spirit I will only instance two places for what needs any more in a thing so evident In the Old Testament Proverbs the 18 and the fourteenth verse The Spirit of man will sustain his infirmity but a broken Spirit who can endure As if he should say a man of a sound and unstained conscience will endure with as much courage as patience whatsoever calamities shall befall him but an afflicted and guilty conscience is a burden insupportable And then in the new Testament I shall make use
and proceed XXIII The fourth argument is taken from the end and proper use of examples for we must duely confesse that examples in themselves are of great use both for the institution of our manners and for the amendment of our lives And certainly otherwise so many precepts had not been left us in the word of God for whatsoever is there written is written for our instruction 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Rom 15 4. And for our admonition 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 neither would the Apostles otherwise have so constantly inclucated them My brothers take the Prophets for an example of patience you have heard of the patience of Job Elias prayed James 5. 19 11. 17. Again Be you followers of me as I am of Christ 1 Cor. 11. 1. What you have heard and seen in me do those things Philip. 4. 9. Observe those who so do walk as you have us for an example Phil. 3. 17. And the like in many places But the use and end of examples are not to be rules unto us for good liveing but only as helps and as it were spurs to shake off our dulness and to rouze our sloth when we are more heavy and dull in the performance of our duties than indeed we ought to be For humane frailty especially upon some great temptations and violent suggestions of the Devil and the World is commonly attended with many murmurings and complaints against the security of the Law of God and the difficulty of giving obedience to it nay oftentimes it is heard to cry out that there are Lyons in our way and that there are snares and stumbling blocks laid under our feet to cause us to trip and fall that we must endure injuries contumelies and calumnies the plundring of our goods the sequestering of our Estates the loss of our dear parents and of those dearer pledges our Wives and Children and that with the losse of our friends that we must lose our Countrey nay even life it self and become a hatred even to those who most of all are obliged to love us How unpleasing are these discourses How unsupportable is the burden of this oppression As often as these thoughts and the like do invade our minds so that we even begin to despond all hope and even to abandon the care of all our duties as of things impossible which in vain we do endeavour to perform our languishing spirits are revived and raysed by the seasonable authority of examples Tuâ—â—iter desperatur quicquid fieri potest Quint. 1. Instit 10. cum quid difficile videtur difficiliora alios obeuntes reâ—â—â— amus Tert. 1. ad uxor â— and are by degrees encouraged and armed to despise all difficulties overcome all temptations and to endure all contumelies whatsoever when I say we seriously thus do consider that pious godly men and obnoxious to the same troubles and temptations with us being assisted by the grace of God which will not be wanting unto us if we wholy depend upon it and faithfully adde our endeavours thereunto have performed and endured all those things which by the help of God are to be performed and to be endured by us our spirits will begin to return and our brests grow warm with a godly emulation the fire will burn within ns as we are musing and in the fulnesse of the heart these or the like expressions will break forth Behold Lord I am ready to perform what thou commandest and to undergo what thou layest upon me The same cloud of witnesses that which way soever we look doth every where surround us will perswade us also that all revenge distemper of spirit being cast away as also the importunity of sin which as it doth closely embrace us so if we use our best endeavours by the grace of God will with no great difficulty abandon us we couragiously constantly and patiently do run the race that is set before us XXIV St. James the Apostle in his fifth Chapter doth exhort us to a fervency in prayer after the example of Elias who by the importunity of his prayer did as it were at his pleasure lock and unlock the Gates of Heaven And that no man might conceive that it was to be imputed rather to the sanctity and the merits of Elias than to the promise of God to the prayers of the faithfull by the Covenant of Grace The Apostle in the very begining of this narration doth take away all occasion of suspition Elias saith he was a man the same passions with us verse 17. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 He was a man not a God or an Angell nor made of better clay but out of the same masse out of which all other men are fashioned This here urged is the most proper the most profitable use of examples we ought therefore to bear in our minds that examples are not the rule it self neither do they carry with them the weight or estimation of a rule nay if any doubt be made of the uprightness or the pravity of the act they are themselves to be brought and diligently to be examined by the Rule 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 saith St. James in his fifth Chapter and the 〈◊〉 verse where I know not well if that word 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 doth carry with it a special force of signification Certainly it seemeth unto me to imply that the acts of the holy Prophets are no◠〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the principal coppy and example which is to be observed by us but as it were the 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 or the second example which is not of authority of it self or for it self but so far to be believed and received as it agreeeth with the original From what hitherto hath been spoken it may be now made manifest that it doth not suffice to prove the goodness of any humane act that it is comformable to the example of some good and holy man and therefore no mans Conscience can securely and safely acquiesse therein unless the example it self be comformable to the rule XXV Again that we may now come to the other part of our proposition The account is almost the same of another mans judgment as of his example and that almost for the same Causes so that we need not to make many words to enlarge our selves upon this Subject I will therefore run it over in as few as I can And in the first place all men though godly and learned are no less lyable unto errours than they are to sins nay peradventure much more and therefore we ought to have a more acute investigation of the mind to discover the difference betwixt Truth and Falshood then betwixt Good and Evil First by reason of that natural ignorance with which our minds are darkened and vaild as with a cloud Secondly by reason of our education which fashione and formeth our minds as yet but tender and doth imprint certain notions on them which it is no easy task to expunge Thirdly by reason of
and to every Learned and Godly Man notwithstanding those things which have been here by me represented You are in the first place to be admonished that in the Interpretation of the Scriptures and in judging of Controversies in reference to Faith and Manners much Reverence and Authority is to be given to the Judgement and the Practice of the Universal Church Secondly That much also is to be imputed to the Authority and the Judgement of a Learned Man for the satisfying of ordinary scruples that too often arise in the minds of men as also for the directing of the Conscience in doubtful things concerning which no certainty can otherwise be had But of both these we shall expresse our selves we hope more commodiously hereafter THE FOURTH LECTURE In which it is both Discussed and Stated what is the Adaequate Rule of Conscience JAMES 4. 12. For there is but one Law-giver who can both Save and Destroy I. HOw small is the Benefit and Protection which redoundeth to every one either in the respect of the Fruit of his Conscience to excuse those things which he hath done or of the security of it with confidence to undertake those things which he is about to do if they only do rely upon the Intention of a good End or upon the Authority altogether of another Judgement or Example I have abundantly declared in my two last Lectures in which my purpose was those stops being removed to make the way more plain ready to proceed unto those things which I had determined to speak of the obligation of Conscience which obligation being two fold Active by which it bringeth one obligation on another and Passive by which it is subjected to the obligation of another the method and privilege of order doth require that we should begin with the Passive For then we more securely can pronounce of the thing measured when it is once manifest that the measure it self is just Our businesse therefore now in hand is to inquire what that is which properly doth oblige Conscience or which is the same what is the proper and Adaequate Rule of Conscience to which to be upright it ought to conform it self which inquisition that it may be the more certain and profitable some few things being premised by way of explication I shall endeavour at the last by certain conclusions to give you an account of the thing it self II. In the first place therefore it is to be understood that for the more exact performance of the offices of Conscience it is necessary to lay down some Rules to which it ought to be subjected for wheresoever there is any Virtue active which of its own Nature is not determined unto one thing in its acting but is in a Potentia to another so that it may act either well or evilly whether this Virtue be a Habite of the first Species of Quality or a natural Potentia of the second it is necessary that there should be some Law or Rule which may direct it in the acting For as often as any thing doth offer it self to the Fancy to be done whither represented by the exterior sence or by some internal suggestion of the mind because the Will which is the next principium of acting is as commonly it is spoken in the Schools but Potentia caeca a blind Potentia and of it self cannot discern Good from Evill so as to be a Rule unto it self the Inquisitive Reason doth straight reflect on Conscience and doth listen to her Dictates Now it is the Office of Conscience presently to Examine the thing propounded And the examination being made to Judge whether it ought to be performed or eschewed whether to be admitted or omitted and accordingly as she hath judged so presently to transmit her Judgement to the Will that is to propound it to the Free-will the same thing either to be chosen or disliked To which Office of Examining Judging and Informing least it should rashly be performed lest the Conscience as blind as the Will it self should misguide it it is necessary that there should be a certain Rule according to which it should be examined III. In the second place we are to know that in Rules as well as in Causes there is a kind of subordination And as in Causes that are ordinated to one another the latter if compared with the former carry with them the Relation and the Account of Effects So in Rules and Measures ordinated to one another every one of the posterior in respect of the superior doth seem to be regulated or to be mensurated by it Since therefore the Rule of the Conscience is two fold one next or the immediate and the other the first and more remote that Rule which is next as it is a Rule in respect of the Conscience which it doth direct so it is also as a Rule Regulated in respect of the first Rule by which it is it self to be directed IV. Seeing the Rectitude of every thing whatsoever doth consist in the conformity of it to its Rule we are in the third place to understand that as I have said there is a two fold Rule of Conscience to wit the Rule which is neerest the Rule which is more remote So there is also a twofold Rectitude of Conscience correspondent to that two fold Rule of it For the Conscience may be said to be upright either absolutely and simply or respectively and secundum quid as the Schoolmen do expresse it In this last Acceptation a Conscience may be said to be upright when it is conformable to its nearest and immediate Rule as he is said to have a true and certain knowledge of any proper passion who from the Subject of it can demonstrate it by its next Cause although he can ascend no higher But in the former acceptation the Conscience may then be said to be upright when it is not only conformable it self to its next Rule but when that Rule is conformable also unto the first Rule In the same sence he may be said to have attained to a perfect knowledge of any thing who knoweth all the causes of it from the first to the last so saith Aristotle lib. 1. phisica Tunc enim unam quamque rem scire dicimur quum omnes ejus Causas principia elementa cognoscimus usque ad prima We are then said to understand what any thing is when we can give you an account of all its causes principals even to the first Elements thereof Therefore as the certainty of Science though immediately arising from the knowledge of the next Cause doth not arrive to its ultimate perfection but by the knowledge of the first cause so the Rectitude of Conscience though immediately it reflecteth upon a conformity to its next rule yet it ascendeth higher and ultimately concludeth in that Rule which is the first rule of it and the supreme II. In the fourth place it is to be understood that when we speak of the obligation of
performance of them because they did not pertain unto him but were only peculiar to the Israelites and it is known that the Law doth not oblige all men unto whom it is known but all those only to whom it is given XXII In the third place I say the will of God in what way soever it be revealed for the will of God receiveth its authority from it self and not from the manner of revealing it So that the Church of Rome in their controversie concerning Traditions need not to take so much pains to prove That the word of God unwritten is of equal authority with the word of God that is written for this we willingly do grant unto them We only â—ain would understand how we may satisfie our selves that the Tradition unwritten may appear to be the word of God as undoubtedly as the word which is written The will of God therefore in what manner soever it be revealed is the Rule of the Conscience provided it be so revealed that it either actually be made known or may be so made known unto the mind if culpable negligence doth not hinder And it doth oblige the Conscience to acknowledge it and to propound it unto our own will as the will of God to which it is bound to conform it self and not only so but to command the executive potentiaes to bestirre themselves for the fulfilling of this will of God Remarkable is that of Damascene 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 what God willeth mâ—st of necessity be good for his will is the measure of goodnesse but the Law of God is 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 â—hat commandment by which 〈…〉 that good will of his he proceeds 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 the Law of God comming to our â—ind doth attract it to it 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 it doth incite instimâ—late and as it were spurs it doth urge our Consciences to the performance of their duties by representing and inculcating into our wills the will of God And this is that most proper and exact obligation of Conscience which we before have spoken of XXIII The force and effect of this obligation is variously expressed by St. Paul Sometimes he confesseth himself a Debator to the Grecians and Barbarians Rom. 1. 14. As if he should say seeing I know by the will of God that I am set apart to preach the Gospel to the Gentiles without difference whether they are Graecians or Barbarians I acknowledge that in this respect I am a Debtor to them And in the 2 Cor. 2. 14. he saith that he is tyed and bound as men are bound with bonds to the performance of this duty And in the first of the Corinthians the ninth Chapter and the sixteenth verse 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 The preaching of the Gospel is intrusted to me so that I have not the leasure to be idle for a great necessity doth presse me and wo unto me if I should neglect it The like necessity to be imposed upon them and not to be shaken off was openly and before St. Pauls time acknowledged by two of the greatest of the Apostles and for a long time individual Companions S. Peter and St. John Acts 4. 20. 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 For we cannot but speak God hath commanded us to speak with authority and you command us to hold our peace Whether it be better to obey him or to obey you Do you judge We are free and can be so from your command for you have no power upon our Consciences but the command of God doth hold us fast and haâ—h such a coercive power over us that unlesse we wil perish we cannot be free nor do any thing but that only which he commandeth XXIV Moreover when it is asserted that the next and immediate Rule of the Conscience is the light of the mind and the primary and the supreme Rule is the written word of God and the proper and the Adaequate Rule of it the will of God by manner whatsoever revealed or which is to the same sence The Law imposed by God on the reasonable Creature That these things may more fully be understood we are to know that the light of the mind is threefold as God in three ways hath manifested his will to the reasonable Creature There is the light innate the light inferred and the light acquired or the light of nature the light of Scripture and the light of Doctrine The first light which I do call the light Innate doth proceed from the Law of nature For in the first creation of the World as God endued brute and inanimate Creatures with a natural instinct by which they are inclined unto those things which are congruous to their natures and the conservatives of it which is as a Law unto them as it is so expressed by David Psal 148. 6. Thou hast given them a Law which they may not transgresse So a certain natural Law is given unto man and proportionated to his nature as he is a reasonable Creature that is more sublime and noble and if I may so speak it more Divine than what is given to other Creatures of this inferiour Oâ—h And this Law doth incite him to the performance of those things which are agreeable to his nature as he is a man that is to say a living Creature indued with reason or to live according to reason Now this Law is natural impression and as it were a figure of that eternal Law which is in the mind of God and it is a part of that Divine Image after which man at the first was said to be made Gen. 1. by which knowing of a certainty that there are some things in our reasonable nature that are congruous to the will of God the Creator and other things which are not so we do conclude that the one is good and ought to be performed by us and the other evil altogether to be abhomined The light proceeding from this law is extremely obscured by that grievous ruine which folowed the fall of Adam and from hence arise those thick clouds of Ignorance and Error in which all his posterity whilst we live in this World are invelopped But the providence of God hath so most wisely ordered it that in the common wrack it hath come off more unhurt than many other of the Faculties for it hath pleased God that certain propositions and practical principles Quae animis imprimuntur inâ—â—â—atae intelligentiae Cic. 1 de leg which the Philosophers call 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 and 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 and Basilius most acutely 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 spark of the Divine Fire which in the great conflagration was preserved in the ashes of it should still remain that so in our breasts and most inward parts Haec tamen exigua lucis scintillula râ—mansit Calvin Instit 10. Sect. 5. he might have the Preachers of his will These 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 These common Notions are that Law of God which the Apostle Rom. 1. doth say is
from our own meditations or the Institution of other men II. I affirmed that all these and every one of them do oblige the Consciences of men and only these absolutely and primarily by themselves and by their proper virtue for all these and these alone do exhibite to us the will of God who alone of himself hath an absolute and a direct command over the Consciences of men But I gave you to understand that there were many other things which Secondarily and relatively and by Virtue of the Law or the Divine will in which they are founded do in their manner oblige the Consciences And all of them do agree in this that they owe all the force of obliging which they have to the Divine will for otherwise the Divine Law would not be the Adaequate Rule of Conscience nevertheless they do all differ among themselves both in the Species by reason of the diversity of the matter and also in the degree according to the power of obliging Moreover there are three degrees of those who do thus oblige The first is of those things whose obligation doth arise from the Authority of another having a right or power in which number are Humane Laws The second is of those things whose obligation doth arise from a free act of the proper will such as are Vowes Oathes Promises and Spontaneous Contracts The third degree is of those things whose obligation doth arise from the intuition of brotherly Charity in which classis is ranked the Law or the Consideration of Scandal or offence III. As for the obligation of Humane Laws I have spoken much more than at the first I propounded to my self yet it may be much less than the weight of the thing deserved of which in our dayly Conversations there is a most frequent Use or the Abundance and Variety of those Doubts required which might cast a scruple into the minds of men In the resolution where of I proceeded so far in the former Terms that having gone over those difficulties which I thought could not improperly be reduced to the material efficient and formal Causes of Laws in my last Lecture I came to treat of those which more properly did pertain to their final Cause where at first having laid this foundation for the whole following Discourse That the good of the Commonalty or which is the same that the publick Peace and Happinesse is the End of Humane Laws with what brevity and perspicuity that I could I answered to the six following Questions First Whether there be any Use or at least any necessary Use of Humane Laws in a Common-wealth in order to the Common Good Secondly It belonging to the Common-wealth that Vertue be reverenced and Vices restrained whether a Law-maker could command all the Acts and Offices of all Vertues and prohibit all Vices and Enormities whatsoever Which if he were not able to perform whether he were at least bound to command and prohibit as many as he could of either kind by Laws which might oblige his Subjects in their Consciences Whether and how far it be required to the effect of the obliging of the Subjects that the Intent of the Law-maker be carryed to the publick Good Fourthly If the Laws made already shall appear less profitable to the publick whether and how far the change of them is either to be attempted by the Prince or to be urged by the Subject Fifthly The Common good being the end of Laws and even of Government it self whether it be lawful and how far lawful for the said Common good to change the form it self of the whole Government or to attempt the change thereof Lastly how that common saying The safety of the People is the supreme Law is to be understood IV. These things I thought necessary to repeat more fully to you that after so long an interruption of Academical exercitations my whole proceedings in these Lectures and the order I have observed therein might better appear unto you and that I might recall into your memory the heads of those things which having heard before with so much humanity I justly do believe that in so long an interval of time you have almost forgotten You will expect I conceive and not undeservedly that I should now proceed in my intended course and go directly on to those next Doubts which yet remain to be resolved As of those of Privileges of Dispensations and to others which some ways do belong to the final kind of a Cause I do confess it indeed and I ought to do it But my friends do interrupt me they advise me that the stubborn and intolerable boldnesse of some men do rather efflagitate that seeing so precisely and so impudently they abuse the Aphorism to the publick ruine although I expounded it but in my last Lecture in the former Term yet that I would take it under examination again and open the genuine sense thereof more clearly and fully than before I had done This in my Construction was nothing else but in a new pomp of words to do over that which I had done before and to the loathing of your Stomacks to give you that meat you before were cloyd with This desire was not pleasing to me but they did grow upon me with new importunities to take it in hand again It will be your humanity to resent and excuse that modesty which I granted to my persisting friends especially having used such a prevalent Argument to overcome me to it not doubting but it would be grateful to the most of you if I should again undertake it V. It is therefore my present businesse to declare unto you what is the meaning of that common Axiom The safety of the people is the supreme Law and how it is to be understood Some men within these few years not well imployed have invented and brought at last into the Common-wealth a new state of Government as before they had brought into the Church a new Religion and as they have earnestly endeavoured under the pretence of Conscience or of Christian liberty to overthrow all the force and frame of the Ecclesiastick Government so under the preâ—ence of Civil liberty or the liberty of the Subject they labour in this confusion of times and with incredible heat of spirit and military terrour to shake and from the very foundation of it to pluck up the whole Fabrick of the Government of State These as often as they are accused of the Royal Dignity trod under feet of the despised Authority of all holy Laws of the disturbance of the publick peace of an unbridled and horrible tyranny exercised on their fellow Subjects all barrs of Right and Justice being broken down of an affected parity in the Church and in the Common-wealth all difference of birth and honours and States being taken away and many more such Anabaptistical impieties they presently defend themselves and their manners with this safety of the people as with a Buckler and think this alone to be preferred