such where the Superiour commands what he ought I will express it if you will in other words When the Superiour commands any thing which he ought we are obliged for conscience sake and the fifth Commandment requires us to do the thing or else we break that command because this thing bears in it the authority of both Commanders when he commands any thing which he ought not we are obliged for wrath's sake and the fifth Commandment requires only that we do not resist so that if we resist not we give that honour and pay that duty to the Magistrate which we owe in this case If we suffer with submission or obey rather then suffer or avoid both the grievance and suffering with prudence neither bringing contempt on his Authority or inducing our Brethren to sin we are to account that we answer the intent of this Commandment I must add still that this is as much too as the Magistrate himself need desire in the Earth seeing if he be strict upon it and the thing be not sinful he may take any body do what he please upon this account As for our Prefacer it must be yet a greater reproof to his undertaking that in this endeavour of his to set up an Authority in the Magistrate over the Conscience in all matters External he is certainly fallen in with Mr Hobs whom yet to avoid the odium he is fain himself to confute For when that more considerable person according to his principles of Government makes all men by nature before they come into society to be in a state of War that gives every man right to every thing which right upon their agreement into a Common-wealth is given up he counts into the hands of the Soveraign to determine Propriety so that his will thenceforth becomes the measure of right and wrong to the Community he proceeds so far upon the conceit as to condemn these two positions That every man is judge of good and evil Doctrine That whatsoever a man does against his conscience is sin See his Leviathan C. 29. Now let us compare this ingenuously as we ought seeing else it is so bad with other places in his Book That Subjects owe to Soveraigns simple obedience in all things wherein their obedience is not repugnant to the Laws of God I have proved C. 31. Again It is manifest enough that when a man receiveth two contrary commands and knows that one of them is Gods he ought to obey that and not the other though it be the command of his lawful Soveraign or his Father C. 43. It does appear then when the Ecclesiastical Polititian does confine the authority he gives the Magistrate over the conscience to external and indifferent things allowing the authority of the conscience over the Magistrates in things intrinsecally sinful and expresly forbidden by God he does but the same which Mr. Hobs does also if you compare them equally taking one place with another But herein are they wicked companions both that they should once offer to take away from reasonable Agents a judgement of private discretion in any concernment of conscience whatsoever One may easily indeed perceive what the Contents of this young mans papers do amount unto He dare not take off all obligations of good and evil from mens consciences antecedent to humane Laws as Hobs in that one place though otherwhere as it seems he intended not so far hath done because this were not only the way to ruine Religion but his name and to bring all Government also to ruine which he engages to assert But he would take off all obligations from mens consciences in the whole business of Conformity antecedent to the will of the Parliament and Bishops so as their Acts must be the rule of good and evil to us as to these matters He does tell us indeed of a liberty to our Judgments and to our Faith but when he will allow us to judge and believe of these things as we do and would yet have us account that the publick conscience the Laws and not the private dictates of our own must govern our outward actions it does bring to my mind one passage more in his Friend What if a Soveraign forbids his Subjects to believe in Christ I answer says Mr. Hobs it is no effect because belief or unbelief never follow mans Commands But what if we be commanded to confess with our Tongues It is an external thing and no more then any other gesture whereby we signifie our obedience and a Christian holding firmly in his heart the Faith of Christ hath the same liberty herein with Naaman Leviathan C. 42. There are no passages but this and that one before cited that in my reading over that Book I observed to be so extream bad as folks ordinarily talk but this I noted for a Devilish Doctrine seeing it is offered thus indefinitely for it is directly contrary to all the Holy Martyrs belief and practise and the express institution of our Lord that he that confesses him before men he will acknowledge and he that denieth him he will deny before his Heavenly Father Yet if any will be so kind to the old Gentleman as I have been before to produce some passages otherwhere that may confine hâ—s meaning here to such compliances of the Tongue and Knee only as are required in the impositions of Vniformity and no other but such then shall the old Leviathan and the young Leviathan agree very throughly in their opinion And why the young one should fall upon his Sire so foully as he hath done whom above all men being alone of his side he should have rather endeavoured to excuse unless out of shew onely and for a coulour or out of invenility and vanity he shall for me have the Tripos or be the eighth man who can give me a good reason I perceive indeed that two points and both of which I have had long in my thoughts are harled together through the skein of this Prefacers Discourse that is the Magistrates Authority in Religion and the Obligation of human Laws It will be expedient for me to dispatch the one quite out of my hands being already done in another Book to be at liberty to attend the other presently altogether By what hath been then laid down it may appear that the right and relation of a Subject to his Soveraign may be held good when yet there are it may be some of his Laws not obeyed Some Laws there are which a man must rather suffer or dye then obey as the Roman Emperors commanding Sacrifice to their Gods Some we are to obey out of conscience such are all the wholesome Laws of a mans Countrey Some there are that we obey out of prudence rather then suffer which yet we do not judge our selves bound to obey for fear of sin or of Gods displeasure The great question then arises what is that rule according to which the Laws of men are to be measured that we may
many men of sober spirits thought themselves bound to go that way which would most tend to the advancement of Religion And this is the true state of their cause which though I my self in my judgement for my university Oaths sake was otherwise inclined I do humbly offer in Justice for their Apology Onely I must add this that the occasion which happened once that was the Kings own deposing his power of dissolving the Parliament at that time being like never to be again there is no hurt at all in it If after this these men will yet press us further I will return that the state of the case being quite altered the King brought in again and with universal consent into the old constitution here is a wonderful kind of thing fallen out that the Fanatick or Anti-Episcopial party of the Nation are really turning to be the Royalist who are for Prorogative Supremacy in Ecclesiasticals when the Bishops party who have made it hitherto a proverb that without them no King are the men bandy against it for the maintenance of these Acts of Parliament And thus much shall suffice as to the first thing offered by the Prefacer about Popery and the Kings Declaration Sect. 3. I come then now to the other thing that requires our notice which is a matter indeed of great moment and therefore intended by me for the main task of my present engagement and that is his asserting an authority in the Magistrate over the conscience of his Subjects in matters of Religion So he hath expressed it and made it the subject of two other Books and insists upon it still in this Preface I am willing therefore to enter into a dissertation with him about the point for it will be worthy not only of our two labours but of another learned pious studious and worthy Knight who was the Author of the Papers entituled Liberty of Conscience and whom I shall purposely engage with the Prefacer that if it be possible we may all three together will we nill we beat out the right determination of the business As for the Prefacer I must needs say that I take him to be a man of fewer years and quicker parts and of a more flourishing Pen than to be fit at least of himself for the undertaking any such point as this is For either a man must be of a patient complexion that can read over all that is written by others about the subject and then give us the Compendium according to his judgment or he must be able by fixing long upon one thing and inculcating the thoughts of it upon the mind to frame his own notion in such a fore-casting of it through the whole train of its consequences to the end as to make it hold together which is not the work unius Diei or unius liturae to use the expression of the Bishop offer'd to my hand I know that the happiness of the first conceit does much but it is not the nimbleness of the Pen and a torrent of words does the rest Nay rather it is this volubility of the tongue which is Truth 's great Harlot while the handsomness of the expression will be ready still to allure away the judgment from that closer attendance to the dry notion that Controversal points or Cases of Conscience do require which should not therefore be writ in the style of this age For the language particularly of this person I cannot but compare methinks to a like present fashion in the Garments of Women the superfluity of whose dimensions may perhaps make their bodies look more stately but it will trip their heels up besides the cumbersomness if they take not heed to themselves or some other come after to keep them from falling Well! the business this notable eloquent Gentleman hath to do in this Preface is for ought I see really only to abuse the Non-Conformists and so fasten upon them some charge if he could tell what against whom in reference to their loyalty or duty to the Government But the charge being founded at the bottom only upon his first Book or the cause he hath there managed the best way to answer all his partiâ—ulars wil be to let them quite alone without raking the Dunghill up and to touch only in general upon the foundation There are two passages then I will cite out of this Preface for there are no more I count of that nature which I make my concern All their exceptions relate either to the Power in it self or to the matters of the Command The first are directly levell'd against the very being of Authority and Magistrates of what kind soever according to their general pretences must not dare to put any restraint upon their subjects consciences lest they invade the Divine Prerogative overthrow the fundamental liberties of human nature and undo honest men for their loyalty to God and their Religion Now if this right be claimed without limitation then the consequence is unavoidable That subjects may when ever they please cross with the authority of their Governours upon any pretence that can wear the name of Religion But this being grosly absurd the necessity of a Soveraign power in matters of Religion is granted and all Arguments that prove it in general necessary to Peace and Government are allowed or at least are not contradicted for what ever admits an Ecclesiastical Jurisdiction howsoever bounded and limited admits it and that is enough to the first assertion of a supream Authority over the Conscience in matters of Religion Again after eighteen pages farther And they are exhorted above all things to keep their Consciences i.e. themselves free from the usurpation of all human Laws that is in effect they are forbidden to make any conscience of subjection to Princes for it is only Conscience that is capable of the obligation of Laws so that if they be exempt the whole man is at liberty By these two passages it does appear to me that this Ecclesiastical Politician from the beginning of his setting out to the end does run all along in that confusion as it will be hard to bring him to sorts But it shall suffice me to offer two distinctions which alone as I hope may serve to do this work both of drawing him out of his darkness and convincing others thereby of the injury of his accusations Distinguish we then first between the Authority of the Magistrate over his Subjects in matters of Religion and an Authority over the Conscience in any matters whatsoever It is manifest in the very expression of his Title and the customary language of his first Book and of this Preface That he does confound Conscience with the Matters of Religion whereas there are matters of Religion wherein the Conscience may not be concerned and matters wherein the Conscience may be concerned they be no Ecclesiastical matters The second distinction then is between Subjection which refers to the Authority residing in the Magistrate himself and
which is our duty in opposition to resistance or rebellion and Obedience which lyes in the doing what he commands It is apparent in the last passage how he confounds these two things when the making conscience of subjection to Princes and obligation to the Law is belike all one with him in his present conception But that there is a difference to be put between these two it does appear undeniably from one consideration that we are always bound in conscience to the one that is subjection but we are not always so bound to the other to obedience The things that are commanded may be sometimes sinful or hurtful to the Common-wealth and then it will be our duty not to obey them or they may be idle vain frivolous which we may choose therefore to do out of prudence for fear of wrath and to avoid contempt and scandal when we are not otherwise to hold our selves bound in conscience Sect. 4. To begin with the former By me Kings Reign says Wisdom and if they rule by God it is fit they should also rule for him He is the Minister of God for our good says the Apostle The Minister is to look to his Lords will and the good of the Subject is not only their Temporal but Spiritual good And if he be Gods Minister for our good there can be no exemption of Sacred things any more then Civils from his Authority under God for the good of his People And hence are we taught to pray for Magistrates that we may lead peaceable lives under them in all Godliness as well as Honesty Kings and Emperors says Grotius from some other are equally to take care of Sacred and Secular things but onely when we come to particulars it must be confessed that the jus imperii is more narrow in matters of Religion then in other matters upon this one account that the Divine Law does appoint or determine more things concerning Religion and so takes them out of the Magistrates liberty then it does concerning other matters In hoc Reges sicut cis Divinitus praecipitur Deo serviunt in quantum Reges sunt si in suo regno bona jubeant mala prohibeant non solum quae pertinent ad humanam sicietatem verum etiam quae ad Divinam Religionem says Augustine Contra Cresco nium l. 3. c 51. The affairs of Religion I must say again are of the greatest concernment and it is not fit Gods Minister should neglect his greater affairs to take care only of the less Besides there are no matters in the Earth which have so great an influence on Mens spirits to put them in agitation as the matters of Religion and if they were exemted wholy from the authority of the Supreme Governour it would be a very hard thing for any mortal to govern at all The Non-Conformists therefore deny not the authority of the King in matters Ecclesiastical No they may perhaps be rather accused shortly for acknowledging it too much as hath been intimated seeing they do accept of his Declaration nor do they scruple his Title of Supreame Head We distinguish indeed between a Civil head of the Church and the Constitutive head The King we acknowledge the civil Head or Governour of the Church of England as well as the State that is in whom the only Supream Coercive authority does lye over all persons in Ecclesiastical as well as other matters But as to the constitutive head of our Church as an Ecclesiastical organical body it will be hard for those who own not be Bishops jure Divino to assign The National Church hitherto I took to be the Integrum of our Parochial Congregations and the Pastors of all the Parish Churches in England virtually associated for they are not actually are I think the constitutive head of the Church of England under Christ in that external formal Government of it he hath committed to them There is the internal Government of the Church which belongs only to Christ and his Spirit who alone can rule mens hearts or the external Government of it This external regiment is either formal which belongs to the Ministers or Objective which belongs to the Magistrate The Magistrate cannot therefore by vertue of his Office enter into the function of the Priest to do his work though he can make the Minister himself do it and punish him if he neglect his duty He can give a call to the Pastoral Rulers to meet and frame Ecclesiastical constitutions and when himself cannot make them they shall not yet be obligatory to the subject unless they have his Sanction This external authority over the Church which is Objective that is which is conversant about Ecclesiastical affairs but does not exercise them which is Circa Sacra not in Sacris according to Constantine of old Episcopus 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 does differ from the formal which is from Christ to us as his Stewards and Embassadors and so to be put in execution no otherwise then as it is prescribed by him in the word in this mainly that the one is Declarative that can direct what is Gods will and perswade to it and threaten only with reference to another world but the other is a power to make that our duty which it requires and enforce it to be done by present punishments that is a power which is juris Constitutinum and Coercive There are two sorts then of things which are subject to the Magistrates Power or Government Things or actions determined by God himself in his word or things that are less undetermined by him as neither commanded nor forbidden For the former the Magistrates power does lye in his being made the Keeper of the Tables having no authority to change a title of Gods Law so that his work in respect of such things consists in protecting those that observe them and encouraging such by removing what will hinder and promoting what will further them in their duty as also in his discouraging the Transgressour by withdrawing the occasions of their sin and punishing them for it For the latter the power of the Magistrate does lye in his liberty to determine all such things as being before not determined so as by that determination to make them our duty which were indifferent before to make it our duty I say to avoid or do such things according as he requires or prohibits them for the common edification Haes sive Sacra sive profana sint says Grotius determinare in alterum partem jus est summae potestatis Provided always that such commands as these do indeed answer that end For seeing power in the original is derived from God as Supreame Lord Thou couldst have no power says Christ to Pilate unless it were given thee of God and it is given of God to none but for the common good we are to conceive that the things that are commanded in Civils are for the good of the Common-wealth and in Ecclesiasticals for our Spiritual edification or else though
they must be done rather then we resist or suffer they do not bind us in our consciences The will of God that such a one should command is I say power in the root This will is that he command nothing but for our edification or the common good According to the power given us of God for edification If his command then be not indeed such it is destitute of Gods authority and becoming thereby a command in foro alieno that is in foro exteriori onely and in aliena materia the conscience whose adaequate rule the will of God only is must be left to its liberty The Body indeed is bound says Dr. Taylor and we must suffer patiently the evil which we cannot deprecate but Laws that are made to purposes beyond these measures do no ways oblige the conscience He is the Minister of God for good says St. Paul otherwise he is not Gods Minister and hath to other purposes none of Gods authority and therefore cannot oblige the conscience to an active obedience in such where the power is incompetent to command Duc. Dub. B. 3. c. 1. r. 3. Having then granted and stated one member of the distinction I must come to the other which is that though the Magistrate hath an authority over his Subjects in the matters of Religion as well as civil matters yet hath he no authority for all that over the conscience of any Conscience is the judgement of a man concerning himself and actions with reference to the Judgement of God It is a faculty whereby we discern what is Gods Judgement of us and our actions and there is no man must do any thing contrary to that judgement If the Magistrate then have power over the conscience in any thing whatsoever he must have power either to make us change our judgement of that thing and judge otherwise or else though we judge thus to do otherwise then that judgement that is though we judge that it is Gods will we should do thus the command of the Magistrate shall make it lawful for us to do oterwise The first of these is against reason there is no man can make himself to judge otherwise of a thing in good earnest then he does judge and it cannot then be in the power of the Magistrate to make him do it any more then it is in his power to make him fly in the Air or live under water This is so manifest that this ingenious Author hath spoken enough of it himself in his first Book The latter is against Piety for to do the thing which I judge to be the will of God I should not do because the Magistrate does command it is manifestly a preferring the will of Man before Gods that is an having of other Gods before him which is the sin of the first Commandment The truth is to go about the making of the Magistrates will to be the rule of conscience in any thing let it be what it will is manifestly to defloure conscience to make that which is peculiar to God to be common with man or profane For con-scientia importing in the very word and thing the judgement of God together with ours it must be his will and that alone must be the rule of it and if any thing else be once made its rule it is gone If the Magistrate have an authority over the conscience in any thing the reason will be the same for all I mean if I may do any thing which I judge contrary to Gods will which judgement I say is my conscience then cannot that be a reason to restrain me in another The reason why I dare not commit Adultery or do the like hainous crime is because it is against my conscience and if that reason be rendred insufficient that a thing may be done though it be against a mans conscience there is an end of Religion If the Magistrate have an authority over the conscience then must the internal acts of men be subject to his Government when it is God only that knows and can rule the heart But Grotius hath taught us well here There are internal acts of men and the external Those acts of men says he which do subiacere humano imperio are his external acts only and our internal acts can be commanded no further then they are concerned in the external The inward acts of mans soul in general and much less his conscience are not within his cognizance and so not under his jurisdiction If the Magistrate hath power over the conscience then good and evil should be founded in jure positivo and not in jure naturae Then might he impose on us a new Faith nor new Articles in our Creed Then must we have no Religion but his Will and no God but Leniathan only It is true that when the Magistrate commands me any thing for my good or for the common good though to my loss that thing is now become my duty and as I know it is Gods will that I should obey such commands I am obliged in conscience and if this very nimble Gentleman will but be contented with this interpretation and declare that by the Magistrates authority over the conscience he intends not either that he hath power to force the judgement or the action against the judgement when upon the last indeed it is he does intrench I may descend to the other distinction Sect. 5. The second distinction then that must bring some light to this young Doctors understanding if he be not yet too old to learn and confutation to his charge which he so frivolously without any cause to no purpose does advance against he knows not whom may appear with conviction upon himself from these words speaking of the Non-Conformists exceptions which relate says he either to the Power it self or the matters of the command If then he distinguishes well the power it self and it commands the duty or obligation that arises upon the subject in reference to these which are two must be distinct likewise The force of it cannot be avoided let him seem never so much to neglect it He is pleased indeed to say that we exhort people in effect to make no conscience of subjection to Princes because we say that they are not always bound in conscience to their Commands that is because we do instruct them so about the obligation of human Laws as they may know they are not to make the will of the Magistrate but the will of God alone to be the rule of the Conscience We do therefore here instruct them right and that which this man would have were to pervert them He does discover plainly his ignorance of this distinction and this distinction the vanity of his accusation We are always bound in conscience to subjection unto the Powers that are we acknowledge this this we Preach it we Print it and are ready to maintain it but we are not always bound in conscience to Obedience And God forbid that
we should If he could have distinguished these two things he might have spared most of his labour There is a Book entituled The Obligation of human Laws discussed which I Printed a year since I must desire my Reader to get it and bind it together if he can with this for they are of two subjects that do enterfare very much The authority of the Magistrate in the matters of God discussed was the entended Title of this but I could not Print it till this Preface now hath given me the occasion I use the expression of Scripture in the matters of God because I would include all matters wherein the conscience is concerned as well as Ecclesiastical matters Now I have in that Book laid down this distinction with one more as the ground work of my determination of that point and I have need to say a little more to prevent some cavil which may be raised by this person upon my reproof which I must also give him for the next words he uses viz. 'T is conscience onely says he that is capable of the Obligation of human Laws so that if that be exempt the whole man is at liberty I wonder at the Man for this I do hate this pride methinks for being indocible and perverse no less then for being ugly Pride is an overweening conceit of ones self with the contempt of others There is nothing more visible than this filthy pride in this young man and that Author who wrote the Friendly Debate but only with this difference that I judg this the more ingenuous or open the other the more cankered and sly I pray God forgive them both with all my heart It is a base piece of immorality I am sure in either that when they have to do with any such person as Dr Owen of years so much elder than themselves and who are not without some reputation at least with other persons to use such contemptuous disdainful scorning language as they do altogether which arising so manifestly too from the conceit and confidence alone they have of themselves does declare them two such Sons of the morning such a couple of proud Despisers that until they do shew some repentance and acknowledgment for their fault they do deserve really to be excommunicated out of the good thoughts of all men that most deservedly otherwise do honor them never so much Well! This man cannot it seems understand how he should be obliged at all unless he be obliged in Conscience He cannot discern belike between an obligation simpliciter the obligation of conscience He cannot discern that the conscience which judges of our duty only in relation to God is bound only by a Divine obligation and that a Divine obligation may be distinguished from an Human obligation Is it not indeed strange that a man of such quick parts hath yet so little solid judgment Is it not one thing thinks he to be bound to an action because it is Gods will and for fear of Hell or Divine punishments and another to be bound to it out of fear only of the Law and to escape suffering Does not the Apostle when he tells us We must be subject not only for wrath but also for Conscience sake imply this distinction that there is an obligation then only for wrath sake and an obligation out of conscience And cannot this exceeding fine witted man by any means discern this And will not he nor the Debater learn though it be never so ingenuous for them to come here to some acknowledgment that themselves as well as others may be able to live in this World under Laws with peace to their souls I do profess sincerely that of all the Books that ever yet I wrot I am most pleased in my heart with that Book I now mentioned as being a subject so needful for all persons though it be the worst printed I will supply some little I want in it in this place It is this If this Author were a man of as much judgment as wit he would not have laid down himself so rawly and excepted at the thing but at the terms of the distinction which I have used with other Divines For when Doctor Taylor speaks of the Bodies being bound and I have said the outward man in distinction to the Conscience it must be confessed that these terms are taken from custom and that it does fare with them as it does usually with other School-terms that they will not strictly hold the examination The Law of man which binds the subject for wrath sake only does so bind him to the external act as the will to that act must be included for to bind him in the Body without the Will were to put him in Fetters but it is no human obligation This I have said in my Book and I add here when I say we distinguish not the Will from the outward Man in the Obligation of human Laws it must be conceived that the will is guided still by the understanding and is supposed by some to be nothing else but the last practical act of it I distinguish not then the outward man from the inward so far as the inward acts are necessary to that which is external when I distinguish both from the conscience There is the understanding N.B. that I shall suffer if I do not such a thing and therefore I will do it is one thing and the understanding that I sin if I do it not and therefore I will do it is another The one is that our Divines mean by this term of the outward man still and the other is the conscience You may ask how comes it to pass that when there goes all this to an act the Magistrate commands so that the subject in his will and understanding so far as to do the thing is obliged we do yet call it but the outward man or forum exterius and can distinguish it with all that from the conscience I answer we call this the outward man upon this account because it is the external acts only that are subject to the Magistrates Government or can be required for themselves and the acts of the will and understanding are not required but indirectly in relation only to these external acts therefore I say do we well call all this still but the outward Man and this is distinguished plainly from the conscience because a man may know that such a thing is not required of God and that God will not punish him though he does not do it when yet he does know that it is prudent for him rather then suffer and therefore wills it In the one there is the external act with the will and understanding so far as that act is concerned but so long as my understanding is that it is not Gods will but mans will that I perform such a thing may be said to be done out of understanding and will as well as by the outward man but not out of conscience It is
not my knowledge of a thing and that I am to do it but my knowledge that it is God will or my knowledge of his judgement of the thing to be the same with mine that makes it Conscience I think I am full enough now You may then object that I sometimes seem in that Book to make the obligation of the outward man to be negative not to rebell and another time to be positive also to some act I answer 't is true that from the beginning I do make the obligation of the outward man to lye in both these a necessity never to resist and upon that necessity to act rather then suffer But interest of fear or self preservation binds the reason as well as the sense I say true and that there is the reason then of the outward man which is one and the reason of the conscience which is another When my reason is the fear of suffering because I may not resist and therefore I will it is my outward man is bound but when my reason is that the thing hath Gods Authority and it will offend him if I do it not and therefore I will then am I bound in conscience A human Law which is for the common good binds me from reason of conscience a Law which is unprofitable or against it binds me only from the outward mans reason There is Candour indeed to be allowed to this distinction which I have intimated as to most terms of Art but they are not therefore to be left both because of their constant use and also for their profit in the shorter cut which we get to what we would have by the use of them Onely they are verily to be at once first throughly understood and then shall all that which we signifie by them be as compleatly represented with a word as if it were drawn out in the full expression That which I have to offer upon this against the Prefacer and Debater who are companions in this cause is this that whereas they see no more but to think that the stability of Crowns and Scepters and so of all Government does lye in the Ministers especially the Episcopal Divines preaching such Doctrine as theirs which is to lay an obligation upon the conscience of the subject to obey them in all things indefinitely unless they be apparently forbidden in the Word of God they are exceedingly mistaken for if there were nothing else to support Soveraignity but that the Kings Crown might perhaps stick no longer on his Head then till the Parliament sits again seeing we may then very likely have more Laws that we shall make no conscience to obey and yet we shall make conscience God willing of our Loyalty to his Majesty and must do while we live by the command of the Aâ—mighty It is not the point of Obedience then it must be inculcated upon which the Government of Kings is established but upon the point of Subjection Let me say it over again It is not on the point of obedience out of Conscience but on the point that we must obey because the Magistrate beareth the Sword and that not in vain that the whole World is kept in Order And also upon this point of Conscience that whether we have cause to obey or not obey we must however never resist upon pain of damnation Let the Book before mentioned be herein further consulted And after this there will be little reason for our Prefacer to talk any more of exceptions levelled at the Power it self by any Pretences of the Non-Conformist against the Soveraign right of the King in the matters of the Church any more then of the State for we own no such no more then he though the way of his expressing himself by putting a restraint upon his Subjects consciences is so feat and grating till it be digested and withal so wayward that I cannot but point it to the Readers correction by what will hereafter follow If he hath any thing then to charge us with it must be in regard to the matters of the command unto which therefore he proceeds But then they say there are some particular things exempted from all humane cognizance which if the Civil Magistrate presume to impose upon the consciences of his Subjects He should say upon his Subjects not upon the consciences of his Subjects for the Magistrate imposes nothing but upon the outward man requiring the external act and the inward acts follow onely so far as they are necessary to the external as he ventures beyond the Warrant of his Commission so he can tye no Obligation of Obedience upon them seeing they can be under no subjection in those things where they are under no Authority Now this pretence resolves it self thus that they do not quarrel his Majesties Ecclesiastical Supremacy but they acknowledge it to be the undoubted right of all Soveraign Princes as long as its exercise is kept within due bounds of modesty and moderation Which being granted all their general exceptions Very fine when we have indeed none at all against the sufficiency of the Authority it self are quitted and they have now nothing to except against but the excess of its Jurisdiction So that having gained this ground Mighty to gain what never was with held the next thing to be assigned and determined is the just and lawful bounds of this Power which may be summed up in this general rule That Governours take care not to impose things apparently evil and that Subjects be not allowed to plead Conscience in any other case This is the safest and most easie Rule to secure the Quiet of all that are upright and peaceable and all that refuse subjection to such a gentle and moderate Government make themselves uncapable of all the benefits of society It is well we are come now at last where the water â—…cks The Non-Conformist differs not from the Conformist in the main point that secures all Government that is Subjection but it is in the point of Obedience only we differ And here are two questions The one is about the matters of our obedience in general what is the rule or the bounds that must be set to the Magistrates commands that we exceed not our duty to God while we are obedient to our Governours The other is about the particular matters of it whether the present impositions of Conformity do keep within that compass and consequently are lawful or unlawful The latter of these is the pitcht Field between the Conformist and Non-Conformist and neither of us have a mind to enter into it Only I will offer thus much by the way The Conformists generally do hold that the things we differ about are indifferent and consequently thae they may be removed out of the Church by Authority without sin The Non-Conformists say generally they shall sin if they obey them What then is to be done in the case but if my friend be weak and cannot indeed come to me I must go to my
in the matters of Religion they are not able to say Thus far as far as Conscience even to these Confines and it must go no farther It is Gods Authority must be first That of the Conscience next and then the Magistrates So long as the Magistrates commands trespass not upon conscience they are within his proper Territories but if they require any thing against that they are gone beyond their bounds and their Authority ceases The truth is there is but Gods Authority and Mans in all and the conscience hath Gods Authority which must therefore be over mans There is no Determination almost in any point which hath been held of difficulty which in the vertical turn is so plain clear and perfect as this The Magistrate I say hath power over his Subject in all things N.B. even in all things whatsoever in the Earth that he can do as to the external acts I have said and the Subject may or is to obey him in them so far as his conscience will let him Lo here the true rule or bounds of Gods own setting in this business In short The Magistrate shall command me in any thing but my conscience And who will not be ready to say now that this is indeed that which they knew and must wonder that they themselves did not make the Determination Indeed how shall a man be subject to the Magistrate for conscience sake if the command of conscience had not in it a Superiour and more prevalent Power than his it would be for his own sake and not for conscience sake if his authority was greater than it I know I have something here anticipated what is to follow in giving my notion so soon and at once but I do it for this reason because I know also it is the dry light at last and that alone that must be of force for conviction of those that will receive any by controversie Sect. 6. I must not yet leave this There are things in their nature indifferent and things apparently forbidden or required of God There is no difference between us in the last God must be obeyed in such things beyond question Duo sunt genera actuum imperii qui ad jus imperantis non pertinent Deo vetita jubere Deo jussa vetare For the other there is a double case The case of meer indifferency and the case of doubt That is there are things which are indifferent in their nature and appear so to us and there are things indifferent in their nature and yet appear to us unlawful In the one case the resolution is plain To do a thing whereof I am in doubt that is whereof I am not sufficiently perswaded it is lawful to do is forbidden Whatsoever is not of Faith is sin But the Magistrate hath not power to command me to sin You may say I had better obey doubtfully then disobey doubtfully I answer my doubt in the one refers unto God in the other unto Man and I must prefer God before Man If I disobey I doubt that I do ill onely because of Mans command but if I obey I doubt I do ill because of Gods I must be resolved that God forbids not the thing before the command of man can take place I obey then doubtfully but I forbear in saith I believe and am assured that God hath not commanded the thing I forbear but I am in doubt whether he hath not forbidden what I obey In the other case the resolution in general is that we are bound to obedience but it must be offered not indefinitely but with the distinction of a Political and Moral Obligation When Samuel tells the people the manner of their King that he would take their sons for his Charrets and Daughters for confectionaries their Fields and Vineyards to give unto his Servants Here is a political obligation on this people to deliver their Children and Estates for the Kings use upon his command because the Government was such in the Constitution that if he did so they might not resist him for all that when yet if any of them could save their sons and daughters or goods without violence or offending the King no doubt but they might and have a good conscience to God A political obligation then is to be bound to the thing so as to do it rather then resist a moral is to be bound to it so as if we do it not we sin We are bound to obey the King in all his commands of things indifferent with a political we are not bound to obey them with a moral obligation onely when they are for the common good I have used other terms to the same sense in my other Book and I am free in them being explained but it may be these are less obnoxious to cavil The Ecclesiastical Polititian therefore and the Debater both so far as he goes along with him hath made a very grievous young Determination in this business while he so confoundedly asserts that the Magistrate must be obeyed in all things not intrinsecally and aparently evil without any discrimination else whatsoever whereas the holding this is manifestly impious in one of these cases and tyrannous or intolerably oppressive to the conscience in the other There are some things indifferent I say in their nature that yet to us are unlawful while we suppose them unlawful or are in doubt of it and to do them in that doubt is sin and there are some things lawfull but so inconvenient so unprofitable so grievous that we should be loath always when then outward man is to have the conscience also charged with them I know upon the whole matter what it is that can mainly be urged God commands that we honour and obey our Superiours This is the duty of the fifth Commandment When the Magistrate then does appoint this or that particular thing an obligation to it arises upon us as part of that duty and so the conscience is obliged by God and that indefinitely in all Laws I answer the Reader who hath read my other Book with this thus far I will receive this instruction as one use of the whole viz. how the duty which God requires of us the fifth Commandment is to be understood and it is to be understood thus When our Superiour commands what he ought we are obliged by the Authority of that particular command so that if the thing be not done we sin when he commands what he ought not as when a Law is not for the peoples good we are obliged only by the Authority which is in his person and so if that be preferred otherwise we sin not though the thing be left undone And this is but what is ordinarily affirmed though not ordinarily so well understood by our Divines in their saying that the commands of men do oblige onely so far as to avoid Contempt and Scandal A determination I must say to be received onely in such commands which ought not to be commanded but not in
whatsoever he does according to his conscience yet he requires not in every thing that is according to his conscience he should act His conscience may be Erroneous or the thing not expedient if lawful to be done Again the Magistrates conscience and his are two He may think he is bound in conscience to act suppose in preaching seditious Doctrine yet if upon restraint he acts not his conscience cannot accuse him of sin because he cannot help it and the Magistrates restraining him is good and thereupon the does it for avoiding the evil that would follow if he should suffer him As to the latter question which is the case of constraint viz. the constraining of men to do any thing which is against their conscience I say the Magistrate hath in that case no Authority and that for this one reason which is to be insisted on to the last breach of these Papers viz because this is manifestly against his Office or work who being to see Gods Will performed does hereby directly endeavour the contrary His will is the man should never act against his conscience whatsoever comes of it he is forcing him hereunto Let me add Either the conscience of a man is in an error or it is in the right If it erre not a mans conscience is as God to him who can say a word against it If it be erroneous I say Gods will lyes in both these things that a man should not do against his conscience because it is his conscience and that he should not do according to his conscience because it erres but that he should lay down his error and so act And this is the meaning of that which Divines do say that such a conscience does ligare not obligare The Magistrate accordingly may not compel him to that which is positive to act against his conscience but to that which is negative viz. not to act according to it and if he do and do wickedly no doubt but he may punish him for it And so having offered you my Determination I am glad I can confirm it and that with two testimonies likewise most of sufficient credit The one is St. Austin in his second Book and Chapter 83. against Petilian who pleading the unlawfulness of compelling them to Religion Austin answers Ad fidem quidem nullus est cogendus invitus sed per severitatem solet perfidia castigari Si quae erga vos leges constitutae sunt non eis benefacere cogimini sed malefacere prohibemini nam benefacere nemo potest nisi elegerit The other is Grotius who letting nothing almost escape him which is momenâ— us in any Author hath fallen in upon this very quotation Suspenso pede hic incedendum ut illi qui Divinae Humanaeque ordinationi resistant non tam cegantur benefacere quam malefacere prohibeantur Quae duo in hoc ipso argumento Augustinus olim provide distinxit De Imperio summarum potestatum circa Sacra C. 6. S. 10. There are two Notes I must leave farther The one is that when I have laid down my two distinctions for the determining this point you must take beed of going away with one of them I know S. Augustins seventeenth Chapter in his second Book against the second Epistle of Gaudentius hath this Title quod ad veritatem cogendi sint etiam inviti which he makes good with these two instances of the King of Ninives commanding his people to repent and the Servants compelling them to come in to the Feast under the Gospel But neither of these Commands I hope and as I have said are to be supposed against the consciences of the one or the other but only they were unwilling and negligent and so had need of importunity and enforcement I deny not therefore but the Magistrate hath power N.B. of Constraint and Restraint in the matters of Religion but I say he hath not power of Constraint in matters Religious or other matters which are against a mans conscience The other Note is that when I have distinguished between Restraint and Constraint in the matter of Conscience not in the general matters only of Religion it does not seem to me safe to descend to particulars what is and what is not to be restrained but in general the Magistrate may use a due restraint when he hath reason and it is not fit he should restrain any when he hath none There is reason the Magistrate should restrain a John of Leyden and Knipperdoling when he hath indeed none against a peaceable Owen and honest Kiffin The Roman Emperour may have cause in general to take heed of innovation and yet have no cause to disturb the Christian of whom Pliny wrot to Traian By this means shall it not follow either that Christianity should be ever kept out of the World or that when Religion is established it must be overturned again by faction but that such a liberty only be allowed to conscience as is consistent with the Articles of Faith a good Life and the Government of the Nation SECT 10. Suppose we now then a Magistrate desirous to bring his People to a Religion or to a Uniformity in that way of worship he himself best approves What may he do therein The first thing he may and is to do is doubtless to take care that the people have Instruction that the Word be preached and such means used which are proper to convince their understandings and satisfie their consciences that they may submit to it This is the chief I count he is to do In the next place he may and is to cause all those impediments to be removed which may obstruct them in the reception of this Religion So Cyrus by his authority repressed the Jews enemies and made the way open for their return and rebuilding Jerusalem In the last place the Magistrate may tender all the encouragements and advantages with a restraint of the same to the refusers that he can possible to win them over to the way he conceives good for them When he hath gone thus far he must make a stand and consider in good earnest whether that which he would impose be against their Consciences or no. If it be not he may proceed to lay his Injunctions upon them whereby an obligation does fall upon the conscience supposing the thing reasonable and for the common good to do what his will is and if they do it not hereupon he may by the infliction of punishment that is by his Temporal Sword enforce them to a due obedience In summ He may do all and the very same in the concerns of Religion as he may do in the other concerns of his Kingdom upon that supposition But if it be against their Consciences he can proceed no farther He cannot lay any obligation on the Conscience which is contrary to that wherein it stands bound already and where he can lay no obligation on the conscience he cannot ex imperio command and where he cannot
command and oblige the Conscience as human law does bind it which how and how far it does is stated in my other book he cannot justly punish the man for not doing that which he was not bound to do So that we see here where the Magistrate must not use his Sword even while he is using it and acts not as a Magistrate but by it He acts by his authority or sword in seeing the means used helps administred obstacles removed He can and may force others whose duty it is not to be wanting in this when he cannot then enforce the end to which he causes these means to be used He cannot I mean he ought not punish any man only because his Conscience is not wrought upon by the means which he has used and so does not what he would have him In this case it is not he or the man either can help it and he may as well beat his Dog for not whistling Upon this account there is very good reason that regard be had so much the more to things that are not attainable without supernatural help that they be not enforced as other things So that we are to understand well after this that the distinctions between the Religious and Secullar things in reference to the Magistrates Authority or using his Sword is for all what is before said to be held so far as it will reach but that is only to a majus minus of his Care not to the specification of the state of our business My meaning is that in things not Religious but Moral only or Civil the Magistrate is more free as to his commands and using his Sword than in matters of Religion or he is to take more care of what he imposes in the one than he need to do in the other but that will not advance to the stating the point hereupon that he hath Authority and may use his Sword in Civil and not in Sacred concerments The King under the Law was to have the Book of God by him to this end that he might govern the people according to it and consequently use his Authority in the things of Religion And so Jehoshaphat to name no other appoints his Officers for the doing justice in the matters of God as in the Kings matters This Proposition The Magistrate may use his Sword in Civil but not in Religious affairs is not a true Proposition and therefore can determine nothing And this Proposition The Magistrate is to take more heed how he uses his Sword in supernatural than in natural or civil concerns is a true Proposition but not a sufficient determination The main Question still remains What are those things wherein the Magistrate indeed hath no power or may not use his Sword Upon the knowledg of this must the stating the business depend for when we know in what things he may and in what he may not use his Authority the matter is at an end Here are we now therefore to think upon it what are those reasons why the Magistrate is to be more careful in the use of his power in Religious than in other matters and if it be any where it is like to be there that we shall find a bottom to determine the main issue To know these reasons look whatsoever difference there are to be made between Religious and Civil matters in respect to the Magistrates using his Sword about them and they must be these reasons The first difference then between Religious and Civil things that may be offerred as a reason why the Magistrate is to take more care of using his Sword in the one than the other is That Religious things are supposed to be of supernatural Revelation which cannot therefore be known and done without Gods grace and it is not fit the Magistrate should punish a man for the want of that which God does not give him When in Moral and Civil things he hath the knowledg of them only by Nature and the practise of the Realm Now then if this will serve to determine the Question the Proposition drawn from it must be this That in all matters that are of supernatural Revelation the Magistrate may not use his Sword but in all other he may use it But this Proposition is alike false with the first That in all Religious he may not and in all Civil he may The Law given by Moses was by Revelation but the Magistrates might punish the breakers of that Law The Gospel is by Revelation but the Magistrate may punish those that keep from Church out of Irreligion The example of the man that was put to death for gathering Sticks on the Sabbath is a president uncontroulable that a man may be punished for his Presumption when he may not for his Conscience in the matters of Religion The second difference between Sacred and Civil affairs which may be another reason why the Magistrate is to take more heed as to the one than to the other is That the World cannot be governed without the exercise of his Authority in Civils when if the world were without all that which is of supernatural Revelation and consequently if he meddles not at all with those things it might It appears then reasonable that in what the government of the World can be without the Magistrate should not be so pressing when in that which it cannot subsist without he must Let us then again draw out what is here and try if it will do In matters which the world may be governed without the Magistrate must not use his Sword but in matters without which it cannot be governed he may This Proposition labours with the same failing for the Magistrate may use his Authority in things which the world may be governed if it were without because he can use it in religious matters as hath been instanced already from Scripture A third difference between Sacred and Civil things and which is a reason why the Magistrate is to be more careful of his injunctions and using his Sword in the one above the other is Because it is more like that the things he imposes in Religious concerns should be against mens consciences than in Civil or Moral matters and the Magistrate hath no Authority over the Conscience of any It is the commandment of the most High that no man should ever do any thing against his Conscience and the Magistrate cannot use his Authority but for God Now let us see if this at last will serve for the determining the question and if it will then must this proposition be true That in all matters that are against mens Consciences the Magistrate hath no authority and cannot use his Sword but in all matters that are not against their Consciences or that are according to them he may use it And this proposition I count is true and certain and to be maintained even in Religious and Civil matters and so is the foundation concluded upon by me to establish our Determination SECT