teach when we make the work of faith a worke of power 2 Thess. 1. And shall not the raising of men from the dead be a worke of power and is not the worke of grace such a worke Eph. 2. 2 But you doe ill under colour of magnifying the love of God to dishonour both his love and his power his love in confining it onely to promises and threatnings as if by these operations alone he moved us unto repentance his power in denying that God brings to passe those things which hee desires to bring to passe and that ardently And this latter is Austins objection as well as ours and hee makes the former to be meere Pelagianisme as wel'l as we doe In the next place you tell us We are to beleeve that Gods infinite power shall effect all things possible for them that love him but constraines no mans will to love him But doth he make mans will to love him without constraint why did you not expresse your minde on this point you are willing to acknowledge God to be the author of glory but I doe not finde you so ready to acknowledge God to be the author of all goodnesse the author and finisher of our faith of our repentance of our obedience Did you acknowledge this there should bee no difference betweene us For we doe not affirme that he works faith and repentance in us by way of constraint And when the Apostle prayeth that God would worke in the Hebrewes that which was pleasing in his sight you shall never finde in any of our Divines that the meaning of the Apostles prayer was that he would constraine them to doe that which is good and acceptable in the sight of God I know no power in God but infinite and seeing what worke soever he workes is by the exercise of his power it cannot be denied but that it is the exercise of that power which is infinite Againe is man or Angell able to circumcise our hearts so as to make us to love the Lord our God with all our hearts It is not as I presume you will confesse why then shall not this worke of Gods love in circumcising our hearts and making us to love him be accounted a worke of power infinite And Austin divers times professeth that God doth convert our hearts omnipotenti facilitate by an almighty facility and when God regenerates us he quickneth us and raiseth us from death to life Eph. 2. 2. and is said to transform us as it were of beasts to make us become men Esay 9. and how can this be wrought by lesse then power infinite as when Bernard confesseth of God saying Bernâ—n circumcis Dom. Serm. 2. Numquid non vere admirabilem experti sumus in imitatione utique voluntatum nostrarum As for Gods power to the immediate parent of our love to God it is no article of our Creed but a tricke of yours to insinuate any thing on your adversaries part that may make your owne cause seeme plausible wee rather conceive Gods grace and mercy to be the immediate cause of the circumcision of our hearts whereby wee are brought to love him Neither doe we say that he workes in us the love of himselfe immediately but rather by faith brings us first acquainted with the love of God towards us according to that of Iohn 1 Ioh. 3. 19. We love him because he loved us first and to that of S. Paul The end of the Law is love out of a pure heart and good conscience and faith unfained 1 Tim. 1. 5. No other seed of our love to God doe I acknowledge to be sowne in our soule Yet I doubt you referre this to a seed of nature and not to a seed of grace though you doe not affect to manifest your meaning so plainly as it were fit you should And no marvell For they which doe evill hate the light As for constraint we hold that infinite power cannot so worke the will Bodies may be constrained to suffer the execution of mens lusts upon them and may justly breed loathing in the parties so constrained As for the will that non potest cogi cannot be constrained And I wonder you that take notice of so many choice points of philosophy and divinity whereof others doe not should not all this while take notice of so popular a Maxime as this though I confesse your taking notice of it in this place had marred your game for the furthering whereof you are content to obtrude upon your adversaries so unreasonable a conceite as if they maintained that the will of man may be constrained yet suppose the will were constrained by God to love him would this breed in God a loathing of him Thus the foule and uncivill resemblance you make transports you Yet I have read My soule loathed them and their soule abhorred mee but I never heard the contrary My soule loathed them and their soule loved mee for while we abhorre God as enemies unto him yet notwithstanding even then hee loved us Rom. 5. 8. how much more when we love will he continue to love us and not turne his love into loathing as mens lusts turne into loathing sometimes as being satisfied and disdaining to be scorned by them whose bodies though they could force to be subject to their lusts yet could not winne their loues But God never makes us unwillingly to love him it is a thing impossible but as Austine saith Ex nolentibus volentes facit T is true God loves a cheerefull giver but who makes this cheerefulnesse but God and whose workes is it fit hee should love but his owne Like as it is said of him that Corâ—nat non merit a nostra sed donasua he crownes not our works but his owne And where there is a willing minde there it is accepted not according to that which a man hath not but to that which he hath but whose worke is this willing minde Is it not God that worketh in us both the will and the deede And that God doth not wrest any obedience from us but makes us willing and ready and cheerefull in the performing of it not onely in the way of doing what hee commandeth but in suffering what hee inflicteth or permitteth the sins of others to inflict upon us In so much that the Apostles rejoyced that they were accounted worthy to suffer for the name of Christ. And if a father prevaile to worke his childe to dutifulnesse though with much a doe yet in the end masters his stubbornnesse will hee love his childe or his obedience or dutifulnesse the worse for this yet God more effectually and with a great deale more case changeth our hearts even omnipotente facilitate as Austine speaketh and shall hee love our obedience our thankfulnesse our repentance the lesse for this 5 Now wee are like to receive something concerning the maine probleme to wit In what sense God may bee said to doe all that he can for his vineyard All
no such obligation for t is not the blessings but the sanctified use of them that is a pledge and assurance to them of the favour of God unto salvation and so the sanctified use of Gods temporall curses are no lesse evident a pledge and assurance to them of the same favour of God For by chastising divers and sundry waies with crosses and afflictions hee manifests unto them that God receives them for his sonnes and so esteemes of them and not as bastards Heb. 12. 8. I am glad to heare you acknowledge that Of all the motions of our hearts and soules God is the sole author and guide For such acknowledgements are most rare with you and which you cannot embrace without manifest contradiction to your selfe and overthrowing all your discourse touching Gods decree which as you say decreeth contingency but not the contingent things themselves But the motions of the soule and heart are contingent things and these must needes he decreed by God if they be produced by God And if God be the author of them hee must needs produce them So that the whole tower of your discourse touching Gods decree is suddenly overthrowne by your selfe and that with the blast of this one sentence Besides when you acknowledge God to be the authour of all the motions of our hearts and soules you therewithall acknowledge him to be the author of evill motions as well as good For you doe nor say hee is the author of all good motions but of all whose motions in reference to our hearts our soules our strength God is the sole Authour and guide yet we dare not avouch that God is the Author much lesse the sole Author of all our motions without manifold distinctions And to my thinking it became you to be very cautulous of such assertions who are so apt to charge your opposites with making God the Author of sinne Of every action of man that is free wee maintaine man to be the author as well as God but man wee make in operation subordinate unto God the second cause unto the first This is true as touching actions naturally considered and as touching good actions but with a difference man in working any naturall action we make him subordinate unto God in respect of influence generall in working good actions wee make him subordinate unto God in respect of influence speciall But as touching evill actions there wee make man alone to be the author of them as they are evill without any subordination unto God in respect of any influence generall or speciall And cannot sufficiently wonder what improvidence hath overtaken you to out-lash in so strange a manner But even in this we acknowledge a providence of God confounding the wittes and longues of them that build up Babell I remember what the Prophet saith of the Aegyptians The Lord hath mingled among them the spirit of errours and they have caused Aegypt to erre in every worke thereof as a drunken man erreth in his vomit and how is that but in defiling himselfe and that which is before him oâ— his owne favourites that sit next unto him Christs yoake is easie and his burthen light to the regenerate but is it so unto naturall men doe they not account it coards and bands Psal. 2. Doth not the Apostle tell us The affections of the flesh are not subject to the law of God nor can be It seemes you are a very morrall man you do so willingly fall upon this theame of advancing the power of mans naturall morallity But I remember withall what Austine sometimes said Malo humilem peccatorem quam superbum innocentem And arrogancie is a speciall fruit of pride And you discourse in such sort of the nature of man as if it had never beene corrupt in Adam 4 If our love of God be raised from the beliefe of his loving kindenesse to us then our love to God is not the first conception or plantation of true happinesse but rather our faith as the Apostle plainely testifieth 1 Tim. 1. 5. saying The end of the law is love out of a pure heart and good conscience and faith unfained And neither the one nor the other is the worke of nature but of Grace nor the worke of God neither by influence generall and naturall but by influence speciall and spirituall As for the conclusion you deduce herehence it is well known that life and sense and reason we obtaine by course of nature and naturall generation of naturall and reasonable parents And to know that God gives all this and maintaines naturall generation by the counsell of his will that he it is that fashioneth us in the wombe is not knowne by light of nature for the greatest Philosophers knew not this but by light of grace and so the moanest christian comes acquainted with this mysterie But herehence to inferre that God hath a purpose to give me with them whatsoever good things my heart my sense or reason can desire is a verie loose inference God hath no purpose to give his own children whatsoever good thing they doe desire much lesse what they can desire Paul desired and prayed thrise to be delivered from the buffetings of Satan but God granted it not unto him Moses desired to go over Iordan to see the goodly mountain and Lebanon but it was denied him Abraham desired that the blessing might be conferred on Ishmael but could not obtaine it And no marveyle For God knows what is better for us then our selves the childe prayeth for his Fathers health sayth Austine but it is Gods pleasure to take him away by death God hath not promised to give us all that we desire much lesse that sense desireth but hath promised that all things shall worke together for our good even povertie as well as riches sikenesse as well as health and adversitie as well as prosperitie For every creature of God is sanctified unto them that beleive and know the truth This is the faith only of a childe of God who is the heyre of the World by faith in Christ. But to say of all and every one hand over head that God hath a purpose to give them all eternall life is your common errour that now is like an hereditary sicknesse unto you driving you to maintayne two foule tenets the one that God is not omnipotent as purposing to give that which he never performes a manifest signe that he is not able to performe it as Austine many hundred yeares agoe disputed Enchirid 95. Deus noster in caelo sursum in caelo in terra omnia quaecunque voluit fecit Quod utique non est verum si aliqua voluit non fecit quod est indignius ideo non fecit quoniam ne fieret quod volebat omnipotens voluntas hominis impedivit And Enchirid. 96. Deo procul dubio quam facile est quod vult facere tam facile est quod non vult esse non sinere Hoc
neighbours or brethren either in time of plenty or time of scarcitie You doe him the greater wrong to charge him with sucking in cruelty as wine and feeding upon the needy as upon delicates neither will your good phrases make him amends in words for the wrong you doe him in deeds as for cutting morsels out of other mens throats this is a phrase incongruous for an intemperate mans diet is fitter for a superstitious Papist that in case the Priest should vomit the hoast thinkes the people bound to lickâ— it up The close of this ninth Section complies with the beginning of the first betweene which what suitable matter hath occurred let the Reader judge Though indigence be the mother of cruelty yet herehence it followeth not that it is not the mother of pitty for Rara est concordia fratrum Cleocles and Polynicas both had one mother yet there is a great difference in indigence as the cause of these Indigence heretofore suffered is made the cause of pitty but indigence in present alone is the cause of cruelty and that onely in case it cannot be relieved but by cruelty 5 Philosopher-like or rather meere naturalist-like you make errour of judgement the root of all evill as the cause of covetousnesse you make to be the opinion of want either that is for the present or may be for the time to come How farre are you different from Aquinas who maintaines that our wills are more corrupt quoad appetitum boni then our mindes quoad intellectum veri yet the Poet seems to have had another conscience in that of his Video moliora proboque deteriorasequor Saint Paul I thinke was a man regenerate when he made that profession I see a law in my members rebelling against the law of my minde and leading me captive to the law of sinne It is true there are bosome sinnes as wee call them like familiar spirits to particular men and so they may be dispensed withall in these they will shew themselves very morrall in other points and thinke it reason God should be mercifull unto them in breaking one commandment so they keepe the other nine Herod heard Iohn Baptist gladly untill hee toucht upon the keeping of his brother Phillips wife Iudas was content to follow Christ so he might bâ—are the bagge and so long as hee could make best wages by his service but thirty pieces of silver mooved him to give his master the bagge and to betray him A man for judgement able to arbitrate and voide of exorbitant affections which might expose him to partialitie or prejudice no doubt is the fittest arbitratour But if you aske me whereto this running discourse tends I cannot answer you yet it may bee you may answer your selfe hereafter Internall moderation mixt with outward competency is the onely supporter of true constancy I had thought integritie had made a man fit for arbitrament not constancy for constancy may be in courses unjust as well as just I presume it proceeds from constant integrity That content is little commendable that depends upon sufficiencie of estate not onely competent but more then competent And to my thinking even in the course of naturall morality a vertuous condition should not depend upon outward things the exercise of vertue doth I confesse but not vertue it selfe Bias his saying was Omnia meo mecum porto but wee are taught of a better Master that Godlinesse is great gaine with contentment and that the righteous cateth to the contentation of his minde which is delivered without distinction of poore or rich like as that which followeth The belly of the wicked shall want And that a dinner of greene herbs and love with it is better then a stalled oxe with hatred and strife The meanest Christian hath the love of God with him who answereth to the joy of his heart and the most glorious King that ever was professeth that A good conscience is a continuall feast and David the father a great conquerour found no blessednesse in any temporall state but in that which was incident to the meanest of his subjects saying Blessed is the man whose iniquitie is forgiven and whose sinne is covered Blessed is the man to whom the Lord imputeth no sinne and in whose spirit there is no guile The truth is if our pretences depend upon outward things they shall bee as fraile as those are mutable and who can give strength to resist the temptations of Satan but God As there is no being but from God so no permanence of being but from God till the time of temptation a man is not known let the raine fall and the flouds rise and the winde beat upon the house then it will appeare whether it were built upon the rock or upon the sand Wee know the Angells fell wee know Adam fell and how vaine a thing is it to discourse of any naturall permanency in vertuous courses amongst naturall men that knew not God By the way your phrase of satisfying capacities is incongruous of satisfying desires wee usually heare but of satisfying capacities I never read of but in your discourse You proceed to discourse unto us of another roote of unconstancy which you call contingency which is a terme of art with you and your peculiar dialect this roote you will have to be the infinite capacitie of reasonable creatures conceites or desires within whose compasse their finite motions may become eccentricke and irregular as it were a starre fixed in too wide a sphere And this applyed to the fall of Angels in whom wee finde a double change or alteration the one morall to wit a change from the state of integrity wherein they were created into the state of sinne the second naturall to wit a change from a blessed state into a wretched and damned condition the first change was their owne worke as wherein they sinned the second the worke of God whereby they were punished Their inconstancie in not standing upright but falling into sinne is onely pertinent to the present purpose and to enquire after the root of this is to enquire after the cause of their fall Now the cause hereof as it is plaine so if we please we may as plainly expresse it for as for their possibility to fall that rose from the condition of their natures being made by God free agents and so accordingly a law being given them by God they might freely obey it freely disobey it what need wee straine our wits for obscure expression of so plaine a truth as by referring it to the infinite capacitie of their conceits or desires within whose compasse their finite motions may become eccentricke and irregular What need we affect such perturbation of speech in confounding conceits with desires and placing finite motions within the compasse of desires infinitely capacious which motions undoubtedly were their desires for they sinned questionlesse in desiring somewhat and comparing desires to spheres and againe desires to starres fixed in spheres that so
coaction and naturall necessitation though now you divert from this unto civill liberty which is onely liberty from subjection As touching the lawes of men it is fit there should be a Court of Chancery for mitigation because men cannot foresee all cases that may fall out and by too strict observation of lawes summum jus may prove summa injuria But this cannot without great absurdity be applyed unto the decrees of God who from everlasting was ignorant of nothing but foresaw all things that were to come And by the way what doe you manifest hereby but a strange fancy that in some respects it were fit Gods decrees should be alterable lest otherwise hee might be deprived of liberty in taking opportunity of doing good implying withall that God in course of time takes notice of something whereof from everlasting hee was not conscious And though the Pope in reserving to himselfe power and liberty to send them forth or call them in againe doth take upon him more authority then is fit because hee hath neither wisedome nor integrity answerable to so great authority yet seeing God wants neither wisedome nor integrity it seemes fit in your judgement as may appeare by the tenour of this sentence that he should make decrees and recall them at his pleasure And so though at the first entrance upon this discourse and since also you professed that Gods decrees were unalterable yet here you plainly signifie that Gods wisedome and integrity may well beare him out in exercising such authority as the Pope usurpes to wit in making grants at pleasure and at pleasure to revoke them Which I confesse the Pope doth with a great deale more ease then he doth draw in the same breath which once hee hath breathed out which if he doth yet certainly it is more then it is in his power to doe at his pleasure unlesse hee hath some extraordinary device that I know not of I doubt your mysteries are not yet full you seeme to commend the condition of mutability as a condition befitting the wisedome and integrity of God it remaines that you doe as much disgrace immutability and count it an impotent condition that so with the better grace you may reject it as unbeseeming the nature of God In the next sentence you utterly forsake your text and whereas in congruity to the precedent discourse you should shew how alteration of decrees is no signe of a fickle disposition you nothing to the purpose tell us that the alteration of awards is no signe of a fickle disposition For by the same decree may different awards be executed without any revocation or alteration of the decree It was long agoe the saying of Gregory that Deus mutat sententiam consilium nunquam But by the way you signifie that the former practice of Popes in making grants and recalling of them is no signe of mutability A manifest untruth Nay your selfe laboured to justifie such a change as to make grants and to revoke them as an apparant change but you justified it by the opportunity to doe the greater good thereby provided that wisedome and integrity bee answerable So that though it be no vicious change as you would have it yet apparantly there is a change But the administration sometimes of rewards sometimes of punishments doth argue I confesse no mutability in decrees One and the selfe same lawes of men doe cause the different administration of rewards and punishments to divers persons yea and to the selfe same persons at different times without all colour of change in the lawes themselves Of the coherence of that which followeth with that which went before I will not enquire for what doe I know whether you purpose to write quodlibets But in my judgement you doe not give a right reason why it is fitter to be grounded by lawes then by the wils of men For the corruption of man disables him as well from the making of good lawes as from governing well by will and pleasure But if men are to chuse the reason in my opinion why they will chuse to be governed by lawes is because by lawes they may aforehand know what shall be the execution of justice and accordingly judge thereof and if they like and approve it they may the better submit unto it But if executions proceed according to the will of a Prince absolute they cannot judge of executions before they come because they know them not they being left to the pleasure of men and after they are brought forth it is too late to remedy them if they prove evill And the incorruptest and wisest man that ever was is fitter to give lawes and to execute justâ—ce thereby then to bee trusted with execution of justice according unto pleasure because such men come indifferent to the making of lawes which may bee particularly interested in the manner of execution For executions are only in particular cases which particular cases may in speciall cencerne them that have the execution of justice As for example the malefactor may be a friend to the Magistrate himselfe or a brother or neare of kâ—nne which is a shrewd tentation to provoke him though otherwise vncorrupt and fit enough to mak generall lawes in this particular case to strain a good conscience and by partialitie to corrupt the course of justice Secondly in case government is by succession lawes are most necessary because the most wise and uncorrupt Prince is not sure to beget one like to himselfe or if hee should yet is it not in his power to leave it unto him at such a time as by ripenes of age and experience he shall be fit for government and by experience wee finde that many times good government in the father doth degenerate into tyrannie in the sonne And it is true that good Princes as true fathers of their countrie and people have sometimes remitted off their absolutenesse the better to enjoy the heartes of their subjects which is the best maintenance of perpetuity then by force to compell them Yet by your leave every Act wherunto princes passe their consent doth not restraine them of their former liberty or abate something of their present greatnes For unto all acts of Parliament the King consents yet in consenting to give him 5. Subsidies in a yeare or restoring and confirming unto him the customes called runnage and poundage I doe not find that hereby he either remitts of his former liberty or abates any thing of his present greatnes It is true the lawes of men can have no greater perfection then men that make them and therfore they are sayd non cavere de particularibus for it is impossible that they should comprehend all occurrences yet in this case there is an helpe in Christian states having a court of chancery established for the remedying of such inconveniences without so much as taking any notice of the Pope as the Chancelor of Christendome For if S. Peter himselfe were alive and Bishop of Rome yet what
Ioseph be tempted with a wanton Mistris yet if lust be mortified within him her wanton invitation shall never captivate Ioseph No nor the ladyes admitted to his presence could inflame Scipio Adricanus though a man of warre with a lustfull appetit Shewe a Lyon grasse he is nothing affected with it sayth Decumenius because it is not the dyet of a Lyon but of an Oxe Shew an Oxe flesh he hath no appetite unto it for fleshe is no diet for an Oxe but for a Lyon rather every man is tempted sayth S. Iames when he is drawne away by his owne concupiscence and entised And by working upon this concupiscence it is that the Divell leades men captive to doe his will no such matter could he finde in our Saviour And so much some conceaved to be signified when he sayth The Prince of the World commeth and sindes nought in me Yet cannot the Divell certainly prevaile to every particular nor to any particular so as to justifie that man doth not that evill which he doth sponte for even beasts doe sponte whatsoever they doe and man even the worst of men doth not onely of his owne accord that which he doth but voluntarily also yea and freely too And yet the Divell is none of those externall things you speake of with farre more colour of reason did they proceed who mainteyned that looke what meÌ„ did of passion they did not voluntarily fetching the restraynt of doeing voluntarily not from things externall but internall rather even from the passion themselves but even this also is learnedly confuted by Aristotle long agoe 3. We must with patience expect and wait till you come to your text and intreat of the theame proposed to wit of the infinity and immutability of divine goodnesse communicative The first sentence is not well stated for Sarah was old stricken in age and it ceased to be with her after the manner of Women when hearing from the Lord something concerning the conceaving of a child by her she sayd After I am waxed old and my Lord also shall I have lust Lust certeynly may be in old age and not a sinne lust is one thing inordinate lust is another thing and where lust is why should it seeme a Monster in corrupte nature for that lust to be inordinate And if a proud man be brought to a beggars condition why should it seeme monstrous if his morall condition be not altered but he continue as proud as ever As Plato discerned a proud heart thorough Antisthenes patcht coate And Diogenes might be as proud of his tubbe as Alexander of his Crowne And a man may be as proud of carying a cloake bagge behâ—nde him as Cardinall Camprins was of his sumpter horse that followed after him for pride though it be more hatefull in one then in another as the wiseman speaks yet it disdeyns no condition but accepteth entertainment in every breast how much more in the breasts of Kings and such may be found even amongst the wandring planets on earth otherwise called Roagues and beggars Certeynly men of a shifting disposition if they have gotten wealth thereby it is nothing strange if they continue their trade still considering that Crescit amor nummi quantum ipsa pecunia crescit especially if they have prospered well by it And yet I confesse men sometimes give over their former trades as horse leaches leave sucking when their bodyes are full but I doe not think they can so easely leave off their manners neither doe temptations begett any sinnes but rather provoke our corruptions to actuate themselvs as a mans corrupted will and affection to actuate it selfe and bring forth actuall sinne And as the Apostle sayth Sinne not only provoked by temptation but even taking occasion by the Commandement doth bring forth in us all manner of concupiscences It seemes you are a very morall man your selfe that are so well perswaded of others but in the meane time you are little thankfull unto Gods grace For this your morality when you ascribe it to a generall inclination of nature belike you are loath to be beholding to Gods grace for the morality of your nature I wonder the lesse at the prodigious blindnesse of your minde mainteyning that he who hates his brother desires to deserve well of him whereas S. Iohn sayth that he who hateth his brother is a man-slayer that the avaritious person desires to be liberall and the Hypocrite desires to be upright and the unmercifull to be compassionate the Extortioner or robber to be just and the Niggard to be bountifull which is as much as to say that the hotte fire desires to be cold as earth and the cold earth desires to be as hote as fire Why doe you not proceed in expressing the good opinion you have of a naturall man even of the worst of men and say that they have a desire to repent to please God to be holy to be religious Continuance in sinne was wont to bee called altera natura and secunda natura and the Prophet justifieth it where hee saith Can a blacke Moore change his skinne or a Leopard his spots then may ye also doe good that are accustomed unto evill The sight of Gods judgements causing feare may restrain from evill like as an hedge of thornes crossing a mans way may hinder him from finding his paths But as for impulsions unto goodnesse in a man abandoned unto his lusts and who as the Apostle speakes commits sinne with greedinesse and is growne to 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 I know none And Seneca seemes to be your onely Oracle for this a proper master for a Christian Divine to rely upon And yet upon the scanning Seneca alledged by you in this place I finde pleades against you rather then for you as who plainly professeth that They who erre in matters of life and manners are delighted with their errours every criminall person is delighted with his crime one solaâ—th himselfe in adultery another delights in over-reaching others and in theft He saith that naughtinesse is afraid of darknesse it selfe which may restraine from evill I confesse but this gives no evidence of any impulsion unto goodnesse no more then his last conclusion that naughtinesse may be safe but never secure Which conclusion seves you for a passage to the next Section 4. It is very true an evill conscience will not suffer a man to be secure for if a good conscience be a continuall feast surely an evill conscience holds a man continually upon the racke Occultum quatiente animo tortore slagellum The wicked slye when no man pursueth him saith Solomon and There is no peace saith the Lord to the wicked It was one of the Iudgements God threatned to his owne people when they persisted in their obstinate courses against him namely that the sound of a leafe should chase them and they should flie no man pursuing them but this is no evidence of any impulsion unto
Overbury saw manifestly that his refusall would have beene an occasion to bereave him of his Lieutenancy of the Tower which he had bought with a great summe of money This temptation prevailed with him wee commonly say The greater is the temptation the lesse is the sin So where small meanes of contentments are the greater is the temptation to discontent and to tast of the bitter fruits thereof But I doe not finde that the particular instances following doe any way savour of this member of your distinction You seeme to keepe your selfe wholly to the prosecuting of inequality of naturall propensions yet not that neither with such congruity as might justly be expected For first you prosecute the inequality of wealth and wit Wit is a naturall faculty I confesse I never heard it called a naturall propension till now But as for wealth it is neither propension nor faculty naturall nor at all naturall It is true I confesse that some mens wealth gets the start of wit as he observed that in a great audience sometimes said unto his auditors When I behold your wealth I wonder at your wit againe when I behold your wit I wonder at your wealth I confesse willingly that to abound in wealth is to abound in temptations unto sinne that fulnesse of bread is reckoned among the sins of Sodome that when Jeshurun waxed fat he spurned with the heele But the temptations herehence arising prevaile onely on them that want wit is an observation I have not beene acquainted with before neither am prone to beleeve it I never read this laid to the charge of Sardanapalus of the Assyrians or of Xerxes who as I remember it was that proposed a reward to him that could invent a new pleasure nor to Heliogabalus among the Romane Emperours Nero was luxurious enough I never heard it proceeded from want of wit for the first quinquennium of his reigne hee manifested himselfe to bee no foole Hercules servivit Omphale was it for want of wit That the Merchants sonne of whom it is reported that in one night at Venice he spent sive hundred pounds upon his five senses had his honesty beene answerable to his wit he had kept his reputation with the best And the Gentleman of the house of the Vaineys that in most luxurious manner wasted his estate and afterwards turned Turke I never heard defamed for want of wit Yet we commonly say many men have good wits but they are in fooles keeping And indeed a foole in Solomons computation doth usually stand for a knave And it is most true that such are most unwise as appeares by the issue for by such courses they shorten their dayes and send themselves with precipitation unto their graves there to grow greene before their heads bee gray and after they are gone their remembrance rots and they leave a very ill savour behinde them But I should thinke that dull fellowes are neither so inventious of mad courses nor of so active spirits to prosecute them as those whom God hath endued with better parts of understanding I grant men of great wits have not alwaies revenues answerable But I should thinke it is their pride rather then their wit that instigates them to injurious courses For when men cannot subject their minds unto their fortunes but labour to carve unto themselves fortunes answerable to their mindes this must needs expose them to lewd courses Yet a good wit I confesse to maintaine a bad cause may animate some more to molest and vexe and it is not the greatnes of revenues will free them from such exorbitant courses Though mens bodies overgrow their soules yet if they have not a spirit answerable they will prove but lubbers though great lubbers as great as Gog-Magog whom Corineus met withall at Dover when that great lubber like a timber log came tumbling topsie turvie over and over And it is a common saying that a short man needs not a stoole to give a great lubber a box in the eare though he that is weake had neede to be witty yet it is not alwaies true or for the most part that weake persons are wily and where wilinesse is found it is a temptation strong enough without weaknesse to move men to practise unlawfull policy where grace is wanting But to say that wilinesse shelters it selfe with craft is as much as to say it shelters it selfe with it selfe and if the distinction be put betweene the disposition of wilinesse that is within and wily crafty courses without well something else to wit mens private reaches and ends may be said to be sheltred hereby yet wilines cannot For like as wisdome is not sheltered but rather discovered laid open by wise courses folly by foolish courses so also wilines craftines by wily and crafty courses I see no reason to justifie that saying men love their wits more strongly when they perceive them set upon that which in it selfe is good And I give a reason for my negation though you give none for your affirmation for the more convenient the object is unto the appetite the more strongly doth the appetite affect it and the more convenient things are unto us the more wee love our selves for affecting them Now it is manifest that luxurious objects are more convenient to a luxurious appetite then objects temperate and avaritious courses more convenient to the appetite of an avaricious person then courses of liberality and generally to all men in the state of corruption the pleasures of sinne are more gratefull then the pleasure of righteous courses Nay a man regenerate may for good reason seeme not to be so strongly caried in his affections unto good as the wicked are in their affections unto evill my reason is because in the regenerate there dwels a flesh lusting against the spirit which remits and qualifies the fervour of his affection unto good whereas on the contrary in the wicked there is found no spirit lusting against the flesh to remit or qualifie the fervour or fury rather of their affection unto evill especially when they are fitted with most convenient objects to allure them Againe to doe good to the poore is not good in it selfe as you suppose we were wont to say in the Vniversity that Omnis actio est bona aut mala propter circumstantias and as I remember it was a saying of Bernard that vaine-glory clotheth the poore as well as charity And how can that bee a good will to the poore that practiseth to coosen others for the gratifying of the poore â—o may hee be said to beare a good will to Paul that robbeth Peter to pay Paul yet that which hee will leth is good to Paul I confesse but it is no good will to him that is such a pay master neither is it necessary it should proceed from any intention to satisfie Paul it may well proceed from other intentions No man is bound in conscience to hinder any mans welfare or his owne either no
irreligiousnesse contempt of government murder uncleannesse gluttony drunkennesse theft oppression extortion lying to be evill and the contrary to these to be good by the light of nature and suggestion of conscience there being a law of good and evill written in the hearts of all their conscience bearing witnesse and their thoughts accusing or excusing Rom. 2. 14. 15. And therefore it is false to say that wee know this or that to be good because Gods will revealed commends it to be such For undoubtedly in most points of morality wee know this to be good and that to bee evill without the revealed will of God and by the very light of nature Neither doth it follow that because God willeth nothing but that which is just and good therefore justice and goodnesse are the objects of his will first because wee have heard out of Aquinas that Gods wisedome is his justice secondly it is absurd to say that justice goodnesse or wisedome are the objects of his will Againe if the goodnesse of Gods will consists in willing that which is good and just to wit in things that are to be done by man then the rectitude of Gods will shall accrue to him from without and shall not bee essentiall unto him like as the rectitude of mans will which is disproved by Aquinas in the place before alledged Whereas you say unlesse this or that had beene good God had not willed it this may admit such an interpretation as nothing serves your turne for the wisedome of God may represent this or that to bee good that is such as is sit to be done in the way of congruity so that if it be done it shall be done congruously yet not to bee good so as it ought to be done in the way of necessity Nay marke what Bradwardine professeth suppose the wisedome of God shall represent this to be more congruous to be done then that yet is not God hereby bound to preferre the doing of that before this Ratio praeponderans est qua dictat quod melius esset facere hoc quam illud vel quod melius est hoc facere quam dimittere talis ratio non movet nec concludit voluntati divinae nec eam determinat ad agendum Posset enim Deus facere meliora quam facit multa bona quae non facit And concludes Homini tutum est semper ut conformet voluntatem suam rationi praeponderanti Deus autem non potest sequi per omnia rationem praeponderantem nisi faceret omnia possibilia horum quod libet infinitum quod contradictionem includit Sufficit igitur sibi in talibus pro ratione voluntas vel saltem ratio congruens concomitans praelaxata Yet the will of God is alwaies reasonable but marke what is the ground of this denomination according to Aquinas in 1. Quest. 19. Art 5. Ad. 1. Voluntas Dei rationabilis est non quod aliquid sit Deo causa volendi sed in quantum vult unum esse propter aliud Yet you would make the world beleeve that you fetch your divinitie from the fountaine they that thinke otherwise never taste it but in trenches yet where have you hitherto discovered the fountaine from whence you take it 3 You proceed to free your tenet from exceptions but alas you propose but one exception and that a poore one Seeing no thing can be without Gods will what can be good before God wills it And your answer is by concession That goodnesse actually existent in the creature cannot be without some precedent act of Gods will as much as to say this exception is nothing to the purpose and so you undertake to free your Tenet onely from such exceptions as are nothing to the purpose Now as touching goodnesse actually existent in God himselfe doth that depend meerly upon the will of God or at all upon the will of God The manifestation of it or the exercise of it depends meerly upon the will of God for as much as this is performed onely by outward workes and God might have chosen whether hee would have made the world or any part of it yea or no. But as for Gods goodnesse we that tast of divinity but in trenches acknowledge that the being thereof is as necessary as the being of God himselfe and depends not at all upon the liberty of Gods will There is you say a goodnesse objective precedent in order of nature to the act or exercise of Gods will What I pray Is it any such as bindes God to the willing of any outward thing take heed what you say lest you fall into Atheisme by making God a necessary agent or that he was bound in the way of justice to make the world whence it followeth that the world was everlasting Yet this goodnesse which you make the object of Gods will savoureth of ditch water rather then of spring water for it is brought by you as that which sheweth Gods will what is to be done But every novice knowes it belongs not to goodnesse to give direction but to wisedome rather and therefore Aquinas as I shewed before makes that whereupon depends the reason of all justice to be the wisedome of Gods understanding And I grant willingly that the direction of wisedome in God precedeth the operation of his will in order of nature according to that of Aug. alledged by Bradw out of his answer to the 7. question of Orosius In Deo praeire voluntas sapientiam non potest ergo prius est rationabiliter sapere qaam rationabiliter velle Yet neither the wisedome of God shall determine his will unlesse it doth so direct as to shew that this or that ought to be done For if it doth onely direct by shewing what is fit to be done and of many courses which Gods wisedome can devise sit to be taken if it be left indifferent to Gods will to choose or refuse what hee list it is apparent that though before God choose it was fit to be done like as many other courses were also yet no necessity why God should preferre this before an other sure I am you have proved no such thing hitherunto neither out of the fountaine nor out of the trenches Intellectus divinus saith one singulos modos operandorum possibiles circa creaturas considerat omnes voluntati proponit ut libere quem voluerit exequi eligat Henrie quodlib 8. Quest. 1. Aquinas professeth that whatsoever God is able to doe that also hee can wisely doe in 1. Quest. 25. Art 5. in Corp. Divina sapientia totum posse potentia comprehendit And again professeth that the order of things in the government of this world doth not adequate the wisedome of God as much as to say hee could have brought forth a world and the dispensation of his providence in as wise a manner as hee hath shewed in this his words are these Ordo divinae sapientiae rebus inditus in quo ratio justitiae consistit
What the Church of England doth teach concerning the extent of Gods love Of the distinction of Singula generum and Genera singulorum Of the distinction of Voluntas signi and Voluntas beneplaciti WHat you meane by a course of Compromising contentions betweene some other reformed Churches in certaine points of religion I know not neither am I acquainted with any such course I conceive our Church to be as absolute and entire in maintaining the prerogative as of Gods grace effectuall to every good action so of his soveraignetie in electing whom he will according to his good pleasure and passing by others as any Church in Christendome which I do not speake upon snatching of a clause here and there to be found in the litturgie of our Church whereunto I shape at pleasure an interpretation as I thinke good as your fashion is but this I speake upon consideration of that doctrine which is positively set downe in the articles of religion manifestly containing the profession of the Church of England Yet you would perswade your Readers the Church of England concurreth with you in extending the love of God towards all But you manifest a faint heart in the maintenance of your cause by walking in the cloudes of generalities as if you feared to come to the light and had a purpose rather to circumvent your reader then to endoctrinate him You talke of Gods unspeakable love towards mankinde but you define not in what kinde but keepe your selfe a loose off for all advantages Wee acknowledge Gods love to all in respect of conferring upon them blessings temporal and that in an unspeakable manner But the question onely is whether God doth bestow or ever did intend to bestow grace of sanctification upon all or salvation upon all If Gods love in these respects in your opinion doth extend to all say plainly that God hath elected all with Huberus and predestinated all For predestination in Austines divinity is but praeparatio gratiae gloriae Now the Church of England in her publicke and authorized doctrine plainly professeth that God hath predestinated none but those whom he hath chosen in Christ as vessells of honour If you say that the reason why God did not predestinate all nor elect all in Christ proceeds not from the meere pleasure and free disposition of God but that onely upon the foresight of the obedience of the one and disobedience of the other he elected those and reprobated these for hereunto the Genius of your Tenent carrieth you though you are loath in plaine termes to professe as much let any man judge whether this bee suitable to the seventeenth Article of religion in our Church whereupon Rogers in his Analesis thereof published by authority and dedicated to Archbishop Bancroft observes in his fifth proposition that In Christ Jesus of the meere will and purpose of God some are elected and not others unto salvation And he just fieth it by holy Scripture Rom. 9. 11. that the purpose of God might remaine according to election not of works but of him that calleth Ephes. 1. 5. Who doth predestinate us according to the good pleasure of his will 2 Tim. 1. 9. Not according to our workes but according to his owne purpose and grace Exod. 33. 19. Rom. 9. 15. I will shew mercy to whom I will shew mercy Prov. 16. 4. The Lord hath made all things for himselfe even the wicked against the day of evill Rom. 9. 21. Hath not the potter power over the clay to make of the same lumpe one vessell to honour and another to dishonour But consider the Article it selfe They which are indued with so excellent a benefit to wit as election and predestination is are called according to Gods purpose by his spirit working in due season they through grace obey their calling they be justified freely they be made sonnes of God by adoption they be made like the image of his onely begotten Sonne Jesus Christ they walke religiously in good workes and at length by Gods mercy they attaine to everlasting felicity Whereby it appeares that election and predestination is made the fountaine and cause of obedience and perseverance therein even unto everlasting life whereas if God did elect and predestinate any man unto salvation upon foresight of obedience and perseverance our obedience and perseverance should be the cause of our election and predestination rather then our election and predestination the cause of our obedience and perseverance Againe consider these alone whom God hath elected in Christ and predestinated are noted to bee made in due time the sonnes of God by adoption But you make all to bee the sonnes of God and Gods infinite love in unspeakable maner to be enlarged towards all and every one even towards them that have hated God all their life Lastly onely the elect are here noted to bee those vessels whom God hath made unto honour not that any others are made unto honour which is nothing answerable to your tenet But proceed we along with you You undertake to prove that Gods love is extended to mankinde which no Christian ever called in question but your meaning is that it extends to all and every one of mankinde and that so farre forth as to will the salvation of all and every one as appeares by the sequele and all this out of the publique and authorized doctrine of our Church And yet you insist onely upon certaine passages and prayers in the Liturgy of our Church The Liturgie I hope is not the doctrine of our Church though it be not contradictory to our doctrine But therein wee have beene content to conforme unto the practice of the Chuch so farre forth as it might seeme tolerable and such as might be performed with a good conscience which yet if in any particular it be found dissonant from the Articles of Religion it is rather to receive correction from the Articles then the Articles to receive correction from the Liturgy But consider wee what is that which you plead for your selfe You enter upon it after your course with great state discovering unto us a wonderfull providence of God in drawing those Articles for you tell us that No Nationall Councell though assembled for that purpose could fit their doctrine more expresly to meet with all the late restrictions of Gods love then the Church our Mother even from the beginning of reformation hath done as if she had then foreseene a necessity of declaring her judgement in this point for preventing schismes or distractions of opinions amongst her sonnes Here we have a pretty Comedy towards and you have a poeticall wit for fiction Had our Church foreseene a necessity of declaring her judgement in this point where I pray was it fit that she should doe this but in the Articles of Religion But you finde no place where she hath fitted her doctrine to meet with the restrictions of Gods love but in the Liturgy and Catechisme Was that think you a fit place to fit
proving that which no Christian will deny For your conclusion is that God willeth not the death of any but the life of all whom of men or infidels he hath made Christians Did ever any Christian deny this Is this it you are to prove that God wils the salvation of all Christians Have you not rather undertaken to prove that God willeth not the salvation of all sorts of men onely which was Austins glosse and which you set up here as a mark to shoot at thinking by the power of your discourse to beare downe the authority and learned discourse of that worthy Father hereupon but that he willeth the salvation of every man of every sort throughout the world And this you would prove out of the doctrine established in the Church of England that is out of their Liturgie and three prayers therein you insist upon whereas the two first are apparantly nothing for the purpose whereof your selfe seeme to bee sensible enough and therefore the third place Triary like was to doe the feat and to cleare all and the conclusion herehence definit in piscem being no more but this that God willeth the salvation of all men whom he hath vouchsafed to make Christians which no man denies or cals into question May I not justly aske and that with admiration Quid dignum tanto tulit hic promissor hiatu Parturiunt montes nascetur ridiculus mus But what should move you to carie your selfe so preposterously and to balke or blast rather so faire a consequence and so beneficiall unto your cause as your antecedent doth bespeake For if your antecedent be true namely that God willeth not the death of any Turke Iew or Infidell will it not manifestly follow that God willeth not the death of any Turke or Iew or Infidell To my thinking it should follow as manifestly as to say that if the Sunne shineth it shineth though in my poore judgement this is identity rather then consequence or concomitance I say I wonder what moved you to blast this consequence with such a dash of your pen in the very face of it and the addition of such a proviso as this whom of men or infidels he hath made Christians First especially considering that no such qualification is in the antecedent and it is most unreasonable that any qualification should be foisted into a conclusion that hath no ground in the premisses especially it being such a qualification as utterly marres your market and that at the end of the day and you have a long time waited for a good penyworth and now your selfe are the man that cuts your owne throat Did the conscience of so foule a conclusion as was towards make you blush to put it in writing that cannot be for you have it full and whole in the antecedent though straining to proceed most indecently it fares with you as it doth with the horse in the Poet Peccat ad extremum ridendus ilia ducit Or by the way did your consequence suggest unto you that the argument drawne from this prayer proves no more but this that God will save every Iew Turke and Infidell in case he be first made a Christian If so then the supposed consequence in your antecedent was made against your conscience and therefore by the consequence herehence made you desired to strangle it that so the birth of it might bee abortive Yet because you carie some shew of argumentation in the antecedent I will not trust to the corruptnesse of your consequent deduced therhence but I will take the pains to strangle it my selfe since the presse hath brought it to light your antecedent is this If God therefore will not the death of any Jewe Turke or Infidel because of nothing he made them men Now this includes such an Enthymeme Of all Turkes Iewes and Infidels it is true that God of nothing hath made them men therefore he will not the death of any Iew Turke or Infidel Now I say this consequence is notoriously false and in stead of your proving it in any manner I disprove it in this manner Of all Devils it is as true that God of nothing made them angels shall I herehence inferre therefore he will not the death of any devill So likewise of all cats and dogs horses and hogs it is as true that God of nothing made them such as they are will it therefore follow that God willeth not the death of any of them But perhaps some may say that the Collect implyeth some such argument for it runneth thus Mercifull God who hast made all men and hatest nothing that thou hast made have mercy upon all Jewes I answer first here is no such argument implyed as to inferre that God will not the death of any Iewe Turke or Infidell but onely it implieth a reason why we pray God to have mercy upon all Iewes Turkes and Infidels But albeit we doe thus pray for all yet it followeth not that God will save every Iew Turke and Infidell that liveth as before I have shewed For who doubts but the childe is bound to pray for the recovery of his fathers health being cast downe upon the bed of sicknesse at what time it may bee it is Gods will that his father shall not recover but dye the death Secondly the complete reason why we pray for all signified in this praier is not this because God hath made all men and hateth nothing that he hath made for by the same reason we might be urged to pray for devils as well as for men This is onely a part of the reason not the whole reason The whole reason is this Who hast made all men and hatest nothing that thou hast made nor wouldest the death of a sinner but rather that he should be converted and live And we finde by manifest experience that most wicked men are converted and God hath revealed unto us that the fulnesse of the Gentiles shall come in Rom. 11. and that then shall be the calling of the Iewes therefore wee pray for the fulnesse of the one and of the other but with submission unto the will of God as touching the time of this and the manner how Thirdly and lastly like as it followeth not that because we must pray for all men therefore wee must pray for every man throughout the world in like sort it followeth not that because our Church prescribes us to pray for all Iewes Turks and Infidels therefore it prescribes us to pray for every Iew Turke and Infidel throughout the world and looke what restraint may be laid upon all men the very same restraint of interpretation may be laid upon all Jewes all Turkes and all Insidels Yet you keep your course and tel us that as God made all things without invitation a prettie phrase for them that affect eloquence beyond intelligence out of meere love made nothing hatefull Apply this I pray to devils and see whether we have not as good a ground to pray for them
communication of them also Am. 9. 7. I have withheld the raine from you when there were yet three weekes to the harvest and caused it to raine upon one Citie and caused it not to raine upon another Citie one piece was rained upon and the piece whereon it rained not withered Some dye in their mothers wombe some hanging at their mothers breasts some after a long time are consumed with a lingring death neither is Gods love in Scripture phrase enlarged towards any save towards his elect Thus Iacob was loved but Esau hated Againe what justice doe you devise in God towards his creature Both Vasquez and Suarez concurre in this that the justice of God towards man doth alwaies presuppose his will and God may binde himselfe as he pleaseth by promise But Gods will you say is not the rule of goodnesse because the designes thereof are backt with infinite power Your theame was to prove that Gods will is not the rule of goodnesse when you come to prove it you prove nothing lesse but onely that the cause why Gods will is not the rule of goodnesse is not for that his designes are backt with infinite power This is not to disprove Gods will to be the rule of goodnesse but rather to confirme it for in saying that this or that is not the cause why Gods will is the rule of goodnesse you doe imply that you maintaine that his will is the rule of goodnesse though not for this cause Perhaps you may say They which maintaine Gods will to be the rule of Gods goodnesse doe maintaine it upon no other ground then this to wit Because his designes are backt with infinite power But had it beene so you might have fallen directly upon the overthrowing of such a foundation without carrying it in such a manner as if you would beare the world in hand that your selfe in some sort hold Gods will to bee the rule of goodnesse whereas you mean nothing lesse and therefore in carying your discourse after this manner you betray a faint heart in maintaining the maine Secondly I say it is incredible that any should maintaine Gods will to bee the rule of goodnesse for this cause because his designes are backt with infinite power as much as to say because God can doe what hee will This reason carieth no colour of truth with it for there is no reason why amongst men they that can doe what they will in comparison to other men should therefore bee honester men then other But because God hath infinite lawfull power that extends to every thing that implies no contradiction hence it followeth that whatsoever God doth is good and whatsoever God can doe if it were done by him it should justly be done otherwise hee should have power to be unjust which power in this case should either be in vain because it is not possible that ever it should be actuated or if actuated God should be unjust Holinesse you say doth so rule his power and moderate his will that the one cannot enjoyne or the other exact any thing not most consonant to the eternall or abstract patterns of equitie You take great liberty of discourse throughout What I pray according to our understandings is the subject of Gods holinesse is it not his will And how can his holinesse worke upon his will Doth the heat of fire worke upon the fire or the cold of water worke upon the water Againe here wee have power and will distinguished and the act of injoyning attributed to the one and exacting to the other Both are acts of command now I pray consider doth Gods power command I had thought imperium had beene the proper prerogative of the will yet both these by your discourse are in subjection to the eternall patterns of equity and equity before you confounded with justice Now I know no such justice in God different from his wisedome And herein I am of the same minde with Aquinas Quest. 23. De voluntate Dei Art 6. where hee disputeth this question Utrum justitia in rebus creatis ex simplici divina voluntate dependeat And there hee professeth that Primum ex quo pendet ratio omnis justitiae est sapientia divini intellectus qua res constituit in debita proportione ad se invicem ad suam causam Now let any man name any thing that God can doe and then let him answer me whether God bee not as well able by the infinitie of his wisedome to doe it wisely as by the infinity of his power to doe it at all And marke what in the same place where he seems most to favour your present Tenet Aquinas professeth Quamvis in nobis sit aliud intellectus voluntas secundum rem pro hoc nec idem est voluntas rectitudo voluntatis Deo tamen est idem secundum rein intellectus voluntas propter hoc est idem rectitudo voluntatis ipsa voluntas Although in us the understanding is one thing and the will really another thing whence it is that our will and the rectitude of our will is not the same yet seeing that in God the understanding and the will are really the same hence it is that in God his will and the rectitude of his will are all one But be it that his will is consonant to the eternall or abstract paternes of equitie I pray what more eternall and abstract paterne of equity then this that it is lawfull for God to make the world if he will and not to make it if he will yea and to doe what he will and leave undone what he will I hope the will of God revealed doth as sufficiently warrant all our actions if things are therefore good because God wils them as in case because they are good therefore God willeth them Now the former of these is true without all question in most things for whether the world had beene made sooner or later bigger or lesser more Angels or lesse more spheres or lesse whether they had moved this way they doe or the contrary way whether they should have continued longer or shorter time then they shall all had been received as the good course of Gods providence equally as now it is But here you passe to a point of a farre different nature for it is one thing to enquire whether Gods will be the rule of goodnesse in this sense whether whatsoever God brings to passe in the world is therefore good because God hath done it and a farre different thing to demand whether Gods will be the rule of goodnesse in this sense that whatsoever God commands us in his word for so I understand you when you speake of Gods revealed will it is therefore good because God commandeth it And I give a manifest reason of this difference for before the revelation of Gods word and without that all men naturally are able to discerne between good and evill they knew impiety idolatry profane swearing perjury