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A00671 A treatise of vsurie diuided into three bookes: the first defineth what is vsurie. The second determineth that to be vnlawfull. The third remoueth such motiues as perswade men in this age that it may be lawfull. By Robert Fenton Bachelar of Diuinitie. Fenton, Roger, 1565-1616. 1611 (1611) STC 10806; ESTC S101958 118,517 170

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of as great power beyond Douer as it is on this side for the law of nature and reason is euerie where alike But it is the custome of place and people which addeth power for euen a custome doth bind taking vpon it the nature of a law Ligat consuetudo quatenus interpretatiue lex est Be it custome then or be it a perfect law it must haue a greater power of binding euen as it is a custom or a law thē can alwaies be raised out of the nature of the thing accustomed or imposed For circumstances may so alter the matter as that which is imposed may be sometimes not so conuenient as in common intendment a good law doth presume Yet hath it been euer though more conuenient that some particular inconuenience should bee borne then an ancient custome or law should bee broken And if the binding power of a law should worke no further then the thing it selfe of it selfe doth moue the conscience without a law then were it no power at all but euery mans priuate conscience should haue power to abrogate and disanull as fast as authority doth inact A priuate power then must not abrogate that which is publicke Nihilagit vltra suam speciem but euery priuate man doth stand bound to a humane law vntill the same authoritie which bound him doe absolue him All things therfore considered it is a dangerous conceit to imagine that the power of humane lawes doth extend no further then the qualitie of the thing it selfe doth carie the conscience and so dangerous as if it should take palce it would violate that authority which is the ordinance of God and shake the very pillers of the earth § 2. 2 Then for the penaltie which maketh it a penall law I demand what power that hath to alter the premisses Is the vndergoing of such a penaltie an expiation of the sinne committed in transgressing the law God forbid The least sin deserueth a greater punishment then man can inflict Or hath it a power to dissolue that bond which by vertue of Gods law lieth vpon my conscience Or is it so incorporate into the law that it leaueth a free choice vnto men indifferently either to obserue such an act or to vndergoe such a penaltie Verily this is auerred but the contrarie seemeth vnto me very pregnant vpon these reasons following 1 First to make some way to that which followeth it is much to the preiudice and weakning of good lawes to giue such interpretations as doe dispence with the conscience and set that at libertie For if men be taught to make no conscience of this kind of obedience as God knowes they make but little such lawes shall lie as contemptible in the estimate both of good and bad as well of the obedient as of lawlesse and vnruly people euery man keeping or breaking the same as shall seeme best for his owne priuate aduantage But I would rather thinke and teach that as God Almightie is not an idle beholder of mens affaires but hath a powerfull working in euery action either to effect it or dispose it vnto good so sitting as Dauid speaketh in the parliament or assemblie of gods hee giueth an influence into euery good law enacted and by his owne law bindeth the conscience to the obedience of the fame 2 The end of a law is to withold men from vnlawfull acts such as bee thought vnfit to bee done or suffered in a well established gouernment For if men would of themselues refraine there should be no vse of lawes as the Apostle saith The law is not giuen to the iust man but to the laxlesse and disobedient They be snaffles and bridles to curbe those horses and mules which wil not otherwise be ruled And consequently the end of a penall law is by such a penalty to withhold the disobedient that such people might seele the smart of punishment who haue no sense of conscience First therefore if men would bee good of themselues there should need no lawes Next if men would make a conscience to obey that law which is made there should need no penaltie to be annexed As the law therefore is ordained for good manners so the penaltie is a thing subordinate to the law Now it is premised that euery good law without the penaltie by vertue of Gods law doth bind the conscience shall the penaltie then bee added to disanull that bond shall law and penaltie bee so incorporate and tempered together that the one shall disable the other this is no good morter Wee did rather thinke that penalties were annexed to corroborate and strengthen the law that by punishing transgressors according to the proportion and degree of the offence men might bee the more afraid to offend 3 But to speake in their language who doe vrge this interpretation if a penall law be disiunctiuely to be vnderstood that is either to be obeyed or else to vndergoe such a forfeiture I demand whether of these two is principally intended by the law Doth the statute first intend the penaltie or doth it lie indifferent vnto both alike If either of these then is it an vniust law For a good lawgiuer had rather haue his law kept then broken the reason is because the obseruation or keeping of it is simply good but the punishment of a transgressor hath in it the nature of euill tearmed malum poenae therefore a good intention is first moued vnto that which is good that the law may beekept And in the second place a punishment is intended as it is a remedie against a greater euill then it selfe I stand bound then euen in conscience vnto a good law according to the simple intent of it that is to say not because of the penalty only or to speak in the phrase of the holy Ghost not because of wrath onely which is all one but chiefly that I may performe that good thing which the law doth chiefly intend which if I shall trangresse the penaltie is indeed a satisfaction to that law but no expiation of my sinne of disobedience 4 Last of all that we may cleere this statute of all such imputation a statute which hitherto hath had no blemish cast vpon it being without the compasse and reach of their ordinarie exceptions the opposition to Gods law the abridgement of Christian libertie scandall and such like stones which they vse to fling at lawes If the Statute had any such purpose to make a disiunctiue law how shall that appeare For if it be not expressed then is it by common intendment to be vnderstood according to the premised rules and to put it out of quarrell that the contrary is intended shall appeare by three points within the statute 1 First there is a speciall clause in this statute of Vsurie that it shall bee most largely and strongly construed for the repressing of Vsurie against all persons who shall offend But this construction doth contrariwise giue a liberty to commit Vsurie so a man will
the law So that whosoeuer transgresseth the law transgresseth iustice or charitie though not all alike nor in the same degree of euidence to be discerned but some more obscurely then other which thing begetteth so many difficult cases of iustice in lawes and of conscience in Diuinitie Amongst which this case of vsurie is not the least because the iniquitie of it cannot so easily be discerned as of theft and bare faced robberie whose malice and iniustice doth open it selfe to the first sight And that vsurie is a thing in it selfe inordinate and so consequently opposite to iustice and charitie both shall be more fully expressed when we come to the arguments drawne from those places But our present businesse in this Chapter is to deale with the very text of Scripture the written law of God Their meaning then who would patronize vsurie is this that Gods expresse law against it is not morall binding Christians but iudiciall or politike only framed peculiarly for that Common-wealth of the Iewes Which conceit likewise ouerthroweth that former distinction of biting vsurie for if God in that law doe forbid biting and oppressing vsurie only then is that law morall binding Christians as well as Iewes except they would muzzle the Iewes and giue Christians libertie to bite and oppresse their brethren These groundlesse conceits are built likewise with vntempered morter they ouerthrow one another and themselues When wee looke into the consent of Interpreters wee shall finde no question made but the law against vsurie is morall and as binding as may be Looke into the Prophets and they euer combine this sinne of vsurie with the transgressions of the Morall law in the highest degree with lying backbiting deceit wrong briberie Psalme 15. with Idolatrie oppression adulterie crueltie vnmercifulnesse to the poore bloodshed and murther Ezek. 18. with the profanation of holy things with the abomination of vncleannes with the vnnaturall sinnes of incest Ezek. 22. Vsurie saith S. Basil is placed among the greatest abominations all of them transgressions of the Morall law It is true indeed there is a iudiciall and politique toleration annexed vnto this law that the lewes might take vsurie of strangers but that maketh not the law it selfe iudicial but rather morall The Iewes had a diuorce permitted vnto them in the same book of Moses the next chapter and yet the 7. Commandement to which that belongeth is morall notwithstanding In like manner the Iewes might take vsurie of strangers which was a peculiar toleration for that nation yet the law against vsurie is morall Of which peculiar permission there was speciall cause whether we take it for all strangers in generall or for the Cananites and those who dwelt among them in particular 1. If it was lawfull for Iewes to exact vsurie of all strangers that were not Iewes that was permitted of God as a wise lawgiuer to preuent the greater oppression of his own Church and people For if the Iewes had not had power to haue made their part good with the wicked Gentiles the Gentiles would haue eaten vp Gods people Besides such was the hardnes of Iewish hearts that if they might not haue taken vsurie of strangers they also would haue made a pray euen of their owne brethren Which toleration in ciuill respects might absolue the Iewes in the externall Court but not in the Court of Conscience no more then the toleration of diuorce did dispense with that hardnes of their hearts before God 2. If by stranger in that toleration bee meant onely the remnant of the Cananites as S. Ambrose and Hierome among the ancient Iunius and Tremellius of latter time haue expounded it then is there a more speciall reason of it that they might deuoure them by peece meale whom they could not ouercome at once Whereupon saith S. Ambrose Ab hoc vsuram exige quem non sit crimen occidere Thou maist lawfully take vsurie of him whom thou maist lawfully kill Now when the Cananites were once suppressed we find all vsurie euer after simply forbidden without any such limitation So the Hebrews vnderstood the 15. Psalme as if it were vnlawfull for a Iew in Dauids time to take vsurie of any Gentile Which Lyranus reporteth to be the opinion of Rabbi Salomon and which P. Galatinus noteth to be the iudgement of the Rabbines in generall To which assertion S. Hierome vpon Ezekiel subscribeth In the beginning of the law vsurie is forbidden towards thy brethren in this Prophet towards all Which speciall permission of lending to a stranger be it Cananite or stranger in generall which for the present conclusion I leaue as a thing indifferent doth rather confirme that law whereto it belongeth to bee morall then otherwise and so consequently vsurie to be simply vnlawfull For lawfull things haue no need of permission Last of all let that permission of lending to a stranger passe as nothing concerning Christians because the partition wall being taken away we are all brethren and then the question for the interpretation of the law dependeth chiefly vpon this point how farre that law of Moses against vsurie did binde the Iewes among themselues If all increase aboue the principall then was simply forbidden to the Iewes as is granted by them who make this exception I demaund what warrant Christians haue in assuming greater libertie herein vnto themselues then was granted vnto the Iewes Our Christian libertie I confesse is much greater then theirs was for rites and ceremonies which were shadowes of things then to come as the Apostles doe warrant vs. But for matter of equitie and charitie among brethren God did vse more toleration and conniuencie towards them then he doth toward Christians of right looking for more fruite at our hands then theirs in regard of that Gospell of grace which we doe enioy If that vsurie alone which hath a Neshec or oppression in it was forbidden in the Law as opposite to the rules of iustice and charitie then was not that law iudiciall or peculiar for the Iewes but obligatorie and standing in as full force and vertue amongst Christians as euer it did amongst them So that grant them whatsoeuer they will demaund let them winde themselues which way they list yet the law of God maketh strong against them both in letter and sense condemning all vsurie for a sinne §. 5. As vsurie is a sinne in it selfe by the censure of the text so is it branded by the holy Ghost for a sinne of that nature and degree which doth make shipwrack of conscience the continuance of which sinne cannot stand with the grace and fauor of God For God hath in his law noted this sin amongst others with some special marks of impiety hath sealed his law against vsury with his owne signet and great seale The same motiue which God vseth by way of preface for the keeping of all his Commandements of both tables he hath singled cut and annexed it to this law against