nolition of it or the volition of its absence and instead thereof the volition of the universal Good may be called Charity or if there be any fitter Name 3 The third Object causing delight to us is power to do what one pleaseth to make any thing consequent upon ones will of which three degrees Liberty Equality Superiority Now to have pleasure arising from hence the onely Object of our volition is an action of pride the onely Object of our habitual inclination the vice thereof To refuse it as before or will its absence is Humility 4 Mere Activity and Life and that exerted in all the operations of our Souls such as is for example mere Contemplation and Knowledge Sense Imagination strong Passions intense Volitions or Resolutions And because Knowledge may be indefinitely divided according to its Objects here alone may be almost an infinite number of particular Vices and Virtues This Vice and contrary Virtue have no names some kinds of it may 5 Some certain agreeable corporeal Motions or Motions of our Bodies to which our Souls are united suaves Corporis Commotiones as some have called them which I know no common name to signifie them by unless Titillation may be allowed These as Cartes thinks create pleasure to the mind as a natural sign of the health or good constitution of the Body and the pleasures arising in the Soul from them Plato calls 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Pleasures which are conveyed to the Soul by the Body Of this sort are all Sensations amongst which are those of Health Calmness and Serenity other bodily tempers many corporeal passions such as Love Joy Hope Acquiescence c. Nay I may say all perhaps for it may be that some Souls may be delighted with the corporeal passions of Sadness and Grief though in these not onely the Mechanical or Corporeal Vibrations and motions of Fibres Nerves and Spirits delight and please but also the Sense Perception Life and some kind of action of the Soul So that this pleasure is mixed from two very different Objects one Corporeal t'other Intellectual and indeed most of our pleasure or delight ariseth from several Objects mixed and blended together Now to have the pleasure or delight arising from such motions of our Bodies the entire Object of our Volition is an act of Sensuality and to be habitually enclined thereto the Vice But to refuse this Self-pleasure or to will its absence is Sobriety or Temperance 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 6 The perfection of a mans nature of all his Faculties which may be referred to the first and amongst the rest the Rectitude Honesty Probity of his Actions and Inclinations or his Virtue may be and is the cause of great pleasure and delight to him Now even to have this delight usually called the satisfaction of a good Conscience nay let me adde that pleasure which ariseth from hopes and assurance of a reward and from the possession of it too I say to have this the entire Object of our Volition Intention Inclination or in greater proportion to other parts of the Universal Good than it ought is a sin and vice which wants a name as doth its opposite Virtue Finally not to insist upon this distribution I have made which I brought onely for example of some general Heads as many as there are Objects which may please or delight us and consequently correspondent Appetites which are numberless So many sorts of sins or vices may there be they all may be reduced to some general heads and those heads divided and these again subdivided c. 27. Many other distributions of Virtue and Vice may be made as from the parts of the Universal Good distinguished by its Subjects usually comprehended under three viz. God All created or finite Beings besides our selves under the name of our Neighbour though we know little of any other or what we can do to or for them besides Mankind and lastly our selves The Volition of the Universal Good our last end therefore may be resolved into three parts viz. The love of God The love of â—ur Neighbour The love of our selves Or Piety Charity and prudent and sober care of our own greatest concerns And by Love I mean not Gratitude but a Volition of the good of the Object beloved whether the good be an absent or present good To will an absent good and desire it for the person we love can onely take place with respect to our Neighbour and our selves not to God who we know cannot want any thing But to will a present good may be to God also We may will approve rejoyce delight in the infinite perfection and happiness of his nature which he always doth and cannot but possess 28. But these three parts of the Universal Good are always to be intended together actually or habitually although but one of them may be first regarded As when we actually will any good to our Neighbour we ought at least habitually to will it not onely because thereby we do good to him but also because it pleaseth God and it is our own perfection and will be for our own greater good so to do although that we first looked at was our Neighbours good And these three parts are so necessarily and inseparably conjoyned that we may and ought always habitually to believe when we endeavour to effect the one the other will necessarily follow Thus for example to love God the Volition of good to him or the rejoycing in the perfection and happiness of his Nature hath necessarily consequent others and our own Good Because all the happiness of Creatures depends thereon and flows therefrom from his Being and from his most perfect Nature and because it is and will be our greatest Perfection Comfort Reward So again if we sincerely love and do good to our Neighbour we may be sure it pleaseth God and is best for our selves And so Lastly our own greatest good truly as to Intension Extension and Duration or our greatest perfection and happiness is in and by loving of God and doing all the good we can to our Neighbour 29. It may be further observed that all actions and correspondent habits of the Will whatsoever which do effect the Universal good have been used to be called Virtues without any consideration of the end of the Action or the ultimate Object thereof and for distinction-sake may be called instrumental or eventual vertues The other sort of Volitions which have their due end or due ultimate Object considered as such having the name of principal or inherent Virtues So for example to apply the mind to attention and consideration pursuit after or love of the Truth 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 are accounted Virtues because they usually are the causes of good effects in the world more than hurtful ones Such again are to judge rightly and truly especially concerning other men i.e. always onely according to what really appears to us from things themselves not because we imagine so Although the end of
where there is no Law there is no transgression because God himself and his Volition of what is right and just are eternal or the Apostle may mean by Law not strictly an act of some Will concerning anothers Action and Will but an obligation to will or do any thing a 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 a 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Such there always is whenever any will exist being a relation betwen the Will and its due Object the Universal good Besides St. Paul may mean comparatively the Transgression or Sin is much less where there is no express known Law 23. Nor doth the nature of Sin or Virtue depend upon liberum arbitrium or Free-will for whether any Will hath power to determine its own Volition to the greatest or any lesser good or no which I do not deny yet most certainly whenever there is a direction thereof to a lesser good there is a defect in that Volition come it from what cause it will though it should be the effect of some other Being without it which by his power was able so to determine it or suppose any Nature should be eternally and necessarily so constituted 24. It follows likewise that supposing it possible for any Being to have for the Object of his Volition the rectitude the perfection thereof and should not place it in the willing the greatest good but in willing some particular or which is most common some personal good as self-preservation this very Volition would have that defect in it we call Sin and would not be capable of any reward i. e. any thing which should maintain or encourage such an action If it were possible for a man unfeignedly in his Conscience to judge it his bounden duty to desire and pursue always as his ultimate end his own greatest personal good without regard to God or others and accordingly should Will and Act this would be a vitious man And whether God may not by way of punishment for pride c. permit a man so to err is not here to be determined and there have been two pernicious and foolish mistakes if not wilful Errors that men might securely indulge their lusts of some late new Modellers of Morality to which a great part of the ill-nature and debauchery of the Age is to be imputed the one the advancing of their personal good to the place and dignity of the last end of all their actions the other the pitching upon no better than the preservation of life and limb or to enlarge their own Sence the greatest measures of the Conveniencies Comforts and Pleasures proper to this bodily life In these Opinions they have quite perverted the nature of things and made Vice to be Virtue Or because according to the same mens Doctrine every one is necessarily carried to his own greatest good or happiness in general only through ignorance is oft out of the way they have made no Vice at all substituting in its room Folly and Imprudence 25. What hath been said of Volition may be said of Actual and Habitual Inclination and because Volition and Actual Inclination are but sometimes existent in men but Habitual Inclinations constant and perpetual 't is according to this a man is chiefly to be estimated viz. by three things 1. It s direction to its right Object the Universal Good 2. The force and strength thereof 3. It s constancy or frequency in the Soul each of which hath degrees so that it is easie to set down certain rules for the judgment of the goodness or badness of any man For example sake only He is the worst man in the first respect who is habitually inclined to and in love with the meanest or least delectable good in the second respect who is the most vehemently inclined thereto in the third respect who is perpetually or constantly so Contrariwise he is the best who hath the greatest good absolutely or the Eternal Felicity for by Felicity I mean the greatest degree of delight or pleasure as to intension of the Vniverse or all Beings existent for the Object of his Habitual Inclination or who is habitually inclined thereto and that with the greatest force and strength of his nature and then constantly and perpetually It is easie to see what an indefinite number of degrees there are between these two extremes in all the three respects The greatest difficulty is not to know these Rules of our Judgment but to know our selves and consequently to apply them And since Denominatio fit à Majore he only is to be called a good man who hath a stronger and more constant Habitual Inclination to the Universal good than to any one or more particulars And this was or might have been the reason why Martyrdome was so highly esteemed and magnified in the Primitiue Church A Martyr by his suffering for his Faith even though he was not actually Baptized was thought to expiate all former bad life and to be undoubtedly saved or to obtain a most glorious and blissful condition in Heaven because such his suffering death or parting with life itself deemed the greatest personal good amongst men rather than to deny that Truth which they supposed God had commanded to believe and profess and consequently to disobey God was a certain sign and argument of a stronger actual and habitual inclination at that time of his death to obey God and consequently to that which was right just and good than to any other thing in the world besides Nor may it be here amiss to hint how easie it is to understand it possible for this Habitual Inclination Bent and Propension to any certain Object to be so forcible and strong as to be inconsistent with an act of Free Will or choice about that Object nor may a man be able to divert suspend or withhold his actual Volition consent or embrace from it when it is proposed Though by prudent contrivance these Habitual Inclinations generally I do not say all may also by degrees be weakned and at last quite extinguished and destroyed 26. 'T is as easie hence to deduce all particular virtues and vices of which we shall find many to have as yet no Names For one way and the most common is by distinguishing particular delectable Good or Pleasure whether that particular Good be in a mans self or in another as the Subject whether it be mine or anothers but it is usually if not always a mans own from its various Causes or Objects And it seems there may be six general ones I do but now suggest not determine 1 The possession of any Good in general so esteemed many things thus onely please 2 The pain mischief evil suffering of another Whether any Being is of such a temper as to be delighted therewith let others consider but I see no reason why it is not possible Now to will ones delight or pleasure from this Object or Cause is called Malice to be habitually inclined thereto Maliciousness but the renouncing of this or the
these actions may be no other than the pleasure and delight a man takes in such conduct of himself in such temper and actions or some personal and proper good and therefore indeed are inherently vitious according to our sense of Virtue and Vice So likewise Liberality or the distribution of many good things to others considered without its end I mean the inward Volition of so doing or the action of the Will of which the outward bodily action is a Signe and Effect onely and belongs not to this present discourse 30. And 't is here only that it is generally true that Virtus consistit in medio i.e. there may be too much or too little of such actions and habits both which extremes do not effect the Universal good but are of more ill than good consequence Thus for example A man may attend too much sometimes and to some things or too little he may give too much or too little the first of which is called prodigality the second parsimony or covetousness But it is false and absurd to say this of Virtue as it is before defined for there can be no excess therein Nay some of these very actions may have no excess as Justice rightly desined and Faith 31. Those of this sort of actions and habits are called Virtues which are observed and believed to have more good effects than evil ones in the total sum Insomuch that if they have very few more good than bad consequences they are termed mean Virtues as Frugality if very many and great ones then they are called great Virtues such as Justice or giving to every one his due i.e. that to each particular and consequently to ones self also as to quality quantity time and all other respects of giving it which is most for the Universal good Meekness 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 or slowness to be moved to anger or returning evil when provoked by infirmities ill actions or injuries to our selves or others Clemency or an omission of part of punishment Forbearance and long sufferance 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 a delay of punishment or of returning evil for a long time after many injuries Forgiveness or an omission to punish or return any evil for injuries at all Bounty Courage Veracity consent to the Constitution and Administration of Government or entring into a Society where some may be on purpose set apart and appointed for finding out and improving and securing what is for the common benefit of that Society and particularly for the arbitration of all differences which the Jews call 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 〈◊〉 Judges or Government and make it one of the seven Precepts of the Sons of Noah or of those whose advantages of benefit to Mankind were so easily and well known that all men who had the use of Reason and Natural light only allowed and commanded them But there is no greater instrumental or eventual Virtue than Christian Faith or to be a Believer by which I mean Obedience to Jesus in Gods Name which consists of or contains two things 1. An assent to all things Jesus or those commissionated and inspired by him taught and delivered as infallibly true And 2. A practising all he hath commanded Better words than these we have not to express these two particulars by though both indeed are doing and practising commands For the precepts of Christian Faith contain the most sincere and generous and constant inherent Virtue as also the greatest instrumental or eventual ones The very first part alone or Assent is generally in various degrees a great instrumental Virtue Some habits again there are whose advantage of good or bad effects is so uncertain that it is disputed whether they be Virtues or not Some at some times say they are and others say not For example Facetiousness and Taciturnity And for the same reason it is hardly yet determined or determinable whether some dispositions and actions be Vices or Vitious or no viz. because the advantage or excess of good or bad consequences of either side is yet unknown Such perhaps may be Scrupulosity or an aptitude to examine the lawfulness of every the smallest action not in respect of the end only for that is easily known but of the effect which is mostly difficult often impossible to know So also Separation from some particular corrupted Church Some may think Separation some Communion the greatest mischief Such individual actions also may be called indifferent These for their very being such are not by any man to be done at all and a man is always to do that which is not indifferent or to act because he judgeth upon so much consideration as is fit to be allowed or sufficient for things of no more importance that of his action there may be more good than bad consequences and more good consequences than of his omission of it or doing any other action at that time Those actions also are by some termed indifferent which though they are at one time in some circumstances of best effect and therefore to be done yet in others 't is confessed they are not If so there may be a great many degrees of Indifferency Some actions may be more some less indifferent than others in respect of frequency and number of conveniencies or good effects Some may be for the most part of many and great good consequences and effects but seldom of any hurtful ones and those but small and few On the contrary some may more generally be very inconvenient and noxious yet sometimes convenient and useful Some lastly may be near equal All which hindereth not but that every one of these individual actions according as with all their circumstances they are judged to be of most good or bad consequences are as much to be done or not to be done at that particular time as if they were of that sort of actions which were perpetually to be done or abstained from And these are the things generally about which the World with an unproportionate confidence dissent and quarrel and contend unto wounds and death itself 32. Many other are the useful inferences which may be made from these few Observations and many the Questions determined thereby As only for instance sake It is an ordinary Question among the Writers of Ethicks and it may be of some importance whether Virtutes sunt connexae all Virtues are connected so that if there be one in any Subject there are all To which it is easily answered that they are not For it is plain that a man may have a more strong and prevailing habitual inclination to his duty to that which is just and right to please and obey God to the Universal good than to some one or more certain Objects but not than to some other So some men especially if advanced in years may prefer their duty and acting according to Conscience before any sensual pleasures but not before Riches Reputation Dignity Power Self-will c. They may have so little inclination to the former as